From: Atish Patra <atish.patra@linux.dev>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, robh@kernel.org,
conor+dt@kernel.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 10/21] RISC-V: perf: Restructure the SBI PMU code
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 17:17:16 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e16f8195-c718-468d-a8a1-6abe66ea58b4@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260609061839.70B9B1F00893@smtp.kernel.org>
On 6/8/26 11:18 PM, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
>
> Pre-existing issues:
> - [Critical] NULL pointer dereference when tearing down the PMU on error paths in probe.
> - [High] Missing cleanup on error paths in rvpmu_device_probe() leads to Use-After-Free and resource leaks.
> - [High] Broadcasting `SCOUNTEREN` updates to all CPUs in `mm_cpumask` leaks counter access to userspace.
> --
>
> commit 497e3337649afaedc330eca31dba2dda185d6179
> Author: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
>
> RISC-V: perf: Restructure the SBI PMU code
>
> With Ssccfg/Smcdeleg, supervisor mode can program and access the hpmcounters
> and events directly, without the SBI PMU extension. The SBI PMU extension is
> still required for firmware counters. Restructure the existing SBI PMU code so
> the hpmcounter/event helpers can be shared between the SBI and the counter
> delegation paths that follow.
>
>> diff --git a/drivers/perf/riscv_pmu_sbi.c b/drivers/perf/riscv_pmu_sbi.c
>> index 385af5e6e6d0d..7f21c16003f04 100644
>> --- a/drivers/perf/riscv_pmu_sbi.c
>> +++ b/drivers/perf/riscv_pmu_sbi.c
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -1305,7 +1349,7 @@ static void riscv_pmu_destroy(struct riscv_pmu *pmu)
>> cpuhp_state_remove_instance(CPUHP_AP_PERF_RISCV_STARTING, &pmu->node);
>> }
> [Severity: Critical]
> This is a pre-existing issue, but does this code cause a NULL pointer
> dereference on error paths?
>
> In rvpmu_device_probe(), if an error occurs (such as perf_pmu_register(),
> pmu_sbi_snapshot_alloc(), or cpuhp_state_add_instance() failing), the error
> path jumps to out_unregister and calls riscv_pmu_destroy().
>
> Because cpuhp_state_add_instance() either was not called yet, or failed and
> did not hash the node, pmu->node.pprev is NULL. The function
> cpuhp_state_remove_instance() does not check if the node is unhashed and
> directly calls hlist_del(). This attempts to write to the previous node
> pointer, which crashes the kernel with a NULL pointer dereference.
Good catch. Fixed in v7.
I will have a separate patch for these fixes.
>> -static void pmu_sbi_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
>> +static void rvpmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -1347,14 +1391,14 @@ static void pmu_sbi_event_mapped(struct perf_event *event, struct mm_struct *mm)
>> * that it is possible to do so to avoid any race.
>> * And we must notify all cpus here because threads that currently run
>> * on other cpus will try to directly access the counter too without
>> - * calling pmu_sbi_ctr_start.
>> + * calling rvpmu_sbi_ctr_start.
>> */
>> if (event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ACCESS)
>> on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(mm),
>> - pmu_sbi_set_scounteren, (void *)event, 1);
>> + rvpmu_set_scounteren, (void *)event, 1);
>> }
> [Severity: High]
> This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does broadcasting scounteren
> updates to all CPUs leak counter access to userspace?
>
> When a user-accessible event is mapped, rvpmu_set_scounteren is broadcast
> across all CPUs where the process has threads running. This enables the
> scounteren bit corresponding to event->hw.idx.
>
> However, event->hw.idx is a dynamic, per-CPU hardware counter index allocated
> only on the CPU where the event was scheduled. Broadcasting this index across
> all CPUs in the mask grants userspace access to that specific hardware
> counter slot on CPUs where the event is not running.
>
> Could a thread on another CPU read from that counter slot, potentially leaking
> the count of whatever unrelated perf event is active on that counter?
It's a valid concern. Though it is very difficult to exploit to leak the
counter values
through this approach as direct user access for programmable counters is
a niche use case to begin with.
I think we can toggle the scounteren bit in add/delete path to avoid the
leak. I will experiment
that idea and send a patch.
>> -static void pmu_sbi_event_unmapped(struct perf_event *event, struct mm_struct *mm)
>> +static void rvpmu_event_unmapped(struct perf_event *event, struct mm_struct *mm)
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -1419,7 +1463,7 @@ static const struct ctl_table sbi_pmu_sysctl_table[] = {
>> },
>> };
>>
>> -static int pmu_sbi_device_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>> +static int rvpmu_device_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>> {
>> struct riscv_pmu *pmu = NULL;
>> int ret = -ENODEV;
> [Severity: High]
> This is a pre-existing issue, but does this probe function correctly clean
> up resources on error paths?
>
> If initialization fails after perf_pmu_register(), the code jumps to the
> out_unregister label:
>
> out_unregister:
> riscv_pmu_destroy(pmu);
>
> out_free:
> kfree(pmu);
> return ret;
>
> However, riscv_pmu_destroy() does not call perf_pmu_unregister(). This leaves
> the core perf subsystem with a dangling pointer to the freed pmu structure,
> which can lead to a use-after-free when the perf core attempts to access it.
>
> Additionally, the per-CPU memory allocated for pmu->hw_events and the per-CPU
> interrupts requested via request_percpu_irq() are never freed on these error
> paths, resulting in resource leaks.
Nice catch. Fixed in v7.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-20 0:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-09 6:01 [PATCH v6 00/21] Add Counter delegation ISA extension support Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 01/21] RISC-V: Add Sxcsrind ISA extension CSR definitions Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 02/21] RISC-V: Add Sxcsrind ISA extension definition and parsing Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 03/21] dt-bindings: riscv: add Sxcsrind ISA extension description Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-19 23:39 ` Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 04/21] RISC-V: Define indirect CSR access helpers Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-19 23:39 ` Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 05/21] RISC-V: Add Smcntrpmf extension parsing Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 06/21] dt-bindings: riscv: add Smcntrpmf ISA extension description Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-19 23:40 ` Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 07/21] RISC-V: Add Sscfg extension CSR definition Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 08/21] RISC-V: Add Ssccfg/Smcdeleg ISA extension definition and parsing Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:14 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-19 23:44 ` Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 09/21] dt-bindings: riscv: add Counter delegation ISA extensions description Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:12 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-19 23:49 ` Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 10/21] RISC-V: perf: Restructure the SBI PMU code Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-20 0:17 ` Atish Patra [this message]
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 11/21] RISC-V: perf: Modify the counter discovery mechanism Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-20 0:31 ` Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 12/21] RISC-V: perf: Add a mechanism to defined legacy event encoding Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:16 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 13/21] RISC-V: perf: Implement supervisor counter delegation support Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:23 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-20 23:25 ` Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 14/21] RISC-V: perf: Skip PMU SBI extension when not implemented Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-20 23:15 ` Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 15/21] RISC-V: perf: Use config2/vendor table for event to counter mapping Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:23 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 16/21] RISC-V: perf: Add legacy event encodings via sysfs Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:21 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-20 0:35 ` Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 17/21] RISC-V: perf: Add Qemu virt machine events Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:22 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-20 0:37 ` Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 18/21] tools/perf: Support event code for arch standard events Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 19/21] tools/perf: Add RISC-V CounterIDMask event field Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 20/21] TEST(do-not-upstream): fake qemu-virt PMU events for cdeleg counter-mask testing Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-09 6:01 ` [PATCH v6 21/21] TEST(do-not-upstream): fake qemu vendor JSON + mapfile entry for CounterIDMask path Atish Patra
2026-06-09 6:20 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-20 0:04 ` Atish Patra
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=e16f8195-c718-468d-a8a1-6abe66ea58b4@linux.dev \
--to=atish.patra@linux.dev \
--cc=conor+dt@kernel.org \
--cc=devicetree@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=robh@kernel.org \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox