* [PATCH 2/3] implement some resilience against pack corruptions
@ 2008-06-24 1:23 Nicolas Pitre
2008-06-24 1:33 ` Shawn O. Pearce
2008-06-24 4:49 ` Junio C Hamano
0 siblings, 2 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Nicolas Pitre @ 2008-06-24 1:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Junio C Hamano; +Cc: git
We should be able to fall back to loose objects or alternative packs when
a pack becomes corrupted. This is especially true when an object exists
in one pack only as a delta but its base object is corrupted. Currently
there is no way to retrieve the former object even if the later is
available in another pack or loose.
This patch allows for a delta to be resolved (with a performance cost)
using a base object from a source other than the pack where that delta
is located. Same thing for non-delta objects: rather than failing
outright, a search is made in other packs or used loose when the
currently active pack has it but corrupted.
Of course git will become extremely noisy with error messages when that
happens. However, if the operation succeeds nevertheless, a simple
'git repack -a -f -d' will "fix" the corrupted repository given that all
corrupted objects have a good duplicate somewhere in the object store,
possibly manually copied from another source.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org>
---
Yes I've been bitten by the corruption described above...
cache.h | 2 +
sha1_file.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
2 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cache.h b/cache.h
index a0688c6..8ad29e3 100644
--- a/cache.h
+++ b/cache.h
@@ -645,6 +645,8 @@ extern struct packed_git {
const void *index_data;
size_t index_size;
uint32_t num_objects;
+ uint32_t num_bad_objects;
+ unsigned char *bad_object_sha1;
int index_version;
time_t mtime;
int pack_fd;
diff --git a/sha1_file.c b/sha1_file.c
index fe4ee3e..ffd31c6 100644
--- a/sha1_file.c
+++ b/sha1_file.c
@@ -818,6 +818,8 @@ struct packed_git *add_packed_git(const char *path, int path_len, int local)
p->index_data = NULL;
p->index_size = 0;
p->num_objects = 0;
+ p->num_bad_objects = 0;
+ p->bad_object_sha1 = NULL;
p->pack_size = st.st_size;
p->next = NULL;
p->windows = NULL;
@@ -982,6 +984,18 @@ void reprepare_packed_git(void)
prepare_packed_git();
}
+static void mark_bad_packed_object(struct packed_git *p,
+ const unsigned char *sha1)
+{
+ unsigned i;
+ for (i = 0; i < p->num_bad_objects; i++)
+ if (!hashcmp(sha1, p->bad_object_sha1 + 20 * i))
+ return;
+ p->bad_object_sha1 = xrealloc(p->bad_object_sha1, 20 * (p->num_bad_objects + 1));
+ hashcpy(p->bad_object_sha1 + 20 * p->num_bad_objects, sha1);
+ p->num_bad_objects++;
+}
+
int check_sha1_signature(const unsigned char *sha1, void *map, unsigned long size, const char *type)
{
unsigned char real_sha1[20];
@@ -1300,20 +1314,17 @@ static off_t get_delta_base(struct packed_git *p,
while (c & 128) {
base_offset += 1;
if (!base_offset || MSB(base_offset, 7))
- die("offset value overflow for delta base object");
+ return 0; /* overflow */
c = base_info[used++];
base_offset = (base_offset << 7) + (c & 127);
}
base_offset = delta_obj_offset - base_offset;
if (base_offset >= delta_obj_offset)
- die("delta base offset out of bound");
+ return 0; /* out of bound */
*curpos += used;
} else if (type == OBJ_REF_DELTA) {
/* The base entry _must_ be in the same pack */
base_offset = find_pack_entry_one(base_info, p);
- if (!base_offset)
- die("failed to find delta-pack base object %s",
- sha1_to_hex(base_info));
*curpos += 20;
} else
die("I am totally screwed");
@@ -1406,6 +1417,9 @@ const char *packed_object_info_detail(struct packed_git *p,
return typename(type);
case OBJ_OFS_DELTA:
obj_offset = get_delta_base(p, &w_curs, &curpos, type, obj_offset);
+ if (!obj_offset)
+ die("pack %s contains bad delta base reference",
+ p->pack_name, type);
if (*delta_chain_length == 0) {
revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, obj_offset);
hashcpy(base_sha1, nth_packed_object_sha1(p, revidx->nr));
@@ -1600,17 +1614,41 @@ static void *unpack_delta_entry(struct packed_git *p,
off_t base_offset;
base_offset = get_delta_base(p, w_curs, &curpos, *type, obj_offset);
+ if (!base_offset) {
+ error("failed to validate delta base reference "
+ "at offset %"PRIuMAX" from %s",
+ (uintmax_t)curpos, p->pack_name);
+ return NULL;
+ }
base = cache_or_unpack_entry(p, base_offset, &base_size, type, 0);
- if (!base)
- die("failed to read delta base object"
- " at %"PRIuMAX" from %s",
- (uintmax_t)base_offset, p->pack_name);
+ if (!base) {
+ /*
+ * We're probably in deep shit, but let's try to fetch
+ * the required base anyway from another pack or loose.
+ * This is costly but should happen only in the presence
+ * of a corrupted pack, and is better than failing outright.
+ */
+ struct revindex_entry *revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, base_offset);
+ const unsigned char *base_sha1 =
+ nth_packed_object_sha1(p, revidx->nr);
+ error("failed to read delta base object %s"
+ " at offset %"PRIuMAX" from %s",
+ sha1_to_hex(base_sha1), (uintmax_t)base_offset,
+ p->pack_name);
+ mark_bad_packed_object(p, base_sha1);
+ base = read_sha1_file(base_sha1, type, &base_size);
+ if (!base)
+ return NULL;
+ }
delta_data = unpack_compressed_entry(p, w_curs, curpos, delta_size);
- if (!delta_data)
- die("failed to unpack compressed delta"
- " at %"PRIuMAX" from %s",
- (uintmax_t)curpos, p->pack_name);
+ if (!delta_data) {
+ error("failed to unpack compressed delta "
+ "at offset %"PRIuMAX" from %s",
+ (uintmax_t)curpos, p->pack_name);
+ free(base);
+ return NULL;
+ }
result = patch_delta(base, base_size,
delta_data, delta_size,
sizep);
@@ -1642,7 +1680,9 @@ void *unpack_entry(struct packed_git *p, off_t obj_offset,
data = unpack_compressed_entry(p, &w_curs, curpos, *sizep);
break;
default:
- die("unknown object type %i in %s", *type, p->pack_name);
+ data = NULL;
+ error("unknown object type %i at offset %"PRIuMAX" in %s",
+ *type, (uintmax_t)obj_offset, p->pack_name);
}
unuse_pack(&w_curs);
return data;
@@ -1788,6 +1828,13 @@ static int find_pack_entry(const unsigned char *sha1, struct pack_entry *e, cons
goto next;
}
+ if (p->num_bad_objects) {
+ unsigned i;
+ for (i = 0; i < p->num_bad_objects; i++)
+ if (!hashcmp(sha1, p->bad_object_sha1 + 20 * i))
+ goto next;
+ }
+
offset = find_pack_entry_one(sha1, p);
if (offset) {
/*
@@ -1872,11 +1919,24 @@ static void *read_packed_sha1(const unsigned char *sha1,
enum object_type *type, unsigned long *size)
{
struct pack_entry e;
+ void *data;
if (!find_pack_entry(sha1, &e, NULL))
return NULL;
- else
- return cache_or_unpack_entry(e.p, e.offset, size, type, 1);
+ data = cache_or_unpack_entry(e.p, e.offset, size, type, 1);
+ if (!data) {
+ /*
+ * We're probably in deep shit, but let's try to fetch
+ * the required object anyway from another pack or loose.
+ * This should happen only in the presence of a corrupted
+ * pack, and is better than failing outright.
+ */
+ error("failed to read object %s at offset %"PRIuMAX" from %s",
+ sha1_to_hex(sha1), (uintmax_t)e.offset, e.p->pack_name);
+ mark_bad_packed_object(e.p, sha1);
+ data = read_sha1_file(sha1, type, size);
+ }
+ return data;
}
/*
--
1.5.6.GIT
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 2/3] implement some resilience against pack corruptions
2008-06-24 1:23 [PATCH 2/3] implement some resilience against pack corruptions Nicolas Pitre
@ 2008-06-24 1:33 ` Shawn O. Pearce
2008-06-24 2:20 ` Nicolas Pitre
2008-06-24 4:49 ` Junio C Hamano
1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Shawn O. Pearce @ 2008-06-24 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nicolas Pitre; +Cc: Junio C Hamano, git
Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> wrote:
> We should be able to fall back to loose objects or alternative packs when
> a pack becomes corrupted. This is especially true when an object exists
> in one pack only as a delta but its base object is corrupted. Currently
> there is no way to retrieve the former object even if the later is
> available in another pack or loose.
Dang, nice timing Nico. We were bitten by something like this at
day-job a couple of weeks back. Adding this sort of support went
onto my internal todo-list. I'm glad you beat me to it. :)
> Yes I've been bitten by the corruption described above...
But sorry to hear about this.
As usual for your patches, the implementation looks quite sane.
Thanks for taking care of it.
--
Shawn.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/3] implement some resilience against pack corruptions
2008-06-24 1:33 ` Shawn O. Pearce
@ 2008-06-24 2:20 ` Nicolas Pitre
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Nicolas Pitre @ 2008-06-24 2:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Shawn O. Pearce; +Cc: Junio C Hamano, git
On Mon, 23 Jun 2008, Shawn O. Pearce wrote:
> Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> wrote:
> > We should be able to fall back to loose objects or alternative packs when
> > a pack becomes corrupted. This is especially true when an object exists
> > in one pack only as a delta but its base object is corrupted. Currently
> > there is no way to retrieve the former object even if the later is
> > available in another pack or loose.
>
> Dang, nice timing Nico. We were bitten by something like this at
> day-job a couple of weeks back. Adding this sort of support went
> onto my internal todo-list. I'm glad you beat me to it. :)
>
> > Yes I've been bitten by the corruption described above...
>
> But sorry to hear about this.
Well, this is fixed now. So the theory worked. ;-)
Nicolas
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/3] implement some resilience against pack corruptions
2008-06-24 1:23 [PATCH 2/3] implement some resilience against pack corruptions Nicolas Pitre
2008-06-24 1:33 ` Shawn O. Pearce
@ 2008-06-24 4:49 ` Junio C Hamano
1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Junio C Hamano @ 2008-06-24 4:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nicolas Pitre; +Cc: git
Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> writes:
> We should be able to fall back to loose objects or alternative packs when
> a pack becomes corrupted. This is especially true when an object exists
> in one pack only as a delta but its base object is corrupted. Currently
> there is no way to retrieve the former object even if the later is
> available in another pack or loose.
All three patches applied, but with the following squashed in. Thanks
sha1_file.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sha1_file.c b/sha1_file.c
index a5cef94..9330bc4 100644
--- a/sha1_file.c
+++ b/sha1_file.c
@@ -1418,8 +1418,8 @@ const char *packed_object_info_detail(struct packed_git *p,
case OBJ_OFS_DELTA:
obj_offset = get_delta_base(p, &w_curs, &curpos, type, obj_offset);
if (!obj_offset)
- die("pack %s contains bad delta base reference",
- p->pack_name, type);
+ die("pack %s contains bad delta base reference of type %s",
+ p->pack_name, typename(type));
if (*delta_chain_length == 0) {
revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, obj_offset);
hashcpy(base_sha1, nth_packed_object_sha1(p, revidx->nr));
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2008-06-24 4:51 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2008-06-24 1:23 [PATCH 2/3] implement some resilience against pack corruptions Nicolas Pitre
2008-06-24 1:33 ` Shawn O. Pearce
2008-06-24 2:20 ` Nicolas Pitre
2008-06-24 4:49 ` Junio C Hamano
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox