From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev
Cc: ross.philipson@gmail.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca,
luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net,
ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
daniel.kiper@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH v16 33/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch SMP bringup support
Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 14:14:05 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260515211410.31440-34-ross.philipson@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260515211410.31440-1-ross.philipson@gmail.com>
On Intel, the APs are left in a well documented state after TXT
performs the secure launch. Specifically, they cannot have #INIT
asserted on them so a standard startup via INIT/SIPI/SIPI cannot
be performed. Instead the early SL stub code uses MONITOR and MWAIT
to park the APs. The realmode/init.c code updates the jump address
for the waiting APs with the location of the Secure Launch entry
point in the rmpiggy image.
The rmpiggy image is a payload contained in the kernel used to start
the APs (in 16b or 32b modes). It is loaded at runtime so its
location and entry point must be updated in the long jump for the
waiting APs by the running kernel.
As the APs are woken up by writing the monitor, the APs jump to the
Secure Launch entry point in the rmpiggy which mimics what the real
mode code would do then jumps to the standard rmpiggy protected mode
entry point.
Co-developed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h | 3 ++
arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c | 26 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 8 +++++
| 3 ++
arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 32 +++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
index e406a1e92c63..e3336c49d26b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ struct real_mode_header {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
u32 machine_real_restart_seg;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
+ u32 sl_trampoline_start32;
+#endif
};
/* This must match data at realmode/rm/trampoline_{32,64}.S */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c
index 0179ff855b62..f6e6f1b7e18c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c
@@ -511,3 +511,29 @@ void __init slaunch_setup(void)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMX))
slaunch_setup_txt();
}
+
+/*
+ * After a launch, the APs are woken up, enter the DRTM and are left to
+ * wait for a wakeup call on a MONITOR address. The block where they are
+ * idle has a long jump to the AP startup code in the mainline kernel.
+ * This address has to be calculated at runtime and "fixed up" to point
+ * to the SL startup location in the rmpiggy SMP startup image. This image
+ * is loaded into separate memory at kernel start time.
+ */
+void __init slaunch_fixup_ap_wake_vector(void)
+{
+ struct sl_ap_wake_info *ap_wake_info;
+ u32 *ap_jmp_ptr;
+
+ if (!slaunch_is_txt_launch())
+ return;
+
+ ap_wake_info = slaunch_get_ap_wake_info();
+
+ ap_jmp_ptr = (u32 *)__va(ap_wake_info->ap_wake_block +
+ ap_wake_info->ap_jmp_offset);
+
+ *ap_jmp_ptr = real_mode_header->sl_trampoline_start32;
+
+ pr_info("TXT AP startup vector address updated\n");
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index 294a8ea60298..16a0f2718a38 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
#include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
#include <linux/mc146818rtc.h>
#include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <linux/slaunch.h>
#include <asm/acpi.h>
#include <asm/cacheinfo.h>
@@ -989,6 +990,45 @@ int common_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
return 0;
}
+#if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH))
+
+/*
+ * TXT AP startup is quite different than normal. The APs cannot have #INIT
+ * asserted on them or receive SIPIs. The early Secure Launch code has parked
+ * the APs using MONITOR/MWAIT in the safe AP wake block area (details in
+ * sl_stub.S). The SMP boot will wake the APs by writing the MONITOR associated
+ * with the AP and have them jump to the protected mode code in the rmpiggy where
+ * the rest of the SMP boot of the AP will proceed normally.
+ *
+ * Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) Software Development Guide
+ * Section 2.3 - MLE Initialization
+ */
+static void slaunch_wakeup_cpu_from_txt(int cpu, int apicid)
+{
+ struct sl_ap_stack_and_monitor *stack_monitor;
+ struct sl_ap_wake_info *ap_wake_info;
+
+ ap_wake_info = slaunch_get_ap_wake_info();
+
+ stack_monitor = (struct sl_ap_stack_and_monitor *)__va(ap_wake_info->ap_wake_block +
+ ap_wake_info->ap_stacks_offset);
+
+ for (unsigned int i = SL_MAX_CPUS - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (stack_monitor[i].apicid == apicid) {
+ stack_monitor[i].monitor = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline void slaunch_wakeup_cpu_from_txt(int cpu, int apicid)
+{
+}
+
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) */
+
/*
* NOTE - on most systems this is a PHYSICAL apic ID, but on multiquad
* (ie clustered apic addressing mode), this is a LOGICAL apic ID.
@@ -998,7 +1038,7 @@ int common_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
static int do_boot_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
{
unsigned long start_ip = real_mode_header->trampoline_start;
- int ret;
+ int ret = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* If 64-bit wakeup method exists, use the 64-bit mode trampoline IP */
@@ -1043,12 +1083,15 @@ static int do_boot_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
/*
* Wake up a CPU in difference cases:
+ * - Intel TXT DRTM launch uses its own method to wake the APs
* - Use a method from the APIC driver if one defined, with wakeup
* straight to 64-bit mode preferred over wakeup to RM.
* Otherwise,
* - Use an INIT boot APIC message
*/
- if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)
+ if (slaunch_is_txt_launch())
+ slaunch_wakeup_cpu_from_txt(cpu, apicid);
+ else if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)
ret = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64(apicid, start_ip, cpu);
else if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu)
ret = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu(apicid, start_ip, cpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index 88be32026768..ded4dafc6a0a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/slaunch.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/realmode.h>
@@ -213,6 +214,13 @@ void __init init_real_mode(void)
setup_real_mode();
set_real_mode_permissions();
+
+ /*
+ * If Secure Launch is active, it will use the rmpiggy to do the TXT AP
+ * startup. Secure Launch has its own entry stub in the rmpiggy and this prepares
+ * it for SMP boot.
+ */
+ slaunch_fixup_ap_wake_vector();
}
static int __init do_init_real_mode(void)
--git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
index 2eb62be6d256..3b5cbcbbfc90 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ SYM_DATA_START(real_mode_header)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
.long __KERNEL32_CS
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
+ .long pa_sl_trampoline_start32
+#endif
SYM_DATA_END(real_mode_header)
/* End signature, used to verify integrity */
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
index 14d9c7daf90f..b0ce6205d7ea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
@@ -122,6 +122,38 @@ SYM_CODE_END(sev_es_trampoline_start)
.section ".text32","ax"
.code32
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
+ .balign 4
+SYM_CODE_START(sl_trampoline_start32)
+ /*
+ * The early secure launch stub AP wakeup code has taken care of all
+ * the vagaries of launching out of TXT. This bit just mimics what the
+ * 16b entry code does and jumps off to the real startup_32.
+ */
+ cli
+ wbinvd
+
+ /*
+ * The %ebx provided is not terribly useful since it is the physical
+ * address of tb_trampoline_start and not the base of the image.
+ * Use pa_real_mode_base, which is fixed up, to get a run time
+ * base register to use for offsets to location that do not have
+ * pa_ symbols.
+ */
+ movl $pa_real_mode_base, %ebx
+
+ LOCK_AND_LOAD_REALMODE_ESP lock_pa=1
+
+ lgdt tr_gdt(%ebx)
+ lidt tr_idt(%ebx)
+
+ movw $__KERNEL_DS, %dx # Data segment descriptor
+
+ /* Jump to where the 16b code would have jumped */
+ ljmpl $__KERNEL32_CS, $pa_startup_32
+SYM_CODE_END(sl_trampoline_start32)
+#endif
+
.balign 4
SYM_CODE_START(startup_32)
movl %edx, %ss
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-15 21:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-15 21:13 [PATCH v16 00/38] x86: Secure Launch support for Intel TXT Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 01/38] tpm: Initial step to reorganize TPM public headers Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 23:05 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-05-15 23:10 ` Dave Hansen
2026-05-15 23:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 02/38] tpm: Move TPM1 specific definitions to the command header Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 03/38] tpm: Move TPM2 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 04/38] tpm: Move TPM common base " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 05/38] tpm: Move platform specific definitions to the new PTP header Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 06/38] tpm: Remove main TPM header from TPM event log header Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 07/38] tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 08/38] tpm-buf: Remove chip parameter from tpm_buf_append_handle() Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 10/38] tpm-buf: Add TPM buffer support header for standalone reuse Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 11/38] tpm/tpm_tis: Close all localities Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 12/38] tpm/tpm_tis: Address positive localities in tpm_tis_request_locality() Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 13/38] tpm/tpm_tis: Allow locality to be set to a different value Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 14/38] tpm/sysfs: Show locality used by kernel Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 15/38] Documentation/security: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 22:02 ` Randy Dunlap
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 16/38] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 17/38] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 18/38] x86/efi: Secure Launch Resource Table EFI definitions " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 19/38] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 20/38] x86/txt: Intel Trusted eXecution Technology (TXT) definitions Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 21/38] lib/crypto: Add SHA1 support for pre-boot environments Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 22/38] lib/crypto: Add SHA512 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 23/38] x86: Allow WARN_trap() macro to be included in " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 24/38] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 25/38] x86/boot: Slight refactor of the 5 level paging logic Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 26/38] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 27/38] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 28/38] x86: Add early SHA-384/512 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 29/38] x86/tpm: Early startup TPM PCR extending driver Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 22:32 ` Dave Hansen
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 30/38] x86/slaunch: Add MLE header and Secure Launch entrypoint to the core kernel Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 31/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch kernel early boot initialization Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 32/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 34/38] kexec/slaunch: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 35/38] reboot/slaunch: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 36/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 37/38] x86/efistub: EFI stub DRTM support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 38/38] x86/boot: Legacy boot " Ross Philipson
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