From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Ben Segall" <bsegall@google.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"David Hildenbrand" <david@kernel.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
"Dietmar Eggemann" <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
"Juri Lelli" <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"K Prateek Nayak" <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Manfred Spraul" <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
"Mel Gorman" <mgorman@suse.de>, "Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>,
"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>, "Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
"Valentin Schneider" <vschneid@redhat.com>,
"Vincent Guittot" <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>,
"Zygmunt Krynicki" <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() system call
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 23:15:15 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-222160@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117231352.3816603-7-jarkko@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] rootns: fork() race in rootns_kill_members() missing
tasklist_lock
- [High] rootns: missing PID namespace ancestry check in
rootns_kill_members()
--
commit ea67311730397795196206953e1b7e54d487cc13
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
rootns: Add rootns_kill() system call
This commit adds the rootns_kill() system call to walk a root namespace's
PID namespace IDR and deliver a signal to each member thread group.
> diff --git a/kernel/rootns.c b/kernel/rootns.c
> index 83ab759a31ecd..90a070dbf4a82 100644
> --- a/kernel/rootns.c
> +++ b/kernel/rootns.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -389,3 +390,67 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(rootns_wait, int, rootnsfd,
> return ret;
> }
> #endif
> +
> +static int rootns_kill_members(struct rootns *rootns, int sig)
> +{
> + struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = rootns->ns->pid_ns_for_children;
[Severity: High]
Does rootns_kill_members() need to check that the caller's active PID
namespace is an ancestor of pid_ns before delivering signals?
kill_pid(pid, sig, 0) passes SEND_SIG_NOINFO to send_signal_locked():
kernel/signal.c:send_signal_locked() {
...
if (info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO) {
/* Force if sent from an ancestor pid namespace */
force = !task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(t));
}
...
}
Without a PID namespace ancestry check (like access_pidfd_pidns() in
sys_pidfd_send_signal()), a holder of rootnsfd in a sibling or disjoint
PID namespace has task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(t)) == 0.
That sets force = true and bypasses SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE in
sig_task_ignored(), allowing a non-ancestor process to kill or stop the
PID namespace init with SIGKILL or SIGSTOP. A caller in a descendant PID
namespace created inside the rootns can also signal tasks upward in its
ancestor pid_ns, while a caller inside pid_ns itself has force = false so
SIGKILL and SIGSTOP are ignored on the rootns init process.
> + bool any_success = false;
> + bool any_other = false;
> + bool any_perm = false;
> + int other_err = 0;
> + struct pid *pid;
> + int nr;
> +
> + if (READ_ONCE(rootns->state) != ROOTNS_RUNNING)
> + return -ESRCH;
> +
> + scoped_guard(rcu) {
> + idr_for_each_entry(&pid_ns->idr, pid, nr) {
> + int err;
> +
> + if (!pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID))
> + continue;
> +
> + err = kill_pid(pid, sig, 0);
[Severity: High]
Can a concurrent fork() still escape signal delivery in
rootns_kill_members()?
CPU0 CPU1
copy_process()
/* queues delayed.node on
* current->signal->multiprocess
*/
alloc_pid()
/* inserts child pid into
* pid_ns->idr (tasks[] empty)
*/
rootns_kill_members()
idr_for_each_entry(&pid_ns->idr, ...)
/* child pid: pid_task(..., PIDTYPE_TGID)
* is NULL -> skipped
*/
/* parent pid: kill_pid() passes
* PIDTYPE_TGID
*/
__send_signal_locked()
/* type > PIDTYPE_TGID is false;
* delayed.signal not updated
*/
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock)
p->signal->shared_pending.signal =
delayed.signal;
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_TGID)
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID)
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock)
/* child never receives sig */
__send_signal_locked() only records signals into t->signal->multiprocess
for in-flight forks when type > PIDTYPE_TGID, whereas kill_pid() uses
PIDTYPE_TGID. For any signal that does not make fatal_signal_pending()
true on the parent (such as SIGSTOP, SIGHUP, SIGINT, or a caught or
blocked SIGTERM), the child finishes copy_process() without receiving the
signal.
Because pid_ns->idr is walked without read_lock(&tasklist_lock), a parent
at a higher IDR index can also allocate a lower, already-visited IDR index
for its child (after PID wrap-around or via clone3() set_tid) and finish
attaching the child before the scan reaches the parent, escaping even
SIGKILL. In addition, copy_process() calls attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_TGID)
before attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID) under tasklist_lock, so unlocked readers
can see pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID) != NULL while kill_pid() still sees
pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID) == NULL and returns -ESRCH.
Holding read_lock(&tasklist_lock) and signaling via group_send_sig_info()
with PIDTYPE_MAX (as zap_pid_ns_processes() and kill_something_info() do)
would serialize against copy_process() and populate delayed.signal for
ongoing forks.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117231352.3816603-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=6
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 23:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 23:13 [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/13] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/13] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/13] rootns: Add rootns_wait() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/13] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/13] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/13] fs: Support installing rootns mount trees via move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/13] arch: Wire up rootns system calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/13] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/13] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:47 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Josef Bacik
2026-11-18 15:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 15:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 15:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18 17:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 17:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 17:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 17:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18 18:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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