From: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
To: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>,
alison.schofield@intel.com
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>,
Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>,
Ben Widawsky <bwidawsk@kernel.org>,
linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/5] cxl/memdev: Add support for the Inject Poison mailbox command
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 09:42:01 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a595f3dd-3655-eda8-34ed-b11445068e62@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221130144057.000024de@Huawei.com>
On 11/30/2022 7:40 AM, Jonathan Cameron wrote:
> On Wed, 30 Nov 2022 14:31:36 +0000
> Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 29 Nov 2022 20:34:33 -0800
>> alison.schofield@intel.com wrote:
>>
>>> From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
>>>
>>> CXL devices optionally support the INJECT POISON mailbox command. Add
>>> a sysfs attribute and memdev driver support for injecting poison.
>>>
>>> When a Device Physical Address (DPA) is written to the inject_poison
>>> sysfs attribute send an inject poison command to the device for the
>>> specified address.
>>>
>>> Per the CXL Specification (8.2.9.8.4.2), after receiving a valid
>>> inject poison request, the device will return poison when the address
>>> is accessed through the CXL.mem bus. Injecting poison adds the address
>>> to the device's Poison List and the error source is set to injected
>>> error. In addition, the device adds a poison creation event to its
>>> internal Informational Event log, updates the Event Status register,
>>> and if configured, interrupts the host.
>>>
>>> Also, per the CXL Specification, it is not an error to inject poison
>>> into an address that already has poison present and no error is returned
>>> from the device. The memdev driver performs basic sanity checking on the
>>> address, however, it does not go as far as reading the poison list to see
>>> if the address is on the list. That discovery is left to the device.
>>>
>>> The inject_poison attribute is only visible for devices supporting
>>> the capability.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
>> A few trivial things inline. With those fixes LGTM
>>
>> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
>>
>>> ---
>>> Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 19 +++++++++
>>> drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 3 ++
>>> 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
>>> index b715a4609718..20db97f7a1aa 100644
>>> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
>>> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
>>> @@ -416,3 +416,22 @@ Description:
>>> if accessed, and the source of the poison. The retrieved
>>> errors are logged as kernel trace events with the label
>>> 'cxl_poison'.
>>> +
>>> +
>>> +What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/inject_poison
>>> +Date: December, 2022
>>> +KernelVersion: v6.2
>>> +Contact: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
>>> +Description:
>>> + (WO) When a Device Physical Address (DPA) is written to this
>>> + attribute the memdev driver sends an inject poison command to
>>> + the device for the specified address. If successful, the device
>>> + returns poison when the address is accessed through the CXL.mem
>>> + bus. Injecting poison adds the address to the device's Poison
>>> + List and the error source is set to injected error. In addition,
>> "set to Injected."
>>
>> perhaps to match spec naming in Media Error Record.
>>
>>> + the device adds a poison creation event to its internal
>>> + Informational Event log, updates the Event Status register, and
>>> + if configured, interrupts the host. It is not an error to inject
>>> + poison into an address that already has poison present and no
>>> + error is returned. The inject_poison attribute is only visible
>>> + for devices supporting the capability.
>>
>> White space issues (spaces instead of tabs?)
>>
>> Add something about the masked bits / granularity of addresses that are accepted.
>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
>>> index d08b7295a01c..71130813030f 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
>>> @@ -142,6 +142,51 @@ static ssize_t trigger_poison_list_store(struct device *dev,
>>> }
>>> static DEVICE_ATTR_WO(trigger_poison_list);
>>>
>>> +static int cxl_validate_poison_dpa(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u64 dpa)
>>> +{
>>> + if (!resource_size(&cxlds->dpa_res)) {
>>> + dev_dbg(cxlds->dev, "device has no dpa resource\n");
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + }
>>> + if (dpa < cxlds->dpa_res.start || dpa > cxlds->dpa_res.end) {
>>> + dev_dbg(cxlds->dev, "dpa:0x%llx not in resource:%pR\n",
>>> + dpa, &cxlds->dpa_res);
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + }
>>> + if ((dpa & CXL_POISON_INJECT_RESERVED) != 0) {
>>> + dev_dbg(cxlds->dev, "dpa reserve bit(s) [5:0] set 0x%llx\n",
>>> + dpa);
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + }
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static ssize_t inject_poison_store(struct device *dev,
>>> + struct device_attribute *attr,
>>> + const char *buf, size_t len)
>>> +{
>>> + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev);
>>> + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
>>> + u64 dpa;
>>> + int rc;
>>> +
>>> + rc = kstrtou64(buf, 0, &dpa);
>>> + if (rc)
>>> + return rc;
>>> + rc = cxl_validate_poison_dpa(cxlds, dpa);
>>> + if (rc)
>>> + return rc;
>>> +
>>> + dpa = cpu_to_le64(dpa);
>>> + rc = cxl_mbox_send_cmd(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_INJECT_POISON, &dpa,
>>
>> Endianness?
>
> Got thrown by the type and missed the cpu_to_le64(). Use a local __le64 so it's all explicit.
> One of the static analysis tools will correctly moan about storing it to a u64
> (can't remember which).
Sparse. I just got yelled at by 0-day for something similar. :)
>
>>
>>> + sizeof(dpa), NULL, cxlds->payload_size);
>>> + if (rc)
>>> + return rc;
>>> +
>>> + return len;
>>> +}
>>> +static DEVICE_ATTR_WO(inject_poison);
>>> +
>>> static struct attribute *cxl_memdev_attributes[] = {
>>> &dev_attr_serial.attr,
>>> &dev_attr_firmware_version.attr,
>>> @@ -149,6 +194,7 @@ static struct attribute *cxl_memdev_attributes[] = {
>>> &dev_attr_label_storage_size.attr,
>>> &dev_attr_numa_node.attr,
>>> &dev_attr_trigger_poison_list.attr,
>>> + &dev_attr_inject_poison.attr,
>>> NULL,
>>> };
>>>
>>> @@ -175,6 +221,13 @@ static umode_t cxl_memdev_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *a,
>>> to_cxl_memdev(dev)->cxlds->enabled_cmds))
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>> + if (a == &dev_attr_inject_poison.attr) {
>>> + struct device *dev = kobj_to_dev(kobj);
>>> +
>>> + if (!test_bit(CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_INJECT_POISON,
>>> + to_cxl_memdev(dev)->cxlds->enabled_cmds))
>>> + return 0;
>>> + }
>>> return a->mode;
>>> }
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
>>> index 19a9e545ac19..0d4c34be7335 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
>>> +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
>>> @@ -396,6 +396,9 @@ struct cxl_mbox_poison_payload_out {
>>> #define CXL_POISON_SOURCE_INJECTED 3
>>> #define CXL_POISON_SOURCE_VENDOR 7
>>>
>>> +/* Inject & Clear Poison CXL 3.0 Spec 8.2.9.8.4.2/3 */
>>> +#define CXL_POISON_INJECT_RESERVED GENMASK_ULL(5, 0)
>>> +
>>> /**
>>> * struct cxl_mem_command - Driver representation of a memory device command
>>> * @info: Command information as it exists for the UAPI
>>
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-12-01 16:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-30 4:34 [PATCH 0/5] cxl: CXL Inject & Clear Poison alison.schofield
2022-11-30 4:34 ` [PATCH 1/5] cxl/memdev: Add support for the Inject Poison mailbox command alison.schofield
2022-11-30 14:31 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-30 14:40 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-12-01 16:42 ` Dave Jiang [this message]
2022-12-08 4:20 ` Alison Schofield
2022-12-01 17:26 ` Dave Jiang
2022-12-08 4:17 ` Alison Schofield
2022-12-04 22:04 ` Dan Williams
2022-12-08 4:16 ` Alison Schofield
2022-11-30 4:34 ` [PATCH 2/5] cxl/memdev: Add support for the Clear " alison.schofield
2022-11-30 14:43 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-12-01 20:14 ` Alison Schofield
2022-12-01 17:54 ` Dave Jiang
2022-12-01 20:09 ` Alison Schofield
2022-11-30 4:34 ` [PATCH 3/5] tools/testing/cxl: Mock the Inject " alison.schofield
2022-11-30 14:58 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-12-08 4:47 ` Alison Schofield
2022-12-08 14:53 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-30 4:34 ` [PATCH 4/5] tools/testing/cxl: Mock the Clear " alison.schofield
2022-11-30 15:01 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-30 4:34 ` [PATCH 5/5] tools/testing/cxl: Use injected poison for Get Poison List alison.schofield
2022-11-30 15:15 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-12-08 4:30 ` Alison Schofield
2022-12-08 14:54 ` Jonathan Cameron
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