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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Kevin Brodsky" <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: "Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb+git@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@chromium.org>,
	"Joey Gouly" <joey.gouly@arm.com>, "Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
	"Linu Cherian" <linu.cherian@arm.com>,
	"Linus Walleij" <linusw@kernel.org>,
	"Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>,
	"Mark Brown" <broonie@kernel.org>,
	"Matthew Wilcox" <willy@infradead.org>,
	"Maxwell Bland" <mbland@motorola.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Pierre Langlois" <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
	"Pierre-Clément Tosi" <ptosi@google.com>,
	"Quentin Perret" <qperret@google.com>,
	"Rick Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"Ryan Roberts" <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
	"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>,
	"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
	"Yang Shi" <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>,
	"Yeoreum Yun" <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org,
	"Ira Weiny" <iweiny@kernel.org>,
	"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v10 13/22] mm: kpkeys: Protect early kernel page tables
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 16:02:53 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-207327@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261109-kpkeys-v10-13-aa6c4d9603bc@arm.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential
issues to consider:
- [Medium] mm: kpkeys: redundant KASAN shadow walks in
  protect_early_kernel_pgtables()
- [Medium] mm: kpkeys: repeated swapper_pg_dir walks in
  protect_early_kernel_pgtables()
--

commit 9b67b4dcc54e06a0681d8d0ff9c11cb3015125f0
Author: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>

mm: kpkeys: Protect early kernel page tables

This commit walks the installed kernel page tables during boot and sets the
direct-map pkey of their backing pages to KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES when
kpkeys_hardened_pgtables is enabled.

> diff --git a/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
> index 2311fd8da6bbb..f6825a0e0689d 100644
> --- a/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
> +++ b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
> @@ -54,10 +56,130 @@ void kpkeys_pgtable_free(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
>  	__free_pages(page, order);
>  }
>  
> +static void __init protect_pgtable_page(void *page)
> +{
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ret = set_direct_map_pkey((unsigned long)page, 1, KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES);
> +	WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
> +}
> +
> +static int __init protect_pte_table(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
> +				    unsigned long next, struct mm_walk *walk)
> +{
> +	pmd_t entry = pmdp_get(pmd);
> +
> +	if (!pmd_present(entry) || pmd_leaf(entry))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	protect_pgtable_page(pte_offset_kernel(pmd, 0));
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int __init protect_pmd_table(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
> +				    unsigned long next, struct mm_walk *walk)
> +{
> +	pud_t entry;
> +
> +	if (mm_pmd_folded(walk->mm))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	entry = pudp_get(pud);
> +	if (!pud_present(entry) || pud_leaf(entry))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	protect_pgtable_page(pmd_offset(pud, 0));
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int __init protect_pud_table(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr,
> +				    unsigned long next, struct mm_walk *walk)
> +{
> +	p4d_t entry;
> +
> +	if (mm_pud_folded(walk->mm))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	entry = p4dp_get(p4d);
> +	if (!p4d_present(entry) || p4d_leaf(entry))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	protect_pgtable_page(pud_offset(p4d, 0));
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int __init protect_p4d_table(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr,
> +				    unsigned long next, struct mm_walk *walk)
> +{
> +	pgd_t entry;
> +
> +	if (mm_p4d_folded(walk->mm))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	entry = pgdp_get(pgd);
> +	if (!pgd_present(entry) || pgd_leaf(entry))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	protect_pgtable_page(p4d_offset(pgd, 0));
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
When CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC or CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS is enabled, does this walk
and call set_direct_map_pkey() millions of times on the shared
kasan_early_shadow_{p4d,pud,pmd,pte} tables?

kasan_init() runs in setup_arch() before mm_core_init() calls
kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(), populating unbacked shadow ranges in
[PAGE_OFFSET, ULONG_MAX) with shared static tables where all 512 entries at
each level point to the same next-level kasan_early_shadow_* page.  Unlike
mm/ptdump.c, which detects those tables and sets walk->action =
ACTION_CONTINUE, the callbacks here descend through every entry and invoke
set_direct_map_pkey() (including a direct-map page table walk and broadcast
TLB flush) for every 2 MiB PMD slot across the multi-terabyte shadow range,
stalling boot.

[ ... ]

> +static void __init protect_early_kernel_pgtables(void)
> +{
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	mmap_write_lock(&init_mm);
> +	/*
> +	 * [PAGE_OFFSET, ULONG_MAX) covers all early kernel mappings on arm64
> +	 * and x86 (at least).
> +	 */
> +	ret = walk_kernel_page_table_range(PAGE_OFFSET, ULONG_MAX,
> +					   &protect_pgtable_ops, NULL, NULL);
> +	mmap_write_unlock(&init_mm);
> +	WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
On arm64 with CONFIG_ARM64_LPA2=y running on hardware where the top page
table level is dynamically folded (vabits_actual < VA_BITS), does starting
at PAGE_OFFSET walk and re-protect swapper_pg_dir 16 or 32 times?

On arm64, PAGE_OFFSET is the compile-time _PAGE_OFFSET(VA_BITS) rather than
_PAGE_OFFSET(vabits_actual).  When !pgtable_l5_enabled() on 4K pages (or
!pgtable_l4_enabled() on 16K pages), pgd_none() is always false and
pgd_to_folded_p4d() (or p4d_to_folded_pud()) wraps each top-level step in
[PAGE_OFFSET, ULONG_MAX) back to the start of swapper_pg_dir:

arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h:pgd_to_folded_p4d() {
	return (p4d_t *)PTR_ALIGN_DOWN(pgdp, PAGE_SIZE) + p4d_index(addr);
}

As a result, walk_kernel_page_table_range() traverses the entire kernel page
table hierarchy and flushes TLBs across all page table pages 16 times on 4K
pages (or 32 times on 16K pages) during boot.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261109-kpkeys-v10-0-aa6c4d9603bc@arm.com?part=13


  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-10 16:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-09 15:58 [PATCH RFC v10 00/22] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 01/22] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-11 10:24     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 02/22] set_memory: Introduce set_direct_map_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 03/22] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 04/22] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 14:19   ` Mark Brown
2026-11-11 10:26     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-11 15:18     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 05/22] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_direct_map_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 06/22] arm64: Disable EL2 trapping of POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 15:29   ` Mark Brown
2026-11-11 15:22     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 07/22] arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume() Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 15:53   ` Mark Brown
2026-11-10 16:36     ` Yeoreum Yun
2026-11-10 16:02   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 08/22] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 09/22] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 10/22] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 11/22] mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 12/22] mm: kpkeys: Protect regular page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 13/22] mm: kpkeys: Protect early kernel " Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 14/22] mm: kpkeys: Protect vmemmap " Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 15/22] arm64: kpkeys: Implement arch_supports_kpkeys_early() Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 16/22] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 17/22] arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 18/22] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 19/22] arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES switches Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 20/22] arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 21/22] arm64: mm: Map kernel image alias of init_pg_dir read-only Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 16:02   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 22/22] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 19:28   ` Mark Brown
2026-11-10  9:01     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-10 11:24       ` Mark Brown
2026-11-11 15:29         ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-11 16:15           ` Mark Brown
2026-11-10 16:03   ` sashiko-bot

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