public inbox for linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Matt Chapman <matthewc@cse.unsw.edu.au>
To: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] prevent "dd if=/dev/mem" crash
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2003 01:31:37 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <marc-linux-ia64-106644074523554@msgid-missing> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <marc-linux-ia64-106642876514553@msgid-missing>

On Fri, Oct 17, 2003 at 05:49:55PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> David Mosberger <davidm@napali.hpl.hp.com> wrote:
> >
> > One philosophy states that if
> > your kernel touches random addresses, it's better to signal a visible
> > error (machine-check) than to risk silent data corruption.
> 
> An access to an illegal address should generate a fault, period.  This puts
> the processing into the hands of software.  If software chooses to silently
> ignore the fault (ie: "silent data corruption") then it is poorly designed.

It *does* signal a fault, in the form of a machine check.  On other
architectures I'm familiar with this is usually implemented as an
interrupt, but the idea is similar - when the system bus controller
detects a bad address on the bus, it returns all 1s (for a read) and
signals an interrupt.  Usually you can turn this interrupt off (and
most likely you can on Itanium chipsets too) but that is not a good
idea.

The problem is that this interrupt is not synchronous with respect to
the instruction stream, and this makes it difficult for software to
recover from, particularly in a monolithic system like Linux where you
can't just terminate the faulting driver.  The best you can usually do
is to print the details and hope that it's a once-off.  It is not
something that you can sensibly use to abort copy_*_user.

In any case touching random addresses is just plain bad.  What if
there's a device mapped there which happens to have read side effects
like clearing the interrupt cause, so e.g. every time you read /dev/mem
you cause a timeout on your SCSI bus :)

Matt


  parent reply	other threads:[~2003-10-18  1:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2003-10-17 22:10 [RFC] prevent "dd if=/dev/mem" crash Bjorn Helgaas
2003-10-17 22:19 ` Luck, Tony
2003-10-17 22:23 ` Matt Mackall
2003-10-17 22:40 ` Andreas Schwab
2003-10-17 22:50 ` Andrew Morton
2003-10-17 23:25 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2003-10-17 23:55 ` Andrew Morton
2003-10-18  0:15 ` William Lee Irwin III
2003-10-18  0:21 ` David Mosberger
2003-10-18  0:49 ` Andrew Morton
2003-10-18  1:31 ` Matt Chapman [this message]
2003-10-18  1:41 ` Andrew Morton
2003-10-18  1:48 ` David Mosberger
2003-10-18  2:01 ` Andrew Morton
2003-10-18  2:01 ` Matt Chapman
2003-10-19 11:25 ` Eric W. Biederman
2003-10-19 18:17 ` Pavel Machek
2003-10-19 19:01 ` William Lee Irwin III
2003-10-20 15:17 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2003-10-20 17:42 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2003-10-20 18:48 ` David Mosberger
2003-10-23  8:33 ` Martin Pool
2003-10-23  9:31 ` Zoltan Menyhart
2003-10-23 21:05 ` Bjorn Helgaas

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=marc-linux-ia64-106644074523554@msgid-missing \
    --to=matthewc@cse.unsw.edu.au \
    --cc=linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox