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From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
To: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>
Cc: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>, Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>,
	David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@fb.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 05/20] fscrypt: add extent-based encryption
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2022 11:33:26 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YxoLRh0b4Qf8BtUh@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <48d09d4905d0c6e5e72d37535eb852487f1bd9cb.1662420176.git.sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>

On Mon, Sep 05, 2022 at 08:35:20PM -0400, Sweet Tea Dorminy wrote:
> Some filesystems need to encrypt data based on extents, rather than on
> inodes, due to features incompatible with inode-based encryption. For
> instance, btrfs can have multiple inodes referencing a single block of
> data, and moves logical data blocks to different physical locations on
> disk in the background; these two features mean inode or
> physical-location-based policies will not work for btrfs.
> 
> This change introduces fscrypt_extent_context objects, in analogy to
> existing context objects based on inodes. For a filesystem which uses
> extents, a new hook provides a new fscrypt_extent_context. During file
> content encryption/decryption, the existing fscrypt_context object
> provides key information, while the new fscrypt_extent_context provides
> IV information. For filename encryption, the existing IV generation
> methods are still used, since filenames are not stored in extents.
> 
> As individually keyed inodes prevent sharing of extents, such policies
> are forbidden for filesystems with extent-based encryption.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>
> ---
>  fs/crypto/crypto.c          | 15 +++++++-
>  fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 26 ++++++++++++-
>  fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c    | 29 +++++++++++---
>  fs/crypto/policy.c          | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/fscrypt.h     | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  5 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/crypto/crypto.c b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
> index 7fe5979fbea2..77537736096b 100644
> --- a/fs/crypto/crypto.c
> +++ b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
> @@ -81,8 +81,19 @@ void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
>  			 const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
>  {
>  	u8 flags = fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy);
> +	struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode;
> +	const struct fscrypt_operations *s_cop = inode->i_sb->s_cop;
>  
>  	memset(iv, 0, ci->ci_mode->ivsize);
> +	if (s_cop->get_extent_context && lblk_num != U64_MAX) {
> +		size_t extent_offset;
> +		union fscrypt_extent_context ctx;
> +		int ret = fscrypt_get_extent_context(inode, lblk_num, &ctx, &extent_offset, NULL);

Newline between declarations and code, and since you use the warnon i'd do

int ret;

ret = fscrypt_get_extent_context();
WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);

> +		WARN_ON_ONCE(ret != 0);
> +		memcpy(iv->raw, ctx.v1.iv, ci->ci_mode->ivsize);
> +		iv->lblk_num = iv->lblk_num + cpu_to_le64(extent_offset);
> +		return;
> +	}
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * Filename encryption. For inode-based policies, filenames are
> @@ -93,8 +104,8 @@ void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
>  
>  	if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64) {
>  		WARN_ON_ONCE(lblk_num > U32_MAX);
> -		WARN_ON_ONCE(ci->ci_inode->i_ino > U32_MAX);
> -		lblk_num |= (u64)ci->ci_inode->i_ino << 32;
> +		WARN_ON_ONCE(inode->i_ino > U32_MAX);
> +		lblk_num |= (u64)inode->i_ino << 32;
>  	} else if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32) {
>  		WARN_ON_ONCE(lblk_num > U32_MAX);
>  		lblk_num = (u32)(ci->ci_hashed_ino + lblk_num);
> diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
> index 3afdaa084773..2092ef63c80a 100644
> --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
> +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
> @@ -165,6 +165,27 @@ fscrypt_policy_flags(const union fscrypt_policy *policy)
>  	BUG();
>  }
>  
> +#define FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE	32
> +
> +/*
> + * fscrypt_extent_context - the encryption context for an extent
> + * 

Whitespace.

> + * For filesystems that support extent encryption, this context provides the
> + * necessary randomly-initialized IV in order to encrypt/decrypt the data
> + * stored in the extent. It is stored alongside each extent, and is
> + * insufficient to decrypt the extent: the extent's owning inode(s) provide the
> + * policy information (including key identifier) necessary to decrypt.
> + */
> +struct fscrypt_extent_context_v1 {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 iv[FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE];
> +};
> +
> +union fscrypt_extent_context {
> +	u8 version;
> +	struct fscrypt_extent_context_v1 v1;
> +};
> +
>  /*
>   * For encrypted symlinks, the ciphertext length is stored at the beginning
>   * of the string in little-endian format.
> @@ -279,8 +300,6 @@ fscrypt_msg(const struct inode *inode, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...);
>  #define fscrypt_err(inode, fmt, ...)		\
>  	fscrypt_msg((inode), KERN_ERR, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
>  
> -#define FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE	32
> -
>  union fscrypt_iv {
>  	struct {
>  		/* logical block number within the file */
> @@ -628,5 +647,8 @@ int fscrypt_policy_from_context(union fscrypt_policy *policy_u,
>  				const union fscrypt_context *ctx_u,
>  				int ctx_size);
>  const union fscrypt_policy *fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(struct inode *dir);
> +int fscrypt_get_extent_context(const struct inode *inode, u64 lblk_num,
> +			       union fscrypt_extent_context *ctx,
> +			       size_t *extent_offset, size_t *extent_length);
>  
>  #endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */
> diff --git a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c
> index 90f3e68f166e..0537f710047e 100644
> --- a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c
> +++ b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c
> @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
> +

Whitespace.  Thanks,

Josef

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-09-08 15:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-06  0:35 [PATCH v2 00/20] btrfs: add fscrypt integration Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 01/20] fscrypt: expose fscrypt_nokey_name Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-08 13:41   ` Josef Bacik
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 02/20] fscrypt: add flag allowing partially-encrypted directories Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-08 13:43   ` Josef Bacik
2022-09-12  1:42   ` Eric Biggers
2022-09-15 18:58     ` Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-13 10:07   ` Anand Jain
2022-09-13 11:02     ` Neal Gompa
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 03/20] fscrypt: add fscrypt_have_same_policy() to check inode compatibility Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-08 13:53   ` Josef Bacik
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 04/20] fscrypt: allow fscrypt_generate_iv() to distinguish filenames Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-08 14:01   ` Josef Bacik
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 05/20] fscrypt: add extent-based encryption Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-07 19:59   ` Omar Sandoval
2022-09-08 15:33   ` Josef Bacik [this message]
2022-09-10 18:53   ` kernel test robot
2022-09-12  1:34   ` Eric Biggers
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 06/20] fscrypt: document btrfs' fscrypt quirks Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-08 15:34   ` Josef Bacik
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 07/20] btrfs: store directory's encryption state Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-08 15:37   ` Josef Bacik
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 08/20] btrfs: use fscrypt_names instead of name/len everywhere Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-07 20:04   ` David Sterba
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 09/20] btrfs: setup fscrypt_names from dentrys using helper Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-08 19:11   ` Josef Bacik
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] btrfs: factor a fscrypt_name matching method Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-08 19:27   ` Josef Bacik
2022-09-09 10:15   ` David Sterba
2022-09-09 13:00     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-09-09 13:34       ` David Sterba
2022-09-16 22:18         ` J Lovejoy
2022-09-19  2:00           ` Bradley M. Kuhn
2022-09-19 17:20             ` David Sterba
2022-09-19 16:52           ` David Sterba
2022-09-09 13:41       ` Chris Mason
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 11/20] btrfs: disable various operations on encrypted inodes Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-06  6:36   ` kernel test robot
2022-09-07 20:11   ` David Sterba
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 12/20] btrfs: start using fscrypt hooks Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-07 20:17   ` David Sterba
2022-09-07 20:42     ` Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-12  1:50       ` Eric Biggers
2022-09-08 19:42   ` Josef Bacik
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 13/20] btrfs: add fscrypt_context items Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-07 20:43   ` David Sterba
2022-09-08 20:06   ` Josef Bacik
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 14/20] btrfs: translate btrfs encryption flags and encrypted inode flag Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-08 20:07   ` Josef Bacik
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 15/20] btrfs: store a fscrypt extent context per normal file extent Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-07 21:10   ` David Sterba
2022-09-07 21:39     ` Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-09 10:04       ` David Sterba
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 16/20] btrfs: Add new FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FSCRYPT feature flag Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-09 11:35   ` David Sterba
2022-09-12  1:36   ` Eric Biggers
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 17/20] btrfs: reuse encrypted filename hash when possible Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-07 21:24   ` David Sterba
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 18/20] btrfs: adapt directory read and lookup to potentially encrypted filenames Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-08 20:15   ` Josef Bacik
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 19/20] btrfs: encrypt normal file extent data if appropriate Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-08 20:19   ` Josef Bacik
2022-09-06  0:35 ` [PATCH v2 20/20] btrfs: implement fscrypt ioctls Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-07 21:33   ` David Sterba
2022-09-06 22:35 ` [PATCH v2 00/20] btrfs: add fscrypt integration Eric Biggers
2022-09-06 23:01   ` Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-06 23:10     ` Eric Biggers
2022-09-07  0:01       ` Sweet Tea Dorminy
2022-09-07 19:38 ` David Sterba

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