From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Subject: [PATCH v5 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 01:26:03 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170607232607.26870-10-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170607232607.26870-1-Jason@zx2c4.com>
This is much faster and just as secure. It also has the added benefit of
probably returning better randomness at early-boot on systems with
architectural RNGs.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
---
lib/rhashtable.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/rhashtable.c b/lib/rhashtable.c
index d9e7274a04cd..a1eb7c947f46 100644
--- a/lib/rhashtable.c
+++ b/lib/rhashtable.c
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static struct bucket_table *bucket_table_alloc(struct rhashtable *ht,
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tbl->walkers);
- get_random_bytes(&tbl->hash_rnd, sizeof(tbl->hash_rnd));
+ tbl->hash_rnd = get_random_u32();
for (i = 0; i < nbuckets; i++)
INIT_RHT_NULLS_HEAD(tbl->buckets[i], ht, i);
--
2.13.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-07 23:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-07 23:25 [PATCH v5 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-14 19:28 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-14 22:33 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 8:31 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-16 12:12 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 14:36 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-14 22:45 ` [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 14:35 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-17 0:39 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-19 7:45 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-19 20:55 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 6:44 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-19 20:57 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 6:03 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-20 6:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Joel Stanley
2017-06-20 6:59 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-06-20 8:14 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 8:33 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-20 8:53 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 9:36 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-20 9:49 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-20 17:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sandy Harris
2017-06-20 18:14 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:09 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 9:49 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 23:38 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-20 23:54 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-21 0:03 ` [PATCH] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-21 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-21 6:06 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-06-21 20:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-22 0:04 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-21 23:50 ` [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
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