Kernel KVM virtualization development
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>,
	"Oliver Upton" <oupton@kernel.org>,
	kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 27/28] KVM: arm64: Expose FEAT_NV3 to guests
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 10:15:59 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260714101559.C60F61F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260714091641.1970822-28-maz@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Host nested virtualization capabilities (ID_AA64MMFR4_EL1.NV_frac) are leaked to non-NV guests, breaking live migration across heterogeneous hosts.
--

--- Patch [27]: [PATCH v2 27/28] KVM: arm64: Expose FEAT_NV3 to guests ---
commit 508d53194bf7ddb4e61f279e50216aa88dd973ad
Author: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

KVM: arm64: Expose FEAT_NV3 to guests
    
Further enable FEAT_NV3 by making it visible to NV guests.

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c
> index f646894fec9a9..70d605e60cfb3 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1741,7 +1741,9 @@ u64 limit_nv_id_reg(struct kvm *kvm, u32 reg, u64 val)
>  			val = 0;
>  		} else {
>  			val &= ID_AA64MMFR4_EL1_NV_frac;
> -			if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_NV2P1))
> +			if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_NV3))
> +				val = ID_REG_LIMIT_FIELD_ENUM(val, ID_AA64MMFR4_EL1, NV_frac, NV3);
> +			else if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_NV2P1))
>  				val = ID_REG_LIMIT_FIELD_ENUM(val, ID_AA64MMFR4_EL1, NV_frac, NV2P1);
>  			else
>  				val = SYS_FIELD_PREP_ENUM(ID_AA64MMFR4_EL1, NV_frac, NV2_ONLY);

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but while looking at NV feature
exposure here, could ID_AA64MMFR4_EL1.NV_frac leak into non-NV guests?

Looking at __kvm_read_sanitised_id_reg() in arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c,
it seems SYS_ID_AA64MMFR4_EL1 is not explicitly masked out for non-NV guests
in the switch statement:

	case SYS_ID_MMFR4_EL1:
		val &= ~ID_MMFR4_EL1_CCIDX;
		break;
	}

If a non-NV guest is created on an NV3-capable host, will the host's raw
NV_frac leak into the VM's ID_AA64MMFR4_EL1 register?

If this VM is later migrated to a host with only NV2P1, could userspace's
attempt to restore the capability via KVM_SET_ONE_REG fail because the
destination host's arm64_check_features() rejects the higher NV_frac value?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260714091641.1970822-1-maz@kernel.org?part=27

  reply	other threads:[~2026-07-14 10:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-14  9:16 [PATCH v2 00/28] KVM: arm64: Add support for FEAT_NV2p1 and FEAT_NV3 Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 01/28] arm64: sysreg: Emit RESx/UNKN values for Mapping/Fields definitions Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 02/28] arm64: Update ID_AA64MMFR4_EL1 description to 2026-03 JSON release Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 03/28] KVM: arm64: Merge guest's HCRX_EL2 using NV_HCRX_GUEST_EXCLUDE Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 04/28] KVM: arm64: Drop __HCRX_EL2_* masks Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 05/28] KVM: arm64: Plumb HCRX_EL2.SRMASKEn in HCRX_EL2 sanitisation Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 06/28] KVM: arm64: Classify CPTR_EL2 as a SR_LOC_SPECIAL register Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 07/28] KVM: arm64: Don't evaluate HCR_EL2.NV nor HFGITR_EL2.ERET on ERET fast path Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 08/28] arm64: Add ARM64_HAS_NV2P1 capability Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 09/28] KVM: arm64: Relax CPTR_EL2 handling when FEAT_NV2p1 is present Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14 10:12   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 10/28] KVM: arm64: Relax CNTHCTL_EL2 " Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:53   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 11/28] KVM: arm64: Expose FEAT_NV2p1 to NV guests Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 12/28] arm64: Add FEAT_NV2p1 detection Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:46   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14 11:45     ` Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14 13:18       ` Fuad Tabba
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 13/28] arm64: sysreg: Add NVHCR_EL2 description as a mirror of HCR_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 14/28] arm64: sysreg: Add HCRX_EL2 bits related to FEAT_NV3 Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:45   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14 13:04     ` Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 15/28] arm64: Add ARM64_HAS_NV3 capability Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:40   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14 11:42     ` Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 16/28] KVM: arm64: Split NV-specific exit fixups from the non-NV handling Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 17/28] KVM: arm64: Add NV3 control bits to HCRX_EL2 sanitisation Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 18/28] KVM: arm64: Add kvm_has_nv{2,3}() predicates Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:48   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 19/28] KVM: arm64: Make HCR_EL2 a non-VNCR register Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 20/28] KVM: arm64: Add sanitisation for NVHCR_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 21/28] KVM: arm64: Add NVHCR_EL2 handling to the sysreg array Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14 10:24   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14 12:56     ` Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 22/28] KVM: arm64: Add routing for NVHCR_EL2 trap Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 23/28] KVM: arm64: Add NVHCR_EL2 context switching Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14 10:03   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 24/28] KVM: arm64: Engage NV3 ERET trap elision Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 25/28] KVM: arm64: Engage NV3 TLBI " Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 26/28] KVM: arm64: Add FEAT_NV3 detection Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14 10:07   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 27/28] KVM: arm64: Expose FEAT_NV3 to guests Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14 10:15   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-14  9:16 ` [PATCH v2 28/28] arm64: Add override for ID_AA64MMFR4_EL1.NV_frac Marc Zyngier

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260714101559.C60F61F000E9@smtp.kernel.org \
    --to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=kvmarm@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=maz@kernel.org \
    --cc=oupton@kernel.org \
    --cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox