From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
To: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>, Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>,
linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCHv5 00/16] nvme: implement secure concatenation
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2024 11:10:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240717091031.143188-1-hare@kernel.org> (raw)
Hi all,
here's my attempt to implement secure concatenation for NVMe-of TCP
as outlined in TP8018.
Secure concatenation means that a TLS PSK is generated from the key
material negotiated by the DH-HMAC-CHAP protocol, and the TLS PSK
is then used for a subsequent TLS connection.
The difference between the original definition of secure concatenation
and the method outlined in TP8018 is that with TP8018 the connection
is reset after DH-HMAC-CHAP negotiation, and a new connection is setup
with the generated TLS PSK.
To implement that Sagi came up with the idea to directly reset the
admin queue once the DH-CHAP negotiation has completed; that way
it will be transparent to the upper layers and we don't have to
worry about exposing queues which should not be used.
As usual, comments and reviews are welcome.
Patchset can be found at
git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hare/nvme.git
branch secure-concat.v5
Changes to v4:
- Rework reset admin queue functionality based on an idea
from Sagi (thanks!)
- kbuild robot fixes
- Fixup dhchap negotiation with non-empty C2 value
Changes to v3:
- Include reviews from Sagi
- Do not start I/O queues after DH-HMAC-CHAP negotiation
- Use bool to indicate TLS has been enabled on a queue
- Add 'tls_keyring' sysfs attribute
- Add 'tls_configured_key' sysfs attribute
Changes to v2:
- Fixup reset after dhchap negotiation
- Disable namespace scanning on I/O queues after
dhchap negotiation
- Reworked TLS key handling (again)
Changes to the original submission:
- Sanitize TLS key handling
- Fixup modconfig compilation
Hannes Reinecke (16):
nvme-keyring: restrict match length for version '1' identifiers
nvme-tcp: sanitize TLS key handling
nvme-tcp: check for invalidated or revoked key
nvme: add a newline to the 'tls_key' sysfs attribute
nvme-sysfs: add 'tls_configured_key' sysfs attribute
nvme-sysfs: add 'tls_keyring' attribute
crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand()
nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_psk()
nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest()
nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk()
nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh()
nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation
nvme-fabrics: reset admin connection for secure concatenation
nvmet-auth: allow to clear DH-HMAC-CHAP keys
nvme-target: do not check authentication status for admin commands
twice
nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation
crypto/Makefile | 1 +
crypto/hkdf.c | 112 +++++++++
drivers/nvme/common/auth.c | 303 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c | 103 ++++++++-
drivers/nvme/host/auth.c | 105 ++++++++-
drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 1 -
drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c | 36 ++-
drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h | 3 +
drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h | 2 +-
drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c | 37 ++-
drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c | 108 +++++++--
drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c | 2 -
drivers/nvme/target/auth.c | 84 ++++++-
drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c | 49 +++-
drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c | 26 ++-
drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h | 30 ++-
drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 25 +-
fs/crypto/hkdf.c | 68 +-----
include/crypto/hkdf.h | 18 ++
include/linux/nvme-auth.h | 7 +
include/linux/nvme-keyring.h | 10 +-
include/linux/nvme.h | 7 +
22 files changed, 1015 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 crypto/hkdf.c
create mode 100644 include/crypto/hkdf.h
--
2.35.3
next reply other threads:[~2024-07-17 9:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-17 9:10 Hannes Reinecke [this message]
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 01/16] nvme-keyring: restrict match length for version '1' identifiers Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 21:47 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 02/16] nvme-tcp: sanitize TLS key handling Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 21:53 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-18 7:10 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 03/16] nvme-tcp: check for invalidated or revoked key Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 21:55 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 04/16] nvme: add a newline to the 'tls_key' sysfs attribute Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 21:55 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 05/16] nvme-sysfs: add 'tls_configured_key' " Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 21:58 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-18 7:13 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 06/16] nvme-sysfs: add 'tls_keyring' attribute Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 21:58 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 07/16] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 21:39 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 08/16] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_psk() Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 09/16] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest() Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 10/16] nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk() Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 22:01 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 11/16] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh() Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 22:04 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 12/16] nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 22:31 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-18 7:30 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 13/16] nvme-fabrics: reset admin connection for secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 22:32 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 14/16] nvmet-auth: allow to clear DH-HMAC-CHAP keys Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 22:32 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 15/16] nvme-target: do not check authentication status for admin commands twice Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 22:33 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-17 9:10 ` [PATCH 16/16] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 22:36 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-18 7:34 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-17 21:38 ` [PATCHv5 00/16] nvme: implement secure concatenation Sagi Grimberg
2024-07-18 6:44 ` Hannes Reinecke
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20240717091031.143188-1-hare@kernel.org \
--to=hare@kernel.org \
--cc=hch@lst.de \
--cc=kbusch@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=sagi@grimberg.me \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox