From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
To: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Cc: "Ian Kent" <ikent@redhat.com>,
"Benjamin Coddington" <bcodding@redhat.com>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"David Härdeman" <david@hardeman.nu>,
linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, SteveD@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/19] gssd improvements
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 14:55:27 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20141211195527.GP20526@fieldses.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20141211145029.4761b61e@tlielax.poochiereds.net>
On Thu, Dec 11, 2014 at 02:50:29PM -0500, Jeff Layton wrote:
> On Thu, 11 Dec 2014 14:32:40 -0500
> "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote:
>
> > On Thu, Dec 11, 2014 at 06:45:37AM -0500, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > > For instance: module loading clearly needs to be done in the "context"
> > > of the canonical root init process. That's what call_usermodehelper was
> > > originally used for so we need to keep that ability intact.
> > >
> > > OTOH, keyring upcalls probably ought to be done in the context of the
> > > task that triggered them. Certainly we ought to be spawning them with
> > > the credentials associated with the keyring.
> >
> > Isn't the idmapping done as a keyring upcall? You don't want ordinary
> > users of the filesystem to be able to pollute the id<->name cache.
> >
>
> Yes, it is done as a keyring upcall. You wouldn't need to allow random
> users to pollute the cache. When you do a keys upcall the process gets
> an authorization key that allows it to instantiate the key.
>
> AFAIU, that's what guards against random processes polluting the
> keyring, not any particular capabilities or anything.
That doesn't stop it from instantiating the key with the wrong
information.
> > And in the gssd case, userland doesn't just find the right cred, it also
> > does the rpcsec_gss context setup with the server. A random user of the
> > filesystem might not be able to do that part.
> >
>
> I don't see why not. We already do that today as an unprivileged user
> in gssd. process_krb5_upcall forks and changes identity before getting
> a ticket and setting up the context and then handing that back to the
> kernel. I don't think that requires any special privileges.
Why couldn't you give a task access to an nfs filesystem but wall it off
in a network namespace where it doesn't even have access to the
interface that the mount was done over?
(And similarly what's to guarantee that a user of the filesystem is
capable of doing the ldap calls you might need for idmapping?)
--b.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-12-11 19:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-12-09 5:40 [PATCH 00/19] gssd improvements David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:40 ` [PATCH 01/19] nfs-utils: cleanup daemonization code David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:40 ` [PATCH 02/19] nfs-utils: gssd - merge gssd_main_loop.c and gssd.c David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:40 ` [PATCH 03/19] nfs-utils: gssd - simplify some option handling David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:41 ` [PATCH 04/19] nfs-utils: gssd - remove arbitrary GSSD_MAX_CCACHE_SEARCH limitation David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:41 ` [PATCH 05/19] nfs-utils: gssd - simplify topdirs path David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:41 ` [PATCH 06/19] nfs-utils: gssd - move over pipfs scanning code David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:41 ` [PATCH 07/19] nfs-utils: gssd - simplify client dir " David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:41 ` [PATCH 08/19] nfs-utils: gssd - use libevent David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:41 ` [PATCH 09/19] nfs-utils: gssd - remove "close me" code David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:41 ` [PATCH 10/19] nfs-utils: gssd - make the client lists per-topdir David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:41 ` [PATCH 11/19] nfs-utils: gssd - keep the rpc_pipefs dir open David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:41 ` [PATCH 12/19] nfs-utils: gssd - use more relative paths David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:41 ` [PATCH 13/19] nfs-utils: gssd - simplify topdir scanning David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:41 ` [PATCH 14/19] nfs-utils: gssd - simplify client scanning David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:41 ` [PATCH 15/19] nfs-utils: gssd - cleanup read_service_info David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:42 ` [PATCH 16/19] nfs-utils: gssd - change dnotify to inotify David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:42 ` [PATCH 17/19] nfs-utils: gssd - further shorten some pathnames David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:42 ` [PATCH 18/19] nfs-utils: gssd - improve inotify David Härdeman
2014-12-09 5:42 ` [PATCH 19/19] nfs-utils: gssd - simplify handle_gssd_upcall David Härdeman
2014-12-09 13:09 ` [PATCH 00/19] gssd improvements Jeff Layton
2014-12-09 13:52 ` David Härdeman
2014-12-09 14:58 ` Jeff Layton
2014-12-09 15:07 ` Simo Sorce
2014-12-09 19:55 ` David Härdeman
2014-12-10 11:52 ` Jeff Layton
2014-12-10 14:08 ` David Härdeman
2014-12-10 14:17 ` Jeff Layton
2014-12-10 14:31 ` David Härdeman
2014-12-10 14:34 ` Jeff Layton
2014-12-10 16:03 ` David Howells
2014-12-10 19:03 ` Jeff Layton
2014-12-10 20:55 ` David Härdeman
2014-12-10 23:44 ` Ian Kent
2014-12-10 23:21 ` Benjamin Coddington
2014-12-11 0:12 ` Ian Kent
2014-12-11 1:54 ` Benjamin Coddington
2014-12-11 3:21 ` Ian Kent
2014-12-11 11:45 ` Jeff Layton
2014-12-11 12:55 ` Ian Kent
2014-12-11 13:46 ` Jeff Layton
2014-12-11 22:31 ` Ian Kent
2014-12-11 19:32 ` J. Bruce Fields
2014-12-11 19:50 ` Jeff Layton
2014-12-11 19:55 ` J. Bruce Fields [this message]
2014-12-11 20:11 ` Jeff Layton
2014-12-11 20:38 ` J. Bruce Fields
2014-12-11 22:20 ` Ian Kent
2014-12-09 16:39 ` Steve Dickson
2014-12-09 20:22 ` David Härdeman
2014-12-09 21:13 ` Steve Dickson
2014-12-10 14:20 ` David Härdeman
2014-12-10 20:35 ` J. Bruce Fields
2014-12-10 20:49 ` David Härdeman
2014-12-10 21:07 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-01-28 21:29 ` Steve Dickson
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