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From: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
To: <mic@digikod.net>, <gnoack@google.com>, <paul@paul-moore.com>,
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Subject: [PATCH RFC -next 07/12] LSM: pass struct path to the inode posix acl hooks
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2026 18:48:26 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260924104831.1081137-8-caixinchen1@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260924104831.1081137-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com>

The inode_set_acl, inode_get_acl and inode_remove_acl hooks are
called from fs/posix_acl.c, whose helpers now hold a struct path and
used to derive the idmap and dentry from it just for the hook calls.

Convert the hooks and their SELinux, Smack, EVM and IMA
implementations to take a const struct path.  The implementations
derive the idmap and dentry they still need from the path, so this
is a purely mechanical change with no behavior change.

Assisted-by: opencode: glm-5.3
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
---
 fs/posix_acl.c                        |  6 ++---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h         | 12 ++++-----
 include/linux/security.h              | 20 +++++----------
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c     | 14 +++++-----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  8 +++---
 security/security.c                   | 32 ++++++++++-------------
 security/selinux/hooks.c              | 19 +++++++-------
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c            | 37 ++++++++++++---------------
 8 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index be1643e18a6a..72e77540a0e9 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ int vfs_set_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
 	if (error)
 		goto out_inode_unlock;
 
-	error = security_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+	error = security_inode_set_acl(path, acl_name, kacl);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_inode_unlock;
 
@@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ struct posix_acl *vfs_get_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name)
 	 * The VFS has no restrictions on reading POSIX ACLs so calling
 	 * something like xattr_permission() isn't needed. Only LSMs get a say.
 	 */
-	error = security_inode_get_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+	error = security_inode_get_acl(path, acl_name);
 	if (error)
 		return ERR_PTR(error);
 
@@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@ int vfs_remove_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name)
 	if (error)
 		goto out_inode_unlock;
 
-	error = security_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+	error = security_inode_remove_acl(path, acl_name);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_inode_unlock;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 3a3512a3ee91..45cf0ca24260 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -160,14 +160,14 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry,
 	 const char *name)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_setattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_getattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, const struct path *path,
+	 const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry,
 	 const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, const struct path *path,
+	 const char *acl_name)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, const struct path *path,
+	 const char *acl_name)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_remove_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_need_killpriv, struct dentry *dentry)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index f5dc67a937bd..8b02b3bfe46d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -435,15 +435,12 @@ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path);
 int security_inode_setxattr(const struct path *path,
 			    const char *name, const void *value,
 			    size_t size, int flags);
-int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
-			   struct posix_acl *kacl);
+int security_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
+			   const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl);
 void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
 				 struct posix_acl *kacl);
-int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name);
-int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			      struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name);
+int security_inode_get_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name);
+int security_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name);
 void security_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 				    struct dentry *dentry,
 				    const char *acl_name);
@@ -1021,8 +1018,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_setxattr(const struct path *path,
 	return cap_inode_setxattr(path, name, value, size, flags);
 }
 
-static inline int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-					 struct dentry *dentry,
+static inline int security_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
 					 const char *acl_name,
 					 struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
@@ -1034,15 +1030,13 @@ static inline void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
 					       struct posix_acl *kacl)
 { }
 
-static inline int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-					 struct dentry *dentry,
+static inline int security_inode_get_acl(const struct path *path,
 					 const char *acl_name)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-					    struct dentry *dentry,
+static inline int security_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
 					    const char *acl_name)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 47ad39d64c76..c83befd32e99 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -685,8 +685,7 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 
 /**
  * evm_inode_set_acl - protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
- * @idmap: idmap of the idmapped mount
- * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @path: pointer to the affected object
  * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
  * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls
  *
@@ -696,10 +695,12 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  *
  * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
  */
-static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+static int evm_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
 			     const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	enum integrity_status evm_status;
+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
+	struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(path->mnt);
 
 	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
 	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
@@ -738,8 +739,7 @@ static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 
 /**
  * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
- * @idmap: idmap of the mount
- * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @path: pointer to the affected object
  * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
  *
  * Prevent removing posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
@@ -748,10 +748,10 @@ static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
  *
  * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
  */
-static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+static int evm_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
 				const char *acl_name)
 {
-	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
+	return evm_inode_set_acl(path, acl_name, NULL);
 }
 
 static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 58ba674bc172..518faf04ddde 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -793,11 +793,11 @@ static int ima_inode_setxattr(const struct path *path,
 	return result;
 }
 
-static int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+static int ima_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
 			     const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	if (evm_revalidate_status(acl_name))
-		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), -1);
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(path->dentry), -1);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -818,10 +818,10 @@ static int ima_inode_removexattr(const struct path *path,
 	return result;
 }
 
-static int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+static int ima_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
 				const char *acl_name)
 {
-	return ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
+	return ima_inode_set_acl(path, acl_name, NULL);
 }
 
 static struct security_hook_list ima_appraise_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3a8892d8ca5c..74bcd8c0502c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1987,8 +1987,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(const struct path *path,
 
 /**
  * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed
- * @idmap: idmap of the mount
- * @dentry: file
+ * @path: file
  * @acl_name: acl name
  * @kacl: acl struct
  *
@@ -1997,13 +1996,12 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(const struct path *path,
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
-			   struct posix_acl *kacl)
+int security_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
+			   const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
-	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, path, acl_name, kacl);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2025,8 +2023,7 @@ void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
 
 /**
  * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed
- * @idmap: idmap of the mount
- * @dentry: file
+ * @path: file
  * @acl_name: acl name
  *
  * Check permission before getting osix acls, the posix acls are identified by
@@ -2034,18 +2031,16 @@ void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+int security_inode_get_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name)
 {
-	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, path, acl_name);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed
- * @idmap: idmap of the mount
- * @dentry: file
+ * @path: file
  * @acl_name: acl name
  *
  * Check permission before removing posix acls, the posix acls are identified
@@ -2053,12 +2048,11 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			      struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+int security_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name)
 {
-	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, path, acl_name);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5d98ec73df9f..45ece734463e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3498,23 +3498,22 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(const struct path *path,
 			    &ad);
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
-				 struct posix_acl *kacl)
+static int selinux_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
+				 const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
-	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+static int selinux_inode_get_acl(const struct path *path,
+				 const char *acl_name)
 {
-	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				    struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
+				    const char *acl_name)
 {
-	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 }
 
 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 4adb2fd9cf70..7889f63ec739 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1548,62 +1548,59 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(const struct path *path,
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
  */
-static int smack_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			       struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
-			       struct posix_acl *kacl)
+static int smack_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
+			       const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, path->dentry);
 
-	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
-	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(path->dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
 	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * smack_inode_get_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
- * @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
- * @dentry: the object
+ * @path: the object
  * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
  */
-static int smack_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			       struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+static int smack_inode_get_acl(const struct path *path,
+			       const char *acl_name)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, path->dentry);
 
-	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
-	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(path->dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
 	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * smack_inode_remove_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
- * @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
- * @dentry: the object
+ * @path: the object
  * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
  */
-static int smack_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				  struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+static int smack_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
+				  const char *acl_name)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, path->dentry);
 
-	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
-	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(path->dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-- 
2.18.0.huawei.25


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-09-24 10:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-24 10:48 [PATCH RFC -next 00/12] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 01/12] fs: pass struct path to notify_change() Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 02/12] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 03/12] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 11:12   ` Amir Goldstein
2026-09-28  8:44     ` Cai Xinchen
2026-10-06 15:31   ` Casey Schaufler
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 04/12] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 05/12] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setattr hook Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 06/12] LSM: pass struct path to the inode xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` Cai Xinchen [this message]
2026-10-06 15:30   ` [PATCH RFC -next 07/12] LSM: pass struct path to the inode posix acl hooks Casey Schaufler
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 08/12] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 09/12] landlock: Implement metadata access hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-09-26  8:38   ` Günther Noack
2026-09-28  6:19     ` Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 11/12] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer Cai Xinchen
2026-09-24 10:48 ` [PATCH RFC -next 12/12] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights Cai Xinchen
2026-09-25 15:33 ` [PATCH RFC -next 00/12] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Christian Brauner
2026-09-25 17:07   ` Paul Moore
2026-09-28 19:27     ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-09-25 18:03 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-26  7:56   ` Günther Noack
2026-09-28 17:13     ` Justin Suess
2026-09-28 19:25       ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-09-29 12:12       ` Günther Noack
2026-09-29 17:27         ` Justin Suess
2026-09-29 18:51           ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-10-01 13:47             ` Justin Suess
2026-09-26  8:27 ` Günther Noack
2026-09-28  6:52   ` Cai Xinchen
2026-09-28 19:46     ` Mickaël Salaün

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