From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Dmitry Kasatkin" <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Takashi Iwai" <tiwai@suse.de>,
"Jonathan McDowell" <noodles@fb.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 5/9] LSM: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook
Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2022 15:36:50 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221013223654.659758-5-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221013222702.never.990-kees@kernel.org>
IMA and EVM need to hook after setattr finishes. Introduce this hook and
move IMA and EVM's open-coded stacking to use it.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@fb.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/attr.c | 3 +--
include/linux/evm.h | 6 ------
include/linux/ima.h | 9 ---------
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 +++
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 10 +++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 1 +
security/security.c | 8 ++++++++
9 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 1552a5f23d6b..e5731057426b 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -423,8 +423,7 @@ int notify_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
if (!error) {
fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
- ima_inode_post_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry);
- evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
+ security_inode_post_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, ia_valid);
}
return error;
diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index aa63e0b3c0a2..53f402bfb9f1 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint);
extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
-extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid);
extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size);
@@ -75,11 +74,6 @@ static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
return 0;
}
-static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
-{
- return;
-}
-
static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 9f18df366064..70180b9bd974 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -127,20 +127,11 @@ static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void);
-extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
- struct dentry *dentry);
#else
static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
{
return 0;
}
-
-static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
- struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return;
-}
-
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 806448173033..0b01473eee8a 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_follow_link, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
bool rcu)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, struct inode *inode, int mask)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_setattr,
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+ unsigned int ia_valid)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getattr, const struct path *path)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setxattr, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 1ef965089417..aca689dc0576 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -817,7 +817,9 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
* This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
* to lock the inode's i_mutex.
*/
-void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
+static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ unsigned int ia_valid)
{
if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL))
return;
@@ -905,6 +907,12 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
late_initcall(init_evm);
+static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr),
+};
+
void __init integrity_lsm_evm_init(void)
{
+ pr_info("Integrity LSM enabling EVM\n");
+ integrity_add_lsm_hooks(evm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(evm_hooks));
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 15a369df4c00..5c95ea6e6c94 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
int flags);
int ima_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
+void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int ia_valid);
#endif
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index ddd9df6b7dac..ccd54b50fe48 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
* to lock the inode's i_mutex.
*/
void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
- struct dentry *dentry)
+ struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int ia_valid)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 94379ba40b58..ffebd3236f24 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -1093,6 +1093,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, ima_inode_setxattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, ima_inode_removexattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, ima_inode_post_setattr),
#endif
};
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ca731132a0e9..af42264ad3e2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1333,6 +1333,14 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
+void security_inode_post_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int ia_valid)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return;
+ call_void_hook(inode_post_setattr, mnt_userns, dentry, ia_valid);
+}
+
int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-13 22:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-13 22:36 [PATCH 0/9] integrity: Move hooks into LSM Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 1/9] integrity: Prepare for having "ima" and "evm" available in "integrity" LSM Kees Cook
2022-10-14 14:40 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-14 17:59 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-17 9:26 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-17 18:11 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 18:33 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 19:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-19 22:37 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 14:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-19 18:28 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 2/9] security: Move trivial IMA hooks into LSM Kees Cook
2022-10-19 14:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-19 18:59 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 20:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-19 23:41 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-20 12:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-21 14:53 ` Dr. Greg
2022-10-21 15:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 3/9] ima: Move xattr " Kees Cook
2022-10-18 15:07 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-19 13:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 4/9] ima: Move ima_file_free() " Kees Cook
2022-10-18 15:02 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 15:32 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-18 18:29 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 6:55 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-20 15:47 ` Paul Moore
2022-10-13 22:36 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2022-10-18 14:50 ` [PATCH 5/9] LSM: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Christian Brauner
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 6/9] fs: Introduce file_to_perms() helper Kees Cook
2022-10-18 14:10 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 18:25 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-20 17:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-20 23:04 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 7/9] ima: Move ima_file_check() into LSM Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 8/9] integrity: Move trivial hooks " Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 9/9] integrity: Move integrity_inode_get() out of global header Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:47 ` [PATCH 0/9] integrity: Move hooks into LSM Paul Moore
2022-10-14 1:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-18 15:31 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-18 15:38 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-18 18:31 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-20 17:36 ` Casey Schaufler
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