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From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
	Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
	Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 12/16] KVM: arm64: Implement AT S1PIE support
Date: Tue,  3 Sep 2024 16:38:30 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240903153834.1909472-13-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240903153834.1909472-1-maz@kernel.org>

It doesn't take much effort to imple,emt S1PIE support in AT.
This is only a matter of using the AArch64.S1IndirectBasePermissions()
encodings for the permission, ignoring GCS which has no impact on AT,
and enforce FEAT_PAN3 being enabled as this is a requirement of
FEAT_S1PIE.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/at.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 135 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
index 68f5b89598ec..bd7e1b32b049 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
@@ -736,6 +736,23 @@ static u64 compute_par_s1(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct s1_walk_result *wr,
 	return par;
 }
 
+static bool s1pie_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum trans_regime regime)
+{
+	if (!kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1, S1PIE, IMP))
+		return false;
+
+	switch (regime) {
+	case TR_EL2:
+	case TR_EL20:
+		return __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL2) & TCR2_EL2_PIE;
+	case TR_EL10:
+		return  (__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, HCRX_EL2) & HCRX_EL2_TCR2En) &&
+			(__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL1) & TCR2_EL1x_PIE);
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+}
+
 static bool pan3_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum trans_regime regime)
 {
 	u64 sctlr;
@@ -743,6 +760,9 @@ static bool pan3_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum trans_regime regime)
 	if (!kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, PAN, PAN3))
 		return false;
 
+	if (s1pie_enabled(vcpu, regime))
+		return true;
+
 	if (regime == TR_EL10)
 		sctlr = vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, SCTLR_EL1);
 	else
@@ -826,12 +846,126 @@ static void compute_s1_hierarchical_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	}
 }
 
+#define pi_idx(v, r, i)	((__vcpu_sys_reg((v), (r)) >> ((i) * 4)) & 0xf)
+
+#define set_priv_perms(p, r, w, x)	\
+	do {				\
+		(p)->pr = (r);		\
+		(p)->pw = (w);		\
+		(p)->px = (x);		\
+	} while (0)
+
+#define set_unpriv_perms(p, r, w, x)	\
+	do {				\
+		(p)->ur = (r);		\
+		(p)->uw = (w);		\
+		(p)->ux = (x);		\
+	} while (0)
+
+/* Similar to AArch64.S1IndirectBasePermissions(), without GCS  */
+#define set_perms(w, p, ip)						\
+	do {								\
+		switch ((ip)) {						\
+		case 0b0000:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), false, false, false);	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b0001:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , false, false);	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b0010:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), false, false, true );	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b0011:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , false, true );	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b0100:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), false, false, false);	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b0101:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , true , false);	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b0110:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , true , true );	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b0111:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , true , true );	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b1000:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , false, false);	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b1001:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , false, false);	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b1010:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , false, true );	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b1011:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), false, false, false);	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b1100:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , true , false);	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b1101:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), false, false, false);	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b1110:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , true , true );	\
+			break;						\
+		case 0b1111:						\
+			set_ ## w ## _perms((p), false, false, false);	\
+			break;						\
+		}							\
+	} while (0)
+
+static void compute_s1_indirect_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					    struct s1_walk_info *wi,
+					    struct s1_walk_result *wr,
+					    struct s1_perms *s1p)
+{
+	u8 up, pp, idx;
+
+	idx = (FIELD_GET(GENMASK(54, 53), wr->desc) << 2	|
+	       FIELD_GET(BIT(51), wr->desc) << 1		|
+	       FIELD_GET(BIT(6), wr->desc));
+
+	switch (wi->regime) {
+	case TR_EL10:
+		pp = pi_idx(vcpu, PIR_EL1, idx);
+		up = pi_idx(vcpu, PIRE0_EL1, idx);
+		break;
+	case TR_EL20:
+		pp = pi_idx(vcpu, PIR_EL2, idx);
+		up = pi_idx(vcpu, PIRE0_EL2, idx);
+		break;
+	case TR_EL2:
+		pp = pi_idx(vcpu, PIR_EL2, idx);
+		up = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	set_perms(priv, s1p, pp);
+
+	if (wi->regime != TR_EL2)
+		set_perms(unpriv, s1p, up);
+	else
+		set_unpriv_perms(s1p, false, false, false);
+
+	if (s1p->px && s1p->uw) {
+		set_priv_perms(s1p, false, false, false);
+		set_unpriv_perms(s1p, false, false, false);
+	}
+}
+
 static void compute_s1_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op,
 				   struct s1_walk_info *wi,
 				   struct s1_walk_result *wr,
 				   struct s1_perms *s1p)
 {
-	compute_s1_direct_permissions(vcpu, wi, wr, s1p);
+	if (!s1pie_enabled(vcpu, wi->regime))
+		compute_s1_direct_permissions(vcpu, wi, wr, s1p);
+	else
+		compute_s1_indirect_permissions(vcpu, wi, wr, s1p);
+
 	compute_s1_hierarchical_permissions(vcpu, wi, wr, s1p);
 
 	if (op == OP_AT_S1E1RP || op == OP_AT_S1E1WP) {
-- 
2.39.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-09-03 15:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-09-03 15:38 [PATCH v2 00/16] KVM: arm64: Add EL2 support to FEAT_S1PIE Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 01/16] KVM: arm64: nv: Handle CNTHCTL_EL2 specially Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 02/16] KVM: arm64: nv: Save/Restore vEL2 sysregs Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 03/16] KVM: arm64: Add TCR2_EL2 to the sysreg arrays Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 04/16] KVM: arm64: Add save/restore for TCR2_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 05/16] arm64: Add encoding for PIRE0_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 06/16] arm64: Remove VNCR definition " Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 07/16] KVM: arm64: Add PIR{,E0}_EL2 to the sysreg arrays Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 08/16] KVM: arm64: Add save/restore for PIR{,E0}_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 09/16] KVM: arm64: Handle PIR{,E0}_EL2 traps Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 10/16] KVM: arm64: Sanitise ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 11/16] KVM: arm64: Split S1 permission evaluation into direct and hierarchical parts Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2024-09-05 13:58   ` [PATCH v2 12/16] KVM: arm64: Implement AT S1PIE support Joey Gouly
2024-09-05 14:57     ` Marc Zyngier
2024-09-05 15:37       ` Joey Gouly
2024-09-06  7:04         ` Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 13/16] KVM: arm64: Define helper for EL2 registers with custom visibility Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 14/16] KVM: arm64: Hide TCR2_EL1 from userspace when disabled for guests Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 15/16] KVM: arm64: Hide S1PIE registers " Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:38 ` [PATCH v2 16/16] KVM: arm64: Rely on visibility to let PIR*_ELx/TCR2_ELx UNDEF Marc Zyngier
2024-09-03 15:58   ` Mark Brown

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