From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
To: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/7] man/man7/unix.7: SCM_SECURITY: Generalize to other LSMs, not just SELinux
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 09:54:51 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261027.4df00f962b98@gnoack.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261026.f6d2e191a08e@gnoack.org>
On Mon, Oct 26, 2026 at 11:41:13PM +0100, Günther Noack wrote:
> I'm still leaning towards documenting it as a buffer with
> implementation-defined contents which are provided by a LSM. How
> these buffer contents are interpreted is depending on the LSM in use
> anyway.
To make a more concrete and constructive wording proposal:
SCM_SECURITY
Receive the security context (the security label) of the peer
socket, as provided by the active Linux Security Module (LSM). The
received ancillary data is a byte buffer.
The exact format of the security context buffer is defined by the
active major LSM. For example, SELinux returns a SELinux label as a
string (including a terminating null byte).
Does that sound reasonable? Let me know what you think.
I removed the wording "There is no fixed limit ...", because it should
be a given that callers allocate enough buffer space for receiving and
check the truncation flag. (The more important part is that we remove
the previous wording which suggested that it would fit into NAME_MAX.)
Given that SCM_SECURITY on "real" networks seems to have the same
"buffer, not string" semantics, it feels fair to express it that way?
People who want to read the security context will anyway need to read
up on the exact format used by the LSM in order to attribute any
meaning to it.
–Günther
P.S.: I had a hard time finding many usage examples. The main user of
SCM_SECURITY seems to be systemd's journald, which uses it to log the
SELinux security label. That code can deal with both null terminated
strings and ones where it is missing (due to truncation), and there is
a comment indicating that they are aware of possible truncation.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-27 8:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-21 21:22 [PATCH 0/7] unix.7: Socket Options and SCM_* fixes Günther Noack
2026-10-21 21:22 ` [PATCH 1/7] man/man7/unix.7: ERRORS: ETOOMANYREFS: Fix the conditions Günther Noack
2026-10-22 21:14 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-23 16:50 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-24 4:45 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-21 21:22 ` [PATCH 2/7] man/man7/unix.7: Multiple same-typed SCM_* messages may be sent in one message Günther Noack
2026-10-22 21:28 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-23 17:09 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-21 21:22 ` [PATCH 3/7] man/man7/unix.7: Autobind: Clarify when it happens, and mention SO_PASSPIDFD Günther Noack
2026-10-24 4:57 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-26 21:55 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-27 5:04 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-21 21:22 ` [PATCH 4/7] man/man7/unix.7: SCM_SECURITY: Generalize to other LSMs, not just SELinux Günther Noack
2026-10-23 9:57 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-23 17:57 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-23 18:13 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-26 22:41 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-27 8:54 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2026-10-27 21:46 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-27 22:30 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-27 22:59 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-28 6:19 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-28 12:45 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-27 16:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2026-10-27 21:52 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-21 21:22 ` [PATCH 5/7] man/man7/unix.7: SO_PASSSEC: wfix Günther Noack
2026-10-24 5:02 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-24 8:36 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-26 22:42 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-27 5:05 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-21 21:22 ` [PATCH 6/7] man/man7/unix.7: Document SO_PASSPIDFD, SO_PEERPIDFD, and SCM_PIDFD Günther Noack
2026-10-24 5:22 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-26 23:02 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-27 5:06 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-21 21:22 ` [PATCH 7/7] man/man7/unix.7: Document SO_PASSRIGHTS Günther Noack
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