From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
To: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Haynes <loghyr@gmail.com>, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH nfs-utils] exportfs: make "insecure" the default for all exports
Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2025 15:17:05 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <16285c94bc3498fb7a612f62e718ae8a53c42c3c.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7bbb789d-b3ae-4258-bebf-40ed87587576@redhat.com>
On Wed, 2025-06-04 at 14:26 -0400, Steve Dickson wrote:
> Hello all,
>
> On 5/13/25 9:50 AM, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > Back in the 80's someone thought it was a good idea to carve out a set
> > of ports that only privileged users could use. When NFS was originally
> > conceived, Sun made its server require that clients use low ports.
> > Since Linux was following suit with Sun in those days, exportfs has
> > always defaulted to requiring connections from low ports.
> >
> > These days, anyone can be root on their laptop, so limiting connections
> > to low source ports is of little value.
> >
> > Make the default be "insecure" when creating exports.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > In discussion at the Bake-a-thon, we decided to just go for making
> > "insecure" the default for all exports.
> > ---
> > support/nfs/exports.c | 7 +++++--
> > utils/exportfs/exports.man | 4 ++--
> > 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/support/nfs/exports.c b/support/nfs/exports.c
> > index 21ec6486ba3d3945df0800972ba1dfd03bd65375..69f8ca8b5e2ed50b837ef287ca0685af3e70ed0b 100644
> > --- a/support/nfs/exports.c
> > +++ b/support/nfs/exports.c
> > @@ -34,8 +34,11 @@
> > #include "reexport.h"
> > #include "nfsd_path.h"
> >
> > -#define EXPORT_DEFAULT_FLAGS \
> > - (NFSEXP_READONLY|NFSEXP_ROOTSQUASH|NFSEXP_GATHERED_WRITES|NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK)
> > +#define EXPORT_DEFAULT_FLAGS (NFSEXP_READONLY | \
> > + NFSEXP_ROOTSQUASH | \
> > + NFSEXP_GATHERED_WRITES |\
> > + NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK | \
> > + NFSEXP_INSECURE_PORT)
> >
> > struct flav_info flav_map[] = {
> > { "krb5", RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5, 1},
> > diff --git a/utils/exportfs/exports.man b/utils/exportfs/exports.man
> > index 39dc30fb8290213990ca7a14b1b3971140b0d120..0b62bb3a82b0e74bc2a7eb84301c4ec97b14d003 100644
> > --- a/utils/exportfs/exports.man
> > +++ b/utils/exportfs/exports.man
> > @@ -180,8 +180,8 @@ understands the following export options:
> > .TP
> > .IR secure
> > This option requires that requests not using gss originate on an
> > -Internet port less than IPPORT_RESERVED (1024). This option is on by default.
> > -To turn it off, specify
> > +Internet port less than IPPORT_RESERVED (1024). This option is off by default
> > +but can be explicitly disabled by specifying
> > .IR insecure .
> > (NOTE: older kernels (before upstream kernel version 4.17) enforced this
> > requirement on gss requests as well.)
> >
> > ---
> > base-commit: 2cf015ea4312f37598efe9733fef3232ab67f784
> > change-id: 20250513-master-89974087bb04
> >
> > Best regards,
> My apologies but I got a bit lost in the fairly large thread
> What as is consensus on this patch? Thumbs up or down.
> Will there be a V2?
>
> I'm wondering what type documentation impact this would
> have on all docs out there that say one has to be root
> to do the mount.
>
> I guess I'm not against the patch but as Neil pointed
> out making things insecure is a different direction
> that the rest of the world is going.
>
> my two cents,
>
>
Thumbs down for now. Neil argued for a more measured approach to
changing this.
I started work on a manpage patch for exports(5) but it's not quite
ready yet. I also want to look at converting some manpages to asciidoc
as we go, to make future updates easier.
--
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-04 19:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-13 13:50 [PATCH nfs-utils] exportfs: make "insecure" the default for all exports Jeff Layton
2025-05-13 14:17 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-13 15:14 ` Lionel Cons
2025-05-13 15:35 ` Jeff Layton
2025-05-13 16:11 ` Chuck Lever
2025-06-04 17:12 ` Cedric Blancher
2025-06-04 18:20 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-14 2:16 ` NeilBrown
2025-05-14 2:28 ` NeilBrown
2025-05-14 11:17 ` Jeff Layton
2025-05-14 11:43 ` NeilBrown
2025-05-14 12:02 ` Jeff Layton
2025-05-14 21:58 ` NeilBrown
2025-05-14 12:56 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-14 21:47 ` NeilBrown
2025-05-15 12:01 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-15 21:44 ` NeilBrown
2025-05-16 12:09 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-19 6:02 ` NeilBrown
2025-05-19 11:39 ` Jeff Layton
2025-05-19 14:16 ` Chuck Lever
[not found] ` <4bee9565-c2a8-4b90-be57-7d1340fa9ed7@esat.kuleuven.be>
2025-05-19 20:51 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-20 1:44 ` Rick Macklem
2025-05-20 13:20 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-25 17:29 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-26 0:09 ` NeilBrown
2025-05-26 1:47 ` Rick Macklem
2025-05-26 1:52 ` Rick Macklem
2025-05-26 2:29 ` NeilBrown
2025-05-28 0:57 ` Rick Macklem
2025-05-27 13:28 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-27 15:05 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-27 15:58 ` Rick Macklem
2025-05-27 16:29 ` Rick Macklem
2025-05-27 16:58 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-28 1:06 ` Rick Macklem
2025-05-27 19:18 ` Benjamin Coddington
2025-05-27 19:41 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-27 20:25 ` Benjamin Coddington
2025-05-28 14:07 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-28 1:24 ` NeilBrown
2025-05-28 2:48 ` Rick Macklem
2025-05-14 11:46 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-14 12:28 ` Thomas Haynes
2025-05-14 21:49 ` NeilBrown
2025-05-14 2:38 ` NeilBrown
2025-05-14 11:20 ` Jeff Layton
2025-05-15 1:32 ` Christopher Bii
2025-05-21 9:06 ` Sebastian Feld
2025-05-21 12:25 ` Jeff Layton
2025-05-21 13:14 ` Chuck Lever
2025-05-21 13:43 ` Chuck Lever
2025-06-04 17:07 ` Cedric Blancher
2025-06-04 18:26 ` Steve Dickson
2025-06-04 18:45 ` Cedric Blancher
2025-06-04 19:17 ` Jeff Layton [this message]
2025-06-04 19:53 ` Steve Dickson
2025-06-05 16:48 ` Trond Myklebust
2025-06-05 18:09 ` Chuck Lever
2025-06-05 8:20 ` Cedric Blancher
2025-06-05 13:54 ` Chuck Lever
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