From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Hannes Reinecke" <hare@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:32:19 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-225048@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-4-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 7 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] nvme-fabrics: wrong key revoked in nvmf_free_options() for
dhchap_ctrl_key
- [High] nvme: build failure in nvmf_parse_options() and sysfs.c without
auth/keyring
- [High] nvme: removing secret length checks exposes underflows in key
preparsing
- [Medium] nvme: out-of-bounds write on read error in
dhchap_ctrl_secret_show()
- [Medium] nvme-auth: host_key ref leak and inverted check in
nvme_auth_init_ctrl()
- [Medium] nvme: unlocked host_key and ctrl_key access in dhchap sysfs
show callbacks
- [Low] nvme: check !ctrl->opts for dhchap_key attrs in
nvme_dev_attrs_are_visible()
--
commit ddf0d4926edd9ec44ea25839b02c0ba20380f64e
Author: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing
This commit parses DH-HMAC-CHAP secrets into struct key pointers during
fabric option parsing instead of storing raw secret strings in
nvmf_ctrl_options, and adds sysfs attributes to expose the host and
controller key serials.
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
> index 0ddf3834f4ea2..c189096f825ea 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1038,31 +1056,68 @@ int nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
> INIT_WORK(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_work, nvme_ctrl_auth_work);
> if (!ctrl->opts)
> return 0;
> - ctrl->host_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(ctrl->opts->keyring,
> - ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret,
> - strlen(ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret));
> - if (IS_ERR(ctrl->host_key)) {
> - ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->host_key);
> - ctrl->host_key = NULL;
> - return ret;
> + if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_key) {
> + nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl);
> + nvme_auth_clear_ctrl_key(ctrl);
> + return 0;
> }
> + if (!ctrl->host_key)
> + nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl);
>
> - ctrl->ctrl_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(ctrl->opts->keyring,
> - ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret,
> - strlen(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret));
> - if (IS_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key)) {
> - ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key);
> - ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
> - goto err_free_dhchap_secret;
> + ctrl->host_key = key_get(ctrl->opts->dhchap_key);
> + if (!ctrl->host_key) {
> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
> + "dhchap host key %08x not present\n",
> + key_serial(ctrl->opts->dhchap_key));
> + return -ENOKEY;
> }
> + down_read(&ctrl->host_key->sem);
> + ret = key_validate(ctrl->host_key);
> + up_read(&ctrl->host_key->sem);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
> + "dhchap host key %08x invalidated\n",
> + key_serial(ctrl->host_key));
> + key_put(ctrl->host_key);
> + ctrl->host_key = NULL;
> + return -ENOKEY;
> + }
> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
> + "%s: using dhchap host key %08x\n",
> + __func__, key_serial(ctrl->host_key));
>
> - if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret && !ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret)
> - return 0;
> + if (ctrl->ctrl_key)
> + nvme_auth_clear_ctrl_key(ctrl);
> +
> + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key) {
> + ctrl->ctrl_key = key_get(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key);
> + if (!ctrl->ctrl_key) {
> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
> + "dhchap ctrl key %08x not present\n",
> + key_serial(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key));
> + return -ENOKEY;
> + }
> + down_read(&ctrl->ctrl_key->sem);
> + ret = key_validate(ctrl->ctrl_key);
> + up_read(&ctrl->ctrl_key->sem);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
> + "dhchap ctrl key %08x invalidated\n",
> + key_serial(ctrl->ctrl_key));
> + key_put(ctrl->ctrl_key);
> + ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
> + return -EKEYREVOKED;
> + }
[Severity: Medium]
Do the error returns in the ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key block leak the
ctrl->host_key reference taken earlier in nvme_auth_init_ctrl()?
When nvme_auth_init_ctrl() fails, nvme_init_ctrl() jumps to
out_release_instance before initializing ctrl->ctrl_device, so
nvme_auth_free() is never called on that error path.
Also, the check before nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl) is inverted
(!ctrl->host_key instead of ctrl->host_key), and nvme_init_ctrl() calls
nvme_auth_init_ctrl() before assigning ctrl->device = &ctrl->ctrl_device,
so the dev_warn() and dev_dbg() calls here pass a NULL ctrl->device.
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
> index 5ed91557f0706..7ed8618257ca9 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1020,14 +1024,8 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto out;
> }
> - if (strlen(p) < 11 || strncmp(p, "DHHC-1:", 7)) {
> - pr_err("Invalid DH-CHAP secret %s\n", p);
> - kfree_sensitive(p);
> - ret = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> - }
> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_secret);
> - opts->dhchap_secret = p;
> + kfree_sensitive(host_secret);
> + host_secret = p;
> break;
> case NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_CTRL_SECRET:
> p = match_strdup(args);
> @@ -1035,14 +1033,8 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto out;
> }
> - if (strlen(p) < 11 || strncmp(p, "DHHC-1:", 7)) {
> - pr_err("Invalid DH-CHAP secret %s\n", p);
> - kfree_sensitive(p);
> - ret = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> - }
> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
> - opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret = p;
> + kfree_sensitive(ctrl_secret);
> + ctrl_secret = p;
> break;
[Severity: High]
Does removing the minimum length checks here and in dhchap_secret_store() /
dhchap_ctrl_secret_store() allow short secret strings to underflow datalen
and ret in nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse()?
drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c:nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse() {
...
if (sscanf(prep->data, "DHHC-%01hhu:%02hhu:%*s",
&version, &hmac) != 2) {
...
}
/* skip header and final ':' character */
datalen -= 11;
}
Because %*s is assignment-suppressed and %02hhu matches one or two digits,
sscanf() returns 2 for 8- to 10-byte strings such as "DHHC-1:0:a", causing
unsigned datalen -= 11 to wrap around and wrap the kzalloc() size
calculation sizeof(*upayload) + datalen. For 11- to 15-byte inputs such as
"DHHC-1:00:a" where base64_decode() returns 0..3, ret -= 4 in
nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse() becomes negative and is passed as an unsigned
length to crc32(~0, upayload->data, ret), reading out-of-bounds across
kernel memory.
[ ... ]
> @@ -1086,6 +1078,41 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
> pr_warn("failfast tmo (%d) larger than controller loss tmo (%d)\n",
> opts->fast_io_fail_tmo, ctrl_loss_tmo);
> }
> +
> + opts->host = nvmf_host_add(hostnqn, &hostid);
> + if (IS_ERR(opts->host)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(opts->host);
> + opts->host = NULL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (host_secret) {
> + pr_debug("lookup host identity '%s'\n", host_secret);
> + key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, host_secret,
> + strlen(host_secret));
> + if (IS_ERR(key)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(key);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + pr_debug("using dhchap host key %08x\n", key_serial(key));
> + opts->dhchap_key = key;
> + }
> + if (ctrl_secret) {
> + if (!opts->dhchap_key) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + pr_debug("lookup ctrl identity '%s'\n", ctrl_secret);
> + key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, ctrl_secret,
> + strlen(ctrl_secret));
[Severity: High]
Does calling nvme_auth_extract_key() unconditionally here break the build
when CONFIG_NVME_FABRICS is enabled without CONFIG_NVME_AUTH (or when
CONFIG_NVME_FABRICS=y and CONFIG_NVME_AUTH=m)?
include/linux/nvme-auth.h declares nvme_auth_extract_key() without a
!CONFIG_NVME_AUTH stub, and match_token() is an external call so the
compiler cannot dead-code-eliminate the host_secret and ctrl_secret
branches when CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH is disabled.
In addition, drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c now includes <linux/nvme-keyring.h>
unconditionally, which fails to compile when CONFIG_NVME_KEYRING is
disabled due to a stray semicolon and a non-inline function definition in
the fallback block:
include/linux/nvme-keyring.h:
static inline struct key *nvme_dhchap_psk_lookup(struct key *keyring,
const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn, u8 hmac);
{
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
u8 nvme_dhchap_psk_hash(struct key *key)
{
return 0;
}
[ ... ]
> @@ -1304,8 +1326,18 @@ void nvmf_free_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts)
> kfree(opts->subsysnqn);
> kfree(opts->host_traddr);
> kfree(opts->host_iface);
> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_secret);
> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
> + if (opts->dhchap_key) {
> + pr_debug("revoke dhchap host key %08x\n",
> + key_serial(opts->dhchap_key));
> + key_revoke(opts->dhchap_key);
> + key_put(opts->dhchap_key);
> + }
> + if (opts->dhchap_ctrl_key) {
> + pr_debug("revoke dhchap ctrl key %08x\n",
> + key_serial(opts->dhchap_ctrl_key));
> + key_revoke(opts->dhchap_key);
> + key_put(opts->dhchap_ctrl_key);
> + }
[Severity: High]
In the opts->dhchap_ctrl_key block, should key_revoke() be passed
opts->dhchap_ctrl_key instead of opts->dhchap_key? Passing
opts->dhchap_key dereferences the host key after key_put(opts->dhchap_key)
has already dropped its reference, and leaves opts->dhchap_ctrl_key
unrevoked.
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
> index a5c1511e49ac2..1311f5e29b004 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -818,11 +820,23 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_secret_show(struct device *dev,
> struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> {
> struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> - struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
> + struct key *key = ctrl->host_key;
> + ssize_t count;
>
> - if (!opts->dhchap_secret)
> + if (!key)
> return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n");
> - return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", opts->dhchap_secret);
> + down_read(&key->sem);
> + if (key_validate(key))
> + count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>\n");
> + else {
> + count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (count > 0) {
> + buf[count] = '\n';
> + count++;
> + }
> + }
> + up_read(&key->sem);
> + return count;
> }
[ ... ]
> @@ -830,36 +844,47 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_secret_store(struct device *dev,
[ ... ]
> + mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
> + old_key = ctrl->host_key;
> + dev_dbg(ctrl->dev, "revoke host key %08x\n",
> + key_serial(old_key));
> + key_revoke(old_key);
> +
> + ctrl->host_key = key;
> + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
> + key_put(old_key);
[Severity: Medium]
Can a concurrent read of dhchap_secret (or dhchap_ctrl_secret, dhchap_key,
or dhchap_ctrl_key) race with dhchap_secret_store() or
dhchap_ctrl_secret_store() and trigger a use-after-free on the old key?
CPU0 CPU1
dhchap_secret_show()
key = ctrl->host_key;
dhchap_secret_store()
mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
old_key = ctrl->host_key;
key_revoke(old_key);
ctrl->host_key = key;
mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
key_put(old_key); <-- frees old_key
down_read(&key->sem); <-- use-after-free
None of dhchap_secret_show(), dhchap_ctrl_secret_show(), dhchap_key_show(),
or dhchap_ctrl_key_show() hold ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex or take a key_get()
reference before dereferencing ctrl->host_key or ctrl->ctrl_key. Once a
key has been replaced via sysfs store (so opts->dhchap_key no longer holds
a reference), ctrl->host_key holds the only reference, and key_put(old_key)
frees it while a concurrent show callback is using it.
> @@ -873,11 +898,23 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_secret_show(struct device *dev,
> struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> {
> struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> - struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
> + struct key *key = ctrl->ctrl_key;
> + size_t count;
>
> - if (!opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret)
> + if (!key)
> return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n");
> - return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
> + down_read(&key->sem);
> + if (key_validate(key))
> + count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>");
> + else {
> + count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (count > 0) {
> + buf[count] = '\n';
> + count++;
> + }
> + }
> + up_read(&key->sem);
> + return count;
> }
[Severity: Medium]
Can a negative error return from key->type->read() cause an out-of-bounds
write before buf in dhchap_ctrl_secret_show() and dhchap_key_show()?
Unlike dhchap_secret_show(), which declares ssize_t count, both
dhchap_ctrl_secret_show() and dhchap_key_show() declare count as unsigned
size_t. If key->type->read() returns a negative error code (such as
-EINVAL), count wraps to a large positive value, passes count > 0, and
writes '\n' to buf[count] out-of-bounds. Commit "nvme: allow to pass in
key description as dhchap secret" later in this series replaces
key->type->read() in dhchap_key_show(), but dhchap_ctrl_secret_show()
retains the unsigned size_t count and also omits the trailing newline on
"<invalidated>".
[ ... ]
> @@ -925,6 +970,41 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_secret_store(struct device *dev,
> }
>
> static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RW(dhchap_ctrl_secret);
> +
> +static ssize_t dhchap_key_show(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> + struct key *key = ctrl->host_key;
> + size_t count;
> +
> + if (!key)
> + return 0;
> + down_read(&key->sem);
> + if (key_validate(key))
> + count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>\n");
> + else {
> + count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (count > 0) {
> + buf[count] = '\n';
> + count++;
> + }
> + }
> + up_read(&key->sem);
> + return count;
> +}
> +static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(dhchap_key);
> +
> +static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_key_show(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> +
> + if (!ctrl->ctrl_key)
> + return 0;
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%08x\n", key_serial(ctrl->ctrl_key));
> +}
> +static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(dhchap_ctrl_key);
> #endif
>
> static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = {
> @@ -956,6 +1036,8 @@ static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = {
> #ifdef CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH
> &dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr,
> &dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_secret.attr,
> + &dev_attr_dhchap_key.attr,
> + &dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_key.attr,
> #endif
[Severity: Low]
Should nvme_dev_attrs_are_visible() hide dev_attr_dhchap_key.attr and
dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_key.attr when !ctrl->opts, the same way it hides
dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr and dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_secret.attr? Without
that check, both attributes appear on non-Fabrics controllers (such as PCIe
controllers) when CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH is enabled.
Also, in this patch dhchap_key_show() outputs the key payload via
key->type->read() instead of key_serial(key) as dhchap_ctrl_key_show() does
(though commit "nvme: allow to pass in key description as dhchap secret"
later in the series updates dhchap_key_show() to emit key_serial()).
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-0-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org?part=4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 11:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-20 11:13 [PATCH v4 0/9] nvme-auth: switch to use the kernel keyring Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] nvme-auth: modify nvme_auth_transform_key() to return status Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:42 ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] nvme-keyring: add 'dhchap' key type Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] nvme-auth: switch to use 'struct key' Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:32 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] nvmet-auth: parse dhchap key from configfs attribute Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] nvme: allow to pass in key description as dhchap secret Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] nvme-auth: wait for authentication to finish when changing keys Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] nvme-fabrics: allow to pass in keyring by name Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:37 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] nvmet: add configfs attribute 'dhchap_keyring' Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:39 ` sashiko-bot
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