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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>,
	 John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	 Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
	 Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
	Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
	 Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>, Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Subject: [PATCH v16 17/51] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields
Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2025 15:32:24 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250919223258.1604852-18-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250919223258.1604852-1-seanjc@google.com>

From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>

Save constant values to HOST_{S_CET,SSP,INTR_SSP_TABLE} field explicitly.
Kernel IBT is supported and the setting in MSR_IA32_S_CET is static after
post-boot(The exception is BIOS call case but vCPU thread never across it)
and KVM doesn't need to refresh HOST_S_CET field before every VM-Enter/
VM-Exit sequence.

Host supervisor shadow stack is not enabled now and SSP is not accessible
to kernel mode, thus it's safe to set host IA32_INT_SSP_TAB/SSP VMCS field
to 0s. When shadow stack is enabled for CPL3, SSP is reloaded from PL3_SSP
before it exits to userspace. Check SDM Vol 2A/B Chapter 3/4 for SYSCALL/
SYSRET/SYSENTER SYSEXIT/RDSSP/CALL etc.

Prevent KVM module loading if host supervisor shadow stack SHSTK_EN is set
in MSR_IA32_S_CET as KVM cannot co-exit with it correctly.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
[sean: snapshot host S_CET if SHSTK *or* IBT is supported]
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h              |  1 +
 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
index f614428dbeda..59c83888bdc0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -100,6 +100,10 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl(void)
 	return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
 }
 
+static inline bool cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl(void)
+{
+	return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE);
+}
 static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_mpx(void)
 {
 	return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 5fe4a4b8efb1..a7d9e60b2771 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4325,6 +4325,21 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 
 	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
 		vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, kvm_host.efer);
+
+	/*
+	 * Supervisor shadow stack is not enabled on host side, i.e.,
+	 * host IA32_S_CET.SHSTK_EN bit is guaranteed to 0 now, per SDM
+	 * description(RDSSP instruction), SSP is not readable in CPL0,
+	 * so resetting the two registers to 0s at VM-Exit does no harm
+	 * to kernel execution. When execution flow exits to userspace,
+	 * SSP is reloaded from IA32_PL3_SSP. Check SDM Vol.2A/B Chapter
+	 * 3 and 4 for details.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl()) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_S_CET, kvm_host.s_cet);
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_SSP, 0);
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, 0);
+	}
 }
 
 void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index fee90388a861..d2cccc7594d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -9997,6 +9997,18 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
+		rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, kvm_host.s_cet);
+		/*
+		 * Linux doesn't yet support supervisor shadow stacks (SSS), so
+		 * KVM doesn't save/restore the associated MSRs, i.e. KVM may
+		 * clobber the host values.  Yell and refuse to load if SSS is
+		 * unexpectedly enabled, e.g. to avoid crashing the host.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_host.s_cet & CET_SHSTK_EN))
+			return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	memset(&kvm_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_caps));
 
 	x86_emulator_cache = kvm_alloc_emulator_cache();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 076eccba0f7e..65cbd454c4f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct kvm_host_values {
 	u64 efer;
 	u64 xcr0;
 	u64 xss;
+	u64 s_cet;
 	u64 arch_capabilities;
 };
 
-- 
2.51.0.470.ga7dc726c21-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-09-19 22:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 114+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-19 22:32 [PATCH v16 00/51] KVM: x86: Super Mega CET Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 01/51] KVM: SEV: Rename kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code() to kvm_get_cached_sw_exit_code() Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 02/51] KVM: SEV: Read save fields from GHCB exactly once Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 21:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 03/51] KVM: SEV: Validate XCR0 provided by guest in GHCB Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 04/51] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 05/51] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 06/51] KVM: x86: Check XSS validity against guest CPUIDs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 07/51] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 08/51] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 09/51] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  2:10   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 16:41     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 10/51] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 11/51] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 12/51] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 13/51] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  2:58   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23  9:06   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 14/51] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 15/51] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 16/51] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-09-22  3:03   ` [PATCH v16 17/51] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 18/51] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions affected by CET features Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  5:39   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 16:47     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22 10:27   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-22 20:04     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 14:12       ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-23 16:15         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 19/51] KVM: x86: Don't emulate task switches when IBT or SHSTK is enabled Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  6:41   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 17:23     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 14:16       ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-22 11:27   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 20/51] KVM: x86: Emulate SSP[63:32]!=0 #GP(0) for FAR JMP to 32-bit mode Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  7:15   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:29   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 21/51] KVM: x86/mmu: WARN on attempt to check permissions for Shadow Stack #PF Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  7:17   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22  7:46     ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:33       ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 22/51] KVM: x86/mmu: Pretty print PK, SS, and SGX flags in MMU tracepoints Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  7:18   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 16:18     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 14:46   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 23/51] KVM: x86: Allow setting CR4.CET if IBT or SHSTK is supported Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  7:25   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:46   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 24/51] KVM: nVMX: Always forward XSAVES/XRSTORS exits from L2 to L1 Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  8:15   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 14:49   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 25/51] KVM: x86: Add XSS support for CET_KERNEL and CET_USER Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  7:31   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:55   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 26/51] KVM: x86: Disable support for Shadow Stacks if TDP is disabled Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  7:45   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:56   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 27/51] KVM: x86: Disable support for IBT and SHSTK if allow_smaller_maxphyaddr is true Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:00   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 18:40   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 14:44   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-23 15:04     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 28/51] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:06   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-23 14:57   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 29/51] KVM: VMX: Configure nested capabilities after CPU capabilities Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  2:37   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 16:24     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23 16:49       ` Xin Li
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 30/51] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:37   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 31/51] KVM: nVMX: Prepare for enabling CET support for nested guest Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 32/51] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:47   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 33/51] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  9:23   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-22 16:35     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 34/51] KVM: nVMX: Advertise new VM-Entry/Exit control bits for CET state Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  2:43   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 16:28     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 35/51] KVM: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 36/51] KVM: nSVM: Save/load CET Shadow Stack state to/from vmcb12/vmcb02 Sean Christopherson
2025-10-28 22:23   ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-12-09  0:48     ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 37/51] KVM: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 38/51] KVM: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs as appropriate Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 39/51] KVM: SEV: Synchronize MSR_IA32_XSS from the GHCB when it's valid Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 40/51] KVM: SVM: Enable shadow stack virtualization for SVM Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 41/51] KVM: x86: Add human friendly formatting for #XM, and #VE Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:29   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 42/51] KVM: x86: Define Control Protection Exception (#CP) vector Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:29   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 43/51] KVM: x86: Define AMD's #HV, #VC, and #SX exception vectors Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 44/51] KVM: selftests: Add ex_str() to print human friendly name of " Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 45/51] KVM: selftests: Add an MSR test to exercise guest/host and read/write Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  8:03   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 16:51     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 46/51] KVM: selftests: Add support for MSR_IA32_{S,U}_CET to MSRs test Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  7:12   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 47/51] KVM: selftests: Extend MSRs test to validate vCPUs without supported features Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 48/51] KVM: selftests: Add KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG coverage to MSRs test Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  6:52   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 49/51] KVM: selftests: Add coverate for KVM-defined registers in " Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  6:31   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 16:59     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 50/51] KVM: selftests: Verify MSRs are (not) in save/restore list when (un)supported Sean Christopherson
2025-09-23  6:46   ` Chao Gao
2025-09-23 17:02     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 22:32 ` [PATCH v16 51/51] KVM: VMX: Make CR4.CET a guest owned bit Sean Christopherson
2025-09-22  8:34   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-24 14:32 ` [PATCH v16 00/51] KVM: x86: Super Mega CET Chao Gao
2025-09-24 18:07 ` Sean Christopherson

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