[PATCH V40 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down

[PATCH V40 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down

[Matthew Garrett]

From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>

The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary
code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It
makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation.

This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a
signature on the image to be booted.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 include/linux/security.h     | 1 +
 kernel/kexec.c               | 8 ++++++++
 security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 +
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index e5dd446ef35b..b607a8ac97fe 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
 	LOCKDOWN_NONE,
 	LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
 	LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM,
+	LOCKDOWN_KEXEC,
 	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
 	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
 };
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 1b018f1a6e0d..bc933c0db9bf 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -205,6 +205,14 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
 	if (result < 0)
 		return result;
 
+	/*
+	 * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so
+	 * prevent loading in that case
+	 */
+	result = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
+	if (result)
+		return result;
+
 	/*
 	 * Verify we have a legal set of flags
 	 * This leaves us room for future extensions.
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 240ecaa10a1d..aaf30ad351f9 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
 	[LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
 	[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
 	[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
+	[LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
 	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
 	[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
 };
-- 
2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog


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[PATCH V40 07/29] lockdown: Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot

[Matthew Garrett]

From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>

Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load.  In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot.

Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original
kernel.

secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub.  Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.

Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index f03237e3f192..5d64a22f99ce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
 	if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
 		return 0;
 
+	params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot;
 	ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
 	ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
 	ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
-- 
2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog


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[PATCH V40 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE

[Matthew Garrett]

From: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>

This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown.  A locked down
kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with
kexec_file_load().  Currently, the only way to force the signature
verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG.  This prevents loading
usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime.

This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.
Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG
turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be
loaded.  KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                      |  6 +--
 arch/s390/Kconfig                       |  2 +-
 arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig       |  2 +-
 arch/s390/configs/defconfig             |  2 +-
 arch/s390/configs/performance_defconfig |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/kexec_elf.c            |  4 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/kexec_image.c          |  4 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c   |  4 +-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                        | 20 ++++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c              |  4 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c  |  4 +-
 include/linux/kexec.h                   |  4 +-
 kernel/kexec_file.c                     | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig          |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c       |  2 +-
 15 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 697ea0510729..f940500a941b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
 	  for kernel and initramfs as opposed to list of segments as
 	  accepted by previous system call.
 
-config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
 	depends on KEXEC_FILE
 	help
@@ -976,13 +976,13 @@ config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
 config KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
 	bool "Enable Image signature verification support"
 	default y
-	depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+	depends on KEXEC_SIG
 	depends on EFI && SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
 	help
 	  Enable Image signature verification support.
 
 comment "Support for PE file signature verification disabled"
-	depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+	depends on KEXEC_SIG
 	depends on !EFI || !SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
 
 config CRASH_DUMP
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 109243fdb6ec..c4a423f30d49 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 	def_bool y
 	depends on KEXEC_FILE
 
-config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
 	depends on KEXEC_FILE && SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
 	help
diff --git a/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig b/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig
index b0920b35f87b..525e0a6addb9 100644
--- a/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ CONFIG_NUMA=y
 CONFIG_PREEMPT=y
 CONFIG_HZ_100=y
 CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE=y
-CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG=y
+CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG=y
 CONFIG_EXPOLINE=y
 CONFIG_EXPOLINE_AUTO=y
 CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG=y
diff --git a/arch/s390/configs/defconfig b/arch/s390/configs/defconfig
index c59b922cb6c5..4c37279acdb4 100644
--- a/arch/s390/configs/defconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/configs/defconfig
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ CONFIG_NR_CPUS=256
 CONFIG_NUMA=y
 CONFIG_HZ_100=y
 CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE=y
-CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG=y
+CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG=y
 CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y
 CONFIG_HIBERNATION=y
 CONFIG_PM_DEBUG=y
diff --git a/arch/s390/configs/performance_defconfig b/arch/s390/configs/performance_defconfig
index 09aa5cb14873..158ad0f0d433 100644
--- a/arch/s390/configs/performance_defconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/configs/performance_defconfig
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ CONFIG_NR_CPUS=512
 CONFIG_NUMA=y
 CONFIG_HZ_100=y
 CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE=y
-CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG=y
+CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG=y
 CONFIG_EXPOLINE=y
 CONFIG_EXPOLINE_AUTO=y
 CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG=y
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_elf.c b/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_elf.c
index 6d0635ceddd0..9b4f37a4edf1 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_elf.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_elf.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int s390_elf_probe(const char *buf, unsigned long len)
 const struct kexec_file_ops s390_kexec_elf_ops = {
 	.probe = s390_elf_probe,
 	.load = s390_elf_load,
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC__SIG
 	.verify_sig = s390_verify_sig,
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 };
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_image.c
index 58318bf89fd9..af23eff5774d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_image.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_image.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static int s390_image_probe(const char *buf, unsigned long len)
 const struct kexec_file_ops s390_kexec_image_ops = {
 	.probe = s390_image_probe,
 	.load = s390_image_load,
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 	.verify_sig = s390_verify_sig,
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 };
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index fbdd3ea73667..c0f33ba49a9a 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
 	NULL,
 };
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 /*
  * Module signature information block.
  *
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
 				      NULL, NULL);
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
 static int kexec_file_update_purgatory(struct kimage *image,
 				       struct s390_load_data *data)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 2bbbd4d1ba31..cd41998aa6e6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2006,20 +2006,30 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
 config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
 
-config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
 	depends on KEXEC_FILE
 	---help---
-	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
-	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
 
-	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
+	  This option makes the kexec_file_load() syscall check for a valid
+	  signature of the kernel image.  The image can still be loaded without
+	  a valid signature unless you also enable KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, though if
+	  there's a signature that we can check, then it must be valid.
+
+	  In addition to this option, you need to enable signature
 	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
 	  loaded in order for this to work.
 
+config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
+	bool "Require a valid signature in kexec_file_load() syscall"
+	depends on KEXEC_SIG
+	---help---
+	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
+	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
+
 config KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
 	bool "Enable bzImage signature verification support"
-	depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+	depends on KEXEC_SIG
 	depends on SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
 	select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	---help---
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
index 64b973f0e985..b98890894731 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
@@ -66,9 +66,9 @@ bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
 
 /* secureboot arch rules */
 static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
-#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG)
+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
 	"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 	"measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
 #if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
 	"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index 3b303fe2f061..cc9dbcecaaca 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
 
 	if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) {
 		pr_debug("Unsigned PE binary\n");
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		return -ENODATA;
 	}
 
 	chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address,
@@ -403,6 +403,8 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
  *  (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust
  *	keyring, or:
  *
+ *  (*) -ENODATA if there is no signature present.
+ *
  *  (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a
  *	chain.
  *
diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h
index b9b1bc5f9669..58b27c7bdc2b 100644
--- a/include/linux/kexec.h
+++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ typedef void *(kexec_load_t)(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 			     unsigned long cmdline_len);
 typedef int (kexec_cleanup_t)(void *loader_data);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 typedef int (kexec_verify_sig_t)(const char *kernel_buf,
 				 unsigned long kernel_len);
 #endif
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ struct kexec_file_ops {
 	kexec_probe_t *probe;
 	kexec_load_t *load;
 	kexec_cleanup_t *cleanup;
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 	kexec_verify_sig_t *verify_sig;
 #endif
 };
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index ef7b951a8087..972931201995 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 	return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 static int kexec_image_verify_sig_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
 					  unsigned long buf_len)
 {
@@ -177,6 +177,51 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 	image->image_loader_data = NULL;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+static int
+kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
+{
+	const char *reason;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
+					   image->kernel_buf_len);
+	switch (ret) {
+	case 0:
+		break;
+
+		/* Certain verification errors are non-fatal if we're not
+		 * checking errors, provided we aren't mandating that there
+		 * must be a valid signature.
+		 */
+	case -ENODATA:
+		reason = "kexec of unsigned image";
+		goto decide;
+	case -ENOPKG:
+		reason = "kexec of image with unsupported crypto";
+		goto decide;
+	case -ENOKEY:
+		reason = "kexec of image with unavailable key";
+	decide:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) {
+			pr_notice("%s rejected\n", reason);
+			return ret;
+		}
+
+		return 0;
+
+		/* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
+		 * signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures
+		 * aren't required.
+		 */
+	default:
+		pr_notice("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * In file mode list of segments is prepared by kernel. Copy relevant
  * data from user space, do error checking, prepare segment list
@@ -186,7 +231,7 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
 			     const char __user *cmdline_ptr,
 			     unsigned long cmdline_len, unsigned flags)
 {
-	int ret = 0;
+	int ret;
 	void *ldata;
 	loff_t size;
 
@@ -205,14 +250,11 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
-	ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
-					   image->kernel_buf_len);
-	if (ret) {
-		pr_debug("kernel signature verification failed.\n");
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+	ret = kimage_validate_signature(image);
+
+	if (ret)
 		goto out;
-	}
-	pr_debug("kernel signature verification successful.\n");
 #endif
 	/* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
 	if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 2692c7358c2c..32cd25fa44a5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
 
 config IMA_ARCH_POLICY
         bool "Enable loading an IMA architecture specific policy"
-        depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG || IMA_APPRAISE && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+        depends on KEXEC_SIG || IMA_APPRAISE && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
         default n
         help
           This option enables loading an IMA architecture specific policy
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f556e6c18f9b..1cffda4412b7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
 
 	switch (id) {
 	case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG)
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
 		    && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
 			pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
 			return -EACCES;
-- 
2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog


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[PATCH V40 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down

[Matthew Garrett]

From: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>

When KEXEC_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load images through
kexec_file systemcall if the kernel is locked down.

[Modified by David Howells to fit with modifications to the previous patch
 and to return -EPERM if the kernel is locked down for consistency with
 other lockdowns. Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA
 integration, which will be replaced by integrating with the IMA
 architecture policy patches.]

Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
---
 kernel/kexec_file.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 972931201995..43109ef4d6bf 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
 			return ret;
 		}
 
-		return 0;
+		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
 
 		/* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
 		 * signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures
-- 
2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog


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Re: [PATCH V40 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE

[Philipp Rudo]

Hi Matthew,

found a typo ...

On Mon, 19 Aug 2019 17:17:44 -0700
Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> wrote:

[...]

> index 6d0635ceddd0..9b4f37a4edf1 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_elf.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_elf.c
> @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int s390_elf_probe(const char *buf, unsigned long len)
>  const struct kexec_file_ops s390_kexec_elf_ops = {
>  	.probe = s390_elf_probe,
>  	.load = s390_elf_load,
> -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC__SIG
		      ^^
... here.
>  	.verify_sig = s390_verify_sig,
> -#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */
> +#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
>  };

Thanks
Philipp


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