From: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
To: berrange@redhat.com, kchamart@redhat.com,
pierrick.bouvier@oss.qualcomm.com, peter.maydell@linaro.org,
mst@redhat.com, cohuck@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
eblake@redhat.com, armbru@redhat.com,
lorenzo.pieralisi@linaro.org, gshan@redhat.com,
enju.kohei@fujitsu.com
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, qemu-arm@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
mathieu.poirier@linaro.org
Subject: [RFC v3 24/24] hw/arm/boot: Skip bootloader for confidential guests
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2026 16:01:01 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260825220101.3443954-25-mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260825220101.3443954-1-mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
From: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
An independent verifier needs to reconstruct the content of guest memory
in order to attest that it is running trusted code. To avoid having to
reconstruct the bootloader generated by QEMU, skip this step and jump
directly to the kernel, with the DTB address in x0 as specified by the
Linux boot protocol [1].
[1] https://docs.kernel.org/arch/arm64/booting.html
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
---
hw/arm/boot.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/arm/boot.c b/hw/arm/boot.c
index ad588121452a..c555228a0dcd 100644
--- a/hw/arm/boot.c
+++ b/hw/arm/boot.c
@@ -731,7 +731,13 @@ static void do_cpu_reset(void *opaque)
if (cpu == info->primary_cpu) {
AddressSpace *as = arm_boot_address_space(cpu, info);
- cpu_set_pc(cs, info->loader_start);
+ if (info->confidential) {
+ assert(is_a64(env));
+ env->xregs[0] = info->dtb_start;
+ cpu_set_pc(cs, info->entry);
+ } else {
+ cpu_set_pc(cs, info->loader_start);
+ }
if (!have_dtb(info)) {
set_kernel_args(info, as);
@@ -821,7 +827,8 @@ static ssize_t arm_load_elf(struct arm_boot_info *info, uint64_t *pentry,
}
static uint64_t load_aarch64_image(const char *filename, hwaddr mem_base,
- hwaddr *entry, AddressSpace *as)
+ hwaddr *entry, AddressSpace *as,
+ bool confidential)
{
const size_t max_bytes = LOAD_IMAGE_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES;
hwaddr kernel_load_offset = KERNEL64_LOAD_ADDR;
@@ -873,7 +880,8 @@ static uint64_t load_aarch64_image(const char *filename, hwaddr mem_base,
* bootloader, we can just load it starting at 2MB+offset rather
* than 0MB + offset.
*/
- if (kernel_load_offset < BOOTLOADER_MAX_SIZE) {
+ if (kernel_load_offset < BOOTLOADER_MAX_SIZE &&
+ !confidential) {
kernel_load_offset += 2 * MiB;
}
}
@@ -957,7 +965,8 @@ static void arm_setup_direct_kernel_boot(ARMCPU *cpu,
}
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_AARCH64) && kernel_size < 0) {
kernel_size = load_aarch64_image(info->kernel_filename,
- info->loader_start, &entry, as);
+ info->loader_start, &entry, as,
+ info->confidential);
is_linux = 1;
if (kernel_size >= 0) {
image_low_addr = entry;
@@ -1098,8 +1107,11 @@ static void arm_setup_direct_kernel_boot(ARMCPU *cpu,
fixupcontext[FIXUP_ENTRYPOINT_LO] = entry;
fixupcontext[FIXUP_ENTRYPOINT_HI] = entry >> 32;
- arm_write_bootloader("bootloader", as, info->loader_start,
- primary_loader, fixupcontext);
+ /* Immediately jump to the kernel when guest is a Realm */
+ if (!info->confidential) {
+ arm_write_bootloader("bootloader", as, info->loader_start,
+ primary_loader, fixupcontext);
+ }
if (info->write_board_setup) {
info->write_board_setup(cpu, info);
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-25 22:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-25 22:00 [RFC v3 00/24] Add Realm support to QEMU-VMM Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 01/24] linux-headers: Add RME related definitions Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 02/24] target/arm/kvm: Return immediately on error in kvm_arch_init() Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 03/24] target/arm: Add confidential guest support Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 04/24] target/arm/kvm-rme: Add mechanic to initialize realms Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 05/24] target/arm/kvm: Split kvm_arch_get/put_registers Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 06/24] target/arm/kvm-rme: Initialize vCPU Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 07/24] target/arm/kvm: Create scratch Realm VM when requested Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 08/24] target/arm/kvm: Use kvm_vm_check_extension() where necessary Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 09/24] hw/core/loader: Add a ROM loader notifier Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 10/24] target/arm/kvm-rme: Keep track of images loaded in Realm memory Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 11/24] target/arm/kvm-rme: Populate Realm with runtime images Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 12/24] target/arm/cpu: Set number of breakpoints and watchpoints in KVM Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 13/24] target/arm/cpu: Set number of PMU counters " Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 14/24] target/arm/cpu: Don't read Realm registers Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 15/24] hw/arm/virt: Set proper conduit method for Realms Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 16/24] hw/arm/virt: Embed Realm VM type with IPA address space Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 17/24] hw/arm/virt: Reserve one bit of guest physical address for RME Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 18/24] hw/arm/virt: Disable DTB randomness for confidential VMs Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 19/24] hw/arm/virt: Move virt_flash_create() to machvirt_init() Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 20/24] hw/arm/virt: Use RAM instead of flash for confidential guest firmware Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 21/24] target/arm/kvm-rme: Add DMA remapping for the shared memory region Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:00 ` [RFC v3 22/24] docs/interop/firmware.json: Add arm-rme firmware feature Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:01 ` [RFC v3 23/24] hw/arm/boot: Load DTB as is for confidential VMs Mathieu Poirier
2026-08-25 22:01 ` Mathieu Poirier [this message]
2026-08-27 13:06 ` [RFC v3 00/24] Add Realm support to QEMU-VMM Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-08-27 13:28 ` Lorenzo Pieralisi
2026-09-01 13:20 ` Markus Armbruster
2026-09-02 15:45 ` Mathieu Poirier
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