From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Peter Fang <peter.fang@intel.com>,
Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Yilun Xu <yilun.xu@intel.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@intel.com>,
"kas@kernel.org" <kas@kernel.org>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: TDG quote analysis
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 17:18:14 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <arRsRkn1V8A3xUE5@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGtprH8syQUQf9PjPe8o6rBFSg+01k=Hb4cvvn3TqED3uWb+yQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Sep 23, 2026, Vishal Annapurve wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 22, 2026 at 9:09 PM Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Sep 21, 2026 at 4:06 PM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On 9/21/26 16:00, Peter Fang wrote:
> > > >> is how to hide the fact that someone in the future might think following AMD's
> > > >> lead and putting a precious resource into a tiny microprosser on a slow bus is a
> > > >> fantastic idea.
> > > > As shocking as it sounds, there are actually cloud providers out there
> > > > that are wanting this, or at the very least wanting to see how it goes
> > > > in real deployment. I think memory side channel attacks are a real
> > > > concern for some of them. But yeah this is not great from a performance
> > > > perspective.
> > >
> > > I'll believe it when I see it (on this mailing list).
> > >
> > > If folks want complexity and low performance in the kernel for
> > > side-channel defense, then I'm your guy. I've made half a career out of
> > > it. All that I ask is that they come and ask for it in the open. Here,
> > > please.
> >
> > Google is tracking use cases for deploying S3M-based attestation for
> > both TDX guest workloads and host workloads.
> >
>
> To clarify this statement further and address the discussion from the
> PUCK meeting: Google is tracking use cases for deploying S3M based
> signing of attestation quotes (or S3M-based quoting as referred to in
> this thread) for TDX guest workloads.
Good timing, I was just chatting with Erdem about this. The TL;DR of "why" is
that anything that's done on-CPU is more vulnerable to side channel attacks, so
hyper-paranoid use cases that *also* know the tradeoffs involved may want to
use much slower, but more secure (in theory) S3M signing.
From an upstream perspective, I think we don't care? Or rather, we *shouldn't*
have to care beyond letting the admin flip a TDX Module switch. I'm a-ok letting
end users opt-in to ultra-paranoid mode, with a pile of disclaimers around the
shortcomings and tradeoffs involved. I.e. I don't really care how the quote is
generated, I just don't want to carry any kernel/KVM code to make it less painful
(and it should absolutely be opt-in).
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-24 0:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-16 0:48 TDG quote analysis Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-09-16 18:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-16 18:49 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-09-16 19:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-16 22:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-09-16 23:00 ` Peter Fang
2026-09-16 23:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-17 0:56 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-09-17 13:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-17 18:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-09-17 19:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-17 21:32 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-09-18 0:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-18 2:39 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-09-18 13:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-18 18:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-09-18 21:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-21 23:00 ` Peter Fang
2026-09-21 23:06 ` Dave Hansen
2026-09-23 4:09 ` Vishal Annapurve
2026-09-24 0:03 ` Vishal Annapurve
2026-09-24 0:18 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-09-24 0:44 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-09-24 16:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-21 23:04 ` Dave Hansen
2026-09-21 23:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-21 23:36 ` Dave Hansen
2026-09-21 23:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-22 0:03 ` Dave Hansen
2026-09-22 6:48 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-09-22 17:07 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-09-23 8:50 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-09-23 22:50 ` Peter Fang
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