From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: "Gregory Price (Meta)" <gourry@gourry.net>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-team@meta.com, leon@kernel.org, david@kernel.org,
kas@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de,
rppt@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
"Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)" <ljs@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 12:05:04 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <55034934-8aab-4e8a-a74a-b30c977670ed@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261114170127.3d29199864eb352d9045eaba@linux-foundation.org>
On 11/14/26 17:01, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear. The CPU
> rejects ordinary stores, but pte_write() reports it writable because
> shadow-stack instructions can write it. HMM consequently sets
> HMM_PFN_WRITE. Nouveau uses that flag for GPU write permission, and
> RDMA on-demand paging can use it to grant device write permission to a
> registered memory region. A device, or an RDMA peer with write access
> to that region, can then overwrite the process's shadow stack,
> potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection.
>
> Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access.
> A requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.
This is a fun one.
I almost wonder if we want to go one step further and disallow GUPs with
FOLL_WRITE on these PTEs. There should be precious few reasons for
devices to be writing to shadow stack pages.
Isn't this a bigger issue than HMM? Should the fix be in HMM?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 20:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-13 19:55 [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-13 19:57 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-11-13 20:15 ` Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-13 20:03 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-13 20:42 ` Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-13 21:19 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-13 20:03 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-13 20:41 ` Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-14 0:20 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-14 2:10 ` Andrew Morton
2026-11-15 0:00 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-15 1:01 ` Andrew Morton
2026-11-15 23:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-19 20:05 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2026-11-19 20:16 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-19 20:40 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-11-19 20:33 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-11-14 7:25 ` Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-14 11:11 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-15 23:48 ` Alistair Popple
2026-11-16 16:09 ` Gregory Price (Meta)
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