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* [patch 2/2] staging: lustre: validate size in ll_setxattr()
@ 2014-10-22  8:12 Dan Carpenter
  2014-10-22 10:32 ` Dan Carpenter
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Dan Carpenter @ 2014-10-22  8:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: kernel-janitors

If size is smaller than the lov_user_md struct then we are reading
beyond the end of the buffer.  I guess this is an information leak or it
could cause an Oops if the memory is not mapped.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
---
This was discovered through a code audit.  I'm not terribly familiar
with this code and I haven't tested it.  Please review it carefully.

diff --git a/drivers/staging/lustre/lustre/llite/xattr.c b/drivers/staging/lustre/lustre/llite/xattr.c
index 252a619..75abb97 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/lustre/lustre/llite/xattr.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/lustre/lustre/llite/xattr.c
@@ -223,6 +223,9 @@ int ll_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	CDEBUG(D_VFSTRACE, "VFS Op:inode=%lu/%u(%p), xattr %s\n",
 	       inode->i_ino, inode->i_generation, inode, name);
 
+	if (size != 0 && size < sizeof(struct lov_user_md))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ll_stats_ops_tally(ll_i2sbi(inode), LPROC_LL_SETXATTR, 1);
 
 	if ((strncmp(name, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX,

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2014-10-22 14:09 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2014-10-22  8:12 [patch 2/2] staging: lustre: validate size in ll_setxattr() Dan Carpenter
2014-10-22 10:32 ` Dan Carpenter
2014-10-22 13:53 ` Drokin, Oleg
2014-10-22 14:09 ` Dan Carpenter

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