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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Hannes Reinecke" <hare@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 9/9] nvmet: add configfs attribute 'dhchap_keyring'
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:39:15 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-225082@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-9-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] nvmet: keyring reference leak in nvmet_host_release()
- [Medium] nvmet: inverted error return sign in
  nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_store()
- [Medium] nvmet: unlocked host->dhchap_keyring access in
  nvmet_auth_set_key()
- [Medium] nvmet: 1-byte OOB write in nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_show()
  via sprintf()
--

commit 7f1bb5c7e432b0938e23615bf24751f61d823e03
Author: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>

nvmet: add configfs attribute 'dhchap_keyring'

This commit adds a dhchap_keyring configfs attribute to the nvmet host
directory so userspace can specify the keyring used for DH-HMAC-CHAP key
lookups.

> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
> index 4f2489c5d894b..d583813ef4f27 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
> @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int nvmet_auth_set_key(struct nvmet_host *host, const char *secret,
>  		return 0;
>  	}
>  	len = strcspn(secret, "\n");
> -	key = nvme_auth_extract_key(NULL, secret, len, &generated);
> +	key = nvme_auth_extract_key(host->dhchap_keyring, secret, len, &generated);
>  	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
>  		pr_debug("%s: invalid key specification\n", __func__);
>  		return PTR_ERR(key);

[Severity: Medium]
Can a concurrent write to dhchap_keyring free host->dhchap_keyring while
nvmet_auth_set_key() is using it?

CPU0                                    CPU1
nvmet_host_dhchap_key_store()
  nvmet_auth_set_key()
    keyring = host->dhchap_keyring
                                        nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_store()
                                          down_write(&nvmet_config_sem)
                                          key_put(host->dhchap_keyring)
                                          host->dhchap_keyring = new_ring
                                          up_write(&nvmet_config_sem)
    nvme_auth_extract_key(keyring, ...)
      ...                               <-- use-after-free

nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_store() replaces host->dhchap_keyring and drops
the old reference under nvmet_config_sem, whereas nvmet_auth_set_key()
reads and uses host->dhchap_keyring without holding nvmet_config_sem or
pinning it with key_get().

> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/configfs.c b/drivers/nvme/target/configfs.c
> index 319947aa0a40f..ffe0f852e59d9 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/target/configfs.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/configfs.c
> @@ -2347,6 +2347,62 @@ static ssize_t nvmet_host_dhchap_ctrl_key_store(struct config_item *item,
>  
>  CONFIGFS_ATTR(nvmet_host_, dhchap_ctrl_key);
>  
> +static ssize_t nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_show(struct config_item *item,
> +		char *page)
> +{
> +	struct nvmet_host *host = to_host(item);
> +	struct key *keyring;
> +	ssize_t ret;
> +
> +	down_read(&nvmet_config_sem);
> +	keyring = key_get(host->dhchap_keyring);
> +	if (!keyring) {
> +		page[0] = '\0';
> +		ret = 0;
> +	} else {
> +		down_read(&keyring->sem);
> +		if (key_validate(keyring))
> +			ret = sprintf(page, "<invalidated>\n");
> +		else
> +			ret = sprintf(page, "%s\n", keyring->description);
> +		up_read(&keyring->sem);
> +		key_put(keyring);
> +	}
> +	up_read(&nvmet_config_sem);
> +	return ret;
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
Can sprintf() write one byte past the end of page here?

add_key() accepts descriptions up to 4095 bytes (KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE - 1),
and configfs fill_write_buffer() accepts a 4095-byte write without a
trailing newline.  Formatting a 4095-byte keyring->description with "%s\n"
writes 4097 bytes (including the NUL terminator) into the 4096-byte
PAGE_SIZE configfs read buffer.  Using sysfs_emit() or snprintf(page,
PAGE_SIZE, ...) would avoid the overflow.

> +
> +static ssize_t nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_store(struct config_item *item,
> +		const char *page, size_t count)
> +{
> +	struct nvmet_host *host = to_host(item);
> +	struct key *keyring;
> +	char *desc;
> +	size_t len;
> +	int ret = 0;
> +
> +	len = strcspn(page, "\n");
> +	if (!len)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	desc = kstrndup(page, len, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!desc)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +	keyring = request_key(&key_type_keyring, desc, NULL);
> +	if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
> +		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
> +	} else {
> +		down_write(&nvmet_config_sem);
> +		key_put(host->dhchap_keyring);
> +		host->dhchap_keyring = keyring;
> +		up_write(&nvmet_config_sem);
> +	}
> +	kfree(desc);
> +
> +	return ret ? -ret : count;
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
Does negating ret return a positive value when request_key() fails?
PTR_ERR(keyring) is already negative, so returning -ret causes
configfs_write_iter() to treat the positive errno as a successful write
byte count and silently ignore the failure.

[ ... ]

> @@ -2445,6 +2502,11 @@ static struct config_group *nvmet_hosts_make_group(struct config_group *group,
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_AUTH
>  	/* Default to SHA256 */
>  	host->dhchap_hash_id = NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA256;
> +	host->dhchap_keyring = key_lookup(nvme_keyring_id());
> +	if (IS_ERR(host->dhchap_keyring)) {
> +		kfree(host);
> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
> +	}
>  #endif
>  
>  	config_group_init_type_name(&host->group, name, &nvmet_host_type);

[Severity: High]
Does removing a host group leak host->dhchap_keyring?

Both key_lookup() here and request_key() in
nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_store() acquire a reference on
host->dhchap_keyring, but nvmet_host_release() never calls
key_put(host->dhchap_keyring):

drivers/nvme/target/configfs.c:nvmet_host_release() {
	struct nvmet_host *host = to_host(item);

#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_AUTH
	nvmet_auth_revoke_key(host, false);
	nvmet_auth_revoke_key(host, true);
#endif
	kfree(host);
}

Every removed host configfs directory leaks a reference on its configured
keyring.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-0-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org?part=9


      reply	other threads:[~2026-11-20 11:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-20 11:13 [PATCH v4 0/9] nvme-auth: switch to use the kernel keyring Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] nvme-auth: modify nvme_auth_transform_key() to return status Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:19   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:42     ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] nvme-keyring: add 'dhchap' key type Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:28   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] nvme-auth: switch to use 'struct key' Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:31   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:32   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] nvmet-auth: parse dhchap key from configfs attribute Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:28   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] nvme: allow to pass in key description as dhchap secret Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:31   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] nvme-auth: wait for authentication to finish when changing keys Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:26   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] nvme-fabrics: allow to pass in keyring by name Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] nvmet: add configfs attribute 'dhchap_keyring' Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:39   ` sashiko-bot [this message]

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