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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Ben Segall" <bsegall@google.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"David Hildenbrand" <david@kernel.org>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	"Dietmar Eggemann" <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"Juri Lelli" <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
	"K Prateek Nayak" <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
	"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
	"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
	"Manfred Spraul" <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
	"Mel Gorman" <mgorman@suse.de>, "Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>, "Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
	"Valentin Schneider" <vschneid@redhat.com>,
	"Vincent Guittot" <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
	"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>,
	"Zygmunt Krynicki" <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 23:15:25 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-222166@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117231352.3816603-13-jarkko@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 9 potential
issues to consider:
- [Medium] selftests/rootns: enter_unpriv_user_mntns() fails to restore
  dumpability
- [Medium] selftests/rootns: PID 1 exit race with sibling tasks in
  clone_concurrent
- [Medium] selftests/rootns: missing SKIP() in setup and silent skips in
  child tests
- [Medium] selftests/rootns: setns tests fail to open /proc/self/ns/mnt
  and hang
- [Medium] selftests/rootns: nested_ns fails with EPERM in unmapped user
  namespace
- [Medium] selftests/rootns: fsconfig test fails with EPERM at
  sys_fsopen() for sysfs
- [Low] selftests/rootns: stack direction and lifetime hazard in
  clone_with_flags()
- [Low] selftests/rootns: fd leak in create_rootns_as_uid() when
  waitpid() fails
- [Low] selftests/rootns: fallback syscall definitions omit MIPS ABI
  offsets
--

commit 29bf6658ccf4cdfdf8e29f5c0581be3d7fb38e3f
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite

This commit adds a kselftest harness suite under
tools/testing/selftests/rootns to test root namespace creation,
clone3(CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS), mount configuration, and permission checks.

> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rootns/smoke.c b/tools/testing/selftests/rootns/smoke.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..350e6e8e25236
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rootns/smoke.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,1381 @@
[ ... ]
> +#ifndef __NR_rootns_create
> +#ifdef __alpha__
> +#define __NR_rootns_create 583
> +#define __NR_rootns_wait 584
> +#define __NR_rootns_kill 585
> +#else
> +#define __NR_rootns_create 473
> +#define __NR_rootns_wait 474
> +#define __NR_rootns_kill 475
> +#endif
> +#endif

[Severity: Low]
Do these fallback syscall numbers need to account for the MIPS ABI base
offsets (4000 for o32, 5000 for n64, and 6000 for n32)?  Without adding
 the _MIPS_SIM offset, a standalone build on MIPS without updated kernel
headers will invoke the wrong syscalls.

[ ... ]

> +static int clone_with_flags(int flags)
> +{
> +	const size_t stack_size = 64 * 1024;
> +	void *stack;
> +	pid_t pid;
> +	int status;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	stack = malloc(stack_size);
> +	if (!stack)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	pid = clone(clone_exit, (char *)stack + stack_size,
> +		    SIGCHLD | flags, NULL);
> +	if (pid < 0)
> +		ret = -errno;
> +	else if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
> +		ret = -errno;
> +	else if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status))
> +		ret = -EIO;
> +	else
> +		ret = 0;
> +
> +	free(stack);
> +	return ret;
> +}

[Severity: Low]
Does passing (char *)stack + stack_size to clone() write past the end of
stack on upward-growing stack architectures such as PA-RISC?  In addition,
if waitpid() fails (for example on EINTR), free(stack) runs while the
child may still be executing on that stack.  Using sys_clone3() with a
NULL stack avoids both issues.

[ ... ]

> +	if (!err) {
> +		*cfd = recv_fd(sv[0]);
> +		if (*cfd < 0)
> +			err = errno;
> +	}
> +	close(sv[0]);
> +
> +	if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid && !err)
> +		err = errno;
> +	if (!err && (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status)))
> +		err = ECHILD;
> +
> +	return err ? -err : 0;
> +}

[Severity: Low]
Does create_rootns_as_uid() leak *cfd if recv_fd() succeeds but waitpid()
fails or the child exits non-zero?

[ ... ]

> +FIXTURE(rootns) {
> +	int cfd;
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_SETUP(rootns) {
> +	self->cfd = create_test_rootns(false, ROOTNS_ALL_NAMESPACES |
> +					ROOTNS_KILL_ON_CLOSE |
> +					ROOTNS_CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
> +	ASSERT_GE(self->cfd, 0);
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
Should FIXTURE_SETUP(rootns) call SKIP() when create_test_rootns() fails
with ENOSYS, EPERM, EACCES, or ENOSPC?  Because rootns is added to TARGETS
in tools/testing/selftests/Makefile while CONFIG_ROOTNS defaults to n,
asserting self->cfd >= 0 fails all 17 tests instead of skipping them when
CONFIG_ROOTNS is disabled or when the test runs without mount/namespace
privileges.

Similarly, pivot_root and mount_empty_path do not skip on EPERM,
mount_perms omits -ENOSPC from its SKIP() check, and the child processes
in mount_perms, clone_perms, and fsconfig call _exit(0) when prerequisites
are unavailable, reporting silent passes without a skip reason.

[ ... ]

> +TEST_F(rootns, nested_ns) {
> +	pid_t pid;
> +	int nsfd;
> +
> +	nsfd = open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
> +	ASSERT_GE(nsfd, 0);
> +
> +	pid = clone_into_rootns(self->cfd, 0);
> +	ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
> +	if (pid == 0) {
> +		close(self->cfd);
> +
> +		if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS))
> +			_exit(1);
> +		if (clone_with_flags(CLONE_NEWNS))
> +			_exit(2);
> +		if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER))
> +			_exit(3);
> +		if (clone_with_flags(CLONE_NEWUSER))
> +			_exit(4);

[Severity: Medium]
Won't unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) and clone_with_flags(CLONE_NEWUSER) here fail
with EPERM?  self->cfd is created with ROOTNS_ALL_NAMESPACES (which
includes ROOTNS_USER), but no uid_map or gid_map is written for its user
namespace, so create_user_ns() rejects creating a child user namespace
because the caller's UID and GID are unmapped in parent_ns.  Even if
self->cfd's user namespace were mapped, unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) moves the
child into a second unmapped user namespace before
clone_with_flags(CLONE_NEWUSER) runs.

[ ... ]

> +TEST_F(rootns, setns_same) {
> +	ssize_t nwritten;
> +	pid_t pid1;
> +	pid_t pid2;
> +	char ch;
> +	int nsfd;
> +	int sv[2];
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, sv), 0);
> +
> +	pid1 = clone_into_rootns(self->cfd, 0);
> +	ASSERT_GE(pid1, 0);
> +	if (pid1 == 0) {
> +		int ret;
> +
> +		close(self->cfd);
> +		close(sv[0]);
> +		ret = send_unshared_mntns_and_wait(sv[1]);
> +		close(sv[1]);
> +		_exit(ret);
> +	}
> +	close(sv[1]);
> +
> +	nsfd = recv_fd(sv[0]);

[Severity: Medium]
Does send_unshared_mntns_and_wait() fail with ENOENT here and leave the
parent hanging in recv_fd(sv[0])?

Both self->cfd (in setns_same) and beta_cfd (in setns_foreign below) are
created with create_test_rootns(false, ...), which mounts an empty tmpfs
at /proc instead of procfs.  When the child calls
send_unshared_mntns_and_wait(), open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", ...) fails with
ENOENT and the child exits without sending a descriptor.  Because sv is a
SOCK_DGRAM socketpair, closing sv[1] does not deliver EOF to sv[0], so
recv_fd(sv[0]) blocks until the test times out.

[ ... ]

> +static int enter_unpriv_user_mntns(uid_t drop_uid)
> +{
> +	char map[32];
> +	uid_t uid;
> +	gid_t gid;
> +	int fd;
> +	int len;
> +
> +	if (geteuid() == 0 &&
> +	    (setresgid(drop_uid, drop_uid, drop_uid) < 0 ||
> +	     setresuid(drop_uid, drop_uid, drop_uid) < 0))
> +		return -errno;
> +
> +	uid = geteuid();
> +	gid = getegid();
> +	if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS) < 0)
> +		return -errno;
> +
> +	fd = open("/proc/self/setgroups", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
> +	if (fd >= 0) {
> +		(void)write(fd, "deny\n", 5);
> +		close(fd);
> +	}
> +
> +	fd = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
> +	if (fd < 0)
> +		return -errno;

[Severity: Medium]
When the test runs as root, does dropping privileges via setresgid() and
setresuid() clear task dumpability and cause open("/proc/self/uid_map",
O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC) to fail with EACCES?

Without prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1, 0, 0, 0) after setresuid(), files under
/proc/self/ remain owned by global root (0:0), which is unmapped in the
newly unshared user namespace.  enter_unpriv_user_mntns() then returns
-EACCES, and all three callers (mount_perms, clone_perms, and fsconfig)
treat -EACCES as _exit(0), silently skipping their unprivileged permission
checks.

[ ... ]

> +		ucfd = sys_rootns_create(ROOTNS_USER | ROOTNS_CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
> +		if (ucfd < 0) {
> +			if (errno == EPERM || errno == EACCES ||
> +			    errno == EINVAL || errno == ENOSPC)
> +				_exit(0);
> +			_exit(2);
> +		}
> +
> +		sfd = sys_fsopen("sysfs", 0);
> +		if (sfd < 0) {
> +			if (errno == ENODEV) {
> +				close(ucfd);
> +				_exit(0);
> +			}
> +			_exit(3);
> +		}
> +
> +		if (sys_fsconfig(sfd, FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, NULL, NULL, ucfd) < 0)
> +			_exit(4);
> +		if (sys_fsconfig(sfd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0) != -1 ||
> +		    errno != EPERM)
> +			_exit(5);

[Severity: Medium]
Doesn't sys_fsopen("sysfs", 0) fail with EPERM here before reaching
FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS?

enter_unpriv_user_mntns() unshares CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS but keeps
the parent network namespace, so sysfs_init_fs_context() ->
kobj_ns_current_may_mount(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET) rejects sys_fsopen("sysfs", 0)
with EPERM and the child exits with status 3.  Furthermore, even if
CLONE_NEWNET were unshared, sysfs_init_fs_context() sets fc->global = true
and binds fc->user_ns to netns->user_ns, so FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE would
succeed rather than failing with EPERM.

[ ... ]

> +			ent_pid = clone_into_rootns(self->cfd, 0);
> +			if (ent_pid < 0)
> +				_exit(1);
> +			if (ent_pid == 0) {
> +				unsigned char my_pid = (unsigned char)getpid();
> +
> +				if (write(ready_pipe[1], &my_pid, 1) != 1)
> +					_exit(2);
> +				close(ready_pipe[1]);
> +				(void)read(hold_pipe[0], &ch, 1);
> +				close(hold_pipe[0]);
> +				_exit(0);
> +			}
> +
> +			close(ready_pipe[1]);
> +			close(hold_pipe[0]);
> +			close(self->cfd);
> +			_exit(reap_child_exit_code(ent_pid) == 0 ? 0 : 3);
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	close(start_pipe[0]);
> +	close(ready_pipe[1]);
> +	close(hold_pipe[0]);
> +	close(start_pipe[1]);
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
> +		unsigned char pid_byte = 0;
> +
> +		ASSERT_EQ(read(ready_pipe[0], &pid_byte, 1), 1);
> +		ASSERT_GE(pid_byte, 1);
> +		ASSERT_LE(pid_byte, 4);
> +		seen_mask |= 1U << pid_byte;
> +	}
> +	close(ready_pipe[0]);
> +	close(hold_pipe[1]);
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(seen_mask, 0x1eU);
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
> +		ASSERT_EQ(reap_child_exit_code(workers[i]), 0);

[Severity: Medium]
When close(hold_pipe[1]) wakes all four processes in the rootns PID
namespace at once, can PID 1 exit before PIDs 2..4 and kill them via
zap_pid_ns_processes()?

CPU0 (rootns PID 1)               CPU1 (rootns PID 2)
read(hold_pipe[0]) returns 0
                                  read(hold_pipe[0]) returns 0
_exit(0)
  zap_pid_ns_processes()
    send_sig_info(SIGKILL, p)
                                  terminated by SIGKILL
                                  worker: reap_child_exit_code() -> -2
                                  worker exits with 3  <-- test fails

Because reap_child_exit_code() requires WIFEXITED(status), any non-init
sibling killed by SIGKILL before completing _exit(0) causes its worker to
exit with code 3 and fails the test.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117231352.3816603-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=12


  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18 23:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17 23:13 [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/13] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/13] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/13] rootns: Add rootns_wait() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/13] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/13] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/13] fs: Support installing rootns mount trees via move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/13] arch: Wire up rootns system calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/13] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:15   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/13] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:47 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Josef Bacik
2026-11-18 15:28   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 15:39     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 15:46       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18 17:04   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 17:08     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 17:30       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 17:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18 18:23         ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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