From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>, Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Subject: [PATCH v16 45/51] KVM: selftests: Add an MSR test to exercise guest/host and read/write
Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2025 15:32:52 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250919223258.1604852-46-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250919223258.1604852-1-seanjc@google.com>
Add a selftest to verify reads and writes to various MSRs, from both the
guest and host, and expect success/failure based on whether or not the
vCPU supports the MSR according to supported CPUID.
Note, this test is extremely similar to KVM-Unit-Test's "msr" test, but
provides more coverage with respect to host accesses, and will be extended
to provide addition testing of CPUID-based features, save/restore lists,
and KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG, all which are extremely difficult to validate in
KUT.
If kvm.ignore_msrs=true, skip the unsupported and reserved testcases as
KVM's ABI is a mess; what exactly is supposed to be ignored, and when,
varies wildly.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h | 5 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/msrs_test.c | 315 ++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 321 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/msrs_test.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm
index 66c82f51837b..1d1b77dabb36 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/kvm_clock_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/kvm_pv_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/kvm_buslock_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/monitor_mwait_test
+TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/msrs_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/nested_emulation_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/nested_exceptions_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/platform_info_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h
index 2ad84f3809e8..fb3e6ab81a80 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h
@@ -1357,6 +1357,11 @@ static inline bool kvm_is_unrestricted_guest_enabled(void)
return get_kvm_intel_param_bool("unrestricted_guest");
}
+static inline bool kvm_is_ignore_msrs(void)
+{
+ return get_kvm_param_bool("ignore_msrs");
+}
+
uint64_t *__vm_get_page_table_entry(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr,
int *level);
uint64_t *vm_get_page_table_entry(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/msrs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/msrs_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9285cf51ef75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/msrs_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <asm/msr-index.h>
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "kvm_util.h"
+#include "processor.h"
+
+/* Use HYPERVISOR for MSRs that are emulated unconditionally (as is HYPERVISOR). */
+#define X86_FEATURE_NONE X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR
+
+struct kvm_msr {
+ const struct kvm_x86_cpu_feature feature;
+ const struct kvm_x86_cpu_feature feature2;
+ const char *name;
+ const u64 reset_val;
+ const u64 write_val;
+ const u64 rsvd_val;
+ const u32 index;
+};
+
+#define ____MSR_TEST(msr, str, val, rsvd, reset, feat, f2) \
+{ \
+ .index = msr, \
+ .name = str, \
+ .write_val = val, \
+ .rsvd_val = rsvd, \
+ .reset_val = reset, \
+ .feature = X86_FEATURE_ ##feat, \
+ .feature2 = X86_FEATURE_ ##f2, \
+}
+
+#define __MSR_TEST(msr, str, val, rsvd, reset, feat) \
+ ____MSR_TEST(msr, str, val, rsvd, reset, feat, feat)
+
+#define MSR_TEST_NON_ZERO(msr, val, rsvd, reset, feat) \
+ __MSR_TEST(msr, #msr, val, rsvd, reset, feat)
+
+#define MSR_TEST(msr, val, rsvd, feat) \
+ __MSR_TEST(msr, #msr, val, rsvd, 0, feat)
+
+#define MSR_TEST2(msr, val, rsvd, feat, f2) \
+ ____MSR_TEST(msr, #msr, val, rsvd, 0, feat, f2)
+
+/*
+ * Note, use a page aligned value for the canonical value so that the value
+ * is compatible with MSRs that use bits 11:0 for things other than addresses.
+ */
+static const u64 canonical_val = 0x123456789000ull;
+
+#define MSR_TEST_CANONICAL(msr, feat) \
+ __MSR_TEST(msr, #msr, canonical_val, NONCANONICAL, 0, feat)
+
+/*
+ * The main struct must be scoped to a function due to the use of structures to
+ * define features. For the global structure, allocate enough space for the
+ * foreseeable future without getting too ridiculous, to minimize maintenance
+ * costs (bumping the array size every time an MSR is added is really annoying).
+ */
+static struct kvm_msr msrs[128];
+static int idx;
+
+static bool ignore_unsupported_msrs;
+
+static u64 fixup_rdmsr_val(u32 msr, u64 want)
+{
+ /*
+ * AMD CPUs drop bits 63:32 on some MSRs that Intel CPUs support. KVM
+ * is supposed to emulate that behavior based on guest vendor model
+ * (which is the same as the host vendor model for this test).
+ */
+ if (!host_cpu_is_amd)
+ return want;
+
+ switch (msr) {
+ case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+ case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+ case MSR_TSC_AUX:
+ return want & GENMASK_ULL(31, 0);
+ default:
+ return want;
+ }
+}
+
+static void __rdmsr(u32 msr, u64 want)
+{
+ u64 val;
+ u8 vec;
+
+ vec = rdmsr_safe(msr, &val);
+ __GUEST_ASSERT(!vec, "Unexpected %s on RDMSR(0x%x)", ex_str(vec), msr);
+
+ __GUEST_ASSERT(val == want, "Wanted 0x%lx from RDMSR(0x%x), got 0x%lx",
+ want, msr, val);
+}
+
+static void __wrmsr(u32 msr, u64 val)
+{
+ u8 vec;
+
+ vec = wrmsr_safe(msr, val);
+ __GUEST_ASSERT(!vec, "Unexpected %s on WRMSR(0x%x, 0x%lx)",
+ ex_str(vec), msr, val);
+ __rdmsr(msr, fixup_rdmsr_val(msr, val));
+}
+
+static void guest_test_supported_msr(const struct kvm_msr *msr)
+{
+ __rdmsr(msr->index, msr->reset_val);
+ __wrmsr(msr->index, msr->write_val);
+ GUEST_SYNC(fixup_rdmsr_val(msr->index, msr->write_val));
+
+ __rdmsr(msr->index, msr->reset_val);
+}
+
+static void guest_test_unsupported_msr(const struct kvm_msr *msr)
+{
+ u64 val;
+ u8 vec;
+
+ /*
+ * KVM's ABI with respect to ignore_msrs is a mess and largely beyond
+ * repair, just skip the unsupported MSR tests.
+ */
+ if (ignore_unsupported_msrs)
+ goto skip_wrmsr_gp;
+
+ if (this_cpu_has(msr->feature2))
+ goto skip_wrmsr_gp;
+
+ vec = rdmsr_safe(msr->index, &val);
+ __GUEST_ASSERT(vec == GP_VECTOR, "Wanted #GP on RDMSR(0x%x), got %s",
+ msr->index, ex_str(vec));
+
+ vec = wrmsr_safe(msr->index, msr->write_val);
+ __GUEST_ASSERT(vec == GP_VECTOR, "Wanted #GP on WRMSR(0x%x, 0x%lx), got %s",
+ msr->index, msr->write_val, ex_str(vec));
+
+skip_wrmsr_gp:
+ GUEST_SYNC(0);
+}
+
+void guest_test_reserved_val(const struct kvm_msr *msr)
+{
+ /* Skip reserved value checks as well, ignore_msrs is trully a mess. */
+ if (ignore_unsupported_msrs)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * If the CPU will truncate the written value (e.g. SYSENTER on AMD),
+ * expect success and a truncated value, not #GP.
+ */
+ if (!this_cpu_has(msr->feature) ||
+ msr->rsvd_val == fixup_rdmsr_val(msr->index, msr->rsvd_val)) {
+ u8 vec = wrmsr_safe(msr->index, msr->rsvd_val);
+
+ __GUEST_ASSERT(vec == GP_VECTOR,
+ "Wanted #GP on WRMSR(0x%x, 0x%lx), got %s",
+ msr->index, msr->rsvd_val, ex_str(vec));
+ } else {
+ __wrmsr(msr->index, msr->rsvd_val);
+ __wrmsr(msr->index, msr->reset_val);
+ }
+}
+
+static void guest_main(void)
+{
+ for (;;) {
+ const struct kvm_msr *msr = &msrs[READ_ONCE(idx)];
+
+ if (this_cpu_has(msr->feature))
+ guest_test_supported_msr(msr);
+ else
+ guest_test_unsupported_msr(msr);
+
+ if (msr->rsvd_val)
+ guest_test_reserved_val(msr);
+
+ GUEST_SYNC(msr->reset_val);
+ }
+}
+
+static void host_test_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_val)
+{
+ u64 reset_val = msrs[idx].reset_val;
+ u32 msr = msrs[idx].index;
+ u64 val;
+
+ if (!kvm_cpu_has(msrs[idx].feature))
+ return;
+
+ val = vcpu_get_msr(vcpu, msr);
+ TEST_ASSERT(val == guest_val, "Wanted 0x%lx from get_msr(0x%x), got 0x%lx",
+ guest_val, msr, val);
+
+ vcpu_set_msr(vcpu, msr, reset_val);
+
+ val = vcpu_get_msr(vcpu, msr);
+ TEST_ASSERT(val == reset_val, "Wanted 0x%lx from get_msr(0x%x), got 0x%lx",
+ reset_val, msr, val);
+}
+
+static void do_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct ucall uc;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ vcpu_run(vcpu);
+
+ switch (get_ucall(vcpu, &uc)) {
+ case UCALL_SYNC:
+ host_test_msr(vcpu, uc.args[1]);
+ return;
+ case UCALL_PRINTF:
+ pr_info("%s", uc.buffer);
+ break;
+ case UCALL_ABORT:
+ REPORT_GUEST_ASSERT(uc);
+ case UCALL_DONE:
+ TEST_FAIL("Unexpected UCALL_DONE");
+ default:
+ TEST_FAIL("Unexpected ucall: %lu", uc.cmd);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void vcpus_run(struct kvm_vcpu **vcpus, const int NR_VCPUS)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NR_VCPUS; i++)
+ do_vcpu_run(vcpus[i]);
+}
+
+#define MISC_ENABLES_RESET_VAL (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PEBS_UNAVAIL | MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_BTS_UNAVAIL)
+
+static void test_msrs(void)
+{
+ const struct kvm_msr __msrs[] = {
+ MSR_TEST_NON_ZERO(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE,
+ MISC_ENABLES_RESET_VAL | MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FAST_STRING,
+ MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FAST_STRING, MISC_ENABLES_RESET_VAL, NONE),
+ MSR_TEST_NON_ZERO(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, 0x07070707, 0, 0x7040600070406, NONE),
+
+ /*
+ * TSC_AUX is supported if RDTSCP *or* RDPID is supported. Add
+ * entries for each features so that TSC_AUX doesn't exists for
+ * the "unsupported" vCPU, and obviously to test both cases.
+ */
+ MSR_TEST2(MSR_TSC_AUX, 0x12345678, canonical_val, RDTSCP, RDPID),
+ MSR_TEST2(MSR_TSC_AUX, 0x12345678, canonical_val, RDPID, RDTSCP),
+
+ MSR_TEST(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, 0x1234, 0, NONE),
+ /*
+ * SYSENTER_{ESP,EIP} are technically non-canonical on Intel,
+ * but KVM doesn't emulate that behavior on emulated writes,
+ * i.e. this test will observe different behavior if the MSR
+ * writes are handed by hardware vs. KVM. KVM's behavior is
+ * intended (though far from ideal), so don't bother testing
+ * non-canonical values.
+ */
+ MSR_TEST(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, canonical_val, 0, NONE),
+ MSR_TEST(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, canonical_val, 0, NONE),
+
+ MSR_TEST_CANONICAL(MSR_FS_BASE, LM),
+ MSR_TEST_CANONICAL(MSR_GS_BASE, LM),
+ MSR_TEST_CANONICAL(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, LM),
+ MSR_TEST_CANONICAL(MSR_LSTAR, LM),
+ MSR_TEST_CANONICAL(MSR_CSTAR, LM),
+ MSR_TEST(MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, 0xffffffff, 0, LM),
+
+ MSR_TEST_CANONICAL(MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, SHSTK),
+ MSR_TEST(MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, canonical_val, canonical_val | 1, SHSTK),
+ MSR_TEST_CANONICAL(MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, SHSTK),
+ MSR_TEST(MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, canonical_val, canonical_val | 1, SHSTK),
+ MSR_TEST_CANONICAL(MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, SHSTK),
+ MSR_TEST(MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, canonical_val, canonical_val | 1, SHSTK),
+ MSR_TEST_CANONICAL(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, SHSTK),
+ MSR_TEST(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, canonical_val, canonical_val | 1, SHSTK),
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Create two vCPUs, but run them on the same task, to validate KVM's
+ * context switching of MSR state. Don't pin the task to a pCPU to
+ * also validate KVM's handling of cross-pCPU migration.
+ */
+ const int NR_VCPUS = 2;
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpus[NR_VCPUS];
+ struct kvm_vm *vm;
+
+ kvm_static_assert(sizeof(__msrs) <= sizeof(msrs));
+ kvm_static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(__msrs) <= ARRAY_SIZE(msrs));
+ memcpy(msrs, __msrs, sizeof(__msrs));
+
+ ignore_unsupported_msrs = kvm_is_ignore_msrs();
+
+ vm = vm_create_with_vcpus(NR_VCPUS, guest_main, vcpus);
+
+ sync_global_to_guest(vm, msrs);
+ sync_global_to_guest(vm, ignore_unsupported_msrs);
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < ARRAY_SIZE(__msrs); idx++) {
+ sync_global_to_guest(vm, idx);
+
+ vcpus_run(vcpus, NR_VCPUS);
+ vcpus_run(vcpus, NR_VCPUS);
+ }
+
+ kvm_vm_free(vm);
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ test_msrs();
+}
--
2.51.0.470.ga7dc726c21-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-09-19 22:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 114+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-19 22:32 [PATCH v16 00/51] KVM: x86: Super Mega CET Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 01/51] KVM: SEV: Rename kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code() to kvm_get_cached_sw_exit_code() Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 02/51] KVM: SEV: Read save fields from GHCB exactly once Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 21:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 03/51] KVM: SEV: Validate XCR0 provided by guest in GHCB Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 04/51] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 05/51] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 06/51] KVM: x86: Check XSS validity against guest CPUIDs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 07/51] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 08/51] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 09/51] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 2:10 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 16:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 10/51] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 11/51] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 12/51] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 13/51] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 2:58 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 9:06 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 14/51] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 15/51] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 16/51] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 17/51] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 3:03 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 18/51] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions affected by CET features Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 5:39 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 16:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 10:27 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-22 20:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 14:12 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-23 16:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 19/51] KVM: x86: Don't emulate task switches when IBT or SHSTK is enabled Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 6:41 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 17:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 14:16 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-22 11:27 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 20/51] KVM: x86: Emulate SSP[63:32]!=0 #GP(0) for FAR JMP to 32-bit mode Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 7:15 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:29 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 21/51] KVM: x86/mmu: WARN on attempt to check permissions for Shadow Stack #PF Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 7:17 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 7:46 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:33 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 22/51] KVM: x86/mmu: Pretty print PK, SS, and SGX flags in MMU tracepoints Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 7:18 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 16:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 14:46 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 23/51] KVM: x86: Allow setting CR4.CET if IBT or SHSTK is supported Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 7:25 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:46 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 24/51] KVM: nVMX: Always forward XSAVES/XRSTORS exits from L2 to L1 Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 8:15 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 14:49 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 25/51] KVM: x86: Add XSS support for CET_KERNEL and CET_USER Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 7:31 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:55 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 26/51] KVM: x86: Disable support for Shadow Stacks if TDP is disabled Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 7:45 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:56 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 27/51] KVM: x86: Disable support for IBT and SHSTK if allow_smaller_maxphyaddr is true Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 8:00 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 18:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 14:44 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-23 15:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 28/51] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 8:06 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:57 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 29/51] KVM: VMX: Configure nested capabilities after CPU capabilities Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 2:37 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 16:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 16:49 ` Xin Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 30/51] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 8:37 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 31/51] KVM: nVMX: Prepare for enabling CET support for nested guest Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 32/51] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 8:47 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 33/51] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 9:23 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 16:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 34/51] KVM: nVMX: Advertise new VM-Entry/Exit control bits for CET state Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 2:43 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 16:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 35/51] KVM: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 36/51] KVM: nSVM: Save/load CET Shadow Stack state to/from vmcb12/vmcb02 Sean Christopherson
2025-10-28 22:23 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-12-09 0:48 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 37/51] KVM: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 38/51] KVM: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs as appropriate Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 39/51] KVM: SEV: Synchronize MSR_IA32_XSS from the GHCB when it's valid Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 40/51] KVM: SVM: Enable shadow stack virtualization for SVM Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 41/51] KVM: x86: Add human friendly formatting for #XM, and #VE Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 8:29 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 42/51] KVM: x86: Define Control Protection Exception (#CP) vector Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 8:29 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 43/51] KVM: x86: Define AMD's #HV, #VC, and #SX exception vectors Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 44/51] KVM: selftests: Add ex_str() to print human friendly name of " Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-09-23 8:03 ` [PATCH v16 45/51] KVM: selftests: Add an MSR test to exercise guest/host and read/write Chao Gao
2025-09-23 16:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 46/51] KVM: selftests: Add support for MSR_IA32_{S,U}_CET to MSRs test Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 7:12 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 47/51] KVM: selftests: Extend MSRs test to validate vCPUs without supported features Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 48/51] KVM: selftests: Add KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG coverage to MSRs test Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 6:52 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 49/51] KVM: selftests: Add coverate for KVM-defined registers in " Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 6:31 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 16:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 50/51] KVM: selftests: Verify MSRs are (not) in save/restore list when (un)supported Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 6:46 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 17:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 51/51] KVM: VMX: Make CR4.CET a guest owned bit Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 8:34 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-24 14:32 ` [PATCH v16 00/51] KVM: x86: Super Mega CET Chao Gao
2025-09-24 18:07 ` Sean Christopherson
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