From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86,retpoline: Be sure to emit INT3 after JMP *%\reg
Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2022 10:16:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yxr2TaWaN8VjJ60D@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAADnVQKWTaXFqYri9VG3ux-CJEBsjAP5PetH6Q1ccS8HoeP28g@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Sep 08, 2022 at 07:01:12AM -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> > index c1f6c1c51d99..37f821dee68f 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> > @@ -419,7 +419,8 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip)
> > OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(reg);
> > emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip);
> > } else {
> > - EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg);
> > + EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); /* jmp *%\reg */
> > + EMIT1(0xCC); /* int3 */
>
> Hmm. Why is this unconditional?
> Shouldn't it be guarded with CONFIG_xx or cpu_feature_enabled ?
> People that don't care about hw speculation vulnerabilities
> shouldn't pay the price of increased code size.
Sure, like so then?
---
Subject: x86,retpoline: Be sure to emit INT3 after JMP *%\reg
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2022 12:04:50 +0200
Both AMD and Intel recommend using INT3 after an indirect JMP. Make sure
to emit one when rewriting the retpoline JMP irrespective of compiler
SLS options or even CONFIG_SLS.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 9 +++++++++
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -453,6 +453,15 @@ static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, s
return ret;
i += ret;
+ /*
+ * The compiler is supposed to EMIT an INT3 after every unconditional
+ * JMP instruction due to AMD BTC. However, if the compiler is too old
+ * or SLS isn't enabled, we still need an INT3 after indirect JMPs
+ * even on Intel.
+ */
+ if (op == JMP32_INSN_OPCODE && i < insn->length)
+ bytes[i++] = INT3_INSN_OPCODE;
+
for (; i < insn->length;)
bytes[i++] = BYTES_NOP1;
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -419,7 +419,9 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **ppro
OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(reg);
emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip);
} else {
- EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg);
+ EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); /* jmp *%\reg */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+ EMIT1(0xCC); /* int3 */
}
*pprog = prog;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-09-09 8:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-08 1:34 [PATCH v2 0/2] x86/kprobes: Fixes for CONFIG_RETHUNK Masami Hiramatsu (Google)
2022-09-08 1:34 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/kprobes: Fix kprobes instruction boudary check with CONFIG_RETHUNK Masami Hiramatsu (Google)
2022-09-08 5:08 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-09-08 9:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-09-08 10:04 ` [PATCH] x86,retpoline: Be sure to emit INT3 after JMP *%\reg Peter Zijlstra
2022-09-08 14:01 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-09-09 8:16 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2022-09-09 14:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-09-09 16:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-09-11 15:14 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-09-08 10:08 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/kprobes: Fix kprobes instruction boudary check with CONFIG_RETHUNK Peter Zijlstra
2022-09-08 13:03 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2022-09-08 15:01 ` [PATCH v3 0/2] x86/kprobes: Fixes for CONFIG_RETHUNK Masami Hiramatsu (Google)
2022-09-08 15:01 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] x86/kprobes: Fix kprobes instruction boudary check with CONFIG_RETHUNK Masami Hiramatsu (Google)
2022-09-08 15:01 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] x86/kprobes: Fix optprobe optimization " Masami Hiramatsu (Google)
2022-12-15 3:31 ` Nadav Amit
2022-12-18 14:28 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2022-09-08 19:31 ` [PATCH v3 0/2] x86/kprobes: Fixes for CONFIG_RETHUNK Josh Poimboeuf
2022-09-08 1:34 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/kprobes: Fix optprobe optimization check with CONFIG_RETHUNK Masami Hiramatsu (Google)
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