From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] integrity: Prepare for having "ima" and "evm" available in "integrity" LSM
Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 16:40:01 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <08a8b202-69b4-e154-28f5-337a898acf61@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221013223654.659758-1-keescook@chromium.org>
On 14/10/2022 00:36, Kees Cook wrote:
> Move "integrity" LSM to the end of the Kconfig list and prepare for
> having ima and evm LSM initialization called from the top-level
> "integrity" LSM.
>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
> Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> security/Kconfig | 10 +++++-----
> security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 4 ++++
> security/integrity/iint.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 ++++
> security/integrity/integrity.h | 6 ++++++
> 5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index e6db09a779b7..d472e87a2fc4 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -246,11 +246,11 @@ endchoice
>
> config LSM
> string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
> - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
> - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
> - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
> - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf"
> + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
> + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,bpf,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
> + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,bpf,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
> + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf,integrity"
This is not backward compatible, but can easily be fixed thanks to
DEFINE_LSM().order
Side node: I proposed an alternative to that but it was Nacked:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210222150608.808146-1-mic@digikod.net/
> help
> A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
> Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index 2e6fb6e2ffd2..1ef965089417 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -904,3 +904,7 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
> }
>
> late_initcall(init_evm);
> +
> +void __init integrity_lsm_evm_init(void)
> +{
> +}
> diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
> index 8638976f7990..4f322324449d 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
> @@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
> #include <linux/file.h>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
> -#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> #include "integrity.h"
>
> static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
> @@ -172,19 +171,29 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
> mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
> }
>
> -static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
> +void __init integrity_add_lsm_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
> + int count)
> +{
> + security_add_hooks(hooks, count, "integrity");
> +}
> +
> +static int __init integrity_lsm_init(void)
> {
> iint_cache =
> kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache),
> 0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
> +
> + integrity_lsm_ima_init();
> + integrity_lsm_evm_init();
> +
> return 0;
> }
> +
> DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = {
> .name = "integrity",
> - .init = integrity_iintcache_init,
> + .init = integrity_lsm_init,
For backward compatibility, there should be an ".order =
LSM_ORDER_FIRST," here.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-14 14:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-13 22:36 [PATCH 0/9] integrity: Move hooks into LSM Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 1/9] integrity: Prepare for having "ima" and "evm" available in "integrity" LSM Kees Cook
2022-10-14 14:40 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2022-10-14 17:59 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-17 9:26 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-17 18:11 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 18:33 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 19:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-19 22:37 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 14:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-19 18:28 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 2/9] security: Move trivial IMA hooks into LSM Kees Cook
2022-10-19 14:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-19 18:59 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 20:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-19 23:41 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-20 12:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-21 14:53 ` Dr. Greg
2022-10-21 15:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 3/9] ima: Move xattr " Kees Cook
2022-10-18 15:07 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-19 13:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 4/9] ima: Move ima_file_free() " Kees Cook
2022-10-18 15:02 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 15:32 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-18 18:29 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 6:55 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-20 15:47 ` Paul Moore
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 5/9] LSM: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Kees Cook
2022-10-18 14:50 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 6/9] fs: Introduce file_to_perms() helper Kees Cook
2022-10-18 14:10 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 18:25 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-20 17:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-20 23:04 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 7/9] ima: Move ima_file_check() into LSM Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 8/9] integrity: Move trivial hooks " Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 9/9] integrity: Move integrity_inode_get() out of global header Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:47 ` [PATCH 0/9] integrity: Move hooks into LSM Paul Moore
2022-10-14 1:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-18 15:31 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-18 15:38 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-18 18:31 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-20 17:36 ` Casey Schaufler
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=08a8b202-69b4-e154-28f5-337a898acf61@digikod.net \
--to=mic@digikod.net \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox