From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>,
"Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE 32-BIT AND 64-BIT" <x86@kernel.org>,
"open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE 32-BIT AND 64-BIT"
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
"open list:DRM DRIVERS" <dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
"open list:INTEL GVT-g DRIVERS Intel GPU Virtualization"
<intel-gvt-dev@lists.freedesktop.org>,
"open list:INTEL DRM DRIVERS excluding Poulsbo, Moorestow...,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>,
\"H. Peter Anvin\" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>" <intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 27/30] KVM: x86: add force_intercept_exceptions_mask
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 17:28:44 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220207152847.836777-28-mlevitsk@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220207152847.836777-1-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
This parameter will be used by VMX and SVM code to force
interception of a set of exceptions, given by a bitmask
for guest debug and/or kvm debug.
This is based on an idea first shown here:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/kvm/patch/20160301192822.GD22677@pd.tnic/
CC: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 7 +++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 +++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 5 +++++
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 428ab1cc7dd34..fa498612839a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1168,6 +1168,13 @@ struct kvm_arch {
struct kvm_pmu_event_filter __rcu *pmu_event_filter;
struct task_struct *nx_lpage_recovery_thread;
+ /*
+ * Bitmask of exceptions that KVM will intercept
+ * and forward to the guest, even if that is not needed
+ * for normal operation. Debug feature.
+ */
+ u32 force_intercept_exceptions_bitmask;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Whether the TDP MMU is enabled for this VM. This contains a
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 63d84c373e465..202c34697852f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -193,6 +193,13 @@ module_param(enable_pmu, bool, 0444);
bool __read_mostly eager_page_split = true;
module_param(eager_page_split, bool, 0644);
+/*
+ * force_intercept_exceptions_mask is a writable param and its value
+ * is snapshotted when a VM is created
+ */
+static uint force_intercept_exceptions_mask;
+module_param(force_intercept_exceptions_mask, uint, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+
/*
* Restoring the host value for MSRs that are only consumed when running in
* usermode, e.g. SYSCALL MSRs and TSC_AUX, can be deferred until the CPU
@@ -11646,6 +11653,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock, flags);
kvm->arch.guest_can_read_msr_platform_info = true;
+ kvm->arch.force_intercept_exceptions_bitmask = force_intercept_exceptions_mask;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
spin_lock_init(&kvm->arch.hv_root_tdp_lock);
@@ -12886,6 +12894,7 @@ int kvm_sev_es_string_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int size,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_sev_es_string_io);
+
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_entry);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_exit);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fast_mmio);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index e9b303b21f173..34f96f483c7e5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ static inline bool kvm_exception_is_soft(unsigned int nr)
return (nr == BP_VECTOR) || (nr == OF_VECTOR);
}
+static inline bool kvm_is_exception_force_intercepted(struct kvm *kvm, int exception)
+{
+ return kvm->arch.force_intercept_exceptions_bitmask & BIT(exception);
+}
+
static inline bool is_protmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_PE);
--
2.26.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-07 15:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-07 15:28 [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 00/30] My patch queue Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 01/30] KVM: x86: SVM: don't passthrough SMAP/SMEP/PKE bits in !NPT && !gCR0.PG case Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 02/30] KVM: x86: nSVM: fix potential NULL derefernce on nested migration Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 03/30] KVM: x86: nSVM: mark vmcb01 as dirty when restoring SMM saved state Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 04/30] KVM: x86: nSVM/nVMX: set nested_run_pending on VM entry which is a result of RSM Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 05/30] KVM: x86: nSVM: expose clean bit support to the guest Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 06/30] KVM: x86: mark syntethic SMM vmexit as SVM_EXIT_SW Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 07/30] KVM: x86: nSVM: deal with L1 hypervisor that intercepts interrupts but lets L2 control them Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 08/30] KVM: x86: lapic: don't touch irr_pending in kvm_apic_update_apicv when inhibiting it Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 09/30] KVM: x86: SVM: move avic definitions from AMD's spec to svm.h Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 10/30] KVM: x86: SVM: fix race between interrupt delivery and AVIC inhibition Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 11/30] KVM: x86: SVM: use vmcb01 in avic_init_vmcb Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 12/30] KVM: x86: SVM: allow AVIC to co-exist with a nested guest running Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 13/30] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change APIC ID when apic acceleration is enabled Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 14/30] KVM: x86: lapic: don't allow to change local apic id when using older x2apic api Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 15/30] KVM: x86: SVM: remove avic's broken code that updated APIC ID Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 16/30] KVM: x86: SVM: allow to force AVIC to be enabled Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 17/30] KVM: x86: mmu: trace kvm_mmu_set_spte after the new SPTE was set Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 18/30] KVM: x86: mmu: add strict mmu mode Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 19/30] KVM: x86: mmu: add gfn_in_memslot helper Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 20/30] KVM: x86: mmu: allow to enable write tracking externally Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 21/30] x86: KVMGT: use kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enable Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 22/30] KVM: x86: nSVM: correctly virtualize LBR msrs when L2 is running Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 23/30] KVM: x86: nSVM: implement nested LBR virtualization Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 24/30] KVM: x86: nSVM: implement nested VMLOAD/VMSAVE Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 25/30] KVM: x86: nSVM: support PAUSE filter threshold and count when cpu_pm=on Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 26/30] KVM: x86: nSVM: implement nested vGIF Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` Maxim Levitsky [this message]
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 28/30] KVM: SVM: implement force_intercept_exceptions_mask Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 29/30] KVM: VMX: " Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:28 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 30/30] KVM: x86: get rid of KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES Maxim Levitsky
2022-02-07 15:43 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for My patch queue Patchwork
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