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From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
To: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Maxwell Bland <mbland@motorola.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>,
	Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	x86@kernel.org, Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v8 04/24] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 11:15:38 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0554305f-d2a1-4727-bada-0fba203a8af6@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e334c595-92ab-4eb9-a096-35602d57ae6d@kernel.org>

On 22/06/2026 15:16, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
> On 5/26/26 13:15, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
>> Introduce a helper that sets the permissions of a given pkey
>> (POIndex) in the POR_ELx format, and make use of it in
>> arch_set_user_pkey_access().
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h |  7 +++++++
>>  arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c          | 26 ++++++++++----------------
>>  2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
>> index d913d5b529e4..bffb4d2b1246 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
>> @@ -31,4 +31,11 @@ static inline bool por_elx_allows_exec(u64 por, u8 pkey)
>>  	return perm & POE_X;
>>  }
>>  
>> +static inline u64 por_elx_set_pkey_perms(u64 por, u8 pkey, u64 perms)
>> +{
>> +	u64 shift = POR_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(pkey);
>> +
>> +	return (por & ~(POE_MASK << shift)) | (perms << shift);
>> +}
>> +
>>  #endif /* _ASM_ARM64_POR_H */
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
>> index dd85e093ffdb..493310cf0486 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
>> @@ -2339,8 +2339,8 @@ void __cpu_replace_ttbr1(pgd_t *pgdp, bool cnp)
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
>>  int arch_set_user_pkey_access(int pkey, unsigned long init_val)
>>  {
>> -	u64 new_por;
>> -	u64 old_por;
>> +	u64 new_perms;
> You should spell out the renaming of the variable.

Sure, will do.

> Given that perms is 4bit per key, should we use a u8 for it instead?

We could, in fact I'm just noticing that this all very inconsistent
right now: the POE_* constants are defined as UL, but por_elx_allows_*
and other functions use u8. I'll clean that up in a separate patch and
use u8 here.

>> +	u64 por;
>>  
>>  	if (!system_supports_poe())
>>  		return -ENOSPC;
>> @@ -2354,25 +2354,19 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(int pkey, unsigned long init_val)
>>  		return -EINVAL;
>>  
>>  	/* Set the bits we need in POR:  */
>> -	new_por = POE_RWX;
>> +	new_perms = POE_RWX;
>>  	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
>> -		new_por &= ~POE_W;
>> +		new_perms &= ~POE_W;
>>  	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
>> -		new_por &= ~POE_RW;
>> +		new_perms &= ~POE_RW;
>>  	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_READ)
>> -		new_por &= ~POE_R;
>> +		new_perms &= ~POE_R;
>>  	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE)
>> -		new_por &= ~POE_X;
>> +		new_perms &= ~POE_X;
>>  
>> -	/* Shift the bits in to the correct place in POR for pkey: */
>> -	new_por = POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(pkey, new_por);
>> -
>> -	/* Get old POR and mask off any old bits in place: */
>> -	old_por = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
>> -	old_por &= ~(POE_MASK << POR_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(pkey));
>> -
>> -	/* Write old part along with new part: */
>> -	write_sysreg_s(old_por | new_por, SYS_POR_EL0);
>> +	por = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
>> +	por = por_elx_set_pkey_perms(por, pkey, new_perms);
>> +	write_sysreg_s(por, SYS_POR_EL0);
> Was wondering whether to move reading+writing of the register into the same
> helper, but you cannot reuse this exactly the same way for SYS_POR_EL1 as it seems.

It wouldn't be useful because the new user of the helper,
por_set_kpkeys_context(), doesn't itself read or write the register.

> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>

Thanks!

- Kevin


  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-30  9:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-26 11:15 [PATCH RFC v8 00/24] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 01/24] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 13:17   ` Linus Walleij
2026-05-27  8:24     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-06-16 15:32       ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-16 15:19   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-18 13:22     ` Linus Walleij
2026-06-22 18:38       ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-30  9:11         ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-06-30  9:13     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 02/24] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2026-06-16 15:41   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-30  9:14     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 03/24] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2026-06-22 13:06   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 04/24] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2026-06-22 13:16   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-30  9:15     ` Kevin Brodsky [this message]
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 05/24] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2026-06-22 13:35   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-30  9:16     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 06/24] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 07/24] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 08/24] arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 09/24] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 10/24] memblock: Move INIT_MEMBLOCK_* macros to header Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 11/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 12/24] mm: kpkeys: Protect regular page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 13/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce early page table allocator Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 14/24] mm: kpkeys: Protect vmemmap page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 15/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce hook for protecting static " Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 16/24] arm64: kpkeys: Implement arch_supports_kpkeys_early() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 17/24] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 18/24] arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 19/24] arm64: kpkeys: Protect early page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 20/24] arm64: kpkeys: Protect init_pg_dir Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 21/24] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 22/24] arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES switches Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 23/24] arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 24/24] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky

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