From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Kevin Brodsky" <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: "Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb+git@google.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@chromium.org>,
"Joey Gouly" <joey.gouly@arm.com>, "Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Linu Cherian" <linu.cherian@arm.com>,
"Linus Walleij" <linusw@kernel.org>,
"Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>,
"Mark Brown" <broonie@kernel.org>,
"Matthew Wilcox" <willy@infradead.org>,
"Maxwell Bland" <mbland@motorola.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Pierre Langlois" <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
"Pierre-Clément Tosi" <ptosi@google.com>,
"Quentin Perret" <qperret@google.com>,
"Rick Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
"Ryan Roberts" <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>,
"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
"Yang Shi" <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>,
"Yeoreum Yun" <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org,
"Ira Weiny" <iweiny@kernel.org>,
"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v10 04/22] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 16:02:47 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-207318@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261109-kpkeys-v10-4-aa6c4d9603bc@arm.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
issue to consider:
- [Medium] arm64: kpkeys: mismatched CONFIG_ARM64_POE guard in
asm/kpkeys.h
--
commit 6f45a834f4b090307d508db166b798a5f825afea
Author: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE
This commit implements the arm64 kpkeys headers and context-switching
helpers using the Permission Overlay Extension (POE) and POR_EL1.
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..4f9bdb369b47e
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +#ifndef __ASM_KPKEYS_H
> +#define __ASM_KPKEYS_H
> +
> +#include <linux/kpkeys_types.h>
> +
> +#include <asm/barrier.h>
> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
> +#include <asm/por.h>
> +
> +/*
> + * Equivalent to por_set_kpkeys_context(0, KPKEYS_CTX_DEFAULT), but can also be
> + * used in assembly.
> + */
> +#define POR_EL1_INIT POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(0, POE_RWX)
> +
> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> +
> +static inline bool arch_supports_kpkeys(void)
> +{
> + return system_supports_poe();
> +}
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_POE
> +
> +static inline u64 por_set_kpkeys_context(u64 por, enum kpkeys_ctx ctx)
> +{
> + por = por_elx_set_pkey_perms(por, 0, POE_RWX);
> +
> + return por;
> +}
> +
> +static __always_inline void __kpkeys_set_pkey_reg_nosync(u64 pkey_reg)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Writing to POR_EL1 potentially affects all memory accesses, so
> + * use barrier() to ensure load/store instructions cannot be reordered
> + * past the write.
> + */
> + barrier();
> + write_sysreg_s(pkey_reg, SYS_POR_EL1);
> + barrier();
> +}
> +
> +static __always_inline
> +bool arch_kpkeys_enter_context(enum kpkeys_ctx ctx,
> + struct arch_kpkeys_state *state)
> +{
> + const u64 prev_por = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL1);
> + const u64 new_por = por_set_kpkeys_context(prev_por, ctx);
> +
> + if (prev_por == new_por)
> + return false;
> +
> + state->por = prev_por;
[Severity: Medium]
Should this block be guarded by CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS instead of
CONFIG_ARM64_POE?
include/linux/kpkeys_types.h only includes <asm/kpkeys_types.h> (for
struct arch_kpkeys_state) and defines enum kpkeys_ctx when
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS is enabled:
include/linux/kpkeys_types.h:
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS
#include <asm/kpkeys_types.h>
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS) && !defined(__ASSEMBLY__)
enum kpkeys_ctx {
KPKEYS_CTX_DEFAULT = 0,
KPKEYS_CTX_COUNT,
};
Because CONFIG_ARM64_POE is enabled by default on arm64 and does not
select ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS until the later commit "arm64: Enable kpkeys",
when commit "arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1" includes <asm/kpkeys.h> in
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c, the build fails with incomplete type errors
for enum kpkeys_ctx and struct arch_kpkeys_state, breaking bisection.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261109-kpkeys-v10-0-aa6c4d9603bc@arm.com?part=4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-10 16:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-09 15:58 [PATCH RFC v10 00/22] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 01/22] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-11 10:24 ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 02/22] set_memory: Introduce set_direct_map_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 03/22] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 04/22] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 14:19 ` Mark Brown
2026-11-11 10:26 ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-11 15:18 ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 05/22] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_direct_map_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 06/22] arm64: Disable EL2 trapping of POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 15:29 ` Mark Brown
2026-11-11 15:22 ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 07/22] arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume() Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 15:53 ` Mark Brown
2026-11-10 16:36 ` Yeoreum Yun
2026-11-10 16:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 08/22] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 09/22] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 10/22] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 11/22] mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 12/22] mm: kpkeys: Protect regular page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 13/22] mm: kpkeys: Protect early kernel " Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 14/22] mm: kpkeys: Protect vmemmap " Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 15/22] arm64: kpkeys: Implement arch_supports_kpkeys_early() Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 16/22] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 17/22] arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 18/22] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 19/22] arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES switches Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 20/22] arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 21/22] arm64: mm: Map kernel image alias of init_pg_dir read-only Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 22/22] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 19:28 ` Mark Brown
2026-11-10 9:01 ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 11:24 ` Mark Brown
2026-11-11 15:29 ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-11 16:15 ` Mark Brown
2026-11-10 16:03 ` sashiko-bot
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=sashiko-outbox-207318@kernel.org \
--to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=ardb+git@google.com \
--cc=broonie@kernel.org \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=david@kernel.org \
--cc=iweiny@kernel.org \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=jeffxu@chromium.org \
--cc=joey.gouly@arm.com \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=kevin.brodsky@arm.com \
--cc=linu.cherian@arm.com \
--cc=linusw@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=ljs@kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=maz@kernel.org \
--cc=mbland@motorola.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=pierre.langlois@arm.com \
--cc=ptosi@google.com \
--cc=qperret@google.com \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=rppt@kernel.org \
--cc=ryan.roberts@arm.com \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=tglx@kernel.org \
--cc=vbabka@kernel.org \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=willy@infradead.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=yang@os.amperecomputing.com \
--cc=yeoreum.yun@arm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox