[PATCH v2 bpf-next 0/4] bpf: Track delta between "linked" registers.

[PATCH v2 bpf-next 0/4] bpf: Track delta between "linked" registers.

[Alexei Starovoitov]

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

v1->v2:
- Fixed find_equal_scalars() logic. off,id,add_const flag must be
  preserved.
- Fixed mark_precise_scalar_ids() that should ignore add_const bit in ID.
- Fixed asm test and added two more tests.
- Gate the feature by cap_bpf.

v1:
Compilers can generate the code
  r1 = r2
  r1 += 0x1
  if r2 < 1000 goto ...
  use knowledge of r2 range in subsequent r1 operations

The "undo" pass was introduced in LLVM
https://reviews.llvm.org/D121937
to prevent this optimization, but it cannot cover all cases.
Instead of fighting middle end optimizer in BPF backend teach the verifier
about this pattern.

The veristat difference:
File                                Program             Insns (A)  Insns (B)  Insns     (DIFF)
----------------------------------  ------------------  ---------  ---------  ----------------
arena_htab.bpf.o                    arena_htab_llvm         18656        747  -17909 (-96.00%)
arena_htab_asm.bpf.o                arena_htab_asm          18523        618  -17905 (-96.66%)
iters.bpf.o                         iter_subprog_iters       1109        981    -128 (-11.54%)
verifier_iterating_callbacks.bpf.o  cond_break2               113        128     +15 (+13.27%)

Alexei Starovoitov (4):
  bpf: Relax tuple len requirement for sk helpers.
  bpf: Track delta between "linked" registers.
  bpf: Support can_loop/cond_break on big endian
  selftests/bpf: Add tests for add_const

 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h                  |  12 +-
 kernel/bpf/log.c                              |   4 +-
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                         |  89 +++++++-
 net/core/filter.c                             |  24 +-
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_experimental.h  |  28 +++
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/arena_htab.c  |  16 +-
 .../bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c  | 208 ++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 353 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: Relax tuple len requirement for sk helpers.

[Alexei Starovoitov]

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

__bpf_skc_lookup() safely handles incorrect values of tuple len,
hence we can allow zero to be passed as tuple len.
This patch alone doesn't make an observable verifier difference.
It's a trivial improvement that might simplify bpf programs.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 net/core/filter.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index 7c46ecba3b01..cb133232a887 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -6815,7 +6815,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skc_lookup_tcp_proto = {
 	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL,
 	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY,
-	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE,
+	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg4_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg5_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
@@ -6834,7 +6834,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_sk_lookup_tcp_proto = {
 	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL,
 	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY,
-	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE,
+	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg4_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg5_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
@@ -6853,7 +6853,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_sk_lookup_udp_proto = {
 	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL,
 	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY,
-	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE,
+	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg4_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg5_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
@@ -6877,7 +6877,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_tc_skc_lookup_tcp_proto = {
 	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL,
 	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY,
-	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE,
+	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg4_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg5_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
@@ -6901,7 +6901,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_tc_sk_lookup_tcp_proto = {
 	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL,
 	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY,
-	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE,
+	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg4_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg5_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
@@ -6925,7 +6925,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_tc_sk_lookup_udp_proto = {
 	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL,
 	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY,
-	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE,
+	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg4_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg5_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
@@ -6963,7 +6963,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_xdp_sk_lookup_udp_proto = {
 	.ret_type       = RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL,
 	.arg1_type      = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
 	.arg2_type      = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY,
-	.arg3_type      = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
+	.arg3_type      = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg4_type      = ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg5_type      = ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
@@ -6987,7 +6987,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_xdp_skc_lookup_tcp_proto = {
 	.ret_type       = RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL,
 	.arg1_type      = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
 	.arg2_type      = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY,
-	.arg3_type      = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
+	.arg3_type      = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg4_type      = ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg5_type      = ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
@@ -7011,7 +7011,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_xdp_sk_lookup_tcp_proto = {
 	.ret_type       = RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL,
 	.arg1_type      = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
 	.arg2_type      = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY,
-	.arg3_type      = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
+	.arg3_type      = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg4_type      = ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg5_type      = ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
@@ -7031,7 +7031,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_sock_addr_skc_lookup_tcp_proto = {
 	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL,
 	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY,
-	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE,
+	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg4_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg5_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
@@ -7050,7 +7050,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_sock_addr_sk_lookup_tcp_proto = {
 	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL,
 	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY,
-	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE,
+	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg4_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg5_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
@@ -7069,7 +7069,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_sock_addr_sk_lookup_udp_proto = {
 	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL,
 	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY,
-	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE,
+	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg4_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg5_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v2 bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Track delta between "linked" registers.

[Alexei Starovoitov]

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

Compilers can generate the code
  r1 = r2
  r1 += 0x1
  if r2 < 1000 goto ...
  use knowledge of r2 range in subsequent r1 operations

So remember constant delta between r2 and r1 and update r1 after 'if' condition.

Unfortunately LLVM still uses this pattern for loops with 'can_loop' construct:
for (i = 0; i < 1000 && can_loop; i++)

The "undo" pass was introduced in LLVM
https://reviews.llvm.org/D121937
to prevent this optimization, but it cannot cover all cases.
Instead of fighting middle end optimizer in BPF backend teach the verifier
about this pattern.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 12 ++++-
 kernel/bpf/log.c             |  4 +-
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c        | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 3 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 50aa87f8d77f..2b54e25d2364 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -73,7 +73,10 @@ enum bpf_iter_state {
 struct bpf_reg_state {
 	/* Ordering of fields matters.  See states_equal() */
 	enum bpf_reg_type type;
-	/* Fixed part of pointer offset, pointer types only */
+	/*
+	 * Fixed part of pointer offset, pointer types only.
+	 * Or constant delta between "linked" scalars with the same ID.
+	 */
 	s32 off;
 	union {
 		/* valid when type == PTR_TO_PACKET */
@@ -167,6 +170,13 @@ struct bpf_reg_state {
 	 * Similarly to dynptrs, we use ID to track "belonging" of a reference
 	 * to a specific instance of bpf_iter.
 	 */
+	/*
+	 * Upper bit of ID is used to remember relationship between "linked"
+	 * registers. Example:
+	 * r1 = r2;    both will have r1->id == r2->id == N
+	 * r1 += 10;   r1->id == N | BPF_ADD_CONST and r1->off == 10
+	 */
+#define BPF_ADD_CONST (1U << 31)
 	u32 id;
 	/* PTR_TO_SOCKET and PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK could be a ptr returned
 	 * from a pointer-cast helper, bpf_sk_fullsock() and
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/log.c b/kernel/bpf/log.c
index 4bd8f17a9f24..3f4ae92e549f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/log.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/log.c
@@ -708,7 +708,9 @@ static void print_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		verbose(env, "%s", btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id));
 	verbose(env, "(");
 	if (reg->id)
-		verbose_a("id=%d", reg->id);
+		verbose_a("id=%d", reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST);
+	if (reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST)
+		verbose(env, "%+d", reg->off);
 	if (reg->ref_obj_id)
 		verbose_a("ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id);
 	if (type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type))
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 81a3d2ced78d..25c74ceddd42 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3991,7 +3991,7 @@ static bool idset_contains(struct bpf_idset *s, u32 id)
 	u32 i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < s->count; ++i)
-		if (s->ids[i] == id)
+		if (s->ids[i] == (id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST))
 			return true;
 
 	return false;
@@ -4001,7 +4001,7 @@ static int idset_push(struct bpf_idset *s, u32 id)
 {
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(s->count >= ARRAY_SIZE(s->ids)))
 		return -EFAULT;
-	s->ids[s->count++] = id;
+	s->ids[s->count++] = id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -4438,8 +4438,20 @@ static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
 static void assign_scalar_id_before_mov(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 					struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
 {
-	if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id &&
-	    !tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off))
+	if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
+		return;
+
+	if (src_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) {
+		/*
+		 * The verifier is processing rX = rY insn and
+		 * rY->id has special linked register already.
+		 * Cleared it, since multiple rX += const are not supported.
+		 */
+		src_reg->id = 0;
+		src_reg->off = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!src_reg->id && !tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off))
 		/* Ensure that src_reg has a valid ID that will be copied to
 		 * dst_reg and then will be used by find_equal_scalars() to
 		 * propagate min/max range.
@@ -14026,6 +14038,7 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg;
 	struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0};
+	bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64);
 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
 	int err;
 
@@ -14048,11 +14061,7 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 
 	if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
 		ptr_reg = dst_reg;
-	else
-		/* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be
-		 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars()
-		 */
-		dst_reg->id = 0;
+
 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
 		src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
 		if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
@@ -14116,7 +14125,41 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
+	err = adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	/*
+	 * Compilers can generate the code
+	 * r1 = r2
+	 * r1 += 0x1
+	 * if r2 < 1000 goto ...
+	 * use r1 in memory access
+	 * So remember constant delta between r2 and r1 and update r1 after
+	 * 'if' condition.
+	 */
+	if (env->bpf_capable && BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD &&
+	    dst_reg->id && is_reg_const(src_reg, alu32)) {
+		u64 val = reg_const_value(src_reg, alu32);
+
+		if ((dst_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) || val > (u32)S32_MAX) {
+			/*
+			 * If the register already went through rX += val
+			 * we cannot accumulate another val into rx->off.
+			 */
+			dst_reg->off = 0;
+			dst_reg->id = 0;
+		} else {
+			dst_reg->id |= BPF_ADD_CONST;
+			dst_reg->off = val;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be
+		 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars()
+		 */
+		dst_reg->id = 0;
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */
@@ -15088,12 +15131,36 @@ static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn,
 static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
 			       struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg)
 {
+	struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg;
 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
 
 	bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({
-		if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id)
+		if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg == known_reg)
+			continue;
+		if ((reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST) != (known_reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST))
+			continue;
+		if ((!(reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) && !(known_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST)) ||
+		    reg->off == known_reg->off) {
+			copy_register_state(reg, known_reg);
+		} else {
+			s32 saved_off = reg->off;
+
+			fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
+			__mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, (s32)reg->off - (s32)known_reg->off);
+
+			/* reg = known_reg; reg += delta */
 			copy_register_state(reg, known_reg);
+			/*
+			 * Must preserve off, id and add_const flag,
+			 * otherwise another find_equal_scalars() will be incorrect.
+			 */
+			reg->off = saved_off;
+
+			scalar32_min_max_add(reg, &fake_reg);
+			scalar_min_max_add(reg, &fake_reg);
+			reg->var_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, fake_reg.var_off);
+		}
 	}));
 }
 
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v2 bpf-next 3/4] bpf: Support can_loop/cond_break on big endian

[Alexei Starovoitov]

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

Add big endian support for can_loop/cond_break macros.

Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_experimental.h  | 28 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_experimental.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_experimental.h
index 3d9e4b8c6b81..82b73c37b50b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_experimental.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_experimental.h
@@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ l_true:												\
 	l_continue:;					\
 	})
 #else
+#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__
 #define can_loop					\
 	({ __label__ l_break, l_continue;		\
 	bool ret = true;				\
@@ -376,6 +377,33 @@ l_true:												\
 	l_break: break;					\
 	l_continue:;					\
 	})
+#else
+#define can_loop					\
+	({ __label__ l_break, l_continue;		\
+	bool ret = true;				\
+	asm volatile goto("1:.byte 0xe5;		\
+		      .byte 0;				\
+		      .long (((%l[l_break] - 1b - 8) / 8) & 0xffff) << 16;	\
+		      .short 0"				\
+		      :::: l_break);			\
+	goto l_continue;				\
+	l_break: ret = false;				\
+	l_continue:;					\
+	ret;						\
+	})
+
+#define cond_break					\
+	({ __label__ l_break, l_continue;		\
+	asm volatile goto("1:.byte 0xe5;		\
+		      .byte 0;				\
+		      .long (((%l[l_break] - 1b - 8) / 8) & 0xffff) << 16;	\
+		      .short 0"				\
+		      :::: l_break);			\
+	goto l_continue;				\
+	l_break: break;					\
+	l_continue:;					\
+	})
+#endif
 #endif
 
 #ifndef bpf_nop_mov
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v2 bpf-next 4/4] selftests/bpf: Add tests for add_const

[Alexei Starovoitov]

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

Improve arena based tests and add several C and asm tests
with specific pattern.
These tests would have failed without add_const verifier support.

Also add several loop_inside_iter*() tests that are not related to add_const,
but nice to have.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/arena_htab.c  |  16 +-
 .../bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c  | 208 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/arena_htab.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/arena_htab.c
index 1e6ac187a6a0..cd598348725e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/arena_htab.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/arena_htab.c
@@ -18,25 +18,35 @@ void __arena *htab_for_user;
 bool skip = false;
 
 int zero = 0;
+char __arena arr1[100000];
+char arr2[1000];
 
 SEC("syscall")
 int arena_htab_llvm(void *ctx)
 {
 #if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST) || defined(BPF_ARENA_FORCE_ASM)
 	struct htab __arena *htab;
+	char __arena *arr = arr1;
 	__u64 i;
 
 	htab = bpf_alloc(sizeof(*htab));
 	cast_kern(htab);
 	htab_init(htab);
 
+	cast_kern(arr);
+
 	/* first run. No old elems in the table */
-	for (i = zero; i < 1000; i++)
+	for (i = zero; i < 100000 && can_loop; i++) {
 		htab_update_elem(htab, i, i);
+		arr[i] = i;
+	}
 
-	/* should replace all elems with new ones */
-	for (i = zero; i < 1000; i++)
+	/* should replace some elems with new ones */
+	for (i = zero; i < 1000 && can_loop; i++) {
 		htab_update_elem(htab, i, i);
+		/* Access mem to make the verifier use bounded loop logic */
+		arr2[i] = i;
+	}
 	cast_user(htab);
 	htab_for_user = htab;
 #else
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c
index bd676d7e615f..627b7f0ca8e1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c
@@ -405,4 +405,212 @@ int cond_break5(const void *ctx)
 	return cnt1 > 1 && cnt2 > 1 ? 1 : 0;
 }
 
+#define ARR2_SZ 1000
+SEC(".data.arr2")
+char arr2[ARR2_SZ];
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success __flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+int loop_inside_iter(const void *ctx)
+{
+	struct bpf_iter_num it;
+	int *v, sum = 0;
+	__u64 i = 0;
+
+	bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, ARR2_SZ);
+	while ((v = bpf_iter_num_next(&it))) {
+		if (i < ARR2_SZ)
+			sum += arr2[i++];
+	}
+	bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it);
+	return sum;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success __flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+int loop_inside_iter_signed(const void *ctx)
+{
+	struct bpf_iter_num it;
+	int *v, sum = 0;
+	long i = 0;
+
+	bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, ARR2_SZ);
+	while ((v = bpf_iter_num_next(&it))) {
+		if (i < ARR2_SZ && i >= 0)
+			sum += arr2[i++];
+	}
+	bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it);
+	return sum;
+}
+
+volatile const int limit = ARR2_SZ;
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success __flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+int loop_inside_iter_volatile_limit(const void *ctx)
+{
+	struct bpf_iter_num it;
+	int *v, sum = 0;
+	__u64 i = 0;
+
+	bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, ARR2_SZ);
+	while ((v = bpf_iter_num_next(&it))) {
+		if (i < limit)
+			sum += arr2[i++];
+	}
+	bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it);
+	return sum;
+}
+
+#define ARR_LONG_SZ 1000
+
+SEC(".data.arr_long")
+long arr_long[ARR_LONG_SZ];
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+int test1(const void *ctx)
+{
+	long i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARR_LONG_SZ && can_loop; i++)
+		arr_long[i] = i;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+int test2(const void *ctx)
+{
+	__u64 i;
+
+	for (i = zero; i < ARR_LONG_SZ && can_loop; i++) {
+		barrier_var(i);
+		arr_long[i] = i;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC(".data.arr_foo")
+struct {
+	int a;
+	int b;
+} arr_foo[ARR_LONG_SZ];
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+int test3(const void *ctx)
+{
+	__u64 i;
+
+	for (i = zero; i < ARR_LONG_SZ && can_loop; i++) {
+		barrier_var(i);
+		arr_foo[i].a = i;
+		arr_foo[i].b = i;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+int test4(const void *ctx)
+{
+	long i;
+
+	for (i = zero + ARR_LONG_SZ - 1; i < ARR_LONG_SZ && i >= 0 && can_loop; i--) {
+		barrier_var(i);
+		arr_foo[i].a = i;
+		arr_foo[i].b = i;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+char buf[10] SEC(".data.buf");
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("check add const")
+__success
+__naked void check_add_const(void)
+{
+	/* typical LLVM generated loop with may_goto */
+	asm volatile ("			\
+	call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];	\
+	if r0 > 9 goto l1_%=;		\
+l0_%=:	r1 = %[buf];			\
+	r2 = r0;			\
+	r1 += r2;			\
+	r3 = *(u8 *)(r1 +0);		\
+	.byte 0xe5; /* may_goto */	\
+	.byte 0; /* regs */		\
+	.short 4; /* off of l1_%=: */	\
+	.long 0; /* imm */		\
+	r0 = r2;			\
+	r0 += 1;			\
+	if r2 < 9 goto l0_%=;		\
+	exit;				\
+l1_%=:	r0 = 0;				\
+	exit;				\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns),
+	  __imm_ptr(buf)
+	: __clobber_common);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("*(u8 *)(r7 +0) = r0")
+__msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=10 off=10 size=1")
+__naked void check_add_const_3regs(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+	"r6 = %[buf];"
+	"r7 = %[buf];"
+	"call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
+	"r1 = r0;"              /* link r0.id == r1.id == r2.id */
+	"r2 = r0;"
+	"r1 += 1;"              /* r1 == r0+1 */
+	"r2 += 2;"              /* r2 == r0+2 */
+	"if r0 > 8 goto 1f;"    /* r0 range [0, 8]  */
+	"r6 += r1;"             /* r1 range [1, 9]  */
+	"r7 += r2;"             /* r2 range [2, 10] */
+	"*(u8 *)(r6 +0) = r0;"  /* safe, within bounds   */
+	"*(u8 *)(r7 +0) = r0;"  /* unsafe, out of bounds */
+	"1: exit;"
+	:
+	: __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns),
+	  __imm_ptr(buf)
+	: __clobber_common);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("*(u8 *)(r8 -1) = r0")
+__msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=10 off=10 size=1")
+__naked void check_add_const_3regs_2if(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+	"r6 = %[buf];"
+	"r7 = %[buf];"
+	"r8 = %[buf];"
+	"call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
+	"if r0 < 2 goto 1f;"
+	"r1 = r0;"              /* link r0.id == r1.id == r2.id */
+	"r2 = r0;"
+	"r1 += 1;"              /* r1 == r0+1 */
+	"r2 += 2;"              /* r2 == r0+2 */
+	"if r2 > 11 goto 1f;"   /* r2 range [0, 11] -> r0 range [-2, 9]; r1 range [-1, 10] */
+	"if r0 s< 0 goto 1f;"   /* r0 range [0, 9] -> r1 range [1, 10]; r2 range [2, 11]; */
+	"r6 += r0;"             /* r0 range [0, 9]  */
+	"r7 += r1;"             /* r1 range [1, 10] */
+	"r8 += r2;"             /* r2 range [2, 11] */
+	"*(u8 *)(r6 +0) = r0;"  /* safe, within bounds   */
+	"*(u8 *)(r7 -1) = r0;"  /* safe */
+	"*(u8 *)(r8 -1) = r0;"  /* unsafe */
+	"1: exit;"
+	:
+	: __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns),
+	  __imm_ptr(buf)
+	: __clobber_common);
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Track delta between "linked" registers.

[Eduard Zingerman]

On Mon, 2024-06-10 at 16:08 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:

[...]

> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> index 50aa87f8d77f..2b54e25d2364 100644
> --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> @@ -73,7 +73,10 @@ enum bpf_iter_state {
>  struct bpf_reg_state {
>  	/* Ordering of fields matters.  See states_equal() */
>  	enum bpf_reg_type type;
> -	/* Fixed part of pointer offset, pointer types only */
> +	/*
> +	 * Fixed part of pointer offset, pointer types only.
> +	 * Or constant delta between "linked" scalars with the same ID.
> +	 */
>  	s32 off;

After thinking about this some more I came to conclusion that ->off
has to be checked for scalar registers in regsafe().
Otherwise the following test is marked as safe:

char buf[10] SEC(".data.buf");

SEC("socket")
__failure
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
__naked void check_add_const_regsafe_off(void)
{
	asm volatile (
	"r8 = %[buf];"
	"call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
	"r6 = r0;"
	"call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
	"r7 = r0;"
	"call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
	"r1 = r0;"		/* same ids for r1 and r0 */
	"if r6 > r7 goto 1f;"	/* this jump can't be predicted */
	"r1 += 1;"		/* r1.off == +1 */
	"goto 2f;"
	"1: r1 += 100;"		/* r1.off == +100 */
	"goto +0;"		/* force checkpoint, must verify r1.off in regsafe() here */
	"2: if r0 > 8 goto 3f;"	/* r0 range [0,8], r1 range either [1,9] or [100,108]*/
	"r8 += r1;"
	"*(u8 *)(r8 +0) = r0;"	/* potentially unsafe, buf size is 10 */
	"3: exit;"
	:
	: __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns),
	  __imm_ptr(buf)
	: __clobber_common);
}

Sorry for missing this yesterday.
Something like below is necessary.
(To trigger ((rold->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) != (rcur->id & BPF_ADD_CONST))
 a variation of the test where r1 += 1 is not done is necessary).

---

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index ad11e5441860..70e44fa4f765 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -16797,6 +16797,10 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
                }
                if (!rold->precise && exact == NOT_EXACT)
                        return true;
+               if ((rold->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) != (rcur->id & BPF_ADD_CONST))
+                       return false;
+               if ((rold->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) && (rold->off != rcur->off))
+                       return false;
                /* Why check_ids() for scalar registers?
                 *
                 * Consider the following BPF code:

Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: Relax tuple len requirement for sk helpers.

[Eduard Zingerman]

On Mon, 2024-06-10 at 16:08 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> 
> __bpf_skc_lookup() safely handles incorrect values of tuple len,
> hence we can allow zero to be passed as tuple len.
> This patch alone doesn't make an observable verifier difference.
> It's a trivial improvement that might simplify bpf programs.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> ---

All seems correct.

Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>

Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Track delta between "linked" registers.

[Alexei Starovoitov]

On Tue, Jun 11, 2024 at 1:09 PM Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 2024-06-10 at 16:08 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>
> [...]
>
> > diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> > index 50aa87f8d77f..2b54e25d2364 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> > @@ -73,7 +73,10 @@ enum bpf_iter_state {
> >  struct bpf_reg_state {
> >       /* Ordering of fields matters.  See states_equal() */
> >       enum bpf_reg_type type;
> > -     /* Fixed part of pointer offset, pointer types only */
> > +     /*
> > +      * Fixed part of pointer offset, pointer types only.
> > +      * Or constant delta between "linked" scalars with the same ID.
> > +      */
> >       s32 off;
>
> After thinking about this some more I came to conclusion that ->off
> has to be checked for scalar registers in regsafe().
> Otherwise the following test is marked as safe:
>
> char buf[10] SEC(".data.buf");
>
> SEC("socket")
> __failure
> __flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
> __naked void check_add_const_regsafe_off(void)
> {
>         asm volatile (
>         "r8 = %[buf];"
>         "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
>         "r6 = r0;"
>         "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
>         "r7 = r0;"
>         "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
>         "r1 = r0;"              /* same ids for r1 and r0 */
>         "if r6 > r7 goto 1f;"   /* this jump can't be predicted */
>         "r1 += 1;"              /* r1.off == +1 */
>         "goto 2f;"
>         "1: r1 += 100;"         /* r1.off == +100 */
>         "goto +0;"              /* force checkpoint, must verify r1.off in regsafe() here */

The goto +0 is unnecessary. It will force a checkpoint at the target.
Which is the next insn, but the next insn is 'if' already
which will be marked as a checkpoint.

But I'll keep it in the next version, since it makes the verifier log
easier to read.
Without goto +0 the verifier doesn't have a chance to print
the value of R1 after addition.
I'll only adjust the comment to say
/* verify r1.off in regsafe() after this insn */

>         "2: if r0 > 8 goto 3f;" /* r0 range [0,8], r1 range either [1,9] or [100,108]*/
>         "r8 += r1;"
>         "*(u8 *)(r8 +0) = r0;"  /* potentially unsafe, buf size is 10 */
>         "3: exit;"
>         :
>         : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns),
>           __imm_ptr(buf)
>         : __clobber_common);
> }
>
> Sorry for missing this yesterday.
> Something like below is necessary.
> (To trigger ((rold->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) != (rcur->id & BPF_ADD_CONST))
>  a variation of the test where r1 += 1 is not done is necessary).

Yes. Will copy paste into another test.

>
> ---
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index ad11e5441860..70e44fa4f765 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -16797,6 +16797,10 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
>                 }
>                 if (!rold->precise && exact == NOT_EXACT)
>                         return true;
> +               if ((rold->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) != (rcur->id & BPF_ADD_CONST))
> +                       return false;
> +               if ((rold->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) && (rold->off != rcur->off))
> +                       return false;

Thanks for the diff.
I haven't considered the case where explored state have
R1=Pscalar(id=3)
and its boundaries were not adjusted by later find_equal_scalars().
Only precision was propagated.
And it will incorrectly match in regsafe() to current
R1=scalar(id=3+any)