From: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
To: <mic@digikod.net>, <gnoack@google.com>, <paul@paul-moore.com>,
<jmorris@namei.org>, <serge@hallyn.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>,
<skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
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Subject: [PATCH RFC -next 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata access rights
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2026 18:48:29 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260924104831.1081137-11-caixinchen1@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260924104831.1081137-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com>
Add layout1 tests for the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_METADATA and
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA access rights:
- unhandled_metadata: metadata access is allowed when the new rights
are not handled by the ruleset;
- write_metadata: chmod(2), fchmod(2), chown(2), fchown(2), lchown(2),
utimensat(2) (both with explicit times and with UTIME_NOW),
setxattr(2), and removexattr(2) are denied with EACCES without
WRITE_METADATA, and allowed with it. Writing to a file (which
triggers implicit timestamp updates) stays allowed without
WRITE_METADATA;
- read_metadata: stat(2), fstat(2), getxattr(2), and listxattr(2) are
denied with EACCES without READ_METADATA, and allowed with it.
Rule enforcement is checked per file and per directory. chown(2) is
tested with a group change because chown(2) with (-1, -1) is a no-op
that is not visible to the inode_setattr hook.
Update the ACCESS_FILE and ACCESS_LAST definitions to include the new
rights.
Assisted-by: opencode: glm-5.3
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 309 ++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 308 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index fd20a2b3c0a5..a3e764cc56d5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <sys/vfs.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -578,11 +579,13 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_METADATA | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX)
-#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
+#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA
#define ACCESS_ALL ( \
ACCESS_FILE | \
@@ -10923,4 +10926,308 @@ TEST_F(trace_layout1, check_rule_fs_empty_grant)
free(buf);
}
+/* Invokes chmod(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_chmod(const char *const path, mode_t mode)
+{
+ if (chmod(path, mode) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes fchmod(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_fchmod(int fd, mode_t mode)
+{
+ if (fchmod(fd, mode) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes chown(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_chown(const char *const path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+ if (chown(path, uid, gid) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes fchown(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_fchown(int fd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+ if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes lchown(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_lchown(const char *const path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+ if (lchown(path, uid, gid) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes utimensat(2) with explicit times and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_utimensat(const char *const path)
+{
+ const struct timespec times[] = {
+ {
+ .tv_sec = 0,
+ .tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT,
+ },
+ {
+ .tv_sec = 1,
+ .tv_nsec = 0,
+ },
+ };
+
+ if (utimensat(AT_FDCWD, path, times, 0) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes utimensat(2) with UTIME_NOW and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_utimensat_now(const char *const path)
+{
+ if (utimensat(AT_FDCWD, path, NULL, 0) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes setxattr(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_setxattr(const char *const path, const char *const name,
+ const void *const value, const size_t size)
+{
+ if (setxattr(path, name, value, size, 0) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes getxattr(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_getxattr(const char *const path, const char *const name,
+ void *const value, const size_t size)
+{
+ if (getxattr(path, name, value, size) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes listxattr(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_listxattr(const char *const path, void *const list,
+ const size_t size)
+{
+ if (listxattr(path, list, size) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes removexattr(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_removexattr(const char *const path, const char *const name)
+{
+ if (removexattr(path, name) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes stat(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_stat(const char *const path, struct stat *statbuf)
+{
+ if (stat(path, statbuf) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes fstat(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_fstat(int fd, struct stat *statbuf)
+{
+ if (fstat(fd, statbuf) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, unhandled_metadata)
+{
+ int file_fd;
+ int ruleset_fd;
+ const char *const file1 = file1_s1d1;
+ const char *const file2 = file2_s1d1;
+ const char *const dir1 = dir_s1d1;
+ struct stat statbuf;
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = file1,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file2,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = dir1,
+ .access = ACCESS_RW,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA are not handled, so metadata
+ * access should be allowed.
+ */
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ file_fd = open(file1, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, file_fd);
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chmod(file1, 0644));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fchmod(file_fd, 0644));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chmod(file2, 0400));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chmod(dir1, 0700));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chown(file1, -1, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fchown(file_fd, -1, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_lchown(file1, -1, 0));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_utimensat(file1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_utimensat_now(file1));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_setxattr(file1, "user.test", "a", 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_getxattr(file1, "user.test", NULL, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_listxattr(file1, NULL, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_removexattr(file1, "user.test"));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_stat(file1, &statbuf));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fstat(file_fd, &statbuf));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_stat(dir1, &statbuf));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file_fd));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, write_metadata)
+{
+ int file_fd, file2_fd;
+ int ruleset_fd;
+ const char *const file1 = file1_s1d1;
+ const char *const file2 = file2_s1d1;
+ const char *const dir1 = dir_s1d1;
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = file1,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file2,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = dir1,
+ .access = ACCESS_RW,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA, rules);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ file_fd = open(file1, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, file_fd);
+ file2_fd = open(file2, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, file2_fd);
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ /* file1 has WRITE_METADATA: allowed */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chmod(file1, 0644));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fchmod(file_fd, 0644));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chown(file1, -1, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fchown(file_fd, -1, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_lchown(file1, -1, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_utimensat(file1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_utimensat_now(file1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_setxattr(file1, "user.test", "a", 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_removexattr(file1, "user.test"));
+
+ /*
+ * Writing is not an explicit metadata change: implicit timestamp
+ * updates are allowed without WRITE_METADATA.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, write(file2_fd, "a", 1));
+
+ /* file2 does not have WRITE_METADATA: denied */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_chmod(file2, 0400));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_chown(file2, -1, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_lchown(file2, -1, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_utimensat(file2));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_utimensat_now(file2));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_setxattr(file2, "user.test", "a", 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_removexattr(file2, "user.test"));
+
+ /* dir1 does not have WRITE_METADATA: denied */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_chmod(dir1, 0700));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_chown(dir1, -1, 0));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file_fd));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file2_fd));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, read_metadata)
+{
+ int file_fd;
+ int ruleset_fd;
+ const char *const file1 = file1_s1d1;
+ const char *const file2 = file2_s1d1;
+ const char *const dir1 = dir_s1d1;
+ struct stat statbuf;
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = file1,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_METADATA,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file2,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = dir1,
+ .access = ACCESS_RW,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_METADATA, rules);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setxattr(file1, "user.test", "a", 1, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setxattr(file2, "user.test", "a", 1, 0));
+
+ file_fd = open(file1, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, file_fd);
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ /* file1 has READ_METADATA: allowed */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_stat(file1, &statbuf));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fstat(file_fd, &statbuf));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_getxattr(file1, "user.test", NULL, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_listxattr(file1, NULL, 0));
+
+ /* file2 does not have READ_METADATA: denied */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_stat(file2, &statbuf));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_getxattr(file2, "user.test", NULL, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_listxattr(file2, NULL, 0));
+ /* dir1 does not have READ_METADATA: denied */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_stat(dir1, &statbuf));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file_fd));
+}
+
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.18.0.huawei.25
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-24 10:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-24 10:48 [PATCH RFC -next 00/12] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 01/12] fs: pass struct path to notify_change() Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 02/12] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 03/12] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 11:12 ` Amir Goldstein
2026-09-28 8:44 ` Cai Xinchen
2026-10-06 15:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 04/12] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 05/12] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setattr hook Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 06/12] LSM: pass struct path to the inode xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 07/12] LSM: pass struct path to the inode posix acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-06 15:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 08/12] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 09/12] landlock: Implement metadata access hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-09-26 8:38 ` Günther Noack
2026-09-28 6:19 ` Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` Cai Xinchen [this message]
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 11/12] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 12/12] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights Cai Xinchen
2026-09-25 15:33 ` [PATCH RFC -next 00/12] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Christian Brauner
2026-09-25 17:07 ` Paul Moore
2026-09-28 19:27 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-09-25 18:03 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-26 7:56 ` Günther Noack
2026-09-28 17:13 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-28 19:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-09-29 12:12 ` Günther Noack
2026-09-29 17:27 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-29 18:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-10-01 13:47 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-26 8:27 ` Günther Noack
2026-09-28 6:52 ` Cai Xinchen
2026-09-28 19:46 ` Mickaël Salaün
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