[PATCH RFC v9 00/25] pkeys-based page table hardening

[PATCH RFC v9 00/25] pkeys-based page table hardening

[Kevin Brodsky]

[Sending during the merge window in case reviewers have spare
cycles; I'm not aiming to have this series merged in v7.3.]

This is a proposal to leverage protection keys (pkeys) to harden
critical kernel data, by making it mostly read-only. The series includes
a simple framework called "kpkeys" to manipulate pkeys for in-kernel use,
as well as a page table hardening feature based on that framework,
"kpkeys_hardened_pgtables". Both are implemented on arm64 as a proof of
concept, but they are designed to be compatible with any architecture
that supports pkeys.

The proposed approach is a typical use of pkeys: the data to protect is
mapped with a given pkey P, and the pkey register is initially
configured to grant read-only access to P. Where the protected data
needs to be written to, the pkey register is temporarily switched to
grant write access to P on the current CPU.

The key fact this approach relies on is that the target data is
only written to via a limited and well-defined API. This makes it
possible to explicitly switch the pkey register where needed, without
introducing excessively invasive changes, and only for a small amount of
trusted code.

Page tables are chosen as an initial target because of their especially
critical nature - a single write may result in arbitrary pages becoming
accessible to any context (including userspace). In order to keep the
series digestible for reviewers, this version focuses on functionality
rather than performance, making it most suitable as a debug feature. The
key trade-off is the requirement to PTE-map the linear map - see section
"Protected page table allocation" for details.

This series has similarities with the "PKS write protected page tables"
series posted by Rick Edgecombe a few years ago [1] but it is not
specific to x86/PKS - the approach is meant to be generic.

This proposal (as of RFC v5) was presented at Linux Security Summit
Europe 2025 [2].

[Table of contents]

* kpkeys
  - pkey register management

* kpkeys_hardened_pgtables
  - Protected page table allocation
  - kpkeys context switching
  - Performance
  - Limitations

* This series
  - Branches

* Threat model

* Further use-cases

* Open questions

kpkeys
======

The use of pkeys involves two separate mechanisms: assigning a pkey to
pages, and defining the pkeys -> permissions mapping via the pkey
register. This is implemented through the following interface:

- Pages are assigned a pkey in the linear map using set_memory_pkey().
  This is sufficient for this series, but it is also plausible for
  higher-level allocators to support marking allocations with a given
  pkey.

- The pkey register is configured based on a *kpkeys context*. kpkeys
  contexts are represented as simple integers that correspond to a given
  configuration, for instance:

  KPKEYS_CTX_DEFAULT:
        RW access to KPKEYS_PKEY_DEFAULT
        RO access to any other KPKEYS_PKEY_*

  KPKEYS_CTX_<FEAT>:
        RW access to KPKEYS_PKEY_DEFAULT
        RW access to KPKEYS_PKEY_<FEAT>
        RO access to any other KPKEYS_PKEY_*

  Only pkeys that are managed by the kpkeys framework are impacted;
  permissions for other pkeys are left unchanged (this allows for other
  schemes using pkeys to be used in parallel, and arch-specific use of
  certain pkeys).

  The current kpkeys context is changed by calling
  kpkeys_enter_context(), which will set the pkey register
  accordingly and return the original state. A
  subsequent call to kpkeys_leave_context() restores the original
  state (and thus the original kpkeys context). The numeric value of
  KPKEYS_CTX_* (kpkeys context) is purely symbolic and thus generic,
  however each architecture is free to define non-default pkeys
  values (KPKEYS_PKEY_*).

pkey register management
------------------------

The kpkeys model relies on the kernel pkey register being set to a
specific value for the duration of a relatively small section of code,
and otherwise to the default value. Two aspects should be considered:

1. Exception entry/return

2. Thread context-switch

Ideally, an implementation would switch the pkey register in both
cases: 1. reset it to a fixed state on exception entry, and 2.
context-switch it along with the other thread registers.

In this series, the arm64 implementation only performs 2. i.e.
context-switching POR_EL1 per-thread. This ensures that each thread's
pkey register is preserved no matter how a thread is rescheduled
(voluntarily or not).

Resetting POR_EL1 on exception entry proved problematic for the
kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature with the lazy MMU optimisation (see
next section), because page table setters may be used immediately when a
thread resumes after being rescheduled on irqexit, before exception
return. If POR_EL1 is reset on exception entry, we may end up in an
inconsistent state where lazy MMU mode may be enabled but POR_EL1 does
not allow writing to page tables until exception return. For more
details, see [3].

Having the entire exception handling inherit the interrupted POR_EL1 is
not ideal as it increases the amount of code run with a potentially
privileged kpkeys state. It may be possible to pause the lazy MMU mode
to avoid the issue described above, but it isn't clear whether this is
a general enough solution.

An important assumption is that all kpkeys contexts allow RW access to the
default pkey (0). Context-switching and saving/restoring POR_EL1 on
exception entry/return becomes significantly more complex otherwise.

kpkeys_hardened_pgtables
========================

The kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature uses the interface above to make
the (kernel and user) page tables read-only by default, enabling write
access only in helpers such as set_pte().

Protected page table allocation
-------------------------------

Kernel page tables are required as soon as the MMU is turned on, i.e.
extremely early. Different allocators are therefore used to obtain
page table pages (PTPs), depending on where we are in the boot sequence.
In chronological order:

1. Static pools (in the kernel image itself). Typically used to map the
   kernel image. By definition these pools have a fixed size.

2. memblock. Mainly used to create the linear map and sparse-vmemmap
   page tables.

3. Buddy allocator, via pagetable_alloc(). Used for everything else,
   including user page tables, once available.

No matter which allocator is used, this feature relies on the linear map
being modified to map PTPs with KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES. If large block
mappings are used to create the linear map, blocks may need to be split
when setting the pkey for individual PTPs, which in turn requires a new
PTP to be allocated. RFC v6 introduced a PTP allocator that both handles
splitting and minimises it. This fairly complex component was removed in
RFC v7 so that reviewers can focus on the core logic of the feature,
which is otherwise fairly straightforward.

The present series therefore requires the linear map to be fully
PTE-mapped, so that PTPs can be individually protected without worrying
about block splitting.

The different sources of PTPs listed above are protected as follows:

1. Static pools: an arch hook is introduced to set the pkey of those
   PTPs once the linear map is set up.

2. Early page tables: a very simple memblock-based allocator is
   introduced. The linear map may not be ready yet when these PTPs are
   allocated, so this allocator tracks all allocated pages so that their
   pkey can be set later.

3. Regular page tables: directly obtained from the buddy allocator and
   their pkey set right away.

All this infrastructure is generic. This series only includes the
required plumbing for arm64, but it is meant to be plumbed into x86 in a
similar manner.

kpkeys context switching
------------------------

Page tables are only supposed to be written via a fairly small set of
helpers, so only a few switches to a privileged kpkeys context need to be
introduced.

However, a naive implementation is very inefficient when many PTEs are
changed at once, as the kpkeys context is switched twice for every PTE.
On arm64, this means two barriers (ISBs) per PTE. This is optimised by
making use of the lazy MMU mode to batch those switches: 1. switch to
KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES on arch_enter_lazy_mmu_mode(), 2. skip any kpkeys
switch while in that section, and 3. restore the kpkeys context on
arch_leave_lazy_mmu_mode(). When that last function already issues an
ISB (when updating kernel page tables), we get a further optimisation as
we can skip the ISB when restoring the kpkeys context.

The lazy MMU mode may be enabled/disabled in a nested manner. This is
handled thanks to [5] - if nesting occurs, only the outer section will
switch kpkeys context.

Performance
-----------

No arm64 hardware currently implements POE. Benchmarking has however
been performed on a mock implementation, which should be fairly
representative. On a "real-world" and fork-heavy workload like
kernbench, the estimated overhead is around 2% in system time, while the
real time overhead is negligible. Microbenchmarks focused on
creating/destroying mappings yield overheads up to 15%, but typically
much smaller once batching kicks in (when modifying many PTEs at once).

For more details, see this section in RFC v5 and v6 (linked in the
changelog).

This series
===========

The series is composed of two parts:

- The kpkeys framework (patch 1-9). The main API is introduced in
  <linux/kpkeys.h>, and it is implemented on arm64 using the POE
  (Permission Overlay Extension) feature.

- The kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature (patch 10-25). <linux/kpkeys.h>
  is extended with an API to protect page table pages and a guard object
  to switch kpkeys context accordingly, both gated on a static key. This
  is then used in generic and arm64 pgtable handling code as needed.
  Finally a simple KUnit-based test suite is added to demonstrate the
  page table protection.

Branches
--------

To make reviewing and testing easier, this series is available here:

  https://gitlab.arm.com/linux-arm/linux-kb

The following branches are available:

- kpkeys/rfc-v9 - this series, as posted

Threat model
============

The proposed scheme aims at mitigating data-only attacks (e.g.
use-after-free/cross-cache attacks). In other words, it is assumed that
control flow is not corrupted, and that the attacker does not achieve
arbitrary code execution. Nothing prevents the pkey register from being
set to its most permissive state - the assumption is that the register
is only modified on legitimate code paths.

A few related notes:

- Functions that set the pkey register are all implemented inline.
  Besides performance considerations, this is meant to avoid creating
  a function that can be used as a straightforward gadget to set the
  pkey register to an arbitrary value.

- kpkeys_enter_context() only accepts a compile-time constant as argument,
  as a variable could be manipulated by an attacker. This could be
  relaxed but it seems unlikely that a variable kpkeys context would be
  needed in practice.

Further use-cases
=================

It should be possible to harden various targets using kpkeys, including:

- struct cred - proposal posted as a separate series [6]

- eBPF programs (preventing direct W/X to core kernel code/data) -
  work in progress [7]

- fixmap

- SELinux state (e.g. struct selinux_state::initialized)

... and many others.

kpkeys could also be used to strengthen the confidentiality of secret
data by making it completely inaccessible by default, and granting
read-only or read-write access as needed. This requires such data to be
rarely accessed (or via a limited interface only). One example on arm64
is the pointer authentication keys in thread_struct, whose leakage to
userspace would lead to pointer authentication being easily defeated.

Open questions
==============

A few aspects in this RFC that are debatable and/or worth discussing:

- There is currently no restriction on how kpkeys contexts map to pkeys
  permissions. A typical approach is to allocate one pkey per context and
  make it writable in that context only. As the number of contexts
  increases, we may however run out of pkeys, especially on arm64 (just
  8 pkeys with POE). Depending on the use-cases, it may be acceptable to
  use the same pkey for the data associated to multiple contexts.

Any comment or feedback is highly appreciated, be it on the high-level
approach or implementation choices!

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
Changelog

RFC v8..v9:

- Patch 1 [David Hildenbrand, Linus Walleij]:
  * Abstracted the pkey register using a new struct
    arch_kpkeys_state, itself contained in struct kpkeys_state. The
    main interface is now kpkeys_{enter,leave}_context().
  * A bool in struct kpkeys_state is now used to skip the context
    restore, instead of using a magic pkey register value
    (KPKEYS_PKEY_REG_INVAL).
  * Context values are now defined as enum kpkeys_ctx.
  * All types are defined in a separate kpkeys_types.h to avoid
    circular dependencies. This also replaces
    <asm-generic/kpkeys.h>.
  * Renamed kpkeys_enabled() to kpkeys_supported().
  * Replaced KPKEYS_PKEY_DEFAULT with hardcoded 0 (this is more
    consistent with user pkeys, and that value cannot easily be
    changed).

- Patch 4: changed type of POE permissions to u8, clarified commit
  message. [David H]

- Patch 5:
  * Aligned with new API in patch 1.
  * Added check to skip POR_EL1 updates if we have already entered
    the requested context (no value change).
  * Made prev_por/new_por const. [David H]

- Added patch 20 to make the kernel image alias of init_pg_dir
  read-only. [Sashiko]

- Patch 23:
  * Aligned with patch 1 by storing a full struct kpkeys_state in
    thread_struct.
  * Made kpkeys_lazy_mmu_{enter,exit} static inline. [Sashiko]

- Rebased on v7.2.

RFC v8: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260526-kpkeys-v8-0-eaaacdacc67c@arm.com/

RFC v7..v8:

[Changes below are addressing issues reported by Sashiko [13]]

- Patch 3: do not enable overlays for user memory types in POR_EL1 -
  this breaks the atomic futex uaccess operations. Added some
  comment and test in a separate series [14] to clarify this.

- Patch 5: fix return type of arch_kpkeys_set_context()

- Patch 7: reset POR_EL1 to POR_EL1_INIT when cloning a thread. The
  pkey register value is tied to the context of the original thread
  (e.g. being in lazy MMU mode) and should not be inherited by the
  new thread in the general case.

- Patch 11: make ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES explicitly depend
  on ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS (not sure why I didn't do that to start with...)

- Patch 14:
  * GFP_PGTABLE_KERNEL is not defined on all arch's, use
    GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO instead [reported by kernel CI]
  * Amend the arm64 hotplug code to use pagetable_free(), ensuring
    that the pkey is reset when vmemmap page tables are freed (this
    may belong to a separate patch, surprisingly x86 already uses
    pagetable_free() for this purpose)
  * Fix new caller of vmemmap_alloc_block_zero(), call memset()
    directly since that's the only caller left [also reported by
    kernel CI]
  * Added a note to the commit message explaining why
    __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL is not used

- Patch 21: reduced scope of guard in __ptep_set_access_flags_anysz()

- Patch 24: write to P4D/PUD if not folded in write_direct_map_pggtables()

- Other minor improvements

RFC v7: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260505-kpkeys-v7-0-20c0bdd97197@arm.com/

RFC v6..v7:

- Rebased on v7.1-rc2

- Removed large block mapping support to ease reviewing and focus on the
  core changes. [David Hildenbrand] Accordingly, patched 19 was modified
  to force PTE mappings if kpkeys_hardened_pgtables is enabled.

- Added patch 14 to protect the sparse-vmemmap page tables.

- Dropped patch "arm64: Reset POR_EL1 on exception entry" as it may
  cause a crash when a thread with lazy MMU mode enabled is resumed on
  the irqexit path. See [3] and section "pkey register management" for
  details. The POR_EL1_INIT bits were squashed into patch 5 (they are
  still needed for patch 8).

- Renamed "kpkeys level" to "kpkeys context" as there is no longer a
  notion of ordering - each "context" may be given access to any set of
  pkeys. [David H]

- Re-organised *_enabled() functions [partially suggested by David H].
  The interface is now fully generic and defined in <linux/kpkeys.h>:

    - kpkeys_enabled() -> arch_supports_kpkeys()
    - kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled() -> static key
    - kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_early_enabled() -> arch_supports_kpkeys_early()

  Each arch then implements (without #ifdef'ing required):

    - arch_supports_kpkeys()
    - arch_supports_kpkeys_early()

  See patch 1, 5, 11, 16 for details.

- Patch 2: remove KASAN tag when checking if the address falls in the
  linear map [reported by Yeoreum Yun, thanks!]

- Patch 11: export symbol for the lazy MMU KUnit tests (reported by
  build CI)

- Patch 24: added test for the sparse-vmemmap page tables

RFC v6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/20260227175518.3728055-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com/

RFC v5..v6:

- Rebased on v7.0-rc1 (includes support for splitting large block
  mappings with BBML2-noabort [4] and nested lazy MMU sections [5])

- Completely new approach for allocating protected page tables, see
  section "Protected page table allocation". Patch 11-26 are mostly new.

- Patch 6: check arch_kpkeys_enabled() to make sure that page table
  attributes are still changed when using the mock implementation

- Patch 9: new patch (thank you Yeoreum!)

- Patch 28: minor changes following the merging of the nested lazy MMU
  series [5]

- Patch 30:
    * Many tests added to provide better coverage of the various page
      table allocation paths
    * Require that the tests are built-in (many referenced symbols are
      not exported)
    * Some refactoring to reduce duplication and add logging

RFC v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/20250815085512.2182322-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com/

RFC v4..v5:

- Rebased on v6.17-rc1.

- Cover letter: re-ran benchmarks on top of v6.17-rc1, made various
  small improvements especially to the "Performance" section.

- Patch 18: disable batching while in interrupt, since POR_EL1 is reset
  on exception entry, making the TIF_LAZY_MMU flag meaningless. This
  fixes a crash that may occur when a page table page is freed while in
  interrupt context.

- Patch 17: ensure that the target kernel address is actually
  PTE-mapped. Certain mappings (e.g. code) may be PMD-mapped instead -
  this explains why the change made in v4 was required.

RFC v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20250411091631.954228-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com/

RFC v3..v4:

- Added appropriate handling of the arm64 pkey register (POR_EL1):
  context-switching between threads and resetting on exception entry
  (patch 7 and 8). See section "pkey register management" above for more
  details. A new POR_EL1_INIT macro is introduced to make the default
  value available to assembly (where POR_EL1 is reset on exception
  entry); it is updated in each patch allocating new keys.

- Added patch 18 making use of the lazy_mmu mode to batch switches to
  KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES - just once per lazy_mmu section rather than on
  every pgtable write. See section "Performance" for details.

- Rebased on top of [8]. No direct impact on the patches, but it ensures that
  the ctor/dtor is always called for kernel pgtables. This is an
  important fix as kernel PTEs allocated after boot were not protected
  by kpkeys_hardened_pgtables in v3 - a new test was added to patch 17
  to ensure that pgtables created by vmalloc are protected too.

- Rebased on top of [9]. The batching of kpkeys level switches in patch
  18 relies on the last patch in [9].

- Moved kpkeys guard definitions out of <linux/kpkeys.h> and to a relevant
  header for each subsystem (e.g. <asm/pgtable.h> for the
  kpkeys_hardened_pgtables guard).

- Patch 1,5: marked kpkeys_{set_level,restore_pkey_reg} as
  __always_inline to ensure that no callable gadget is created.
  [Maxwell Bland's suggestion]

- Patch 5: added helper __kpkeys_set_pkey_reg_nosync().

- Patch 10: marked kernel_pgtables_set_pkey() and related helpers as
  __init. [Linus Walleij's suggestion]

- Patch 11: added helper kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled(), renamed the
  static key to kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key.

- Patch 17: followed the KUnit conventions more closely. [Kees Cook's
  suggestion]

- Patch 17: changed the address used in the write_linear_map_pte()
  test. It seems that the PTEs that map some functions are allocated in
  ZONE_DMA and read-only (unclear why exactly). This doesn't seem to
  occur for global variables.

- Various minor fixes/improvements.

- Rebased on v6.15-rc1. This includes [10], which renames a few POE
  symbols: s/POE_RXW/POE_RWX/ and
  s/por_set_pkey_perms/por_elx_set_pkey_perms/

RFC v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/20250203101839.1223008-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com/

RFC v2..v3:

- Patch 1: kpkeys_set_level() may now return KPKEYS_PKEY_REG_INVAL to indicate
  that the pkey register wasn't written to, and as a result that
  kpkeys_restore_pkey_reg() should do nothing. This simplifies the conditional
  guard macro and also allows architectures to skip writes to the pkey
  register if the target value is the same as the current one.

- Patch 1: introduced additional KPKEYS_GUARD* macros to cover more use-cases
  and reduce duplication.

- Patch 6: reject pkey value above arch_max_pkey().

- Patch 13: added missing guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables) in
  __clear_young_dirty_pte().

- Rebased on v6.14-rc1.

RFC v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/20250108103250.3188419-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com/

RFC v1..v2:

- A new approach is used to set the pkey of page table pages. Thanks to
  Qi Zheng's and my own series [11][12], pagetable_*_ctor is
  systematically called when a PTP is allocated at any level (PTE to
  PGD), and pagetable_*_dtor when it is freed, on all architectures.
  Patch 11 makes use of this to call kpkeys_{,un}protect_pgtable_memory
  from the common ctor/dtor helper. The arm64 patches from v1 (patch 12
  and 13) are dropped as they are no longer needed. Patch 10 is
  introduced to allow pagetable_*_ctor to fail at all levels, since
  kpkeys_protect_pgtable_memory may itself fail.
  [Original suggestion by Peter Zijlstra]

- Changed the prototype of kpkeys_{,un}protect_pgtable_memory in patch 9
  to take a struct folio * for more convenience, and implemented them
  out-of-line to avoid a circular dependency with <linux/mm.h>.

- Rebased on next-20250107, which includes [11] and [12].

- Added locking in patch 8. [Peter Zijlstra's suggestion]

RFC v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/20241206101110.1646108-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com/

---
References

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210830235927.6443-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
[2] https://lsseu2025.sched.com/event/25GEE/kernel-hardening-with-protection-keys-kevin-brodsky-arm
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/7dc9485d-a822-494d-9384-4a973c782c11@arm.com/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250917190323.3828347-1-yang@os.amperecomputing.com/
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251215150323.2218608-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com/
[6] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20250815090000.2182450-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com/
[7] https://lore.kernel.org/all/aY3+Raf8eZqipCd6@e129823.arm.com/
[8] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20250408095222.860601-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com/
[9] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20250304150444.3788920-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com/
[10] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20250219164029.2309119-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com/
[11] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/cover.1736317725.git.zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com/
[12] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20250103184415.2744423-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com/
[13] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260505-kpkeys-v7-0-20c0bdd97197%40arm.com
[14] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260521-poe_futex-v1-0-1da286b8f9b2@arm.com/

---
To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Linu Cherian <linu.cherian@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Maxwell Bland <mbland@motorola.com>
Cc: "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>
Cc: Pierre-Clément Tosi <ptosi@google.com>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
Cc: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org

---
Kevin Brodsky (24):
      mm: Introduce kpkeys
      set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub
      arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions
      arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper
      arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE
      arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey()
      arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1
      arm64: Enable kpkeys
      memblock: Move INIT_MEMBLOCK_* macros to header
      mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature
      mm: kpkeys: Protect regular page tables
      mm: kpkeys: Introduce early page table allocator
      mm: kpkeys: Protect vmemmap page tables
      mm: kpkeys: Introduce hook for protecting static page tables
      arm64: kpkeys: Implement arch_supports_kpkeys_early()
      arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES
      arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified
      arm64: kpkeys: Protect early page tables
      arm64: mm: Map kernel image alias of init_pg_dir read-only
      arm64: kpkeys: Protect init_pg_dir
      arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes
      arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES switches
      arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support
      mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables

Yeoreum Yun (1):
      arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume()

 arch/arm64/Kconfig                        |   2 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h       |  12 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h           |  84 +++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys_types.h     |  15 +++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h     |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h          |  66 +++++++++-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h              |  11 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h        |   5 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h         |   1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h       |   4 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c            |   5 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/pi/map_kernel.c         |   9 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/process.c               |  10 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S                 |  12 ++
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                     |  17 +--
 arch/arm64/mm/init.c                      |   1 +
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c                       |  57 ++++++---
 arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c                  |  29 ++++-
 include/linux/kpkeys.h                    | 162 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/kpkeys_types.h              |  30 +++++
 include/linux/memblock.h                  |  11 ++
 include/linux/mm.h                        |  14 ++-
 include/linux/set_memory.h                |   7 ++
 mm/Kconfig                                |   5 +
 mm/Makefile                               |   2 +
 mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c             | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/memblock.c                             |  11 --
 mm/sparse-vmemmap.c                       |  33 +++--
 mm/tests/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_kunit.c | 200 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/Kconfig.hardening                |  24 ++++
 30 files changed, 968 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 8d3ae59288f1e7d58d76558a6ee96d533bc5019f
change-id: 20260428-kpkeys-e165645122c1

[PATCH RFC v9 01/25] mm: Introduce kpkeys

[Kevin Brodsky]

kpkeys is a simple framework to enable the use of protection keys
(pkeys) to harden the kernel itself. This patch introduces the basic
API in <linux/kpkeys.h>: a couple of functions to enter/leave a
kpkeys context and macros to define guard objects.

kpkeys introduces a new concept on top of pkeys: the kpkeys context.
Each context is associated with a set of permissions for the pkeys
managed by the kpkeys framework. kpkeys_enter_context(ctx) sets
those permissions according to ctx, and returns the original kpkeys
state (typically the arch-specific pkeys register) that is later
restored by calling kpkeys_leave_context(). To start with, only
KPKEYS_CTX_DEFAULT is available, which is meant to grant RW access
to KPKEYS_PKEY_DEFAULT (i.e. all memory since this is the only
available pkey for now).

The underlying representation of each kpkeys context is entirely
architecture-specific. Support for kpkeys must be explicitly
indicated by selecting ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS and defining the following
functions in <asm/kpkeys.h>:

* arch_kpkeys_enter_context()
* arch_kpkeys_leave_context()
* arch_supports_kpkeys()

Additionally, <asm/kpkeys_types.h> must define struct arch_kpkeys_state,
which typically provides storage for the pkeys register.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 include/linux/kpkeys.h       | 104 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/kpkeys_types.h |  25 +++++++++++
 mm/Kconfig                   |   2 +
 3 files changed, 131 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/kpkeys.h b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..eac522f55214
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef _LINUX_KPKEYS_H
+#define _LINUX_KPKEYS_H
+
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/kpkeys_types.h>
+
+/**
+ * KPKEYS_GUARD_NOOP() - define a guard type that does nothing
+ * @name: the name of the guard type
+ *
+ * Define a guard type that does nothing, useful to match a real guard type
+ * that is defined under an #ifdef.
+ */
+#define KPKEYS_GUARD_NOOP(name)						\
+	__DEFINE_CLASS_IS_CONDITIONAL(name, false);			\
+	DEFINE_CLASS(name, bool, (void)_T, false, void);		\
+	static inline void *class_##name##_lock_ptr(bool *_T)		\
+	{ return _T; }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS
+
+#include <asm/kpkeys.h>
+
+/**
+ * KPKEYS_GUARD_COND() - define a guard type that conditionally switches to
+ *                       a given kpkeys context
+ * @name: the name of the guard type
+ * @ctx: the kpkeys context to switch to
+ * @cond: an expression that is evaluated as condition
+ *
+ * Define a guard type that switches to @ctx if @cond evaluates to true,
+ * and does nothing otherwise.
+ */
+#define KPKEYS_GUARD_COND(name, ctx, cond)				\
+	__DEFINE_CLASS_IS_CONDITIONAL(name, false);			\
+	DEFINE_CLASS(name, struct kpkeys_state,				\
+		     kpkeys_leave_context(&_T),				\
+		     (cond) ? kpkeys_enter_context(ctx) :		\
+			      (struct kpkeys_state) {}, void);		\
+	static inline							\
+	void *class_##name##_lock_ptr(struct kpkeys_state *_T)		\
+	{ return _T; }
+
+/**
+ * KPKEYS_GUARD() - define a guard type that switches to a given kpkeys context
+ *                  if kpkeys are supported
+ * @name: the name of the guard type
+ * @ctx: the kpkeys context to switch to
+ *
+ * Define a guard type that switches to @ctx if the system supports kpkeys.
+ */
+#define KPKEYS_GUARD(name, ctx)						\
+	KPKEYS_GUARD_COND(name, ctx, kpkeys_supported())
+
+/**
+ * kpkeys_enter_context() - enter a kpkeys context
+ * @ctx: the context to switch to
+ *
+ * Enters the specified kpkeys context. @ctx must be a compile-time constant.
+ *
+ * Return: state to be passed to kpkeys_leave_context().
+ */
+static __always_inline
+struct kpkeys_state kpkeys_enter_context(enum kpkeys_ctx ctx)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!__builtin_constant_p(ctx),
+			 "kpkeys_enter_context() only takes constant values");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(ctx < 0 || ctx >= KPKEYS_CTX_COUNT,
+			 "Invalid value passed to kpkeys_enter_context()");
+
+	return arch_kpkeys_enter_context(ctx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * kpkeys_leave_context() - leave a kpkeys context
+ * @state: state returned by kpkeys_enter_context()
+ *
+ * Restores the state saved when entering a kpkeys context. If no context was
+ * entered, this function does nothing.
+ */
+static __always_inline
+void kpkeys_leave_context(const struct kpkeys_state *state)
+{
+	if (state->entered_context)
+		arch_kpkeys_leave_context(state);
+}
+
+static inline bool kpkeys_supported(void)
+{
+	return arch_supports_kpkeys();
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS */
+
+static inline bool kpkeys_supported(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS */
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_KPKEYS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/kpkeys_types.h b/include/linux/kpkeys_types.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9de59092e9c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/kpkeys_types.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef _LINUX_KPKEYS_TYPES_H
+#define _LINUX_KPKEYS_TYPES_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS
+#include <asm/kpkeys_types.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS) && !defined(__ASSEMBLY__)
+
+enum kpkeys_ctx {
+	KPKEYS_CTX_DEFAULT = 0,
+	KPKEYS_CTX_COUNT,
+};
+
+struct kpkeys_state {
+	bool entered_context;
+	struct arch_kpkeys_state arch_state;
+};
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS && !__ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_KPKEYS_TYPES_H */
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index 9e0ca4824905..55e6763d5792 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -1281,6 +1281,8 @@ config ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
 	bool
 config ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
 	bool
+config ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS
+	bool
 
 config ARCH_USES_PG_ARCH_2
 	bool

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 02/25] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub

[Kevin Brodsky]

Introduce a new function, set_memory_pkey(), which sets the
protection key (pkey) of pages in the specified linear mapping
range. Architectures implementing kernel pkeys (kpkeys) must
provide a suitable implementation; an empty stub is added as
fallback.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 include/linux/set_memory.h | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/set_memory.h b/include/linux/set_memory.h
index 3030d9245f5a..7b3a8bfde3c6 100644
--- a/include/linux/set_memory.h
+++ b/include/linux/set_memory.h
@@ -84,4 +84,11 @@ static inline int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS
+static inline int set_memory_pkey(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int pkey)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_SET_MEMORY_H_ */

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 03/25] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions

[Kevin Brodsky]

In preparation of using POE inside the kernel, enable "Overlay
applied" for kernel memory types in PIR_EL1. This ensures that the
permissions set in POR_EL1 affect all kernel mappings.

User memory types must be left untouched (overlays not applied)
because any privileged access to user memory (e.g. futex atomic
without FEAT_LSUI) would then be mistakenly checked against POR_EL1.

Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
index 212ce1b02e15..d4d45ab86a5a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
@@ -183,9 +183,9 @@ static inline bool __pure lpa2_is_enabled(void)
 	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED_EXEC),   PIE_RW)     | \
 	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_READONLY),      PIE_R)      | \
 	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED),        PIE_RW)     | \
-	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_ROX),    PIE_RX)     | \
-	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC),   PIE_RWX)    | \
-	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_RO),     PIE_R)      | \
-	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL),        PIE_RW))
+	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_ROX),    PIE_RX_O)   | \
+	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC),   PIE_RWX_O)  | \
+	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_RO),     PIE_R_O)    | \
+	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL),        PIE_RW_O))
 
 #endif /* __ASM_PGTABLE_PROT_H */

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 04/25] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper

[Kevin Brodsky]

Introduce a helper that sets the permissions of a given pkey
(POIndex) in the POR_ELx format, and make use of it in
arch_set_user_pkey_access().

new_por now represents the permissions of a single pkey, so rename
it to new_perms and change its type accordingly.

Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h |  7 +++++++
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c          | 26 ++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
index d913d5b529e4..19b3dd1d43a0 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
@@ -31,4 +31,11 @@ static inline bool por_elx_allows_exec(u64 por, u8 pkey)
 	return perm & POE_X;
 }
 
+static inline u64 por_elx_set_pkey_perms(u64 por, u8 pkey, u8 perms)
+{
+	u64 shift = POR_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(pkey);
+
+	return (por & ~(POE_MASK << shift)) | ((u64)perms << shift);
+}
+
 #endif /* _ASM_ARM64_POR_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index d4de88770ecf..767478d9e84b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -2305,8 +2305,8 @@ void __cpu_replace_ttbr1(pgd_t *pgdp, bool cnp)
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
 int arch_set_user_pkey_access(int pkey, unsigned long init_val)
 {
-	u64 new_por;
-	u64 old_por;
+	u8 new_perms;
+	u64 por;
 
 	if (!system_supports_poe())
 		return -ENOSPC;
@@ -2320,25 +2320,19 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(int pkey, unsigned long init_val)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Set the bits we need in POR:  */
-	new_por = POE_RWX;
+	new_perms = POE_RWX;
 	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
-		new_por &= ~POE_W;
+		new_perms &= ~POE_W;
 	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
-		new_por &= ~POE_RW;
+		new_perms &= ~POE_RW;
 	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_READ)
-		new_por &= ~POE_R;
+		new_perms &= ~POE_R;
 	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE)
-		new_por &= ~POE_X;
+		new_perms &= ~POE_X;
 
-	/* Shift the bits in to the correct place in POR for pkey: */
-	new_por = POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(pkey, new_por);
-
-	/* Get old POR and mask off any old bits in place: */
-	old_por = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
-	old_por &= ~(POE_MASK << POR_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(pkey));
-
-	/* Write old part along with new part: */
-	write_sysreg_s(old_por | new_por, SYS_POR_EL0);
+	por = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
+	por = por_elx_set_pkey_perms(por, pkey, new_perms);
+	write_sysreg_s(por, SYS_POR_EL0);
 
 	return 0;
 }

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 05/25] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE

[Kevin Brodsky]

Implement the kpkeys interface if CONFIG_ARM64_POE is enabled.
The permissions for pkey 0 are set to RWX as this pkey is also used
for code mappings. POR_EL1 is left untouched if we have already
entered the requested context.

To allow <asm/kpkeys.h> to be included from assembly, also add
appropriate #ifdef's to <asm/por.h>.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h       | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys_types.h | 15 ++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h          |  4 +++
 3 files changed, 86 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..09fd5a849cb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef __ASM_KPKEYS_H
+#define __ASM_KPKEYS_H
+
+#include <linux/kpkeys_types.h>
+
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/por.h>
+
+/*
+ * Equivalent to por_set_kpkeys_context(0, KPKEYS_CTX_DEFAULT), but can also be
+ * used in assembly.
+ */
+#define POR_EL1_INIT	POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(0, POE_RWX)
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+static inline bool arch_supports_kpkeys(void)
+{
+	return system_supports_poe();
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_POE
+
+static inline u64 por_set_kpkeys_context(u64 por, enum kpkeys_ctx ctx)
+{
+	por = por_elx_set_pkey_perms(por, 0, POE_RWX);
+
+	return por;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void __kpkeys_set_pkey_reg_nosync(u64 pkey_reg)
+{
+	write_sysreg_s(pkey_reg, SYS_POR_EL1);
+}
+
+static __always_inline
+struct kpkeys_state arch_kpkeys_enter_context(enum kpkeys_ctx ctx)
+{
+	const u64 prev_por = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL1);
+	const u64 new_por = por_set_kpkeys_context(prev_por, ctx);
+
+	if (prev_por == new_por)
+		return (struct kpkeys_state) { .entered_context = false };
+
+	__kpkeys_set_pkey_reg_nosync(new_por);
+	isb();
+
+	return (struct kpkeys_state) {
+		.entered_context = true,
+		.arch_state.por = prev_por,
+	};
+}
+
+static __always_inline
+void arch_kpkeys_leave_context(const struct kpkeys_state *state)
+{
+	__kpkeys_set_pkey_reg_nosync(state->arch_state.por);
+	isb();
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_POE */
+
+#endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif	/* __ASM_KPKEYS_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys_types.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys_types.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e9c59a26ee7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys_types.h
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef __ASM_KPKEYS_TYPES_H
+#define __ASM_KPKEYS_TYPES_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+struct arch_kpkeys_state {
+	u64 por;
+};
+
+#endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif	/* __ASM_KPKEYS_TYPES_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
index 19b3dd1d43a0..dddabf6ffae6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
 
 #define POR_EL0_INIT	POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(0, POE_RWX)
 
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
 static inline bool por_elx_allows_read(u64 por, u8 pkey)
 {
 	u8 perm = POR_ELx_PERM_GET(pkey, por);
@@ -38,4 +40,6 @@ static inline u64 por_elx_set_pkey_perms(u64 por, u8 pkey, u8 perms)
 	return (por & ~(POE_MASK << shift)) | ((u64)perms << shift);
 }
 
+#endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
 #endif /* _ASM_ARM64_POR_H */

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 06/25] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey()

[Kevin Brodsky]

Implement set_memory_pkey() using POE.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h |  4 ++++
 arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c            | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h
index 90f61b17275e..b6cd6de34abf 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h
@@ -19,4 +19,8 @@ bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
 int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS
+int set_memory_pkey(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int pkey);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c
index bbe98ac9ad8c..4d79f39570ed 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/pagewalk.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
+#include <linux/kpkeys.h>
 
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable-prot.h>
@@ -365,6 +367,30 @@ int set_direct_map_valid_noflush(struct page *page, unsigned nr, bool valid)
 	return set_memory_valid(addr, nr, valid);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS
+int set_memory_pkey(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int pkey)
+{
+	unsigned long set_prot = 0;
+
+	if (!kpkeys_supported())
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!__is_lm_address(kasan_reset_tag((void *)addr)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (pkey < 0 || pkey >= arch_max_pkey())
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	set_prot |= pkey & BIT(0) ? PTE_PO_IDX_0 : 0;
+	set_prot |= pkey & BIT(1) ? PTE_PO_IDX_1 : 0;
+	set_prot |= pkey & BIT(2) ? PTE_PO_IDX_2 : 0;
+
+	return __change_memory_common(addr, PAGE_SIZE * numpages,
+				      __pgprot(set_prot),
+				      __pgprot(PTE_PO_IDX_MASK));
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
 /*
  * This is - apart from the return value - doing the same

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 07/25] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1

[Kevin Brodsky]

POR_EL1 is about to be used by the kpkeys framework, modifying it
for (typically small) sections of code. If an exception occurs
during that window and scheduling occurs, we must ensure that
POR_EL1 is context-switched as needed (saving the old value and
restoring the new one). An ISB is needed to ensure the write takes
effect, so we skip it if the new value is the same as the old, like
for POR_EL0.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/process.c        | 10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
index c2a627f39314..8d7fa479cd36 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	u64			svcr;
 	u64			tpidr2_el0;
 	u64			por_el0;
+	u64			por_el1;
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_GCS
 	unsigned int		gcs_el0_mode;
 	unsigned int		gcs_el0_locked;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
index 581f80e9b9b7..1dec143decf1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include <asm/exec.h>
 #include <asm/fpsimd.h>
 #include <asm/gcs.h>
+#include <asm/kpkeys.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/mpam.h>
 #include <asm/mte.h>
@@ -431,6 +432,9 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
 
 	ptrauth_thread_init_kernel(p);
 
+	if (system_supports_poe())
+		p->thread.por_el1 = POR_EL1_INIT;
+
 	if (likely(!args->fn)) {
 		*childregs = *current_pt_regs();
 		childregs->regs[0] = 0;
@@ -681,6 +685,12 @@ static void permission_overlay_switch(struct task_struct *next)
 		 * of POR_EL0.
 		 */
 	}
+
+	current->thread.por_el1 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL1);
+	if (current->thread.por_el1 != next->thread.por_el1) {
+		write_sysreg_s(next->thread.por_el1, SYS_POR_EL1);
+		isb();
+	}
 }
 
 /*

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 08/25] arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume()

[Kevin Brodsky]

From: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>

The POR_EL1 register is reset to an unknown value after cpu_suspend().
Since POR_EL1 always holds POR_EL1_INIT when entering cpu_suspend(),
initialize POR_EL1 with POR_EL1_INIT before cpu_do_resume().

Signed-off-by: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
index f093cdf71be1..e0a6ad85cd24 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/assembler.h>
+#include <asm/kpkeys.h>
 #include <asm/smp.h>
 
 	.text
@@ -134,6 +135,17 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
 	/* load sp from context */
 	ldr	x2, [x0, #CPU_CTX_SP]
 	mov	sp, x2
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_POE
+alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_S1POE
+	b	.Lskip_por_set
+alternative_else_nop_endif
+	mov_q	x2, POR_EL1_INIT
+	msr_s	SYS_POR_EL1, x2
+	/* isb can be skipped since cpu_do_resume() will do it. */
+.Lskip_por_set:
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_POE */
+
 	/*
 	 * cpu_do_resume expects x0 to contain context address pointer
 	 */

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 09/25] arm64: Enable kpkeys

[Kevin Brodsky]

This is the final step to enable kpkeys on arm64. We enable
POE at EL1 by setting TCR2_EL1.POE, and initialise POR_EL1 to the
default value, enabling access to the default pkey/POIndex (0).
An ISB is added so that POE restrictions are enforced immediately.

Having done this, we can now select ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS if ARM64_POE is
enabled.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig             | 1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 5 ++++-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index b3afe0688919..0afa085c66be 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -2202,6 +2202,7 @@ config ARM64_POE
 	def_bool y
 	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
 	select ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
+	select ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS
 	help
 	  The Permission Overlay Extension is used to implement Memory
 	  Protection Keys. Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
index 9a22df0c5120..4f2f54007ed6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/sched/isolation.h>
+#include <linux/kpkeys.h>
 
 #include <asm/arm_pmuv3.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
@@ -2463,8 +2464,10 @@ static void cpu_enable_mops(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_POE
 static void cpu_enable_poe(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 {
-	sysreg_clear_set(REG_TCR2_EL1, 0, TCR2_EL1_E0POE);
+	write_sysreg_s(POR_EL1_INIT, SYS_POR_EL1);
+	sysreg_clear_set(REG_TCR2_EL1, 0, TCR2_EL1_E0POE | TCR2_EL1_POE);
 	sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, 0, CPACR_EL1_E0POE);
+	isb();
 }
 #endif
 

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 10/25] memblock: Move INIT_MEMBLOCK_* macros to header

[Kevin Brodsky]

The upcoming page table allocator for the kpkeys_hardened_pgtables
feature will need to know the maximum number of memblock regions.
Move the corresponding macros to <linux/memblock.h> to allow that.

INIT_MEMBLOCK_{RESERVED,MEMORY}_REGIONS may be overridden, but this
should be fine as only arm64 and loong currently do that and the
relevant header is already (indirectly) included by
<linux/memblock.h>.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 include/linux/memblock.h | 11 +++++++++++
 mm/memblock.c            | 11 -----------
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/memblock.h b/include/linux/memblock.h
index 5afcd99aa8c1..c61f80e31cc1 100644
--- a/include/linux/memblock.h
+++ b/include/linux/memblock.h
@@ -24,6 +24,17 @@ extern unsigned long max_pfn;
  */
 extern unsigned long long max_possible_pfn;
 
+#define INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS			128
+#define INIT_PHYSMEM_REGIONS			4
+
+#ifndef INIT_MEMBLOCK_RESERVED_REGIONS
+#define INIT_MEMBLOCK_RESERVED_REGIONS		INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS
+#endif
+
+#ifndef INIT_MEMBLOCK_MEMORY_REGIONS
+#define INIT_MEMBLOCK_MEMORY_REGIONS		INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS
+#endif
+
 /**
  * enum memblock_flags - definition of memory region attributes
  * @MEMBLOCK_NONE: no special request
diff --git a/mm/memblock.c b/mm/memblock.c
index 6349c48154f4..3b497d3556bb 100644
--- a/mm/memblock.c
+++ b/mm/memblock.c
@@ -30,17 +30,6 @@
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
-#define INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS			128
-#define INIT_PHYSMEM_REGIONS			4
-
-#ifndef INIT_MEMBLOCK_RESERVED_REGIONS
-# define INIT_MEMBLOCK_RESERVED_REGIONS		INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS
-#endif
-
-#ifndef INIT_MEMBLOCK_MEMORY_REGIONS
-#define INIT_MEMBLOCK_MEMORY_REGIONS		INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS
-#endif
-
 /**
  * DOC: memblock overview
  *

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 11/25] mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature

[Kevin Brodsky]

kpkeys_hardened_pgtables is a hardening feature based on kpkeys. It
aims to prevent the corruption of page tables by: 1. mapping all
page table pages, both kernel and user, with a privileged pkey
(KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES), and 2. granting write access to that pkey
only when running at in a privileged kpkeys context
(KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES). This patch introduces basic infrastructure;
the implementation of both aspects will follow.

The feature is exposed as CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES; it
requires explicit architecture opt-in by selecting
ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES, since much of the page table
handling is arch-specific.

Because this feature relies on kpkeys being supported and modifies
attributes of the linear map, it must be inactive on boot.
kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init() enables it by toggling a static key;
this function must be called by supported architectures in
mem_init(), before any call to pagetable_alloc() is made.

Supported architectures must also provide
arch_supports_kpkeys_early() in <asm/kpkeys.h>. This will be used
during early boot to detect whether kpkeys_hardened_pgtables is
going to be enabled (e.g. to decide how to allocate early page
tables).

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 include/linux/kpkeys.h        | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/kpkeys_types.h  |  5 +++++
 mm/Kconfig                    |  3 +++
 mm/Makefile                   |  1 +
 mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 security/Kconfig.hardening    | 12 ++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 74 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/kpkeys.h b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
index eac522f55214..23ae4ed512f5 100644
--- a/include/linux/kpkeys.h
+++ b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/bug.h>
 #include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/kpkeys_types.h>
 
 /**
@@ -101,4 +102,40 @@ static inline bool kpkeys_supported(void)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
+
+static inline bool kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled(void)
+{
+	return static_branch_unlikely(&kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
+}
+
+static inline bool kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_early_enabled(void)
+{
+	return arch_supports_kpkeys_early();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Should be called from mem_init(): as soon as the buddy allocator becomes
+ * available and before any call to pagetable_alloc().
+ */
+void kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES */
+
+static inline bool kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_early_enabled(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline void kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void) {}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES */
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_KPKEYS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/kpkeys_types.h b/include/linux/kpkeys_types.h
index 9de59092e9c3..09f15a9565cf 100644
--- a/include/linux/kpkeys_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/kpkeys_types.h
@@ -8,10 +8,15 @@
 #include <asm/kpkeys_types.h>
 #endif
 
+#ifndef KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES
+#define KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES	1
+#endif
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS) && !defined(__ASSEMBLY__)
 
 enum kpkeys_ctx {
 	KPKEYS_CTX_DEFAULT = 0,
+	KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES,
 	KPKEYS_CTX_COUNT,
 };
 
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index 55e6763d5792..21bd3e550de8 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -1283,6 +1283,9 @@ config ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
 	bool
 config ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS
 	bool
+config ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+	bool
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS
 
 config ARCH_USES_PG_ARCH_2
 	bool
diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index eff9f9e7e061..35982b6efb56 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -147,3 +147,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SHRINKER_DEBUG) += shrinker_debug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EXECMEM) += execmem.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TMPFS_QUOTA) += shmem_quota.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_LAZY_MMU_MODE_KUNIT_TEST) += tests/lazy_mmu_mode_kunit.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES) += kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.o
diff --git a/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4c654e0cf585
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <linux/kpkeys.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+
+#include <kunit/visibility.h>
+
+__ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
+
+void __init kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void)
+{
+	if (!kpkeys_supported())
+		return;
+
+	static_branch_enable(&kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
+}
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 6923036e1a2f..bb75b580b7f1 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -271,6 +271,18 @@ config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+	bool "Harden page tables using kernel pkeys"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+	help
+	  This option makes all page tables mostly read-only by
+	  allocating them with a non-default protection key (pkey) and
+	  only enabling write access to that pkey in routines that are
+	  expected to write to page table entries.
+
+	  This option has no effect if the system does not support
+	  kernel pkeys.
+
 endmenu
 
 config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 12/25] mm: kpkeys: Protect regular page tables

[Kevin Brodsky]

If the kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature is enabled, page table pages
(PTPs) should be protected by modifying the linear mapping to map
them with a privileged pkey (KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES). This patch
introduces a new page allocator for that purpose:

* kpkeys_pgtable_alloc() allocates a new PTP and sets the linear
  mapping to KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES for that page

* kpkeys_pgtable_free() frees such a PTP and restores the linear
  mapping to the default pkey

This interface is then hooked into pagetable_alloc() and
pagetable_free(), protecting all page tables created once the buddy
allocator is available. Early page tables are allocated in other
ways and will be protected in subsequent patches.

This implementation of kpkeys_pgtable_{alloc,free}() is minimal and
relies on the linear map being fully PTE-mapped - otherwise
calling set_memory_pkey() on a single page may result in splitting a
block mapping, which in turn requires allocating a new PTP. A more
elaborate implementation could be added later to handle this
situation.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 include/linux/kpkeys.h        | 10 +++++++++
 include/linux/mm.h            | 14 +++++++++++--
 mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/kpkeys.h b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
index 23ae4ed512f5..288c8853eed6 100644
--- a/include/linux/kpkeys.h
+++ b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static inline bool kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_early_enabled(void)
 	return arch_supports_kpkeys_early();
 }
 
+struct page *kpkeys_pgtable_alloc(gfp_t gfp, unsigned int order);
+void kpkeys_pgtable_free(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
+
 /*
  * Should be called from mem_init(): as soon as the buddy allocator becomes
  * available and before any call to pagetable_alloc().
@@ -134,6 +137,13 @@ static inline bool kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_early_enabled(void)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static inline struct page *kpkeys_pgtable_alloc(gfp_t gfp, unsigned int order)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline void kpkeys_pgtable_free(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
+
 static inline void kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void) {}
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES */
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 485df9c2dbdd..eea3131786b3 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include <linux/bitmap.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/iommu-debug-pagealloc.h>
+#include <linux/kpkeys.h>
 
 struct mempolicy;
 struct anon_vma;
@@ -3682,7 +3683,12 @@ static inline bool ptdesc_test_kernel(const struct ptdesc *ptdesc)
  */
 static inline struct ptdesc *pagetable_alloc_noprof(gfp_t gfp, unsigned int order)
 {
-	struct page *page = alloc_pages_noprof(gfp | __GFP_COMP, order);
+	struct page *page;
+
+	if (kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled())
+		page = kpkeys_pgtable_alloc(gfp | __GFP_COMP, order);
+	else
+		page = alloc_pages_noprof(gfp | __GFP_COMP, order);
 
 	return page_ptdesc(page);
 }
@@ -3691,8 +3697,12 @@ static inline struct ptdesc *pagetable_alloc_noprof(gfp_t gfp, unsigned int orde
 static inline void __pagetable_free(struct ptdesc *pt)
 {
 	struct page *page = ptdesc_page(pt);
+	unsigned int order = compound_order(page);
 
-	__free_pages(page, compound_order(page));
+	if (kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled())
+		kpkeys_pgtable_free(page, order);
+	else
+		__free_pages(page, order);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ASYNC_KERNEL_PGTABLE_FREE
diff --git a/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
index 4c654e0cf585..eca798207107 100644
--- a/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
+++ b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
@@ -1,12 +1,59 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 #include <linux/kpkeys.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
 
 #include <kunit/visibility.h>
 
 __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
 
+static int set_pkey_pgtable(struct page *page, unsigned int nr_pages)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = set_memory_pkey(addr, nr_pages, KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES);
+
+	WARN_ON(ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int set_pkey_default(struct page *page, unsigned int nr_pages)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = set_memory_pkey(addr, nr_pages, 0);
+
+	WARN_ON(ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+struct page *kpkeys_pgtable_alloc(gfp_t gfp, unsigned int order)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	int ret;
+
+	page = alloc_pages_noprof(gfp, order);
+	if (!page)
+		return page;
+
+	ret = set_pkey_pgtable(page, 1 << order);
+	if (ret) {
+		__free_pages(page, order);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return page;
+}
+
+void kpkeys_pgtable_free(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+{
+	set_pkey_default(page, 1 << order);
+	__free_pages(page, order);
+}
+
 void __init kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void)
 {
 	if (!kpkeys_supported())

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 13/25] mm: kpkeys: Introduce early page table allocator

[Kevin Brodsky]

The kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature aims to protect all page table
pages (PTPs) by mapping them with a privileged pkey. This is primarily
handled by kpkeys_pgtable_alloc(), called from pagetable_alloc().
However, this does not cover PTPs allocated early, before the
buddy allocator is available. These PTPs are allocated by architecture
code, either 1. from static pools or 2. using the memblock allocator,
and should also be protected.

This patch addresses the second category: PTPs allocated via memblock.
Such PTPs are notably used to create the linear map. Protecting them as
soon as they are allocated would require modifying the linear map while
it is being created, which seems at best difficult. Instead, a
simple allocator is introduced, obtaining pages from memblock and
keeping track of all allocated ranges to set their pkey once it is
safe to do so. PTPs allocated at that stage are not freed, so there
is no need to manage a free list.

Since kpkeys_hardened_pgtables currently requires the linear map to
be PTE-mapped, we can directly allocate page by page using memblock,
without intermediate cache. We rely on memblock allocating
contiguous pages to minimise the number of tracked ranges.

The number of PTPs required to create the linear map is proportional to
the amount of available memory, which means it may be large. At such
an early point, the memblock allocator may however only track a
limited number of regions, and we size the tracking array
(allocated_ranges) accordingly. The array may be quite large as a
result (16KB on arm64), but it is discarded once boot has completed.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 include/linux/kpkeys.h        |   7 +++
 mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c | 115 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 122 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/kpkeys.h b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
index 288c8853eed6..23526d3f9ab3 100644
--- a/include/linux/kpkeys.h
+++ b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
@@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ void kpkeys_pgtable_free(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
  */
 void kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void);
 
+phys_addr_t kpkeys_physmem_pgtable_alloc(void);
+
 #else /* CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES */
 
 static inline bool kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled(void)
@@ -146,6 +148,11 @@ static inline void kpkeys_pgtable_free(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 
 static inline void kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void) {}
 
+static inline phys_addr_t kpkeys_physmem_pgtable_alloc(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES */
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_KPKEYS_H */
diff --git a/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
index eca798207107..9e1e27c2cc96 100644
--- a/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
+++ b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 #include <linux/kpkeys.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/set_memory.h>
 
@@ -30,6 +31,9 @@ static int set_pkey_default(struct page *page, unsigned int nr_pages)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/* pkeys physmem allocator (PPA) - implemented below */
+static void ppa_finalize(void);
+
 struct page *kpkeys_pgtable_alloc(gfp_t gfp, unsigned int order)
 {
 	struct page *page;
@@ -60,4 +64,115 @@ void __init kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void)
 		return;
 
 	static_branch_enable(&kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
+
+	ppa_finalize();
+}
+
+/*
+ * pkeys physmem allocator (PPA): allocator for very early page tables
+ * (especially for creating the linear map), based on memblock. Allocated
+ * ranges are tracked so that their pkey can be set once it is safe to do so.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * We may have to track many ranges when allocating page tables for the linear
+ * map, as their number grows with the amount of available memory. Assuming that
+ * memblock returns contiguous blocks whenever possible, the number of ranges
+ * to track cannot however exceed the number of regions that memblock itself
+ * tracks. memblock_allow_resize() hasn't been called yet at that point, so
+ * that limit is the size of the statically allocated array.
+ */
+#define PHYSMEM_MAX_RANGES	INIT_MEMBLOCK_MEMORY_REGIONS
+
+struct physmem_range {
+	phys_addr_t addr;
+	phys_addr_t size;
+};
+
+struct pkeys_physmem_allocator {
+	struct physmem_range allocated_ranges[PHYSMEM_MAX_RANGES];
+	unsigned int nr_allocated_ranges;
+};
+
+static struct pkeys_physmem_allocator pkeys_physmem_allocator __initdata;
+
+static int __init set_pkey_pgtable_phys(phys_addr_t pa, phys_addr_t size)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)__va(pa);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = set_memory_pkey(addr, size / PAGE_SIZE, KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES);
+
+	WARN_ON(ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static bool __init ppa_try_extend_last_range(phys_addr_t addr, phys_addr_t size)
+{
+	struct pkeys_physmem_allocator *ppa = &pkeys_physmem_allocator;
+	struct physmem_range *range;
+
+	if (!ppa->nr_allocated_ranges)
+		return false;
+
+	range = &ppa->allocated_ranges[ppa->nr_allocated_ranges - 1];
+
+	/* Merge the new range into the last range if they are contiguous */
+	if (addr == range->addr + range->size) {
+		range->size += size;
+		return true;
+	} else if (addr + size == range->addr) {
+		range->addr -= size;
+		range->size += size;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void __init ppa_register_allocated_range(phys_addr_t addr,
+						phys_addr_t size)
+{
+	struct pkeys_physmem_allocator *ppa = &pkeys_physmem_allocator;
+	struct physmem_range *range;
+
+	if (!addr)
+		return;
+
+	if (ppa_try_extend_last_range(addr, size))
+		return;
+
+	/* Could not extend the last range, create a new one */
+	if (WARN_ON(ppa->nr_allocated_ranges >= PHYSMEM_MAX_RANGES))
+		return;
+
+	range = &ppa->allocated_ranges[ppa->nr_allocated_ranges++];
+	range->addr = addr;
+	range->size = size;
+}
+
+static void __init ppa_finalize(void)
+{
+	struct pkeys_physmem_allocator *ppa = &pkeys_physmem_allocator;
+
+	for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ppa->nr_allocated_ranges; i++) {
+		struct physmem_range *range = &ppa->allocated_ranges[i];
+
+		set_pkey_pgtable_phys(range->addr, range->size);
+	}
+}
+
+phys_addr_t __ref kpkeys_physmem_pgtable_alloc(void)
+{
+	size_t size = PAGE_SIZE;
+	phys_addr_t addr;
+
+	addr = memblock_phys_alloc_range(size, size, 0,
+					 MEMBLOCK_ALLOC_NOLEAKTRACE);
+	if (!addr)
+		return addr;
+
+	ppa_register_allocated_range(addr, size);
+
+	return addr;
 }

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 14/25] mm: kpkeys: Protect vmemmap page tables

[Kevin Brodsky]

When the kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature is enabled, make sure that
vmemmap page tables are protected by using:

* The standard pagetable_alloc() if the buddy allocator is
  available, as it already allocates protected memory.

* The memblock-based kpkeys allocator for early allocations.

These allocators are not NUMA-aware, so the page tables may be
allocated on any node. This could potentially incur some overhead on
large NUMA systems.

The arm64 hotplug code is also amended to use a matching
pagetable_free(), ensuring that the pkey is reset when the page
tables are freed. x86 already uses pagetable_free() on that path.

Unlike in vmemmap_alloc_block(), __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL is not used as
it isn't justified for allocating page tables - this disables the
OOM and we do not have a fallback if we fail to allocate page
tables. See previous discussion linked below.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/38d2a358-4146-bfc9-2a4f-68ce02f75c94@suse.cz/
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---

This is a minimal patch to protect vmemmmap page tables. More work
may be needed here:

* Restoring NUMA awareness

* Moving the arm64 change to a separate commit?

* General refactoring of how these page tables are allocated: since
  we are not using the standard per-level functions (e.g.
  pmd_alloc()), we are not calling pagetable_*_ctor() or
  ptdesc_set_kernel(). I sent a separate series [1] that partially
  addresses this, but more work is still needed.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260714-remove_pgtable_cdtor-v1-0-44be8a7685d7@arm.com/
---
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c |  2 +-
 mm/sparse-vmemmap.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index 767478d9e84b..b071f128b9fa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -1446,7 +1446,7 @@ static void free_hotplug_page_range(struct page *page, size_t size,
 static void free_hotplug_pgtable_page(struct page *page)
 {
 	pagetable_dtor(page_ptdesc(page));
-	free_hotplug_page_range(page, PAGE_SIZE, NULL);
+	pagetable_free(page_ptdesc(page));
 }
 
 static bool pgtable_range_aligned(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
diff --git a/mm/sparse-vmemmap.c b/mm/sparse-vmemmap.c
index ebd3ac997f64..1fec89168ff1 100644
--- a/mm/sparse-vmemmap.c
+++ b/mm/sparse-vmemmap.c
@@ -179,13 +179,29 @@ static pte_t * __meminit vmemmap_pte_populate(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr, in
 	return pte;
 }
 
-static void * __meminit vmemmap_alloc_block_zero(unsigned long size, int node)
+static void * __meminit vmemmap_alloc_pgtable(int node)
 {
-	void *p = vmemmap_alloc_block(size, node);
+	void *p;
+
+	if (slab_is_available()) {
+		gfp_t gfp = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO;
+		struct ptdesc *ptdesc = pagetable_alloc(gfp, 0);
+
+		return ptdesc ? ptdesc_address(ptdesc) : NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_early_enabled()) {
+		phys_addr_t phys = kpkeys_physmem_pgtable_alloc();
+
+		p = phys ? phys_to_virt(phys) : NULL;
+	} else {
+		p = __earlyonly_bootmem_alloc(node, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE,
+					      __pa(MAX_DMA_ADDRESS));
+	}
 
 	if (!p)
 		return NULL;
-	memset(p, 0, size);
+	memset(p, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	return p;
 }
@@ -194,7 +210,7 @@ static pmd_t * __meminit vmemmap_pmd_populate(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr, in
 {
 	pmd_t *pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
 	if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
-		void *p = vmemmap_alloc_block_zero(PAGE_SIZE, node);
+		void *p = vmemmap_alloc_pgtable(node);
 		if (!p)
 			return NULL;
 		kernel_pte_init(p);
@@ -207,7 +223,7 @@ static pud_t * __meminit vmemmap_pud_populate(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr, in
 {
 	pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
 	if (pud_none(*pud)) {
-		void *p = vmemmap_alloc_block_zero(PAGE_SIZE, node);
+		void *p = vmemmap_alloc_pgtable(node);
 		if (!p)
 			return NULL;
 		pmd_init(p);
@@ -220,7 +236,7 @@ static p4d_t * __meminit vmemmap_p4d_populate(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr, in
 {
 	p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
 	if (p4d_none(*p4d)) {
-		void *p = vmemmap_alloc_block_zero(PAGE_SIZE, node);
+		void *p = vmemmap_alloc_pgtable(node);
 		if (!p)
 			return NULL;
 		pud_init(p);
@@ -233,7 +249,7 @@ static pgd_t * __meminit vmemmap_pgd_populate(unsigned long addr, int node)
 {
 	pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
 	if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
-		void *p = vmemmap_alloc_block_zero(PAGE_SIZE, node);
+		void *p = vmemmap_alloc_pgtable(node);
 		if (!p)
 			return NULL;
 		pgd_populate_kernel(addr, pgd, p);
@@ -346,10 +362,11 @@ static __meminit struct page *vmemmap_get_tail(unsigned int order, struct zone *
 	 * memmap_init().
 	 */
 
-	p = vmemmap_alloc_block_zero(PAGE_SIZE, node);
+	p = vmemmap_alloc_block(PAGE_SIZE, node);
 	if (!p)
 		return NULL;
 
+	memset(p, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
 	tail = virt_to_page(p);
 	zone->vmemmap_tails[idx] = tail;
 

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 15/25] mm: kpkeys: Introduce hook for protecting static page tables

[Kevin Brodsky]

The kpkeys_hardened_pgtables infrastructure introduced so far allows
compatible architectures to protect all page table pages (PTPs)
allocated at runtime (first via memblock, then the buddy allocator).
Some PTPs are however required even earlier, before any allocator is
available. This is typically needed for mapping the kernel image
itself.

These PTPs are at least as sensitive as those allocated later on,
and should be protected by mapping them with the privileged pkey.
Exactly how these pages are obtained is entirely arch-specific, so
we introduce a hook to let architectures that implement
kpkeys_hardened_pgtables do the right thing.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 include/linux/kpkeys.h        | 4 ++++
 mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c | 1 +
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/kpkeys.h b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
index 23526d3f9ab3..df55ec854586 100644
--- a/include/linux/kpkeys.h
+++ b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
@@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ void kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void);
 
 phys_addr_t kpkeys_physmem_pgtable_alloc(void);
 
+#ifndef arch_kpkeys_protect_static_pgtables
+static inline void arch_kpkeys_protect_static_pgtables(void) {}
+#endif
+
 #else /* CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES */
 
 static inline bool kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled(void)
diff --git a/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
index 9e1e27c2cc96..c133e5896fcc 100644
--- a/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
+++ b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ void __init kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void)
 	static_branch_enable(&kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
 
 	ppa_finalize();
+	arch_kpkeys_protect_static_pgtables();
 }
 
 /*

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 16/25] arm64: kpkeys: Implement arch_supports_kpkeys_early()

[Kevin Brodsky]

We need to check if the kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature is going to
be enabled very early during boot, to decide how to set up the
linear map and how to allocate early page tables. This happens even
before boot CPU features are detected.

Implement the arch_supports_kpkeys_early() helper by directly
checking if the boot CPU supports POE, if it is called before boot
CPU features are detected. It may also be called later, in which
case we simply check the POE feature.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 12 ++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h     |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
index a57870fa96db..37aae60c2d7f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -1085,6 +1085,18 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_lpa2(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+static inline bool cpu_has_poe(void)
+{
+	u64 mmfr3;
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_POE))
+		return false;
+
+	mmfr3 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1);
+	return cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(mmfr3,
+						    ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1_S1POE_SHIFT);
+}
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h
index 09fd5a849cb0..284039e9a244 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h
@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@ static inline bool arch_supports_kpkeys(void)
 	return system_supports_poe();
 }
 
+static inline bool arch_supports_kpkeys_early(void)
+{
+	/* POE is a boot feature */
+	return boot_capabilities_finalized() ?
+		system_supports_poe() : cpu_has_poe();
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_POE
 
 static inline u64 por_set_kpkeys_context(u64 por, enum kpkeys_ctx ctx)

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 17/25] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES

[Kevin Brodsky]

Enable RW access to KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES (used to map page table
pages) if switching to KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES, otherwise only grant RO
access.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h
index 284039e9a244..00e7e5956794 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@
  * Equivalent to por_set_kpkeys_context(0, KPKEYS_CTX_DEFAULT), but can also be
  * used in assembly.
  */
-#define POR_EL1_INIT	POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(0, POE_RWX)
+#define POR_EL1_INIT	(POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(0, POE_RWX) | \
+			 POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES, POE_R))
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
@@ -33,6 +34,8 @@ static inline bool arch_supports_kpkeys_early(void)
 static inline u64 por_set_kpkeys_context(u64 por, enum kpkeys_ctx ctx)
 {
 	por = por_elx_set_pkey_perms(por, 0, POE_RWX);
+	por = por_elx_set_pkey_perms(por, KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES,
+				     ctx == KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES ? POE_RW : POE_R);
 
 	return por;
 }

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 18/25] arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified

[Kevin Brodsky]

When the kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature is enabled, we need to be
able to modify attributes (specifically the pkey/POIndex) in the
linear map at page granularity.

Add the appropriate check to can_set_direct_map() on the same
principle as rodata_full and other features.

kpkeys_hardened_pgtables currently requires the linear map to be
fully PTE-mapped, so we also need to ensure that force_pte_mapping()
returns true, like for DEBUG_PAGEALLOC.

Both functions can be called very early, before POE is actually
detected, so the early_enabled() helper is used.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c      | 2 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index b071f128b9fa..0d7e41d17182 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ static inline bool force_pte_mapping(void)
 	const bool bbml2 = system_capabilities_finalized() ?
 		system_supports_bbml2_noabort() : cpu_supports_bbml2_noabort();
 
-	if (debug_pagealloc_enabled())
+	if (debug_pagealloc_enabled() || kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_early_enabled())
 		return true;
 	if (bbml2)
 		return false;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c
index 4d79f39570ed..46fbebfc5100 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ bool can_set_direct_map(void)
 	 * Realms need to make pages shared/protected at page granularity.
 	 */
 	return rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled() ||
-		arm64_kfence_can_set_direct_map() || is_realm_world();
+		arm64_kfence_can_set_direct_map() || is_realm_world() ||
+		kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_early_enabled();
 }
 
 static int update_range_prot(unsigned long start, unsigned long size,

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 19/25] arm64: kpkeys: Protect early page tables

[Kevin Brodsky]

Use the dedicated kpkeys allocator for early page tables (used to create
the linear map) when the kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature is enabled.

CPU features have not been detected at this stage so we use the
early_enabled() helper. This is not a concern as
kpkeys_physmem_pgtable_alloc() does not itself use POE or
set_memory_pkey().

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index 0d7e41d17182..a10e9f9876d0 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -107,8 +107,11 @@ static phys_addr_t __init early_pgtable_alloc(enum pgtable_level pgtable_level)
 {
 	phys_addr_t phys;
 
-	phys = memblock_phys_alloc_range(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
-					 MEMBLOCK_ALLOC_NOLEAKTRACE);
+	if (kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_early_enabled())
+		phys = kpkeys_physmem_pgtable_alloc();
+	else
+		phys = memblock_phys_alloc_range(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
+						 MEMBLOCK_ALLOC_NOLEAKTRACE);
 	if (!phys)
 		panic("Failed to allocate page table page\n");
 

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 20/25] arm64: mm: Map kernel image alias of init_pg_dir read-only

[Kevin Brodsky]

Updates to page tables in init_pg_dir are expected to be done via
the linear map only. We are about to protect the linear mapping of
init_pg_dir using kpkeys; map its kernel image alias read-only to
ensure that the kpkeys protection cannot be bypassed.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h | 1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/pi/map_kernel.c | 9 +++++++--
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c               | 8 ++++++++
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h
index 51b0d594239e..dc961cf67168 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ extern char __irqentry_text_start[], __irqentry_text_end[];
 extern char __mmuoff_data_start[], __mmuoff_data_end[];
 extern char __entry_tramp_text_start[], __entry_tramp_text_end[];
 extern char __relocate_new_kernel_start[], __relocate_new_kernel_end[];
+extern char __pi_init_pg_dir[], __pi_init_pg_end[];
 
 static inline size_t entry_tramp_text_size(void)
 {
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/map_kernel.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/map_kernel.c
index fb44cbdd2f29..81ca3e98f0f7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/map_kernel.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/map_kernel.c
@@ -92,8 +92,13 @@ static void __init map_kernel(u64 kaslr_offset, u64 va_offset, int root_level)
 		    __inittext_end, prot, false, root_level);
 	map_segment(init_pg_dir, &pgdp, va_offset, __initdata_begin,
 		    __initdata_end, data_prot, false, root_level);
-	map_segment(init_pg_dir, &pgdp, va_offset, _data, _end, data_prot,
-		    true, root_level);
+	map_segment(init_pg_dir, &pgdp, va_offset, _data, init_pg_dir,
+		    data_prot, true, root_level);
+	/* Map init_pg_dir separately as we will remap it read-only later on */
+	map_segment(init_pg_dir, &pgdp, va_offset, init_pg_dir, init_pg_end,
+		    data_prot, true, root_level);
+	map_segment(init_pg_dir, &pgdp, va_offset, init_pg_end, _end,
+		    data_prot, true, root_level);
 	dsb(ishst);
 
 	idmap_cpu_replace_ttbr1((phys_addr_t)init_pg_dir);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index a10e9f9876d0..ee972c78e45c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -1217,6 +1217,14 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
 	update_mapping_prot(__pa_symbol(_text), (unsigned long)_text,
 			    (unsigned long)_stext - (unsigned long)_text,
 			    PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+	/*
+	 * Map the kernel image mapping of init_pg_dir read-only; it should
+	 * only be written via the linear map.
+	 */
+	section_size = (unsigned long)__pi_init_pg_end - (unsigned long)__pi_init_pg_dir;
+	update_mapping_prot(__pa_symbol(__pi_init_pg_dir),
+			    (unsigned long)__pi_init_pg_dir,
+			    section_size, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
 
 	/* Map the kernel data/bss read-only in the linear map */
 	update_mapping_prot(__pa_symbol(__init_end),

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 21/25] arm64: kpkeys: Protect init_pg_dir

[Kevin Brodsky]

When kpkeys_hardened_pgtables is enabled, protect the page tables
that map the kernel image by setting the appropriate pkey for the
linear mapping of those pages.

Most other static page tables (e.g. swapper_pg_dir) should be
read-only both in the kernel image mapping and the linear mapping,
so there is no need to change their pkey.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h |  7 +++++++
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c             | 12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h
index 00e7e5956794..7747af54fd38 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h
@@ -72,6 +72,13 @@ void arch_kpkeys_leave_context(const struct kpkeys_state *state)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_POE */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+
+#define arch_kpkeys_protect_static_pgtables arch_kpkeys_protect_static_pgtables
+void arch_kpkeys_protect_static_pgtables(void);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES */
+
 #endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif	/* __ASM_KPKEYS_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index ee972c78e45c..472ad0f8f002 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -1073,6 +1073,18 @@ void __init mark_linear_text_alias_ro(void)
 			    PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+void __init arch_kpkeys_protect_static_pgtables(void)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)lm_alias(__pi_init_pg_dir);
+	unsigned long size = __pi_init_pg_end - __pi_init_pg_dir;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = set_memory_pkey(addr, size / PAGE_SIZE, KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES);
+	WARN_ON(ret);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE
 
 bool __ro_after_init kfence_early_init = !!CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL;

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 22/25] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes

[Kevin Brodsky]

When CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES is enabled, page tables (both
user and kernel) are mapped with a privileged pkey in the linear
mapping. As a result, they can only be written in a privileged
kpkeys context.

Introduce a kpkeys guard that sets POR_EL1 appropriately to allow
writing to page tables, and use this guard wherever necessary. The
scope is kept as small as possible, so that POR_EL1 is quickly reset
to its default value. Where atomics are involved, the guard's scope
encompasses the whole loop to avoid switching POR_EL1 unnecessarily.

This patch is a no-op if CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES is disabled
(default).

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c            | 17 ++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 27689c62bd25..b4e52d6bb6ba 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -39,6 +39,14 @@
 #include <linux/mm_types.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/page_table_check.h>
+#include <linux/kpkeys.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+KPKEYS_GUARD_COND(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables, KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES,
+		  kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled())
+#else
+KPKEYS_GUARD_NOOP(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)
+#endif
 
 static inline void emit_pte_barriers(void)
 {
@@ -359,6 +367,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)
 
 static inline void __set_pte_nosync(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
 {
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*ptep, pte);
 }
 
@@ -830,6 +839,7 @@ static inline void set_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
 	}
 #endif /* __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED */
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*pmdp, pmd);
 
 	if (pmd_valid(pmd))
@@ -894,6 +904,7 @@ static inline void set_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*pudp, pud);
 
 	if (pud_valid(pud))
@@ -975,6 +986,7 @@ static inline void set_p4d(p4d_t *p4dp, p4d_t p4d)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*p4dp, p4d);
 	queue_pte_barriers();
 }
@@ -1103,6 +1115,7 @@ static inline void set_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*pgdp, pgd);
 	queue_pte_barriers();
 }
@@ -1307,6 +1320,7 @@ static inline bool __ptep_test_and_clear_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 {
 	pte_t old_pte, pte;
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	pte = __ptep_get(ptep);
 	do {
 		old_pte = pte;
@@ -1354,7 +1368,10 @@ static inline pte_t __ptep_get_and_clear_anysz(struct mm_struct *mm,
 					       pte_t *ptep,
 					       unsigned long pgsize)
 {
-	pte_t pte = __pte(xchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), 0));
+	pte_t pte;
+
+	scoped_guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)
+		pte = __pte(xchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), 0));
 
 	switch (pgsize) {
 	case PAGE_SIZE:
@@ -1427,6 +1444,7 @@ static inline void ___ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
 {
 	pte_t old_pte;
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	do {
 		old_pte = pte;
 		pte = pte_wrprotect(pte);
@@ -1460,6 +1478,7 @@ static inline void __clear_young_dirty_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 {
 	pte_t old_pte;
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	do {
 		old_pte = pte;
 
@@ -1507,6 +1526,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
 {
 	page_table_check_pmd_set(vma->vm_mm, address, pmdp, pmd);
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	return __pmd(xchg_relaxed(&pmd_val(*pmdp), pmd_val(pmd)));
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index 0b52557652be..a853a8d4e61a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -229,13 +229,16 @@ int __ptep_set_access_flags_anysz(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	 */
 	pte_val(entry) ^= PTE_RDONLY;
 	pteval = pte_val(pte);
-	do {
-		old_pteval = pteval;
-		pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
-		pteval |= pte_val(entry);
-		pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
-		pteval = cmpxchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), old_pteval, pteval);
-	} while (pteval != old_pteval);
+	scoped_guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables) {
+		do {
+			old_pteval = pteval;
+			pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
+			pteval |= pte_val(entry);
+			pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
+			pteval = cmpxchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), old_pteval,
+						 pteval);
+		} while (pteval != old_pteval);
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Invalidate the local stale read-only entry.  Remote stale entries

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 23/25] arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES switches

[Kevin Brodsky]

The kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature currently switches kpkeys
context in every helper that writes to page tables, such as
set_pte(). With kpkeys implemented using POE, this entails a pair of
ISBs whenever such helper is called.

A simple way to reduce this overhead is to make use of the lazy MMU
mode. We amend the kpkeys_hardened_pgtables guard so that no kpkeys
context switch (i.e. POR_EL1 update) is issued while the lazy MMU
mode is active. Instead, we switch to KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES when
entering the lazy MMU mode, and restore the previous context when
exiting it.

Restoring the previous kpkeys context requires storing struct
kpkeys_state somewhere. POR_EL1 is a full 64-bit value so we cannot
simply use a TIF flag. There is no straightforward way to reuse
current->thread.por_el1 for that purpose - this is where the current
value of POR_EL1 is stored on a context switch, i.e. the value
corresponding to KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES inside a lazy_mmu section.
Instead, we add a new member to thread_struct to hold that state
temporarily. This isn't optimal as that member is unused outside of
lazy MMU sections, but it is the simplest option. Nesting of
sections is not a concern as arch_{enter,leave}_lazy_mmu_mode() are
not called in inner lazy MMU sections (nor do we need to do anything
there).

A further optimisation this patch makes is to merge the ISBs when
exiting lazy_mmu mode. That is, if an ISB is going to be issued by
emit_pte_barriers() because kernel pgtables were modified in the
lazy MMU section, we skip the ISB after restoring POR_EL1. This is
done by checking TIF_LAZY_MMU_PENDING and ensuring that POR_EL1 is
restored before emit_pte_barriers() is called.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h   | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h |  4 +++
 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
index b4e52d6bb6ba..6e5d14c7e8b8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -43,10 +43,44 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
 KPKEYS_GUARD_COND(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables, KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES,
-		  kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled())
-#else
+		  kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled() &&
+		  !is_lazy_mmu_mode_active())
+
+static inline void kpkeys_lazy_mmu_enter(void)
+{
+	if (!kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	current->thread.kpkeys_state_lazy_mmu =
+		kpkeys_enter_context(KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES);
+}
+
+static inline void kpkeys_lazy_mmu_exit(void)
+{
+	const struct kpkeys_state *state =
+		&current->thread.kpkeys_state_lazy_mmu;
+
+	if (!kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * We skip any barrier if TIF_LAZY_MMU_PENDING is set:
+	 * emit_pte_barriers() will issue an ISB just after this function
+	 * returns.
+	 */
+	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_LAZY_MMU_PENDING) && state->entered_context)
+		__kpkeys_set_pkey_reg_nosync(state->arch_state.por);
+	else
+		kpkeys_leave_context(state);
+}
+#else /* CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES */
 KPKEYS_GUARD_NOOP(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)
-#endif
+
+static inline void kpkeys_lazy_mmu_enter(void) {}
+static inline void kpkeys_lazy_mmu_exit(void) {}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES */
+
+
 
 static inline void emit_pte_barriers(void)
 {
@@ -79,7 +113,10 @@ static inline void queue_pte_barriers(void)
 	}
 }
 
-static inline void arch_enter_lazy_mmu_mode(void) {}
+static inline void arch_enter_lazy_mmu_mode(void)
+{
+	kpkeys_lazy_mmu_enter();
+}
 
 static inline void arch_flush_lazy_mmu_mode(void)
 {
@@ -89,6 +126,11 @@ static inline void arch_flush_lazy_mmu_mode(void)
 
 static inline void arch_leave_lazy_mmu_mode(void)
 {
+	/*
+	 * The ordering should be preserved to allow kpkeys_lazy_mmu_exit()
+	 * to skip any barrier when TIF_LAZY_MMU_PENDING is set.
+	 */
+	kpkeys_lazy_mmu_exit();
 	arch_flush_lazy_mmu_mode();
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
index 8d7fa479cd36..23660a233da2 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <linux/build_bug.h>
 #include <linux/cache.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kpkeys_types.h>
 #include <linux/stddef.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
@@ -196,6 +197,9 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	u64			tpidr2_el0;
 	u64			por_el0;
 	u64			por_el1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+	struct kpkeys_state	kpkeys_state_lazy_mmu;
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_GCS
 	unsigned int		gcs_el0_mode;
 	unsigned int		gcs_el0_locked;

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 24/25] arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support

[Kevin Brodsky]

The kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature needs to be initialised as soon
as the buddy allocator becomes available. The canonical place to
handle this is mem_init().

With that done, all the bits are in place and we can advertise
support for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables by selecting
ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES if ARM64_POE is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig   | 1 +
 arch/arm64/mm/init.c | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 0afa085c66be..ac9faec1a018 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -2203,6 +2203,7 @@ config ARM64_POE
 	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
 	select ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
 	select ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS
+	select ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
 	help
 	  The Permission Overlay Extension is used to implement Memory
 	  Protection Keys. Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/init.c b/arch/arm64/mm/init.c
index 97987f850a33..7985045875cf 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/init.c
@@ -386,6 +386,7 @@ bool page_alloc_available __ro_after_init;
 void __init mem_init(void)
 {
 	page_alloc_available = true;
+	kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init();
 	swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
 }
 

-- 
2.51.2

[PATCH RFC v9 25/25] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables

[Kevin Brodsky]

Add basic tests for the kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature: try to
perform direct writes to kernel and user page table entries and
ensure they fail.

Multiple cases are considered for kernel page tables, as early page
tables are allocated and/or protected in a different way.

The tests are builtin (cannot be built as a module) because they
refer to multiple symbols that are not exported (e.g.
copy_to_kernel_nofault()).

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 mm/Makefile                               |   1 +
 mm/tests/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_kunit.c | 200 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/Kconfig.hardening                |  12 ++
 3 files changed, 213 insertions(+)

diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index 35982b6efb56..e31e58294845 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -148,3 +148,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EXECMEM) += execmem.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TMPFS_QUOTA) += shmem_quota.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_LAZY_MMU_MODE_KUNIT_TEST) += tests/lazy_mmu_mode_kunit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES) += kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES_KUNIT_TEST) += tests/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_kunit.o
diff --git a/mm/tests/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_kunit.c b/mm/tests/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_kunit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..80d4f5144e48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/tests/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_kunit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
+static void free_page_wrapper(void *ctx)
+{
+	__free_page((struct page *)ctx);
+}
+
+KUNIT_DEFINE_ACTION_WRAPPER(vfree_wrapper, vfree, const void *);
+
+static pud_t *pud_off_k(unsigned long va)
+{
+	return pud_offset(p4d_offset(pgd_offset_k(va), va), va);
+}
+
+static pte_t *get_kernel_pte(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	pmd_t *pmdp = pmd_off_k(addr);
+
+	if (!pmdp || pmd_leaf(*pmdp))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return pte_offset_kernel(pmdp, addr);
+}
+
+#define write_pgtable(type, ptr) do {					\
+	type##_t val;							\
+	int ret;							\
+									\
+	pr_debug("%s: writing to "#type" at %px\n", __func__, (ptr));	\
+									\
+	val = type##p_get(ptr);						\
+	ret = copy_to_kernel_nofault(ptr, &val, sizeof(val));		\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, ret, -EFAULT,				\
+			    "Direct "#type" write wasn't prevented");	\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Try to write linear map page tables, at every level. This is worthwhile
+ * because those page table pages are obtained from different allocators:
+ *
+ * - Static memory (part of the kernel image) for PGD
+ * - memblock for PUD and possibly PMD/PTE
+ * - pagetable_alloc() (buddy allocator) for PMD/PTE if large block mappings are
+ *   used and the linear map is split after being created
+ */
+static void write_direct_map_pgtables(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	pgd_t *pgdp;
+	p4d_t *p4dp;
+	pud_t *pudp;
+	pmd_t *pmdp;
+	pte_t *ptep;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!kpkeys_supported())
+		kunit_skip(test, "kpkeys are not supported");
+
+	page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, page);
+	ret = kunit_add_action_or_reset(test, free_page_wrapper, page);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, ret, 0);
+
+	/* Ensure page is PTE-mapped (splitting the linear map if necessary) */
+	ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, ret, 0);
+	ret = set_direct_map_default_noflush(page);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, ret, 0);
+
+	addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
+
+	pgdp = pgd_offset_k(addr);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MSG(test, pgdp, "Failed to get PGD");
+	/*
+	 * swapper_pg_dir is still writable at this stage, so don't check it.
+	 * It is not protected by kpkeys_hardened_pgtables because it should be
+	 * made read-only by mark_rodata_ro(). However since these
+	 * KUnit tests are builtin, they are run before mark_rodata_ro() is
+	 * called.
+	 */
+
+	p4dp = p4d_offset(pgdp, addr);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MSG(test, p4dp, "Failed to get P4D");
+	if (!mm_p4d_folded(&init_mm))
+		write_pgtable(p4d, p4dp);
+
+	pudp = pud_offset(p4dp, addr);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MSG(test, pudp, "Failed to get PUD");
+	if (!mm_pud_folded(&init_mm))
+		write_pgtable(pud, pudp);
+
+	pmdp = pmd_offset(pudp, addr);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MSG(test, pmdp, "Failed to get PMD");
+	write_pgtable(pmd, pmdp);
+
+	ptep = pte_offset_kernel(pmdp, addr);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MSG(test, ptep, "Failed to get PTE");
+	write_pgtable(pte, ptep);
+}
+
+/* Worth checking since the kernel image is mapped with static page tables */
+static void write_kernel_image_pud(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	pud_t *pudp;
+
+	if (!kpkeys_supported())
+		kunit_skip(test, "kpkeys are not supported");
+
+	/* The kernel is probably block-mapped, check the PUD to be safe */
+	pudp = pud_off_k((unsigned long)&init_mm);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MSG(test, pudp, "Failed to get PUD");
+
+	write_pgtable(pud, pudp);
+}
+
+static void write_kernel_vmalloc_pte(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	void *mem;
+	pte_t *ptep;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!kpkeys_supported())
+		kunit_skip(test, "kpkeys are not supported");
+
+	mem = vmalloc(PAGE_SIZE);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, mem);
+	ret = kunit_add_action_or_reset(test, vfree_wrapper, mem);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, ret, 0);
+
+	/* vmalloc() without VM_ALLOW_HUGE_VMAP is PTE-mapped */
+	ptep = get_kernel_pte((unsigned long)mem);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MSG(test, ptep, "Failed to get PTE");
+
+	write_pgtable(pte, ptep);
+}
+
+static void write_vmemmap_pmd(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	pmd_t *pmdp;
+
+	if (!kpkeys_supported())
+		kunit_skip(test, "kpkeys are not supported");
+
+	/*
+	 * We just need the address of some struct page, so we can free the
+	 * page right away.
+	 */
+	page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, page);
+	__free_page(page);
+
+	/* vmemmap may use PMD block mappings */
+	pmdp = pmd_off_k((unsigned long)page);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MSG(test, pmdp, "Failed to get PMD");
+	write_pgtable(pmd, pmdp);
+}
+
+static void write_user_pmd(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	pmd_t *pmdp;
+	unsigned long uaddr;
+
+	if (!kpkeys_supported())
+		kunit_skip(test, "kpkeys are not supported");
+
+	uaddr = kunit_vm_mmap(test, NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ,
+			      MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_POPULATE, 0);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NE_MSG(test, uaddr, 0, "Could not create userspace mm");
+
+	/* We passed MAP_POPULATE so a PMD should already be allocated */
+	pmdp = pmd_off(current->mm, uaddr);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MSG(test, pmdp, "Failed to get PMD");
+
+	write_pgtable(pmd, pmdp);
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_test_cases[] = {
+	KUNIT_CASE(write_direct_map_pgtables),
+	KUNIT_CASE(write_kernel_image_pud),
+	KUNIT_CASE(write_kernel_vmalloc_pte),
+	KUNIT_CASE(write_vmemmap_pmd),
+	KUNIT_CASE(write_user_pmd),
+	{}
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_test_suite = {
+	.name = "kpkeys_hardened_pgtables",
+	.test_cases = kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_test_cases,
+};
+kunit_test_suite(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_test_suite);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Tests for the kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index bb75b580b7f1..ad6152961f8e 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -283,6 +283,18 @@ config KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
 	  This option has no effect if the system does not support
 	  kernel pkeys.
 
+config KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES_KUNIT_TEST
+	bool "KUnit tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	depends on KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+	depends on KUNIT=y
+	default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	help
+	  Enable this option to check that the kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature
+	  functions as intended, i.e. prevents arbitrary writes to user and
+	  kernel page tables.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 endmenu
 
 config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT

-- 
2.51.2