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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>,
	 John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	 Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
	 Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
	Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
	 Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>, Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Subject: [PATCH v16 16/51] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs
Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2025 15:32:23 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250919223258.1604852-17-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250919223258.1604852-1-seanjc@google.com>

From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>

Disable interception for CET MSRs that can be accessed via XSAVES/XRSTORS,
and exist accordingly to CPUID, as accesses through XSTATE aren't subject
to MSR interception checks, i.e. can't be intercepted without intercepting
and emulating XSAVES/XRSTORS, and KVM doesn't support emulating
XSAVE/XRSTOR instructions.

Don't condition interception on the guest actually having XSAVES as there
is no benefit to intercepting the accesses (when the MSRs exist).  The
MSRs in question are either context switched by the CPU on VM-Enter/VM-Exit
or by KVM via XSAVES/XRSTORS (KVM requires XSAVES to virtualization SHSTK),
i.e. KVM is going to load guest values into hardware irrespective of guest
XSAVES support.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index e271e3785561..5fe4a4b8efb1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4101,6 +4101,8 @@ void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static void vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
+	bool intercept;
+
 	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
 		return;
 
@@ -4146,6 +4148,23 @@ static void vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W,
 					  !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D));
 
+	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+		intercept = !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
+		intercept = !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT) &&
+			    !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * x2APIC and LBR MSR intercepts are modified on-demand and cannot be
 	 * filtered by userspace.
-- 
2.51.0.470.ga7dc726c21-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-09-19 22:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 114+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-19 22:32 [PATCH v16 00/51] KVM: x86: Super Mega CET Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 01/51] KVM: SEV: Rename kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code() to kvm_get_cached_sw_exit_code() Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 02/51] KVM: SEV: Read save fields from GHCB exactly once Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 21:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 03/51] KVM: SEV: Validate XCR0 provided by guest in GHCB Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 04/51] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 05/51] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 06/51] KVM: x86: Check XSS validity against guest CPUIDs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 07/51] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 08/51] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 09/51] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  2:10   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 16:41     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 10/51] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 11/51] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 12/51] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 13/51] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  2:58   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23  9:06   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 14/51] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 15/51] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 17/51] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  3:03   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 18/51] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions affected by CET features Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  5:39   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 16:47     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 10:27   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-22 20:04     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 14:12       ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-23 16:15         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 19/51] KVM: x86: Don't emulate task switches when IBT or SHSTK is enabled Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  6:41   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 17:23     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 14:16       ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-22 11:27   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 20/51] KVM: x86: Emulate SSP[63:32]!=0 #GP(0) for FAR JMP to 32-bit mode Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  7:15   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:29   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 21/51] KVM: x86/mmu: WARN on attempt to check permissions for Shadow Stack #PF Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  7:17   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22  7:46     ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:33       ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 22/51] KVM: x86/mmu: Pretty print PK, SS, and SGX flags in MMU tracepoints Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  7:18   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 16:18     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 14:46   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 23/51] KVM: x86: Allow setting CR4.CET if IBT or SHSTK is supported Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  7:25   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:46   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 24/51] KVM: nVMX: Always forward XSAVES/XRSTORS exits from L2 to L1 Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  8:15   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 14:49   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 25/51] KVM: x86: Add XSS support for CET_KERNEL and CET_USER Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  7:31   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:55   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 26/51] KVM: x86: Disable support for Shadow Stacks if TDP is disabled Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  7:45   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:56   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 27/51] KVM: x86: Disable support for IBT and SHSTK if allow_smaller_maxphyaddr is true Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:00   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 18:40   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 14:44   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-23 15:04     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 28/51] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:06   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:57   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 29/51] KVM: VMX: Configure nested capabilities after CPU capabilities Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  2:37   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 16:24     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 16:49       ` Xin Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 30/51] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:37   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 31/51] KVM: nVMX: Prepare for enabling CET support for nested guest Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 32/51] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:47   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 33/51] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  9:23   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 16:35     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 34/51] KVM: nVMX: Advertise new VM-Entry/Exit control bits for CET state Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  2:43   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 16:28     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 35/51] KVM: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 36/51] KVM: nSVM: Save/load CET Shadow Stack state to/from vmcb12/vmcb02 Sean Christopherson
2025-10-28 22:23   ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-12-09  0:48     ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 37/51] KVM: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 38/51] KVM: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs as appropriate Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 39/51] KVM: SEV: Synchronize MSR_IA32_XSS from the GHCB when it's valid Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 40/51] KVM: SVM: Enable shadow stack virtualization for SVM Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 41/51] KVM: x86: Add human friendly formatting for #XM, and #VE Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:29   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 42/51] KVM: x86: Define Control Protection Exception (#CP) vector Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:29   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 43/51] KVM: x86: Define AMD's #HV, #VC, and #SX exception vectors Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 44/51] KVM: selftests: Add ex_str() to print human friendly name of " Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 45/51] KVM: selftests: Add an MSR test to exercise guest/host and read/write Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  8:03   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 16:51     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 46/51] KVM: selftests: Add support for MSR_IA32_{S,U}_CET to MSRs test Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  7:12   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 47/51] KVM: selftests: Extend MSRs test to validate vCPUs without supported features Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 48/51] KVM: selftests: Add KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG coverage to MSRs test Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  6:52   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 49/51] KVM: selftests: Add coverate for KVM-defined registers in " Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  6:31   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 16:59     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 50/51] KVM: selftests: Verify MSRs are (not) in save/restore list when (un)supported Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  6:46   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 17:02     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 51/51] KVM: VMX: Make CR4.CET a guest owned bit Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:34   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-24 14:32 ` [PATCH v16 00/51] KVM: x86: Super Mega CET Chao Gao
2025-09-24 18:07 ` Sean Christopherson

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