Kexec Archive on lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev,
	dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
	peterhuewe@gmx.de, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
	nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
	davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	dwmw2@infradead.org, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com,
	kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, daniel.kiper@oracle.com,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 01/38] tpm: Initial step to reorganize TPM public headers
Date: Sat, 16 May 2026 02:03:59 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <agemXwxVb9jvAbYM@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260515211410.31440-2-ross.philipson@gmail.com>

On Fri, May 15, 2026 at 02:13:33PM -0700, Ross Philipson wrote:
> Consolidate TPM1 constants in tpm_command.h and remove duplicate
> constants from tpm1-cmd.c.
> 
> Co-developed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
> Co-developed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>
> ---
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c                |  1 -
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c               | 14 +-------
>  include/keys/trusted_tpm.h                |  1 -
>  include/linux/tpm.h                       |  2 ++
>  include/linux/tpm_command.h               | 41 ++++++++++++++++-------
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c |  1 -
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c |  1 -
>  7 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
> index dc882fc9fa9e..4c4f450630df 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
> @@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
>   * Handling of TPM command and other buffers.
>   */
>  
> -#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
>  #include <linux/module.h>
>  #include <linux/tpm.h>
>  
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
> index b49a790f1bd5..664ca1fff2e8 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
> @@ -22,8 +22,6 @@
>  
>  #include "tpm.h"
>  
> -#define TPM_MAX_ORDINAL 243
> -
>  /*
>   * Array with one entry per ordinal defining the maximum amount
>   * of time the chip could take to return the result.  The ordinal
> @@ -308,9 +306,6 @@ unsigned long tpm1_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal)
>  		return duration;
>  }
>  
> -#define TPM_ORD_STARTUP 153
> -#define TPM_ST_CLEAR 1
> -
>  /**
>   * tpm1_startup() - turn on the TPM
>   * @chip: TPM chip to use
> @@ -459,7 +454,6 @@ int tpm1_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND 20
>  int tpm1_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, const u8 *hash,
>  		    const char *log_msg)
>  {
> @@ -478,7 +472,6 @@ int tpm1_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, const u8 *hash,
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
> -#define TPM_ORD_GET_CAP 101
>  ssize_t tpm1_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
>  		    const char *desc, size_t min_cap_length)
>  {
> @@ -511,7 +504,6 @@ ssize_t tpm1_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm1_getcap);
>  
> -#define TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM 70
>  struct tpm1_get_random_out {
>  	__be32 rng_data_len;
>  	u8 rng_data[TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA];
> @@ -580,13 +572,12 @@ int tpm1_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
> -#define TPM_ORD_PCRREAD 21
>  int tpm1_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
>  {
>  	struct tpm_buf buf;
>  	int rc;
>  
> -	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_PCRREAD);
> +	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_PCR_READ);
>  	if (rc)
>  		return rc;
>  
> @@ -609,7 +600,6 @@ int tpm1_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
> -#define TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST 83
>  /**
>   * tpm1_continue_selftest() - run TPM's selftest
>   * @chip: TPM chip to use
> @@ -726,8 +716,6 @@ int tpm1_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
> -#define TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE 152
> -
>  /**
>   * tpm1_pm_suspend() - pm suspend handler
>   * @chip: TPM chip to use.
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> index 0fadc6a4f166..3a0fa3bc8454 100644
> --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> @@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
>  #define __TRUSTED_TPM_H
>  
>  #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
> -#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
>  
>  extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
>  
> diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
> index 202da079d500..1846d5485a2c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tpm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
> @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
>  #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
>  #include <crypto/aes.h>
>  
> +#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
> +
>  #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20	/* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
>  
>  #define TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE	SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
> diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_command.h b/include/linux/tpm_command.h
> index f5c03e9c3913..174b043d8bbc 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tpm_command.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tpm_command.h
> @@ -3,27 +3,42 @@
>  #define __LINUX_TPM_COMMAND_H__
>  
>  /*
> - * TPM Command constants from specifications at
> - * http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
> + * == TPM 1 Family Chips ==
> + *
> + * TPM 1.2 Main Specification:
> + * https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-main-specification/
>   */
>  
> +#define TPM_MAX_ORDINAL	243
> +
>  /* Command TAGS */
> -#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND             193
> -#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND       194
> -#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND       195
> -#define TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND             196
> -#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND       197
> -#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND       198
> +enum tpm_command_tags {
> +	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND		= 193,
> +	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND	= 194,
> +	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND	= 195,
> +	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND		= 196,
> +	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND	= 197,
> +	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND	= 198,
> +};
>  
>  /* Command Ordinals */
> -#define TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM               70
> -#define TPM_ORD_OSAP                    11
> -#define TPM_ORD_OIAP                    10
> -#define TPM_ORD_SEAL                    23
> -#define TPM_ORD_UNSEAL                  24
> +enum tpm_command_ordinals {
> +	TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST	= 83,
> +	TPM_ORD_GET_CAP			= 101,
> +	TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM		= 70,
> +	TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND		= 20,
> +	TPM_ORD_PCR_READ		= 21,
> +	TPM_ORD_OSAP			= 11,
> +	TPM_ORD_OIAP			= 10,
> +	TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE		= 152,
> +	TPM_ORD_SEAL			= 23,
> +	TPM_ORD_STARTUP			= 153,
> +	TPM_ORD_UNSEAL			= 24,
> +};
>  
>  /* Other constants */
>  #define SRKHANDLE                       0x40000000
>  #define TPM_NONCE_SIZE                  20
> +#define TPM_ST_CLEAR			1
>  
>  #endif
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> index 6ea728f1eae6..0d3244af8de3 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> @@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
>  #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
>  #include <linux/key-type.h>
>  #include <linux/tpm.h>
> -#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
>  
>  #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
>  
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> index 6340823f8b53..29d79c05ed6b 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
>  #include <linux/string.h>
>  #include <linux/err.h>
>  #include <linux/tpm.h>
> -#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
>  
>  #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
>  #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
> -- 
> 2.47.3
> 

LGTM

I'll hold on from actual tags up until there is some consensus with the
patch set.

BR, Jarkko


  reply	other threads:[~2026-05-15 23:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-15 21:13 [PATCH v16 00/38] x86: Secure Launch support for Intel TXT Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 01/38] tpm: Initial step to reorganize TPM public headers Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:03   ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-05-15 23:05     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-05-15 23:10       ` Dave Hansen
2026-05-15 23:51       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 02/38] tpm: Move TPM1 specific definitions to the command header Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:14   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 03/38] tpm: Move TPM2 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:15   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 04/38] tpm: Move TPM common base " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:22   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 05/38] tpm: Move platform specific definitions to the new PTP header Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 06/38] tpm: Remove main TPM header from TPM event log header Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 07/38] tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 08/38] tpm-buf: Remove chip parameter from tpm_buf_append_handle() Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 10/38] tpm-buf: Add TPM buffer support header for standalone reuse Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 11/38] tpm/tpm_tis: Close all localities Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 12/38] tpm/tpm_tis: Address positive localities in tpm_tis_request_locality() Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 13/38] tpm/tpm_tis: Allow locality to be set to a different value Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 14/38] tpm/sysfs: Show locality used by kernel Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 15/38] Documentation/security: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 22:02   ` Randy Dunlap
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 16/38] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 17/38] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 18/38] x86/efi: Secure Launch Resource Table EFI definitions " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 19/38] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 20/38] x86/txt: Intel Trusted eXecution Technology (TXT) definitions Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 21/38] lib/crypto: Add SHA1 support for pre-boot environments Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 22/38] lib/crypto: Add SHA512 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 23/38] x86: Allow WARN_trap() macro to be included in " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 24/38] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 25/38] x86/boot: Slight refactor of the 5 level paging logic Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 26/38] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 27/38] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 28/38] x86: Add early SHA-384/512 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 29/38] x86/tpm: Early startup TPM PCR extending driver Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 22:32   ` Dave Hansen
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 30/38] x86/slaunch: Add MLE header and Secure Launch entrypoint to the core kernel Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 31/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch kernel early boot initialization Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 32/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 33/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 34/38] kexec/slaunch: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 35/38] reboot/slaunch: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 36/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 37/38] x86/efistub: EFI stub DRTM support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 38/38] x86/boot: Legacy boot " Ross Philipson

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=agemXwxVb9jvAbYM@kernel.org \
    --to=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
    --cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=baolu.lu@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=daniel.kiper@oracle.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com \
    --cc=dwmw2@infradead.org \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=iommu@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=jgg@ziepe.ca \
    --cc=kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com \
    --cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=mjg59@srcf.ucam.org \
    --cc=nivedita@alum.mit.edu \
    --cc=peterhuewe@gmx.de \
    --cc=ross.philipson@gmail.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox