From: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
To: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] prevent "dd if=/dev/mem" crash
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2003 00:49:55 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <marc-linux-ia64-106643841722114@msgid-missing> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <marc-linux-ia64-106642876514553@msgid-missing>
David Mosberger <davidm@napali.hpl.hp.com> wrote:
>
> >>>>> On Fri, 17 Oct 2003 16:55:43 -0700, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> said:
>
> >> If we really believe copy_*_user() must correctly handle *all* faults,
> >> isn't the "p >= __pa(high_memory)" test superfluous?
>
> Andrew> This code was conceived before my time and I don't recall seeing much
> Andrew> discussion, so this is all guesswork..
>
> Andrew> I'd say that the high_memory test _is_ superfluous and that
> Andrew> if anyone cared, we would remove it and establish a
> Andrew> temporary pte against the address if it was outside the
> Andrew> direct-mapped area. But nobody cares enough to have done
> Andrew> anything about it.
>
> What about memory-mapped device registers? Isn't all memory
> physically contiguous on x86 and that's why the "p >> __pa(high_memory)" test saves you from that?
We _want_ to be able to read mmio ranges via /dev/mem, don't we? I guess
it has never come up because everyone uses kmem.
> >> On ia64, a read to non-existent physical memory causes the processor
> >> to time out and take a machine check. I'm not sure it's even possible
> >> to recover from that.
>
> Andrew> ick. That would be very poor form.
>
> Reasonable people can disagree on that.
nah ;)
> One philosophy states that if
> your kernel touches random addresses, it's better to signal a visible
> error (machine-check) than to risk silent data corruption.
An access to an illegal address should generate a fault, period. This puts
the processing into the hands of software. If software chooses to silently
ignore the fault (ie: "silent data corruption") then it is poorly designed.
If the hardware doesn't give the system programmer a choice then the
hardware is poorly designed, surely?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2003-10-18 0:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2003-10-17 22:10 [RFC] prevent "dd if=/dev/mem" crash Bjorn Helgaas
2003-10-17 22:19 ` Luck, Tony
2003-10-17 22:23 ` Matt Mackall
2003-10-17 22:40 ` Andreas Schwab
2003-10-17 22:50 ` Andrew Morton
2003-10-17 23:25 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2003-10-17 23:55 ` Andrew Morton
2003-10-18 0:15 ` William Lee Irwin III
2003-10-18 0:21 ` David Mosberger
2003-10-18 0:49 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2003-10-18 1:31 ` Matt Chapman
2003-10-18 1:41 ` Andrew Morton
2003-10-18 1:48 ` David Mosberger
2003-10-18 2:01 ` Andrew Morton
2003-10-18 2:01 ` Matt Chapman
2003-10-19 11:25 ` Eric W. Biederman
2003-10-19 18:17 ` Pavel Machek
2003-10-19 19:01 ` William Lee Irwin III
2003-10-20 15:17 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2003-10-20 17:42 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2003-10-20 18:48 ` David Mosberger
2003-10-23 8:33 ` Martin Pool
2003-10-23 9:31 ` Zoltan Menyhart
2003-10-23 21:05 ` Bjorn Helgaas
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