From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>, Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 01:26:02 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170607232607.26870-9-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170607232607.26870-1-Jason@zx2c4.com>
Using get_random_u32 here is faster, more fitting of the use case, and
just as cryptographically secure. It also has the benefit of providing
better randomness at early boot, which is sometimes when this is used.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
---
fs/cifs/cifsfs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c
index 9a1667e0e8d6..fe0c8dcc7dc7 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c
@@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@ init_cifs(void)
spin_lock_init(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
spin_lock_init(&GlobalMid_Lock);
- get_random_bytes(&cifs_lock_secret, sizeof(cifs_lock_secret));
+ cifs_lock_secret = get_random_u32();
if (cifs_max_pending < 2) {
cifs_max_pending = 2;
--
2.13.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-07 23:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-07 23:25 [PATCH v5 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-14 19:28 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-14 22:33 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 8:31 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-16 12:12 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 14:36 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-14 22:45 ` [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 14:35 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-17 0:39 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-19 7:45 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-19 20:55 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 6:44 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2017-06-19 20:57 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 6:03 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-20 6:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Joel Stanley
2017-06-20 6:59 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-06-20 8:14 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 8:33 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-20 8:53 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 9:36 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-20 9:49 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-20 17:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sandy Harris
2017-06-20 18:14 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:09 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 9:49 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-20 23:38 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-20 23:54 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-21 0:03 ` [PATCH] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-21 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-21 6:06 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-06-21 20:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-22 0:04 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-21 23:50 ` [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
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