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From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: "Adrian Barnaś" <abarnas@google.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@gentwo.org>,
	Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>,
	Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
	Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 6/6] arm64: mm: support PMD page coalescing in the linear map
Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 17:33:50 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aku8zidRtXPe_Rle@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <akuieSDlbYdHnkCV@google.com>

On Mon, Jul 06, 2026 at 12:41:29PM +0000, Adrian Barnaś wrote:
> Hi Mike,
> 
> On Fri, Jun 19, 2026 at 02:40:40PM +0100, Ryan Roberts wrote:
> 
> > I don't think this is safe in general. Let's say we have a 2M region split into
> > 512 x 4K PTEs. It's possible that the first 1M is one object and the second 1M
> > is another object. Different CPUs could set_memory_*() on those 2 objects
> > concurrently. If one of them then calls this function, we could end up
> > collapsing the whole 2M while the other is trying to modify the PTEs and they
> > will race.
> > 
> > Note that splitting _is_ safe (and protected by this lock) because you'd have 2
> > objects backed by the same PMD, so they would both have to split before
> > modifying the PTEs.
> > 
> > I think you'd need to ensure mutual exclusion at a higher level if doing this;
> > probably execmem is the place that can ensure that no objects within a 2M region
> > are racily trying to modify their permissions?
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > Ryan
> 
> I wonder what do you think about enforcing mutual exclusion for permission
> changes to the ROX_CACHE block as Ryan sugest?
> 
> Would it be appropriate to add locks (over `&execmem_cache.mutex`) to
> `execmem_force_rw` and `execmem_restore_rox`?
>                                                                             I
> see that x86 has a lock that wraps entire process of updating attributes
> (including spliting and collapsing pages):
> ```
> spin_lock(&cpa_lock);
> ret = __change_page_attr(cpa, primary);
> spin_unlock(&cpa_lock);                                            ```
> As I understand it makes it safe already.
> However, on ARM64 there is a split lock (which works fine for spliting) but
> for collapsing at least on my implementation it is not sufficient as
> Ryan pointed out.

I think the lock should be at set_memory level so that set_memory callers
shouldn't care about the differences in arch implementations.

I also suspect that the lockless page table walk in update_range_prot()
isn't safe today.
 
> Best regards
> Adrian

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.


      reply	other threads:[~2026-07-06 14:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-11 13:01 [RFC PATCH 0/6] arm64: mm: Introducing ROX CACHE to ARM64 systems with bbml2 no abort Adrian Barnaś
2026-06-11 13:01 ` [RFC PATCH 1/6] arm64: mm: explicitly declare module and ftrace execmem regions Adrian Barnaś
2026-06-11 13:36   ` Brendan Jackman
2026-06-11 13:01 ` [RFC PATCH 2/6] arm64: mm: allow huge vmap permission adjustments with bbml2_no_abort Adrian Barnaś
2026-06-18 14:21   ` Ryan Roberts
2026-06-24 13:54     ` Adrian Barnaś
2026-06-11 13:01 ` [RFC PATCH 3/6] arm64: mm: fix restoring linear map permissions on execmem cache clean Adrian Barnaś
2026-06-11 13:54   ` Brendan Jackman
2026-06-12  7:17     ` Mike Rapoport
2026-06-17 15:18       ` Adrian Barnaś
2026-06-17 18:40         ` Mike Rapoport
2026-06-24 13:57           ` Adrian Barnaś
2026-07-06 11:35         ` Mike Rapoport
2026-07-06 12:47           ` Adrian Barnaś
2026-06-18 15:05   ` Ryan Roberts
2026-06-19  8:33     ` Ryan Roberts
2026-06-24 13:52       ` Adrian Barnaś
2026-06-11 13:01 ` [RFC PATCH 4/6] arm64: mm: add helper to fill execmem with trapping instructions Adrian Barnaś
2026-06-19 10:54   ` Ryan Roberts
2026-06-19 10:58     ` Mike Rapoport
2026-06-11 13:01 ` [RFC PATCH 5/6] arm64: execmem: enable EXECMEM_ROX_CACHE on supported CPUs Adrian Barnaś
2026-06-19 12:09   ` Ryan Roberts
2026-06-11 13:01 ` [RFC PATCH 6/6] arm64: mm: support PMD page coalescing in the linear map Adrian Barnaś
2026-06-19 13:40   ` Ryan Roberts
2026-06-24 14:32     ` Adrian Barnaś
2026-07-06 12:41     ` Adrian Barnaś
2026-07-06 14:33       ` Mike Rapoport [this message]

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