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From: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
To: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Cc: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>,
	Atish Patra <atish.patra@linux.dev>,
	 Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	 Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>,
	 Bingyu Xian <shanbeeyoo@gmail.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	 linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] RISC-V: KVM: Batch user accesses when updating steal time
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 23:59:33 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <awGevuQAuA349gO8@z790sl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <awGJaUFUmBOa4xfO@orel>

On Sat, Nov 21, 2026 at 01:23:43PM +0100, Andrew Jones wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 21, 2026 at 02:20:17AM +0900, Koichiro Den wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 05:40:29PM +0100, Andrew Jones wrote:
> > > On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 03:22:41PM +0900, Koichiro Den wrote:
> > > > Updating the SBI STA shared structure performs 2x get_user() + 3x
> > > > put_user() calls, each of which toggles sstatus.SUM.
> > > > 
> > > > Keep SUM enabled across all five accesses to the shared structure.
> > > > 
> > > > Note that write barriers are added to order the odd sequence store
> > > > before the steal-time update and the even sequence store after it.
> > 
> > Hi Andrew, thanks for the review.
> > 
> > > 
> > > The barrier additions should probably be posted separately with a Fixes
> > > tag.
> > 
> > That's exactly what I wasn't sure about when I read the ISA spec.
> > It was unclear to me from the Zicsr ordering rules whether the SUM toggle in
> > the old code's get_user() and put_user() calls also order the stores to 'sequence'
> > and 'steal' as seen by another hart.
> > (I don't think they do, but I'm not 100% sure. It feels a bit like trying to
> > prove a negative, as I couldn't find a clear statement. I may have missed one
> > though. OTOH, the new code surely needs the barrier, so I included them.)
> > 
> > Do you read the spec as allowing another hart to observe those stores out of
> > order in the old code? If so, I agree the barriers can go in a separate patch.
> 
> Yes, we always needed the barriers since we need something to pair with
> the virt_rmb()'s in pv_time_steal_clock(). get/put_user weren't covering
> for that omission either because CSR accesses are weakly ordered.

Thanks. What I had in mind was the exception in [1] for a CSR access that
"modifies the execution behavior of the instruction that performs the explicit
memory access". I wondered whether toggling it between the stores in the old
code also ordered them as seen by another hart. I agree we can't rely on that.

I'll split the barriers out into the first patch of v2 and add a Fixes tag.

[1] https://docs.riscv.org/reference/isa/v20260120/unpriv/zicsr.html#5-1-1-1-csr-access-ordering

> 
> > 
> > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
> > > > ---
> > > > To reviewers: please let me know if you'd prefer
> > > > scoped_user_rw_access() here.
> 
> For scoped_ or not, whatever you think reads the best. I prefer scoped_
> when it makes sense, as it's harder to get wrong, but readability also
> matters.

Makes sense. After polishing up the scoped_ version locally and looking at both
side by side, I now agree the scoped_ version looks a bit cleaner. I'll use it
in v2.

Thanks for the review.

Best regards,
Koichiro Den

> 
> Thanks,
> drew

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-21 14:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18  6:22 [PATCH 0/2] RISC-V: KVM: Lessen steal time update overhead Koichiro Den
2026-11-18  6:22 ` [PATCH 1/2] RISC-V: KVM: Batch user accesses when updating steal time Koichiro Den
2026-11-20 16:40   ` Andrew Jones
2026-11-20 17:20     ` Koichiro Den
2026-11-21 12:23       ` Andrew Jones
2026-11-21 14:59         ` Koichiro Den [this message]
2026-11-18  6:22 ` [PATCH 2/2] RISC-V: KVM: Skip steal-time updates when run_delay is unchanged Koichiro Den
2026-11-20 16:45   ` Andrew Jones
2026-11-20 17:25     ` Koichiro Den

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