From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 16:36:07 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616143606.lwvuqxvzyixnytzd@breakpoint.cc> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHmME9q_9-zQan0um9j2deHHPejYreCCbfss0BeNuEr4_tuaKg@mail.gmail.com>
On 2017-06-16 14:12:42 [+0200], Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> I actually figured that out myself after sending the initial email, so
> then I wrote a follow-up patch which I attached to this thread. You
> should have received it. Can you take a look?
replied to the patch.
Sebastian
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-16 14:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-07 23:25 [PATCH v5 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-14 19:28 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-14 22:33 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 8:31 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-16 12:12 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 14:36 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior [this message]
2017-06-14 22:45 ` [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 14:35 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-17 0:39 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-19 7:45 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-19 20:55 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 6:44 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-19 20:57 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 6:03 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-20 6:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Joel Stanley
2017-06-20 6:59 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-06-20 8:14 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 8:33 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-20 8:53 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 9:36 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-20 9:49 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-20 17:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sandy Harris
2017-06-20 18:14 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:09 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 9:49 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 23:38 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-20 23:54 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-21 0:03 ` [PATCH] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-21 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-21 6:06 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-06-21 20:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-22 0:04 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-21 23:50 ` [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-06-07 23:21 [PATCH v5 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:21 ` [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
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