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From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>,
	Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>,
	Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>,
	Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>,
	Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
	"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
	Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
	Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>, Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>,
	Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>,
	Nico Pache <npache@redhat.com>,
	Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>, Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>,
	Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org>, Lance Yang <lance.yang@linux.dev>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@gentwo.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
	Harry Yoo <harry@kernel.org>, Hao Li <hao.li@linux.dev>,
	Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
	Byungchul Park <byungchul@sk.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] mm: memory-failure: fix HWPoison flag race with non-atomic page flag ops
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2026 09:00:05 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260708085745-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6b0f028c-574b-4b80-b803-2bff15a5a148@kernel.org>

On Wed, Jul 08, 2026 at 02:13:27PM +0200, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
> On 7/2/26 00:18, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 01, 2026 at 06:17:23PM +0200, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
> >> On 7/1/26 17:54, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Not "generated" surely. But assisted, yes.
> >>
> >> What I thought.
> >>
> >>> Still hacking on it, but the difficulty
> >>> with memory-failure is that fundamentally, it's not 100% robust.
> >>
> >> It's all a bit slapped on top of everything, yes.
> >>
> >> What I was wondering is, assuming the call_task_rcu() and it takes forever,
> >> there might be quite a while where a hwpoisoned page that lost its bit is not
> >> marked as hwpoisoned.
> >>
> >> So you'd actually want the one doing the test_and_set_bit() caller to wait until
> >> the bit is stable.
> > 
> > not sure I get it.
> 
> Essentially, I think that after you set the bit you'd want everybody else in the
> system to see that state before you continue.
> 
> Such that other code that tests for poisoned pages would just immediately act on
> it. Like the buddy not handing out such a page anymore, immediately.
> 
> At least that way it's easier to reason about. Losing these bits is really just
> nasty :(
> 
> > 
> >> But that should be rather hairy as well. :(
> >>
> >>>
> >>> For example, we have a fifo fed by hardware and consumed by a workqueue:
> >>>
> >>>         struct memory_failure_cpu *mf_cpu;
> >>>         unsigned long proc_flags;
> >>>         bool buffer_overflow;
> >>>         struct memory_failure_entry entry = {
> >>>                 .pfn =          pfn,
> >>>                 .flags =        flags,
> >>>         };
> >>>
> >>>         mf_cpu = &get_cpu_var(memory_failure_cpu);
> >>>         raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&mf_cpu->lock, proc_flags);
> >>>         buffer_overflow = !kfifo_put(&mf_cpu->fifo, entry);
> >>>         if (!buffer_overflow)
> >>>                 schedule_work_on(smp_processor_id(), &mf_cpu->work);
> >>>         raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mf_cpu->lock, proc_flags);
> >>>         put_cpu_var(memory_failure_cpu);
> >>>         if (buffer_overflow)
> >>>                 pr_err("buffer overflow when queuing memory failure at %#lx\n",
> >>>                        pfn);
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> if there are lots of these and the scheduler is slow and it overflows,
> >>> it's sayonara you have lost the flag, right?
> >>
> >> I guess so. I assume on relevant hw you wouldn't expect a storm. But who knows :)
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Oh and by the way, I just noticed that when buddy merges pages it does
> >>> not check the poison bit. So it looks like there's a simple way to lose
> >>> the poison bit - have it merge with a non poisoned page.
> >>
> >> When we poison, we try to take the free page off the buddy. At least that's what
> >> I remember.
> > 
> > 
> > Yes but not immediately - we set hwpoison then we try to take it off.
> > 
> > 
> >> So I think we would just then go ahead and split the free higher-order buddy
> >> page to remove the single page.
> > 
> > Later we split, yes. But I don't see where it sets HWPoison after
> > split - it calls
> > SetPageHWPoisonTakenOff but it seems to assume HWPoison is already set.
> > 
> > Am I missing something? It's late here...
> So, we set hwpoison on a page and that is sticky, even when the buddy merges
> them, right?

right. bar races but that is separate.

> When handing out pages, the buddy will check all pages through
> check_new_pages(). If the poisoned page is part of a higher-order page, that
> would still find it.
> 
> So I would assume that the hwpoison page->flags stays there, and
> PageHWPoisonTakenOff() only tells us if we succeeded in removing the page from
> the buddy ourselves.

Right, I see.  Btw in a bunch of paths even if
we unpoison we lose the page, right?
And it seems we can also lose a hugepage just because 4k in
it got poisoned?
Is that expected?

> 
> -- 
> Cheers,
> 
> David



  reply	other threads:[~2026-07-08 13:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-28 21:45 [PATCH 0/2] mm: memory-failure: fix HWPoison flag race with non-atomic page flag ops Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-28 21:45 ` [PATCH 1/2] mm: memory-failure: use RCU to fix HWPoison flag race Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-28 21:45 ` [PATCH 2/2] mm: wrap non-atomic page flag ops in RCU for HWPoison safety Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-29  2:11 ` [PATCH 0/2] mm: memory-failure: fix HWPoison flag race with non-atomic page flag ops Andi Kleen
2026-06-29  8:10   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-29  8:21     ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-29  8:39     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-29 16:54       ` Andi Kleen
2026-06-29 17:04         ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-29 20:43           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-29  6:49 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-29  7:34   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-29 13:05     ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-29 20:08       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-29 20:55         ` Andi Kleen
2026-06-29 21:17           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-29 21:39             ` Andi Kleen
2026-06-29 21:59               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-29 21:22         ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-29 21:43           ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-29 23:34             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-30  6:17               ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-30  6:27                 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-30  6:34                   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-30  7:25                     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-29 21:50           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-30  6:30             ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-30  6:41               ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-30 21:58                 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-07-01  8:08                   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-07-01  8:18                     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-07-01  8:26                       ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-07-01  8:33                         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-07-01  8:36                           ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-07-01 15:54                             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-07-01 16:17                               ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
     [not found]                                 ` <20260701180511-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
2026-07-08 12:13                                   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-07-08 13:00                                     ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2026-07-07 20:27                             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-07-08 12:03                               ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-07-08 13:08                                 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-29 21:54           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-07-01  7:25             ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-29 23:29       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-07-01  7:31         ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)

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