From: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
To: <mic@digikod.net>, <gnoack@google.com>, <paul@paul-moore.com>,
<jmorris@namei.org>, <serge@hallyn.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>,
<skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <rdunlap@infradead.org>, <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
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<selinux@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
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<lujialin4@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC -next 02/12] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2026 18:48:21 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260924104831.1081137-3-caixinchen1@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260924104831.1081137-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com>
The inode_setsecctx hook and its security_inode_setsecctx() caller
in fs/nfsd operate on a dentry even though both have a struct path
available. The SELinux and Smack implementations write the label
through __vfs_setxattr_locked(), whose idmap argument they hardcode
to &nop_mnt_idmap.
Switch the hook to take a const struct path so that the upcoming
conversion of the xattr helpers to struct path can be reflected
directly in the implementations. For now the implementations keep
passing &nop_mnt_idmap together with path->dentry to
__vfs_setxattr_locked(), preserving the current behavior; they will
be switched to pass the path itself once the xattr helpers take one.
Assisted-by: opencode: glm-5.3
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
---
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 2 +-
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 6 +++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 +++---
6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index ed8e04cc794e..922337083fe9 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ nfsd_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,
break;
}
if (attr->na_seclabel && attr->na_seclabel->len)
- attr->na_labelerr = security_inode_setsecctx(dentry,
+ attr->na_labelerr = security_inode_setsecctx(&path,
attr->na_seclabel->data, attr->na_seclabel->len);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL) && attr->na_dpacl) {
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index f4939137e66b..b22f7928523e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secctx_to_secid, const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, release_secctx, struct lsm_context *cp)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_invalidate_secctx, struct inode *inode)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_notifysecctx, struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setsecctx, struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setsecctx, const struct path *path, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_getsecctx, struct inode *inode,
struct lsm_context *cp)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index e3c8b4479a0a..6ac9fb634017 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+int security_inode_setsecctx(const struct path *path, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, u32 *uctx_len,
@@ -1637,7 +1637,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u3
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(const struct path *path, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index bf0ec31f1047..de3ed5c18802 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -4134,7 +4134,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
/**
* security_inode_setsecctx() - Change the security label of an inode
- * @dentry: inode
+ * @path: inode
* @ctx: secctx
* @ctxlen: length of secctx
*
@@ -4148,9 +4148,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
*
* Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
*/
-int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+int security_inode_setsecctx(const struct path *path, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, path, ctx, ctxlen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f2394cf6646e..8af024fe4fb5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7166,10 +7166,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen
/*
* called with inode->i_mutex locked
*/
-static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(const struct path *path, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
- return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
- ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
+ return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, path->dentry,
+ XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
}
static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 4439821a5e57..d9e9f4a52567 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4978,10 +4978,10 @@ static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
ctxlen, 0);
}
-static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static int smack_inode_setsecctx(const struct path *path, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
- return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
- ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
+ return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, path->dentry,
+ XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
}
static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
--
2.18.0.huawei.25
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-24 10:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-24 10:48 [PATCH RFC -next 00/12] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 01/12] fs: pass struct path to notify_change() Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` Cai Xinchen [this message]
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 03/12] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 11:12 ` Amir Goldstein
2026-09-28 8:44 ` Cai Xinchen
2026-10-06 15:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 04/12] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 05/12] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setattr hook Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 06/12] LSM: pass struct path to the inode xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 07/12] LSM: pass struct path to the inode posix acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-06 15:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 08/12] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 09/12] landlock: Implement metadata access hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-09-26 8:38 ` Günther Noack
2026-09-28 6:19 ` Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 11/12] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 12/12] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights Cai Xinchen
2026-09-25 15:33 ` [PATCH RFC -next 00/12] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Christian Brauner
2026-09-25 17:07 ` Paul Moore
2026-09-28 19:27 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-09-25 18:03 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-26 7:56 ` Günther Noack
2026-09-28 17:13 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-28 19:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-09-29 12:12 ` Günther Noack
2026-09-29 17:27 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-29 18:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-10-01 13:47 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-26 8:27 ` Günther Noack
2026-09-28 6:52 ` Cai Xinchen
2026-09-28 19:46 ` Mickaël Salaün
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