* [PATCH 6.6 001/175] fuse: limit FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE to uptodate folios
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 002/175] net/sched: fix pedit partial COW leading to page cache corruption Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (182 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Jann Horn, Miklos Szeredi,
Christian Brauner (Amutable), Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 4e3d1b2c48ca6c55f1e9ca7f8dccc76f120f276c ]
FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE must be limited to uptodate folios; !uptodate folios
can contain uninitialized data.
Since FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE is intended to only return data that is already
in the page cache and not wait for data from the FUSE daemon, treat
!uptodate folios as if they weren't present.
This only has security impact on systems that don't enable automatic
zero-initialization of all page allocations via
CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON or init_on_alloc=1.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 2d45ba381a74 ("fuse: add retrieve request")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260519-fuse-retrieve-uptodate-v1-1-a7a1912a37f9@google.com
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
[adjusted for stable: page instead of folio]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/fuse/dev.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c
index 29a6c3a5829d83..a7705b5b22e09d 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dev.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c
@@ -1722,6 +1722,10 @@ static int fuse_retrieve(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct inode *inode,
page = find_get_page(mapping, index);
if (!page)
break;
+ if (!PageUptodate(page)) {
+ put_page(page);
+ break;
+ }
this_num = min_t(unsigned, num, PAGE_SIZE - offset);
ap->pages[ap->num_pages] = page;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 002/175] net/sched: fix pedit partial COW leading to page cache corruption
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 001/175] fuse: limit FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE to uptodate folios Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 003/175] drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (181 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Yiming Qian, Keenan Dong,
Han Guidong, Zhang Cen, Davide Caratti,
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen, Victor Nogueira,
Jamal Hadi Salim, Rajat Gupta, Jakub Kicinski, Wentao Guan,
Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rajat Gupta <rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com>
[ Upstream commit 899ee91156e57784090c5565e4f31bd7dbffbc5a ]
tcf_pedit_act() computes the COW range for skb_ensure_writable()
once before the key loop using tcfp_off_max_hint, but the hint does
not account for the runtime header offset added by typed keys. This
can leave part of the write region un-COW'd.
Fix by moving skb_ensure_writable() inside the per-key loop where
the actual write offset is known, and add overflow checking on the
offset arithmetic. For negative offsets (e.g. Ethernet header edits
at ingress), use skb_cow() to COW the headroom instead. Guard
offset_valid() against INT_MIN, where negation is undefined.
Fixes: 8b796475fd78 ("net/sched: act_pedit: really ensure the skb is writable")
Reported-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Han Guidong <2045gemini@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Han Guidong <2045gemini@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Han Guidong <2045gemini@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajat Gupta <rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260531123221.48732-1-jhs@mojatatu.com
[rename include file from linux/unaligned.h to asm/unaligned.h]
Conflicts:
include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h | 1 -
net/sched/act_pedit.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++----------------
2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h b/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
index 83fe3993178180..a26d4cd3b8d6f3 100644
--- a/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
+++ b/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ struct tcf_pedit_key_ex {
struct tcf_pedit_parms {
struct tc_pedit_key *tcfp_keys;
struct tcf_pedit_key_ex *tcfp_keys_ex;
- u32 tcfp_off_max_hint;
unsigned char tcfp_nkeys;
unsigned char tcfp_flags;
struct rcu_head rcu;
diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
index 1ef8fcfa9997d1..80b2a1e9d5ceb9 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/overflow.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <net/pkt_sched.h>
@@ -242,7 +244,6 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
goto out_free_ex;
}
- nparms->tcfp_off_max_hint = 0;
nparms->tcfp_flags = parm->flags;
nparms->tcfp_nkeys = parm->nkeys;
@@ -268,14 +269,6 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
BITS_PER_TYPE(int) - 1,
nparms->tcfp_keys[i].shift);
- /* The AT option can read a single byte, we can bound the actual
- * value with uchar max.
- */
- cur += (0xff & offmask) >> nparms->tcfp_keys[i].shift;
-
- /* Each key touches 4 bytes starting from the computed offset */
- nparms->tcfp_off_max_hint =
- max(nparms->tcfp_off_max_hint, cur + 4);
}
p = to_pedit(*a);
@@ -318,15 +311,12 @@ static void tcf_pedit_cleanup(struct tc_action *a)
call_rcu(&parms->rcu, tcf_pedit_cleanup_rcu);
}
-static bool offset_valid(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset)
+static bool offset_valid(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len)
{
- if (offset > 0 && offset > skb->len)
- return false;
-
- if (offset < 0 && -offset > skb_headroom(skb))
+ if (offset < -(int)skb_headroom(skb))
return false;
- return true;
+ return offset <= (int)skb->len - len;
}
static int pedit_l4_skb_offset(struct sk_buff *skb, int *hoffset, const int header_type)
@@ -393,18 +383,10 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tcf_pedit_key_ex *tkey_ex;
struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
struct tc_pedit_key *tkey;
- u32 max_offset;
int i;
parms = rcu_dereference_bh(p->parms);
- max_offset = (skb_transport_header_was_set(skb) ?
- skb_transport_offset(skb) :
- skb_network_offset(skb)) +
- parms->tcfp_off_max_hint;
- if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, min(skb->len, max_offset)))
- goto done;
-
tcf_lastuse_update(&p->tcf_tm);
tcf_action_update_bstats(&p->common, skb);
@@ -412,10 +394,11 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
tkey_ex = parms->tcfp_keys_ex;
for (i = parms->tcfp_nkeys; i > 0; i--, tkey++) {
+ int write_offset, write_len;
int offset = tkey->off;
int hoffset = 0;
- u32 *ptr, hdata;
- u32 val;
+ u32 cur_val, val;
+ u32 *ptr;
int rc;
if (tkey_ex) {
@@ -433,13 +416,15 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (tkey->offmask) {
u8 *d, _d;
+ int at_offset;
- if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + tkey->at)) {
+ if (check_add_overflow(hoffset, (int)tkey->at, &at_offset) ||
+ !offset_valid(skb, at_offset, sizeof(_d))) {
pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit 'at' offset %d out of bounds\n",
hoffset + tkey->at);
goto bad;
}
- d = skb_header_pointer(skb, hoffset + tkey->at,
+ d = skb_header_pointer(skb, at_offset,
sizeof(_d), &_d);
if (!d)
goto bad;
@@ -451,31 +436,51 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
}
}
- if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + offset)) {
- pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n", hoffset + offset);
+ if (check_add_overflow(hoffset, offset, &write_offset)) {
+ pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset overflow\n");
goto bad;
}
- ptr = skb_header_pointer(skb, hoffset + offset,
- sizeof(hdata), &hdata);
- if (!ptr)
+ if (!offset_valid(skb, write_offset, sizeof(*ptr))) {
+ pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n",
+ write_offset);
goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if (write_offset < 0) {
+ if (skb_cow(skb, -write_offset))
+ goto bad;
+ if (write_offset + (int)sizeof(*ptr) > 0) {
+ if (skb_ensure_writable(skb,
+ min_t(int, skb->len,
+ write_offset + (int)sizeof(*ptr))))
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (check_add_overflow(write_offset, (int)sizeof(*ptr),
+ &write_len))
+ goto bad;
+ if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, min_t(int, skb->len,
+ write_len)))
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ ptr = (u32 *)(skb->data + write_offset);
+ cur_val = get_unaligned(ptr);
/* just do it, baby */
switch (cmd) {
case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD_SET:
val = tkey->val;
break;
case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD_ADD:
- val = (*ptr + tkey->val) & ~tkey->mask;
+ val = (cur_val + tkey->val) & ~tkey->mask;
break;
default:
pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit bad command (%d)\n", cmd);
goto bad;
}
- *ptr = ((*ptr & tkey->mask) ^ val);
- if (ptr == &hdata)
- skb_store_bits(skb, hoffset + offset, ptr, 4);
+ put_unaligned((cur_val & tkey->mask) ^ val, ptr);
}
goto done;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 003/175] drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 001/175] fuse: limit FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE to uptodate folios Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 002/175] net/sched: fix pedit partial COW leading to page cache corruption Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 004/175] ip6_vti: set netns_immutable on the fallback device Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (180 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Alex Hung, Harry Wentland, Ray Wu,
Daniel Wheeler, Alex Deucher, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
[ Upstream commit ff287df16a1a58aca78b08d1f3ee09fc44da0351 ]
[Why & How]
All record-chain walk loops in bios_parser.c and bios_parser2.c use
for(;;) and only terminate on a 0xFF record_type sentinel or zero
record_size. A malformed VBIOS image missing the terminator record
causes unbounded iteration at probe time, potentially hundreds of
thousands of iterations with record_size=1. In the final iterations
near the BIOS image boundary, struct casts beyond the 2-byte header
validated by GET_IMAGE can also read out of bounds.
Cap all 14 record-chain walk loops to BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD (256)
iterations. The atombios.h defines up to 22 distinct record types
and atomfirmware.h has 13. Assuming an average of less than 10
records per type (which is reasonable since most are connector-
based) 256 is a generous upper bound.
Fixes: 4562236b3bc0 ("drm/amd/dc: Add dc display driver (v2)")
Assisted-by: Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Mythos
Reviewed-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ray Wu <ray.wu@amd.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 95700a3d660287ed657d6892f7be9ffc0e294a93)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
.../gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c | 15 +++++++----
.../drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c | 27 ++++++++++++-------
.../amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser_helper.h | 5 ++++
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c
index ac2a71e80723d1..fa8fcbcc421aba 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_i2c_info(struct dc_bios *dcb,
ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *header;
ATOM_I2C_RECORD *record;
struct bios_parser *bp = BP_FROM_DCB(dcb);
+ int i;
if (!info)
return BP_RESULT_BADINPUT;
@@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_i2c_info(struct dc_bios *dcb,
offset = le16_to_cpu(object->usRecordOffset)
+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
- for (;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, offset);
if (!header)
@@ -296,11 +297,12 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_device_tag_record(
{
ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *header;
uint32_t offset;
+ int i;
offset = le16_to_cpu(object->usRecordOffset)
+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
- for (;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, offset);
if (!header)
@@ -873,6 +875,7 @@ static ATOM_HPD_INT_RECORD *get_hpd_record(struct bios_parser *bp,
{
ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *header;
uint32_t offset;
+ int i;
if (!object) {
BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -882,7 +885,7 @@ static ATOM_HPD_INT_RECORD *get_hpd_record(struct bios_parser *bp,
offset = le16_to_cpu(object->usRecordOffset)
+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
- for (;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, offset);
if (!header)
@@ -1577,6 +1580,7 @@ static ATOM_ENCODER_CAP_RECORD_V2 *get_encoder_cap_record(
{
ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *header;
uint32_t offset;
+ int i;
if (!object) {
BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -1586,7 +1590,7 @@ static ATOM_ENCODER_CAP_RECORD_V2 *get_encoder_cap_record(
offset = le16_to_cpu(object->usRecordOffset)
+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
- for (;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, offset);
if (!header)
@@ -2675,6 +2679,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout_info(struct dc_bios *dcb,
unsigned int record_offset)
{
unsigned int j;
+ unsigned int n;
struct bios_parser *bp;
ATOM_BRACKET_LAYOUT_RECORD *record;
ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *record_header;
@@ -2684,7 +2689,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout_info(struct dc_bios *dcb,
record = NULL;
record_header = NULL;
- for (;;) {
+ for (n = 0; n < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; n++) {
record_header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, record_offset);
if (record_header == NULL) {
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c
index ed8f669a9a3e15..33142f1c37462b 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_i2c_info(struct dc_bios *dcb,
struct atom_i2c_record *record;
struct atom_i2c_record dummy_record = {0};
struct bios_parser *bp = BP_FROM_DCB(dcb);
+ int i;
if (!info)
return BP_RESULT_BADINPUT;
@@ -424,7 +425,7 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_i2c_info(struct dc_bios *dcb,
break;
}
- for (;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
if (!header)
@@ -529,6 +530,7 @@ static struct atom_hpd_int_record *get_hpd_record_for_path_v3(struct bios_parser
{
struct atom_common_record_header *header;
uint32_t offset;
+ int i;
if (!object) {
BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -537,7 +539,7 @@ static struct atom_hpd_int_record *get_hpd_record_for_path_v3(struct bios_parser
offset = object->disp_recordoffset + bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
- for (;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
if (!header)
@@ -607,6 +609,7 @@ static struct atom_hpd_int_record *get_hpd_record(
{
struct atom_common_record_header *header;
uint32_t offset;
+ int i;
if (!object) {
BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -616,7 +619,7 @@ static struct atom_hpd_int_record *get_hpd_record(
offset = le16_to_cpu(object->disp_recordoffset)
+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
- for (;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
if (!header)
@@ -2125,6 +2128,7 @@ static struct atom_encoder_caps_record *get_encoder_cap_record(
{
struct atom_common_record_header *header;
uint32_t offset;
+ int i;
if (!object) {
BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -2133,7 +2137,7 @@ static struct atom_encoder_caps_record *get_encoder_cap_record(
offset = object->encoder_recordoffset + bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
- for (;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
if (!header)
@@ -2162,6 +2166,7 @@ static struct atom_disp_connector_caps_record *get_disp_connector_caps_record(
{
struct atom_common_record_header *header;
uint32_t offset;
+ int i;
if (!object) {
BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -2170,7 +2175,7 @@ static struct atom_disp_connector_caps_record *get_disp_connector_caps_record(
offset = object->disp_recordoffset + bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
- for (;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
if (!header)
@@ -2198,6 +2203,7 @@ static struct atom_connector_caps_record *get_connector_caps_record(struct bios_
{
struct atom_common_record_header *header;
uint32_t offset;
+ int i;
if (!object) {
BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -2206,7 +2212,7 @@ static struct atom_connector_caps_record *get_connector_caps_record(struct bios_
offset = object->disp_recordoffset + bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
- for (;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
if (!header)
@@ -2286,6 +2292,7 @@ static struct atom_connector_speed_record *get_connector_speed_cap_record(struct
{
struct atom_common_record_header *header;
uint32_t offset;
+ int i;
if (!object) {
BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -2294,7 +2301,7 @@ static struct atom_connector_speed_record *get_connector_speed_cap_record(struct
offset = object->disp_recordoffset + bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
- for (;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
if (!header)
@@ -3154,6 +3161,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout_info(
{
unsigned int record_offset;
unsigned int j;
+ unsigned int n;
struct atom_display_object_path_v2 *object;
struct atom_bracket_layout_record *record;
struct atom_common_record_header *record_header;
@@ -3175,7 +3183,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout_info(
(object->disp_recordoffset) +
(unsigned int)(bp->object_info_tbl_offset);
- for (;;) {
+ for (n = 0; n < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; n++) {
record_header = (struct atom_common_record_header *)
GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header,
@@ -3269,6 +3277,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout_info_v2(
struct slot_layout_info *slot_layout_info)
{
unsigned int record_offset;
+ unsigned int n;
struct atom_display_object_path_v3 *object;
struct atom_bracket_layout_record_v2 *record;
struct atom_common_record_header *record_header;
@@ -3291,7 +3300,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout_info_v2(
(object->disp_recordoffset) +
(unsigned int)(bp->object_info_tbl_offset);
- for (;;) {
+ for (n = 0; n < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; n++) {
record_header = (struct atom_common_record_header *)
GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header,
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser_helper.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser_helper.h
index e1b4a40a353db1..da1e30de3c59a0 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser_helper.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser_helper.h
@@ -38,4 +38,9 @@ uint32_t bios_get_vga_enabled_displays(struct dc_bios *bios);
#define GET_IMAGE(type, offset) ((type *) bios_get_image(&bp->base, offset, sizeof(type)))
+/* Upper bound on the number of records in a VBIOS record chain. Prevents
+ * unbounded looping if the VBIOS image is malformed and lacks a terminator.
+ */
+#define BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD 256
+
#endif
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 004/175] ip6_vti: set netns_immutable on the fallback device.
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 003/175] drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 005/175] drm/v3d: Store the active job inside the queues state Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (179 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Noam Rathaus, Eric Dumazet,
Steffen Klassert, Nicolas Dichtel, Jakub Kicinski,
Salvatore Bonaccorso, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[ Upstream commit d289d5307762d1838aaece22c6b6fcad9e8865f9 ]
john1988 and Noam Rathaus reported that vti6_init_net() does not set the
netns_immutable flag on the per-netns fallback tunnel device (ip6_vti0).
Other similar tunnel drivers (like ip6_tunnel, sit, ip6_gre, and ip_tunnel)
correctly set this flag during their fallback device initialization to
prevent them from being moved to another network namespace.
Fixes: 61220ab34948 ("vti6: Enable namespace changing")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@ssd-disclosure.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260608155918.787644-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Backport for version without 0c493da86374 ("net:
rename netns_local to netns_immutable") in v6.15-rc1 and without
05c1280a2bcf ("netdev_features: convert NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL to
dev->netns_local") in v6.12-rc1 and use NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL device
feature.]
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
index 67cf616c1499a4..95cf8c52953c2f 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
@@ -1166,6 +1166,7 @@ static int __net_init vti6_init_net(struct net *net)
goto err_alloc_dev;
dev_net_set(ip6n->fb_tnl_dev, net);
ip6n->fb_tnl_dev->rtnl_link_ops = &vti6_link_ops;
+ ip6n->fb_tnl_dev->features |= NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL;
err = vti6_fb_tnl_dev_init(ip6n->fb_tnl_dev);
if (err < 0)
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 005/175] drm/v3d: Store the active job inside the queues state
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 004/175] ip6_vti: set netns_immutable on the fallback device Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 006/175] drm/v3d: Skip CSD when it has zeroed workgroups Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (178 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Iago Toral Quiroga, Melissa Wen,
Maíra Canal, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maíra Canal <mcanal@igalia.com>
[ Upstream commit 0d3768826d38c0ac740f8b45cd13346630535f2b ]
Instead of storing the queue's active job in four different variables,
store the active job inside the queue's state. This way, it's possible
to access all active jobs using an index based in `enum v3d_queue`.
Reviewed-by: Iago Toral Quiroga <itoral@igalia.com>
Reviewed-by: Melissa Wen <mwen@igalia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250826-v3d-queue-lock-v3-2-979efc43e490@igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <mcanal@igalia.com>
Stable-dep-of: 7f93fad5ea0a ("drm/v3d: Skip CSD when it has zeroed workgroups")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_drv.h | 8 +++-----
drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_gem.c | 5 +++--
drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_irq.c | 24 ++++++++++++++----------
drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++--------
4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_drv.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_drv.h
index bcef978ba9c4ca..91ea0a80879a9b 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_drv.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_drv.h
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ struct v3d_queue_state {
u64 fence_context;
u64 emit_seqno;
+
+ /* Currently active job for this queue */
+ struct v3d_job *active_job;
};
/* Performance monitor object. The perform lifetime is controlled by userspace
@@ -110,11 +113,6 @@ struct v3d_dev {
struct work_struct overflow_mem_work;
- struct v3d_bin_job *bin_job;
- struct v3d_render_job *render_job;
- struct v3d_tfu_job *tfu_job;
- struct v3d_csd_job *csd_job;
-
struct v3d_queue_state queue[V3D_MAX_QUEUES];
/* Spinlock used to synchronize the overflow memory
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_gem.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_gem.c
index 057f9525a8a422..f14c9f7143355c 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_gem.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_gem.c
@@ -1071,14 +1071,15 @@ void
v3d_gem_destroy(struct drm_device *dev)
{
struct v3d_dev *v3d = to_v3d_dev(dev);
+ enum v3d_queue q;
v3d_sched_fini(v3d);
/* Waiting for jobs to finish would need to be done before
* unregistering V3D.
*/
- WARN_ON(v3d->bin_job);
- WARN_ON(v3d->render_job);
+ for (q = 0; q < V3D_MAX_QUEUES; q++)
+ WARN_ON(v3d->queue[q].active_job);
drm_mm_takedown(&v3d->mm);
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_irq.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_irq.c
index 641315dbee8b29..1717504742a665 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_irq.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_irq.c
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ v3d_overflow_mem_work(struct work_struct *work)
container_of(work, struct v3d_dev, overflow_mem_work);
struct drm_device *dev = &v3d->drm;
struct v3d_bo *bo = v3d_bo_create(dev, NULL /* XXX: GMP */, 256 * 1024);
+ struct v3d_queue_state *queue = &v3d->queue[V3D_BIN];
+ struct v3d_bin_job *bin_job;
struct drm_gem_object *obj;
unsigned long irqflags;
@@ -59,13 +61,15 @@ v3d_overflow_mem_work(struct work_struct *work)
* some binner pool anyway.
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&v3d->job_lock, irqflags);
- if (!v3d->bin_job) {
+ bin_job = (struct v3d_bin_job *)queue->active_job;
+
+ if (!bin_job) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&v3d->job_lock, irqflags);
goto out;
}
drm_gem_object_get(obj);
- list_add_tail(&bo->unref_head, &v3d->bin_job->render->unref_list);
+ list_add_tail(&bo->unref_head, &bin_job->render->unref_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&v3d->job_lock, irqflags);
V3D_CORE_WRITE(0, V3D_PTB_BPOA, bo->node.start << PAGE_SHIFT);
@@ -99,11 +103,11 @@ v3d_irq(int irq, void *arg)
if (intsts & V3D_INT_FLDONE) {
struct v3d_fence *fence =
- to_v3d_fence(v3d->bin_job->base.irq_fence);
+ to_v3d_fence(v3d->queue[V3D_BIN].active_job->irq_fence);
trace_v3d_bcl_irq(&v3d->drm, fence->seqno);
- v3d->bin_job = NULL;
+ v3d->queue[V3D_BIN].active_job = NULL;
dma_fence_signal(&fence->base);
status = IRQ_HANDLED;
@@ -111,11 +115,11 @@ v3d_irq(int irq, void *arg)
if (intsts & V3D_INT_FRDONE) {
struct v3d_fence *fence =
- to_v3d_fence(v3d->render_job->base.irq_fence);
+ to_v3d_fence(v3d->queue[V3D_RENDER].active_job->irq_fence);
trace_v3d_rcl_irq(&v3d->drm, fence->seqno);
- v3d->render_job = NULL;
+ v3d->queue[V3D_RENDER].active_job = NULL;
dma_fence_signal(&fence->base);
status = IRQ_HANDLED;
@@ -123,11 +127,11 @@ v3d_irq(int irq, void *arg)
if (intsts & V3D_INT_CSDDONE) {
struct v3d_fence *fence =
- to_v3d_fence(v3d->csd_job->base.irq_fence);
+ to_v3d_fence(v3d->queue[V3D_CSD].active_job->irq_fence);
trace_v3d_csd_irq(&v3d->drm, fence->seqno);
- v3d->csd_job = NULL;
+ v3d->queue[V3D_CSD].active_job = NULL;
dma_fence_signal(&fence->base);
status = IRQ_HANDLED;
@@ -162,11 +166,11 @@ v3d_hub_irq(int irq, void *arg)
if (intsts & V3D_HUB_INT_TFUC) {
struct v3d_fence *fence =
- to_v3d_fence(v3d->tfu_job->base.irq_fence);
+ to_v3d_fence(v3d->queue[V3D_TFU].active_job->irq_fence);
trace_v3d_tfu_irq(&v3d->drm, fence->seqno);
- v3d->tfu_job = NULL;
+ v3d->queue[V3D_TFU].active_job = NULL;
dma_fence_signal(&fence->base);
status = IRQ_HANDLED;
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c
index 41493cf3d03b81..ff91cdb75bb912 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c
@@ -80,14 +80,18 @@ static struct dma_fence *v3d_bin_job_run(struct drm_sched_job *sched_job)
struct dma_fence *fence;
unsigned long irqflags;
- if (unlikely(job->base.base.s_fence->finished.error))
+ if (unlikely(job->base.base.s_fence->finished.error)) {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&v3d->job_lock, irqflags);
+ v3d->queue[V3D_BIN].active_job = NULL;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&v3d->job_lock, irqflags);
return NULL;
+ }
/* Lock required around bin_job update vs
* v3d_overflow_mem_work().
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&v3d->job_lock, irqflags);
- v3d->bin_job = job;
+ v3d->queue[V3D_BIN].active_job = &job->base;
/* Clear out the overflow allocation, so we don't
* reuse the overflow attached to a previous job.
*/
@@ -134,10 +138,12 @@ static struct dma_fence *v3d_render_job_run(struct drm_sched_job *sched_job)
struct drm_device *dev = &v3d->drm;
struct dma_fence *fence;
- if (unlikely(job->base.base.s_fence->finished.error))
+ if (unlikely(job->base.base.s_fence->finished.error)) {
+ v3d->queue[V3D_RENDER].active_job = NULL;
return NULL;
+ }
- v3d->render_job = job;
+ v3d->queue[V3D_RENDER].active_job = &job->base;
/* Can we avoid this flush? We need to be careful of
* scheduling, though -- imagine job0 rendering to texture and
@@ -179,10 +185,12 @@ v3d_tfu_job_run(struct drm_sched_job *sched_job)
struct drm_device *dev = &v3d->drm;
struct dma_fence *fence;
- if (unlikely(job->base.base.s_fence->finished.error))
+ if (unlikely(job->base.base.s_fence->finished.error)) {
+ v3d->queue[V3D_TFU].active_job = NULL;
return NULL;
+ }
- v3d->tfu_job = job;
+ v3d->queue[V3D_TFU].active_job = &job->base;
fence = v3d_fence_create(v3d, V3D_TFU);
if (IS_ERR(fence))
@@ -221,10 +229,12 @@ v3d_csd_job_run(struct drm_sched_job *sched_job)
struct dma_fence *fence;
int i;
- if (unlikely(job->base.base.s_fence->finished.error))
+ if (unlikely(job->base.base.s_fence->finished.error)) {
+ v3d->queue[V3D_CSD].active_job = NULL;
return NULL;
+ }
- v3d->csd_job = job;
+ v3d->queue[V3D_CSD].active_job = &job->base;
v3d_invalidate_caches(v3d);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 006/175] drm/v3d: Skip CSD when it has zeroed workgroups
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 005/175] drm/v3d: Store the active job inside the queues state Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 007/175] batman-adv: tt: prevent TVLV entry number overflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (177 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jose Maria Casanova Crespo,
Iago Toral Quiroga, Maíra Canal, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maíra Canal <mcanal@igalia.com>
[ Upstream commit 7f93fad5ea0affc9e1505dd0f7596c0fdb496213 ]
A compute shader dispatch encodes its workgroup counts in the CFG0..CFG2
registers. Kicking off a dispatch with a zero count in any of the three
dimensions is invalid. First, the hardware will process 0 as 65536,
while the user-space driver exposes a maximum of 65535. Over that, a
submission with a zeroed workgroup dimension should be a no-op.
These zeroed counts can reach the dispatch path through an indirect CSD
job, whose workgroup counts are only known once the indirect buffer is
read and may legitimately be zero, but such scenario should only result in
a no-op.
Overwrite the indirect CSD job workgroup counts with the indirect BO
ones, even if they are zeroed, and don't submit the job to the hardware
when any of the workgroup counts is zero, so the job completes immediately
instead of running the shader.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d223f98f0209 ("drm/v3d: Add support for compute shader dispatch.")
Suggested-by: Jose Maria Casanova Crespo <jmcasanova@igalia.com>
Reviewed-by: Iago Toral Quiroga <itoral@igalia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602-v3d-fix-indirect-csd-v4-2-654309e32bc0@igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <mcanal@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c
index ff91cdb75bb912..ab872bc818004a 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c
@@ -234,6 +234,16 @@ v3d_csd_job_run(struct drm_sched_job *sched_job)
return NULL;
}
+ /* The HW interprets a workgroup size of 0 as 65536; however, the
+ * user-space driver exposes a maximum of 65535. Therefore, a 0 in
+ * any dimension means that we have no workgroups and the compute
+ * shader should not be dispatched.
+ */
+ if (!V3D_GET_FIELD(job->args.cfg[0], V3D_CSD_QUEUED_CFG0_NUM_WGS_X) ||
+ !V3D_GET_FIELD(job->args.cfg[1], V3D_CSD_QUEUED_CFG1_NUM_WGS_Y) ||
+ !V3D_GET_FIELD(job->args.cfg[2], V3D_CSD_QUEUED_CFG2_NUM_WGS_Z))
+ return NULL;
+
v3d->queue[V3D_CSD].active_job = &job->base;
v3d_invalidate_caches(v3d);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 007/175] batman-adv: tt: prevent TVLV entry number overflow
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 006/175] drm/v3d: Skip CSD when it has zeroed workgroups Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 008/175] debugobjects: Allow to refill the pool before SYSTEM_SCHEDULING Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (176 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 99d9958fa10fb684b2a8e2c48a8d704122721420 upstream.
The helpers to prepare the buffers for the local and global TT based
replies are trying to sum up all TT entries which can be found for each
VLAN. In theory, this sum can be too big for an u16 and therefore overflow.
A too small buffer would then be allocated for the TVLV.
The too small buffer will be handled gracefully by
batadv_tt_tvlv_generate() and is not causing a buffer overflow - just a
truncated reply. But this overflow shouldn't have happened in the first and
the too small buffer should never have been allocated when an overflow was
detected.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 7ea7b4a14275 ("batman-adv: make the TT CRC logic VLAN specific")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
index 4045ddefc29b47..7041cd69e20070 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
@@ -850,11 +850,18 @@ batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data(struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node,
u16 total_entries = 0;
u8 *tt_change_ptr;
int vlan_entries;
+ u16 sum_entries;
spin_lock_bh(&orig_node->vlan_list_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(vlan, &orig_node->vlan_list, list) {
vlan_entries = atomic_read(&vlan->tt.num_entries);
- total_entries += vlan_entries;
+
+ if (check_add_overflow(vlan_entries, total_entries, &sum_entries)) {
+ *tt_len = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ total_entries = sum_entries;
num_vlan++;
}
@@ -941,15 +948,22 @@ batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_local_data(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
struct batadv_softif_vlan *vlan;
size_t change_offset;
u16 num_vlan = 0;
- u16 vlan_entries = 0;
u16 total_entries = 0;
u16 tvlv_len;
u8 *tt_change_ptr;
+ int vlan_entries;
+ u16 sum_entries;
spin_lock_bh(&bat_priv->softif_vlan_list_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(vlan, &bat_priv->softif_vlan_list, list) {
vlan_entries = atomic_read(&vlan->tt.num_entries);
- total_entries += vlan_entries;
+
+ if (check_add_overflow(vlan_entries, total_entries, &sum_entries)) {
+ tvlv_len = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ total_entries = sum_entries;
num_vlan++;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 008/175] debugobjects: Allow to refill the pool before SYSTEM_SCHEDULING
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 007/175] batman-adv: tt: prevent TVLV entry number overflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 009/175] debugobjects: Use LD_WAIT_CONFIG instead of LD_WAIT_SLEEP Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (175 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Thomas Gleixner, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
commit 06e0ae988f6e3499785c407429953ade19c1096b upstream.
The pool of free objects is refilled on several occasions such as object
initialisation. On PREEMPT_RT refilling is limited to preemptible
sections due to sleeping locks used by the memory allocator. The system
boots with disabled interrupts so the pool can not be refilled.
If too many objects are initialized and the pool gets empty then
debugobjects disables itself.
Refiling can also happen early in the boot with disabled interrupts as
long as the scheduler is not operational. If the scheduler can not
preempt a task then a sleeping lock can not be contended.
Allow to additionally refill the pool if the scheduler is not
operational.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251127153652.291697-2-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
lib/debugobjects.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/debugobjects.c b/lib/debugobjects.c
index 35cd384f7e8a2f..5b462a45a9c17b 100644
--- a/lib/debugobjects.c
+++ b/lib/debugobjects.c
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ static void debug_objects_fill_pool(void)
* raw_spinlock_t are basically the same type and this lock-type
* inversion works just fine.
*/
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT) || preemptible()) {
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT) || preemptible() || system_state < SYSTEM_SCHEDULING) {
/*
* Annotate away the spinlock_t inside raw_spinlock_t warning
* by temporarily raising the wait-type to WAIT_SLEEP, matching
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 009/175] debugobjects: Use LD_WAIT_CONFIG instead of LD_WAIT_SLEEP
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 008/175] debugobjects: Allow to refill the pool before SYSTEM_SCHEDULING Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 010/175] debugobjects: Do not fill_pool() if pi_blocked_on Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (174 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Thomas Gleixner, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
commit 37de2dbc318ee10577c1c2704de5a803e75e55a2 upstream.
fill_pool_map is used to suppress nesting violations caused by acquiring
a spinlock_t (from within the memory allocator) while holding a
raw_spinlock_t. The used annotation is wrong.
LD_WAIT_SLEEP is for always sleeping lock types such as mutex_t.
LD_WAIT_CONFIG is for lock type which are sleeping while spinning on
PREEMPT_RT such as spinlock_t.
Use LD_WAIT_CONFIG as override.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251127153652.291697-3-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
lib/debugobjects.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/debugobjects.c b/lib/debugobjects.c
index 5b462a45a9c17b..bebc00aacafedd 100644
--- a/lib/debugobjects.c
+++ b/lib/debugobjects.c
@@ -608,10 +608,10 @@ static void debug_objects_fill_pool(void)
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT) || preemptible() || system_state < SYSTEM_SCHEDULING) {
/*
* Annotate away the spinlock_t inside raw_spinlock_t warning
- * by temporarily raising the wait-type to WAIT_SLEEP, matching
+ * by temporarily raising the wait-type to LD_WAIT_CONFIG, matching
* the preemptible() condition above.
*/
- static DEFINE_WAIT_OVERRIDE_MAP(fill_pool_map, LD_WAIT_SLEEP);
+ static DEFINE_WAIT_OVERRIDE_MAP(fill_pool_map, LD_WAIT_CONFIG);
lock_map_acquire_try(&fill_pool_map);
fill_pool();
lock_map_release(&fill_pool_map);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 010/175] debugobjects: Do not fill_pool() if pi_blocked_on
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 009/175] debugobjects: Use LD_WAIT_CONFIG instead of LD_WAIT_SLEEP Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 011/175] debugobjects: Dont call fill_pool() in early boot hardirq context Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (173 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzbot+b8ca586b9fc235f0c0df,
Helen Koike, Thomas Gleixner, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Helen Koike <koike@igalia.com>
commit 5f41161059fd0f1bbf18c90f3180e38cc45a14eb upstream.
On RT enabled kernels, fill_pool() ends up calling rtlock_lock(), which
asserts if current::pi_blocked_on is set, because a task can obviously only
block on one lock as otherwise the priority inheritenace chain gets
corrupted.
Prevent this by expanding the conditional to take current::pi_blocked_on
into account.
Fixes: 4bedcc28469a ("debugobjects: Make them PREEMPT_RT aware")
Reported-by: syzbot+b8ca586b9fc235f0c0df@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Helen Koike <koike@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260511215359.3351259-1-koike@igalia.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b8ca586b9fc235f0c0df
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
lib/debugobjects.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/debugobjects.c b/lib/debugobjects.c
index bebc00aacafedd..b1c3e873a71d40 100644
--- a/lib/debugobjects.c
+++ b/lib/debugobjects.c
@@ -597,15 +597,25 @@ static struct debug_obj *lookup_object_or_alloc(void *addr, struct debug_bucket
return NULL;
}
+static inline bool debug_objects_is_pi_blocked_on(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES
+ return current->pi_blocked_on != NULL;
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
static void debug_objects_fill_pool(void)
{
/*
* On RT enabled kernels the pool refill must happen in preemptible
- * context -- for !RT kernels we rely on the fact that spinlock_t and
- * raw_spinlock_t are basically the same type and this lock-type
- * inversion works just fine.
+ * context and not enqueued on an rt_mutex -- for !RT kernels we rely
+ * on the fact that spinlock_t and raw_spinlock_t are basically the
+ * same type and this lock-type inversion works just fine.
*/
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT) || preemptible() || system_state < SYSTEM_SCHEDULING) {
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT) || system_state < SYSTEM_SCHEDULING ||
+ (preemptible() && !debug_objects_is_pi_blocked_on())) {
/*
* Annotate away the spinlock_t inside raw_spinlock_t warning
* by temporarily raising the wait-type to LD_WAIT_CONFIG, matching
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 011/175] debugobjects: Dont call fill_pool() in early boot hardirq context
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 010/175] debugobjects: Do not fill_pool() if pi_blocked_on Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 012/175] ARM: group is_permission_fault() with is_translation_fault() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (172 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Thomas Gleixner, Waiman Long, Thomas Gleixner, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
commit 0d046ae106255cba5eb83b23f78ee93f3620247d upstream.
When booting a debug PREEMPT_RT kernel on an ARM64 system, a "inconsistent
{HARDIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-HARDIRQ-W} usage" lockdep warning message was
reported to the console.
During early boot, interrupts are enabled before the scheduler is
enabled. In this window (before SYSTEM_SCHEDULING is set) interrupts can
fire and in the hard interrupt context handler attempt to fill the pool
This can lead to a deadlock when the interrupt occurred when the interrupt
hits a region which holds a lock that is required to be taken in the
allocation path.
Add a new can_fill_pool() helper and reorder the exception rule and forbid
this scenario by excluding allocations from hard interrupt context.
Fixes: 06e0ae988f6e ("debugobjects: Allow to refill the pool before SYSTEM_SCHEDULING")
Suggested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260605173038.495075-1-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
lib/debugobjects.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/debugobjects.c b/lib/debugobjects.c
index b1c3e873a71d40..e4ef9d032d1749 100644
--- a/lib/debugobjects.c
+++ b/lib/debugobjects.c
@@ -606,20 +606,48 @@ static inline bool debug_objects_is_pi_blocked_on(void)
#endif
}
-static void debug_objects_fill_pool(void)
+static inline bool can_fill_pool(void)
{
/*
- * On RT enabled kernels the pool refill must happen in preemptible
- * context and not enqueued on an rt_mutex -- for !RT kernels we rely
- * on the fact that spinlock_t and raw_spinlock_t are basically the
- * same type and this lock-type inversion works just fine.
+ * On !RT enabled kernels there are no restrictions and spinlock_t and
+ * raw_spinlock_t are the same types.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT))
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * On RT enabled kernels, the task must not be blocked on a lock as
+ * that could corrupt the PI state when blocking on a lock in the
+ * allocation path.
+ */
+ if (debug_objects_is_pi_blocked_on())
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * On RT enabled kernels the pool refill should happen in preemptible
+ * context.
*/
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT) || system_state < SYSTEM_SCHEDULING ||
- (preemptible() && !debug_objects_is_pi_blocked_on())) {
+ if (preemptible())
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * Though during system boot before scheduling is set up, preemption is
+ * disabled and the pool can get exhausted. Before scheduling is active
+ * a task cannot be blocked on a sleeping lock, but it might hold a lock
+ * and if interrupted then hard interrupt context might run into a lock
+ * inversion. So exclude hard interrupt context from allocations before
+ * scheduling is active.
+ */
+ return system_state < SYSTEM_SCHEDULING && !in_hardirq();
+}
+
+static void debug_objects_fill_pool(void)
+{
+ if (can_fill_pool()) {
/*
* Annotate away the spinlock_t inside raw_spinlock_t warning
* by temporarily raising the wait-type to LD_WAIT_CONFIG, matching
- * the preemptible() condition above.
+ * the preemptible() condition in can_fill_pool().
*/
static DEFINE_WAIT_OVERRIDE_MAP(fill_pool_map, LD_WAIT_CONFIG);
lock_map_acquire_try(&fill_pool_map);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 012/175] ARM: group is_permission_fault() with is_translation_fault()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 011/175] debugobjects: Dont call fill_pool() in early boot hardirq context Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 013/175] ARM: allow __do_kernel_fault() to report execution of memory faults Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (171 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Russell King (Oracle),
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
commit dea20281ac88226615761c570c8ff7adc18e6ac2 upstream.
Group is_permission_fault() with is_translation_fault(), which is
needed to use is_permission_fault() in __do_kernel_fault(). As
this is static inline, there is no need for this to be under
CONFIG_MMU.
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
index ed1a25f457e48e..879730a47c4a20 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
@@ -128,6 +128,19 @@ static inline bool is_translation_fault(unsigned int fsr)
return false;
}
+static inline bool is_permission_fault(unsigned int fsr)
+{
+ int fs = fsr_fs(fsr);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
+ if ((fs & FS_MMU_NOLL_MASK) == FS_PERM_NOLL)
+ return true;
+#else
+ if (fs == FS_L1_PERM || fs == FS_L2_PERM)
+ return true;
+#endif
+ return false;
+}
+
static void die_kernel_fault(const char *msg, struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
@@ -229,19 +242,6 @@ void do_bad_area(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
#define VM_FAULT_BADMAP ((__force vm_fault_t)0x010000)
#define VM_FAULT_BADACCESS ((__force vm_fault_t)0x020000)
-static inline bool is_permission_fault(unsigned int fsr)
-{
- int fs = fsr_fs(fsr);
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
- if ((fs & FS_MMU_NOLL_MASK) == FS_PERM_NOLL)
- return true;
-#else
- if (fs == FS_L1_PERM || fs == FS_L2_PERM)
- return true;
-#endif
- return false;
-}
-
static int __kprobes
do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 013/175] ARM: allow __do_kernel_fault() to report execution of memory faults
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 012/175] ARM: group is_permission_fault() with is_translation_fault() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 014/175] ARM: fix hash_name() fault Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (170 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Xie Yuanbin, Russell King (Oracle),
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
commit 40b466db1dffb41f0529035c59c5739636d0e5b8 upstream
Allow __do_kernel_fault() to detect the execution of memory, so we can
provide the same fault message as do_page_fault() would do. This is
required when we split the kernel address fault handling from the
main do_page_fault() code path.
Reviewed-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
index 879730a47c4a20..4c0ee81befb1ed 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ __do_kernel_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
*/
if (addr < PAGE_SIZE) {
msg = "NULL pointer dereference";
+ } else if (is_permission_fault(fsr) && fsr & FSR_LNX_PF) {
+ msg = "execution of memory";
} else {
if (is_translation_fault(fsr) &&
kfence_handle_page_fault(addr, is_write_fault(fsr), regs))
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 014/175] ARM: fix hash_name() fault
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
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@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 015/175] ARM: fix branch predictor hardening Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (169 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Zizhi Wo, Xie Yuanbin,
Russell King (Oracle), Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
commit 7733bc7d299d682f2723dc38fc7f370b9bf973e9 upstream.
Zizhi Wo reports:
"During the execution of hash_name()->load_unaligned_zeropad(), a
potential memory access beyond the PAGE boundary may occur. For
example, when the filename length is near the PAGE_SIZE boundary.
This triggers a page fault, which leads to a call to
do_page_fault()->mmap_read_trylock(). If we can't acquire the lock,
we have to fall back to the mmap_read_lock() path, which calls
might_sleep(). This breaks RCU semantics because path lookup occurs
under an RCU read-side critical section."
This is seen with CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y and CONFIG_KFENCE=y.
Kernel addresses (with the exception of the vectors/kuser helper
page) do not have VMAs associated with them. If the vectors/kuser
helper page faults, then there are two possibilities:
1. if the fault happened while in kernel mode, then we're basically
dead, because the CPU won't be able to vector through this page
to handle the fault.
2. if the fault happened while in user mode, that means the page was
protected from user access, and we want to fault anyway.
Thus, we can handle kernel addresses from any context entirely
separately without going anywhere near the mmap lock. This gives us
an entirely non-sleeping path for all kernel mode kernel address
faults.
As we handle the kernel address faults before interrupts are enabled,
this change has the side effect of improving the branch predictor
hardening, but does not completely solve the issue.
Reported-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi@huaweicloud.com>
Reported-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251126090505.3057219-1-wozizhi@huaweicloud.com
Reviewed-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
index 4c0ee81befb1ed..47eecdf29a8312 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
@@ -244,6 +244,35 @@ void do_bad_area(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
#define VM_FAULT_BADMAP ((__force vm_fault_t)0x010000)
#define VM_FAULT_BADACCESS ((__force vm_fault_t)0x020000)
+static int __kprobes
+do_kernel_address_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
+ unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ if (user_mode(regs)) {
+ /*
+ * Fault from user mode for a kernel space address. User mode
+ * should not be faulting in kernel space, which includes the
+ * vector/khelper page. Send a SIGSEGV.
+ */
+ __do_user_fault(addr, fsr, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, regs);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Fault from kernel mode. Enable interrupts if they were
+ * enabled in the parent context. Section (upper page table)
+ * translation faults are handled via do_translation_fault(),
+ * so we will only get here for a non-present kernel space
+ * PTE or PTE permission fault. This may happen in exceptional
+ * circumstances and need the fixup tables to be walked.
+ */
+ if (interrupts_enabled(regs))
+ local_irq_enable();
+
+ __do_kernel_fault(mm, addr, fsr, regs);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int __kprobes
do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
@@ -257,6 +286,12 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
if (kprobe_page_fault(regs, fsr))
return 0;
+ /*
+ * Handle kernel addresses faults separately, which avoids touching
+ * the mmap lock from contexts that are not able to sleep.
+ */
+ if (addr >= TASK_SIZE)
+ return do_kernel_address_page_fault(mm, addr, fsr, regs);
/* Enable interrupts if they were enabled in the parent context. */
if (interrupts_enabled(regs))
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 015/175] ARM: fix branch predictor hardening
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 014/175] ARM: fix hash_name() fault Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 016/175] KVM: VMX: Update SVI during runtime APICv activation Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (168 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Xie Yuanbin, Russell King (Oracle),
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
commit fd2dee1c6e2256f726ba33fd3083a7be0efc80d3 upstream.
__do_user_fault() may be called with indeterminent interrupt enable
state, which means we may be preemptive at this point. This causes
problems when calling harden_branch_predictor(). For example, when
called from a data abort, do_alignment_fault()->do_bad_area().
Move harden_branch_predictor() out of __do_user_fault() and into the
calling contexts.
Moving it into do_kernel_address_page_fault(), we can be sure that
interrupts will be disabled here.
Converting do_translation_fault() to use do_kernel_address_page_fault()
rather than do_bad_area() means that we keep branch predictor handling
for translation faults. Interrupts will also be disabled at this call
site.
do_sect_fault() needs special handling, so detect user mode accesses
to kernel-addresses, and add an explicit call to branch predictor
hardening.
Finally, add branch predictor hardening to do_alignment() for the
faulting case (user mode accessing kernel addresses) before interrupts
are enabled.
This should cover all cases where harden_branch_predictor() is called,
ensuring that it is always has interrupts disabled, also ensuring that
it is called early in each call path.
Reviewed-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm/mm/alignment.c | 4 ++++
arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/alignment.c b/arch/arm/mm/alignment.c
index f8dd0b3cc8e040..ee264737be6d26 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/alignment.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/alignment.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <asm/cp15.h>
#include <asm/system_info.h>
+#include <asm/system_misc.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <asm/opcodes.h>
@@ -809,6 +810,9 @@ do_alignment(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
int thumb2_32b = 0;
int fault;
+ if (addr >= TASK_SIZE && user_mode(regs))
+ harden_branch_predictor();
+
if (interrupts_enabled(regs))
local_irq_enable();
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
index 47eecdf29a8312..87ed5da30e44f1 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
@@ -199,9 +199,6 @@ __do_user_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, unsigned int sig,
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
- if (addr > TASK_SIZE)
- harden_branch_predictor();
-
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_USER
if (((user_debug & UDBG_SEGV) && (sig == SIGSEGV)) ||
((user_debug & UDBG_BUS) && (sig == SIGBUS))) {
@@ -252,8 +249,10 @@ do_kernel_address_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
/*
* Fault from user mode for a kernel space address. User mode
* should not be faulting in kernel space, which includes the
- * vector/khelper page. Send a SIGSEGV.
+ * vector/khelper page. Handle the branch predictor hardening
+ * while interrupts are still disabled, then send a SIGSEGV.
*/
+ harden_branch_predictor();
__do_user_fault(addr, fsr, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, regs);
} else {
/*
@@ -423,16 +422,20 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
* We enter here because the first level page table doesn't contain
* a valid entry for the address.
*
- * If the address is in kernel space (>= TASK_SIZE), then we are
- * probably faulting in the vmalloc() area.
+ * If this is a user address (addr < TASK_SIZE), we handle this as a
+ * normal page fault. This leaves the remainder of the function to handle
+ * kernel address translation faults.
*
- * If the init_task's first level page tables contains the relevant
- * entry, we copy the it to this task. If not, we send the process
- * a signal, fixup the exception, or oops the kernel.
+ * Since user mode is not permitted to access kernel addresses, pass these
+ * directly to do_kernel_address_page_fault() to handle.
*
- * NOTE! We MUST NOT take any locks for this case. We may be in an
- * interrupt or a critical region, and should only copy the information
- * from the master page table, nothing more.
+ * Otherwise, we're probably faulting in the vmalloc() area, so try to fix
+ * that up. Note that we must not take any locks or enable interrupts in
+ * this case.
+ *
+ * If vmalloc() fixup fails, that means the non-leaf page tables did not
+ * contain an entry for this address, so handle this via
+ * do_kernel_address_page_fault().
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
static int __kprobes
@@ -498,7 +501,8 @@ do_translation_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
return 0;
bad_area:
- do_bad_area(addr, fsr, regs);
+ do_kernel_address_page_fault(current->mm, addr, fsr, regs);
+
return 0;
}
#else /* CONFIG_MMU */
@@ -518,7 +522,16 @@ do_translation_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
static int
do_sect_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
+ /*
+ * If this is a kernel address, but from user mode, then userspace
+ * is trying bad stuff. Invoke the branch predictor handling.
+ * Interrupts are disabled here.
+ */
+ if (addr >= TASK_SIZE && user_mode(regs))
+ harden_branch_predictor();
+
do_bad_area(addr, fsr, regs);
+
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM_LPAE */
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 016/175] KVM: VMX: Update SVI during runtime APICv activation
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 015/175] ARM: fix branch predictor hardening Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 017/175] RDMA/bnxt_re: zero shared page before exposing to userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (167 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Dongli Zhang, Chao Gao,
Sean Christopherson, Gulshan Gabel, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit b2849bec936be642b5420801f902337f2507648e ]
The APICv (apic->apicv_active) can be activated or deactivated at runtime,
for instance, because of APICv inhibit reasons. Intel VMX employs different
mechanisms to virtualize LAPIC based on whether APICv is active.
When APICv is activated at runtime, GUEST_INTR_STATUS is used to configure
and report the current pending IRR and ISR states. Unless a specific vector
is explicitly included in EOI_EXIT_BITMAP, its EOI will not be trapped to
KVM. Intel VMX automatically clears the corresponding ISR bit based on the
GUEST_INTR_STATUS.SVI field.
When APICv is deactivated at runtime, the VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD is used
to specify the next interrupt vector to invoke upon VM-entry. The
VMX IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD is used to report un-invoked vectors on
VM-exit. EOIs are always trapped to KVM, so the software can manually clear
pending ISR bits.
There are scenarios where, with APICv activated at runtime, a guest-issued
EOI may not be able to clear the pending ISR bit.
Taking vector 236 as an example, here is one scenario.
1. Suppose APICv is inactive. Vector 236 is pending in the IRR.
2. To handle KVM_REQ_EVENT, KVM moves vector 236 from the IRR to the ISR,
and configures the VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD via vmx_inject_irq().
3. After VM-entry, vector 236 is invoked through the guest IDT. At this
point, the data in VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD is no longer valid. The guest
interrupt handler for vector 236 is invoked.
4. Suppose a VM exit occurs very early in the guest interrupt handler,
before the EOI is issued.
5. Nothing is reported through the IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD because
vector 236 has already been invoked in the guest.
6. Now, suppose APICv is activated. Before the next VM-entry, KVM calls
kvm_vcpu_update_apicv() to activate APICv.
7. Unfortunately, GUEST_INTR_STATUS.SVI is not configured, although
vector 236 is still pending in the ISR.
8. After VM-entry, the guest finally issues the EOI for vector 236.
However, because SVI is not configured, vector 236 is not cleared.
9. ISR is stalled forever on vector 236.
Here is another scenario.
1. Suppose APICv is inactive. Vector 236 is pending in the IRR.
2. To handle KVM_REQ_EVENT, KVM moves vector 236 from the IRR to the ISR,
and configures the VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD via vmx_inject_irq().
3. VM-exit occurs immediately after the next VM-entry. The vector 236 is
not invoked through the guest IDT. Instead, it is saved to the
IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD during the VM-exit.
4. KVM calls kvm_queue_interrupt() to re-queue the un-invoked vector 236
into vcpu->arch.interrupt. A KVM_REQ_EVENT is requested.
5. Now, suppose APICv is activated. Before the next VM-entry, KVM calls
kvm_vcpu_update_apicv() to activate APICv.
6. Although APICv is now active, KVM still uses the legacy
VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD to re-inject vector 236. GUEST_INTR_STATUS.SVI is
not configured.
7. After the next VM-entry, vector 236 is invoked through the guest IDT.
Finally, an EOI occurs. However, due to the lack of GUEST_INTR_STATUS.SVI
configuration, vector 236 is not cleared from the ISR.
8. ISR is stalled forever on vector 236.
Using QEMU as an example, vector 236 is stuck in ISR forever.
(qemu) info lapic 1
dumping local APIC state for CPU 1
LVT0 0x00010700 active-hi edge masked ExtINT (vec 0)
LVT1 0x00010400 active-hi edge masked NMI
LVTPC 0x00000400 active-hi edge NMI
LVTERR 0x000000fe active-hi edge Fixed (vec 254)
LVTTHMR 0x00010000 active-hi edge masked Fixed (vec 0)
LVTT 0x000400ec active-hi edge tsc-deadline Fixed (vec 236)
Timer DCR=0x0 (divide by 2) initial_count = 0 current_count = 0
SPIV 0x000001ff APIC enabled, focus=off, spurious vec 255
ICR 0x000000fd physical edge de-assert no-shorthand
ICR2 0x00000000 cpu 0 (X2APIC ID)
ESR 0x00000000
ISR 236
IRR 37(level) 236
The issue isn't applicable to AMD SVM as KVM simply writes vmcb01 directly
irrespective of whether L1 (vmcs01) or L2 (vmcb02) is active (unlike VMX,
there is no need/cost to switch between VMCBs). In addition,
APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_IRQWIN ensures AMD SVM AVIC is not activated until
the last interrupt is EOI'd.
Fix the bug by configuring Intel VMX GUEST_INTR_STATUS.SVI if APICv is
activated at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251110063212.34902-1-dongli.zhang@oracle.com
[sean: call out that SVM writes vmcb01 directly, tweak comment]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251205231913.441872-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[gulshan: resolved a minor conflict in vmx.c arising from a comment]
Signed-off-by: Gulshan Gabel <gulshan.gabel@nutanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 4 ----
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 4a45e86c5e2fcc..85d301a03b2004 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6851,10 +6851,6 @@ static void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_isr)
* VM-Exit, otherwise L1 with run with a stale SVI.
*/
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
- /*
- * KVM is supposed to forward intercepted L2 EOIs to L1 if VID
- * is enabled in vmcs12; as above, the EOIs affect L2's vAPIC.
- */
to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.update_vmcs01_hwapic_isr = true;
return;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 3838b7336590dd..c04277b35e2edf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -10426,9 +10426,16 @@ void __kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* pending. At the same time, KVM_REQ_EVENT may not be set as APICv was
* still active when the interrupt got accepted. Make sure
* kvm_check_and_inject_events() is called to check for that.
+ *
+ * Update SVI when APICv gets enabled, otherwise SVI won't reflect the
+ * highest bit in vISR and the next accelerated EOI in the guest won't
+ * be virtualized correctly (the CPU uses SVI to determine which vISR
+ * vector to clear).
*/
if (!apic->apicv_active)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+ else
+ kvm_apic_update_hwapic_isr(vcpu);
out:
preempt_enable();
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 017/175] RDMA/bnxt_re: zero shared page before exposing to userspace
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 016/175] KVM: VMX: Update SVI during runtime APICv activation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 018/175] i2c: stub: Reject I2C block transfers with invalid length Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (166 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Lord Ulf Henrik Holmberg,
Leon Romanovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lord Ulf Henrik Holmberg <henrik.holmberg@defensify.se>
commit f6b079629becfa977f9c51fe53ad2e6dcc55ef44 upstream.
bnxt_re_alloc_ucontext() allocates uctx->shpg via
__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL). The buddy allocator does not zero pages
without __GFP_ZERO, so the page contains stale kernel data from
whatever object most recently freed it.
The page is then mapped into userspace via vm_insert_page() under
BNXT_RE_MMAP_SH_PAGE in bnxt_re_mmap(). The driver only ever writes
4 bytes (a u32 AVID) at offset BNXT_RE_AVID_OFFT (0x10) inside
bnxt_re_create_ah(); the remaining 4092 bytes of the page are exposed
to userspace unsanitised, leaking kernel memory contents.
Any user with access to /dev/infiniband/uverbsX on a host with a
bnxt_re device (typically rdma group membership) can read this data
via a single mmap() at pgoff 0 after IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_GET_CONTEXT.
Other shared pages in the same file already use get_zeroed_page()
correctly:
drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c
srq->uctx_srq_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
cq->uctx_cq_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
uctx->shpg is the only outlier. Bring it in line with the existing
convention by switching to get_zeroed_page().
Fixes: 1ac5a4047975 ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Add bnxt_re RoCE driver")
Signed-off-by: Lord Ulf Henrik Holmberg <henrik.holmberg@defensify.se>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260509084011.11971-1-pomzm67@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c
@@ -4146,7 +4146,7 @@ int bnxt_re_alloc_ucontext(struct ib_uco
uctx->rdev = rdev;
- uctx->shpg = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ uctx->shpg = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!uctx->shpg) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 018/175] i2c: stub: Reject I2C block transfers with invalid length
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 017/175] RDMA/bnxt_re: zero shared page before exposing to userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 019/175] net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix endpoint use-after-free in rmnet_dellink() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (165 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Xiang Mei, Weiming Shi, Jean Delvare,
Wolfram Sang
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
commit 6036b5067a8199ba7a2dc7b377d4b9dd276d5f9e upstream.
The I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case in stub_xfer() uses data->block[0]
as the transfer length. The existing check only clamps it to avoid
overrunning the chip->words[256] register array, but does not validate
it against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32), which is the limit of the union
i2c_smbus_data.block buffer (34 bytes total). The driver is a
development/test tool (CONFIG_I2C_STUB=m, not built by default)
that must be loaded with a chip_addr= parameter.
A local user with access to /dev/i2c-* can issue an I2C_SMBUS ioctl
with I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA and data->block[0] > 32, causing
stub_xfer() to read or write past the end of the union
i2c_smbus_data.block buffer:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223)
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800abcfd92 by task exploit/81
Call Trace:
<TASK>
stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223)
__i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:593)
i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:536)
i2cdev_ioctl_smbus (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:391)
i2cdev_ioctl (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:478)
__x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:583)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
</TASK>
The bug exists because i2c-stub implements .smbus_xfer directly,
bypassing the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX validation in
i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated(). The I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same
function correctly validates against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX, but the
I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case does not.
Fix by rejecting transfers with data->block[0] == 0 or
data->block[0] > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX with -EINVAL, consistent with
both the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same function and the
I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA validation in i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated().
Fixes: 4710317891e4 ("i2c-stub: Implement I2C block support")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c
@@ -214,6 +214,11 @@ static s32 stub_xfer(struct i2c_adapter
* We ignore banks here, because banked chips don't use I2C
* block transfers
*/
+ if (data->block[0] == 0 ||
+ data->block[0] > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
if (data->block[0] > 256 - command) /* Avoid overrun */
data->block[0] = 256 - command;
len = data->block[0];
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 019/175] net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix endpoint use-after-free in rmnet_dellink()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 018/175] i2c: stub: Reject I2C block transfers with invalid length Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 020/175] agp/amd64: Fix broken error propagation in agp_amd64_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (164 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Xiang Mei, Weiming Shi,
Jakub Kicinski
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
commit d00c953a8f69921f484b629801766da68f27f658 upstream.
rmnet_dellink() removes the endpoint from the hash table with
hlist_del_init_rcu() and then immediately frees it with kfree(). However,
RCU readers on the receive path (rmnet_rx_handler ->
__rmnet_map_ingress_handler) may still hold a reference to the endpoint and
dereference ep->egress_dev after the memory has been freed. The endpoint is
a kmalloc-32 object, and the stale read at offset 8 corresponds to the
egress_dev pointer.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffde942eef
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 137 Comm: poc_write Not tainted 7.0.0+ #4 PREEMPTLAZY
RIP: 0010:rmnet_vnd_rx_fixup (rmnet_vnd.c:27)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__rmnet_map_ingress_handler (rmnet_handlers.c:48 rmnet_handlers.c:101)
rmnet_rx_handler (rmnet_handlers.c:129 rmnet_handlers.c:235)
__netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6096)
__netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6208)
netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6467)
tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955)
tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2003)
vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688)
ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740)
</TASK>
Add an rcu_head field to struct rmnet_endpoint and replace kfree() with
kfree_rcu() so the endpoint memory remains valid through the RCU grace
period. Also remove the rmnet_vnd_dellink() call and inline only the
nr_rmnet_devs decrement, since rmnet_vnd_dellink() would set
ep->egress_dev to NULL during the grace period, creating a data race
with lockless readers.
Fixes: ceed73a2cf4a ("drivers: net: ethernet: qualcomm: rmnet: Initial implementation")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260514122511.3083479-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.c | 8 ++++----
drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.c
@@ -210,8 +210,8 @@ static void rmnet_dellink(struct net_dev
ep = rmnet_get_endpoint(real_port, mux_id);
if (ep) {
hlist_del_init_rcu(&ep->hlnode);
- rmnet_vnd_dellink(mux_id, real_port, ep);
- kfree(ep);
+ real_port->nr_rmnet_devs--;
+ kfree_rcu(ep, rcu);
}
netdev_upper_dev_unlink(real_dev, dev);
@@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ static void rmnet_force_unassociate_devi
hash_for_each_safe(port->muxed_ep, bkt_ep, tmp_ep, ep, hlnode) {
unregister_netdevice_queue(ep->egress_dev, &list);
netdev_upper_dev_unlink(real_dev, ep->egress_dev);
- rmnet_vnd_dellink(ep->mux_id, port, ep);
hlist_del_init_rcu(&ep->hlnode);
- kfree(ep);
+ port->nr_rmnet_devs--;
+ kfree_rcu(ep, rcu);
}
rmnet_unregister_real_device(real_dev);
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct rmnet_endpoint {
u8 mux_id;
struct net_device *egress_dev;
struct hlist_node hlnode;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
};
struct rmnet_egress_agg_params {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 020/175] agp/amd64: Fix broken error propagation in agp_amd64_probe()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 019/175] net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix endpoint use-after-free in rmnet_dellink() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 021/175] bpf: Reject sleepable kprobe_multi programs at attach time Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (163 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Mingyu Wang, Lukas Wunner
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn>
commit b08472db93b1ccff84a7adec5779d47f0e9d3a30 upstream.
A NULL pointer dereference was observed in the AMD64 AGP driver when
running in a virtualized environment (e.g. qemu/kvm) without a physical
AMD northbridge. The crash occurs in amd64_fetch_size() when attempting
to dereference the pointer returned by node_to_amd_nb(0).
The root cause of this crash is broken error propagation in
agp_amd64_probe(): When no AMD northbridges are found, cache_nbs()
correctly returns -ENODEV. However, the probe function erroneously
checks the return value against exactly -1, rather than < 0.
As a result, the hardware absence error is masked, allowing the driver
to improperly proceed with initialization. It eventually calls
agp_add_bridge(), which invokes amd64_fetch_size(). Since the hardware
does not exist, node_to_amd_nb(0) returns NULL, leading to a General
Protection Fault (GPF) when accessing its ->misc member.
Fix the issue by correcting the error check in agp_amd64_probe() to
abort properly when cache_nbs() returns any negative error code. This
prevents the driver from erroneously proceeding without hardware, thereby
avoiding the subsequent NULL pointer dereference at its source.
Fixes: a32073bffc65 ("[PATCH] x86_64: Clean and enhance up K8 northbridge access code")
Signed-off-by: Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.18+
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260504074823.99377-1-w15303746062@163.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c
+++ b/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static int agp_amd64_probe(struct pci_de
/* Fill in the mode register */
pci_read_config_dword(pdev, bridge->capndx+PCI_AGP_STATUS, &bridge->mode);
- if (cache_nbs(pdev, cap_ptr) == -1) {
+ if (cache_nbs(pdev, cap_ptr) < 0) {
agp_put_bridge(bridge);
return -ENODEV;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 021/175] bpf: Reject sleepable kprobe_multi programs at attach time
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 020/175] agp/amd64: Fix broken error propagation in agp_amd64_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 022/175] selftests/bpf: Add test to ensure kprobe_multi is not sleepable Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (162 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Varun R Mallya,
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi, Leon Hwang, Jiri Olsa,
Alexei Starovoitov, Shung-Hsi Yu, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Varun R Mallya <varunrmallya@gmail.com>
commit eb7024bfcc5f68ed11ed9dd4891a3073c15f04a8 upstream.
kprobe.multi programs run in atomic/RCU context and cannot sleep.
However, bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach() did not validate whether the
program being attached had the sleepable flag set, allowing sleepable
helpers such as bpf_copy_from_user() to be invoked from a non-sleepable
context.
This causes a "sleeping function called from invalid context" splat:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at ./include/linux/uaccess.h:169
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1787, name: sudo
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 0
Fix this by rejecting sleepable programs early in
bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach(), before any further processing.
Fixes: 0dcac2725406 ("bpf: Add multi kprobe link")
Signed-off-by: Varun R Mallya <varunrmallya@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260401191126.440683-1-varunrmallya@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[shung-hsi.yu: sleepable flag was in 'struct bpf_prog_aux' before commit
66c8473135c6 "bpf: move sleepable flag from bpf_prog_aux to bpf_prog"]
Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index a896b80252ae11..87e7cc2dc5ccd8 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -2905,6 +2905,10 @@ int bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *pr
if (prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_MULTI)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* kprobe_multi is not allowed to be sleepable. */
+ if (prog->aux->sleepable)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
flags = attr->link_create.kprobe_multi.flags;
if (flags & ~BPF_F_KPROBE_MULTI_RETURN)
return -EINVAL;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 022/175] selftests/bpf: Add test to ensure kprobe_multi is not sleepable
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 021/175] bpf: Reject sleepable kprobe_multi programs at attach time Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 023/175] af_unix: Reject SIOCATMARK on non-stream sockets Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (161 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Leon Hwang, Varun R Mallya,
Alexei Starovoitov, Shung-Hsi Yu, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Varun R Mallya <varunrmallya@gmail.com>
commit c7cab53f9d5273f0cf2a26bdf178c4e074bdfb50 upstream.
Add a selftest to ensure that kprobe_multi programs cannot be attached
using the BPF_F_SLEEPABLE flag. This test succeeds when the kernel
rejects attachment of kprobe_multi when the BPF_F_SLEEPABLE flag is set.
Suggested-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Varun R Mallya <varunrmallya@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408190137.101418-3-varunrmallya@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[shung-hsi.yu: borrowed 'saved_error' variable from commit 00cdcd2900bd
("selftests/bpf: Don't use libbpf_get_error() in kprobe_multi_test"). ]
Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
.../bpf/prog_tests/kprobe_multi_test.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++
.../bpf/progs/kprobe_multi_sleepable.c | 25 ++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 59 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kprobe_multi_sleepable.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kprobe_multi_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kprobe_multi_test.c
index 4041cfa670eb4c..d41e140c315083 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kprobe_multi_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kprobe_multi_test.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include "trace_helpers.h"
#include "kprobe_multi_empty.skel.h"
#include "kprobe_multi_override.skel.h"
+#include "kprobe_multi_sleepable.skel.h"
#include "bpf/libbpf_internal.h"
#include "bpf/hashmap.h"
@@ -214,7 +215,9 @@ static void test_attach_api_syms(void)
static void test_attach_api_fails(void)
{
LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_kprobe_multi_opts, opts);
+ LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts);
struct kprobe_multi *skel = NULL;
+ struct kprobe_multi_sleepable *sl_skel = NULL;
struct bpf_link *link = NULL;
unsigned long long addrs[2];
const char *syms[2] = {
@@ -222,6 +225,7 @@ static void test_attach_api_fails(void)
"bpf_fentry_test2",
};
__u64 cookies[2];
+ int saved_error, err;
addrs[0] = ksym_get_addr("bpf_fentry_test1");
addrs[1] = ksym_get_addr("bpf_fentry_test2");
@@ -300,9 +304,39 @@ static void test_attach_api_fails(void)
if (!ASSERT_EQ(libbpf_get_error(link), -EINVAL, "fail_5_error"))
goto cleanup;
+ /* fail_9 - sleepable kprobe multi should not attach */
+ sl_skel = kprobe_multi_sleepable__open();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(sl_skel, "sleep_skel_open"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ sl_skel->bss->user_ptr = sl_skel;
+
+ err = bpf_program__set_flags(sl_skel->progs.handle_kprobe_multi_sleepable,
+ BPF_F_SLEEPABLE);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "sleep_skel_set_flags"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ err = kprobe_multi_sleepable__load(sl_skel);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "sleep_skel_load"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ link = bpf_program__attach_kprobe_multi_opts(sl_skel->progs.handle_kprobe_multi_sleepable,
+ "bpf_fentry_test1", NULL);
+ saved_error = -errno;
+
+ if (!ASSERT_ERR_PTR(link, "fail_9"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(saved_error, -EINVAL, "fail_9_error"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(bpf_program__fd(sl_skel->progs.fentry), &topts);
+ ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_prog_test_run_opts");
+
cleanup:
bpf_link__destroy(link);
kprobe_multi__destroy(skel);
+ kprobe_multi_sleepable__destroy(sl_skel);
}
static size_t symbol_hash(long key, void *ctx __maybe_unused)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kprobe_multi_sleepable.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kprobe_multi_sleepable.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..932e1d9c72e2d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kprobe_multi_sleepable.c
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+
+void *user_ptr = 0;
+
+SEC("kprobe.multi")
+int handle_kprobe_multi_sleepable(struct pt_regs *ctx)
+{
+ int a, err;
+
+ err = bpf_copy_from_user(&a, sizeof(a), user_ptr);
+ barrier_var(a);
+ return err;
+}
+
+SEC("fentry/bpf_fentry_test1")
+int BPF_PROG(fentry)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 023/175] af_unix: Reject SIOCATMARK on non-stream sockets
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 022/175] selftests/bpf: Add test to ensure kprobe_multi is not sleepable Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 024/175] bpf: Track equal scalars history on per-instruction level Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (160 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Yuan Tan, Yifan Wu,
Juefei Pu, Xin Liu, Kuniyuki Iwashima, Jiexun Wang, Ren Wei,
Jakub Kicinski, Alexander Martyniuk, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiexun Wang <wangjiexun2025@gmail.com>
commit d119775f2bad827edc28071c061fdd4a91f889a5 upstream.
SIOCATMARK reports whether the receive queue is at the urgent mark for
MSG_OOB.
In AF_UNIX, MSG_OOB is supported only for SOCK_STREAM sockets.
SOCK_DGRAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET reject MSG_OOB in sendmsg() and recvmsg(),
so they should not support SIOCATMARK either.
Return -EOPNOTSUPP for non-stream sockets before checking the receive
queue.
Fixes: 314001f0bf92 ("af_unix: Add OOB support")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Suggested-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiexun Wang <wangjiexun2025@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260506140825.2987635-1-n05ec@lzu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Martyniuk <alexevgmart@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 32892a40d139c2..8bd78cad69e7c5 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -3139,6 +3139,9 @@ static int unix_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
struct sk_buff *skb;
int answ = 0;
+ if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (skb && skb == READ_ONCE(unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb))
answ = 1;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 024/175] bpf: Track equal scalars history on per-instruction level
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 023/175] af_unix: Reject SIOCATMARK on non-stream sockets Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 025/175] bpf: Remove mark_precise_scalar_ids() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (159 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Hao Sun, Andrii Nakryiko,
Eduard Zingerman, Zhenzhong Wu, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 4bf79f9be434e000c8e12fe83b2f4402480f1460 ]
Use bpf_verifier_state->jmp_history to track which registers were
updated by find_equal_scalars() (renamed to collect_linked_regs())
when conditional jump was verified. Use recorded information in
backtrack_insn() to propagate precision.
E.g. for the following program:
while verifying instructions
1: r1 = r0 |
2: if r1 < 8 goto ... | push r0,r1 as linked registers in jmp_history
3: if r0 > 16 goto ... | push r0,r1 as linked registers in jmp_history
4: r2 = r10 |
5: r2 += r0 v mark_chain_precision(r0)
while doing mark_chain_precision(r0)
5: r2 += r0 | mark r0 precise
4: r2 = r10 |
3: if r0 > 16 goto ... | mark r0,r1 as precise
2: if r1 < 8 goto ... | mark r0,r1 as precise
1: r1 = r0 v
Technically, do this as follows:
- Use 10 bits to identify each register that gains range because of
sync_linked_regs():
- 3 bits for frame number;
- 6 bits for register or stack slot number;
- 1 bit to indicate if register is spilled.
- Use u64 as a vector of 6 such records + 4 bits for vector length.
- Augment struct bpf_jmp_history_entry with a field 'linked_regs'
representing such vector.
- When doing check_cond_jmp_op() remember up to 6 registers that
gain range because of sync_linked_regs() in such a vector.
- Don't propagate range information and reset IDs for registers that
don't fit in 6-value vector.
- Push a pair {instruction index, linked registers vector}
to bpf_verifier_state->jmp_history.
- When doing backtrack_insn() check if any of recorded linked
registers is currently marked precise, if so mark all linked
registers as precise.
This also requires fixes for two test_verifier tests:
- precise: test 1
- precise: test 2
Both tests contain the following instruction sequence:
19: (bf) r2 = r9 ; R2=scalar(id=3) R9=scalar(id=3)
20: (a5) if r2 < 0x8 goto pc+1 ; R2=scalar(id=3,umin=8)
21: (95) exit
22: (07) r2 += 1 ; R2_w=scalar(id=3+1,...)
23: (bf) r1 = r10 ; R1_w=fp0 R10=fp0
24: (07) r1 += -8 ; R1_w=fp-8
25: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=0
26: (85) call bpf_probe_read_kernel#113
The call to bpf_probe_read_kernel() at (26) forces r2 to be precise.
Previously, this forced all registers with same id to become precise
immediately when mark_chain_precision() is called.
After this change, the precision is propagated to registers sharing
same id only when 'if' instruction is backtracked.
Hence verification log for both tests is changed:
regs=r2,r9 -> regs=r2 for instructions 25..20.
Fixes: 904e6ddf4133 ("bpf: Use scalar ids in mark_chain_precision()")
Reported-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240718202357.1746514-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzZ0xidVCqB47XnkXcNhkPWF6_nTV7yt+_Lf0kcFEut2Mg@mail.gmail.com/
[ zhenzhong: backport to 6.6.y verifier layout and adapt
sync_linked_regs() to the pre-BPF_ADD_CONST scalar-id code. ]
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Wu <jt26wzz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 4 +
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 253 ++++++++++++++++--
.../bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c | 2 +-
.../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 237 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index dba211d3bb9a0d..9a3b93c24f19f5 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -345,6 +345,10 @@ struct bpf_jmp_history_entry {
u32 prev_idx : 22;
/* special flags, e.g., whether insn is doing register stack spill/load */
u32 flags : 10;
+ /* additional registers that need precision tracking when this
+ * jump is backtracked, vector of six 10-bit records
+ */
+ u64 linked_regs;
};
/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 0d90236d0ad94f..2268f095203e21 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3461,9 +3461,87 @@ static bool is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].jmp_point;
}
+#define LR_FRAMENO_BITS 3
+#define LR_SPI_BITS 6
+#define LR_ENTRY_BITS (LR_SPI_BITS + LR_FRAMENO_BITS + 1)
+#define LR_SIZE_BITS 4
+#define LR_FRAMENO_MASK ((1ull << LR_FRAMENO_BITS) - 1)
+#define LR_SPI_MASK ((1ull << LR_SPI_BITS) - 1)
+#define LR_SIZE_MASK ((1ull << LR_SIZE_BITS) - 1)
+#define LR_SPI_OFF LR_FRAMENO_BITS
+#define LR_IS_REG_OFF (LR_SPI_BITS + LR_FRAMENO_BITS)
+#define LINKED_REGS_MAX 6
+
+struct linked_reg {
+ u8 frameno;
+ union {
+ u8 spi;
+ u8 regno;
+ };
+ bool is_reg;
+};
+
+struct linked_regs {
+ int cnt;
+ struct linked_reg entries[LINKED_REGS_MAX];
+};
+
+static struct linked_reg *linked_regs_push(struct linked_regs *s)
+{
+ if (s->cnt < LINKED_REGS_MAX)
+ return &s->entries[s->cnt++];
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Use u64 as a vector of 6 10-bit values, use first 4-bits to track
+ * number of elements currently in stack.
+ * Pack one history entry for linked registers as 10 bits in the following format:
+ * - 3-bits frameno
+ * - 6-bits spi_or_reg
+ * - 1-bit is_reg
+ */
+static u64 linked_regs_pack(struct linked_regs *s)
+{
+ u64 val = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < s->cnt; ++i) {
+ struct linked_reg *e = &s->entries[i];
+ u64 tmp = 0;
+
+ tmp |= e->frameno;
+ tmp |= e->spi << LR_SPI_OFF;
+ tmp |= (e->is_reg ? 1 : 0) << LR_IS_REG_OFF;
+
+ val <<= LR_ENTRY_BITS;
+ val |= tmp;
+ }
+ val <<= LR_SIZE_BITS;
+ val |= s->cnt;
+ return val;
+}
+
+static void linked_regs_unpack(u64 val, struct linked_regs *s)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ s->cnt = val & LR_SIZE_MASK;
+ val >>= LR_SIZE_BITS;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < s->cnt; ++i) {
+ struct linked_reg *e = &s->entries[i];
+
+ e->frameno = val & LR_FRAMENO_MASK;
+ e->spi = (val >> LR_SPI_OFF) & LR_SPI_MASK;
+ e->is_reg = (val >> LR_IS_REG_OFF) & 0x1;
+ val >>= LR_ENTRY_BITS;
+ }
+}
+
/* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */
static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur,
- int insn_flags)
+ int insn_flags, u64 linked_regs)
{
u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt;
struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *p;
@@ -3479,6 +3557,10 @@ static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_st
"verifier insn history bug: insn_idx %d cur flags %x new flags %x\n",
env->insn_idx, env->cur_hist_ent->flags, insn_flags);
env->cur_hist_ent->flags |= insn_flags;
+ WARN_ONCE(env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs != 0,
+ "verifier insn history bug: insn_idx %d linked_regs != 0: %#llx\n",
+ env->insn_idx, env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs);
+ env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs = linked_regs;
return 0;
}
@@ -3493,6 +3575,7 @@ static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_st
p->idx = env->insn_idx;
p->prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx;
p->flags = insn_flags;
+ p->linked_regs = linked_regs;
cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt;
env->cur_hist_ent = p;
@@ -3668,6 +3751,11 @@ static inline bool bt_is_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg)
return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame] & (1 << reg);
}
+static inline bool bt_is_frame_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg)
+{
+ return bt->reg_masks[frame] & (1 << reg);
+}
+
static inline bool bt_is_frame_slot_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot)
{
return bt->stack_masks[frame] & (1ull << slot);
@@ -3717,6 +3805,42 @@ static void fmt_stack_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u64 stack_mask)
}
}
+/* If any register R in hist->linked_regs is marked as precise in bt,
+ * do bt_set_frame_{reg,slot}(bt, R) for all registers in hist->linked_regs.
+ */
+static void bt_sync_linked_regs(struct backtrack_state *bt, struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist)
+{
+ struct linked_regs linked_regs;
+ bool some_precise = false;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!hist || hist->linked_regs == 0)
+ return;
+
+ linked_regs_unpack(hist->linked_regs, &linked_regs);
+ for (i = 0; i < linked_regs.cnt; ++i) {
+ struct linked_reg *e = &linked_regs.entries[i];
+
+ if ((e->is_reg && bt_is_frame_reg_set(bt, e->frameno, e->regno)) ||
+ (!e->is_reg && bt_is_frame_slot_set(bt, e->frameno, e->spi))) {
+ some_precise = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!some_precise)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < linked_regs.cnt; ++i) {
+ struct linked_reg *e = &linked_regs.entries[i];
+
+ if (e->is_reg)
+ bt_set_frame_reg(bt, e->frameno, e->regno);
+ else
+ bt_set_frame_slot(bt, e->frameno, e->spi);
+ }
+}
+
static bool calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx);
/* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to
@@ -3756,6 +3880,12 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx,
print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks);
}
+ /* If there is a history record that some registers gained range at this insn,
+ * propagate precision marks to those registers, so that bt_is_reg_set()
+ * accounts for these registers.
+ */
+ bt_sync_linked_regs(bt, hist);
+
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg))
return 0;
@@ -3985,7 +4115,8 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx,
*/
bt_set_reg(bt, dreg);
bt_set_reg(bt, sreg);
- /* else dreg <cond> K
+ } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
+ /* dreg <cond> K
* Only dreg still needs precision before
* this insn, so for the K-based conditional
* there is nothing new to be marked.
@@ -4003,6 +4134,10 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx,
/* to be analyzed */
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
+ /* Propagate precision marks to linked registers, to account for
+ * registers marked as precise in this function.
+ */
+ bt_sync_linked_regs(bt, hist);
return 0;
}
@@ -4354,7 +4489,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
/* If some register with scalar ID is marked as precise,
* make sure that all registers sharing this ID are also precise.
- * This is needed to estimate effect of find_equal_scalars().
+ * This is needed to estimate effect of sync_linked_regs().
* Do this at the last instruction of each state,
* bpf_reg_state::id fields are valid for these instructions.
*
@@ -4368,7 +4503,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
* ...
* --- state #1 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} ---
* ...
- * if (r2 > 10) goto exit; // find_equal_scalars() assigns range to r1
+ * if (r2 > 10) goto exit; // sync_linked_regs() assigns range to r1
* ...
* --- state #2 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} ---
* r3 = r10
@@ -4736,7 +4871,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
if (insn_flags)
- return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags);
+ return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0);
return 0;
}
@@ -5032,7 +5167,7 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
insn_flags = 0; /* we are not restoring spilled register */
}
if (insn_flags)
- return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags);
+ return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0);
return 0;
}
@@ -13540,7 +13675,7 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
ptr_reg = dst_reg;
else
/* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be
- * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars()
+ * incorrectly propagated into other registers by sync_linked_regs()
*/
dst_reg->id = 0;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
@@ -13700,7 +13835,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
*/
if (need_id)
/* Assign src and dst registers the same ID
- * that will be used by find_equal_scalars()
+ * that will be used by sync_linked_regs()
* to propagate min/max range.
*/
src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
@@ -13746,7 +13881,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
/* Make sure ID is cleared if src_reg is not in u32
* range otherwise dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly
- * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars()
+ * propagated into src_reg by sync_linked_regs()
*/
if (!is_src_reg_u32)
dst_reg->id = 0;
@@ -14564,19 +14699,75 @@ static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn,
return true;
}
-static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
- struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg)
+static void __collect_linked_regs(struct linked_regs *reg_set, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ u32 id, u32 frameno, u32 spi_or_reg, bool is_reg)
{
- struct bpf_func_state *state;
+ struct linked_reg *e;
+
+ if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->id != id)
+ return;
+
+ e = linked_regs_push(reg_set);
+ if (e) {
+ e->frameno = frameno;
+ e->is_reg = is_reg;
+ e->regno = spi_or_reg;
+ } else {
+ reg->id = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/* For all R being scalar registers or spilled scalar registers
+ * in verifier state, save R in linked_regs if R->id == id.
+ * If there are too many Rs sharing same id, reset id for leftover Rs.
+ */
+static void collect_linked_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 id,
+ struct linked_regs *linked_regs)
+{
+ struct bpf_func_state *func;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
+ int i, j;
- bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({
- if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id) {
+ for (i = vstate->curframe; i >= 0; i--) {
+ func = vstate->frame[i];
+ for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) {
+ reg = &func->regs[j];
+ __collect_linked_regs(linked_regs, reg, id, i, j, true);
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) {
+ if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j]))
+ continue;
+ reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr;
+ __collect_linked_regs(linked_regs, reg, id, i, j, false);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* For all R in linked_regs, copy known_reg range into R
+ * if R->id == known_reg->id.
+ */
+static void sync_linked_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg,
+ struct linked_regs *linked_regs)
+{
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
+ struct linked_reg *e;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < linked_regs->cnt; ++i) {
+ e = &linked_regs->entries[i];
+ reg = e->is_reg ? &vstate->frame[e->frameno]->regs[e->regno]
+ : &vstate->frame[e->frameno]->stack[e->spi].spilled_ptr;
+ if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg == known_reg)
+ continue;
+ if (reg->id != known_reg->id)
+ continue;
+ {
s32 saved_subreg_def = reg->subreg_def;
+
copy_register_state(reg, known_reg);
reg->subreg_def = saved_subreg_def;
}
- }));
+ }
}
static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
@@ -14587,6 +14778,7 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs;
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL;
struct bpf_reg_state *eq_branch_regs;
+ struct linked_regs linked_regs = {};
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bool is_jmp32;
int pred = -1;
@@ -14704,6 +14896,21 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return 0;
}
+ /* Push scalar registers sharing same ID to jump history,
+ * do this before creating 'other_branch', so that both
+ * 'this_branch' and 'other_branch' share this history
+ * if parent state is created.
+ */
+ if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && src_reg->id)
+ collect_linked_regs(this_branch, src_reg->id, &linked_regs);
+ if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id)
+ collect_linked_regs(this_branch, dst_reg->id, &linked_regs);
+ if (linked_regs.cnt > 1) {
+ err = push_jmp_history(env, this_branch, 0, linked_regs_pack(&linked_regs));
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx,
false);
if (!other_branch)
@@ -14746,8 +14953,9 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
src_reg, dst_reg, opcode);
if (src_reg->id &&
!WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) {
- find_equal_scalars(this_branch, src_reg);
- find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]);
+ sync_linked_regs(this_branch, src_reg, &linked_regs);
+ sync_linked_regs(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
+ &linked_regs);
}
}
@@ -14759,8 +14967,9 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id &&
!WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) {
- find_equal_scalars(this_branch, dst_reg);
- find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]);
+ sync_linked_regs(this_branch, dst_reg, &linked_regs);
+ sync_linked_regs(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
+ &linked_regs);
}
/* if one pointer register is compared to another pointer
@@ -16182,7 +16391,7 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
*
* First verification path is [1-6]:
* - at (4) same bpf_reg_state::id (b) would be assigned to r6 and r7;
- * - at (5) r6 would be marked <= X, find_equal_scalars() would also mark
+ * - at (5) r6 would be marked <= X, sync_linked_regs() would also mark
* r7 <= X, because r6 and r7 share same id.
* Next verification path is [1-4, 6].
*
@@ -16915,7 +17124,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
* the current state.
*/
if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx))
- err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur, 0);
+ err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur, 0, 0);
err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -17181,7 +17390,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
}
if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) {
- err = push_jmp_history(env, state, 0);
+ err = push_jmp_history(env, state, 0, 0);
if (err)
return err;
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c
index 4b8b0f45d17d71..a188e26f04da70 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ __msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 14 first_idx 9")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 13: (bf) r1 = r7")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 12: (27) r6 *= 4")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 11: (25) if r6 > 0x3 goto pc+4")
-__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 10: (bf) r6 = r0")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0,r6 stack= before 10: (bf) r6 = r0")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 9: (85) call bpf_loop")
/* State entering callback body popped from states stack */
__msg("from 9 to 17: frame1:")
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c
index 8a2ff81d835088..b0b1bcc668adb1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 23\
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 22\
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 20\
- mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs=r2 stack=:\
+ mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs=r2,r9 stack=:\
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 19 first_idx 10\
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2,r9 stack= before 19\
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r9 stack= before 18\
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 025/175] bpf: Remove mark_precise_scalar_ids()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 024/175] bpf: Track equal scalars history on per-instruction level Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 026/175] selftests/bpf: Tests for per-insn sync_linked_regs() precision tracking Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (158 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Eduard Zingerman, Andrii Nakryiko,
Zhenzhong Wu, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 842edb5507a1038e009d27e69d13b94b6f085763 ]
Function mark_precise_scalar_ids() is superseded by
bt_sync_linked_regs() and equal scalars tracking in jump history.
mark_precise_scalar_ids() propagates precision over registers sharing
same ID on parent/child state boundaries, while jump history records
allow bt_sync_linked_regs() to propagate same information with
instruction level granularity, which is strictly more precise.
This commit removes mark_precise_scalar_ids() and updates test cases
in progs/verifier_scalar_ids to reflect new verifier behavior.
The tests are updated in the following manner:
- mark_precise_scalar_ids() propagated precision regardless of
presence of conditional jumps, while new jump history based logic
only kicks in when conditional jumps are present.
Hence test cases are augmented with conditional jumps to still
trigger precision propagation.
- As equal scalars tracking no longer relies on parent/child state
boundaries some test cases are no longer interesting,
such test cases are removed, namely:
- precision_same_state and precision_cross_state are superseded by
linked_regs_bpf_k;
- precision_same_state_broken_link and equal_scalars_broken_link
are superseded by linked_regs_broken_link.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240718202357.1746514-3-eddyz87@gmail.com
[ zhenzhong: backport to 6.6.y after adapting the first linked-regs
history commit to the older scalar-id verifier layout. ]
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Wu <jt26wzz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 115 ------------
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c | 171 ++++++------------
.../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 232 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 2268f095203e21..f638b2d3a42fbc 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -4265,96 +4265,6 @@ static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_
}
}
-static bool idset_contains(struct bpf_idset *s, u32 id)
-{
- u32 i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < s->count; ++i)
- if (s->ids[i] == id)
- return true;
-
- return false;
-}
-
-static int idset_push(struct bpf_idset *s, u32 id)
-{
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(s->count >= ARRAY_SIZE(s->ids)))
- return -EFAULT;
- s->ids[s->count++] = id;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void idset_reset(struct bpf_idset *s)
-{
- s->count = 0;
-}
-
-/* Collect a set of IDs for all registers currently marked as precise in env->bt.
- * Mark all registers with these IDs as precise.
- */
-static int mark_precise_scalar_ids(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
-{
- struct bpf_idset *precise_ids = &env->idset_scratch;
- struct backtrack_state *bt = &env->bt;
- struct bpf_func_state *func;
- struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
- DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64);
- int i, fr;
-
- idset_reset(precise_ids);
-
- for (fr = bt->frame; fr >= 0; fr--) {
- func = st->frame[fr];
-
- bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr));
- for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) {
- reg = &func->regs[i];
- if (!reg->id || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
- continue;
- if (idset_push(precise_ids, reg->id))
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr));
- for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) {
- if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE)
- break;
- if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i]))
- continue;
- reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
- if (!reg->id)
- continue;
- if (idset_push(precise_ids, reg->id))
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- }
-
- for (fr = 0; fr <= st->curframe; ++fr) {
- func = st->frame[fr];
-
- for (i = BPF_REG_0; i < BPF_REG_10; ++i) {
- reg = &func->regs[i];
- if (!reg->id)
- continue;
- if (!idset_contains(precise_ids, reg->id))
- continue;
- bt_set_frame_reg(bt, fr, i);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; ++i) {
- if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i]))
- continue;
- reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
- if (!reg->id)
- continue;
- if (!idset_contains(precise_ids, reg->id))
- continue;
- bt_set_frame_slot(bt, fr, i);
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/*
* __mark_chain_precision() backtracks BPF program instruction sequence and
* chain of verifier states making sure that register *regno* (if regno >= 0)
@@ -4487,31 +4397,6 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
bt->frame, last_idx, first_idx, subseq_idx);
}
- /* If some register with scalar ID is marked as precise,
- * make sure that all registers sharing this ID are also precise.
- * This is needed to estimate effect of sync_linked_regs().
- * Do this at the last instruction of each state,
- * bpf_reg_state::id fields are valid for these instructions.
- *
- * Allows to track precision in situation like below:
- *
- * r2 = unknown value
- * ...
- * --- state #0 ---
- * ...
- * r1 = r2 // r1 and r2 now share the same ID
- * ...
- * --- state #1 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} ---
- * ...
- * if (r2 > 10) goto exit; // sync_linked_regs() assigns range to r1
- * ...
- * --- state #2 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} ---
- * r3 = r10
- * r3 += r1 // need to mark both r1 and r2
- */
- if (mark_precise_scalar_ids(env, st))
- return -EFAULT;
-
if (last_idx < 0) {
/* we are at the entry into subprog, which
* is expected for global funcs, but only if
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c
index 22a6cf6e8255df..f70392bf696c62 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c
@@ -5,54 +5,27 @@
#include "bpf_misc.h"
/* Check that precision marks propagate through scalar IDs.
- * Registers r{0,1,2} have the same scalar ID at the moment when r0 is
- * marked to be precise, this mark is immediately propagated to r{1,2}.
+ * Registers r{0,1,2} have the same scalar ID.
+ * Range information is propagated for scalars sharing same ID.
+ * Check that precision mark for r0 causes precision marks for r{1,2}
+ * when range information is propagated for 'if <reg> <op> <const>' insn.
*/
SEC("socket")
__success __log_level(2)
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1,r2 stack= before 4: (bf) r3 = r10")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1,r2 stack= before 3: (bf) r2 = r0")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1 stack= before 2: (bf) r1 = r0")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 1: (57) r0 &= 255")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns")
-__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
-__naked void precision_same_state(void)
-{
- asm volatile (
- /* r0 = random number up to 0xff */
- "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
- "r0 &= 0xff;"
- /* tie r0.id == r1.id == r2.id */
- "r1 = r0;"
- "r2 = r0;"
- /* force r0 to be precise, this immediately marks r1 and r2 as
- * precise as well because of shared IDs
- */
- "r3 = r10;"
- "r3 += r0;"
- "r0 = 0;"
- "exit;"
- :
- : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
- : __clobber_all);
-}
-
-/* Same as precision_same_state, but mark propagates through state /
- * parent state boundary.
- */
-SEC("socket")
-__success __log_level(2)
-__msg("frame0: last_idx 6 first_idx 5 subseq_idx -1")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1,r2 stack= before 5: (bf) r3 = r10")
+/* first 'if' branch */
+__msg("6: (0f) r3 += r0")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 4: (25) if r1 > 0x7 goto pc+0")
__msg("frame0: parent state regs=r0,r1,r2 stack=:")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1,r2 stack= before 4: (05) goto pc+0")
__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1,r2 stack= before 3: (bf) r2 = r0")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1 stack= before 2: (bf) r1 = r0")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 1: (57) r0 &= 255")
-__msg("frame0: parent state regs=r0 stack=:")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns")
+/* second 'if' branch */
+__msg("from 4 to 5: ")
+__msg("6: (0f) r3 += r0")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 5: (bf) r3 = r10")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 4: (25) if r1 > 0x7 goto pc+0")
+/* parent state already has r{0,1,2} as precise */
+__msg("frame0: parent state regs= stack=:")
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
-__naked void precision_cross_state(void)
+__naked void linked_regs_bpf_k(void)
{
asm volatile (
/* r0 = random number up to 0xff */
@@ -61,9 +34,8 @@ __naked void precision_cross_state(void)
/* tie r0.id == r1.id == r2.id */
"r1 = r0;"
"r2 = r0;"
- /* force checkpoint */
- "goto +0;"
- /* force r0 to be precise, this immediately marks r1 and r2 as
+ "if r1 > 7 goto +0;"
+ /* force r0 to be precise, this eventually marks r1 and r2 as
* precise as well because of shared IDs
*/
"r3 = r10;"
@@ -75,59 +47,18 @@ __naked void precision_cross_state(void)
: __clobber_all);
}
-/* Same as precision_same_state, but break one of the
+/* Same as linked_regs_bpf_k, but break one of the
* links, note that r1 is absent from regs=... in __msg below.
*/
SEC("socket")
__success __log_level(2)
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r2 stack= before 5: (bf) r3 = r10")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r2 stack= before 4: (b7) r1 = 0")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r2 stack= before 3: (bf) r2 = r0")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 2: (bf) r1 = r0")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 1: (57) r0 &= 255")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns")
-__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
-__naked void precision_same_state_broken_link(void)
-{
- asm volatile (
- /* r0 = random number up to 0xff */
- "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
- "r0 &= 0xff;"
- /* tie r0.id == r1.id == r2.id */
- "r1 = r0;"
- "r2 = r0;"
- /* break link for r1, this is the only line that differs
- * compared to the previous test
- */
- "r1 = 0;"
- /* force r0 to be precise, this immediately marks r1 and r2 as
- * precise as well because of shared IDs
- */
- "r3 = r10;"
- "r3 += r0;"
- "r0 = 0;"
- "exit;"
- :
- : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
- : __clobber_all);
-}
-
-/* Same as precision_same_state_broken_link, but with state /
- * parent state boundary.
- */
-SEC("socket")
-__success __log_level(2)
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r2 stack= before 6: (bf) r3 = r10")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r2 stack= before 5: (b7) r1 = 0")
-__msg("frame0: parent state regs=r0,r2 stack=:")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1,r2 stack= before 4: (05) goto pc+0")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1,r2 stack= before 3: (bf) r2 = r0")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1 stack= before 2: (bf) r1 = r0")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 1: (57) r0 &= 255")
+__msg("7: (0f) r3 += r0")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 6: (bf) r3 = r10")
__msg("frame0: parent state regs=r0 stack=:")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 5: (25) if r0 > 0x7 goto pc+0")
+__msg("frame0: parent state regs=r0,r2 stack=:")
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
-__naked void precision_cross_state_broken_link(void)
+__naked void linked_regs_broken_link(void)
{
asm volatile (
/* r0 = random number up to 0xff */
@@ -136,18 +67,13 @@ __naked void precision_cross_state_broken_link(void)
/* tie r0.id == r1.id == r2.id */
"r1 = r0;"
"r2 = r0;"
- /* force checkpoint, although link between r1 and r{0,2} is
- * broken by the next statement current precision tracking
- * algorithm can't react to it and propagates mark for r1 to
- * the parent state.
- */
- "goto +0;"
/* break link for r1, this is the only line that differs
- * compared to precision_cross_state()
+ * compared to the previous test
*/
"r1 = 0;"
- /* force r0 to be precise, this immediately marks r1 and r2 as
- * precise as well because of shared IDs
+ "if r0 > 7 goto +0;"
+ /* force r0 to be precise,
+ * this eventually marks r2 as precise because of shared IDs
*/
"r3 = r10;"
"r3 += r0;"
@@ -164,10 +90,16 @@ __naked void precision_cross_state_broken_link(void)
*/
SEC("socket")
__success __log_level(2)
-__msg("11: (0f) r2 += r1")
+__msg("12: (0f) r2 += r1")
/* Current state */
-__msg("frame2: last_idx 11 first_idx 10 subseq_idx -1")
-__msg("frame2: regs=r1 stack= before 10: (bf) r2 = r10")
+__msg("frame2: last_idx 12 first_idx 11 subseq_idx -1 ")
+__msg("frame2: regs=r1 stack= before 11: (bf) r2 = r10")
+__msg("frame2: parent state regs=r1 stack=")
+__msg("frame1: parent state regs= stack=")
+__msg("frame0: parent state regs= stack=")
+/* Parent state */
+__msg("frame2: last_idx 10 first_idx 10 subseq_idx 11 ")
+__msg("frame2: regs=r1 stack= before 10: (25) if r1 > 0x7 goto pc+0")
__msg("frame2: parent state regs=r1 stack=")
/* frame1.r{6,7} are marked because mark_precise_scalar_ids()
* looks for all registers with frame2.r1.id in the current state
@@ -192,7 +124,7 @@ __msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack= before 4: (85) call pc+1")
__msg("frame0: parent state regs=r1,r6 stack=")
/* Parent state */
__msg("frame0: last_idx 3 first_idx 1 subseq_idx 4")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1,r6 stack= before 3: (bf) r6 = r0")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r1,r6 stack= before 3: (bf) r6 = r0")
__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1 stack= before 2: (bf) r1 = r0")
__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 1: (57) r0 &= 255")
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
@@ -230,7 +162,8 @@ static __naked __noinline __used
void precision_many_frames__bar(void)
{
asm volatile (
- /* force r1 to be precise, this immediately marks:
+ "if r1 > 7 goto +0;"
+ /* force r1 to be precise, this eventually marks:
* - bar frame r1
* - foo frame r{1,6,7}
* - main frame r{1,6}
@@ -247,14 +180,16 @@ void precision_many_frames__bar(void)
*/
SEC("socket")
__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("11: (0f) r2 += r1")
/* foo frame */
-__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack=-8,-16 before 9: (bf) r2 = r10")
+__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack= before 10: (bf) r2 = r10")
+__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack= before 9: (25) if r1 > 0x7 goto pc+0")
__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack=-8,-16 before 8: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r1")
__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack=-8 before 7: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1")
__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack= before 4: (85) call pc+2")
/* main frame */
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1 stack=-8 before 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1 stack= before 2: (bf) r1 = r0")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r1 stack=-8 before 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 2: (bf) r1 = r0")
__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 1: (57) r0 &= 255")
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
__naked void precision_stack(void)
@@ -283,7 +218,8 @@ void precision_stack__foo(void)
*/
"*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
"*(u64*)(r10 - 16) = r1;"
- /* force r1 to be precise, this immediately marks:
+ "if r1 > 7 goto +0;"
+ /* force r1 to be precise, this eventually marks:
* - foo frame r1,fp{-8,-16}
* - main frame r1,fp{-8}
*/
@@ -299,15 +235,17 @@ void precision_stack__foo(void)
SEC("socket")
__success __log_level(2)
/* r{6,7} */
-__msg("11: (0f) r3 += r7")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r6,r7 stack= before 10: (bf) r3 = r10")
+__msg("12: (0f) r3 += r7")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r7 stack= before 11: (bf) r3 = r10")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r7 stack= before 9: (25) if r7 > 0x7 goto pc+0")
/* ... skip some insns ... */
__msg("frame0: regs=r6,r7 stack= before 3: (bf) r7 = r0")
__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r6 stack= before 2: (bf) r6 = r0")
/* r{8,9} */
-__msg("12: (0f) r3 += r9")
-__msg("frame0: regs=r8,r9 stack= before 11: (0f) r3 += r7")
+__msg("13: (0f) r3 += r9")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r9 stack= before 12: (0f) r3 += r7")
/* ... skip some insns ... */
+__msg("frame0: regs=r9 stack= before 10: (25) if r9 > 0x7 goto pc+0")
__msg("frame0: regs=r8,r9 stack= before 7: (bf) r9 = r0")
__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r8 stack= before 6: (bf) r8 = r0")
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
@@ -328,8 +266,9 @@ __naked void precision_two_ids(void)
"r9 = r0;"
/* clear r0 id */
"r0 = 0;"
- /* force checkpoint */
- "goto +0;"
+ /* propagate equal scalars precision */
+ "if r7 > 7 goto +0;"
+ "if r9 > 7 goto +0;"
"r3 = r10;"
/* force r7 to be precise, this also marks r6 */
"r3 += r7;"
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c
index b0b1bcc668adb1..59a020c3564742 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 22\
mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs=r2 stack=:\
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 20 first_idx 20\
- mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2,r9 stack= before 20\
+ mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 20\
mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs=r2,r9 stack=:\
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 19 first_idx 17\
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2,r9 stack= before 19\
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 026/175] selftests/bpf: Tests for per-insn sync_linked_regs() precision tracking
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 025/175] bpf: Remove mark_precise_scalar_ids() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 027/175] selftests/bpf: Update comments find_equal_scalars->sync_linked_regs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (157 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Eduard Zingerman, Andrii Nakryiko,
Zhenzhong Wu, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit bebc17b1c03b224a0b4aec6a171815e39f8ba9bc ]
Add a few test cases to verify precision tracking for scalars gaining
range because of sync_linked_regs():
- check what happens when more than 6 registers might gain range in
sync_linked_regs();
- check if precision is propagated correctly when operand of
conditional jump gained range in sync_linked_regs() and one of
linked registers is marked precise;
- check if precision is propagated correctly when operand of
conditional jump gained range in sync_linked_regs() and a
other-linked operand of the conditional jump is marked precise;
- add a minimized reproducer for precision tracking bug reported in [0];
- Check that mark_chain_precision() for one of the conditional jump
operands does not trigger equal scalars precision propagation.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzZ0xidVCqB47XnkXcNhkPWF6_nTV7yt+_Lf0kcFEut2Mg@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240718202357.1746514-4-eddyz87@gmail.com
[ zhenzhong: keep the linked_regs_broken_link_2 reject check, but
drop the mark_precise log expectations because 6.6.y does not derive
the scalar-vs-scalar range for that non-constant JMP_X comparison. ]
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Wu <jt26wzz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c | 162 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 162 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c
index f70392bf696c62..2eb85eb3a06ccb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c
@@ -47,6 +47,72 @@ __naked void linked_regs_bpf_k(void)
: __clobber_all);
}
+/* Registers r{0,1,2} share same ID when 'if r1 > ...' insn is processed,
+ * check that verifier marks r{1,2} as precise while backtracking
+ * 'if r1 > ...' with r0 already marked.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 5: (2d) if r1 > r3 goto pc+0")
+__msg("frame0: parent state regs=r0,r1,r2,r3 stack=:")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1,r2,r3 stack= before 4: (b7) r3 = 7")
+__naked void linked_regs_bpf_x_src(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* r0 = random number up to 0xff */
+ "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
+ "r0 &= 0xff;"
+ /* tie r0.id == r1.id == r2.id */
+ "r1 = r0;"
+ "r2 = r0;"
+ "r3 = 7;"
+ "if r1 > r3 goto +0;"
+ /* force r0 to be precise, this eventually marks r1 and r2 as
+ * precise as well because of shared IDs
+ */
+ "r4 = r10;"
+ "r4 += r0;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Registers r{0,1,2} share same ID when 'if r1 > r3' insn is processed,
+ * check that verifier marks r{0,1,2} as precise while backtracking
+ * 'if r1 > r3' with r3 already marked.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__msg("frame0: regs=r3 stack= before 5: (2d) if r1 > r3 goto pc+0")
+__msg("frame0: parent state regs=r0,r1,r2,r3 stack=:")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r0,r1,r2,r3 stack= before 4: (b7) r3 = 7")
+__naked void linked_regs_bpf_x_dst(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* r0 = random number up to 0xff */
+ "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
+ "r0 &= 0xff;"
+ /* tie r0.id == r1.id == r2.id */
+ "r1 = r0;"
+ "r2 = r0;"
+ "r3 = 7;"
+ "if r1 > r3 goto +0;"
+ /* force r0 to be precise, this eventually marks r1 and r2 as
+ * precise as well because of shared IDs
+ */
+ "r4 = r10;"
+ "r4 += r3;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
/* Same as linked_regs_bpf_k, but break one of the
* links, note that r1 is absent from regs=... in __msg below.
*/
@@ -280,6 +346,102 @@ __naked void precision_two_ids(void)
: __clobber_all);
}
+SEC("socket")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+/* check thar r0 and r6 have different IDs after 'if',
+ * collect_linked_regs() can't tie more than 6 registers for a single insn.
+ */
+__msg("8: (25) if r0 > 0x7 goto pc+0 ; R0=scalar(id=1")
+__msg("9: (bf) r6 = r6 ; R6_w=scalar(id=2")
+/* check that r{0-5} are marked precise after 'if' */
+__msg("frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 8: (25) if r0 > 0x7 goto pc+0")
+__msg("frame0: parent state regs=r0,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5 stack=:")
+__naked void linked_regs_too_many_regs(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* r0 = random number up to 0xff */
+ "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
+ "r0 &= 0xff;"
+ /* tie r{0-6} IDs */
+ "r1 = r0;"
+ "r2 = r0;"
+ "r3 = r0;"
+ "r4 = r0;"
+ "r5 = r0;"
+ "r6 = r0;"
+ /* propagate range for r{0-6} */
+ "if r0 > 7 goto +0;"
+ /* make r6 appear in the log */
+ "r6 = r6;"
+ /* force r0 to be precise,
+ * this would cause r{0-4} to be precise because of shared IDs
+ */
+ "r7 = r10;"
+ "r7 += r0;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure __log_level(2)
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__msg("div by zero")
+__naked void linked_regs_broken_link_2(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "r7 = r0;"
+ "r8 = r0;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 > 1 goto +0;"
+ /* r7.id == r8.id,
+ * thus r7 precision implies r8 precision,
+ * which implies r0 precision because of the conditional below.
+ */
+ "if r8 >= r0 goto 1f;"
+ /* break id relation between r7 and r8 */
+ "r8 += r8;"
+ /* make r7 precise */
+ "if r7 == 0 goto 1f;"
+ "r0 /= 0;"
+"1:"
+ "r0 = 42;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Check that mark_chain_precision() for one of the conditional jump
+ * operands does not trigger equal scalars precision propagation.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("3: (25) if r1 > 0x100 goto pc+0")
+__msg("frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 2: (bf) r1 = r0")
+__naked void cjmp_no_linked_regs_trigger(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* r0 = random number up to 0xff */
+ "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
+ "r0 &= 0xff;"
+ /* tie r0.id == r1.id */
+ "r1 = r0;"
+ /* the jump below would be predicted, thus r1 would be marked precise,
+ * this should not imply precision mark for r0
+ */
+ "if r1 > 256 goto +0;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
/* Verify that check_ids() is used by regsafe() for scalars.
*
* r9 = ... some pointer with range X ...
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 027/175] selftests/bpf: Update comments find_equal_scalars->sync_linked_regs
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 026/175] selftests/bpf: Tests for per-insn sync_linked_regs() precision tracking Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 028/175] ring-buffer: Remove ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (156 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Eduard Zingerman, Andrii Nakryiko,
Zhenzhong Wu, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit cfbf25481d6dec0089c99c9d33a2ea634fe8f008 ]
find_equal_scalars() is renamed to sync_linked_regs(),
this commit updates existing references in the selftests comments.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240718202357.1746514-5-eddyz87@gmail.com
[ zhenzhong: only two pre-existing comments still needed updating in 6.6.y. ]
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Wu <jt26wzz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c
index 1f71f596d33f8b..07a2527a8f47a7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ __naked void spill_32bit_of_64bit_fail(void)
*(u32*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
/* 32-bit fill r2 from stack. */ \
r2 = *(u32*)(r10 - 8); \
- /* Compare r2 with another register to trigger find_equal_scalars.\
+ /* Compare r2 with another register to trigger sync_linked_regs.\
* Having one random bit is important here, otherwise the verifier cuts\
* the corners. If the ID was mistakenly preserved on spill, this would\
* cause the verifier to think that r1 is also equal to zero in one of\
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ __naked void spill_16bit_of_32bit_fail(void)
*(u16*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
/* 16-bit fill r2 from stack. */ \
r2 = *(u16*)(r10 - 8); \
- /* Compare r2 with another register to trigger find_equal_scalars.\
+ /* Compare r2 with another register to trigger sync_linked_regs.\
* Having one random bit is important here, otherwise the verifier cuts\
* the corners. If the ID was mistakenly preserved on spill, this would\
* cause the verifier to think that r1 is also equal to zero in one of\
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 028/175] ring-buffer: Remove ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 027/175] selftests/bpf: Update comments find_equal_scalars->sync_linked_regs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 029/175] regulator: core: fix locking in regulator_resolve_supply() error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (155 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Mathieu Desnoyers, David Howells,
Masami Hiramatsu (Google), Steven Rostedt (Google), Bjoern Doebel,
Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bjoern Doebel <doebel@amazon.de>
[ Upstream commit 119a5d573622ae90ba730d18acfae9bb75d77b9a ]
When the ring buffer was first introduced, reading the non-consuming
"trace" file required disabling the writing of the ring buffer. To make
sure the writing was fully disabled before iterating the buffer with a
non-consuming read, it would set the disable flag of the buffer and then
call an RCU synchronization to make sure all the buffers were
synchronized.
The function ring_buffer_read_start() originally would initialize the
iterator and call an RCU synchronization, but this was for each individual
per CPU buffer where this would get called many times on a machine with
many CPUs before the trace file could be read. The commit 72c9ddfd4c5bf
("ring-buffer: Make non-consuming read less expensive with lots of cpus.")
separated ring_buffer_read_start into ring_buffer_read_prepare(),
ring_buffer_read_sync() and then ring_buffer_read_start() to allow each of
the per CPU buffers to be prepared, call the read_buffer_read_sync() once,
and then the ring_buffer_read_start() for each of the CPUs which made
things much faster.
The commit 1039221cc278 ("ring-buffer: Do not disable recording when there
is an iterator") removed the requirement of disabling the recording of the
ring buffer in order to iterate it, but it did not remove the
synchronization that was happening that was required to wait for all the
buffers to have no more writers. It's now OK for the buffers to have
writers and no synchronization is needed.
Remove the synchronization and put back the interface for the ring buffer
iterator back before commit 72c9ddfd4c5bf was applied.
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250630180440.3eabb514@batman.local.home
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fixes: 1039221cc278 ("ring-buffer: Do not disable recording when there is an iterator")
Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Assisted-by: Kiro:claude-opus-4.8
Signed-off-by: Bjoern Doebel <doebel@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/ring_buffer.h | 4 +--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 67 ++++++-------------------------------
kernel/trace/trace.c | 14 +++-----
kernel/trace/trace_kdb.c | 8 ++---
4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ring_buffer.h b/include/linux/ring_buffer.h
index ded528d23f855b..382fbaa701f930 100644
--- a/include/linux/ring_buffer.h
+++ b/include/linux/ring_buffer.h
@@ -129,9 +129,7 @@ ring_buffer_consume(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, u64 *ts,
unsigned long *lost_events);
struct ring_buffer_iter *
-ring_buffer_read_prepare(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, gfp_t flags);
-void ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync(void);
-void ring_buffer_read_start(struct ring_buffer_iter *iter);
+ring_buffer_read_start(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, gfp_t flags);
void ring_buffer_read_finish(struct ring_buffer_iter *iter);
struct ring_buffer_event *
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
index 508edf1f3f1e2e..52c7dbccafedde 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -5084,28 +5084,20 @@ ring_buffer_consume(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, u64 *ts,
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_consume);
/**
- * ring_buffer_read_prepare - Prepare for a non consuming read of the buffer
+ * ring_buffer_read_start - start a non consuming read of the buffer
* @buffer: The ring buffer to read from
* @cpu: The cpu buffer to iterate over
* @flags: gfp flags to use for memory allocation
*
- * This performs the initial preparations necessary to iterate
- * through the buffer. Memory is allocated, buffer recording
- * is disabled, and the iterator pointer is returned to the caller.
- *
- * Disabling buffer recording prevents the reading from being
- * corrupted. This is not a consuming read, so a producer is not
- * expected.
- *
- * After a sequence of ring_buffer_read_prepare calls, the user is
- * expected to make at least one call to ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync.
- * Afterwards, ring_buffer_read_start is invoked to get things going
- * for real.
+ * This creates an iterator to allow non-consuming iteration through
+ * the buffer. If the buffer is disabled for writing, it will produce
+ * the same information each time, but if the buffer is still writing
+ * then the first hit of a write will cause the iteration to stop.
*
- * This overall must be paired with ring_buffer_read_finish.
+ * Must be paired with ring_buffer_read_finish.
*/
struct ring_buffer_iter *
-ring_buffer_read_prepare(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, gfp_t flags)
+ring_buffer_read_start(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, gfp_t flags)
{
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
struct ring_buffer_iter *iter;
@@ -5130,51 +5122,12 @@ ring_buffer_read_prepare(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, gfp_t flags)
atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
- return iter;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_read_prepare);
-
-/**
- * ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync - Synchronize a set of prepare calls
- *
- * All previously invoked ring_buffer_read_prepare calls to prepare
- * iterators will be synchronized. Afterwards, read_buffer_read_start
- * calls on those iterators are allowed.
- */
-void
-ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync(void)
-{
- synchronize_rcu();
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync);
-
-/**
- * ring_buffer_read_start - start a non consuming read of the buffer
- * @iter: The iterator returned by ring_buffer_read_prepare
- *
- * This finalizes the startup of an iteration through the buffer.
- * The iterator comes from a call to ring_buffer_read_prepare and
- * an intervening ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync must have been
- * performed.
- *
- * Must be paired with ring_buffer_read_finish.
- */
-void
-ring_buffer_read_start(struct ring_buffer_iter *iter)
-{
- struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
- unsigned long flags;
-
- if (!iter)
- return;
-
- cpu_buffer = iter->cpu_buffer;
-
- raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
+ guard(raw_spinlock_irqsave)(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock);
arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
rb_iter_reset(iter);
arch_spin_unlock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
- raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
+
+ return iter;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_read_start);
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
index 6b35666a4e0be6..f57baf67726da8 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -4792,21 +4792,15 @@ __tracing_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool snapshot)
if (iter->cpu_file == RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) {
for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
iter->buffer_iter[cpu] =
- ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
- cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
- }
- ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync();
- for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
- ring_buffer_read_start(iter->buffer_iter[cpu]);
+ ring_buffer_read_start(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
+ cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
tracing_iter_reset(iter, cpu);
}
} else {
cpu = iter->cpu_file;
iter->buffer_iter[cpu] =
- ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
- cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
- ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync();
- ring_buffer_read_start(iter->buffer_iter[cpu]);
+ ring_buffer_read_start(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
+ cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
tracing_iter_reset(iter, cpu);
}
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_kdb.c b/kernel/trace/trace_kdb.c
index 59857a1ee44cdf..628c25693cef2f 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_kdb.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_kdb.c
@@ -43,17 +43,15 @@ static void ftrace_dump_buf(int skip_entries, long cpu_file)
if (cpu_file == RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) {
for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
iter.buffer_iter[cpu] =
- ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter.array_buffer->buffer,
- cpu, GFP_ATOMIC);
- ring_buffer_read_start(iter.buffer_iter[cpu]);
+ ring_buffer_read_start(iter.array_buffer->buffer,
+ cpu, GFP_ATOMIC);
tracing_iter_reset(&iter, cpu);
}
} else {
iter.cpu_file = cpu_file;
iter.buffer_iter[cpu_file] =
- ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter.array_buffer->buffer,
+ ring_buffer_read_start(iter.array_buffer->buffer,
cpu_file, GFP_ATOMIC);
- ring_buffer_read_start(iter.buffer_iter[cpu_file]);
tracing_iter_reset(&iter, cpu_file);
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 029/175] regulator: core: fix locking in regulator_resolve_supply() error path
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 028/175] ring-buffer: Remove ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 030/175] dlm: prevent NPD when writing a positive value to event_done Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (154 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, André Draszik, Mark Brown,
Nazar Kalashnikov
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
commit 497330b203d2c59c5ff3fa4c34d14494d7203bc3 upstream.
If late enabling of a supply regulator fails in
regulator_resolve_supply(), the code currently triggers a lockdep
warning:
WARNING: drivers/regulator/core.c:2649 at _regulator_put+0x80/0xa0, CPU#6: kworker/u32:4/596
...
Call trace:
_regulator_put+0x80/0xa0 (P)
regulator_resolve_supply+0x7cc/0xbe0
regulator_register_resolve_supply+0x28/0xb8
as the regulator_list_mutex must be held when calling _regulator_put().
To solve this, simply switch to using regulator_put().
While at it, we should also make sure that no concurrent access happens
to our rdev while we clear out the supply pointer. Add appropriate
locking to ensure that.
While the code in question will be removed altogether in a follow-up
commit, I believe it is still beneficial to have this corrected before
removal for future reference.
Fixes: 36a1f1b6ddc6 ("regulator: core: Fix memory leak in regulator_resolve_supply()")
Fixes: 8e5356a73604 ("regulator: core: Clear the supply pointer if enabling fails")
Signed-off-by: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260109-regulators-defer-v2-2-1a25dc968e60@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nazar Kalashnikov <nazarkalashnikov0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/regulator/core.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/regulator/core.c
+++ b/drivers/regulator/core.c
@@ -2176,8 +2176,16 @@ static int regulator_resolve_supply(stru
if (rdev->use_count) {
ret = regulator_enable(rdev->supply);
if (ret < 0) {
- _regulator_put(rdev->supply);
+ struct regulator *supply;
+
+ regulator_lock_two(rdev, rdev->supply->rdev, &ww_ctx);
+
+ supply = rdev->supply;
rdev->supply = NULL;
+
+ regulator_unlock_two(rdev, supply->rdev, &ww_ctx);
+
+ regulator_put(supply);
goto out;
}
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 030/175] dlm: prevent NPD when writing a positive value to event_done
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 029/175] regulator: core: fix locking in regulator_resolve_supply() error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 031/175] netfilter: nf_tables: always walk all pending catchall elements Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (153 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo,
David Teigland, Nazar Kalashnikov
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com>
commit 8e2bad543eca5c25cd02cbc63d72557934d45f13 upstream.
do_uevent returns the value written to event_done. In case it is a
positive value, new_lockspace would undo all the work, and lockspace
would not be set. __dlm_new_lockspace, however, would treat that
positive value as a success due to commit 8511a2728ab8 ("dlm: fix use
count with multiple joins").
Down the line, device_create_lockspace would pass that NULL lockspace to
dlm_find_lockspace_local, leading to a NULL pointer dereference.
Treating such positive values as successes prevents the problem. Given
this has been broken for so long, this is unlikely to break userspace
expectations.
Fixes: 8511a2728ab8 ("dlm: fix use count with multiple joins")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nazar Kalashnikov <nazarkalashnikov0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/dlm/lockspace.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/dlm/lockspace.c
+++ b/fs/dlm/lockspace.c
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ static int new_lockspace(const char *nam
lockspace to start running (via sysfs) in dlm_ls_start(). */
error = do_uevent(ls, 1);
- if (error)
+ if (error < 0)
goto out_recoverd;
/* wait until recovery is successful or failed */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 031/175] netfilter: nf_tables: always walk all pending catchall elements
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 030/175] dlm: prevent NPD when writing a positive value to event_done Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 032/175] mptcp: pm: fix extra_subflows underflow on userspace PM subflow creation Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (152 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Yiming Qian, Florian Westphal,
Shivani Agarwal
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
commit 7cb9a23d7ae40a702577d3d8bacb7026f04ac2a9 upstream.
During transaction processing we might have more than one catchall element:
1 live catchall element and 1 pending element that is coming as part of the
new batch.
If the map holding the catchall elements is also going away, its
required to toggle all catchall elements and not just the first viable
candidate.
Otherwise, we get:
WARNING: ./include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h:1281 at nft_data_release+0xb7/0xe0 [nf_tables], CPU#2: nft/1404
RIP: 0010:nft_data_release+0xb7/0xe0 [nf_tables]
[..]
__nft_set_elem_destroy+0x106/0x380 [nf_tables]
nf_tables_abort_release+0x348/0x8d0 [nf_tables]
nf_tables_abort+0xcf2/0x3ac0 [nf_tables]
nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x9c9/0x20e0 [..]
Fixes: 628bd3e49cba ("netfilter: nf_tables: drop map element references from preparation phase")
Reported-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
[ Shivani: Modified to apply on v6.6.y-v6.1.y ]
Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal <shivani.agarwal@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -652,7 +652,6 @@ static void nft_map_catchall_deactivate(
elem.priv = catchall->elem;
nft_set_elem_change_active(ctx->net, set, ext);
nft_setelem_data_deactivate(ctx->net, set, &elem);
- break;
}
}
@@ -5615,7 +5614,6 @@ static void nft_map_catchall_activate(co
nft_clear(ctx->net, ext);
elem.priv = catchall->elem;
nft_setelem_data_activate(ctx->net, set, &elem);
- break;
}
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 032/175] mptcp: pm: fix extra_subflows underflow on userspace PM subflow creation
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 031/175] netfilter: nf_tables: always walk all pending catchall elements Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 033/175] hv: utils: handle and propagate errors in kvp_register Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (151 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Tao Cui, Matthieu Baerts (NGI0),
Jakub Kicinski, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tao Cui <cuitao@kylinos.cn>
[ Upstream commit 14e9fea30b68fc75b2b3d97396a7e6adb544bd2a ]
The userspace PM increments extra_subflows after __mptcp_subflow_connect()
succeeds, but __mptcp_subflow_connect() calls mptcp_pm_close_subflow()
on failure to roll back the pre-increment done by the kernel PM's fill_*()
helpers. Because the userspace PM hasn't incremented yet at that point,
this decrement is spurious and causes extra_subflows to underflow.
Fix it by aligning the userspace PM with the kernel PM: increment
extra_subflows before calling __mptcp_subflow_connect(), so the existing
error path in subflow.c correctly rolls it back on failure. Also simplify
the error handling by taking pm.lock only when needed for cleanup.
Fixes: 77e4b94a3de6 ("mptcp: update userspace pm infos")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tao Cui <cuitao@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-7-1-rc7-v2-5-856831229976@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/mptcp/pm_userspace.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/net/mptcp/pm_userspace.c
+++ b/net/mptcp/pm_userspace.c
@@ -408,18 +408,21 @@ int mptcp_nl_cmd_sf_create(struct sk_buf
goto create_err;
}
+ spin_lock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
+ msk->pm.subflows++;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
+
lock_sock(sk);
err = __mptcp_subflow_connect(sk, &addr_l, &addr_r);
release_sock(sk);
- spin_lock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ spin_lock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
mptcp_userspace_pm_delete_local_addr(msk, &local);
- else
- msk->pm.subflows++;
- spin_unlock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
+ }
create_err:
sock_put((struct sock *)msk);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 033/175] hv: utils: handle and propagate errors in kvp_register
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 032/175] mptcp: pm: fix extra_subflows underflow on userspace PM subflow creation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 034/175] futex/requeue: Prevent NULL pointer dereference in remove_waiter() on self-deadlock Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (150 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Thorsten Blum, Long Li, Wei Liu,
Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
[ Upstream commit 3fcf923302a8f5c0dc3af3d2ca2657cb5fae4297 ]
Make kvp_register() return an error code instead of silently ignoring
failures, and propagate the error from kvp_handle_handshake() instead of
returning success.
This propagates both kzalloc_obj() and hvutil_transport_send() failures
to kvp_handle_handshake() and thus to kvp_on_msg().
Fixes: 245ba56a52a3 ("Staging: hv: Implement key/value pair (KVP)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hv/hv_kvp.c | 27 ++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hv/hv_kvp.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/hv_kvp.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static void kvp_send_key(struct work_str
static void kvp_respond_to_host(struct hv_kvp_msg *msg, int error);
static void kvp_timeout_func(struct work_struct *dummy);
static void kvp_host_handshake_func(struct work_struct *dummy);
-static void kvp_register(int);
+static int kvp_register(int);
static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(kvp_timeout_work, kvp_timeout_func);
static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(kvp_host_handshake_work, kvp_host_handshake_func);
@@ -127,24 +127,26 @@ static void kvp_register_done(void)
hv_poll_channel(kvp_transaction.recv_channel, kvp_poll_wrapper);
}
-static void
+static int
kvp_register(int reg_value)
{
struct hv_kvp_msg *kvp_msg;
char *version;
+ int ret;
kvp_msg = kzalloc(sizeof(*kvp_msg), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!kvp_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- if (kvp_msg) {
- version = kvp_msg->body.kvp_register.version;
- kvp_msg->kvp_hdr.operation = reg_value;
- strcpy(version, HV_DRV_VERSION);
-
- hvutil_transport_send(hvt, kvp_msg, sizeof(*kvp_msg),
- kvp_register_done);
- kfree(kvp_msg);
- }
+ version = kvp_msg->body.kvp_register.version;
+ kvp_msg->kvp_hdr.operation = reg_value;
+ strcpy(version, HV_DRV_VERSION);
+
+ ret = hvutil_transport_send(hvt, kvp_msg, sizeof(*kvp_msg),
+ kvp_register_done);
+ kfree(kvp_msg);
+ return ret;
}
static void kvp_timeout_func(struct work_struct *dummy)
@@ -186,9 +188,8 @@ static int kvp_handle_handshake(struct h
*/
pr_debug("KVP: userspace daemon ver. %d connected\n",
msg->kvp_hdr.operation);
- kvp_register(dm_reg_value);
- return 0;
+ return kvp_register(dm_reg_value);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 034/175] futex/requeue: Prevent NULL pointer dereference in remove_waiter() on self-deadlock
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 033/175] hv: utils: handle and propagate errors in kvp_register Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 035/175] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Improve the logic of reserving fb_mmio on Gen2 VMs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (149 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jian Zhou, Thomas Gleixner,
Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ji'an Zhou <eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 74e144274af39935b0f410c0ee4d2b91c3730414 ]
When FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI requeues a non-top waiter that already owns the
target PI futex, task_blocks_on_rt_mutex() returns -EDEADLK before setting
waiter->task.
The subsequent remove_waiter() in rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() dereferences
the NULL waiter->task, causing a kernel crash.
Add a self-deadlock check for non-top waiters before calling
rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(), analogous to the top-waiter check in
futex_lock_pi_atomic().
Fixes: 3bfdc63936dd4773109b7b8c280c0f3b5ae7d349 ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()")
Signed-off-by: Ji'an Zhou <eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/futex/requeue.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/kernel/futex/requeue.c
+++ b/kernel/futex/requeue.c
@@ -629,6 +629,12 @@ retry_private:
continue;
}
+ /* Self-deadlock: non-top waiter already owns the PI futex. */
+ if (rt_mutex_owner(&pi_state->pi_mutex) == this->task) {
+ ret = -EDEADLK;
+ break;
+ }
+
ret = rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(&pi_state->pi_mutex,
this->rt_waiter,
this->task);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 035/175] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Improve the logic of reserving fb_mmio on Gen2 VMs
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 034/175] futex/requeue: Prevent NULL pointer dereference in remove_waiter() on self-deadlock Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 036/175] locking/rtmutex: Skip remove_waiter() when waiter is not enqueued Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (148 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Michael Kelley, Krister Johansen,
Matthew Ruffell, Dexuan Cui, Wei Liu, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
[ Upstream commit 016a25e4b0df4d77e7c258edee4aaf982e4ee809 ]
If vmbus_reserve_fb() in the kdump/kexec kernel fails to properly reserve
the framebuffer MMIO range (which is below 4GB) due to a Gen2 VM's
screen.lfb_base being zero [1], there is an MMIO conflict between the
drivers hyperv-drm and pci-hyperv: when the driver pci-hyperv's
hv_allocate_config_window() calls vmbus_allocate_mmio() to get an
MMIO range, typically it gets a 32-bit MMIO range that overlaps with the
framebuffer MMIO range, and later hv_pci_enter_d0() fails with an
error message "PCI Pass-through VSP failed D0 Entry with status" since
the host thinks that PCI devices must not use MMIO space that the
host has assigned to the framebuffer.
This is especially an issue if pci-hyperv is built-in and hyperv-drm is
built as a module. Consequently, the kdump/kexec kernel fails to detect
PCI devices via pci-hyperv, and may fail to mount the root file system,
which may reside in a NVMe disk. The issue described here has existed
for SR-IOV VF NICs since day one of the pci-hyperv driver, and has been
worked around on x64 when possible. With the recent introduction of
ARM64 VMs that boot from NVMe, there is no workaround, so we need a
formal fix.
On Gen2 VMs, if the screen.lfb_base is 0 in the kdump/kexec kernel [1],
fall back to the low MMIO base, which should be equal to the framebuffer
MMIO base [2] (the statement is true according to my testing on x64
Windows Server 2016, and on x64 and ARM64 Windows Server 2025 and on
Azure. I checked with the Hyper-V team and they said the statement should
continue to be true for Gen2 VMs). In the first kernel, screen.lfb_base
is not 0; if the user specifies a very high resolution, it's not enough
to only reserve 8MB: let's always reserve half of the space below 4GB,
but cap the reservation to 128MB, which is the required framebuffer size
of the highest resolution 7680*4320 supported by Hyper-V.
While at it, fix the comparison "end > VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS" by changing
the > to >=. Here the 'end' is an inclusive end (typically, it's
0xFFFF_FFFF for the low MMIO range).
Note: vmbus_reserve_fb() now also reserves an MMIO range at the beginning
of the low MMIO range on CVMs, which have no framebuffers (the
'screen.lfb_base' in vmbus_reserve_fb() is 0 for CVMs), just in case the
host might treat the beginning of the low MMIO range specially [3]. BTW,
the OpenHCL kernel is not affected by the change, because that kernel
boots with DeviceTree rather than ACPI (so vmbus_reserve_fb() won't run
there), and there is no framebuffer device for that kernel.
Note: normally Gen1 VMs don't have the MMIO conflict issue because the
framebuffer MMIO range (which is hardcoded to base=4GB-128MB and
size=64MB for Gen1 VMs by the host) is always reported via the legacy PCI
graphics device's BAR, so the kdump/kexec kernel can reserve the 64MB
MMIO range; however, if the VM is configured to use a very high resolution
and the required framebuffer size exceeds 64MB (AFAIK, in practice, this
isn't a typical configuration by users), the hyperv-drm driver may need to
allocate an MMIO range above 4GB and change the framebuffer MMIO location
to the allocated MMIO range -- in this case, there can still be issues [4]
which can't be easily fixed: any possible affected Gen1 users would have
to use a resolution whose framebuffer size is <= 64MB, or switch to Gen2
VMs.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/SA1PR21MB692176C1BC53BFC9EAE5CF8EBF51A@SA1PR21MB6921.namprd21.prod.outlook.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/SA1PR21MB69218F955B62DFF62E3E88D2BF222@SA1PR21MB6921.namprd21.prod.outlook.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/SN6PR02MB415726B17D5A6027CD1717E8D4342@SN6PR02MB4157.namprd02.prod.outlook.com/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/all/SA1PR21MB69213486F821CA5A2C793C81BF342@SA1PR21MB6921.namprd21.prod.outlook.com/
Fixes: 4daace0d8ce8 ("PCI: hv: Add paravirtual PCI front-end for Microsoft Hyper-V VMs")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Tested-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
Tested-by: Matthew Ruffell <matthew.ruffell@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
[ changed `sysfb_primary_display.screen.lfb_base/lfb_size` reads to the global `screen_info.lfb_base/lfb_size` and dropped the `if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SYSFB))` wrapper, de-indenting the block. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
@@ -2029,8 +2029,8 @@ static acpi_status vmbus_walk_resources(
return AE_NO_MEMORY;
/* If this range overlaps the virtual TPM, truncate it. */
- if (end > VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS && start < VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS)
- end = VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS;
+ if (end >= VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS && start < VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS)
+ end = VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS - 1;
new_res->name = "hyperv mmio";
new_res->flags = IORESOURCE_MEM;
@@ -2097,12 +2097,31 @@ static void vmbus_mmio_remove(void)
static void __maybe_unused vmbus_reserve_fb(void)
{
resource_size_t start = 0, size;
+ resource_size_t low_mmio_base;
struct pci_dev *pdev;
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
/* Gen2 VM: get FB base from EFI framebuffer */
start = screen_info.lfb_base;
size = max_t(__u32, screen_info.lfb_size, 0x800000);
+
+ low_mmio_base = hyperv_mmio->start;
+ if (!low_mmio_base || upper_32_bits(low_mmio_base) ||
+ (start && start < low_mmio_base)) {
+ pr_warn("Unexpected low mmio base %pa\n", &low_mmio_base);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If the kdump/kexec or CVM kernel's lfb_base
+ * is 0, fall back to the low mmio base.
+ */
+ if (!start)
+ start = low_mmio_base;
+ /*
+ * Reserve half of the space below 4GB for high
+ * resolutions, but cap the reservation to 128MB.
+ */
+ size = min((SZ_4G - start) / 2, SZ_128M);
+ }
} else {
/* Gen1 VM: get FB base from PCI */
pdev = pci_get_device(PCI_VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT,
@@ -2122,8 +2141,10 @@ static void __maybe_unused vmbus_reserve
pci_dev_put(pdev);
}
- if (!start)
+ if (!start) {
+ pr_warn("Unexpected framebuffer mmio base of zero\n");
return;
+ }
/*
* Make a claim for the frame buffer in the resource tree under the
@@ -2133,6 +2154,8 @@ static void __maybe_unused vmbus_reserve
*/
for (; !fb_mmio && (size >= 0x100000); size >>= 1)
fb_mmio = __request_region(hyperv_mmio, start, size, fb_mmio_name, 0);
+
+ pr_info("hv_mmio=%pR,%pR fb=%pR\n", hyperv_mmio, hyperv_mmio->sibling, fb_mmio);
}
/**
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 036/175] locking/rtmutex: Skip remove_waiter() when waiter is not enqueued
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 035/175] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Improve the logic of reserving fb_mmio on Gen2 VMs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 037/175] phonet: Pass ifindex to fill_addr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (147 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzbot+78147abe6c524f183ee9,
Davidlohr Bueso, Thomas Gleixner, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
[ Upstream commit 40a25d59e85b3c8709ac2424d44f65610467871e ]
syzbot triggered the following splat in remove_waiter() via
FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000a88-0x0000000000000a8f]
class_raw_spinlock_constructor
remove_waiter+0x159/0x1200 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1561
rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock+0x103/0x120
futex_requeue+0x10e4/0x20d0
__x64_sys_futex+0x34f/0x4d0
task_blocks_on_rt_mutex() does not arm the waiter upon deadlock detection,
leaving waiter->task nil, where 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead
of current in remove_waiter()") made this fatal.
Furthermore, rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() should not be calling into remove_waiter()
upon a successfully grabbing the rtmutex. 1a1fb985f2e2 ("futex: Handle early deadlock
return correctly"), moved the remove_waiter() out of __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
(where 'ret' was only ever 0 or < 0) into the wrapper. Tighten this check to
account for try_to_take_rt_mutex().
Fixes: 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()")
Reported-by: syzbot+78147abe6c524f183ee9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/69f114ac.050a0220.ac8b.0003.GAE@google.com/
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260507112913.1019537-1-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/locking/rtmutex.c | 3 +++
kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
@@ -1524,6 +1524,9 @@ static void __sched remove_waiter(struct
lockdep_assert_held(&lock->wait_lock);
+ if (!waiter_task) /* never enqueued */
+ return;
+
scoped_guard(raw_spinlock, &waiter_task->pi_lock) {
rt_mutex_dequeue(lock, waiter);
waiter_task->pi_blocked_on = NULL;
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ int __sched rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(st
raw_spin_lock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
ret = __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(lock, waiter, task);
- if (unlikely(ret))
+ if (unlikely(ret < 0))
remove_waiter(lock, waiter);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 037/175] phonet: Pass ifindex to fill_addr().
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (35 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 036/175] locking/rtmutex: Skip remove_waiter() when waiter is not enqueued Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 038/175] phonet: Pass net and ifindex to phonet_address_notify() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (146 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Kuniyuki Iwashima, Eric Dumazet,
Paolo Abeni, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
[ Upstream commit 08a9572be36819b5d9011604edfa5db6c5062a7a ]
We will convert addr_doit() and getaddr_dumpit() to RCU, both
of which call fill_addr().
The former will call phonet_address_notify() outside of RCU
due to GFP_KERNEL, so dev will not be available in fill_addr().
Let's pass ifindex directly to fill_addr().
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Stable-dep-of: 71de0177b28d ("net: phonet: free phonet_device after RCU grace period")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/phonet/pn_netlink.c | 13 +++++++------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
+++ b/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
/* Device address handling */
-static int fill_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, u8 addr,
+static int fill_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ifindex, u8 addr,
u32 portid, u32 seq, int event);
void phonet_address_notify(int event, struct net_device *dev, u8 addr)
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ void phonet_address_notify(int event, st
nla_total_size(1), GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL)
goto errout;
- err = fill_addr(skb, dev, addr, 0, 0, event);
+
+ err = fill_addr(skb, dev->ifindex, addr, 0, 0, event);
if (err < 0) {
WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE);
kfree_skb(skb);
@@ -92,8 +93,8 @@ static int addr_doit(struct sk_buff *skb
return err;
}
-static int fill_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, u8 addr,
- u32 portid, u32 seq, int event)
+static int fill_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ifindex, u8 addr,
+ u32 portid, u32 seq, int event)
{
struct ifaddrmsg *ifm;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ static int fill_addr(struct sk_buff *skb
ifm->ifa_prefixlen = 0;
ifm->ifa_flags = IFA_F_PERMANENT;
ifm->ifa_scope = RT_SCOPE_LINK;
- ifm->ifa_index = dev->ifindex;
+ ifm->ifa_index = ifindex;
if (nla_put_u8(skb, IFA_LOCAL, addr))
goto nla_put_failure;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
@@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ static int getaddr_dumpit(struct sk_buff
if (addr_idx++ < addr_start_idx)
continue;
- if (fill_addr(skb, pnd->netdev, addr << 2,
+ if (fill_addr(skb, pnd->netdev->ifindex, addr << 2,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, RTM_NEWADDR) < 0)
goto out;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 038/175] phonet: Pass net and ifindex to phonet_address_notify().
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 037/175] phonet: Pass ifindex to fill_addr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 039/175] net: phonet: free phonet_device after RCU grace period Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (145 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Kuniyuki Iwashima, Eric Dumazet,
Paolo Abeni, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
[ Upstream commit 68ed5c38b512b734caf3da1f87db4a99fcfe3002 ]
Currently, phonet_address_notify() fetches netns and ifindex from dev.
Once addr_doit() is converted to RCU, phonet_address_notify() will be
called outside of RCU due to GFP_KERNEL, and dev will be unavailable
there.
Let's pass net and ifindex to phonet_address_notify().
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Stable-dep-of: 71de0177b28d ("net: phonet: free phonet_device after RCU grace period")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/net/phonet/pn_dev.h | 2 +-
net/phonet/pn_dev.c | 10 +++++++---
net/phonet/pn_netlink.c | 12 ++++++------
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/include/net/phonet/pn_dev.h
+++ b/include/net/phonet/pn_dev.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int phonet_address_add(struct net_device
int phonet_address_del(struct net_device *dev, u8 addr);
u8 phonet_address_get(struct net_device *dev, u8 addr);
int phonet_address_lookup(struct net *net, u8 addr);
-void phonet_address_notify(int event, struct net_device *dev, u8 addr);
+void phonet_address_notify(struct net *net, int event, u32 ifindex, u8 addr);
int phonet_route_add(struct net_device *dev, u8 daddr);
int phonet_route_del(struct net_device *dev, u8 daddr);
--- a/net/phonet/pn_dev.c
+++ b/net/phonet/pn_dev.c
@@ -98,10 +98,13 @@ static void phonet_device_destroy(struct
mutex_unlock(&pndevs->lock);
if (pnd) {
+ struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
+ u32 ifindex = dev->ifindex;
u8 addr;
for_each_set_bit(addr, pnd->addrs, 64)
- phonet_address_notify(RTM_DELADDR, dev, addr);
+ phonet_address_notify(net, RTM_DELADDR, ifindex, addr);
+
kfree(pnd);
}
}
@@ -244,8 +247,9 @@ static int phonet_device_autoconf(struct
ret = phonet_address_add(dev, req.ifr_phonet_autoconf.device);
if (ret)
return ret;
- phonet_address_notify(RTM_NEWADDR, dev,
- req.ifr_phonet_autoconf.device);
+
+ phonet_address_notify(dev_net(dev), RTM_NEWADDR, dev->ifindex,
+ req.ifr_phonet_autoconf.device);
return 0;
}
--- a/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
+++ b/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
static int fill_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ifindex, u8 addr,
u32 portid, u32 seq, int event);
-void phonet_address_notify(int event, struct net_device *dev, u8 addr)
+void phonet_address_notify(struct net *net, int event, u32 ifindex, u8 addr)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = -ENOBUFS;
@@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ void phonet_address_notify(int event, st
if (skb == NULL)
goto errout;
- err = fill_addr(skb, dev->ifindex, addr, 0, 0, event);
+ err = fill_addr(skb, ifindex, addr, 0, 0, event);
if (err < 0) {
WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE);
kfree_skb(skb);
goto errout;
}
- rtnl_notify(skb, dev_net(dev), 0,
- RTNLGRP_PHONET_IFADDR, NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ rtnl_notify(skb, net, 0, RTNLGRP_PHONET_IFADDR, NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
return;
errout:
- rtnl_set_sk_err(dev_net(dev), RTNLGRP_PHONET_IFADDR, err);
+ rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_PHONET_IFADDR, err);
}
static const struct nla_policy ifa_phonet_policy[IFA_MAX+1] = {
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static int addr_doit(struct sk_buff *skb
else
err = phonet_address_del(dev, pnaddr);
if (!err)
- phonet_address_notify(nlh->nlmsg_type, dev, pnaddr);
+ phonet_address_notify(net, nlh->nlmsg_type, ifm->ifa_index, pnaddr);
return err;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 039/175] net: phonet: free phonet_device after RCU grace period
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:18 ` [PATCH 6.6 038/175] phonet: Pass net and ifindex to phonet_address_notify() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 040/175] rxrpc: Fix the ACK parser to extract the SACK table for parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (144 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Santosh Kalluri,
Rémi Denis-Courmont, Simon Horman, Jakub Kicinski,
Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Santosh Kalluri <santosh.kalluri129@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 71de0177b28da751f407581a4515cf4d762f6296 ]
phonet_device_destroy() removes a phonet_device from the per-net device
list with list_del_rcu(), but frees it immediately. RCU readers walking
the same list can still hold a pointer to the object after it has been
removed, leading to a slab-use-after-free.
Use kfree_rcu(), matching the lifetime rule already used by
phonet_address_del() for the same object type.
Fixes: eeb74a9d45f7 ("Phonet: convert devices list to RCU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Santosh Kalluri <santosh.kalluri129@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont <remi@remlab.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/phonet/pn_dev.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/phonet/pn_dev.c
+++ b/net/phonet/pn_dev.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static void phonet_device_destroy(struct
for_each_set_bit(addr, pnd->addrs, 64)
phonet_address_notify(net, RTM_DELADDR, ifindex, addr);
- kfree(pnd);
+ kfree_rcu(pnd, rcu);
}
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 040/175] rxrpc: Fix the ACK parser to extract the SACK table for parsing
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 039/175] net: phonet: free phonet_device after RCU grace period Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 041/175] slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Fix up platform_driver registration Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (143 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Michael Bommarito, David Howells,
Marc Dionne, Jeffrey Altman, Eric Dumazet, David S. Miller,
Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman, linux-afs, netdev,
stable, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 333b6d5bb9f87827ac2639c737bf9613dbae7253 ]
Fix modification of the received skbuff in rxrpc_input_soft_acks() and a
potential incorrect access of the buffer in a fragmented UDP packet (the
packet would probably have to be deliberately pre-generated as fragmented)
when AF_RXRPC tries to extract the contents of the SACK table by copying
out the contents of the SACK table into a buffer before attempting to parse
AF_RXRPC assumes that it can just call skb_condense() and then validly
access the SACK table from skb->data and that it will be a flat buffer -
but skb_condense() can silently fail to do anything under some
circumstances.
Note that whilst rxrpc_input_soft_acks() should be able to parse extended
ACKs, the rest of AF_RXRPC doesn't currently support that.
Further, there's then no need to call skb_condense() in rxrpc_input_ack(),
so don't.
Fixes: d57a3a151660 ("rxrpc: Save last ACK's SACK table rather than marking txbufs")
Reported-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513180907.2061972-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/105362.1780573560@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/rxrpc/input.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/rxrpc/input.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/input.c
@@ -781,7 +781,18 @@ static void rxrpc_input_soft_acks(struct
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
unsigned int i, old_nacks = 0;
rxrpc_seq_t lowest_nak = seq + sp->nr_acks;
- u8 *acks = skb->data + sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header) + sizeof(struct rxrpc_ackpacket);
+ u8 sack[256] __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long));
+ u8 *acks = sack;
+
+ /* Extract the SACK table into a flat buffer rather than accessing it
+ * directly through skb->data, which is not guaranteed to be linear for
+ * a fragmented packet (skb_condense() can silently fail to linearise
+ * it).
+ */
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb,
+ sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header) + sizeof(struct rxrpc_ackpacket),
+ sack, umin(sp->nr_acks, sizeof(sack))) < 0)
+ return;
for (i = 0; i < sp->nr_acks; i++) {
if (acks[i] == RXRPC_ACK_TYPE_ACK) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 041/175] slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Fix up platform_driver registration
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 040/175] rxrpc: Fix the ACK parser to extract the SACK table for parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 042/175] slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Balance pm_runtime enablement for NGD Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (142 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Dmitry Baryshkov, Mukesh Ojha,
Bjorn Andersson, Srinivas Kandagatla, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@oss.qualcomm.com>
[ Upstream commit 8663e8334d7b6007f5d8a4e5dd270246f35107a6 ]
Device drivers should not invoke platform_driver_register()/unregister()
in their probe and remove paths. They should further not rely on
platform_driver_unregister() as their only means of "deleting" their
child devices.
Introduce a helper to unregister the child device and move the
platform_driver_register()/unregister() to module_init()/exit().
Fixes: 917809e2280b ("slimbus: ngd: Add qcom SLIMBus NGD driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srini@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260530204421.116824-3-srini@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c
@@ -1561,6 +1561,13 @@ static int of_qcom_slim_ngd_register(str
return -ENODEV;
}
+static void qcom_slim_ngd_unregister(struct qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl *ctrl)
+{
+ struct qcom_slim_ngd *ngd = ctrl->ngd;
+
+ platform_device_del(ngd->pdev);
+}
+
static int qcom_slim_ngd_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
@@ -1663,7 +1670,6 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_probe(stru
goto err_pdr_lookup;
}
- platform_driver_register(&qcom_slim_ngd_driver);
return of_qcom_slim_ngd_register(dev, ctrl);
err_pdr_alloc:
@@ -1677,7 +1683,9 @@ err_pdr_lookup:
static int qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
- platform_driver_unregister(&qcom_slim_ngd_driver);
+ struct qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl *ctrl = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
+
+ qcom_slim_ngd_unregister(ctrl);
return 0;
}
@@ -1756,6 +1764,28 @@ static struct platform_driver qcom_slim_
},
};
-module_platform_driver(qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_driver);
+static int qcom_slim_ngd_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = platform_driver_register(&qcom_slim_ngd_driver);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = platform_driver_register(&qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_driver);
+ if (ret)
+ platform_driver_unregister(&qcom_slim_ngd_driver);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void qcom_slim_ngd_exit(void)
+{
+ platform_driver_unregister(&qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_driver);
+ platform_driver_unregister(&qcom_slim_ngd_driver);
+}
+
+module_init(qcom_slim_ngd_init);
+module_exit(qcom_slim_ngd_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Qualcomm SLIMBus NGD controller");
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 042/175] slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Balance pm_runtime enablement for NGD
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 041/175] slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Fix up platform_driver registration Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 043/175] fuse: re-lock request before replacing page cache folio Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (141 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Bjorn Andersson, Srinivas Kandagatla,
Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@oss.qualcomm.com>
[ Upstream commit 6a003446b725c44b9e3ffa111b0effbaa2d43085 ]
The pm_runtime_enable() and pm_runtime_use_autosuspend() calls are
supposed to be balanced on exit, add these calls.
Fixes: 917809e2280b ("slimbus: ngd: Add qcom SLIMBus NGD driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srini@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260530204421.116824-8-srini@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c
@@ -1585,6 +1585,8 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_probe(struct pl
ret = qcom_slim_ngd_qmi_svc_event_init(ctrl);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "QMI service registration failed:%d", ret);
+ pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend(dev);
+ pm_runtime_disable(dev);
return ret;
}
@@ -1694,6 +1696,7 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_remove(struct p
{
struct qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl *ctrl = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
+ pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend(&pdev->dev);
pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);
pdr_handle_release(ctrl->pdr);
qcom_unregister_ssr_notifier(ctrl->notifier, &ctrl->nb);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 043/175] fuse: re-lock request before replacing page cache folio
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 042/175] slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Balance pm_runtime enablement for NGD Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 044/175] scripts/sorttable: Remove unused macro defines Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (140 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Lei Lu, Joanne Koong, Miklos Szeredi,
Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit a078484921052d0badd827fcc2770b5cfc1d4120 ]
fuse_try_move_folio() unlocks the request on entry but does not
re-lock it on the success path. This means fuse_chan_abort() can end the
request and free the fuse_io_args (eg fuse_readpages_end()) while the
subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_try_move_folio() accesses the
fuse_io_args, leading to use-after-free issues.
Fix this by calling lock_request() before replace_page_cache_folio().
This ensures the request is locked on the success path which will
prevent the fuse_io_args from being freed while the later copying logic
runs, and also ensures that the ap->folios[i]->mapping is never null
since ap->folios[i] will always point to the newfolio after
replace_page_cache_folio().
Fixes: ce534fb05292 ("fuse: allow splice to move pages")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Lei Lu <llfamsec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/fuse/dev.c | 19 +++++--------------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/fuse/dev.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c
@@ -843,6 +843,10 @@ static int fuse_try_move_page(struct fus
if (WARN_ON(folio_test_mlocked(oldfolio)))
goto out_fallback_unlock;
+ err = lock_request(cs->req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_fallback_unlock;
+
replace_page_cache_folio(oldfolio, newfolio);
folio_get(newfolio);
@@ -856,20 +860,7 @@ static int fuse_try_move_page(struct fus
*/
pipe_buf_release(cs->pipe, buf);
- err = 0;
- spin_lock(&cs->req->waitq.lock);
- if (test_bit(FR_ABORTED, &cs->req->flags))
- err = -ENOENT;
- else
- *pagep = &newfolio->page;
- spin_unlock(&cs->req->waitq.lock);
-
- if (err) {
- folio_unlock(newfolio);
- folio_put(newfolio);
- goto out_put_old;
- }
-
+ *pagep = &newfolio->page;
folio_unlock(oldfolio);
/* Drop ref for ap->pages[] array */
folio_put(oldfolio);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 044/175] scripts/sorttable: Remove unused macro defines
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 043/175] fuse: re-lock request before replacing page cache folio Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 045/175] scripts/sorttable: Remove unused write functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (139 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 28b24394c6e9a3166fcb4480cba054562526657c ]
The code of sorttable.h was copied from the recordmcount.h which defined
a bunch of Elf MACROs so that they could be used between 32bit and 64bit
functions. But there's several MACROs that sorttable.h does not use but
was copied over. Remove them to clean up the code.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250105162344.128870118@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.h | 27 ---------------------------
1 file changed, 27 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.h
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.h
@@ -27,19 +27,10 @@
#undef Elf_Ehdr
#undef Elf_Shdr
#undef Elf_Rel
-#undef Elf_Rela
#undef Elf_Sym
-#undef ELF_R_SYM
-#undef Elf_r_sym
-#undef ELF_R_INFO
-#undef Elf_r_info
-#undef ELF_ST_BIND
#undef ELF_ST_TYPE
-#undef fn_ELF_R_SYM
-#undef fn_ELF_R_INFO
#undef uint_t
#undef _r
-#undef _w
#ifdef SORTTABLE_64
# define extable_ent_size 16
@@ -52,19 +43,10 @@
# define Elf_Ehdr Elf64_Ehdr
# define Elf_Shdr Elf64_Shdr
# define Elf_Rel Elf64_Rel
-# define Elf_Rela Elf64_Rela
# define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym
-# define ELF_R_SYM ELF64_R_SYM
-# define Elf_r_sym Elf64_r_sym
-# define ELF_R_INFO ELF64_R_INFO
-# define Elf_r_info Elf64_r_info
-# define ELF_ST_BIND ELF64_ST_BIND
# define ELF_ST_TYPE ELF64_ST_TYPE
-# define fn_ELF_R_SYM fn_ELF64_R_SYM
-# define fn_ELF_R_INFO fn_ELF64_R_INFO
# define uint_t uint64_t
# define _r r8
-# define _w w8
#else
# define extable_ent_size 8
# define compare_extable compare_extable_32
@@ -76,19 +58,10 @@
# define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr
# define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr
# define Elf_Rel Elf32_Rel
-# define Elf_Rela Elf32_Rela
# define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym
-# define ELF_R_SYM ELF32_R_SYM
-# define Elf_r_sym Elf32_r_sym
-# define ELF_R_INFO ELF32_R_INFO
-# define Elf_r_info Elf32_r_info
-# define ELF_ST_BIND ELF32_ST_BIND
# define ELF_ST_TYPE ELF32_ST_TYPE
-# define fn_ELF_R_SYM fn_ELF32_R_SYM
-# define fn_ELF_R_INFO fn_ELF32_R_INFO
# define uint_t uint32_t
# define _r r
-# define _w w
#endif
#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 045/175] scripts/sorttable: Remove unused write functions
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 044/175] scripts/sorttable: Remove unused macro defines Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 046/175] scripts/sorttable: Remove unneeded Elf_Rel Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (138 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 4f48a28b37d594dab38092514a42ae9f4b781553 ]
The code of sorttable.h was copied from the recordmcount.h which defined
various write functions for different sizes (2, 4, 8 byte lengths). But
sorttable only uses the 4 byte writes. Remove the extra versions as they
are not used.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250105162344.314385504@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 26 --------------------------
1 file changed, 26 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static uint32_t (*r)(const uint32_t *);
static uint16_t (*r2)(const uint16_t *);
static uint64_t (*r8)(const uint64_t *);
static void (*w)(uint32_t, uint32_t *);
-static void (*w2)(uint16_t, uint16_t *);
-static void (*w8)(uint64_t, uint64_t *);
typedef void (*table_sort_t)(char *, int);
/*
@@ -146,31 +144,11 @@ static void wbe(uint32_t val, uint32_t *
put_unaligned_be32(val, x);
}
-static void w2be(uint16_t val, uint16_t *x)
-{
- put_unaligned_be16(val, x);
-}
-
-static void w8be(uint64_t val, uint64_t *x)
-{
- put_unaligned_be64(val, x);
-}
-
static void wle(uint32_t val, uint32_t *x)
{
put_unaligned_le32(val, x);
}
-static void w2le(uint16_t val, uint16_t *x)
-{
- put_unaligned_le16(val, x);
-}
-
-static void w8le(uint64_t val, uint64_t *x)
-{
- put_unaligned_le64(val, x);
-}
-
/*
* Move reserved section indices SHN_LORESERVE..SHN_HIRESERVE out of
* the way to -256..-1, to avoid conflicting with real section
@@ -277,16 +255,12 @@ static int do_file(char const *const fna
r2 = r2le;
r8 = r8le;
w = wle;
- w2 = w2le;
- w8 = w8le;
break;
case ELFDATA2MSB:
r = rbe;
r2 = r2be;
r8 = r8be;
w = wbe;
- w2 = w2be;
- w8 = w8be;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "unrecognized ELF data encoding %d: %s\n",
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 046/175] scripts/sorttable: Remove unneeded Elf_Rel
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 045/175] scripts/sorttable: Remove unused write functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 047/175] scripts/sorttable: Have the ORC code use the _r() functions to read Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (137 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 6f2c2f93a190467cebd6ebd03feb49514fead5ca ]
The code had references to initialize the Elf_Rel relocation tables, but
it was never used. Remove it.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250105162344.515342233@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.h | 23 ++---------------------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.h
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.h
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
#undef Elf_Addr
#undef Elf_Ehdr
#undef Elf_Shdr
-#undef Elf_Rel
#undef Elf_Sym
#undef ELF_ST_TYPE
#undef uint_t
@@ -42,7 +41,6 @@
# define Elf_Addr Elf64_Addr
# define Elf_Ehdr Elf64_Ehdr
# define Elf_Shdr Elf64_Shdr
-# define Elf_Rel Elf64_Rel
# define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym
# define ELF_ST_TYPE ELF64_ST_TYPE
# define uint_t uint64_t
@@ -57,7 +55,6 @@
# define Elf_Addr Elf32_Addr
# define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr
# define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr
-# define Elf_Rel Elf32_Rel
# define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym
# define ELF_ST_TYPE ELF32_ST_TYPE
# define uint_t uint32_t
@@ -248,14 +245,10 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
Elf32_Word *symtab_shndx = NULL;
Elf_Sym *sort_needed_sym = NULL;
Elf_Shdr *sort_needed_sec;
- Elf_Rel *relocs = NULL;
- int relocs_size = 0;
uint32_t *sort_needed_loc;
const char *secstrings;
const char *strtab;
char *extab_image;
- int extab_index = 0;
- int i;
int idx;
unsigned int shnum;
unsigned int shstrndx;
@@ -279,23 +272,15 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
if (shnum == SHN_UNDEF)
shnum = _r(&shdr[0].sh_size);
- for (i = 0, s = shdr; s < shdr + shnum; i++, s++) {
+ for (s = shdr; s < shdr + shnum; s++) {
idx = r(&s->sh_name);
- if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, "__ex_table")) {
+ if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, "__ex_table"))
extab_sec = s;
- extab_index = i;
- }
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".symtab"))
symtab_sec = s;
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".strtab"))
strtab_sec = s;
- if ((r(&s->sh_type) == SHT_REL ||
- r(&s->sh_type) == SHT_RELA) &&
- r(&s->sh_info) == extab_index) {
- relocs = (void *)ehdr + _r(&s->sh_offset);
- relocs_size = _r(&s->sh_size);
- }
if (r(&s->sh_type) == SHT_SYMTAB_SHNDX)
symtab_shndx = (Elf32_Word *)((const char *)ehdr +
_r(&s->sh_offset));
@@ -397,10 +382,6 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
extable_ent_size, compare_extable);
}
- /* If there were relocations, we no longer need them. */
- if (relocs)
- memset(relocs, 0, relocs_size);
-
/* find the flag main_extable_sort_needed */
for (sym = (void *)ehdr + _r(&symtab_sec->sh_offset);
sym < sym + _r(&symtab_sec->sh_size) / sizeof(Elf_Sym);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 047/175] scripts/sorttable: Have the ORC code use the _r() functions to read
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (45 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 046/175] scripts/sorttable: Remove unneeded Elf_Rel Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 048/175] scripts/sorttable: Make compare_extable() into two functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (136 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 66990c003306c240d570b3ba274ec4f68cf18c91 ]
The ORC code reads the section information directly from the file. This
currently works because the default read function is for 64bit little
endian machines. But if for some reason that ever changes, this will
break. Instead of having a surprise breakage, use the _r() functions that
will read the values from the file properly.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250105162344.721480386@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.h | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.h
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.h
@@ -299,14 +299,14 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
/* locate the ORC unwind tables */
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".orc_unwind_ip")) {
- orc_ip_size = s->sh_size;
+ orc_ip_size = _r(&s->sh_size);
g_orc_ip_table = (int *)((void *)ehdr +
- s->sh_offset);
+ _r(&s->sh_offset));
}
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".orc_unwind")) {
- orc_size = s->sh_size;
+ orc_size = _r(&s->sh_size);
g_orc_table = (struct orc_entry *)((void *)ehdr +
- s->sh_offset);
+ _r(&s->sh_offset));
}
#endif
} /* for loop */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 048/175] scripts/sorttable: Make compare_extable() into two functions
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (46 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 047/175] scripts/sorttable: Have the ORC code use the _r() functions to read Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 049/175] scripts/sorttable: Convert Elf_Ehdr to union Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (135 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 7ffc0d0819f438779ed592e2e2e3576f43ce14f0 ]
Instead of having the compare_extable() part of the sorttable.h header
where it get's defined twice, since it is a very simple function, just
define it twice in sorttable.c, and then it can use the proper read
functions for the word size and endianess and the Elf_Addr macro can be
removed from sorttable.h.
Also add a micro optimization. Instead of:
if (a < b)
return -1;
if (a > b)
return 1;
return 0;
That can be shorten to:
if (a < b)
return -1;
return a > b;
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250105162344.945299671@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
scripts/sorttable.h | 14 --------------
2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -173,6 +173,26 @@ static inline unsigned int get_secindex(
return r(&symtab_shndx_start[sym_offs]);
}
+static int compare_extable_32(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ Elf32_Addr av = r(a);
+ Elf32_Addr bv = r(b);
+
+ if (av < bv)
+ return -1;
+ return av > bv;
+}
+
+static int compare_extable_64(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ Elf64_Addr av = r8(a);
+ Elf64_Addr bv = r8(b);
+
+ if (av < bv)
+ return -1;
+ return av > bv;
+}
+
/* 32 bit and 64 bit are very similar */
#include "sorttable.h"
#define SORTTABLE_64
--- a/scripts/sorttable.h
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.h
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
#undef sort_mcount_loc
#undef elf_mcount_loc
#undef do_sort
-#undef Elf_Addr
#undef Elf_Ehdr
#undef Elf_Shdr
#undef Elf_Sym
@@ -38,7 +37,6 @@
# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_64
# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_64
# define do_sort do_sort_64
-# define Elf_Addr Elf64_Addr
# define Elf_Ehdr Elf64_Ehdr
# define Elf_Shdr Elf64_Shdr
# define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym
@@ -52,7 +50,6 @@
# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_32
# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_32
# define do_sort do_sort_32
-# define Elf_Addr Elf32_Addr
# define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr
# define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr
# define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym
@@ -160,17 +157,6 @@ static void *sort_orctable(void *arg)
}
#endif
-static int compare_extable(const void *a, const void *b)
-{
- Elf_Addr av = _r(a);
- Elf_Addr bv = _r(b);
-
- if (av < bv)
- return -1;
- if (av > bv)
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
pthread_t mcount_sort_thread;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 049/175] scripts/sorttable: Convert Elf_Ehdr to union
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (47 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 048/175] scripts/sorttable: Make compare_extable() into two functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 050/175] scripts/sorttable: Replace Elf_Shdr Macro with a union Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (134 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 157fb5b3cfd2cb5950314f926a76e567fc1921c5 ]
In order to remove the double #include of sorttable.h for 64 and 32 bit
to create duplicate functions for both, replace the Elf_Ehdr macro with a
union that defines both Elf64_Ehdr and Elf32_Ehdr, with field e64 for the
64bit version, and e32 for the 32bit version.
Then a macro etype can be used instead to get to the proper value.
This will eventually be replaced with just single functions that can
handle both 32bit and 64bit ELF parsing.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250105162345.148224465@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
scripts/sorttable.h | 12 ++++++------
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@
#define EM_LOONGARCH 258
#endif
+typedef union {
+ Elf32_Ehdr e32;
+ Elf64_Ehdr e64;
+} Elf_Ehdr;
+
static uint32_t (*r)(const uint32_t *);
static uint16_t (*r2)(const uint16_t *);
static uint64_t (*r8)(const uint64_t *);
@@ -266,10 +271,10 @@ static void sort_relative_table_with_dat
static int do_file(char const *const fname, void *addr)
{
int rc = -1;
- Elf32_Ehdr *ehdr = addr;
+ Elf_Ehdr *ehdr = addr;
table_sort_t custom_sort = NULL;
- switch (ehdr->e_ident[EI_DATA]) {
+ switch (ehdr->e32.e_ident[EI_DATA]) {
case ELFDATA2LSB:
r = rle;
r2 = r2le;
@@ -284,18 +289,18 @@ static int do_file(char const *const fna
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "unrecognized ELF data encoding %d: %s\n",
- ehdr->e_ident[EI_DATA], fname);
+ ehdr->e32.e_ident[EI_DATA], fname);
return -1;
}
- if (memcmp(ELFMAG, ehdr->e_ident, SELFMAG) != 0 ||
- (r2(&ehdr->e_type) != ET_EXEC && r2(&ehdr->e_type) != ET_DYN) ||
- ehdr->e_ident[EI_VERSION] != EV_CURRENT) {
+ if (memcmp(ELFMAG, ehdr->e32.e_ident, SELFMAG) != 0 ||
+ (r2(&ehdr->e32.e_type) != ET_EXEC && r2(&ehdr->e32.e_type) != ET_DYN) ||
+ ehdr->e32.e_ident[EI_VERSION] != EV_CURRENT) {
fprintf(stderr, "unrecognized ET_EXEC/ET_DYN file %s\n", fname);
return -1;
}
- switch (r2(&ehdr->e_machine)) {
+ switch (r2(&ehdr->e32.e_machine)) {
case EM_386:
case EM_AARCH64:
case EM_LOONGARCH:
@@ -318,14 +323,14 @@ static int do_file(char const *const fna
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "unrecognized e_machine %d %s\n",
- r2(&ehdr->e_machine), fname);
+ r2(&ehdr->e32.e_machine), fname);
return -1;
}
- switch (ehdr->e_ident[EI_CLASS]) {
+ switch (ehdr->e32.e_ident[EI_CLASS]) {
case ELFCLASS32:
- if (r2(&ehdr->e_ehsize) != sizeof(Elf32_Ehdr) ||
- r2(&ehdr->e_shentsize) != sizeof(Elf32_Shdr)) {
+ if (r2(&ehdr->e32.e_ehsize) != sizeof(Elf32_Ehdr) ||
+ r2(&ehdr->e32.e_shentsize) != sizeof(Elf32_Shdr)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"unrecognized ET_EXEC/ET_DYN file: %s\n", fname);
break;
@@ -334,20 +339,19 @@ static int do_file(char const *const fna
break;
case ELFCLASS64:
{
- Elf64_Ehdr *const ghdr = (Elf64_Ehdr *)ehdr;
- if (r2(&ghdr->e_ehsize) != sizeof(Elf64_Ehdr) ||
- r2(&ghdr->e_shentsize) != sizeof(Elf64_Shdr)) {
+ if (r2(&ehdr->e64.e_ehsize) != sizeof(Elf64_Ehdr) ||
+ r2(&ehdr->e64.e_shentsize) != sizeof(Elf64_Shdr)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"unrecognized ET_EXEC/ET_DYN file: %s\n",
fname);
break;
}
- rc = do_sort_64(ghdr, fname, custom_sort);
+ rc = do_sort_64(ehdr, fname, custom_sort);
}
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "unrecognized ELF class %d %s\n",
- ehdr->e_ident[EI_CLASS], fname);
+ ehdr->e32.e_ident[EI_CLASS], fname);
break;
}
--- a/scripts/sorttable.h
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.h
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@
#undef sort_mcount_loc
#undef elf_mcount_loc
#undef do_sort
-#undef Elf_Ehdr
#undef Elf_Shdr
#undef Elf_Sym
#undef ELF_ST_TYPE
#undef uint_t
#undef _r
+#undef etype
#ifdef SORTTABLE_64
# define extable_ent_size 16
@@ -37,12 +37,12 @@
# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_64
# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_64
# define do_sort do_sort_64
-# define Elf_Ehdr Elf64_Ehdr
# define Elf_Shdr Elf64_Shdr
# define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym
# define ELF_ST_TYPE ELF64_ST_TYPE
# define uint_t uint64_t
# define _r r8
+# define etype e64
#else
# define extable_ent_size 8
# define compare_extable compare_extable_32
@@ -50,12 +50,12 @@
# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_32
# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_32
# define do_sort do_sort_32
-# define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr
# define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr
# define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym
# define ELF_ST_TYPE ELF32_ST_TYPE
# define uint_t uint32_t
# define _r r
+# define etype e32
#endif
#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
table_sort_t custom_sort)
{
int rc = -1;
- Elf_Shdr *s, *shdr = (Elf_Shdr *)((char *)ehdr + _r(&ehdr->e_shoff));
+ Elf_Shdr *s, *shdr = (Elf_Shdr *)((char *)ehdr + _r(&ehdr->etype.e_shoff));
Elf_Shdr *strtab_sec = NULL;
Elf_Shdr *symtab_sec = NULL;
Elf_Shdr *extab_sec = NULL;
@@ -249,12 +249,12 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
unsigned int orc_num_entries = 0;
#endif
- shstrndx = r2(&ehdr->e_shstrndx);
+ shstrndx = r2(&ehdr->etype.e_shstrndx);
if (shstrndx == SHN_XINDEX)
shstrndx = r(&shdr[0].sh_link);
secstrings = (const char *)ehdr + _r(&shdr[shstrndx].sh_offset);
- shnum = r2(&ehdr->e_shnum);
+ shnum = r2(&ehdr->etype.e_shnum);
if (shnum == SHN_UNDEF)
shnum = _r(&shdr[0].sh_size);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 050/175] scripts/sorttable: Replace Elf_Shdr Macro with a union
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (48 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 049/175] scripts/sorttable: Convert Elf_Ehdr to union Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 051/175] scripts/sorttable: Convert Elf_Sym MACRO over to " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (133 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 545f6cf8f4c9a268e0bab2637f1d279679befdbf ]
In order to remove the double #include of sorttable.h for 64 and 32 bit
to create duplicate functions for both, replace the Elf_Shdr macro with a
union that defines both Elf64_Shdr and Elf32_Shdr, with field e64 for the
64bit version, and e32 for the 32bit version.
It can then use the macro etype to get the proper value.
This will eventually be replaced with just single functions that can
handle both 32bit and 64bit ELF parsing.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250105162345.339462681@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 10 +++++++
scripts/sorttable.h | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -69,6 +69,11 @@ typedef union {
Elf64_Ehdr e64;
} Elf_Ehdr;
+typedef union {
+ Elf32_Shdr e32;
+ Elf64_Shdr e64;
+} Elf_Shdr;
+
static uint32_t (*r)(const uint32_t *);
static uint16_t (*r2)(const uint16_t *);
static uint64_t (*r8)(const uint64_t *);
@@ -198,6 +203,11 @@ static int compare_extable_64(const void
return av > bv;
}
+static inline void *get_index(void *start, int entsize, int index)
+{
+ return start + (entsize * index);
+}
+
/* 32 bit and 64 bit are very similar */
#include "sorttable.h"
#define SORTTABLE_64
--- a/scripts/sorttable.h
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.h
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
#undef sort_mcount_loc
#undef elf_mcount_loc
#undef do_sort
-#undef Elf_Shdr
#undef Elf_Sym
#undef ELF_ST_TYPE
#undef uint_t
@@ -37,7 +36,6 @@
# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_64
# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_64
# define do_sort do_sort_64
-# define Elf_Shdr Elf64_Shdr
# define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym
# define ELF_ST_TYPE ELF64_ST_TYPE
# define uint_t uint64_t
@@ -50,7 +48,6 @@
# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_32
# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_32
# define do_sort do_sort_32
-# define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr
# define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym
# define ELF_ST_TYPE ELF32_ST_TYPE
# define uint_t uint32_t
@@ -171,8 +168,8 @@ struct elf_mcount_loc {
static void *sort_mcount_loc(void *arg)
{
struct elf_mcount_loc *emloc = (struct elf_mcount_loc *)arg;
- uint_t offset = emloc->start_mcount_loc - _r(&(emloc->init_data_sec)->sh_addr)
- + _r(&(emloc->init_data_sec)->sh_offset);
+ uint_t offset = emloc->start_mcount_loc - _r(&(emloc->init_data_sec)->etype.sh_addr)
+ + _r(&(emloc->init_data_sec)->etype.sh_offset);
uint_t count = emloc->stop_mcount_loc - emloc->start_mcount_loc;
unsigned char *start_loc = (void *)emloc->ehdr + offset;
@@ -222,10 +219,11 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
table_sort_t custom_sort)
{
int rc = -1;
- Elf_Shdr *s, *shdr = (Elf_Shdr *)((char *)ehdr + _r(&ehdr->etype.e_shoff));
+ Elf_Shdr *shdr_start;
Elf_Shdr *strtab_sec = NULL;
Elf_Shdr *symtab_sec = NULL;
Elf_Shdr *extab_sec = NULL;
+ Elf_Shdr *string_sec;
Elf_Sym *sym;
const Elf_Sym *symtab;
Elf32_Word *symtab_shndx = NULL;
@@ -235,7 +233,10 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
const char *secstrings;
const char *strtab;
char *extab_image;
+ int sort_need_index;
+ int shentsize;
int idx;
+ int i;
unsigned int shnum;
unsigned int shstrndx;
#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
@@ -249,34 +250,40 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
unsigned int orc_num_entries = 0;
#endif
+ shdr_start = (Elf_Shdr *)((char *)ehdr + _r(&ehdr->etype.e_shoff));
+ shentsize = r2(&ehdr->etype.e_shentsize);
+
shstrndx = r2(&ehdr->etype.e_shstrndx);
if (shstrndx == SHN_XINDEX)
- shstrndx = r(&shdr[0].sh_link);
- secstrings = (const char *)ehdr + _r(&shdr[shstrndx].sh_offset);
+ shstrndx = r(&shdr_start->etype.sh_link);
+ string_sec = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, shstrndx);
+ secstrings = (const char *)ehdr + _r(&string_sec->etype.sh_offset);
shnum = r2(&ehdr->etype.e_shnum);
if (shnum == SHN_UNDEF)
- shnum = _r(&shdr[0].sh_size);
+ shnum = _r(&shdr_start->etype.sh_size);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < shnum; i++) {
+ Elf_Shdr *shdr = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, i);
- for (s = shdr; s < shdr + shnum; s++) {
- idx = r(&s->sh_name);
+ idx = r(&shdr->etype.sh_name);
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, "__ex_table"))
- extab_sec = s;
+ extab_sec = shdr;
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".symtab"))
- symtab_sec = s;
+ symtab_sec = shdr;
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".strtab"))
- strtab_sec = s;
+ strtab_sec = shdr;
- if (r(&s->sh_type) == SHT_SYMTAB_SHNDX)
+ if (r(&shdr->etype.sh_type) == SHT_SYMTAB_SHNDX)
symtab_shndx = (Elf32_Word *)((const char *)ehdr +
- _r(&s->sh_offset));
+ _r(&shdr->etype.sh_offset));
#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
/* locate the .init.data section in vmlinux */
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".init.data")) {
get_mcount_loc(&_start_mcount_loc, &_stop_mcount_loc);
mstruct.ehdr = ehdr;
- mstruct.init_data_sec = s;
+ mstruct.init_data_sec = shdr;
mstruct.start_mcount_loc = _start_mcount_loc;
mstruct.stop_mcount_loc = _stop_mcount_loc;
}
@@ -285,14 +292,14 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
/* locate the ORC unwind tables */
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".orc_unwind_ip")) {
- orc_ip_size = _r(&s->sh_size);
+ orc_ip_size = _r(&shdr->etype.sh_size);
g_orc_ip_table = (int *)((void *)ehdr +
- _r(&s->sh_offset));
+ _r(&shdr->etype.sh_offset));
}
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".orc_unwind")) {
- orc_size = _r(&s->sh_size);
+ orc_size = _r(&shdr->etype.sh_size);
g_orc_table = (struct orc_entry *)((void *)ehdr +
- _r(&s->sh_offset));
+ _r(&shdr->etype.sh_offset));
}
#endif
} /* for loop */
@@ -355,22 +362,22 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
goto out;
}
- extab_image = (void *)ehdr + _r(&extab_sec->sh_offset);
- strtab = (const char *)ehdr + _r(&strtab_sec->sh_offset);
+ extab_image = (void *)ehdr + _r(&extab_sec->etype.sh_offset);
+ strtab = (const char *)ehdr + _r(&strtab_sec->etype.sh_offset);
symtab = (const Elf_Sym *)((const char *)ehdr +
- _r(&symtab_sec->sh_offset));
+ _r(&symtab_sec->etype.sh_offset));
if (custom_sort) {
- custom_sort(extab_image, _r(&extab_sec->sh_size));
+ custom_sort(extab_image, _r(&extab_sec->etype.sh_size));
} else {
- int num_entries = _r(&extab_sec->sh_size) / extable_ent_size;
+ int num_entries = _r(&extab_sec->etype.sh_size) / extable_ent_size;
qsort(extab_image, num_entries,
extable_ent_size, compare_extable);
}
/* find the flag main_extable_sort_needed */
- for (sym = (void *)ehdr + _r(&symtab_sec->sh_offset);
- sym < sym + _r(&symtab_sec->sh_size) / sizeof(Elf_Sym);
+ for (sym = (void *)ehdr + _r(&symtab_sec->etype.sh_offset);
+ sym < sym + _r(&symtab_sec->etype.sh_size) / sizeof(Elf_Sym);
sym++) {
if (ELF_ST_TYPE(sym->st_info) != STT_OBJECT)
continue;
@@ -388,13 +395,14 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
goto out;
}
- sort_needed_sec = &shdr[get_secindex(r2(&sym->st_shndx),
- sort_needed_sym - symtab,
- symtab_shndx)];
+ sort_need_index = get_secindex(r2(&sym->st_shndx),
+ sort_needed_sym - symtab,
+ symtab_shndx);
+ sort_needed_sec = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, sort_need_index);
sort_needed_loc = (void *)ehdr +
- _r(&sort_needed_sec->sh_offset) +
+ _r(&sort_needed_sec->etype.sh_offset) +
_r(&sort_needed_sym->st_value) -
- _r(&sort_needed_sec->sh_addr);
+ _r(&sort_needed_sec->etype.sh_addr);
/* extable has been sorted, clear the flag */
w(0, sort_needed_loc);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 051/175] scripts/sorttable: Convert Elf_Sym MACRO over to a union
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (49 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 050/175] scripts/sorttable: Replace Elf_Shdr Macro with a union Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 052/175] scripts/sorttable: Add helper functions for Elf_Ehdr Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (132 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 200d015e73b4da69bcd8212a7c58695452b12bad ]
In order to remove the double #include of sorttable.h for 64 and 32 bit
to create duplicate functions for both, replace the Elf_Sym macro with a
union that defines both Elf64_Sym and Elf32_Sym, with field e64 for the
64bit version, and e32 for the 32bit version.
It can then use the macro etype to get the proper value.
This will eventually be replaced with just single functions that can
handle both 32bit and 64bit ELF parsing.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250105162345.528626969@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 5 +++++
scripts/sorttable.h | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ typedef union {
Elf64_Shdr e64;
} Elf_Shdr;
+typedef union {
+ Elf32_Sym e32;
+ Elf64_Sym e64;
+} Elf_Sym;
+
static uint32_t (*r)(const uint32_t *);
static uint16_t (*r2)(const uint16_t *);
static uint64_t (*r8)(const uint64_t *);
--- a/scripts/sorttable.h
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.h
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
#undef sort_mcount_loc
#undef elf_mcount_loc
#undef do_sort
-#undef Elf_Sym
#undef ELF_ST_TYPE
#undef uint_t
#undef _r
@@ -36,7 +35,6 @@
# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_64
# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_64
# define do_sort do_sort_64
-# define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym
# define ELF_ST_TYPE ELF64_ST_TYPE
# define uint_t uint64_t
# define _r r8
@@ -48,7 +46,6 @@
# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_32
# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_32
# define do_sort do_sort_32
-# define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym
# define ELF_ST_TYPE ELF32_ST_TYPE
# define uint_t uint32_t
# define _r r
@@ -230,10 +227,13 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
Elf_Sym *sort_needed_sym = NULL;
Elf_Shdr *sort_needed_sec;
uint32_t *sort_needed_loc;
+ void *sym_start;
+ void *sym_end;
const char *secstrings;
const char *strtab;
char *extab_image;
int sort_need_index;
+ int symentsize;
int shentsize;
int idx;
int i;
@@ -376,12 +376,15 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
}
/* find the flag main_extable_sort_needed */
- for (sym = (void *)ehdr + _r(&symtab_sec->etype.sh_offset);
- sym < sym + _r(&symtab_sec->etype.sh_size) / sizeof(Elf_Sym);
- sym++) {
- if (ELF_ST_TYPE(sym->st_info) != STT_OBJECT)
+ sym_start = (void *)ehdr + _r(&symtab_sec->etype.sh_offset);
+ sym_end = sym_start + _r(&symtab_sec->etype.sh_size);
+ symentsize = _r(&symtab_sec->etype.sh_entsize);
+
+ for (sym = sym_start; (void *)sym + symentsize < sym_end;
+ sym = (void *)sym + symentsize) {
+ if (ELF_ST_TYPE(sym->etype.st_info) != STT_OBJECT)
continue;
- if (!strcmp(strtab + r(&sym->st_name),
+ if (!strcmp(strtab + r(&sym->etype.st_name),
"main_extable_sort_needed")) {
sort_needed_sym = sym;
break;
@@ -395,13 +398,13 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
goto out;
}
- sort_need_index = get_secindex(r2(&sym->st_shndx),
- sort_needed_sym - symtab,
+ sort_need_index = get_secindex(r2(&sym->etype.st_shndx),
+ ((void *)sort_needed_sym - (void *)symtab) / symentsize,
symtab_shndx);
sort_needed_sec = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, sort_need_index);
sort_needed_loc = (void *)ehdr +
_r(&sort_needed_sec->etype.sh_offset) +
- _r(&sort_needed_sym->st_value) -
+ _r(&sort_needed_sym->etype.st_value) -
_r(&sort_needed_sec->etype.sh_addr);
/* extable has been sorted, clear the flag */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 052/175] scripts/sorttable: Add helper functions for Elf_Ehdr
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (50 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 051/175] scripts/sorttable: Convert Elf_Sym MACRO over to " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 053/175] scripts/sorttable: Add helper functions for Elf_Shdr Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (131 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 1dfb59a228dde59ad7d99b2fa2104e90004995c7 ]
In order to remove the double #include of sorttable.h for 64 and 32 bit
to create duplicate functions, add helper functions for Elf_Ehdr. This
will create a function pointer for each helper that will get assigned to
the appropriate function to handle either the 64bit or 32bit version.
This also moves the _r()/r() wrappers for the Elf_Ehdr references that
handle endian and size differences between the different architectures,
into the helper function and out of the open code which is more error
prone.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250105162345.736369526@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
scripts/sorttable.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -85,6 +85,31 @@ static uint64_t (*r8)(const uint64_t *);
static void (*w)(uint32_t, uint32_t *);
typedef void (*table_sort_t)(char *, int);
+static uint64_t ehdr64_shoff(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr)
+{
+ return r8(&ehdr->e64.e_shoff);
+}
+
+static uint64_t ehdr32_shoff(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr)
+{
+ return r(&ehdr->e32.e_shoff);
+}
+
+#define EHDR_HALF(fn_name) \
+static uint16_t ehdr64_##fn_name(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr) \
+{ \
+ return r2(&ehdr->e64.e_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint16_t ehdr32_##fn_name(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr) \
+{ \
+ return r2(&ehdr->e32.e_##fn_name); \
+}
+
+EHDR_HALF(shentsize)
+EHDR_HALF(shstrndx)
+EHDR_HALF(shnum)
+
/*
* Get the whole file as a programming convenience in order to avoid
* malloc+lseek+read+free of many pieces. If successful, then mmap
--- a/scripts/sorttable.h
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.h
@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@
#undef uint_t
#undef _r
#undef etype
+#undef ehdr_shoff
+#undef ehdr_shentsize
+#undef ehdr_shstrndx
+#undef ehdr_shnum
#ifdef SORTTABLE_64
# define extable_ent_size 16
@@ -39,6 +43,10 @@
# define uint_t uint64_t
# define _r r8
# define etype e64
+# define ehdr_shoff ehdr64_shoff
+# define ehdr_shentsize ehdr64_shentsize
+# define ehdr_shstrndx ehdr64_shstrndx
+# define ehdr_shnum ehdr64_shnum
#else
# define extable_ent_size 8
# define compare_extable compare_extable_32
@@ -50,6 +58,10 @@
# define uint_t uint32_t
# define _r r
# define etype e32
+# define ehdr_shoff ehdr32_shoff
+# define ehdr_shentsize ehdr32_shentsize
+# define ehdr_shstrndx ehdr32_shstrndx
+# define ehdr_shnum ehdr32_shnum
#endif
#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
@@ -250,16 +262,16 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
unsigned int orc_num_entries = 0;
#endif
- shdr_start = (Elf_Shdr *)((char *)ehdr + _r(&ehdr->etype.e_shoff));
- shentsize = r2(&ehdr->etype.e_shentsize);
+ shdr_start = (Elf_Shdr *)((char *)ehdr + ehdr_shoff(ehdr));
+ shentsize = ehdr_shentsize(ehdr);
- shstrndx = r2(&ehdr->etype.e_shstrndx);
+ shstrndx = ehdr_shstrndx(ehdr);
if (shstrndx == SHN_XINDEX)
shstrndx = r(&shdr_start->etype.sh_link);
string_sec = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, shstrndx);
secstrings = (const char *)ehdr + _r(&string_sec->etype.sh_offset);
- shnum = r2(&ehdr->etype.e_shnum);
+ shnum = ehdr_shnum(ehdr);
if (shnum == SHN_UNDEF)
shnum = _r(&shdr_start->etype.sh_size);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 053/175] scripts/sorttable: Add helper functions for Elf_Shdr
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (51 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 052/175] scripts/sorttable: Add helper functions for Elf_Ehdr Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 054/175] scripts/sorttable: Add helper functions for Elf_Sym Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (130 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 67afb7f504400e5b4e5ff895459fbb3eb63d4450 ]
In order to remove the double #include of sorttable.h for 64 and 32 bit
to create duplicate functions, add helper functions for Elf_Shdr. This
will create a function pointer for each helper that will get assigned to
the appropriate function to handle either the 64bit or 32bit version.
This also moves the _r()/r() wrappers for the Elf_Shdr references that
handle endian and size differences between the different architectures,
into the helper function and out of the open code which is more error
prone.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250105162345.940924221@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
scripts/sorttable.h | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -110,6 +110,48 @@ EHDR_HALF(shentsize)
EHDR_HALF(shstrndx)
EHDR_HALF(shnum)
+#define SHDR_WORD(fn_name) \
+static uint32_t shdr64_##fn_name(Elf_Shdr *shdr) \
+{ \
+ return r(&shdr->e64.sh_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint32_t shdr32_##fn_name(Elf_Shdr *shdr) \
+{ \
+ return r(&shdr->e32.sh_##fn_name); \
+}
+
+#define SHDR_ADDR(fn_name) \
+static uint64_t shdr64_##fn_name(Elf_Shdr *shdr) \
+{ \
+ return r8(&shdr->e64.sh_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint64_t shdr32_##fn_name(Elf_Shdr *shdr) \
+{ \
+ return r(&shdr->e32.sh_##fn_name); \
+}
+
+#define SHDR_WORD(fn_name) \
+static uint32_t shdr64_##fn_name(Elf_Shdr *shdr) \
+{ \
+ return r(&shdr->e64.sh_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint32_t shdr32_##fn_name(Elf_Shdr *shdr) \
+{ \
+ return r(&shdr->e32.sh_##fn_name); \
+}
+
+SHDR_ADDR(addr)
+SHDR_ADDR(offset)
+SHDR_ADDR(size)
+SHDR_ADDR(entsize)
+
+SHDR_WORD(link)
+SHDR_WORD(name)
+SHDR_WORD(type)
+
/*
* Get the whole file as a programming convenience in order to avoid
* malloc+lseek+read+free of many pieces. If successful, then mmap
--- a/scripts/sorttable.h
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.h
@@ -31,6 +31,13 @@
#undef ehdr_shentsize
#undef ehdr_shstrndx
#undef ehdr_shnum
+#undef shdr_addr
+#undef shdr_offset
+#undef shdr_link
+#undef shdr_size
+#undef shdr_name
+#undef shdr_type
+#undef shdr_entsize
#ifdef SORTTABLE_64
# define extable_ent_size 16
@@ -47,6 +54,13 @@
# define ehdr_shentsize ehdr64_shentsize
# define ehdr_shstrndx ehdr64_shstrndx
# define ehdr_shnum ehdr64_shnum
+# define shdr_addr shdr64_addr
+# define shdr_offset shdr64_offset
+# define shdr_link shdr64_link
+# define shdr_size shdr64_size
+# define shdr_name shdr64_name
+# define shdr_type shdr64_type
+# define shdr_entsize shdr64_entsize
#else
# define extable_ent_size 8
# define compare_extable compare_extable_32
@@ -62,6 +76,13 @@
# define ehdr_shentsize ehdr32_shentsize
# define ehdr_shstrndx ehdr32_shstrndx
# define ehdr_shnum ehdr32_shnum
+# define shdr_addr shdr32_addr
+# define shdr_offset shdr32_offset
+# define shdr_link shdr32_link
+# define shdr_size shdr32_size
+# define shdr_name shdr32_name
+# define shdr_type shdr32_type
+# define shdr_entsize shdr32_entsize
#endif
#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
@@ -177,8 +198,8 @@ struct elf_mcount_loc {
static void *sort_mcount_loc(void *arg)
{
struct elf_mcount_loc *emloc = (struct elf_mcount_loc *)arg;
- uint_t offset = emloc->start_mcount_loc - _r(&(emloc->init_data_sec)->etype.sh_addr)
- + _r(&(emloc->init_data_sec)->etype.sh_offset);
+ uint_t offset = emloc->start_mcount_loc - shdr_addr(emloc->init_data_sec)
+ + shdr_offset(emloc->init_data_sec);
uint_t count = emloc->stop_mcount_loc - emloc->start_mcount_loc;
unsigned char *start_loc = (void *)emloc->ehdr + offset;
@@ -267,18 +288,18 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
shstrndx = ehdr_shstrndx(ehdr);
if (shstrndx == SHN_XINDEX)
- shstrndx = r(&shdr_start->etype.sh_link);
+ shstrndx = shdr_link(shdr_start);
string_sec = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, shstrndx);
- secstrings = (const char *)ehdr + _r(&string_sec->etype.sh_offset);
+ secstrings = (const char *)ehdr + shdr_offset(string_sec);
shnum = ehdr_shnum(ehdr);
if (shnum == SHN_UNDEF)
- shnum = _r(&shdr_start->etype.sh_size);
+ shnum = shdr_size(shdr_start);
for (i = 0; i < shnum; i++) {
Elf_Shdr *shdr = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, i);
- idx = r(&shdr->etype.sh_name);
+ idx = shdr_name(shdr);
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, "__ex_table"))
extab_sec = shdr;
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".symtab"))
@@ -286,9 +307,9 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".strtab"))
strtab_sec = shdr;
- if (r(&shdr->etype.sh_type) == SHT_SYMTAB_SHNDX)
+ if (shdr_type(shdr) == SHT_SYMTAB_SHNDX)
symtab_shndx = (Elf32_Word *)((const char *)ehdr +
- _r(&shdr->etype.sh_offset));
+ shdr_offset(shdr));
#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
/* locate the .init.data section in vmlinux */
@@ -304,14 +325,14 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
/* locate the ORC unwind tables */
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".orc_unwind_ip")) {
- orc_ip_size = _r(&shdr->etype.sh_size);
+ orc_ip_size = shdr_size(shdr);
g_orc_ip_table = (int *)((void *)ehdr +
- _r(&shdr->etype.sh_offset));
+ shdr_offset(shdr));
}
if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".orc_unwind")) {
- orc_size = _r(&shdr->etype.sh_size);
+ orc_size = shdr_size(shdr);
g_orc_table = (struct orc_entry *)((void *)ehdr +
- _r(&shdr->etype.sh_offset));
+ shdr_offset(shdr));
}
#endif
} /* for loop */
@@ -374,23 +395,22 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
goto out;
}
- extab_image = (void *)ehdr + _r(&extab_sec->etype.sh_offset);
- strtab = (const char *)ehdr + _r(&strtab_sec->etype.sh_offset);
- symtab = (const Elf_Sym *)((const char *)ehdr +
- _r(&symtab_sec->etype.sh_offset));
+ extab_image = (void *)ehdr + shdr_offset(extab_sec);
+ strtab = (const char *)ehdr + shdr_offset(strtab_sec);
+ symtab = (const Elf_Sym *)((const char *)ehdr + shdr_offset(symtab_sec));
if (custom_sort) {
- custom_sort(extab_image, _r(&extab_sec->etype.sh_size));
+ custom_sort(extab_image, shdr_size(extab_sec));
} else {
- int num_entries = _r(&extab_sec->etype.sh_size) / extable_ent_size;
+ int num_entries = shdr_size(extab_sec) / extable_ent_size;
qsort(extab_image, num_entries,
extable_ent_size, compare_extable);
}
/* find the flag main_extable_sort_needed */
- sym_start = (void *)ehdr + _r(&symtab_sec->etype.sh_offset);
- sym_end = sym_start + _r(&symtab_sec->etype.sh_size);
- symentsize = _r(&symtab_sec->etype.sh_entsize);
+ sym_start = (void *)ehdr + shdr_offset(symtab_sec);
+ sym_end = sym_start + shdr_size(symtab_sec);
+ symentsize = shdr_entsize(symtab_sec);
for (sym = sym_start; (void *)sym + symentsize < sym_end;
sym = (void *)sym + symentsize) {
@@ -415,9 +435,9 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
symtab_shndx);
sort_needed_sec = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, sort_need_index);
sort_needed_loc = (void *)ehdr +
- _r(&sort_needed_sec->etype.sh_offset) +
+ shdr_offset(sort_needed_sec) +
_r(&sort_needed_sym->etype.st_value) -
- _r(&sort_needed_sec->etype.sh_addr);
+ shdr_addr(sort_needed_sec);
/* extable has been sorted, clear the flag */
w(0, sort_needed_loc);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 054/175] scripts/sorttable: Add helper functions for Elf_Sym
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (52 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 053/175] scripts/sorttable: Add helper functions for Elf_Shdr Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 055/175] scripts/sorttable: Use uint64_t for mcount sorting Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (129 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 17bed33ac12f011f4695059960e1b1d6457229a7 ]
In order to remove the double #include of sorttable.h for 64 and 32 bit
to create duplicate functions, add helper functions for Elf_Sym. This
will create a function pointer for each helper that will get assigned to
the appropriate function to handle either the 64bit or 32bit version.
This also removes the last references of etype and _r() macros from the
sorttable.h file as their references are now just defined in the
appropriate architecture version of the helper functions. All read
functions now exist in the helper functions which makes it easier to
maintain, as the helper functions define the necessary architecture sizes.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250105162346.185740651@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
scripts/sorttable.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -152,6 +152,53 @@ SHDR_WORD(link)
SHDR_WORD(name)
SHDR_WORD(type)
+#define SYM_ADDR(fn_name) \
+static uint64_t sym64_##fn_name(Elf_Sym *sym) \
+{ \
+ return r8(&sym->e64.st_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint64_t sym32_##fn_name(Elf_Sym *sym) \
+{ \
+ return r(&sym->e32.st_##fn_name); \
+}
+
+#define SYM_WORD(fn_name) \
+static uint32_t sym64_##fn_name(Elf_Sym *sym) \
+{ \
+ return r(&sym->e64.st_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint32_t sym32_##fn_name(Elf_Sym *sym) \
+{ \
+ return r(&sym->e32.st_##fn_name); \
+}
+
+#define SYM_HALF(fn_name) \
+static uint16_t sym64_##fn_name(Elf_Sym *sym) \
+{ \
+ return r2(&sym->e64.st_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint16_t sym32_##fn_name(Elf_Sym *sym) \
+{ \
+ return r2(&sym->e32.st_##fn_name); \
+}
+
+static uint8_t sym64_type(Elf_Sym *sym)
+{
+ return ELF64_ST_TYPE(sym->e64.st_info);
+}
+
+static uint8_t sym32_type(Elf_Sym *sym)
+{
+ return ELF32_ST_TYPE(sym->e32.st_info);
+}
+
+SYM_ADDR(value)
+SYM_WORD(name)
+SYM_HALF(shndx)
+
/*
* Get the whole file as a programming convenience in order to avoid
* malloc+lseek+read+free of many pieces. If successful, then mmap
--- a/scripts/sorttable.h
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.h
@@ -23,10 +23,7 @@
#undef sort_mcount_loc
#undef elf_mcount_loc
#undef do_sort
-#undef ELF_ST_TYPE
#undef uint_t
-#undef _r
-#undef etype
#undef ehdr_shoff
#undef ehdr_shentsize
#undef ehdr_shstrndx
@@ -38,6 +35,10 @@
#undef shdr_name
#undef shdr_type
#undef shdr_entsize
+#undef sym_type
+#undef sym_name
+#undef sym_value
+#undef sym_shndx
#ifdef SORTTABLE_64
# define extable_ent_size 16
@@ -46,10 +47,7 @@
# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_64
# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_64
# define do_sort do_sort_64
-# define ELF_ST_TYPE ELF64_ST_TYPE
# define uint_t uint64_t
-# define _r r8
-# define etype e64
# define ehdr_shoff ehdr64_shoff
# define ehdr_shentsize ehdr64_shentsize
# define ehdr_shstrndx ehdr64_shstrndx
@@ -61,6 +59,10 @@
# define shdr_name shdr64_name
# define shdr_type shdr64_type
# define shdr_entsize shdr64_entsize
+# define sym_type sym64_type
+# define sym_name sym64_name
+# define sym_value sym64_value
+# define sym_shndx sym64_shndx
#else
# define extable_ent_size 8
# define compare_extable compare_extable_32
@@ -68,10 +70,7 @@
# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_32
# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_32
# define do_sort do_sort_32
-# define ELF_ST_TYPE ELF32_ST_TYPE
# define uint_t uint32_t
-# define _r r
-# define etype e32
# define ehdr_shoff ehdr32_shoff
# define ehdr_shentsize ehdr32_shentsize
# define ehdr_shstrndx ehdr32_shstrndx
@@ -83,6 +82,10 @@
# define shdr_name shdr32_name
# define shdr_type shdr32_type
# define shdr_entsize shdr32_entsize
+# define sym_type sym32_type
+# define sym_name sym32_name
+# define sym_value sym32_value
+# define sym_shndx sym32_shndx
#endif
#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
@@ -414,9 +417,9 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
for (sym = sym_start; (void *)sym + symentsize < sym_end;
sym = (void *)sym + symentsize) {
- if (ELF_ST_TYPE(sym->etype.st_info) != STT_OBJECT)
+ if (sym_type(sym) != STT_OBJECT)
continue;
- if (!strcmp(strtab + r(&sym->etype.st_name),
+ if (!strcmp(strtab + sym_name(sym),
"main_extable_sort_needed")) {
sort_needed_sym = sym;
break;
@@ -430,14 +433,13 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
goto out;
}
- sort_need_index = get_secindex(r2(&sym->etype.st_shndx),
+ sort_need_index = get_secindex(sym_shndx(sym),
((void *)sort_needed_sym - (void *)symtab) / symentsize,
symtab_shndx);
sort_needed_sec = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, sort_need_index);
sort_needed_loc = (void *)ehdr +
shdr_offset(sort_needed_sec) +
- _r(&sort_needed_sym->etype.st_value) -
- shdr_addr(sort_needed_sec);
+ sym_value(sort_needed_sym) - shdr_addr(sort_needed_sec);
/* extable has been sorted, clear the flag */
w(0, sort_needed_loc);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 055/175] scripts/sorttable: Use uint64_t for mcount sorting
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (53 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 054/175] scripts/sorttable: Add helper functions for Elf_Sym Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 056/175] scripts/sorttable: Move code from sorttable.h into sorttable.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (128 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 1b649e6ab8dc9188d82c64069493afe66ca0edad ]
The mcount sorting defines uint_t to uint64_t on 64bit architectures and
uint32_t on 32bit architectures. It can work with just using uint64_t as
that will hold the values of both, and they are not used to point into the
ELF file.
sizeof(uint_t) is used for defining the size of the mcount_loc section.
Instead of using a type, define long_size and use that instead. This will
allow the header code to be moved into the C file as generic functions and
not need to include sorttable.h twice, once for 64bit and once for 32bit.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250105162346.373528925@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.h | 22 +++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.h
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.h
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
#undef sort_mcount_loc
#undef elf_mcount_loc
#undef do_sort
-#undef uint_t
#undef ehdr_shoff
#undef ehdr_shentsize
#undef ehdr_shstrndx
@@ -39,6 +38,7 @@
#undef sym_name
#undef sym_value
#undef sym_shndx
+#undef long_size
#ifdef SORTTABLE_64
# define extable_ent_size 16
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@
# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_64
# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_64
# define do_sort do_sort_64
-# define uint_t uint64_t
# define ehdr_shoff ehdr64_shoff
# define ehdr_shentsize ehdr64_shentsize
# define ehdr_shstrndx ehdr64_shstrndx
@@ -63,6 +62,7 @@
# define sym_name sym64_name
# define sym_value sym64_value
# define sym_shndx sym64_shndx
+# define long_size 8
#else
# define extable_ent_size 8
# define compare_extable compare_extable_32
@@ -70,7 +70,6 @@
# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_32
# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_32
# define do_sort do_sort_32
-# define uint_t uint32_t
# define ehdr_shoff ehdr32_shoff
# define ehdr_shentsize ehdr32_shentsize
# define ehdr_shstrndx ehdr32_shstrndx
@@ -86,6 +85,7 @@
# define sym_name sym32_name
# define sym_value sym32_value
# define sym_shndx sym32_shndx
+# define long_size 4
#endif
#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
@@ -193,25 +193,25 @@ pthread_t mcount_sort_thread;
struct elf_mcount_loc {
Elf_Ehdr *ehdr;
Elf_Shdr *init_data_sec;
- uint_t start_mcount_loc;
- uint_t stop_mcount_loc;
+ uint64_t start_mcount_loc;
+ uint64_t stop_mcount_loc;
};
/* Sort the addresses stored between __start_mcount_loc to __stop_mcount_loc in vmlinux */
static void *sort_mcount_loc(void *arg)
{
struct elf_mcount_loc *emloc = (struct elf_mcount_loc *)arg;
- uint_t offset = emloc->start_mcount_loc - shdr_addr(emloc->init_data_sec)
+ uint64_t offset = emloc->start_mcount_loc - shdr_addr(emloc->init_data_sec)
+ shdr_offset(emloc->init_data_sec);
- uint_t count = emloc->stop_mcount_loc - emloc->start_mcount_loc;
+ uint64_t count = emloc->stop_mcount_loc - emloc->start_mcount_loc;
unsigned char *start_loc = (void *)emloc->ehdr + offset;
- qsort(start_loc, count/sizeof(uint_t), sizeof(uint_t), compare_extable);
+ qsort(start_loc, count/long_size, long_size, compare_extable);
return NULL;
}
/* Get the address of __start_mcount_loc and __stop_mcount_loc in System.map */
-static void get_mcount_loc(uint_t *_start, uint_t *_stop)
+static void get_mcount_loc(uint64_t *_start, uint64_t *_stop)
{
FILE *file_start, *file_stop;
char start_buff[20];
@@ -277,8 +277,8 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
unsigned int shstrndx;
#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
struct elf_mcount_loc mstruct = {0};
- uint_t _start_mcount_loc = 0;
- uint_t _stop_mcount_loc = 0;
+ uint64_t _start_mcount_loc = 0;
+ uint64_t _stop_mcount_loc = 0;
#endif
#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
unsigned int orc_ip_size = 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 056/175] scripts/sorttable: Move code from sorttable.h into sorttable.c
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (54 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 055/175] scripts/sorttable: Use uint64_t for mcount sorting Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 057/175] scripts/sorttable: Get start/stop_mcount_loc from ELF file directly Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (127 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf, Stephen Rothwell,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 58d87678a0f46c6120904b4326aaf5ebf4454c69 ]
Instead of having the main code live in a header file and included twice
with MACROs that define the Elf structures for 64 bit or 32 bit, move the
code in the C file now that the Elf structures are defined in a union that
has both. All accesses to the Elf structure fields are done through helper
function pointers. If the file being parsed if for a 64 bit architecture,
all the helper functions point to the 64 bit versions to retrieve the Elf
fields. The same is true if the architecture is 32 bit, where the function
pointers will point to the 32 bit helper functions.
Note, when the value of a field can be either 32 bit or 64 bit, a 64 bit
is always returned, as it works for the 32 bit code as well.
This makes the code easier to read and maintain, and it now all exists in
sorttable.c and sorttable.h may be removed.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250107223217.6f7f96a5@gandalf.local.home
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 473 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
scripts/sorttable.h | 485 ----------------------------------------------------
2 files changed, 460 insertions(+), 498 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 scripts/sorttable.h
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -327,10 +327,423 @@ static inline void *get_index(void *star
return start + (entsize * index);
}
-/* 32 bit and 64 bit are very similar */
-#include "sorttable.h"
-#define SORTTABLE_64
-#include "sorttable.h"
+
+static int (*compare_extable)(const void *a, const void *b);
+static uint64_t (*ehdr_shoff)(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr);
+static uint16_t (*ehdr_shstrndx)(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr);
+static uint16_t (*ehdr_shentsize)(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr);
+static uint16_t (*ehdr_shnum)(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr);
+static uint64_t (*shdr_addr)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+static uint64_t (*shdr_offset)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+static uint64_t (*shdr_size)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+static uint64_t (*shdr_entsize)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+static uint32_t (*shdr_link)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+static uint32_t (*shdr_name)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+static uint32_t (*shdr_type)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+static uint8_t (*sym_type)(Elf_Sym *sym);
+static uint32_t (*sym_name)(Elf_Sym *sym);
+static uint64_t (*sym_value)(Elf_Sym *sym);
+static uint16_t (*sym_shndx)(Elf_Sym *sym);
+
+static int extable_ent_size;
+static int long_size;
+
+
+#ifdef UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED
+/* ORC unwinder only support X86_64 */
+#include <asm/orc_types.h>
+
+#define ERRSTR_MAXSZ 256
+
+static char g_err[ERRSTR_MAXSZ];
+static int *g_orc_ip_table;
+static struct orc_entry *g_orc_table;
+
+static pthread_t orc_sort_thread;
+
+static inline unsigned long orc_ip(const int *ip)
+{
+ return (unsigned long)ip + *ip;
+}
+
+static int orc_sort_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b)
+{
+ struct orc_entry *orc_a, *orc_b;
+ const int *a = g_orc_ip_table + *(int *)_a;
+ const int *b = g_orc_ip_table + *(int *)_b;
+ unsigned long a_val = orc_ip(a);
+ unsigned long b_val = orc_ip(b);
+
+ if (a_val > b_val)
+ return 1;
+ if (a_val < b_val)
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * The "weak" section terminator entries need to always be on the left
+ * to ensure the lookup code skips them in favor of real entries.
+ * These terminator entries exist to handle any gaps created by
+ * whitelisted .o files which didn't get objtool generation.
+ */
+ orc_a = g_orc_table + (a - g_orc_ip_table);
+ orc_b = g_orc_table + (b - g_orc_ip_table);
+ if (orc_a->type == ORC_TYPE_UNDEFINED && orc_b->type == ORC_TYPE_UNDEFINED)
+ return 0;
+ return orc_a->type == ORC_TYPE_UNDEFINED ? -1 : 1;
+}
+
+static void *sort_orctable(void *arg)
+{
+ int i;
+ int *idxs = NULL;
+ int *tmp_orc_ip_table = NULL;
+ struct orc_entry *tmp_orc_table = NULL;
+ unsigned int *orc_ip_size = (unsigned int *)arg;
+ unsigned int num_entries = *orc_ip_size / sizeof(int);
+ unsigned int orc_size = num_entries * sizeof(struct orc_entry);
+
+ idxs = (int *)malloc(*orc_ip_size);
+ if (!idxs) {
+ snprintf(g_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ, "malloc idxs: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ pthread_exit(g_err);
+ }
+
+ tmp_orc_ip_table = (int *)malloc(*orc_ip_size);
+ if (!tmp_orc_ip_table) {
+ snprintf(g_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ, "malloc tmp_orc_ip_table: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ pthread_exit(g_err);
+ }
+
+ tmp_orc_table = (struct orc_entry *)malloc(orc_size);
+ if (!tmp_orc_table) {
+ snprintf(g_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ, "malloc tmp_orc_table: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ pthread_exit(g_err);
+ }
+
+ /* initialize indices array, convert ip_table to absolute address */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) {
+ idxs[i] = i;
+ tmp_orc_ip_table[i] = g_orc_ip_table[i] + i * sizeof(int);
+ }
+ memcpy(tmp_orc_table, g_orc_table, orc_size);
+
+ qsort(idxs, num_entries, sizeof(int), orc_sort_cmp);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) {
+ if (idxs[i] == i)
+ continue;
+
+ /* convert back to relative address */
+ g_orc_ip_table[i] = tmp_orc_ip_table[idxs[i]] - i * sizeof(int);
+ g_orc_table[i] = tmp_orc_table[idxs[i]];
+ }
+
+ free(idxs);
+ free(tmp_orc_ip_table);
+ free(tmp_orc_table);
+ pthread_exit(NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
+static pthread_t mcount_sort_thread;
+
+struct elf_mcount_loc {
+ Elf_Ehdr *ehdr;
+ Elf_Shdr *init_data_sec;
+ uint64_t start_mcount_loc;
+ uint64_t stop_mcount_loc;
+};
+
+/* Sort the addresses stored between __start_mcount_loc to __stop_mcount_loc in vmlinux */
+static void *sort_mcount_loc(void *arg)
+{
+ struct elf_mcount_loc *emloc = (struct elf_mcount_loc *)arg;
+ uint64_t offset = emloc->start_mcount_loc - shdr_addr(emloc->init_data_sec)
+ + shdr_offset(emloc->init_data_sec);
+ uint64_t count = emloc->stop_mcount_loc - emloc->start_mcount_loc;
+ unsigned char *start_loc = (void *)emloc->ehdr + offset;
+
+ qsort(start_loc, count/long_size, long_size, compare_extable);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Get the address of __start_mcount_loc and __stop_mcount_loc in System.map */
+static void get_mcount_loc(uint64_t *_start, uint64_t *_stop)
+{
+ FILE *file_start, *file_stop;
+ char start_buff[20];
+ char stop_buff[20];
+ int len = 0;
+
+ file_start = popen(" grep start_mcount System.map | awk '{print $1}' ", "r");
+ if (!file_start) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "get start_mcount_loc error!");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ file_stop = popen(" grep stop_mcount System.map | awk '{print $1}' ", "r");
+ if (!file_stop) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "get stop_mcount_loc error!");
+ pclose(file_start);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ while (fgets(start_buff, sizeof(start_buff), file_start) != NULL) {
+ len = strlen(start_buff);
+ start_buff[len - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+ *_start = strtoul(start_buff, NULL, 16);
+
+ while (fgets(stop_buff, sizeof(stop_buff), file_stop) != NULL) {
+ len = strlen(stop_buff);
+ stop_buff[len - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+ *_stop = strtoul(stop_buff, NULL, 16);
+
+ pclose(file_start);
+ pclose(file_stop);
+}
+#endif
+static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
+ char const *const fname,
+ table_sort_t custom_sort)
+{
+ int rc = -1;
+ Elf_Shdr *shdr_start;
+ Elf_Shdr *strtab_sec = NULL;
+ Elf_Shdr *symtab_sec = NULL;
+ Elf_Shdr *extab_sec = NULL;
+ Elf_Shdr *string_sec;
+ Elf_Sym *sym;
+ const Elf_Sym *symtab;
+ Elf32_Word *symtab_shndx = NULL;
+ Elf_Sym *sort_needed_sym = NULL;
+ Elf_Shdr *sort_needed_sec;
+ uint32_t *sort_needed_loc;
+ void *sym_start;
+ void *sym_end;
+ const char *secstrings;
+ const char *strtab;
+ char *extab_image;
+ int sort_need_index;
+ int symentsize;
+ int shentsize;
+ int idx;
+ int i;
+ unsigned int shnum;
+ unsigned int shstrndx;
+#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
+ struct elf_mcount_loc mstruct = {0};
+ uint64_t _start_mcount_loc = 0;
+ uint64_t _stop_mcount_loc = 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED
+ unsigned int orc_ip_size = 0;
+ unsigned int orc_size = 0;
+ unsigned int orc_num_entries = 0;
+#endif
+
+ shdr_start = (Elf_Shdr *)((char *)ehdr + ehdr_shoff(ehdr));
+ shentsize = ehdr_shentsize(ehdr);
+
+ shstrndx = ehdr_shstrndx(ehdr);
+ if (shstrndx == SHN_XINDEX)
+ shstrndx = shdr_link(shdr_start);
+ string_sec = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, shstrndx);
+ secstrings = (const char *)ehdr + shdr_offset(string_sec);
+
+ shnum = ehdr_shnum(ehdr);
+ if (shnum == SHN_UNDEF)
+ shnum = shdr_size(shdr_start);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < shnum; i++) {
+ Elf_Shdr *shdr = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, i);
+
+ idx = shdr_name(shdr);
+ if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, "__ex_table"))
+ extab_sec = shdr;
+ if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".symtab"))
+ symtab_sec = shdr;
+ if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".strtab"))
+ strtab_sec = shdr;
+
+ if (shdr_type(shdr) == SHT_SYMTAB_SHNDX)
+ symtab_shndx = (Elf32_Word *)((const char *)ehdr +
+ shdr_offset(shdr));
+
+#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
+ /* locate the .init.data section in vmlinux */
+ if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".init.data")) {
+ get_mcount_loc(&_start_mcount_loc, &_stop_mcount_loc);
+ mstruct.ehdr = ehdr;
+ mstruct.init_data_sec = shdr;
+ mstruct.start_mcount_loc = _start_mcount_loc;
+ mstruct.stop_mcount_loc = _stop_mcount_loc;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED
+ /* locate the ORC unwind tables */
+ if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".orc_unwind_ip")) {
+ orc_ip_size = shdr_size(shdr);
+ g_orc_ip_table = (int *)((void *)ehdr +
+ shdr_offset(shdr));
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".orc_unwind")) {
+ orc_size = shdr_size(shdr);
+ g_orc_table = (struct orc_entry *)((void *)ehdr +
+ shdr_offset(shdr));
+ }
+#endif
+ } /* for loop */
+
+#ifdef UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED
+ if (!g_orc_ip_table || !g_orc_table) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "incomplete ORC unwind tables in file: %s\n", fname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ orc_num_entries = orc_ip_size / sizeof(int);
+ if (orc_ip_size % sizeof(int) != 0 ||
+ orc_size % sizeof(struct orc_entry) != 0 ||
+ orc_num_entries != orc_size / sizeof(struct orc_entry)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "inconsistent ORC unwind table entries in file: %s\n",
+ fname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* create thread to sort ORC unwind tables concurrently */
+ if (pthread_create(&orc_sort_thread, NULL,
+ sort_orctable, &orc_ip_size)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "pthread_create orc_sort_thread failed '%s': %s\n",
+ strerror(errno), fname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
+ if (!mstruct.init_data_sec || !_start_mcount_loc || !_stop_mcount_loc) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "incomplete mcount's sort in file: %s\n",
+ fname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* create thread to sort mcount_loc concurrently */
+ if (pthread_create(&mcount_sort_thread, NULL, &sort_mcount_loc, &mstruct)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "pthread_create mcount_sort_thread failed '%s': %s\n",
+ strerror(errno), fname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!extab_sec) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "no __ex_table in file: %s\n", fname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!symtab_sec) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "no .symtab in file: %s\n", fname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!strtab_sec) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "no .strtab in file: %s\n", fname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ extab_image = (void *)ehdr + shdr_offset(extab_sec);
+ strtab = (const char *)ehdr + shdr_offset(strtab_sec);
+ symtab = (const Elf_Sym *)((const char *)ehdr + shdr_offset(symtab_sec));
+
+ if (custom_sort) {
+ custom_sort(extab_image, shdr_size(extab_sec));
+ } else {
+ int num_entries = shdr_size(extab_sec) / extable_ent_size;
+ qsort(extab_image, num_entries,
+ extable_ent_size, compare_extable);
+ }
+
+ /* find the flag main_extable_sort_needed */
+ sym_start = (void *)ehdr + shdr_offset(symtab_sec);
+ sym_end = sym_start + shdr_size(symtab_sec);
+ symentsize = shdr_entsize(symtab_sec);
+
+ for (sym = sym_start; (void *)sym + symentsize < sym_end;
+ sym = (void *)sym + symentsize) {
+ if (sym_type(sym) != STT_OBJECT)
+ continue;
+ if (!strcmp(strtab + sym_name(sym),
+ "main_extable_sort_needed")) {
+ sort_needed_sym = sym;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!sort_needed_sym) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "no main_extable_sort_needed symbol in file: %s\n",
+ fname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ sort_need_index = get_secindex(sym_shndx(sym),
+ ((void *)sort_needed_sym - (void *)symtab) / symentsize,
+ symtab_shndx);
+ sort_needed_sec = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, sort_need_index);
+ sort_needed_loc = (void *)ehdr +
+ shdr_offset(sort_needed_sec) +
+ sym_value(sort_needed_sym) - shdr_addr(sort_needed_sec);
+
+ /* extable has been sorted, clear the flag */
+ w(0, sort_needed_loc);
+ rc = 0;
+
+out:
+#ifdef UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED
+ if (orc_sort_thread) {
+ void *retval = NULL;
+ /* wait for ORC tables sort done */
+ rc = pthread_join(orc_sort_thread, &retval);
+ if (rc) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "pthread_join failed '%s': %s\n",
+ strerror(errno), fname);
+ } else if (retval) {
+ rc = -1;
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "failed to sort ORC tables '%s': %s\n",
+ (char *)retval, fname);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
+ if (mcount_sort_thread) {
+ void *retval = NULL;
+ /* wait for mcount sort done */
+ rc = pthread_join(mcount_sort_thread, &retval);
+ if (rc) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "pthread_join failed '%s': %s\n",
+ strerror(errno), fname);
+ } else if (retval) {
+ rc = -1;
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "failed to sort mcount '%s': %s\n",
+ (char *)retval, fname);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return rc;
+}
static int compare_relative_table(const void *a, const void *b)
{
@@ -399,7 +812,6 @@ static void sort_relative_table_with_dat
static int do_file(char const *const fname, void *addr)
{
- int rc = -1;
Elf_Ehdr *ehdr = addr;
table_sort_t custom_sort = NULL;
@@ -462,29 +874,64 @@ static int do_file(char const *const fna
r2(&ehdr->e32.e_shentsize) != sizeof(Elf32_Shdr)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"unrecognized ET_EXEC/ET_DYN file: %s\n", fname);
- break;
+ return -1;
}
- rc = do_sort_32(ehdr, fname, custom_sort);
+
+ compare_extable = compare_extable_32;
+ ehdr_shoff = ehdr32_shoff;
+ ehdr_shentsize = ehdr32_shentsize;
+ ehdr_shstrndx = ehdr32_shstrndx;
+ ehdr_shnum = ehdr32_shnum;
+ shdr_addr = shdr32_addr;
+ shdr_offset = shdr32_offset;
+ shdr_link = shdr32_link;
+ shdr_size = shdr32_size;
+ shdr_name = shdr32_name;
+ shdr_type = shdr32_type;
+ shdr_entsize = shdr32_entsize;
+ sym_type = sym32_type;
+ sym_name = sym32_name;
+ sym_value = sym32_value;
+ sym_shndx = sym32_shndx;
+ long_size = 4;
+ extable_ent_size = 8;
break;
case ELFCLASS64:
- {
if (r2(&ehdr->e64.e_ehsize) != sizeof(Elf64_Ehdr) ||
r2(&ehdr->e64.e_shentsize) != sizeof(Elf64_Shdr)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"unrecognized ET_EXEC/ET_DYN file: %s\n",
fname);
- break;
- }
- rc = do_sort_64(ehdr, fname, custom_sort);
+ return -1;
}
+
+ compare_extable = compare_extable_64;
+ ehdr_shoff = ehdr64_shoff;
+ ehdr_shentsize = ehdr64_shentsize;
+ ehdr_shstrndx = ehdr64_shstrndx;
+ ehdr_shnum = ehdr64_shnum;
+ shdr_addr = shdr64_addr;
+ shdr_offset = shdr64_offset;
+ shdr_link = shdr64_link;
+ shdr_size = shdr64_size;
+ shdr_name = shdr64_name;
+ shdr_type = shdr64_type;
+ shdr_entsize = shdr64_entsize;
+ sym_type = sym64_type;
+ sym_name = sym64_name;
+ sym_value = sym64_value;
+ sym_shndx = sym64_shndx;
+ long_size = 8;
+ extable_ent_size = 16;
+
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "unrecognized ELF class %d %s\n",
ehdr->e32.e_ident[EI_CLASS], fname);
- break;
+ return -1;
}
- return rc;
+ return do_sort(ehdr, fname, custom_sort);
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
--- a/scripts/sorttable.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,485 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
-/*
- * sorttable.h
- *
- * Added ORC unwind tables sort support and other updates:
- * Copyright (C) 1999-2019 Alibaba Group Holding Limited. by:
- * Shile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
- *
- * Copyright 2011 - 2012 Cavium, Inc.
- *
- * Some of code was taken out of arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c, written by:
- * Copyright (C) 2017 Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
- *
- * Some of this code was taken out of recordmcount.h written by:
- *
- * Copyright 2009 John F. Reiser <jreiser@BitWagon.com>. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright 2010 Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com>, Red Hat Inc.
- */
-
-#undef extable_ent_size
-#undef compare_extable
-#undef get_mcount_loc
-#undef sort_mcount_loc
-#undef elf_mcount_loc
-#undef do_sort
-#undef ehdr_shoff
-#undef ehdr_shentsize
-#undef ehdr_shstrndx
-#undef ehdr_shnum
-#undef shdr_addr
-#undef shdr_offset
-#undef shdr_link
-#undef shdr_size
-#undef shdr_name
-#undef shdr_type
-#undef shdr_entsize
-#undef sym_type
-#undef sym_name
-#undef sym_value
-#undef sym_shndx
-#undef long_size
-
-#ifdef SORTTABLE_64
-# define extable_ent_size 16
-# define compare_extable compare_extable_64
-# define get_mcount_loc get_mcount_loc_64
-# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_64
-# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_64
-# define do_sort do_sort_64
-# define ehdr_shoff ehdr64_shoff
-# define ehdr_shentsize ehdr64_shentsize
-# define ehdr_shstrndx ehdr64_shstrndx
-# define ehdr_shnum ehdr64_shnum
-# define shdr_addr shdr64_addr
-# define shdr_offset shdr64_offset
-# define shdr_link shdr64_link
-# define shdr_size shdr64_size
-# define shdr_name shdr64_name
-# define shdr_type shdr64_type
-# define shdr_entsize shdr64_entsize
-# define sym_type sym64_type
-# define sym_name sym64_name
-# define sym_value sym64_value
-# define sym_shndx sym64_shndx
-# define long_size 8
-#else
-# define extable_ent_size 8
-# define compare_extable compare_extable_32
-# define get_mcount_loc get_mcount_loc_32
-# define sort_mcount_loc sort_mcount_loc_32
-# define elf_mcount_loc elf_mcount_loc_32
-# define do_sort do_sort_32
-# define ehdr_shoff ehdr32_shoff
-# define ehdr_shentsize ehdr32_shentsize
-# define ehdr_shstrndx ehdr32_shstrndx
-# define ehdr_shnum ehdr32_shnum
-# define shdr_addr shdr32_addr
-# define shdr_offset shdr32_offset
-# define shdr_link shdr32_link
-# define shdr_size shdr32_size
-# define shdr_name shdr32_name
-# define shdr_type shdr32_type
-# define shdr_entsize shdr32_entsize
-# define sym_type sym32_type
-# define sym_name sym32_name
-# define sym_value sym32_value
-# define sym_shndx sym32_shndx
-# define long_size 4
-#endif
-
-#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
-/* ORC unwinder only support X86_64 */
-#include <asm/orc_types.h>
-
-#define ERRSTR_MAXSZ 256
-
-char g_err[ERRSTR_MAXSZ];
-int *g_orc_ip_table;
-struct orc_entry *g_orc_table;
-
-pthread_t orc_sort_thread;
-
-static inline unsigned long orc_ip(const int *ip)
-{
- return (unsigned long)ip + *ip;
-}
-
-static int orc_sort_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b)
-{
- struct orc_entry *orc_a, *orc_b;
- const int *a = g_orc_ip_table + *(int *)_a;
- const int *b = g_orc_ip_table + *(int *)_b;
- unsigned long a_val = orc_ip(a);
- unsigned long b_val = orc_ip(b);
-
- if (a_val > b_val)
- return 1;
- if (a_val < b_val)
- return -1;
-
- /*
- * The "weak" section terminator entries need to always be on the left
- * to ensure the lookup code skips them in favor of real entries.
- * These terminator entries exist to handle any gaps created by
- * whitelisted .o files which didn't get objtool generation.
- */
- orc_a = g_orc_table + (a - g_orc_ip_table);
- orc_b = g_orc_table + (b - g_orc_ip_table);
- if (orc_a->type == ORC_TYPE_UNDEFINED && orc_b->type == ORC_TYPE_UNDEFINED)
- return 0;
- return orc_a->type == ORC_TYPE_UNDEFINED ? -1 : 1;
-}
-
-static void *sort_orctable(void *arg)
-{
- int i;
- int *idxs = NULL;
- int *tmp_orc_ip_table = NULL;
- struct orc_entry *tmp_orc_table = NULL;
- unsigned int *orc_ip_size = (unsigned int *)arg;
- unsigned int num_entries = *orc_ip_size / sizeof(int);
- unsigned int orc_size = num_entries * sizeof(struct orc_entry);
-
- idxs = (int *)malloc(*orc_ip_size);
- if (!idxs) {
- snprintf(g_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ, "malloc idxs: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- pthread_exit(g_err);
- }
-
- tmp_orc_ip_table = (int *)malloc(*orc_ip_size);
- if (!tmp_orc_ip_table) {
- snprintf(g_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ, "malloc tmp_orc_ip_table: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- pthread_exit(g_err);
- }
-
- tmp_orc_table = (struct orc_entry *)malloc(orc_size);
- if (!tmp_orc_table) {
- snprintf(g_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ, "malloc tmp_orc_table: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- pthread_exit(g_err);
- }
-
- /* initialize indices array, convert ip_table to absolute address */
- for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) {
- idxs[i] = i;
- tmp_orc_ip_table[i] = g_orc_ip_table[i] + i * sizeof(int);
- }
- memcpy(tmp_orc_table, g_orc_table, orc_size);
-
- qsort(idxs, num_entries, sizeof(int), orc_sort_cmp);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) {
- if (idxs[i] == i)
- continue;
-
- /* convert back to relative address */
- g_orc_ip_table[i] = tmp_orc_ip_table[idxs[i]] - i * sizeof(int);
- g_orc_table[i] = tmp_orc_table[idxs[i]];
- }
-
- free(idxs);
- free(tmp_orc_ip_table);
- free(tmp_orc_table);
- pthread_exit(NULL);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
-pthread_t mcount_sort_thread;
-
-struct elf_mcount_loc {
- Elf_Ehdr *ehdr;
- Elf_Shdr *init_data_sec;
- uint64_t start_mcount_loc;
- uint64_t stop_mcount_loc;
-};
-
-/* Sort the addresses stored between __start_mcount_loc to __stop_mcount_loc in vmlinux */
-static void *sort_mcount_loc(void *arg)
-{
- struct elf_mcount_loc *emloc = (struct elf_mcount_loc *)arg;
- uint64_t offset = emloc->start_mcount_loc - shdr_addr(emloc->init_data_sec)
- + shdr_offset(emloc->init_data_sec);
- uint64_t count = emloc->stop_mcount_loc - emloc->start_mcount_loc;
- unsigned char *start_loc = (void *)emloc->ehdr + offset;
-
- qsort(start_loc, count/long_size, long_size, compare_extable);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/* Get the address of __start_mcount_loc and __stop_mcount_loc in System.map */
-static void get_mcount_loc(uint64_t *_start, uint64_t *_stop)
-{
- FILE *file_start, *file_stop;
- char start_buff[20];
- char stop_buff[20];
- int len = 0;
-
- file_start = popen(" grep start_mcount System.map | awk '{print $1}' ", "r");
- if (!file_start) {
- fprintf(stderr, "get start_mcount_loc error!");
- return;
- }
-
- file_stop = popen(" grep stop_mcount System.map | awk '{print $1}' ", "r");
- if (!file_stop) {
- fprintf(stderr, "get stop_mcount_loc error!");
- pclose(file_start);
- return;
- }
-
- while (fgets(start_buff, sizeof(start_buff), file_start) != NULL) {
- len = strlen(start_buff);
- start_buff[len - 1] = '\0';
- }
- *_start = strtoul(start_buff, NULL, 16);
-
- while (fgets(stop_buff, sizeof(stop_buff), file_stop) != NULL) {
- len = strlen(stop_buff);
- stop_buff[len - 1] = '\0';
- }
- *_stop = strtoul(stop_buff, NULL, 16);
-
- pclose(file_start);
- pclose(file_stop);
-}
-#endif
-static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
- char const *const fname,
- table_sort_t custom_sort)
-{
- int rc = -1;
- Elf_Shdr *shdr_start;
- Elf_Shdr *strtab_sec = NULL;
- Elf_Shdr *symtab_sec = NULL;
- Elf_Shdr *extab_sec = NULL;
- Elf_Shdr *string_sec;
- Elf_Sym *sym;
- const Elf_Sym *symtab;
- Elf32_Word *symtab_shndx = NULL;
- Elf_Sym *sort_needed_sym = NULL;
- Elf_Shdr *sort_needed_sec;
- uint32_t *sort_needed_loc;
- void *sym_start;
- void *sym_end;
- const char *secstrings;
- const char *strtab;
- char *extab_image;
- int sort_need_index;
- int symentsize;
- int shentsize;
- int idx;
- int i;
- unsigned int shnum;
- unsigned int shstrndx;
-#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
- struct elf_mcount_loc mstruct = {0};
- uint64_t _start_mcount_loc = 0;
- uint64_t _stop_mcount_loc = 0;
-#endif
-#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
- unsigned int orc_ip_size = 0;
- unsigned int orc_size = 0;
- unsigned int orc_num_entries = 0;
-#endif
-
- shdr_start = (Elf_Shdr *)((char *)ehdr + ehdr_shoff(ehdr));
- shentsize = ehdr_shentsize(ehdr);
-
- shstrndx = ehdr_shstrndx(ehdr);
- if (shstrndx == SHN_XINDEX)
- shstrndx = shdr_link(shdr_start);
- string_sec = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, shstrndx);
- secstrings = (const char *)ehdr + shdr_offset(string_sec);
-
- shnum = ehdr_shnum(ehdr);
- if (shnum == SHN_UNDEF)
- shnum = shdr_size(shdr_start);
-
- for (i = 0; i < shnum; i++) {
- Elf_Shdr *shdr = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, i);
-
- idx = shdr_name(shdr);
- if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, "__ex_table"))
- extab_sec = shdr;
- if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".symtab"))
- symtab_sec = shdr;
- if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".strtab"))
- strtab_sec = shdr;
-
- if (shdr_type(shdr) == SHT_SYMTAB_SHNDX)
- symtab_shndx = (Elf32_Word *)((const char *)ehdr +
- shdr_offset(shdr));
-
-#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
- /* locate the .init.data section in vmlinux */
- if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".init.data")) {
- get_mcount_loc(&_start_mcount_loc, &_stop_mcount_loc);
- mstruct.ehdr = ehdr;
- mstruct.init_data_sec = shdr;
- mstruct.start_mcount_loc = _start_mcount_loc;
- mstruct.stop_mcount_loc = _stop_mcount_loc;
- }
-#endif
-
-#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
- /* locate the ORC unwind tables */
- if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".orc_unwind_ip")) {
- orc_ip_size = shdr_size(shdr);
- g_orc_ip_table = (int *)((void *)ehdr +
- shdr_offset(shdr));
- }
- if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".orc_unwind")) {
- orc_size = shdr_size(shdr);
- g_orc_table = (struct orc_entry *)((void *)ehdr +
- shdr_offset(shdr));
- }
-#endif
- } /* for loop */
-
-#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
- if (!g_orc_ip_table || !g_orc_table) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "incomplete ORC unwind tables in file: %s\n", fname);
- goto out;
- }
-
- orc_num_entries = orc_ip_size / sizeof(int);
- if (orc_ip_size % sizeof(int) != 0 ||
- orc_size % sizeof(struct orc_entry) != 0 ||
- orc_num_entries != orc_size / sizeof(struct orc_entry)) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "inconsistent ORC unwind table entries in file: %s\n",
- fname);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* create thread to sort ORC unwind tables concurrently */
- if (pthread_create(&orc_sort_thread, NULL,
- sort_orctable, &orc_ip_size)) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "pthread_create orc_sort_thread failed '%s': %s\n",
- strerror(errno), fname);
- goto out;
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
- if (!mstruct.init_data_sec || !_start_mcount_loc || !_stop_mcount_loc) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "incomplete mcount's sort in file: %s\n",
- fname);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* create thread to sort mcount_loc concurrently */
- if (pthread_create(&mcount_sort_thread, NULL, &sort_mcount_loc, &mstruct)) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "pthread_create mcount_sort_thread failed '%s': %s\n",
- strerror(errno), fname);
- goto out;
- }
-#endif
- if (!extab_sec) {
- fprintf(stderr, "no __ex_table in file: %s\n", fname);
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (!symtab_sec) {
- fprintf(stderr, "no .symtab in file: %s\n", fname);
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (!strtab_sec) {
- fprintf(stderr, "no .strtab in file: %s\n", fname);
- goto out;
- }
-
- extab_image = (void *)ehdr + shdr_offset(extab_sec);
- strtab = (const char *)ehdr + shdr_offset(strtab_sec);
- symtab = (const Elf_Sym *)((const char *)ehdr + shdr_offset(symtab_sec));
-
- if (custom_sort) {
- custom_sort(extab_image, shdr_size(extab_sec));
- } else {
- int num_entries = shdr_size(extab_sec) / extable_ent_size;
- qsort(extab_image, num_entries,
- extable_ent_size, compare_extable);
- }
-
- /* find the flag main_extable_sort_needed */
- sym_start = (void *)ehdr + shdr_offset(symtab_sec);
- sym_end = sym_start + shdr_size(symtab_sec);
- symentsize = shdr_entsize(symtab_sec);
-
- for (sym = sym_start; (void *)sym + symentsize < sym_end;
- sym = (void *)sym + symentsize) {
- if (sym_type(sym) != STT_OBJECT)
- continue;
- if (!strcmp(strtab + sym_name(sym),
- "main_extable_sort_needed")) {
- sort_needed_sym = sym;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (!sort_needed_sym) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "no main_extable_sort_needed symbol in file: %s\n",
- fname);
- goto out;
- }
-
- sort_need_index = get_secindex(sym_shndx(sym),
- ((void *)sort_needed_sym - (void *)symtab) / symentsize,
- symtab_shndx);
- sort_needed_sec = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, sort_need_index);
- sort_needed_loc = (void *)ehdr +
- shdr_offset(sort_needed_sec) +
- sym_value(sort_needed_sym) - shdr_addr(sort_needed_sec);
-
- /* extable has been sorted, clear the flag */
- w(0, sort_needed_loc);
- rc = 0;
-
-out:
-#if defined(SORTTABLE_64) && defined(UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED)
- if (orc_sort_thread) {
- void *retval = NULL;
- /* wait for ORC tables sort done */
- rc = pthread_join(orc_sort_thread, &retval);
- if (rc) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "pthread_join failed '%s': %s\n",
- strerror(errno), fname);
- } else if (retval) {
- rc = -1;
- fprintf(stderr,
- "failed to sort ORC tables '%s': %s\n",
- (char *)retval, fname);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
- if (mcount_sort_thread) {
- void *retval = NULL;
- /* wait for mcount sort done */
- rc = pthread_join(mcount_sort_thread, &retval);
- if (rc) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "pthread_join failed '%s': %s\n",
- strerror(errno), fname);
- } else if (retval) {
- rc = -1;
- fprintf(stderr,
- "failed to sort mcount '%s': %s\n",
- (char *)retval, fname);
- }
- }
-#endif
- return rc;
-}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 057/175] scripts/sorttable: Get start/stop_mcount_loc from ELF file directly
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (55 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 056/175] scripts/sorttable: Move code from sorttable.h into sorttable.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 058/175] scripts/sorttable: Use a structure of function pointers for elf helpers Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (126 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 4acda8edefa1ce66d3de845f1c12745721cd14c3 ]
The get_mcount_loc() does a cheesy trick to find the start_mcount_loc and
stop_mcount_loc values. That trick is:
file_start = popen(" grep start_mcount System.map | awk '{print $1}' ", "r");
and
file_stop = popen(" grep stop_mcount System.map | awk '{print $1}' ", "r");
Those values are stored in the Elf symbol table. Use that to capture those
values. Using the symbol table is more efficient and more robust. The
above could fail if another variable had "start_mcount" or "stop_mcount"
as part of its name.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250105162346.817157047@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -472,42 +472,41 @@ static void *sort_mcount_loc(void *arg)
}
/* Get the address of __start_mcount_loc and __stop_mcount_loc in System.map */
-static void get_mcount_loc(uint64_t *_start, uint64_t *_stop)
+static void get_mcount_loc(struct elf_mcount_loc *emloc, Elf_Shdr *symtab_sec,
+ const char *strtab)
{
- FILE *file_start, *file_stop;
- char start_buff[20];
- char stop_buff[20];
- int len = 0;
+ Elf_Sym *sym, *end_sym;
+ int symentsize = shdr_entsize(symtab_sec);
+ int found = 0;
+
+ sym = (void *)emloc->ehdr + shdr_offset(symtab_sec);
+ end_sym = (void *)sym + shdr_size(symtab_sec);
+
+ while (sym < end_sym) {
+ if (!strcmp(strtab + sym_name(sym), "__start_mcount_loc")) {
+ emloc->start_mcount_loc = sym_value(sym);
+ if (++found == 2)
+ break;
+ } else if (!strcmp(strtab + sym_name(sym), "__stop_mcount_loc")) {
+ emloc->stop_mcount_loc = sym_value(sym);
+ if (++found == 2)
+ break;
+ }
+ sym = (void *)sym + symentsize;
+ }
- file_start = popen(" grep start_mcount System.map | awk '{print $1}' ", "r");
- if (!file_start) {
+ if (!emloc->start_mcount_loc) {
fprintf(stderr, "get start_mcount_loc error!");
return;
}
- file_stop = popen(" grep stop_mcount System.map | awk '{print $1}' ", "r");
- if (!file_stop) {
+ if (!emloc->stop_mcount_loc) {
fprintf(stderr, "get stop_mcount_loc error!");
- pclose(file_start);
return;
}
-
- while (fgets(start_buff, sizeof(start_buff), file_start) != NULL) {
- len = strlen(start_buff);
- start_buff[len - 1] = '\0';
- }
- *_start = strtoul(start_buff, NULL, 16);
-
- while (fgets(stop_buff, sizeof(stop_buff), file_stop) != NULL) {
- len = strlen(stop_buff);
- stop_buff[len - 1] = '\0';
- }
- *_stop = strtoul(stop_buff, NULL, 16);
-
- pclose(file_start);
- pclose(file_stop);
}
#endif
+
static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
char const *const fname,
table_sort_t custom_sort)
@@ -538,8 +537,6 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
unsigned int shstrndx;
#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
struct elf_mcount_loc mstruct = {0};
- uint64_t _start_mcount_loc = 0;
- uint64_t _stop_mcount_loc = 0;
#endif
#ifdef UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED
unsigned int orc_ip_size = 0;
@@ -577,13 +574,8 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
/* locate the .init.data section in vmlinux */
- if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".init.data")) {
- get_mcount_loc(&_start_mcount_loc, &_stop_mcount_loc);
- mstruct.ehdr = ehdr;
+ if (!strcmp(secstrings + idx, ".init.data"))
mstruct.init_data_sec = shdr;
- mstruct.start_mcount_loc = _start_mcount_loc;
- mstruct.stop_mcount_loc = _stop_mcount_loc;
- }
#endif
#ifdef UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED
@@ -627,23 +619,6 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
goto out;
}
#endif
-
-#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
- if (!mstruct.init_data_sec || !_start_mcount_loc || !_stop_mcount_loc) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "incomplete mcount's sort in file: %s\n",
- fname);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* create thread to sort mcount_loc concurrently */
- if (pthread_create(&mcount_sort_thread, NULL, &sort_mcount_loc, &mstruct)) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "pthread_create mcount_sort_thread failed '%s': %s\n",
- strerror(errno), fname);
- goto out;
- }
-#endif
if (!extab_sec) {
fprintf(stderr, "no __ex_table in file: %s\n", fname);
goto out;
@@ -663,6 +638,26 @@ static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
strtab = (const char *)ehdr + shdr_offset(strtab_sec);
symtab = (const Elf_Sym *)((const char *)ehdr + shdr_offset(symtab_sec));
+#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
+ mstruct.ehdr = ehdr;
+ get_mcount_loc(&mstruct, symtab_sec, strtab);
+
+ if (!mstruct.init_data_sec || !mstruct.start_mcount_loc || !mstruct.stop_mcount_loc) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "incomplete mcount's sort in file: %s\n",
+ fname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* create thread to sort mcount_loc concurrently */
+ if (pthread_create(&mcount_sort_thread, NULL, &sort_mcount_loc, &mstruct)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "pthread_create mcount_sort_thread failed '%s': %s\n",
+ strerror(errno), fname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+#endif
+
if (custom_sort) {
custom_sort(extab_image, shdr_size(extab_sec));
} else {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 058/175] scripts/sorttable: Use a structure of function pointers for elf helpers
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 057/175] scripts/sorttable: Get start/stop_mcount_loc from ELF file directly Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 059/175] arm64: scripts/sorttable: Implement sorting mcount_loc at boot for arm64 Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (125 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Masahiro Yamada,
Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian, Martin Kelly,
Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf, Stephen Rothwell,
Linus Torvalds, Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 1e5f6771c247b28135307058d2cfe3b0153733dc ]
Instead of having a series of function pointers that gets assigned to the
Elf64 or Elf32 versions, put them all into a single structure and use
that. Add the helper function that chooses the structure into the macros
that build the different versions of the elf functions.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wiafEyX7UgOeZgvd6fvuByE5WXUPh9599kwOc_d-pdeug@mail.gmail.com/
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250110075459.13d4b94c@gandalf.local.home
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 175 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 118 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -85,6 +85,25 @@ static uint64_t (*r8)(const uint64_t *);
static void (*w)(uint32_t, uint32_t *);
typedef void (*table_sort_t)(char *, int);
+static struct elf_funcs {
+ int (*compare_extable)(const void *a, const void *b);
+ uint64_t (*ehdr_shoff)(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr);
+ uint16_t (*ehdr_shstrndx)(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr);
+ uint16_t (*ehdr_shentsize)(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr);
+ uint16_t (*ehdr_shnum)(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr);
+ uint64_t (*shdr_addr)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+ uint64_t (*shdr_offset)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+ uint64_t (*shdr_size)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+ uint64_t (*shdr_entsize)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+ uint32_t (*shdr_link)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+ uint32_t (*shdr_name)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+ uint32_t (*shdr_type)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
+ uint8_t (*sym_type)(Elf_Sym *sym);
+ uint32_t (*sym_name)(Elf_Sym *sym);
+ uint64_t (*sym_value)(Elf_Sym *sym);
+ uint16_t (*sym_shndx)(Elf_Sym *sym);
+} e;
+
static uint64_t ehdr64_shoff(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr)
{
return r8(&ehdr->e64.e_shoff);
@@ -95,6 +114,11 @@ static uint64_t ehdr32_shoff(Elf_Ehdr *e
return r(&ehdr->e32.e_shoff);
}
+static uint64_t ehdr_shoff(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr)
+{
+ return e.ehdr_shoff(ehdr);
+}
+
#define EHDR_HALF(fn_name) \
static uint16_t ehdr64_##fn_name(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr) \
{ \
@@ -104,6 +128,11 @@ static uint16_t ehdr64_##fn_name(Elf_Ehd
static uint16_t ehdr32_##fn_name(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr) \
{ \
return r2(&ehdr->e32.e_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint16_t ehdr_##fn_name(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr) \
+{ \
+ return e.ehdr_##fn_name(ehdr); \
}
EHDR_HALF(shentsize)
@@ -119,6 +148,11 @@ static uint32_t shdr64_##fn_name(Elf_Shd
static uint32_t shdr32_##fn_name(Elf_Shdr *shdr) \
{ \
return r(&shdr->e32.sh_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint32_t shdr_##fn_name(Elf_Shdr *shdr) \
+{ \
+ return e.shdr_##fn_name(shdr); \
}
#define SHDR_ADDR(fn_name) \
@@ -130,6 +164,11 @@ static uint64_t shdr64_##fn_name(Elf_Shd
static uint64_t shdr32_##fn_name(Elf_Shdr *shdr) \
{ \
return r(&shdr->e32.sh_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint64_t shdr_##fn_name(Elf_Shdr *shdr) \
+{ \
+ return e.shdr_##fn_name(shdr); \
}
#define SHDR_WORD(fn_name) \
@@ -141,6 +180,10 @@ static uint32_t shdr64_##fn_name(Elf_Shd
static uint32_t shdr32_##fn_name(Elf_Shdr *shdr) \
{ \
return r(&shdr->e32.sh_##fn_name); \
+} \
+static uint32_t shdr_##fn_name(Elf_Shdr *shdr) \
+{ \
+ return e.shdr_##fn_name(shdr); \
}
SHDR_ADDR(addr)
@@ -161,6 +204,11 @@ static uint64_t sym64_##fn_name(Elf_Sym
static uint64_t sym32_##fn_name(Elf_Sym *sym) \
{ \
return r(&sym->e32.st_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint64_t sym_##fn_name(Elf_Sym *sym) \
+{ \
+ return e.sym_##fn_name(sym); \
}
#define SYM_WORD(fn_name) \
@@ -172,6 +220,11 @@ static uint32_t sym64_##fn_name(Elf_Sym
static uint32_t sym32_##fn_name(Elf_Sym *sym) \
{ \
return r(&sym->e32.st_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint32_t sym_##fn_name(Elf_Sym *sym) \
+{ \
+ return e.sym_##fn_name(sym); \
}
#define SYM_HALF(fn_name) \
@@ -183,6 +236,11 @@ static uint16_t sym64_##fn_name(Elf_Sym
static uint16_t sym32_##fn_name(Elf_Sym *sym) \
{ \
return r2(&sym->e32.st_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint16_t sym_##fn_name(Elf_Sym *sym) \
+{ \
+ return e.sym_##fn_name(sym); \
}
static uint8_t sym64_type(Elf_Sym *sym)
@@ -195,6 +253,11 @@ static uint8_t sym32_type(Elf_Sym *sym)
return ELF32_ST_TYPE(sym->e32.st_info);
}
+static uint8_t sym_type(Elf_Sym *sym)
+{
+ return e.sym_type(sym);
+}
+
SYM_ADDR(value)
SYM_WORD(name)
SYM_HALF(shndx)
@@ -322,29 +385,16 @@ static int compare_extable_64(const void
return av > bv;
}
+static int compare_extable(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ return e.compare_extable(a, b);
+}
+
static inline void *get_index(void *start, int entsize, int index)
{
return start + (entsize * index);
}
-
-static int (*compare_extable)(const void *a, const void *b);
-static uint64_t (*ehdr_shoff)(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr);
-static uint16_t (*ehdr_shstrndx)(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr);
-static uint16_t (*ehdr_shentsize)(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr);
-static uint16_t (*ehdr_shnum)(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr);
-static uint64_t (*shdr_addr)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
-static uint64_t (*shdr_offset)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
-static uint64_t (*shdr_size)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
-static uint64_t (*shdr_entsize)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
-static uint32_t (*shdr_link)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
-static uint32_t (*shdr_name)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
-static uint32_t (*shdr_type)(Elf_Shdr *shdr);
-static uint8_t (*sym_type)(Elf_Sym *sym);
-static uint32_t (*sym_name)(Elf_Sym *sym);
-static uint64_t (*sym_value)(Elf_Sym *sym);
-static uint16_t (*sym_shndx)(Elf_Sym *sym);
-
static int extable_ent_size;
static int long_size;
@@ -864,7 +914,30 @@ static int do_file(char const *const fna
}
switch (ehdr->e32.e_ident[EI_CLASS]) {
- case ELFCLASS32:
+ case ELFCLASS32: {
+ struct elf_funcs efuncs = {
+ .compare_extable = compare_extable_32,
+ .ehdr_shoff = ehdr32_shoff,
+ .ehdr_shentsize = ehdr32_shentsize,
+ .ehdr_shstrndx = ehdr32_shstrndx,
+ .ehdr_shnum = ehdr32_shnum,
+ .shdr_addr = shdr32_addr,
+ .shdr_offset = shdr32_offset,
+ .shdr_link = shdr32_link,
+ .shdr_size = shdr32_size,
+ .shdr_name = shdr32_name,
+ .shdr_type = shdr32_type,
+ .shdr_entsize = shdr32_entsize,
+ .sym_type = sym32_type,
+ .sym_name = sym32_name,
+ .sym_value = sym32_value,
+ .sym_shndx = sym32_shndx,
+ };
+
+ e = efuncs;
+ long_size = 4;
+ extable_ent_size = 8;
+
if (r2(&ehdr->e32.e_ehsize) != sizeof(Elf32_Ehdr) ||
r2(&ehdr->e32.e_shentsize) != sizeof(Elf32_Shdr)) {
fprintf(stderr,
@@ -872,26 +945,32 @@ static int do_file(char const *const fna
return -1;
}
- compare_extable = compare_extable_32;
- ehdr_shoff = ehdr32_shoff;
- ehdr_shentsize = ehdr32_shentsize;
- ehdr_shstrndx = ehdr32_shstrndx;
- ehdr_shnum = ehdr32_shnum;
- shdr_addr = shdr32_addr;
- shdr_offset = shdr32_offset;
- shdr_link = shdr32_link;
- shdr_size = shdr32_size;
- shdr_name = shdr32_name;
- shdr_type = shdr32_type;
- shdr_entsize = shdr32_entsize;
- sym_type = sym32_type;
- sym_name = sym32_name;
- sym_value = sym32_value;
- sym_shndx = sym32_shndx;
- long_size = 4;
- extable_ent_size = 8;
+ }
break;
- case ELFCLASS64:
+ case ELFCLASS64: {
+ struct elf_funcs efuncs = {
+ .compare_extable = compare_extable_64,
+ .ehdr_shoff = ehdr64_shoff,
+ .ehdr_shentsize = ehdr64_shentsize,
+ .ehdr_shstrndx = ehdr64_shstrndx,
+ .ehdr_shnum = ehdr64_shnum,
+ .shdr_addr = shdr64_addr,
+ .shdr_offset = shdr64_offset,
+ .shdr_link = shdr64_link,
+ .shdr_size = shdr64_size,
+ .shdr_name = shdr64_name,
+ .shdr_type = shdr64_type,
+ .shdr_entsize = shdr64_entsize,
+ .sym_type = sym64_type,
+ .sym_name = sym64_name,
+ .sym_value = sym64_value,
+ .sym_shndx = sym64_shndx,
+ };
+
+ e = efuncs;
+ long_size = 8;
+ extable_ent_size = 16;
+
if (r2(&ehdr->e64.e_ehsize) != sizeof(Elf64_Ehdr) ||
r2(&ehdr->e64.e_shentsize) != sizeof(Elf64_Shdr)) {
fprintf(stderr,
@@ -900,25 +979,7 @@ static int do_file(char const *const fna
return -1;
}
- compare_extable = compare_extable_64;
- ehdr_shoff = ehdr64_shoff;
- ehdr_shentsize = ehdr64_shentsize;
- ehdr_shstrndx = ehdr64_shstrndx;
- ehdr_shnum = ehdr64_shnum;
- shdr_addr = shdr64_addr;
- shdr_offset = shdr64_offset;
- shdr_link = shdr64_link;
- shdr_size = shdr64_size;
- shdr_name = shdr64_name;
- shdr_type = shdr64_type;
- shdr_entsize = shdr64_entsize;
- sym_type = sym64_type;
- sym_name = sym64_name;
- sym_value = sym64_value;
- sym_shndx = sym64_shndx;
- long_size = 8;
- extable_ent_size = 16;
-
+ }
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "unrecognized ELF class %d %s\n",
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 059/175] arm64: scripts/sorttable: Implement sorting mcount_loc at boot for arm64
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (57 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 058/175] scripts/sorttable: Use a structure of function pointers for elf helpers Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 060/175] scripts/sorttable: Have mcount rela sort use direct values Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (124 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf, Heiko Carstens,
Will Deacon, Vasily Gorbik, Alexander Gordeev, Catalin Marinas,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit b3d09d06e052e1d754645acea4e4d1e96f81c934 ]
The mcount_loc section holds the addresses of the functions that get
patched by ftrace when enabling function callbacks. It can contain tens of
thousands of entries. These addresses must be sorted. If they are not
sorted at compile time, they are sorted at boot. Sorting at boot does take
some time and does have a small impact on boot performance.
x86 and arm32 have the addresses in the mcount_loc section of the ELF
file. But for arm64, the section just contains zeros. The .rela.dyn
Elf_Rela section holds the addresses and they get patched at boot during
the relocation phase.
In order to sort these addresses, the Elf_Rela needs to be updated instead
of the location in the binary that holds the mcount_loc section. Have the
sorttable code, allocate an array to hold the functions, load the
addresses from the Elf_Rela entries, sort them, then put them back in
order into the Elf_rela entries so that they will be sorted at boot up
without having to sort them during boot up.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250218200022.373319428@goodmis.org
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1
scripts/sorttable.c | 185 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ config ARM64
if DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_ARGS
select HAVE_SAMPLE_FTRACE_DIRECT
select HAVE_SAMPLE_FTRACE_DIRECT_MULTI
+ select HAVE_BUILDTIME_MCOUNT_SORT
select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
select HAVE_FAST_GUP
select HAVE_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
@@ -79,10 +80,16 @@ typedef union {
Elf64_Sym e64;
} Elf_Sym;
+typedef union {
+ Elf32_Rela e32;
+ Elf64_Rela e64;
+} Elf_Rela;
+
static uint32_t (*r)(const uint32_t *);
static uint16_t (*r2)(const uint16_t *);
static uint64_t (*r8)(const uint64_t *);
static void (*w)(uint32_t, uint32_t *);
+static void (*w8)(uint64_t, uint64_t *);
typedef void (*table_sort_t)(char *, int);
static struct elf_funcs {
@@ -102,6 +109,10 @@ static struct elf_funcs {
uint32_t (*sym_name)(Elf_Sym *sym);
uint64_t (*sym_value)(Elf_Sym *sym);
uint16_t (*sym_shndx)(Elf_Sym *sym);
+ uint64_t (*rela_offset)(Elf_Rela *rela);
+ uint64_t (*rela_info)(Elf_Rela *rela);
+ uint64_t (*rela_addend)(Elf_Rela *rela);
+ void (*rela_write_addend)(Elf_Rela *rela, uint64_t val);
} e;
static uint64_t ehdr64_shoff(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr)
@@ -262,6 +273,38 @@ SYM_ADDR(value)
SYM_WORD(name)
SYM_HALF(shndx)
+#define __maybe_unused __attribute__((__unused__))
+
+#define RELA_ADDR(fn_name) \
+static uint64_t rela64_##fn_name(Elf_Rela *rela) \
+{ \
+ return r8((uint64_t *)&rela->e64.r_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint64_t rela32_##fn_name(Elf_Rela *rela) \
+{ \
+ return r((uint32_t *)&rela->e32.r_##fn_name); \
+} \
+ \
+static uint64_t __maybe_unused rela_##fn_name(Elf_Rela *rela) \
+{ \
+ return e.rela_##fn_name(rela); \
+}
+
+RELA_ADDR(offset)
+RELA_ADDR(info)
+RELA_ADDR(addend)
+
+static void rela64_write_addend(Elf_Rela *rela, uint64_t val)
+{
+ w8(val, (uint64_t *)&rela->e64.r_addend);
+}
+
+static void rela32_write_addend(Elf_Rela *rela, uint64_t val)
+{
+ w(val, (uint32_t *)&rela->e32.r_addend);
+}
+
/*
* Get the whole file as a programming convenience in order to avoid
* malloc+lseek+read+free of many pieces. If successful, then mmap
@@ -341,6 +384,16 @@ static void wle(uint32_t val, uint32_t *
put_unaligned_le32(val, x);
}
+static void w8be(uint64_t val, uint64_t *x)
+{
+ put_unaligned_be64(val, x);
+}
+
+static void w8le(uint64_t val, uint64_t *x)
+{
+ put_unaligned_le64(val, x);
+}
+
/*
* Move reserved section indices SHN_LORESERVE..SHN_HIRESERVE out of
* the way to -256..-1, to avoid conflicting with real section
@@ -398,13 +451,12 @@ static inline void *get_index(void *star
static int extable_ent_size;
static int long_size;
+#define ERRSTR_MAXSZ 256
#ifdef UNWINDER_ORC_ENABLED
/* ORC unwinder only support X86_64 */
#include <asm/orc_types.h>
-#define ERRSTR_MAXSZ 256
-
static char g_err[ERRSTR_MAXSZ];
static int *g_orc_ip_table;
static struct orc_entry *g_orc_table;
@@ -499,7 +551,19 @@ static void *sort_orctable(void *arg)
#endif
#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
+
+/* Only used for sorting mcount table */
+static void rela_write_addend(Elf_Rela *rela, uint64_t val)
+{
+ e.rela_write_addend(rela, val);
+}
+
static pthread_t mcount_sort_thread;
+static bool sort_reloc;
+
+static long rela_type;
+
+static char m_err[ERRSTR_MAXSZ];
struct elf_mcount_loc {
Elf_Ehdr *ehdr;
@@ -508,6 +572,103 @@ struct elf_mcount_loc {
uint64_t stop_mcount_loc;
};
+/* Sort the relocations not the address itself */
+static void *sort_relocs(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr, uint64_t start_loc, uint64_t size)
+{
+ Elf_Shdr *shdr_start;
+ Elf_Rela *rel;
+ unsigned int shnum;
+ unsigned int count;
+ int shentsize;
+ void *vals;
+ void *ptr;
+
+ shdr_start = (Elf_Shdr *)((char *)ehdr + ehdr_shoff(ehdr));
+ shentsize = ehdr_shentsize(ehdr);
+
+ vals = malloc(long_size * size);
+ if (!vals) {
+ snprintf(m_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ, "Failed to allocate sort array");
+ pthread_exit(m_err);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ptr = vals;
+
+ shnum = ehdr_shnum(ehdr);
+ if (shnum == SHN_UNDEF)
+ shnum = shdr_size(shdr_start);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < shnum; i++) {
+ Elf_Shdr *shdr = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, i);
+ void *end;
+
+ if (shdr_type(shdr) != SHT_RELA)
+ continue;
+
+ rel = (void *)ehdr + shdr_offset(shdr);
+ end = (void *)rel + shdr_size(shdr);
+
+ for (; (void *)rel < end; rel = (void *)rel + shdr_entsize(shdr)) {
+ uint64_t offset = rela_offset(rel);
+
+ if (offset >= start_loc && offset < start_loc + size) {
+ if (ptr + long_size > vals + size) {
+ free(vals);
+ snprintf(m_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ,
+ "Too many relocations");
+ pthread_exit(m_err);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure this has the correct type */
+ if (rela_info(rel) != rela_type) {
+ free(vals);
+ snprintf(m_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ,
+ "rela has type %lx but expected %lx\n",
+ (long)rela_info(rel), rela_type);
+ pthread_exit(m_err);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (long_size == 4)
+ *(uint32_t *)ptr = rela_addend(rel);
+ else
+ *(uint64_t *)ptr = rela_addend(rel);
+ ptr += long_size;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ count = ptr - vals;
+ qsort(vals, count / long_size, long_size, compare_extable);
+
+ ptr = vals;
+ for (int i = 0; i < shnum; i++) {
+ Elf_Shdr *shdr = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, i);
+ void *end;
+
+ if (shdr_type(shdr) != SHT_RELA)
+ continue;
+
+ rel = (void *)ehdr + shdr_offset(shdr);
+ end = (void *)rel + shdr_size(shdr);
+
+ for (; (void *)rel < end; rel = (void *)rel + shdr_entsize(shdr)) {
+ uint64_t offset = rela_offset(rel);
+
+ if (offset >= start_loc && offset < start_loc + size) {
+ if (long_size == 4)
+ rela_write_addend(rel, *(uint32_t *)ptr);
+ else
+ rela_write_addend(rel, *(uint64_t *)ptr);
+ ptr += long_size;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ free(vals);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/* Sort the addresses stored between __start_mcount_loc to __stop_mcount_loc in vmlinux */
static void *sort_mcount_loc(void *arg)
{
@@ -517,6 +678,9 @@ static void *sort_mcount_loc(void *arg)
uint64_t count = emloc->stop_mcount_loc - emloc->start_mcount_loc;
unsigned char *start_loc = (void *)emloc->ehdr + offset;
+ if (sort_reloc)
+ return sort_relocs(emloc->ehdr, emloc->start_mcount_loc, count);
+
qsort(start_loc, count/long_size, long_size, compare_extable);
return NULL;
}
@@ -866,12 +1030,14 @@ static int do_file(char const *const fna
r2 = r2le;
r8 = r8le;
w = wle;
+ w8 = w8le;
break;
case ELFDATA2MSB:
r = rbe;
r2 = r2be;
r8 = r8be;
w = wbe;
+ w8 = w8be;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "unrecognized ELF data encoding %d: %s\n",
@@ -887,8 +1053,13 @@ static int do_file(char const *const fna
}
switch (r2(&ehdr->e32.e_machine)) {
- case EM_386:
case EM_AARCH64:
+#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
+ sort_reloc = true;
+ rela_type = 0x403;
+#endif
+ /* fallthrough */
+ case EM_386:
case EM_LOONGARCH:
case EM_RISCV:
case EM_S390:
@@ -932,6 +1103,10 @@ static int do_file(char const *const fna
.sym_name = sym32_name,
.sym_value = sym32_value,
.sym_shndx = sym32_shndx,
+ .rela_offset = rela32_offset,
+ .rela_info = rela32_info,
+ .rela_addend = rela32_addend,
+ .rela_write_addend = rela32_write_addend,
};
e = efuncs;
@@ -965,6 +1140,10 @@ static int do_file(char const *const fna
.sym_name = sym64_name,
.sym_value = sym64_value,
.sym_shndx = sym64_shndx,
+ .rela_offset = rela64_offset,
+ .rela_info = rela64_info,
+ .rela_addend = rela64_addend,
+ .rela_write_addend = rela64_write_addend,
};
e = efuncs;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 060/175] scripts/sorttable: Have mcount rela sort use direct values
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (58 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 059/175] arm64: scripts/sorttable: Implement sorting mcount_loc at boot for arm64 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 061/175] scripts/sorttable: Always use an array for the mcount_loc sorting Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (123 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf, Heiko Carstens,
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Vasily Gorbik, Alexander Gordeev,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit a0265659322540d656727b9e132edfb6f06b6c1a ]
The mcount_loc sorting for when the values are stored in the Elf_Rela
entries uses the compare_extable() function to do the compares in the
qsort(). That function does handle byte swapping if the machine being
compiled for is a different endian than the host machine. But the
sort_relocs() function sorts an array that pulled in the values from the
Elf_Rela section and has already done the swapping.
Create two new compare functions that will sort the direct values. One
will sort 32 bit values and the other will sort the 64 bit value. One of
these will be assigned to a compare_values function pointer and that will
be used for sorting the Elf_Rela mcount values.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250218200022.538888594@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -552,6 +552,28 @@ static void *sort_orctable(void *arg)
#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
+static int compare_values_64(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ uint64_t av = *(uint64_t *)a;
+ uint64_t bv = *(uint64_t *)b;
+
+ if (av < bv)
+ return -1;
+ return av > bv;
+}
+
+static int compare_values_32(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ uint32_t av = *(uint32_t *)a;
+ uint32_t bv = *(uint32_t *)b;
+
+ if (av < bv)
+ return -1;
+ return av > bv;
+}
+
+static int (*compare_values)(const void *a, const void *b);
+
/* Only used for sorting mcount table */
static void rela_write_addend(Elf_Rela *rela, uint64_t val)
{
@@ -583,6 +605,8 @@ static void *sort_relocs(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
void *vals;
void *ptr;
+ compare_values = long_size == 4 ? compare_values_32 : compare_values_64;
+
shdr_start = (Elf_Shdr *)((char *)ehdr + ehdr_shoff(ehdr));
shentsize = ehdr_shentsize(ehdr);
@@ -640,7 +664,7 @@ static void *sort_relocs(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
}
}
count = ptr - vals;
- qsort(vals, count / long_size, long_size, compare_extable);
+ qsort(vals, count / long_size, long_size, compare_values);
ptr = vals;
for (int i = 0; i < shnum; i++) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 061/175] scripts/sorttable: Always use an array for the mcount_loc sorting
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (59 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 060/175] scripts/sorttable: Have mcount rela sort use direct values Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 062/175] scripts/sorttable: Zero out weak functions in mcount_loc table Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (122 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf, Heiko Carstens,
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Vasily Gorbik, Alexander Gordeev,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 5fb964f5ba53afda0e2b6dbc00b8205461ffe04a ]
The sorting of the mcount_loc section is done directly to the section for
x86 and arm32 but it uses a separate array for arm64 as arm64 has the
values for the mcount_loc stored in the rela sections of the vmlinux ELF
file.
In order to use the same code to remove weak functions, always use a
separate array to do the sorting. This requires splitting up the filling
of the array into one function and the placing the contents of the array
back into the rela sections or into the mcount_loc section into a separate
file.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250218200022.710676551@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -594,31 +594,19 @@ struct elf_mcount_loc {
uint64_t stop_mcount_loc;
};
-/* Sort the relocations not the address itself */
-static void *sort_relocs(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr, uint64_t start_loc, uint64_t size)
+/* Fill the array with the content of the relocs */
+static int fill_relocs(void *ptr, uint64_t size, Elf_Ehdr *ehdr, uint64_t start_loc)
{
Elf_Shdr *shdr_start;
Elf_Rela *rel;
unsigned int shnum;
- unsigned int count;
+ unsigned int count = 0;
int shentsize;
- void *vals;
- void *ptr;
-
- compare_values = long_size == 4 ? compare_values_32 : compare_values_64;
+ void *array_end = ptr + size;
shdr_start = (Elf_Shdr *)((char *)ehdr + ehdr_shoff(ehdr));
shentsize = ehdr_shentsize(ehdr);
- vals = malloc(long_size * size);
- if (!vals) {
- snprintf(m_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ, "Failed to allocate sort array");
- pthread_exit(m_err);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ptr = vals;
-
shnum = ehdr_shnum(ehdr);
if (shnum == SHN_UNDEF)
shnum = shdr_size(shdr_start);
@@ -637,22 +625,18 @@ static void *sort_relocs(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
uint64_t offset = rela_offset(rel);
if (offset >= start_loc && offset < start_loc + size) {
- if (ptr + long_size > vals + size) {
- free(vals);
+ if (ptr + long_size > array_end) {
snprintf(m_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ,
"Too many relocations");
- pthread_exit(m_err);
- return NULL;
+ return -1;
}
/* Make sure this has the correct type */
if (rela_info(rel) != rela_type) {
- free(vals);
snprintf(m_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ,
"rela has type %lx but expected %lx\n",
(long)rela_info(rel), rela_type);
- pthread_exit(m_err);
- return NULL;
+ return -1;
}
if (long_size == 4)
@@ -660,13 +644,28 @@ static void *sort_relocs(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
else
*(uint64_t *)ptr = rela_addend(rel);
ptr += long_size;
+ count++;
}
}
}
- count = ptr - vals;
- qsort(vals, count / long_size, long_size, compare_values);
+ return count;
+}
+
+/* Put the sorted vals back into the relocation elements */
+static void replace_relocs(void *ptr, uint64_t size, Elf_Ehdr *ehdr, uint64_t start_loc)
+{
+ Elf_Shdr *shdr_start;
+ Elf_Rela *rel;
+ unsigned int shnum;
+ int shentsize;
+
+ shdr_start = (Elf_Shdr *)((char *)ehdr + ehdr_shoff(ehdr));
+ shentsize = ehdr_shentsize(ehdr);
+
+ shnum = ehdr_shnum(ehdr);
+ if (shnum == SHN_UNDEF)
+ shnum = shdr_size(shdr_start);
- ptr = vals;
for (int i = 0; i < shnum; i++) {
Elf_Shdr *shdr = get_index(shdr_start, shentsize, i);
void *end;
@@ -689,8 +688,32 @@ static void *sort_relocs(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
}
}
}
- free(vals);
- return NULL;
+}
+
+static int fill_addrs(void *ptr, uint64_t size, void *addrs)
+{
+ void *end = ptr + size;
+ int count = 0;
+
+ for (; ptr < end; ptr += long_size, addrs += long_size, count++) {
+ if (long_size == 4)
+ *(uint32_t *)ptr = r(addrs);
+ else
+ *(uint64_t *)ptr = r8(addrs);
+ }
+ return count;
+}
+
+static void replace_addrs(void *ptr, uint64_t size, void *addrs)
+{
+ void *end = ptr + size;
+
+ for (; ptr < end; ptr += long_size, addrs += long_size) {
+ if (long_size == 4)
+ w(*(uint32_t *)ptr, addrs);
+ else
+ w8(*(uint64_t *)ptr, addrs);
+ }
}
/* Sort the addresses stored between __start_mcount_loc to __stop_mcount_loc in vmlinux */
@@ -699,14 +722,49 @@ static void *sort_mcount_loc(void *arg)
struct elf_mcount_loc *emloc = (struct elf_mcount_loc *)arg;
uint64_t offset = emloc->start_mcount_loc - shdr_addr(emloc->init_data_sec)
+ shdr_offset(emloc->init_data_sec);
- uint64_t count = emloc->stop_mcount_loc - emloc->start_mcount_loc;
+ uint64_t size = emloc->stop_mcount_loc - emloc->start_mcount_loc;
unsigned char *start_loc = (void *)emloc->ehdr + offset;
+ Elf_Ehdr *ehdr = emloc->ehdr;
+ void *e_msg = NULL;
+ void *vals;
+ int count;
+
+ vals = malloc(long_size * size);
+ if (!vals) {
+ snprintf(m_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ, "Failed to allocate sort array");
+ pthread_exit(m_err);
+ }
if (sort_reloc)
- return sort_relocs(emloc->ehdr, emloc->start_mcount_loc, count);
+ count = fill_relocs(vals, size, ehdr, emloc->start_mcount_loc);
+ else
+ count = fill_addrs(vals, size, start_loc);
+
+ if (count < 0) {
+ e_msg = m_err;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (count != size / long_size) {
+ snprintf(m_err, ERRSTR_MAXSZ, "Expected %u mcount elements but found %u\n",
+ (int)(size / long_size), count);
+ e_msg = m_err;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ compare_values = long_size == 4 ? compare_values_32 : compare_values_64;
+
+ qsort(vals, count, long_size, compare_values);
+
+ if (sort_reloc)
+ replace_relocs(vals, size, ehdr, emloc->start_mcount_loc);
+ else
+ replace_addrs(vals, size, start_loc);
+
+out:
+ free(vals);
- qsort(start_loc, count/long_size, long_size, compare_extable);
- return NULL;
+ pthread_exit(e_msg);
}
/* Get the address of __start_mcount_loc and __stop_mcount_loc in System.map */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 062/175] scripts/sorttable: Zero out weak functions in mcount_loc table
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (60 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 061/175] scripts/sorttable: Always use an array for the mcount_loc sorting Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 063/175] ftrace: Update the mcount_loc check of skipped entries Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (121 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf, Heiko Carstens,
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Vasily Gorbik, Alexander Gordeev,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit ef378c3b8233855497a414b9d67bf22592c928a4 ]
When a function is annotated as "weak" and is overridden, the code is not
removed. If it is traced, the fentry/mcount location in the weak function
will be referenced by the "__mcount_loc" section. This will then be added
to the available_filter_functions list. Since only the address of the
functions are listed, to find the name to show, a search of kallsyms is
used.
Since kallsyms will return the function by simply finding the function
that the address is after but before the next function, an address of a
weak function will show up as the function before it. This is because
kallsyms does not save names of weak functions. This has caused issues in
the past, as now the traced weak function will be listed in
available_filter_functions with the name of the function before it.
At best, this will cause the previous function's name to be listed twice.
At worse, if the previous function was marked notrace, it will now show up
as a function that can be traced. Note that it only shows up that it can
be traced but will not be if enabled, which causes confusion.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220412094923.0abe90955e5db486b7bca279@kernel.org/
The commit b39181f7c6907 ("ftrace: Add FTRACE_MCOUNT_MAX_OFFSET to avoid
adding weak function") was a workaround to this by checking the function
address before printing its name. If the address was too far from the
function given by the name then instead of printing the name it would
print: __ftrace_invalid_address___<invalid-offset>
The real issue is that these invalid addresses are listed in the ftrace
table look up which available_filter_functions is derived from. A place
holder must be listed in that file because set_ftrace_filter may take a
series of indexes into that file instead of names to be able to do O(1)
lookups to enable filtering (many tools use this method).
Even if kallsyms saved the size of the function, it does not remove the
need of having these place holders. The real solution is to not add a weak
function into the ftrace table in the first place.
To solve this, the sorttable.c code that sorts the mcount regions during
the build is modified to take a "nm -S vmlinux" input, sort it, and any
function listed in the mcount_loc section that is not within a boundary of
the function list given by nm is considered a weak function and is zeroed
out.
Note, this does not mean they will remain zero when booting as KASLR
will still shift those addresses. To handle this, the entries in the
mcount_loc section will be ignored if they are zero or match the
kaslr_offset() value.
Before:
~# grep __ftrace_invalid_address___ /sys/kernel/tracing/available_filter_functions | wc -l
551
After:
~# grep __ftrace_invalid_address___ /sys/kernel/tracing/available_filter_functions | wc -l
0
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250218200022.883095980@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 6 +-
scripts/link-vmlinux.sh | 4 +
scripts/sorttable.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
@@ -6525,6 +6525,7 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
unsigned long count;
unsigned long *p;
unsigned long addr;
+ unsigned long kaslr;
unsigned long flags = 0; /* Shut up gcc */
int ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -6573,6 +6574,9 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
ftrace_pages->next = start_pg;
}
+ /* For zeroed locations that were shifted for core kernel */
+ kaslr = !mod ? kaslr_offset() : 0;
+
p = start;
pg = start_pg;
while (p < end) {
@@ -6584,7 +6588,7 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
* object files to satisfy alignments.
* Skip any NULL pointers.
*/
- if (!addr) {
+ if (!addr || addr == kaslr) {
skipped++;
continue;
}
--- a/scripts/link-vmlinux.sh
+++ b/scripts/link-vmlinux.sh
@@ -198,13 +198,15 @@ mksysmap()
sorttable()
{
- ${objtree}/scripts/sorttable ${1}
+ ${NM} -S ${1} > .tmp_vmlinux.nm-sort
+ ${objtree}/scripts/sorttable -s .tmp_vmlinux.nm-sort ${1}
}
# Delete output files in case of error
cleanup()
{
rm -f .btf.*
+ rm -f .tmp_vmlinux.nm-sort
rm -f System.map
rm -f vmlinux
rm -f vmlinux.map
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -580,6 +580,98 @@ static void rela_write_addend(Elf_Rela *
e.rela_write_addend(rela, val);
}
+struct func_info {
+ uint64_t addr;
+ uint64_t size;
+};
+
+/* List of functions created by: nm -S vmlinux */
+static struct func_info *function_list;
+static int function_list_size;
+
+/* Allocate functions in 1k blocks */
+#define FUNC_BLK_SIZE 1024
+#define FUNC_BLK_MASK (FUNC_BLK_SIZE - 1)
+
+static int add_field(uint64_t addr, uint64_t size)
+{
+ struct func_info *fi;
+ int fsize = function_list_size;
+
+ if (!(fsize & FUNC_BLK_MASK)) {
+ fsize += FUNC_BLK_SIZE;
+ fi = realloc(function_list, fsize * sizeof(struct func_info));
+ if (!fi)
+ return -1;
+ function_list = fi;
+ }
+ fi = &function_list[function_list_size++];
+ fi->addr = addr;
+ fi->size = size;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Only return match if the address lies inside the function size */
+static int cmp_func_addr(const void *K, const void *A)
+{
+ uint64_t key = *(const uint64_t *)K;
+ const struct func_info *a = A;
+
+ if (key < a->addr)
+ return -1;
+ return key >= a->addr + a->size;
+}
+
+/* Find the function in function list that is bounded by the function size */
+static int find_func(uint64_t key)
+{
+ return bsearch(&key, function_list, function_list_size,
+ sizeof(struct func_info), cmp_func_addr) != NULL;
+}
+
+static int cmp_funcs(const void *A, const void *B)
+{
+ const struct func_info *a = A;
+ const struct func_info *b = B;
+
+ if (a->addr < b->addr)
+ return -1;
+ return a->addr > b->addr;
+}
+
+static int parse_symbols(const char *fname)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ char addr_str[20]; /* Only need 17, but round up to next int size */
+ char size_str[20];
+ char type;
+
+ fp = fopen(fname, "r");
+ if (!fp) {
+ perror(fname);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ while (fscanf(fp, "%16s %16s %c %*s\n", addr_str, size_str, &type) == 3) {
+ uint64_t addr;
+ uint64_t size;
+
+ /* Only care about functions */
+ if (type != 't' && type != 'T' && type != 'W')
+ continue;
+
+ addr = strtoull(addr_str, NULL, 16);
+ size = strtoull(size_str, NULL, 16);
+ if (add_field(addr, size) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ qsort(function_list, function_list_size, sizeof(struct func_info), cmp_funcs);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static pthread_t mcount_sort_thread;
static bool sort_reloc;
@@ -752,6 +844,21 @@ static void *sort_mcount_loc(void *arg)
goto out;
}
+ /* zero out any locations not found by function list */
+ if (function_list_size) {
+ for (void *ptr = vals; ptr < vals + size; ptr += long_size) {
+ uint64_t key;
+
+ key = long_size == 4 ? r((uint32_t *)ptr) : r8((uint64_t *)ptr);
+ if (!find_func(key)) {
+ if (long_size == 4)
+ *(uint32_t *)ptr = 0;
+ else
+ *(uint64_t *)ptr = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
compare_values = long_size == 4 ? compare_values_32 : compare_values_64;
qsort(vals, count, long_size, compare_values);
@@ -801,6 +908,8 @@ static void get_mcount_loc(struct elf_mc
return;
}
}
+#else /* MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED */
+static inline int parse_symbols(const char *fname) { return 0; }
#endif
static int do_sort(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr,
@@ -1256,14 +1365,29 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
int i, n_error = 0; /* gcc-4.3.0 false positive complaint */
size_t size = 0;
void *addr = NULL;
+ int c;
+
+ while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "s:")) >= 0) {
+ switch (c) {
+ case 's':
+ if (parse_symbols(optarg) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not parse %s\n", optarg);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: sorttable [-s nm-file] vmlinux...\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
- if (argc < 2) {
+ if ((argc - optind) < 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "usage: sorttable vmlinux...\n");
return 0;
}
/* Process each file in turn, allowing deep failure. */
- for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
+ for (i = optind; i < argc; i++) {
addr = mmap_file(argv[i], &size);
if (!addr) {
++n_error;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 063/175] ftrace: Update the mcount_loc check of skipped entries
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 062/175] scripts/sorttable: Zero out weak functions in mcount_loc table Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 064/175] ftrace: Have ftrace pages output reflect freed pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (120 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf, Heiko Carstens,
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Vasily Gorbik, Alexander Gordeev,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 4a3efc6baff931da9a85c6d2e42c87bd9a827399 ]
Now that weak functions turn into skipped entries, update the check to
make sure the amount that was allocated would fit both the entries that
were allocated as well as those that were skipped.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250218200023.055162048@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
@@ -6632,7 +6632,28 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
/* We should have used all pages unless we skipped some */
if (pg_unuse) {
- WARN_ON(!skipped);
+ unsigned long pg_remaining, remaining = 0;
+ unsigned long skip;
+
+ /* Count the number of entries unused and compare it to skipped. */
+ pg_remaining = (ENTRIES_PER_PAGE << pg->order) - pg->index;
+
+ if (!WARN(skipped < pg_remaining, "Extra allocated pages for ftrace")) {
+
+ skip = skipped - pg_remaining;
+
+ for (pg = pg_unuse; pg; pg = pg->next)
+ remaining += 1 << pg->order;
+
+ skip = DIV_ROUND_UP(skip, ENTRIES_PER_PAGE);
+
+ /*
+ * Check to see if the number of pages remaining would
+ * just fit the number of entries skipped.
+ */
+ WARN(skip != remaining, "Extra allocated pages for ftrace: %lu with %lu skipped",
+ remaining, skipped);
+ }
/* Need to synchronize with ftrace_location_range() */
synchronize_rcu();
ftrace_free_pages(pg_unuse);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 064/175] ftrace: Have ftrace pages output reflect freed pages
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 063/175] ftrace: Update the mcount_loc check of skipped entries Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 065/175] ftrace: Do not over-allocate ftrace memory Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (119 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, bpf, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Zheng Yejian,
Martin Kelly, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf, Heiko Carstens,
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Vasily Gorbik, Alexander Gordeev,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 264143c4e54412095f4b615e65bf736fc3c60af0 ]
The amount of memory that ftrace uses to save the descriptors to manage
the functions it can trace is shown at output. But if there are a lot of
functions that are skipped because they were weak or the architecture
added holes into the tables, then the extra pages that were allocated are
freed. But these freed pages are not reflected in the numbers shown, and
they can even be inconsistent with what is reported:
ftrace: allocating 57482 entries in 225 pages
ftrace: allocated 224 pages with 3 groups
The above shows the number of original entries that are in the mcount_loc
section and the pages needed to save them (225), but the second output
reflects the number of pages that were actually used. The two should be
consistent as:
ftrace: allocating 56739 entries in 224 pages
ftrace: allocated 224 pages with 3 groups
The above also shows the accurate number of entires that were actually
stored and does not include the entries that were removed.
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250218200023.221100846@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
@@ -6527,6 +6527,7 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
unsigned long addr;
unsigned long kaslr;
unsigned long flags = 0; /* Shut up gcc */
+ unsigned long pages;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
count = end - start;
@@ -6534,6 +6535,8 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
if (!count)
return 0;
+ pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(count, ENTRIES_PER_PAGE);
+
/*
* Sorting mcount in vmlinux at build time depend on
* CONFIG_BUILDTIME_MCOUNT_SORT, while mcount loc in
@@ -6645,6 +6648,8 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
for (pg = pg_unuse; pg; pg = pg->next)
remaining += 1 << pg->order;
+ pages -= remaining;
+
skip = DIV_ROUND_UP(skip, ENTRIES_PER_PAGE);
/*
@@ -6658,6 +6663,13 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
synchronize_rcu();
ftrace_free_pages(pg_unuse);
}
+
+ if (!mod) {
+ count -= skipped;
+ pr_info("ftrace: allocating %ld entries in %ld pages\n",
+ count, pages);
+ }
+
return ret;
}
@@ -7315,9 +7327,6 @@ void __init ftrace_init(void)
goto failed;
}
- pr_info("ftrace: allocating %ld entries in %ld pages\n",
- count, DIV_ROUND_UP(count, ENTRIES_PER_PAGE));
-
ret = ftrace_process_locs(NULL,
__start_mcount_loc,
__stop_mcount_loc);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 065/175] ftrace: Do not over-allocate ftrace memory
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 064/175] ftrace: Have ftrace pages output reflect freed pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 066/175] ftrace: Test mcount_loc addr before calling ftrace_call_addr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (118 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Guenter Roeck,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
[ Upstream commit be55257fab181b93af38f8c4b1b3cb453a78d742 ]
The pg_remaining calculation in ftrace_process_locs() assumes that
ENTRIES_PER_PAGE multiplied by 2^order equals the actual capacity of the
allocated page group. However, ENTRIES_PER_PAGE is PAGE_SIZE / ENTRY_SIZE
(integer division). When PAGE_SIZE is not a multiple of ENTRY_SIZE (e.g.
4096 / 24 = 170 with remainder 16), high-order allocations (like 256 pages)
have significantly more capacity than 256 * 170. This leads to pg_remaining
being underestimated, which in turn makes skip (derived from skipped -
pg_remaining) larger than expected, causing the WARN(skip != remaining)
to trigger.
Extra allocated pages for ftrace: 2 with 654 skipped
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7295 ftrace_process_locs+0x5bf/0x5e0
A similar problem in ftrace_allocate_records() can result in allocating
too many pages. This can trigger the second warning in
ftrace_process_locs().
Extra allocated pages for ftrace
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7276 ftrace_process_locs+0x548/0x580
Use the actual capacity of a page group to determine the number of pages
to allocate. Have ftrace_allocate_pages() return the number of allocated
pages to avoid having to calculate it. Use the actual page group capacity
when validating the number of unused pages due to skipped entries.
Drop the definition of ENTRIES_PER_PAGE since it is no longer used.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4a3efc6baff93 ("ftrace: Update the mcount_loc check of skipped entries")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260113152243.3557219-1-linux@roeck-us.net
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 29 +++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
@@ -1117,7 +1117,6 @@ struct ftrace_page {
};
#define ENTRY_SIZE sizeof(struct dyn_ftrace)
-#define ENTRIES_PER_PAGE (PAGE_SIZE / ENTRY_SIZE)
static struct ftrace_page *ftrace_pages_start;
static struct ftrace_page *ftrace_pages;
@@ -3245,7 +3244,8 @@ static int ftrace_update_code(struct mod
return 0;
}
-static int ftrace_allocate_records(struct ftrace_page *pg, int count)
+static int ftrace_allocate_records(struct ftrace_page *pg, int count,
+ unsigned long *num_pages)
{
int order;
int pages;
@@ -3255,7 +3255,7 @@ static int ftrace_allocate_records(struc
return -EINVAL;
/* We want to fill as much as possible, with no empty pages */
- pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(count, ENTRIES_PER_PAGE);
+ pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(count * ENTRY_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
order = fls(pages) - 1;
again:
@@ -3270,6 +3270,7 @@ static int ftrace_allocate_records(struc
}
ftrace_number_of_pages += 1 << order;
+ *num_pages += 1 << order;
ftrace_number_of_groups++;
cnt = (PAGE_SIZE << order) / ENTRY_SIZE;
@@ -3298,12 +3299,14 @@ static void ftrace_free_pages(struct ftr
}
static struct ftrace_page *
-ftrace_allocate_pages(unsigned long num_to_init)
+ftrace_allocate_pages(unsigned long num_to_init, unsigned long *num_pages)
{
struct ftrace_page *start_pg;
struct ftrace_page *pg;
int cnt;
+ *num_pages = 0;
+
if (!num_to_init)
return NULL;
@@ -3317,7 +3320,7 @@ ftrace_allocate_pages(unsigned long num_
* waste as little space as possible.
*/
for (;;) {
- cnt = ftrace_allocate_records(pg, num_to_init);
+ cnt = ftrace_allocate_records(pg, num_to_init, num_pages);
if (cnt < 0)
goto free_pages;
@@ -6535,8 +6538,6 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
if (!count)
return 0;
- pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(count, ENTRIES_PER_PAGE);
-
/*
* Sorting mcount in vmlinux at build time depend on
* CONFIG_BUILDTIME_MCOUNT_SORT, while mcount loc in
@@ -6549,7 +6550,7 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
test_is_sorted(start, count);
}
- start_pg = ftrace_allocate_pages(count);
+ start_pg = ftrace_allocate_pages(count, &pages);
if (!start_pg)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -6636,27 +6637,27 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
/* We should have used all pages unless we skipped some */
if (pg_unuse) {
unsigned long pg_remaining, remaining = 0;
- unsigned long skip;
+ long skip;
/* Count the number of entries unused and compare it to skipped. */
- pg_remaining = (ENTRIES_PER_PAGE << pg->order) - pg->index;
+ pg_remaining = (PAGE_SIZE << pg->order) / ENTRY_SIZE - pg->index;
if (!WARN(skipped < pg_remaining, "Extra allocated pages for ftrace")) {
skip = skipped - pg_remaining;
- for (pg = pg_unuse; pg; pg = pg->next)
+ for (pg = pg_unuse; pg && skip > 0; pg = pg->next) {
remaining += 1 << pg->order;
+ skip -= (PAGE_SIZE << pg->order) / ENTRY_SIZE;
+ }
pages -= remaining;
- skip = DIV_ROUND_UP(skip, ENTRIES_PER_PAGE);
-
/*
* Check to see if the number of pages remaining would
* just fit the number of entries skipped.
*/
- WARN(skip != remaining, "Extra allocated pages for ftrace: %lu with %lu skipped",
+ WARN(pg || skip > 0, "Extra allocated pages for ftrace: %lu with %lu skipped",
remaining, skipped);
}
/* Need to synchronize with ftrace_location_range() */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 066/175] ftrace: Test mcount_loc addr before calling ftrace_call_addr()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 065/175] ftrace: Do not over-allocate ftrace memory Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 067/175] ftrace: Check against is_kernel_text() instead of kaslr_offset() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (117 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Masahiro Yamada,
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Mark Brown, Nathan Chancellor,
Arnd Bergmann, Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 6eeca746fa5f1dd03c6ee05cb03f5eb1ddda1c81 ]
The addresses in the mcount_loc can be zeroed and then moved by KASLR
making them invalid addresses. ftrace_call_addr() for ARM 64 expects a
valid address to kernel text. If the addr read from the mcount_loc section
is invalid, it must not call ftrace_call_addr(). Move the addr check
before calling ftrace_call_addr() in ftrace_process_locs().
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250225182054.290128736@goodmis.org
Fixes: ef378c3b8233 ("scripts/sorttable: Zero out weak functions in mcount_loc table")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reported-by: "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250225025631.GA271248@ax162/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/91523154-072b-437b-bbdc-0b70e9783fd0@app.fastmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
@@ -6585,7 +6585,9 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
pg = start_pg;
while (p < end) {
unsigned long end_offset;
- addr = ftrace_call_adjust(*p++);
+
+ addr = *p++;
+
/*
* Some architecture linkers will pad between
* the different mcount_loc sections of different
@@ -6597,6 +6599,8 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
continue;
}
+ addr = ftrace_call_adjust(addr);
+
end_offset = (pg->index+1) * sizeof(pg->records[0]);
if (end_offset > PAGE_SIZE << pg->order) {
/* We should have allocated enough */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 067/175] ftrace: Check against is_kernel_text() instead of kaslr_offset()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (65 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 066/175] ftrace: Test mcount_loc addr before calling ftrace_call_addr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 068/175] scripts/sorttable: Use normal sort if theres no relocs in the mcount section Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (116 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Masahiro Yamada,
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Arnd Bergmann, Nathan Chancellor,
Mark Brown, Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit da0f622b344be769ed61e7c1caf95cd0cdb47964 ]
As kaslr_offset() is architecture dependent and also may not be defined by
all architectures, when zeroing out unused weak functions, do not check
against kaslr_offset(), but instead check if the address is within the
kernel text sections. If KASLR added a shift to the zeroed out function,
it would still not be located in the kernel text. This is a more robust
way to test if the text is valid or not.
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250225182054.471759017@goodmis.org
Fixes: ef378c3b8233 ("scripts/sorttable: Zero out weak functions in mcount_loc table")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250224180805.GA1536711@ax162/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/5225b07b-a9b2-4558-9d5f-aa60b19f6317@sirena.org.uk/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
@@ -6528,7 +6528,6 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
unsigned long count;
unsigned long *p;
unsigned long addr;
- unsigned long kaslr;
unsigned long flags = 0; /* Shut up gcc */
unsigned long pages;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -6578,9 +6577,6 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
ftrace_pages->next = start_pg;
}
- /* For zeroed locations that were shifted for core kernel */
- kaslr = !mod ? kaslr_offset() : 0;
-
p = start;
pg = start_pg;
while (p < end) {
@@ -6594,7 +6590,18 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct mo
* object files to satisfy alignments.
* Skip any NULL pointers.
*/
- if (!addr || addr == kaslr) {
+ if (!addr) {
+ skipped++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If this is core kernel, make sure the address is in core
+ * or inittext, as weak functions get zeroed and KASLR can
+ * move them to something other than zero. It just will not
+ * move it to an area where kernel text is.
+ */
+ if (!mod && !(is_kernel_text(addr) || is_kernel_inittext(addr))) {
skipped++;
continue;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 068/175] scripts/sorttable: Use normal sort if theres no relocs in the mcount section
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (66 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 067/175] ftrace: Check against is_kernel_text() instead of kaslr_offset() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 069/175] scripts/sorttable: Allow matches to functions before function entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (115 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Masahiro Yamada,
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Mark Brown, Arnd Bergmann,
Nathan Chancellor, Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit 46514b3c2c17c67cefe84b0c1a59e0aaf6093131 ]
When ARM 64 is compiled with gcc, the mcount_loc section will be filled
with zeros and the addresses will be located in the Elf_Rela sections. To
sort the mcount_loc section, the addresses from the Elf_Rela need to be
placed into an array and that is sorted.
But when ARM 64 is compiled with clang, it does it the same way as other
architectures and leaves the addresses as is in the mcount_loc section.
To handle both cases, ARM 64 will first try to sort the Elf_Rela section,
and if it doesn't find any functions, it will then fall back to the
sorting of the addresses in the mcount_loc section itself.
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250225182054.648398403@goodmis.org
Fixes: b3d09d06e052 ("arm64: scripts/sorttable: Implement sorting mcount_loc at boot for arm64")
Reported-by: "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/893cd8f1-8585-4d25-bf0f-4197bf872465@app.fastmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -827,9 +827,14 @@ static void *sort_mcount_loc(void *arg)
pthread_exit(m_err);
}
- if (sort_reloc)
+ if (sort_reloc) {
count = fill_relocs(vals, size, ehdr, emloc->start_mcount_loc);
- else
+ /* gcc may use relocs to save the addresses, but clang does not. */
+ if (!count) {
+ count = fill_addrs(vals, size, start_loc);
+ sort_reloc = 0;
+ }
+ } else
count = fill_addrs(vals, size, start_loc);
if (count < 0) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 069/175] scripts/sorttable: Allow matches to functions before function entry
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (67 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 068/175] scripts/sorttable: Use normal sort if theres no relocs in the mcount section Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 070/175] scripts/sorttable: Fix endianness handling in build-time mcount sort Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (114 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andrew Morton, Masahiro Yamada,
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Arnd Bergmann, Mark Brown,
Nathan Chancellor, Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit dc208c69c033d3caba0509da1ae065d2b5ff165f ]
ARM 64 uses -fpatchable-function-entry=4,2 which adds padding before the
function and the addresses in the mcount_loc point there instead of the
function entry that is returned by nm. In order to find a function from nm
to make sure it's not an unused weak function, the entries in the
mcount_loc section needs to match the entries from nm. Since it can be an
instruction before the entry, add a before_func variable that ARM 64 can
set to 8, and if the mcount_loc entry is within 8 bytes of the nm function
entry, then it will be considered a match.
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250225182054.815536219@goodmis.org
Fixes: ef378c3b82338 ("scripts/sorttable: Zero out weak functions in mcount_loc table")
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -611,13 +611,16 @@ static int add_field(uint64_t addr, uint
return 0;
}
+/* Used for when mcount/fentry is before the function entry */
+static int before_func;
+
/* Only return match if the address lies inside the function size */
static int cmp_func_addr(const void *K, const void *A)
{
uint64_t key = *(const uint64_t *)K;
const struct func_info *a = A;
- if (key < a->addr)
+ if (key + before_func < a->addr)
return -1;
return key >= a->addr + a->size;
}
@@ -1253,6 +1256,8 @@ static int do_file(char const *const fna
#ifdef MCOUNT_SORT_ENABLED
sort_reloc = true;
rela_type = 0x403;
+ /* arm64 uses patchable function entry placing before function */
+ before_func = 8;
#endif
/* fallthrough */
case EM_386:
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 070/175] scripts/sorttable: Fix endianness handling in build-time mcount sort
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (68 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 069/175] scripts/sorttable: Allow matches to functions before function entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 071/175] vc_screen: fix null-ptr-deref in vcs_notifier() during concurrent vcs_write Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (113 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Masami Hiramatsu, Catalin Marinas,
Nathan Chancellor, Heiko Carstens, Alexander Gordeev,
Ilya Leoshkevich, Ihor Solodrai, Vasily Gorbik,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Andrey Grodzovsky
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
[ Upstream commit 023f124a64174c47e18340ded7e2a39b96eb9523 ]
Kernel cross-compilation with BUILDTIME_MCOUNT_SORT produces zeroed
mcount values if the build-host endianness does not match the ELF
file endianness.
The mcount values array is converted from ELF file
endianness to build-host endianness during initialization in
fill_relocs()/fill_addrs(). Avoid extra conversion of these values during
weak-function zeroing; otherwise, they do not match nm-parsed addresses
and all mcount values are zeroed out.
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/patch.git-dca31444b0f1.your-ad-here.call-01743554658-ext-8692@work.hours
Fixes: ef378c3b8233 ("scripts/sorttable: Zero out weak functions in mcount_loc table")
Reported-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/your-ad-here.call-01743522822-ext-4975@work.hours/
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/sorttable.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/scripts/sorttable.c
+++ b/scripts/sorttable.c
@@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ static void *sort_mcount_loc(void *arg)
for (void *ptr = vals; ptr < vals + size; ptr += long_size) {
uint64_t key;
- key = long_size == 4 ? r((uint32_t *)ptr) : r8((uint64_t *)ptr);
+ key = long_size == 4 ? *(uint32_t *)ptr : *(uint64_t *)ptr;
if (!find_func(key)) {
if (long_size == 4)
*(uint32_t *)ptr = 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 071/175] vc_screen: fix null-ptr-deref in vcs_notifier() during concurrent vcs_write
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (69 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 070/175] scripts/sorttable: Fix endianness handling in build-time mcount sort Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 072/175] ksmbd: reject non-VALID session in compound request branch Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (112 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Yi Yang, Jiri Slaby
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yi Yang <yiyang13@huawei.com>
commit a287620312dc6dcb9a093417a0e589bf30fcf38a upstream.
A KASAN null-ptr-deref was observed in vcs_notifier():
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in vcs_notifier+0x98/0x130
Read of size 2 at addr qmp_cmd_name: qmp_capabilities, arguments: {}
The issue is a race condition in vcs_write(). When the console_lock is
temporarily dropped (to copy data from userspace), the vc_data pointer
obtained from vcs_vc() may become stale. After re-acquiring the lock,
vcs_vc() is called again to re-validate the pointer. If the vc has been
deallocated in the meantime, vcs_vc() returns NULL, and the while loop
breaks (with written > 0). However, after the loop, vcs_scr_updated(vc)
is still called with the now-NULL vc pointer, leading to a null pointer
dereference in the notifier chain (vcs_notifier dereferences param->vc).
Fix this by adding a NULL check for vc before calling vcs_scr_updated().
Fixes: 8fb9ea65c9d1 ("vc_screen: reload load of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_write() to avoid UAF")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260604060734.2914976-1-yiyang13@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c
@@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ vcs_write(struct file *file, const char
}
*ppos += written;
ret = written;
- if (written)
+ if (written && vc)
vcs_scr_updated(vc);
unlock_out:
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 072/175] ksmbd: reject non-VALID session in compound request branch
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 071/175] vc_screen: fix null-ptr-deref in vcs_notifier() during concurrent vcs_write Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 073/175] media: vidtv: fix NULL pointer dereference in vidtv_mux_push_si Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (111 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Gil Portnoy, Namjae Jeon,
Steve French
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gil Portnoy <dddhkts1@gmail.com>
commit 609ca17d869d04ba249e32cdcbf13c0b1c66f43c upstream.
smb2_check_user_session() takes a shortcut for any operation that is not
the first in a COMPOUND request: it reuses work->sess (the session bound by
the first operation) and validates only the SessionId, then returns
"valid". It never re-checks work->sess->state == SMB2_SESSION_VALID, and a
SessionId of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF (ULLONG_MAX, the MS-SMB2 related-operation
value) skips even the id comparison. The standalone path
(ksmbd_session_lookup_all() plus the SESSION_SETUP state machine) does
enforce the VALID state; the compound branch bypasses all of it.
A SESSION_SETUP carrying only an NTLM Type-1 (NtLmNegotiate) blob publishes
a fresh SMB2_SESSION_IN_PROGRESS session whose sess->user is still NULL
(->user is assigned later, by ntlm_authenticate()). Used as operation 1 of
a COMPOUND with operation 2 = TREE_CONNECT (related, SessionId=ULLONG_MAX,
\\host\IPC$), the tree-connect then runs on that IN_PROGRESS session and
reaches ksmbd_ipc_tree_connect_request(), which dereferences
user_name(sess->user) with sess->user == NULL (transport_ipc.c:687/701/704)
-> remote NULL-pointer dereference and a kernel Oops that wedges the ksmbd
worker for all clients.
Reject any non-first compound operation that lands on a session which is
not SMB2_SESSION_VALID, mirroring the validity the standalone lookup path
enforces. SESSION_SETUP itself legitimately runs on an IN_PROGRESS session,
but it is never carried as a non-first compound operation, so multi-leg
authentication is unaffected by this check.
Fixes: 5005bcb42191 ("ksmbd: validate session id and tree id in the compound request")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy <dddhkts1@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
@@ -606,6 +606,11 @@ int smb2_check_user_session(struct ksmbd
sess_id, work->sess->id);
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (work->sess->state != SMB2_SESSION_VALID) {
+ pr_err("compound request on a non-valid session (state %d)\n",
+ work->sess->state);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
return 1;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 073/175] media: vidtv: fix NULL pointer dereference in vidtv_mux_push_si
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 072/175] ksmbd: reject non-VALID session in compound request branch Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 074/175] virtiofs: fix UAF on submount umount Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (110 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzbot+814c351d094f4f1a1b86,
Ruslan Valiyev, Hans Verkuil
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ruslan Valiyev <linuxoid@gmail.com>
commit 7d8bf3d8f91073f4db347ed3aa6302b56107499c upstream.
syzbot reported a general protection fault in
vidtv_psi_ts_psi_write_into [1].
vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx() can return NULL, but vidtv_mux_push_si() does
not check for this before dereferencing the returned pointer to access
the continuity counter. This leads to a general protection fault when
accessing a near-NULL address.
The root cause is that vidtv_mux_pid_ctx_init() does not check the
return value of vidtv_mux_create_pid_ctx_once() for PMT section PIDs.
If the allocation fails, the PID context is never created, but init
returns success. The subsequent vidtv_mux_push_si() call then gets
NULL from vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx() and crashes.
Fix both the root cause (add error check in vidtv_mux_pid_ctx_init
for PMT PIDs) and add defensive NULL checks in vidtv_mux_push_si for
all vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx() calls.
[1]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
Workqueue: events vidtv_mux_tick
RIP: 0010:vidtv_psi_ts_psi_write_into+0x54a/0xbc0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:197
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vidtv_psi_table_header_write_into drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:799 [inline]
vidtv_psi_pmt_write_into+0x3b2/0xa70 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:1231
vidtv_mux_push_si+0x932/0xe80 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:196
vidtv_mux_tick+0xe9b/0x1480 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:408
Fixes: f90cf6079bf67 ("media: vidtv: add a bridge driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+814c351d094f4f1a1b86@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=814c351d094f4f1a1b86
Signed-off-by: Ruslan Valiyev <linuxoid@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil+cisco@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c
+++ b/drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ static int vidtv_mux_pid_ctx_init(struct
/* add a ctx for all PMT sections */
while (p) {
pid = vidtv_psi_get_pat_program_pid(p);
- vidtv_mux_create_pid_ctx_once(m, pid);
+ if (!vidtv_mux_create_pid_ctx_once(m, pid))
+ goto free;
p = p->next;
}
@@ -170,6 +171,9 @@ static u32 vidtv_mux_push_si(struct vidt
nit_ctx = vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx(m, VIDTV_NIT_PID);
eit_ctx = vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx(m, VIDTV_EIT_PID);
+ if (!pat_ctx || !sdt_ctx || !nit_ctx || !eit_ctx)
+ return 0;
+
pat_args.offset = m->mux_buf_offset;
pat_args.continuity_counter = &pat_ctx->cc;
@@ -186,6 +190,8 @@ static u32 vidtv_mux_push_si(struct vidt
}
pmt_ctx = vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx(m, pmt_pid);
+ if (!pmt_ctx)
+ continue;
pmt_args.offset = m->mux_buf_offset;
pmt_args.pmt = m->si.pmt_secs[i];
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 074/175] virtiofs: fix UAF on submount umount
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 073/175] media: vidtv: fix NULL pointer dereference in vidtv_mux_push_si Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 075/175] file: add fput() cleanup helper Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (109 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Aurélien Bombo, Zhihao Cheng,
Greg Kurz, Miklos Szeredi
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
commit 06b41351779e9289e8785694ade9042ae85e41ea upstream.
iput() called from fuse_release_end() can Oops if the super block has
already been destroyed. Normally this is prevented by waiting for
num_waiting to go down to zero before commencing with super block shutdown.
This only works, however, for the last submount instance, as the wait
counter is per connection, not per superblock.
Revert to using synchronous release requests for the auto_submounts case,
which is virtiofs only at this time.
Reported-by: Aurélien Bombo <abombo@microsoft.com>
Reported-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Cc: Greg Kurz <gkurz@redhat.com>
Closes: https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/issues/12589
Fixes: 26e5c67deb2e ("fuse: fix livelock in synchronous file put from fuseblk workers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <gkurz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/fuse/file.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/fuse/file.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/file.c
@@ -357,8 +357,14 @@ void fuse_file_release(struct inode *ino
* aio and closes the fd before the aio completes. Since aio takes its
* own ref to the file, the IO completion has to drop the ref, which is
* how the fuse server can end up closing its clients' files.
+ *
+ * Exception is virtio-fs, which is not affected by the above (server is
+ * on host, cannot close open files in guest). Virtio-fs needs sync
+ * release, because the num_waiting mechanism to wait for all requests
+ * before commencing with fs shutdown doesn't work if submounts are
+ * used.
*/
- fuse_file_put(ff, false);
+ fuse_file_put(ff, ff->fm->fc->auto_submounts);
}
void fuse_release_common(struct file *file, bool isdir)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 075/175] file: add fput() cleanup helper
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 074/175] virtiofs: fix UAF on submount umount Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 076/175] eventpoll: use hlist_is_singular_node() in __ep_remove() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (108 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Josef Bacik, Jeff Layton,
Christian Brauner, Wentao Guan, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 257b1c2c78c25643526609dee0c15f1544eb3252 ]
Add a simple helper to put a file reference.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719-work-mount-namespace-v1-4-834113cab0d2@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 257b1c2c78c25643526609dee0c15f1544eb3252)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/file.h | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/file.h b/include/linux/file.h
index 6e9099d2934368..221ba0888107a0 100644
--- a/include/linux/file.h
+++ b/include/linux/file.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/posix_types.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
struct file;
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ extern void put_unused_fd(unsigned int fd);
DEFINE_CLASS(get_unused_fd, int, if (_T >= 0) put_unused_fd(_T),
get_unused_fd_flags(flags), unsigned flags)
+DEFINE_FREE(fput, struct file *, if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(_T)) fput(_T))
extern void fd_install(unsigned int fd, struct file *file);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 076/175] eventpoll: use hlist_is_singular_node() in __ep_remove()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 075/175] file: add fput() cleanup helper Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 077/175] eventpoll: split __ep_remove() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (107 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christian Brauner (Amutable),
Quentin Schulz, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3d9fd0abc94d8cd430cc7cd7d37ce5e5aae2cd2b ]
Replace the open-coded "epi is the only entry in file->f_ep" check
with hlist_is_singular_node(). Same semantics, and the helper avoids
the head-cacheline access in the common false case.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-1-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a6dc643c6931 ("eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF")
Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/eventpoll.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c
index 8a556560a5b2f2..4f05d12a05031a 100644
--- a/fs/eventpoll.c
+++ b/fs/eventpoll.c
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ static bool __ep_remove(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi, bool force)
to_free = NULL;
head = file->f_ep;
- if (head->first == &epi->fllink && !epi->fllink.next) {
+ if (hlist_is_singular_node(&epi->fllink, head)) {
/* See eventpoll_release() for details. */
WRITE_ONCE(file->f_ep, NULL);
if (!is_file_epoll(file)) {
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 077/175] eventpoll: split __ep_remove()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 076/175] eventpoll: use hlist_is_singular_node() in __ep_remove() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 078/175] eventpoll: kill __ep_remove() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (106 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Linus Torvalds,
Christian Brauner (Amutable), Quentin Schulz, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0f7bdfd413000985de09fc39eb9efa1e091a3ce0 ]
Split __ep_remove() to delineate file removal from epoll item removal.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-2-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a6dc643c6931 ("eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF")
Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/eventpoll.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c
index 4f05d12a05031a..ae9cb82764482c 100644
--- a/fs/eventpoll.c
+++ b/fs/eventpoll.c
@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ static void ep_free(struct eventpoll *ep)
kfree_rcu(ep, rcu);
}
+static void __ep_remove_file(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi, struct file *file);
+static bool __ep_remove_epi(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi);
+
/*
* Removes a "struct epitem" from the eventpoll RB tree and deallocates
* all the associated resources. Must be called with "mtx" held.
@@ -726,8 +729,6 @@ static void ep_free(struct eventpoll *ep)
static bool __ep_remove(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi, bool force)
{
struct file *file = epi->ffd.file;
- struct epitems_head *to_free;
- struct hlist_head *head;
lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
@@ -743,8 +744,21 @@ static bool __ep_remove(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi, bool force)
return false;
}
- to_free = NULL;
- head = file->f_ep;
+ __ep_remove_file(ep, epi, file);
+ return __ep_remove_epi(ep, epi);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called with &file->f_lock held,
+ * returns with it released
+ */
+static void __ep_remove_file(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct epitems_head *to_free = NULL;
+ struct hlist_head *head = file->f_ep;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&ep->mtx);
+
if (hlist_is_singular_node(&epi->fllink, head)) {
/* See eventpoll_release() for details. */
WRITE_ONCE(file->f_ep, NULL);
@@ -758,6 +772,11 @@ static bool __ep_remove(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi, bool force)
hlist_del_rcu(&epi->fllink);
spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
free_ephead(to_free);
+}
+
+static bool __ep_remove_epi(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_held(&ep->mtx);
rb_erase_cached(&epi->rbn, &ep->rbr);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 078/175] eventpoll: kill __ep_remove()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 077/175] eventpoll: split __ep_remove() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 079/175] eventpoll: drop vestigial __ prefix from ep_remove_{file,epi}() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (105 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christian Brauner (Amutable),
Quentin Schulz, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e9e5cd40d7c403e19f21d0f7b8b8ba3a76b58330 ]
Remove the boolean conditional in __ep_remove() and restructure the code
so the check for racing with eventpoll_release_file() are only done in
the ep_remove_safe() path where they belong.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-3-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a6dc643c6931 ("eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF")
Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/eventpoll.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c
index ae9cb82764482c..766716c2fd92a0 100644
--- a/fs/eventpoll.c
+++ b/fs/eventpoll.c
@@ -715,49 +715,18 @@ static void ep_free(struct eventpoll *ep)
kfree_rcu(ep, rcu);
}
-static void __ep_remove_file(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi, struct file *file);
-static bool __ep_remove_epi(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi);
-
-/*
- * Removes a "struct epitem" from the eventpoll RB tree and deallocates
- * all the associated resources. Must be called with "mtx" held.
- * If the dying flag is set, do the removal only if force is true.
- * This prevents ep_clear_and_put() from dropping all the ep references
- * while running concurrently with eventpoll_release_file().
- * Returns true if the eventpoll can be disposed.
- */
-static bool __ep_remove(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi, bool force)
-{
- struct file *file = epi->ffd.file;
-
- lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
-
- /*
- * Removes poll wait queue hooks.
- */
- ep_unregister_pollwait(ep, epi);
-
- /* Remove the current item from the list of epoll hooks */
- spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
- if (epi->dying && !force) {
- spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
- return false;
- }
-
- __ep_remove_file(ep, epi, file);
- return __ep_remove_epi(ep, epi);
-}
-
/*
* Called with &file->f_lock held,
* returns with it released
*/
-static void __ep_remove_file(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi, struct file *file)
+static void __ep_remove_file(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi,
+ struct file *file)
{
struct epitems_head *to_free = NULL;
struct hlist_head *head = file->f_ep;
lockdep_assert_held(&ep->mtx);
+ lockdep_assert_held(&file->f_lock);
if (hlist_is_singular_node(&epi->fllink, head)) {
/* See eventpoll_release() for details. */
@@ -804,7 +773,25 @@ static bool __ep_remove_epi(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
*/
static void ep_remove_safe(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
{
- if (__ep_remove(ep, epi, false))
+ struct file *file = epi->ffd.file;
+
+ lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
+ lockdep_assert_held(&ep->mtx);
+
+ ep_unregister_pollwait(ep, epi);
+
+ /* sync with eventpoll_release_file() */
+ if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(epi->dying)))
+ return;
+
+ spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
+ if (epi->dying) {
+ spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
+ return;
+ }
+ __ep_remove_file(ep, epi, file);
+
+ if (__ep_remove_epi(ep, epi))
WARN_ON_ONCE(ep_refcount_dec_and_test(ep));
}
@@ -1013,7 +1000,7 @@ void eventpoll_release_file(struct file *file)
spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
if (file->f_ep && file->f_ep->first) {
epi = hlist_entry(file->f_ep->first, struct epitem, fllink);
- epi->dying = true;
+ WRITE_ONCE(epi->dying, true);
spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
/*
@@ -1022,7 +1009,13 @@ void eventpoll_release_file(struct file *file)
*/
ep = epi->ep;
mutex_lock(&ep->mtx);
- dispose = __ep_remove(ep, epi, true);
+
+ ep_unregister_pollwait(ep, epi);
+
+ spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
+ __ep_remove_file(ep, epi, file);
+ dispose = __ep_remove_epi(ep, epi);
+
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
if (dispose && ep_refcount_dec_and_test(ep))
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 079/175] eventpoll: drop vestigial __ prefix from ep_remove_{file,epi}()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 078/175] eventpoll: kill __ep_remove() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 080/175] eventpoll: rename ep_remove_safe() back to ep_remove() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (104 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christian Brauner (Amutable),
Quentin Schulz, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0feaf644f7180c4a91b6b405a881afbfd958f1cf ]
With __ep_remove() gone, the double-underscore on __ep_remove_file()
and __ep_remove_epi() no longer contrasts with a __-less parent and
just reads as noise. Rename both to ep_remove_file() and
ep_remove_epi(). No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a6dc643c6931 ("eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF")
Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/eventpoll.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c
index 766716c2fd92a0..0a54a42263575f 100644
--- a/fs/eventpoll.c
+++ b/fs/eventpoll.c
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ static void ep_free(struct eventpoll *ep)
* Called with &file->f_lock held,
* returns with it released
*/
-static void __ep_remove_file(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi,
+static void ep_remove_file(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi,
struct file *file)
{
struct epitems_head *to_free = NULL;
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ static void __ep_remove_file(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi,
free_ephead(to_free);
}
-static bool __ep_remove_epi(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
+static bool ep_remove_epi(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
{
lockdep_assert_held(&ep->mtx);
@@ -789,9 +789,9 @@ static void ep_remove_safe(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
return;
}
- __ep_remove_file(ep, epi, file);
+ ep_remove_file(ep, epi, file);
- if (__ep_remove_epi(ep, epi))
+ if (ep_remove_epi(ep, epi))
WARN_ON_ONCE(ep_refcount_dec_and_test(ep));
}
@@ -1013,8 +1013,8 @@ void eventpoll_release_file(struct file *file)
ep_unregister_pollwait(ep, epi);
spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
- __ep_remove_file(ep, epi, file);
- dispose = __ep_remove_epi(ep, epi);
+ ep_remove_file(ep, epi, file);
+ dispose = ep_remove_epi(ep, epi);
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 080/175] eventpoll: rename ep_remove_safe() back to ep_remove()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 079/175] eventpoll: drop vestigial __ prefix from ep_remove_{file,epi}() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 081/175] eventpoll: move epi_fget() up Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (103 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christian Brauner (Amutable),
Quentin Schulz, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0bade234723e40e4937be912e105785d6a51464e ]
The current name is just confusing and doesn't clarify anything.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-4-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a6dc643c6931 ("eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF")
Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/eventpoll.c | 16 ++++++++--------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c
index 0a54a42263575f..db5d7c1d726c83 100644
--- a/fs/eventpoll.c
+++ b/fs/eventpoll.c
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ static bool ep_remove_epi(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
/*
* ep_remove variant for callers owing an additional reference to the ep
*/
-static void ep_remove_safe(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
+static void ep_remove(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
{
struct file *file = epi->ffd.file;
@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ static void ep_clear_and_put(struct eventpoll *ep)
/*
* Walks through the whole tree and try to free each "struct epitem".
- * Note that ep_remove_safe() will not remove the epitem in case of a
+ * Note that ep_remove() will not remove the epitem in case of a
* racing eventpoll_release_file(); the latter will do the removal.
* At this point we are sure no poll callbacks will be lingering around.
* Since we still own a reference to the eventpoll struct, the loop can't
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ static void ep_clear_and_put(struct eventpoll *ep)
for (rbp = rb_first_cached(&ep->rbr); rbp; rbp = next) {
next = rb_next(rbp);
epi = rb_entry(rbp, struct epitem, rbn);
- ep_remove_safe(ep, epi);
+ ep_remove(ep, epi);
cond_resched();
}
@@ -1497,21 +1497,21 @@ static int ep_insert(struct eventpoll *ep, const struct epoll_event *event,
mutex_unlock(&tep->mtx);
/*
- * ep_remove_safe() calls in the later error paths can't lead to
+ * ep_remove() calls in the later error paths can't lead to
* ep_free() as the ep file itself still holds an ep reference.
*/
ep_get(ep);
/* now check if we've created too many backpaths */
if (unlikely(full_check && reverse_path_check())) {
- ep_remove_safe(ep, epi);
+ ep_remove(ep, epi);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (epi->event.events & EPOLLWAKEUP) {
error = ep_create_wakeup_source(epi);
if (error) {
- ep_remove_safe(ep, epi);
+ ep_remove(ep, epi);
return error;
}
}
@@ -1535,7 +1535,7 @@ static int ep_insert(struct eventpoll *ep, const struct epoll_event *event,
* high memory pressure.
*/
if (unlikely(!epq.epi)) {
- ep_remove_safe(ep, epi);
+ ep_remove(ep, epi);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -2227,7 +2227,7 @@ int do_epoll_ctl(int epfd, int op, int fd, struct epoll_event *epds,
* The eventpoll itself is still alive: the refcount
* can't go to zero here.
*/
- ep_remove_safe(ep, epi);
+ ep_remove(ep, epi);
error = 0;
} else {
error = -ENOENT;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 081/175] eventpoll: move epi_fget() up
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 080/175] eventpoll: rename ep_remove_safe() back to ep_remove() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 082/175] eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (102 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christian Brauner (Amutable),
Quentin Schulz, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 86e87059e6d1fd5115a31949726450ed03c1073b ]
We'll need it when removing files so move it up. No functional change.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-5-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a6dc643c6931 ("eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF")
[file_ref_get(&file->f_ref) from original commit left as
atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&file->f_count) due to v6.12.y missing commit
90ee6ed776c0 ("fs: port files to file_ref") and its dependent commit
08ef26ea9ab3 ("fs: add file_ref")]
Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/eventpoll.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c
index db5d7c1d726c83..fc4668a403c9d3 100644
--- a/fs/eventpoll.c
+++ b/fs/eventpoll.c
@@ -715,6 +715,34 @@ static void ep_free(struct eventpoll *ep)
kfree_rcu(ep, rcu);
}
+/*
+ * The ffd.file pointer may be in the process of being torn down due to
+ * being closed, but we may not have finished eventpoll_release() yet.
+ *
+ * Normally, even with the atomic_long_inc_not_zero, the file may have
+ * been free'd and then gotten re-allocated to something else (since
+ * files are not RCU-delayed, they are SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU).
+ *
+ * But for epoll, users hold the ep->mtx mutex, and as such any file in
+ * the process of being free'd will block in eventpoll_release_file()
+ * and thus the underlying file allocation will not be free'd, and the
+ * file re-use cannot happen.
+ *
+ * For the same reason we can avoid a rcu_read_lock() around the
+ * operation - 'ffd.file' cannot go away even if the refcount has
+ * reached zero (but we must still not call out to ->poll() functions
+ * etc).
+ */
+static struct file *epi_fget(const struct epitem *epi)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+
+ file = epi->ffd.file;
+ if (!atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&file->f_count))
+ file = NULL;
+ return file;
+}
+
/*
* Called with &file->f_lock held,
* returns with it released
@@ -886,34 +914,6 @@ static __poll_t __ep_eventpoll_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait, int dep
return res;
}
-/*
- * The ffd.file pointer may be in the process of being torn down due to
- * being closed, but we may not have finished eventpoll_release() yet.
- *
- * Normally, even with the atomic_long_inc_not_zero, the file may have
- * been free'd and then gotten re-allocated to something else (since
- * files are not RCU-delayed, they are SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU).
- *
- * But for epoll, users hold the ep->mtx mutex, and as such any file in
- * the process of being free'd will block in eventpoll_release_file()
- * and thus the underlying file allocation will not be free'd, and the
- * file re-use cannot happen.
- *
- * For the same reason we can avoid a rcu_read_lock() around the
- * operation - 'ffd.file' cannot go away even if the refcount has
- * reached zero (but we must still not call out to ->poll() functions
- * etc).
- */
-static struct file *epi_fget(const struct epitem *epi)
-{
- struct file *file;
-
- file = epi->ffd.file;
- if (!atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&file->f_count))
- file = NULL;
- return file;
-}
-
/*
* Differs from ep_eventpoll_poll() in that internal callers already have
* the ep->mtx so we need to start from depth=1, such that mutex_lock_nested()
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 082/175] eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 081/175] eventpoll: move epi_fget() up Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 083/175] KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected role Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (101 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jaeyoung Chung,
Christian Brauner (Amutable), Wentao Guan, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a6dc643c69311677c574a0f17a3f4d66a5f3744b ]
ep_remove() (via ep_remove_file()) cleared file->f_ep under
file->f_lock but then kept using @file inside the critical section
(is_file_epoll(), hlist_del_rcu() through the head, spin_unlock).
A concurrent __fput() taking the eventpoll_release() fastpath in
that window observed the transient NULL, skipped
eventpoll_release_file() and ran to f_op->release / file_free().
For the epoll-watches-epoll case, f_op->release is
ep_eventpoll_release() -> ep_clear_and_put() -> ep_free(), which
kfree()s the watched struct eventpoll. Its embedded ->refs
hlist_head is exactly where epi->fllink.pprev points, so the
subsequent hlist_del_rcu()'s "*pprev = next" scribbles into freed
kmalloc-192 memory.
In addition, struct file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so the slot
backing @file could be recycled by alloc_empty_file() --
reinitializing f_lock and f_ep -- while ep_remove() is still
nominally inside that lock. The upshot is an attacker-controllable
kmem_cache_free() against the wrong slab cache.
Pin @file via epi_fget() at the top of ep_remove() and gate the
critical section on the pin succeeding. With the pin held @file
cannot reach refcount zero, which holds __fput() off and
transitively keeps the watched struct eventpoll alive across the
hlist_del_rcu() and the f_lock use, closing both UAFs.
If the pin fails @file has already reached refcount zero and its
__fput() is in flight. Because we bailed before clearing f_ep,
that path takes the eventpoll_release() slow path into
eventpoll_release_file() and blocks on ep->mtx until the waiter
side's ep_clear_and_put() drops it. The bailed epi's share of
ep->refcount stays intact, so the trailing ep_refcount_dec_and_test()
in ep_clear_and_put() cannot free the eventpoll out from under
eventpoll_release_file(); the orphaned epi is then cleaned up
there.
A successful pin also proves we are not racing
eventpoll_release_file() on this epi, so drop the now-redundant
re-check of epi->dying under f_lock. The cheap lockless
READ_ONCE(epi->dying) fast-path bailout stays.
Fixes: 58c9b016e128 ("epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention")
Reported-by: Jaeyoung Chung <jjy600901@snu.ac.kr>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-6-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit a6dc643c69311677c574a0f17a3f4d66a5f3744b)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/eventpoll.c | 16 ++++++++++------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c
index fc4668a403c9d3..0e09bddea16a5f 100644
--- a/fs/eventpoll.c
+++ b/fs/eventpoll.c
@@ -801,22 +801,26 @@ static bool ep_remove_epi(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
*/
static void ep_remove(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
{
- struct file *file = epi->ffd.file;
+ struct file *file __free(fput) = NULL;
lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
lockdep_assert_held(&ep->mtx);
ep_unregister_pollwait(ep, epi);
- /* sync with eventpoll_release_file() */
+ /* cheap sync with eventpoll_release_file() */
if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(epi->dying)))
return;
- spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
- if (epi->dying) {
- spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
+ /*
+ * If we manage to grab a reference it means we're not in
+ * eventpoll_release_file() and aren't going to be.
+ */
+ file = epi_fget(epi);
+ if (!file)
return;
- }
+
+ spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
ep_remove_file(ep, epi, file);
if (ep_remove_epi(ep, epi))
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 083/175] KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected role
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 082/175] eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 084/175] KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure hugepage is in by slot before checking max mapping level Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (100 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Hyunwoo Kim, Paolo Bonzini,
Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
commit 81ccda30b4e83d8f5cc4fd50503c44e3a33abfeb upstream.
Commit 0cb2af2ea66ad ("KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due
to unexpected GFN") fixed a shadow paging mismatch between stored and
computed GFNs; the bug could be triggered by changing a PDE mapping from
outside the guest, and then deleting a memslot. The rmap_remove()
call would miss entries created after the PDE change because the GFN
of the leaf SPTE does not match the GFN of the struct kvm_mmu_page.
A similar hole however remains if the modified PDE points to a non-leaf
page. In this case the gfn can be made to match, but the role does not
match: the original large 2MB page creates a kvm_mmu_page with direct=1,
while the new 4KB needs a kvm_mmu_page with direct=0. However,
kvm_mmu_get_child_sp() does not compare the role, and therefore reuses
the page.
The next step is installing a leaf (4KB) SPTE on the new path which
records an rmap entry under the gfn resolved by the walk. But when
that child is zapped its parent kvm_mmu_page has direct=1 and
kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn() computes the gfn for the 4KB page as
sp->gfn + index instead of using sp->shadowed_translation[] (or sp->gfns[]
in older kernels). It therefore fails to remove the recorded entry.
When the memslot is dropped the shadow page is freed but the rmap
entry survives, as in the scenario that was already fixed. Code that
later walks that gfn (dirty logging, MMU notifier invalidation, and
so on) dereferences an sptep that lies in the freed page, causing the
use-after-free.
Fixes: 2032a93d66fa ("KVM: MMU: Don't allocate gfns page for direct mmu pages")
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 774bc26b8235e3..8e9ba7eaeaf3a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -2337,13 +2337,15 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *kvm_mmu_get_child_sp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u64 *sptep, gfn_t gfn,
bool direct, unsigned int access)
{
- union kvm_mmu_page_role role;
+ union kvm_mmu_page_role role = kvm_mmu_child_role(sptep, direct, access);
- if (is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep) && !is_large_pte(*sptep) &&
- spte_to_child_sp(*sptep) && spte_to_child_sp(*sptep)->gfn == gfn)
+ if (is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep) &&
+ !is_large_pte(*sptep) &&
+ spte_to_child_sp(*sptep) &&
+ spte_to_child_sp(*sptep)->gfn == gfn &&
+ spte_to_child_sp(*sptep)->role.word == role.word)
return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
- role = kvm_mmu_child_role(sptep, direct, access);
return kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page(vcpu, gfn, role);
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 084/175] KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure hugepage is in by slot before checking max mapping level
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (82 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 083/175] KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected role Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 085/175] Revert "ptp: add testptp mask test" Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (99 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, David Matlack, James Houghton,
Alexander Bulekov, Fred Griffoul, Alexander Graf, David Woodhouse,
Filippo Sironi, Ivan Orlov, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini,
Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
commit ef057cbf825e03b63f6edf5980f96abf3c53089d upstream.
When recovering hugepages in the shadow MMU, verify that the base gfn of
the shadow page is actually contained within the target memslot, *before*
querying the max mapping level given the shadow page's gfn. Failure to
pre-check the validity of the gfn can lead to an out-of-bounds access to
the slot's lpage_info (which typically manifests as a host #PF because the
lpage_info is vmalloc'd) if the guest creates a hugepage mapping (in its
PTEs) that extends "below" the bounds of a memslot.
When faulting in memory for a guest, and the size of the guest mapping is
greater than KVM's (current) max mapping, then KVM will create a "direct"
shadow page (direct in that there are no gPTEs to shadow, and so the target
gfn is a direct calculation given the base gfn of the shadow page). The
hugepage recovery flow looks for such direct shadow pages, as forcing 4KiB
mappings when dirty logging generates the guest > host mapping size case.
When the 4KiB restriction is lifted, then KVM can replace the shadow page
with a hugepage.
But if KVM originally used a smaller mapping than the guest because the
range of memory covered by the guest hugepage exceeds the bounds of a
memslot, then KVM will link a direct shadow page with a gfn that is outside
the bounds of the memslot being used to fault in memory. The rmap entry
added for the leaf mapping is correct and within bounds, but the gfn of the
leaf SPTE's parent shadow page will be out of bounds.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000806ffc
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 1002a7067 PMD 10612f067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 13 UID: 1000 PID: 757 Comm: mmu_stress_test Not tainted 7.1.0-rc1-48ce1e26eace-x86_pir_to_irr_comments-vm #341 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level+0x79/0x2b0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_mmu_recover_huge_pages+0x21b/0x320 [kvm]
kvm_set_memslot+0x1ee/0x590 [kvm]
kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x3a1/0x4d0 [kvm]
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x9bf/0x15d0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0xb7/0xbb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f21c0f1a9bf
</TASK>
Don't bother pre-checking the bounds of the potential hugepage, i.e. don't
check that e.g. sp->gfn + KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(sp->role.level + 1) is also
within the memslot, as the checks performed by kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level()
are a superset of the basic bounds checks. I.e. pre-checking the full
range would be a dubious micro-optimization.
Fixes: 9eba50f8d7fc ("KVM: x86/mmu: Consult max mapping level when zapping collapsible SPTEs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Cc: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Bulekov <bkov@amazon.com>
Cc: Fred Griffoul <fgriffo@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Filippo Sironi <sironi@amazon.de>
Cc: Ivan Orlov <iorlov@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 7 ++++++-
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 8e9ba7eaeaf3a0..2453524ea4a1fc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -6582,13 +6582,19 @@ static bool kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_spte(struct kvm *kvm,
sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep);
/*
- * We cannot do huge page mapping for indirect shadow pages,
- * which are found on the last rmap (level = 1) when not using
- * tdp; such shadow pages are synced with the page table in
- * the guest, and the guest page table is using 4K page size
- * mapping if the indirect sp has level = 1.
+ * Direct shadow page can be replaced by a hugepage if the host
+ * mapping level allows it and the memslot maps all of the host
+ * hugepage. Note! If the memslot maps only part of the
+ * hugepage, sp->gfn may be below slot->base_gfn, and querying
+ * the max mapping level would cause an out-of-bounds lpage_info
+ * access. So the gfn bounds check *must* be done first.
+ *
+ * Indirect shadow pages are created when the guest page tables
+ * are using 4K pages. Since the host mapping is always
+ * constrained by the page size in the guest, indirect shadow
+ * pages are never collapsible.
*/
- if (sp->role.direct &&
+ if (sp->role.direct && is_gfn_in_memslot(slot, sp->gfn) &&
sp->role.level < kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot, sp->gfn,
PG_LEVEL_NUM)) {
kvm_zap_one_rmap_spte(kvm, rmap_head, sptep);
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index ab09b08967bba4..57c7b4009f5758 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -1650,6 +1650,11 @@ int kvm_request_irq_source_id(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_free_irq_source_id(struct kvm *kvm, int irq_source_id);
bool kvm_arch_irqfd_allowed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irqfd *args);
+static inline bool is_gfn_in_memslot(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+ return gfn >= slot->base_gfn && gfn < slot->base_gfn + slot->npages;
+}
+
/*
* Returns a pointer to the memslot if it contains gfn.
* Otherwise returns NULL.
@@ -1660,7 +1665,7 @@ try_get_memslot(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
if (!slot)
return NULL;
- if (gfn >= slot->base_gfn && gfn < slot->base_gfn + slot->npages)
+ if (is_gfn_in_memslot(slot, gfn))
return slot;
else
return NULL;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 085/175] Revert "ptp: add testptp mask test"
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (83 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 084/175] KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure hugepage is in by slot before checking max mapping level Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 086/175] Bluetooth: btmtk: validate WMT event SKB length before struct access Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (98 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Yong Wang, Petr Machata, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
This reverts commit 59ac47a0275fcd5a7637c3d5da20b0905563c7f5, which is
commit 26285e689c6cd2cf3849568c83b2ebe53f467143 upstream.
The reverted commit extends the selftest to test timestamp event queue mask
manipulation in testptp. It exercises masks PTP_MASK_CLEAR_ALL and
PTP_MASK_EN_SINGLE, introduced in commit c5a445b1e934 ("ptp: support event
queue reader channel masks"), which is not on this stable branch. The test
case thus cannot be built against this tree's own UAPI headers.
The reverted commit was introduced to resolve a missing dependency of
commit 8d9f22c570ba ("testptp: Add option to open PHC in readonly mode"),
which is 76868642e427 upstream. The only conflict between the two is the
getopt string, and there is otherwise no direct dependency between the two.
This patch therefore reverts the cited commit, with hand-resolving the
getopt string to include 'r' (as introduced by c6dc458227a3), but not
'F' (introduced by c1c50689799d).
Reported-by: Yong Wang <yongwang@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/ptp/testptp.c | 19 +------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ptp/testptp.c b/tools/testing/selftests/ptp/testptp.c
index e0aed424fe42d5..8f05212f82329a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/ptp/testptp.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ptp/testptp.c
@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ static void usage(char *progname)
" -d name device to open\n"
" -e val read 'val' external time stamp events\n"
" -f val adjust the ptp clock frequency by 'val' ppb\n"
- " -F chan Enable single channel mask and keep device open for debugfs verification.\n"
" -g get the ptp clock time\n"
" -h prints this message\n"
" -i val index for event/trigger\n"
@@ -190,7 +189,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
int seconds = 0;
int readonly = 0;
int settime = 0;
- int channel = -1;
int64_t t1, t2, tp;
int64_t interval, offset;
@@ -200,7 +198,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
progname = strrchr(argv[0], '/');
progname = progname ? 1+progname : argv[0];
- while (EOF != (c = getopt(argc, argv, "cd:e:f:F:ghH:i:k:lL:n:o:p:P:rsSt:T:w:x:Xz"))) {
+ while (EOF != (c = getopt(argc, argv, "cd:e:f:ghH:i:k:lL:n:o:p:P:rsSt:T:w:x:Xz"))) {
switch (c) {
case 'c':
capabilities = 1;
@@ -214,9 +212,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
case 'f':
adjfreq = atoi(optarg);
break;
- case 'F':
- channel = atoi(optarg);
- break;
case 'g':
gettime = 1;
break;
@@ -618,18 +613,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
free(xts);
}
- if (channel >= 0) {
- if (ioctl(fd, PTP_MASK_CLEAR_ALL)) {
- perror("PTP_MASK_CLEAR_ALL");
- } else if (ioctl(fd, PTP_MASK_EN_SINGLE, (unsigned int *)&channel)) {
- perror("PTP_MASK_EN_SINGLE");
- } else {
- printf("Channel %d exclusively enabled. Check on debugfs.\n", channel);
- printf("Press any key to continue\n.");
- getchar();
- }
- }
-
close(fd);
return 0;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 086/175] Bluetooth: btmtk: validate WMT event SKB length before struct access
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (84 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 085/175] Revert "ptp: add testptp mask test" Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 087/175] Bluetooth: btmtk: accept too short WMT FUNC_CTRL events Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (97 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Tristan Madani,
Luiz Augusto von Dentz, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
[ Upstream commit 634a4408c0615c523cf7531790f4f14a422b9206 ]
btmtk_usb_hci_wmt_sync() casts the WMT event response SKB data to
struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt (7 bytes) and struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt_funcc
(9 bytes) without first checking that the SKB contains enough data.
A short firmware response causes out-of-bounds reads from SKB tailroom.
Use skb_pull_data() to validate and advance past the base WMT event
header. For the FUNC_CTRL case, pull the additional status field bytes
before accessing them.
Fixes: d019930b0049 ("Bluetooth: btmtk: move btusb_mtk_hci_wmt_sync to btmtk.c")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c
index ad8753dda826bb..5c6f4d4b2e7f0c 100644
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c
@@ -655,8 +655,13 @@ int btmtk_usb_hci_wmt_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev,
if (data->evt_skb == NULL)
goto err_free_wc;
- /* Parse and handle the return WMT event */
- wmt_evt = (struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt *)data->evt_skb->data;
+ wmt_evt = skb_pull_data(data->evt_skb, sizeof(*wmt_evt));
+ if (!wmt_evt) {
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "WMT event too short (%u bytes)",
+ data->evt_skb->len);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_free_skb;
+ }
if (wmt_evt->whdr.op != hdr->op) {
bt_dev_err(hdev, "Wrong op received %d expected %d",
wmt_evt->whdr.op, hdr->op);
@@ -672,6 +677,12 @@ int btmtk_usb_hci_wmt_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev,
status = BTMTK_WMT_PATCH_DONE;
break;
case BTMTK_WMT_FUNC_CTRL:
+ if (!skb_pull_data(data->evt_skb,
+ sizeof(wmt_evt_funcc->status))) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_free_skb;
+ }
+
wmt_evt_funcc = (struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt_funcc *)wmt_evt;
if (be16_to_cpu(wmt_evt_funcc->status) == 0x404)
status = BTMTK_WMT_ON_DONE;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 087/175] Bluetooth: btmtk: accept too short WMT FUNC_CTRL events
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (85 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 086/175] Bluetooth: btmtk: validate WMT event SKB length before struct access Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 088/175] fs: prepare for adding LSM blob to backing_file Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (96 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Pauli Virtanen,
Luiz Augusto von Dentz, Sasha Levin, Mikhail Gavrilov
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
[ Upstream commit e3ac0d9f1a205f33a43fba3b79ef74d2f604c78b ]
MT7925 (USB ID 0e8d:e025) on fw version 20260106153314 sends WMT
FUNC_CTRL events that are missing the status field.
Prior to commit 006b9943b982 ("Bluetooth: btmtk: validate WMT event SKB
length before struct access") the status was read from out-of-bounds of
SKB data, which usually would result to success with
BTMTK_WMT_ON_UNDONE, although I don't know the intent here. The bounds
check added in that commit returns with error instead, producing
"Bluetooth: hci0: Failed to send wmt func ctrl (-22)" and makes the
device unusable.
Fix the regression by interpreting too short packet as status
BTMTK_WMT_ON_UNDONE, which makes the device work normally again.
Fixes: 634a4408c061 ("Bluetooth: btmtk: validate WMT event SKB length before struct access")
Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
Tested-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com> # MT7922 (0489:e0e2)
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c
index 5c6f4d4b2e7f0c..582915f9a8d700 100644
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c
@@ -679,8 +679,8 @@ int btmtk_usb_hci_wmt_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev,
case BTMTK_WMT_FUNC_CTRL:
if (!skb_pull_data(data->evt_skb,
sizeof(wmt_evt_funcc->status))) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto err_free_skb;
+ status = BTMTK_WMT_ON_UNDONE;
+ break;
}
wmt_evt_funcc = (struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt_funcc *)wmt_evt;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 088/175] fs: prepare for adding LSM blob to backing_file
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (86 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 087/175] Bluetooth: btmtk: accept too short WMT FUNC_CTRL events Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 089/175] lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (95 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, linux-fsdevel, linux-unionfs,
linux-erofs, Amir Goldstein, Serge Hallyn, Paul Moore,
Cai Xinchen, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 880bd496ec72a6dcb00cb70c430ef752ba242ae7 ]
In preparation to adding LSM blob to backing_file struct, factor out
helpers init_backing_file() and backing_file_free().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[PM: use the term "LSM blob", fix comment style to match file]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
[1. The commit def3ae83da02
("fs: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path")
is not merged, The 6.6 LTS version accordingly operates on
&ff->real_path instead of &ff->user_path.
2. Mainline's file_free() does both the backing_file cleanup and the
kmem_cache_free() synchronously. Linux 6.6.y defers the actual kfree()
to file_free_rcu() via call_rcu(), so only path_put() is done
synchronously in file_free().]
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/file_table.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index 234284ef72a9a5..b4c208a771539d 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -72,11 +72,16 @@ static void file_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
kmem_cache_free(filp_cachep, f);
}
+static inline void backing_file_free(struct backing_file *ff)
+{
+ path_put(&ff->real_path);
+}
+
static inline void file_free(struct file *f)
{
security_file_free(f);
if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING))
- path_put(backing_file_real_path(f));
+ backing_file_free(backing_file(f));
if (likely(!(f->f_mode & FMODE_NOACCOUNT)))
percpu_counter_dec(&nr_files);
call_rcu(&f->f_rcuhead, file_free_rcu);
@@ -252,6 +257,12 @@ struct file *alloc_empty_file_noaccount(int flags, const struct cred *cred)
return f;
}
+static int init_backing_file(struct backing_file *ff)
+{
+ memset(&ff->real_path, 0, sizeof(ff->real_path));
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Variant of alloc_empty_file() that allocates a backing_file container
* and doesn't check and modify nr_files.
@@ -274,7 +285,14 @@ struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred)
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
+ /* The f_mode flags must be set before fput(). */
ff->file.f_mode |= FMODE_BACKING | FMODE_NOACCOUNT;
+ error = init_backing_file(ff);
+ if (unlikely(error)) {
+ fput(&ff->file);
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
+ }
+
return &ff->file;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 089/175] lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (87 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 088/175] fs: prepare for adding LSM blob to backing_file Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 090/175] selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (94 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, linux-fsdevel, linux-unionfs,
linux-erofs, Amir Goldstein, Serge Hallyn, Christian Brauner,
Paul Moore, Cai Xinchen, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
[ Upstream commit 6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987 ]
Stacked filesystems such as overlayfs do not currently provide the
necessary mechanisms for LSMs to properly enforce access controls on the
mmap() and mprotect() operations. In order to resolve this gap, a LSM
security blob is being added to the backing_file struct and the following
new LSM hooks are being created:
security_backing_file_alloc()
security_backing_file_free()
security_mmap_backing_file()
The first two hooks are to manage the lifecycle of the LSM security blob
in the backing_file struct, while the third provides a new mmap() access
control point for the underlying backing file. It is also expected that
LSMs will likely want to update their security_file_mprotect() callback
to address issues with their mprotect() controls, but that does not
require a change to the security_file_mprotect() LSM hook.
There are a three other small changes to support these new LSM hooks:
* Pass the user file associated with a backing file down to
alloc_empty_backing_file() so it can be included in the
security_backing_file_alloc() hook.
* Add getter and setter functions for the backing_file struct LSM blob
as the backing_file struct remains private to fs/file_table.c.
* Constify the file struct field in the LSM common_audit_data struct to
better support LSMs that need to pass a const file struct pointer into
the common LSM audit code.
Thanks to Arnd Bergmann for identifying the missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL()
and supplying a fixup.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
[1. Mainline uses call_int_hook(FUNC, ...) with the default IRC baked
into the macro. Linux 6.6.y uses call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) requiring
an explicit default return value.
2. fs/backing-file.c does not exist in LTS
Linux 6.6.y places backing_file_open() in fs/open.c and lacks a
dedicated fs/backing-file.c. The backing_file_mmap() function and
scoped_with_creds() do not exist in 6.6.y. Therefore the LTS patch calls
security_mmap_backing_file() directly in ovl_mmap() in
fs/overlayfs/file.c rather than modifying backing_file_mmap().
3. Missing filesystems/modules
Linux 6.6.y does not have backing_tmpfile_open(), fs/fuse/passthrough.c,
or the erofs ishare mmap path that the mainline patch touches. These hunks
are dropped in the 6.6 LTS backport.
4. Use macro backing_file to replace inline function to eliminate the
const warning.]
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/file_table.c | 32 +++++++---
fs/internal.h | 3 +-
fs/open.c | 7 ++-
fs/overlayfs/file.c | 8 ++-
include/linux/fs.h | 15 ++++-
include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 2 +-
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 ++
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 22 +++++++
security/security.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
10 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index b4c208a771539d..fa4d4c54f790c8 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -48,12 +48,12 @@ static struct percpu_counter nr_files __cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
struct backing_file {
struct file file;
struct path real_path;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ void *security;
+#endif
};
-static inline struct backing_file *backing_file(struct file *f)
-{
- return container_of(f, struct backing_file, file);
-}
+#define backing_file(f) container_of(f, struct backing_file, file)
struct path *backing_file_real_path(struct file *f)
{
@@ -72,8 +72,21 @@ static void file_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
kmem_cache_free(filp_cachep, f);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+void *backing_file_security(const struct file *f)
+{
+ return backing_file(f)->security;
+}
+
+void backing_file_set_security(struct file *f, void *security)
+{
+ backing_file(f)->security = security;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
static inline void backing_file_free(struct backing_file *ff)
{
+ security_backing_file_free(&ff->file);
path_put(&ff->real_path);
}
@@ -257,10 +270,12 @@ struct file *alloc_empty_file_noaccount(int flags, const struct cred *cred)
return f;
}
-static int init_backing_file(struct backing_file *ff)
+static int init_backing_file(struct backing_file *ff,
+ const struct file *user_file)
{
memset(&ff->real_path, 0, sizeof(ff->real_path));
- return 0;
+ backing_file_set_security(&ff->file, NULL);
+ return security_backing_file_alloc(&ff->file, user_file);
}
/*
@@ -270,7 +285,8 @@ static int init_backing_file(struct backing_file *ff)
* This is only for kernel internal use, and the allocate file must not be
* installed into file tables or such.
*/
-struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred)
+struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred,
+ const struct file *user_file)
{
struct backing_file *ff;
int error;
@@ -287,7 +303,7 @@ struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred)
/* The f_mode flags must be set before fput(). */
ff->file.f_mode |= FMODE_BACKING | FMODE_NOACCOUNT;
- error = init_backing_file(ff);
+ error = init_backing_file(ff, user_file);
if (unlikely(error)) {
fput(&ff->file);
return ERR_PTR(error);
diff --git a/fs/internal.h b/fs/internal.h
index d64ae03998cce9..576026e1ce3aab 100644
--- a/fs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/internal.h
@@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ extern void chroot_fs_refs(const struct path *, const struct path *);
*/
struct file *alloc_empty_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred);
struct file *alloc_empty_file_noaccount(int flags, const struct cred *cred);
-struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred);
+struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred,
+ const struct file *user_file);
static inline void put_file_access(struct file *file)
{
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index b5ea1dcbfb2242..5b164481d80b34 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -1175,18 +1175,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_file_open);
* the backing inode on the underlying filesystem, which can be
* retrieved using backing_file_real_path().
*/
-struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path *path, int flags,
+struct file *backing_file_open(const struct file *user_file, int flags,
const struct path *real_path,
const struct cred *cred)
{
+ const struct path *user_path = &user_file->f_path;
struct file *f;
int error;
- f = alloc_empty_backing_file(flags, cred);
+ f = alloc_empty_backing_file(flags, cred, user_file);
if (IS_ERR(f))
return f;
- f->f_path = *path;
+ f->f_path = *user_path;
path_get(real_path);
*backing_file_real_path(f) = *real_path;
error = do_dentry_open(f, d_inode(real_path->dentry), NULL);
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
index 8be4dc050d1ed2..07f00cf91977ee 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file,
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(real_idmap, realinode))
flags &= ~O_NOATIME;
- realfile = backing_file_open(&file->f_path, flags, realpath,
+ realfile = backing_file_open(file, flags, realpath,
current_cred());
}
revert_creds(old_cred);
@@ -527,6 +527,7 @@ static int ovl_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)
static int ovl_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
+ struct file *user_file = vma->vm_file;
struct file *realfile = file->private_data;
const struct cred *old_cred;
int ret;
@@ -540,6 +541,11 @@ static int ovl_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
vma_set_file(vma, realfile);
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
+ ret = security_mmap_backing_file(vma, realfile, user_file);
+ if (ret) {
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+ return ret;
+ }
ret = call_mmap(vma->vm_file, vma);
revert_creds(old_cred);
ovl_file_accessed(file);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 4cdeeaedaa404f..5a897ee50f29cf 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2515,11 +2515,24 @@ struct file *dentry_open(const struct path *path, int flags,
const struct cred *creds);
struct file *dentry_create(const struct path *path, int flags, umode_t mode,
const struct cred *cred);
-struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path *path, int flags,
+struct file *backing_file_open(const struct file *user_file, int flags,
const struct path *real_path,
const struct cred *cred);
struct path *backing_file_real_path(struct file *f);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+void *backing_file_security(const struct file *f);
+void backing_file_set_security(struct file *f, void *security);
+#else
+static inline void *backing_file_security(const struct file *f)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+static inline void backing_file_set_security(struct file *f, void *security)
+{
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
/*
* file_real_path - get the path corresponding to f_inode
*
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
index 97a8b21eb03339..c0a2839253fa1f 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {
#endif
char *kmod_name;
struct lsm_ioctlop_audit *op;
- struct file *file;
+ const struct file *file;
struct lsm_ibpkey_audit *ibpkey;
struct lsm_ibendport_audit *ibendport;
int reason;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 2923754c13bce6..567d7f16609c8b 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -169,6 +169,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernfs_init_security, struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_permission, struct file *file, int mask)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, backing_file_alloc, struct file *backing_file,
+ const struct file *user_file)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, backing_file_free, struct file *backing_file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl_compat, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
@@ -176,6 +179,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl_compat, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_addr, unsigned long addr)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_file, struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_backing_file, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ struct file *backing_file, struct file *user_file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_mprotect, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_lock, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index dcb5e5b5eb1352..3b56b60195ceb9 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
+ int lbs_backing_file;
int lbs_inode;
int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 937840870d86c3..4866ffdb4e6c1d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -389,11 +389,17 @@ int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
void security_file_free(struct file *file);
+int security_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file,
+ const struct file *user_file);
+void security_backing_file_free(struct file *backing_file);
int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
int security_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg);
int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags);
+int security_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ struct file *backing_file,
+ struct file *user_file);
int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot);
@@ -984,6 +990,15 @@ static inline int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
static inline void security_file_free(struct file *file)
{ }
+static inline int security_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file,
+ const struct file *user_file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_backing_file_free(struct file *backing_file)
+{ }
+
static inline int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
@@ -1003,6 +1018,13 @@ static inline int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ struct file *backing_file,
+ struct file *user_file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1794860fd614ea..4b61766c3d27bd 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __ro_after_init;
static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain);
static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
+static struct kmem_cache *lsm_backing_file_cache;
static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
char *lsm_names;
@@ -200,6 +201,8 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_backing_file,
+ &blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file);
/*
* The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to
* what the modules might need.
@@ -374,6 +377,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ init_debug("backing_file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file);
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
@@ -388,6 +392,11 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file)
+ lsm_backing_file_cache = kmem_cache_create(
+ "lsm_backing_file_cache",
+ blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file,
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode)
lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache",
blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0,
@@ -616,6 +625,30 @@ static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsm_backing_file_alloc - allocate a composite backing file blob
+ * @backing_file: the backing file
+ *
+ * Allocate the backing file blob for all the modules.
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file)
+{
+ void *blob;
+
+ if (!lsm_backing_file_cache) {
+ backing_file_set_security(backing_file, NULL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ blob = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_backing_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+ backing_file_set_security(backing_file, blob);
+ if (!blob)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob
* @inode: the inode that needs a blob
@@ -2630,6 +2663,57 @@ void security_file_free(struct file *file)
}
}
+/**
+ * security_backing_file_alloc() - Allocate and setup a backing file blob
+ * @backing_file: the backing file
+ * @user_file: the associated user visible file
+ *
+ * Allocate a backing file LSM blob and perform any necessary initialization of
+ * the LSM blob. There will be some operations where the LSM will not have
+ * access to @user_file after this point, so any important state associated
+ * with @user_file that is important to the LSM should be captured in the
+ * backing file's LSM blob.
+ *
+ * LSM's should avoid taking a reference to @user_file in this hook as it will
+ * result in problems later when the system attempts to drop/put the file
+ * references due to a circular dependency.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful, negative values otherwise.
+ */
+int security_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file,
+ const struct file *user_file)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = lsm_backing_file_alloc(backing_file);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(backing_file_alloc, 0, backing_file, user_file);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_backing_file_free(backing_file);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_backing_file_free() - Free a backing file blob
+ * @backing_file: the backing file
+ *
+ * Free any LSM state associate with a backing file's LSM blob, including the
+ * blob itself.
+ */
+void security_backing_file_free(struct file *backing_file)
+{
+ void *blob = backing_file_security(backing_file);
+
+ call_void_hook(backing_file_free, backing_file);
+
+ if (blob) {
+ backing_file_set_security(backing_file, NULL);
+ kmem_cache_free(lsm_backing_file_cache, blob);
+ }
+}
+
/**
* security_file_ioctl() - Check if an ioctl is allowed
* @file: associated file
@@ -2723,6 +2807,32 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
}
+/**
+ * security_mmap_backing_file - Check if mmap'ing a backing file is allowed
+ * @vma: the vm_area_struct for the mmap'd region
+ * @backing_file: the backing file being mmap'd
+ * @user_file: the user file being mmap'd
+ *
+ * Check permissions for a mmap operation on a stacked filesystem. This hook
+ * is called after the security_mmap_file() and is responsible for authorizing
+ * the mmap on @backing_file. It is important to note that the mmap operation
+ * on @user_file has already been authorized and the @vma->vm_file has been
+ * set to @backing_file.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ struct file *backing_file,
+ struct file *user_file)
+{
+ /* recommended by the stackable filesystem devs */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(backing_file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return call_int_hook(mmap_backing_file, 0, vma, backing_file, user_file);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_mmap_backing_file);
+
/**
* security_mmap_addr() - Check if mmap'ing an address is allowed
* @addr: address
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 090/175] selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (88 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 089/175] lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 091/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: keep unacked list in ascending ordered Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (93 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Amir Goldstein, Paul Moore,
Cai Xinchen, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
[ Upstream commit 82544d36b1729153c8aeb179e84750f0c085d3b1 ]
The existing SELinux security model for overlayfs is to allow access if
the current task is able to access the top level file (the "user" file)
and the mounter's credentials are sufficient to access the lower
level file (the "backing" file). Unfortunately, the current code does
not properly enforce these access controls for both mmap() and mprotect()
operations on overlayfs filesystems.
This patch makes use of the newly created security_mmap_backing_file()
LSM hook to provide the missing backing file enforcement for mmap()
operations, and leverages the backing file API and new LSM blob to
provide the necessary information to properly enforce the mprotect()
access controls.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
[backing_file_user_path() not available
Mainline uses backing_file_user_path(file) to obtain the user-visible path
from a backing file. The 6.6.y version uses &file->f_path directly]
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 242 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 11 ++
2 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 60092d0b013ce0..3f11c5ae8fbf0e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1717,49 +1717,72 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid);
#endif
-/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
- access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
- descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
- check a particular permission to the file.
- Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
- has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
- access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
- where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
-static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
- struct file *file,
- u32 av)
+static int __file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, const struct file *file,
+ u32 av, bool bf_user_file)
+
{
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
- struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct common_audit_data ad;
- u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+ struct inode *inode;
+ u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
+ u32 tsid_fd;
int rc;
- ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
- ad.u.file = file;
+ if (bf_user_file) {
+ struct backing_file_security_struct *bfsec;
+ const struct path *path;
- if (sid != fsec->sid) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
- SECCLASS_FD,
- FD__USE,
- &ad);
+ if (WARN_ON(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ bfsec = selinux_backing_file(file);
+ path = &file->f_path;
+ tsid_fd = bfsec->uf_sid;
+ inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+ ad.u.path = *path;
+ } else {
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
+
+ tsid_fd = fsec->sid;
+ inode = file_inode(file);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
+ }
+
+ if (ssid != tsid_fd) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, tsid_fd, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
if (rc)
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
- rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
+ /* regardless of backing vs user file, use the underlying file here */
+ rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, ssid);
if (rc)
return rc;
#endif
/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
- rc = 0;
if (av)
- rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
-out:
- return rc;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
+ access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
+ descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
+ check a particular permission to the file.
+ Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
+ has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
+ access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
+ where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
+static inline int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+ const struct file *file, u32 av)
+{
+ return __file_has_perm(cred, file, av, false);
}
/*
@@ -3638,6 +3661,17 @@ static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+static int selinux_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file,
+ const struct file *user_file)
+{
+ struct backing_file_security_struct *bfsec;
+
+ bfsec = selinux_backing_file(backing_file);
+ bfsec->uf_sid = selinux_file(user_file)->sid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
* operation to an inode.
@@ -3755,42 +3789,55 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
-static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
+static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred,
+ const struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+ bool shared, bool bf_user_file)
{
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
- int rc = 0;
+ struct inode *inode = NULL;
+ bool prot_exec = prot & PROT_EXEC;
+ bool prot_write = prot & PROT_WRITE;
+
+ if (file) {
+ if (bf_user_file)
+ inode = d_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
+ else
+ inode = file_inode(file);
+ }
+
+ if (default_noexec && prot_exec &&
+ (!file || IS_PRIVATE(inode) || (!shared && prot_write))) {
+ int rc;
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
- if (default_noexec &&
- (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
- (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
/*
- * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
- * private file mapping that will also be writable.
- * This has an additional check.
+ * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a private
+ * file mapping that will also be writable.
*/
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM,
+ NULL);
if (rc)
- goto error;
+ return rc;
}
if (file) {
- /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
+ /* "read" always possible, "write" only if shared */
u32 av = FILE__READ;
-
- /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
- if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
+ if (shared && prot_write)
av |= FILE__WRITE;
-
- if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+ if (prot_exec)
av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
- return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
+ return __file_has_perm(cred, file, av, bf_user_file);
}
-error:
- return rc;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred,
+ const struct file *file,
+ unsigned long prot, bool shared)
+{
+ return __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, false);
}
static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
@@ -3806,36 +3853,80 @@ static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
return rc;
}
-static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file,
- unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+static int selinux_mmap_file_common(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+ unsigned long prot, bool shared)
{
- struct common_audit_data ad;
- int rc;
-
if (file) {
+ int rc;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
ad.u.file = file;
- rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
- FILE__MAP, &ad);
+ rc = inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), FILE__MAP, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
- return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
- (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
+ return file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared);
+}
+
+static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file,
+ unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return selinux_mmap_file_common(current_cred(), file, prot,
+ (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_mmap_backing_file - Check mmap permissions on a backing file
+ * @vma: memory region
+ * @backing_file: stacked filesystem backing file
+ * @user_file: user visible file
+ *
+ * This is called after selinux_mmap_file() on stacked filesystems, and it
+ * is this function's responsibility to verify access to @backing_file and
+ * setup the SELinux state for possible later use in the mprotect() code path.
+ *
+ * By the time this function is called, mmap() access to @user_file has already
+ * been authorized and @vma->vm_file has been set to point to @backing_file.
+ *
+ * Return zero on success, negative values otherwise.
+ */
+static int selinux_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ struct file *backing_file,
+ struct file *user_file __always_unused)
+{
+ unsigned long prot = 0;
+
+ /* translate vma->vm_flags perms into PROT perms */
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_READ)
+ prot |= PROT_READ;
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+ prot |= PROT_WRITE;
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
+ prot |= PROT_EXEC;
+
+ return selinux_mmap_file_common(backing_file->f_cred, backing_file,
+ prot, vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED);
}
static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
unsigned long prot)
{
+ int rc;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+ const struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
+ bool backing_file;
+ bool shared = vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED;
+
+ /* check if we need to trigger the "backing files are awful" mode */
+ backing_file = file && (file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING);
if (default_noexec &&
(prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
- int rc = 0;
/*
* We don't use the vma_is_initial_heap() helper as it has
* a history of problems and is currently broken on systems
@@ -3849,11 +3940,15 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
- } else if (!vma->vm_file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) ||
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ } else if (!file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) ||
vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
- } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ } else if (file && vma->anon_vma) {
/*
* We are making executable a file mapping that has
* had some COW done. Since pages might have been
@@ -3861,13 +3956,29 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
* modified content. This typically should only
* occur for text relocations.
*/
- rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
+ rc = __file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__EXECMOD,
+ backing_file);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (backing_file) {
+ rc = file_has_perm(file->f_cred, file,
+ FILE__EXECMOD);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
}
+ }
+
+ rc = __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, backing_file);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (backing_file) {
+ rc = file_map_prot_check(file->f_cred, file, prot, shared);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
- return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
+ return 0;
}
static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
@@ -6870,6 +6981,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
+ .lbs_backing_file = sizeof(struct backing_file_security_struct),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
@@ -7074,9 +7186,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(backing_file_alloc, selinux_backing_file_alloc),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, selinux_file_ioctl_compat),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_backing_file, selinux_mmap_backing_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 8159fd53c3de2e..541933dd295c07 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ struct file_security_struct {
u32 pseqno; /* Policy seqno at the time of file open */
};
+struct backing_file_security_struct {
+ u32 uf_sid; /* associated user file fsec->sid */
+};
+
struct superblock_security_struct {
u32 sid; /* SID of file system superblock */
u32 def_sid; /* default SID for labeling */
@@ -158,6 +162,13 @@ static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file)
return file->f_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
}
+static inline struct backing_file_security_struct *
+selinux_backing_file(const struct file *backing_file)
+{
+ void *blob = backing_file_security(backing_file);
+ return blob + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file;
+}
+
static inline struct inode_security_struct *selinux_inode(
const struct inode *inode)
{
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 091/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: keep unacked list in ascending ordered
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (89 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 090/175] selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 092/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize dup_acks explicitly Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (92 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 5aa8651527ea0b610e7a09fb3b8204c1398b9525 upstream.
When batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order inserts a new entry in the list of
unacked (out of order) packets, it searches from the entry with the newest
sequence number towards oldest sequence number. If an entry is found which
is older than the newly entry, the new entry has to be added after the
found one to keep the ascending order.
But for this operation list_add_tail() was used. But this function adds an
entry _before_ another one. As result, the list would contain a lot of
swapped sequence numbers. The consumer of this list
(batadv_tp_ack_unordered()) would then fail to correctly ack packets.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index dfc3374549921f..f350a60e6c76b9 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
* one is attached _after_ it. In this way the list is kept in
* ascending order
*/
- list_add_tail(&new->list, &un->list);
+ list_add(&new->list, &un->list);
added = true;
break;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 092/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize dup_acks explicitly
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (90 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 091/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: keep unacked list in ascending ordered Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 093/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize dec_cwnd explicitly Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (91 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit b2b68b32a715e0328662801576974aa37b942b00 upstream.
When an ack with a sequence number equal to the last_acked is received, the
dup_acks counter is increased to decide whether fast retransmit should be
performed. Only when the sequence numbers are not equal, the dup_acks is
set to the initial value (0).
But if the initial packet would have the sequence number
BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ, dup_acks would not be initialized and atomic_inc would
operate on an undefined starting value. It is therefore required to have it
explicitly initialized during the start of the sender session.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index f350a60e6c76b9..750e5e9d3dc9d6 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1045,6 +1045,7 @@ void batadv_tp_start(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
tp_vars->icmp_uid = icmp_uid;
tp_vars->last_sent = BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ;
+ atomic_set(&tp_vars->dup_acks, 0);
atomic_set(&tp_vars->last_acked, BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ);
tp_vars->fast_recovery = false;
tp_vars->recover = BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 093/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize dec_cwnd explicitly
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (91 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 092/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize dup_acks explicitly Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 094/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid window underflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (90 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit febfb1b86224489535312296ecfa3d4bf467f339 upstream.
When batadv_tp_update_cwnd() is called, dec_cwnd is increased. But dec_cwnd
is only initialixed (to 0) when a duplicate Ack was received or when cwnd
is below the ss_threshold.
Just initialize the cwnd during the initialization to avoid any potential
access of uninitialized data.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index 750e5e9d3dc9d6..f6ccb639744a2a 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1055,6 +1055,8 @@ void batadv_tp_start(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
* soft_interface, hence its MTU
*/
tp_vars->cwnd = BATADV_TP_PLEN * 3;
+ tp_vars->dec_cwnd = 0;
+
/* at the beginning initialise the SS threshold to the biggest possible
* window size, hence the AWND size
*/
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 094/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid window underflow
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (92 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 093/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize dec_cwnd explicitly Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 095/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid divide-by-zero for dec_cwnd Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (89 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 765947b81fb54b6ebb0bc1cfe55c0fa399e002b8 upstream.
In batadv_tp_avail(), win_left is calculated with 32-bit unsigned
arithmetic: win_left = win_limit - tp_vars->last_sent;
During Fast Recovery, cwnd is inflated and last_sent advances rapidly. When
Fast Recovery ends, cwnd drops abruptly back to ss_threshold. If the newly
shrunk win_limit is less than last_sent, the unsigned subtraction will
underflow, wrapping to a massive positive value. Instead of returning that
the window is full (unavailable), it returns that the sender can continue
sending.
To handle this situation, it must be checked whether the windows end
sequence number (win_limit) has to be compared with the last sent sequence
number. If it would be before the last sent sequence number, then more acks
are needed before the transmission can be started again.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index f6ccb639744a2a..0fdcafca3aa02b 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -817,10 +817,15 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
static bool batadv_tp_avail(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
size_t payload_len)
{
+ u32 last_sent = READ_ONCE(tp_vars->last_sent);
u32 win_left, win_limit;
win_limit = atomic_read(&tp_vars->last_acked) + tp_vars->cwnd;
- win_left = win_limit - tp_vars->last_sent;
+
+ if (batadv_seq_before(last_sent, win_limit))
+ win_left = win_limit - last_sent;
+ else
+ win_left = 0;
return win_left >= payload_len;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 095/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid divide-by-zero for dec_cwnd
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (93 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 094/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid window underflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 096/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: fix fast recovery precondition Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (88 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 33ccd52f3cc9ed46ce395199f89aa3234dc83314 upstream.
The cwnd is always MSS <= cwnd <= 0x20000000. But the calculation in
batadv_tp_update_cwnd() assumes unsigned 32 bit arithmetics.
((mss * 8) ** 2) / (cwnd * 8)
In case cwnd is actually 0x20000000, it will be shifted by 3 bit to the
left end up at 0x100000000 or U32_MAX + 1. It will therefore wrap around
and be 0 - resulting in:
((mss * 8) ** 2) / 0
This is of course invalid and cannot be calculated. The calculation should
must be simplified to avoid this overflow:
(mss ** 2) * 8 / cwnd
It will keep the precision enhancement from the scaling (by 8) but avoid
the overflow in the divisor.
In theory, there could still be an overflow in the dividend. It is at the
moment fixed to BATADV_TP_PLEN in batadv_tp_recv_ack() - so it is not an
imminent problem. But allowing it to use the whole u32 bit range, would
mean that it can still use up to 67 bits. To keep this calculation safe for
32 bit arithmetic, mss must never use more than floor((32 - 3) / 2) bits -
or in other words: must never be larger than 16383.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index 0fdcafca3aa02b..4ff80e4214ff0a 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -154,9 +154,12 @@ static void batadv_tp_update_cwnd(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars, u32 mss)
return;
}
+ /* prevent overflow in (mss * mss) << 3 */
+ mss = min_t(u32, mss, (1U << 14) - 1);
+
/* increment CWND at least of 1 (section 3.1 of RFC5681) */
tp_vars->dec_cwnd += max_t(u32, 1U << 3,
- ((mss * mss) << 6) / (tp_vars->cwnd << 3));
+ ((mss * mss) << 3) / tp_vars->cwnd);
if (tp_vars->dec_cwnd < (mss << 3)) {
spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->cwnd_lock);
return;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 096/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: fix fast recovery precondition
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (94 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 095/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid divide-by-zero for dec_cwnd Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 097/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: handle seqno wrap-around for fast recovery detection Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (87 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 2b0d08f08ed3b2174f05c43089ec65f3543a025b upstream.
The fast recovery precondition checks if the recover (initialized to
BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ) is bigger than the received ack. But since recover is
only updated when this check is successful, it will never enter the fast
recovery mode.
According to RFC6582 Section 3.2 step 2, the check should actually be
different:
> When the third duplicate ACK is received, the TCP sender first
> checks the value of recover to see if the Cumulative
> Acknowledgment field covers more than recover
The precondition must therefore check if recover is smaller than the
received ack - basically swapping the operands of the current check.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index 4ff80e4214ff0a..c79352cfddc4ae 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
if (atomic_read(&tp_vars->dup_acks) != 3)
goto out;
- if (recv_ack >= tp_vars->recover)
+ if (tp_vars->recover >= recv_ack)
goto out;
/* if this is the third duplicate ACK do Fast Retransmit */
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 097/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: handle seqno wrap-around for fast recovery detection
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (95 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 096/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: fix fast recovery precondition Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 098/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: add only finished tp_vars to lists Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (86 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit f54c85ed42a1b27a516cf2a4728f5a612b799e07 upstream.
The recover variable and the last_sent sequence number are initialized on
purpose as a really high value which will wrap-around after the first 2000
bytes. The fast recovery precondition must therefore not use simple integer
comparisons but use helpers which are aware of the sequence number
wrap-arounds.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index c79352cfddc4ae..089ac7cc9fbebc 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
if (atomic_read(&tp_vars->dup_acks) != 3)
goto out;
- if (tp_vars->recover >= recv_ack)
+ if (!batadv_seq_before(tp_vars->recover, recv_ack))
goto out;
/* if this is the third duplicate ACK do Fast Retransmit */
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 098/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: add only finished tp_vars to lists
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (96 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 097/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: handle seqno wrap-around for fast recovery detection Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 099/175] batman-adv: bla: annotate lasttime access with READ/WRITE_ONCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (85 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 15ccbf685222274f5add1387af58c2a41a95f81e upstream.
When the receiver variables (aka "session") are initialized, then they are
added to the list of sessions before the timer is set up. A RCU protected
reader could therefore find the entry and run mod_setup before
batadv_tp_init_recv() finished the timer initialization.
The same is true for batadv_tp_start(), which must first initialize the
finish_work and the test_length to avoid a similar problem.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 18 +++++++++---------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index 089ac7cc9fbebc..2bba53fc6da5c0 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1096,21 +1096,21 @@ void batadv_tp_start(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
tp_vars->prerandom_offset = 0;
spin_lock_init(&tp_vars->prerandom_lock);
- kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
- hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list);
- spin_unlock_bh(&bat_priv->tp_list_lock);
-
tp_vars->test_length = test_length;
if (!tp_vars->test_length)
tp_vars->test_length = BATADV_TP_DEF_TEST_LENGTH;
+ /* init work item for finished tp tests */
+ INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&tp_vars->finish_work, batadv_tp_sender_finish);
+
+ kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&bat_priv->tp_list_lock);
+
batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_TP_METER, bat_priv,
"Meter: starting throughput meter towards %pM (length=%ums)\n",
dst, test_length);
- /* init work item for finished tp tests */
- INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&tp_vars->finish_work, batadv_tp_sender_finish);
-
/* start tp kthread. This way the write() call issued from userspace can
* happily return and avoid to block
*/
@@ -1430,10 +1430,10 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tp_vars->unacked_list);
kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
- hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list);
+ timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0);
kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
- timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0);
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list);
batadv_tp_reset_receiver_timer(tp_vars);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 099/175] batman-adv: bla: annotate lasttime access with READ/WRITE_ONCE
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (97 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:19 ` [PATCH 6.6 098/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: add only finished tp_vars to lists Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 100/175] batman-adv: prevent ELP transmission interval underflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (84 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 98b0fb191c878a64cbaebfe231d96d57576acf8c upstream.
The lasttime field for claim, backbone_gw, and loopdetect tracks the
jiffies value of the most recent activity and is used to detect timeouts.
These accesses are not consistently protected by a lock, so
READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE must be used to prevent data races caused by compiler
optimizations.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 23721387c409 ("batman-adv: add basic bridge loop avoidance code")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 28 +++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c
index cfb1eb25c6ac4d..ac12c06f11b89e 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ batadv_bla_get_backbone_gw(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *orig,
return NULL;
entry->vid = vid;
- entry->lasttime = jiffies;
+ WRITE_ONCE(entry->lasttime, jiffies);
entry->crc = BATADV_BLA_CRC_INIT;
entry->bat_priv = bat_priv;
spin_lock_init(&entry->crc_lock);
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ batadv_bla_update_own_backbone_gw(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
if (unlikely(!backbone_gw))
return;
- backbone_gw->lasttime = jiffies;
+ WRITE_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime, jiffies);
batadv_backbone_gw_put(backbone_gw);
}
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_add_claim(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
ether_addr_copy(claim->addr, mac);
spin_lock_init(&claim->backbone_lock);
claim->vid = vid;
- claim->lasttime = jiffies;
+ WRITE_ONCE(claim->lasttime, jiffies);
kref_get(&backbone_gw->refcount);
claim->backbone_gw = backbone_gw;
kref_init(&claim->refcount);
@@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_add_claim(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
return;
}
} else {
- claim->lasttime = jiffies;
+ WRITE_ONCE(claim->lasttime, jiffies);
if (claim->backbone_gw == backbone_gw)
/* no need to register a new backbone */
goto claim_free_ref;
@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_add_claim(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
spin_lock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
backbone_gw->crc ^= crc16(0, claim->addr, ETH_ALEN);
spin_unlock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
- backbone_gw->lasttime = jiffies;
+ WRITE_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime, jiffies);
claim_free_ref:
batadv_claim_put(claim);
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ static bool batadv_handle_announce(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *an_addr,
return true;
/* handle as ANNOUNCE frame */
- backbone_gw->lasttime = jiffies;
+ WRITE_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime, jiffies);
crc = ntohs(*((__force __be16 *)(&an_addr[4])));
batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_BLA, bat_priv,
@@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_purge_backbone_gw(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, int now)
head, hash_entry) {
if (now)
goto purge_now;
- if (!batadv_has_timed_out(backbone_gw->lasttime,
+ if (!batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime),
BATADV_BLA_BACKBONE_TIMEOUT))
continue;
@@ -1334,7 +1334,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_purge_claims(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr))
goto skip;
- if (!batadv_has_timed_out(claim->lasttime,
+ if (!batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(claim->lasttime),
BATADV_BLA_CLAIM_TIMEOUT))
goto skip;
@@ -1494,7 +1494,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_periodic_work(struct work_struct *work)
eth_random_addr(bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_addr);
bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_addr[0] = 0xba;
bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_addr[1] = 0xbe;
- bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_lasttime = jiffies;
+ WRITE_ONCE(bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_lasttime, jiffies);
atomic_set(&bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_next,
BATADV_BLA_LOOPDETECT_PERIODS);
@@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_periodic_work(struct work_struct *work)
primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr))
continue;
- backbone_gw->lasttime = jiffies;
+ WRITE_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime, jiffies);
batadv_bla_send_announce(bat_priv, backbone_gw);
if (send_loopdetect)
@@ -1900,7 +1900,7 @@ batadv_bla_loopdetect_check(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
/* If the packet came too late, don't forward it on the mesh
* but don't consider that as loop. It might be a coincidence.
*/
- if (batadv_has_timed_out(bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_lasttime,
+ if (batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_lasttime),
BATADV_BLA_LOOPDETECT_TIMEOUT))
return true;
@@ -2016,7 +2016,7 @@ bool batadv_bla_rx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (own_claim) {
/* ... allow it in any case */
- claim->lasttime = jiffies;
+ WRITE_ONCE(claim->lasttime, jiffies);
goto allow;
}
@@ -2118,7 +2118,7 @@ bool batadv_bla_tx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
/* if yes, the client has roamed and we have
* to unclaim it.
*/
- if (batadv_has_timed_out(claim->lasttime, 100)) {
+ if (batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(claim->lasttime), 100)) {
/* only unclaim if the last claim entry is
* older than 100 ms to make sure we really
* have a roaming client here.
@@ -2372,7 +2372,7 @@ batadv_bla_backbone_dump_entry(struct sk_buff *msg, u32 portid,
backbone_crc = backbone_gw->crc;
spin_unlock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
- msecs = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies - backbone_gw->lasttime);
+ msecs = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies - READ_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime));
if (is_own)
if (nla_put_flag(msg, BATADV_ATTR_BLA_OWN)) {
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 100/175] batman-adv: prevent ELP transmission interval underflow
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (98 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 099/175] batman-adv: bla: annotate lasttime access with READ/WRITE_ONCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 101/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize last_recv_time during init Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (83 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 5e50d4b8ae3ea622122d3c6a38d7f6fe68dfddca upstream.
batadv_v_elp_start_timer() enqeues a delayed work. The time when it starts
is randomly chosen between (elp_interval - BATADV_JITTER) and
(elp_interval + BATADV_JITTER). The configured elp_interval must therefore
be larger or equal to BATADV_JITTER to avoid that it causes an underflow of
the unsigned integer. If this would happen, then a "fast" ELP interval
would turn into a "day long" delay.
At the same time, it must not be larger than the maximum value the variable
can store.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: a10800829040 ("batman-adv: Add elp_interval hardif genl configuration")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/netlink.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/netlink.c b/net/batman-adv/netlink.c
index 0c64d81a776174..03ba6282af91a3 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/netlink.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/netlink.c
@@ -938,9 +938,15 @@ static int batadv_netlink_set_hardif(struct sk_buff *skb,
#ifdef CONFIG_BATMAN_ADV_BATMAN_V
if (info->attrs[BATADV_ATTR_ELP_INTERVAL]) {
+ u32 elp_interval;
+
attr = info->attrs[BATADV_ATTR_ELP_INTERVAL];
+ elp_interval = nla_get_u32(attr);
+
+ elp_interval = min_t(u32, elp_interval, INT_MAX);
+ elp_interval = max_t(u32, elp_interval, BATADV_JITTER);
- atomic_set(&hard_iface->bat_v.elp_interval, nla_get_u32(attr));
+ atomic_set(&hard_iface->bat_v.elp_interval, elp_interval);
}
if (info->attrs[BATADV_ATTR_THROUGHPUT_OVERRIDE]) {
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 101/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize last_recv_time during init
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (99 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 100/175] batman-adv: prevent ELP transmission interval underflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 102/175] batman-adv: ensure bcast is writable before modifying TTL Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (82 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 811cb00fa8cdc3f0a7f6eefc000a6888367c8c8f upstream.
The last_recv_time is the most important indicator for a receiver session
to figure out whether a session timed out or not. But this information was
only initialized after the session was added to the tp_receiver_list and
after the timer was started.
In the worst case, the timer (function) could have tried to access this
information before the actual initialization was reached. Like rest of the
variables of the tp_meter receiver session, this field has to be filled out
before any other (parallel running) context has the chance to access it.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index 2bba53fc6da5c0..133eed2fa9507f 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1403,8 +1403,10 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
tp_vars = batadv_tp_list_find_session(bat_priv, icmp->orig,
icmp->session, BATADV_TP_RECEIVER);
- if (tp_vars)
+ if (tp_vars) {
+ tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
goto out_unlock;
+ }
if (!atomic_add_unless(&bat_priv->tp_num, 1, BATADV_TP_MAX_NUM)) {
batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_TP_METER, bat_priv,
@@ -1432,6 +1434,8 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0);
+ tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+
kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list);
@@ -1480,9 +1484,9 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
icmp->orig);
goto out;
}
- }
- tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+ tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+ }
/* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been
* lost. Resend the ACK
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 102/175] batman-adv: ensure bcast is writable before modifying TTL
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (100 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 101/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize last_recv_time during init Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 103/175] batman-adv: fix (m|b)cast csum after decrementing TTL Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 4cd6d3a4b96a8576f1fed8f9f9f17c2dc2978e0c upstream.
Before batman-adv is allowed to write to an skb, it either has to have its
own copy of the skb or used skb_cow() to ensure that the data part is not
shared.
The old implementation used a shared queue and created copies before
attempting to write to it. But with the new implementation, the broadcast
packet is already modified when it gets received. Potentially writing to
shared buffers in this process.
Adding a skb_cow() right before this operation avoids this and can at the
same time prepare it for the modifications required to rebroadcast the
packet.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 3f69339068f9 ("batman-adv: bcast: queue per interface, if needed")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/routing.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/routing.c b/net/batman-adv/routing.c
index 163cd43c4821b6..747c3ff1c253b0 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/routing.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/routing.c
@@ -1198,6 +1198,12 @@ int batadv_recv_bcast_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (batadv_is_my_mac(bat_priv, bcast_packet->orig))
goto free_skb;
+ /* create a copy of the skb, if needed, to modify it. */
+ if (skb_cow(skb, ETH_HLEN) < 0)
+ goto free_skb;
+
+ bcast_packet = (struct batadv_bcast_packet *)skb->data;
+
if (bcast_packet->ttl-- < 2)
goto free_skb;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 103/175] batman-adv: fix (m|b)cast csum after decrementing TTL
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (101 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 102/175] batman-adv: ensure bcast is writable before modifying TTL Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 104/175] batman-adv: frag: ensure fragment is writable before modifying TTL Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit e728bbdf32660c8f32b8f5e8d09427a2c131ad60 upstream.
The broadcast and multicast packets can be received at the same time by the
local system and forwarded to other nodes. Both are simply decrementing the
TTL at the beginning of the receive path - independent of chosen paths
(receive/forward). But such a modification of the data conflicts with the
hw csum. This is not a problem when the packet is directly forwarded but
can cause errors in the local receive path.
Such a problem can then trigger a "hw csum failure". The receiver path must
therefore ensure that the csum is fixed for each modification of the
payload before batadv_interface_rx() is reached.
Since all batman-adv packet types with a ttl have it as u8 at offset 2, a
helper can be used for all of them. But it is only used at the moment for
batadv_bcast_packet and batadv_mcast_packet because they are the only ones
which deliver the packet locally but unconditionally modify the TTL.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 3f69339068f9 ("batman-adv: bcast: queue per interface, if needed")
Fixes: 07afe1ba288c ("batman-adv: mcast: implement multicast packet reception and forwarding")
[ Context, Drop change for non-existing mcast handling ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/routing.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/routing.c b/net/batman-adv/routing.c
index 747c3ff1c253b0..36e9df0cca0b2f 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/routing.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/routing.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include "main.h"
#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
#include <linux/byteorder/generic.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
@@ -205,6 +206,58 @@ bool batadv_check_management_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
return true;
}
+/**
+ * batadv_skb_decrement_ttl() - decrement ttl in a batman-adv header, csum-safe
+ * @skb: the received packet with @skb->data pointing to the batman-adv header
+ *
+ * Supports the following packet types, all of which carry the TTL at offset 2:
+ *
+ * - batadv_ogm_packet
+ * - batadv_ogm2_packet
+ * - batadv_icmp_header
+ * - batadv_icmp_packet
+ * - batadv_icmp_tp_packet
+ * - batadv_icmp_packet_rr
+ * - batadv_unicast_packet
+ * - batadv_frag_packet
+ * - batadv_bcast_packet
+ * - batadv_mcast_packet
+ * - batadv_coded_packet
+ * - batadv_unicast_tvlv_packet
+ *
+ * Return: true if the packet may be forwarded (ttl decremented),
+ * false if it must be dropped (ttl would expire)
+ */
+static bool batadv_skb_decrement_ttl(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ static const size_t ttl_offset = 2;
+ u8 *ttl_pos;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_ogm_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_ogm2_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_icmp_header, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_icmp_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_icmp_packet_rr, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_unicast_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_frag_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_bcast_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_coded_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_unicast_tvlv_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+
+ ttl_pos = skb->data + ttl_offset;
+
+ /* would expire on this hop -> drop, leave header + csum untouched */
+ if (*ttl_pos < 2)
+ return false;
+
+ skb_postpull_rcsum(skb, ttl_pos, 1);
+ (*ttl_pos)--;
+ skb_postpush_rcsum(skb, ttl_pos, 1);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
/**
* batadv_recv_my_icmp_packet() - receive an icmp packet locally
* @bat_priv: the bat priv with all the soft interface information
@@ -1204,7 +1257,7 @@ int batadv_recv_bcast_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
bcast_packet = (struct batadv_bcast_packet *)skb->data;
- if (bcast_packet->ttl-- < 2)
+ if (!batadv_skb_decrement_ttl(skb))
goto free_skb;
orig_node = batadv_orig_hash_find(bat_priv, bcast_packet->orig);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 104/175] batman-adv: frag: ensure fragment is writable before modifying TTL
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (102 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 103/175] batman-adv: fix (m|b)cast csum after decrementing TTL Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 105/175] batman-adv: frag: avoid underflow of TTL Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit b7293c6e8c15b2db77809b25cf8389e35331b27a upstream.
Before batman-adv is allowed to write to an skb, it either has to have its
own copy of the skb or use skb_cow() to ensure that the data part is not
shared. But batadv_frag_skb_fwd() modifies the TTL even when it is shared.
Adding a skb_cow() right before this operation avoids this and can at the
same time prepare it for the modifications required to forward the
fragment.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 610bfc6bc99b ("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h | 3 ++-
net/batman-adv/routing.c | 3 +--
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
index 4c193194034155..fbf030c57ac04d 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
@@ -385,6 +385,8 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_buffer(struct sk_buff **skb,
* @skb: skb to forward
* @recv_if: interface that the skb is received on
* @orig_node_src: originator that the skb is received from
+ * @rx_result: set to NET_RX_SUCCESS when the fragment was forwarded and
+ * NET_RX_DROP when it was dropped; only valid when true is returned
*
* Look up the next-hop of the fragments payload and check if the merged packet
* will exceed the MTU towards the next-hop. If so, the fragment is forwarded
@@ -394,7 +396,8 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_buffer(struct sk_buff **skb,
*/
bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct batadv_hard_iface *recv_if,
- struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src)
+ struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src,
+ int *rx_result)
{
struct batadv_priv *bat_priv = netdev_priv(recv_if->soft_iface);
struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_dst;
@@ -417,12 +420,22 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb,
*/
total_size = ntohs(packet->total_size);
if (total_size > neigh_node->if_incoming->net_dev->mtu) {
+ if (skb_cow(skb, ETH_HLEN) < 0) {
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ *rx_result = NET_RX_DROP;
+ ret = true;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ packet = (struct batadv_frag_packet *)skb->data;
+
batadv_inc_counter(bat_priv, BATADV_CNT_FRAG_FWD);
batadv_add_counter(bat_priv, BATADV_CNT_FRAG_FWD_BYTES,
skb->len + ETH_HLEN);
packet->ttl--;
batadv_send_unicast_skb(skb, neigh_node);
+ *rx_result = NET_RX_SUCCESS;
ret = true;
}
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h
index dbf0871f870303..51e281027ab630 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h
+++ b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ void batadv_frag_purge_orig(struct batadv_orig_node *orig,
bool (*check_cb)(struct batadv_frag_table_entry *));
bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct batadv_hard_iface *recv_if,
- struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src);
+ struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src,
+ int *rx_result);
bool batadv_frag_skb_buffer(struct sk_buff **skb,
struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node);
int batadv_frag_send_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/routing.c b/net/batman-adv/routing.c
index 36e9df0cca0b2f..ec278f73805e95 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/routing.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/routing.c
@@ -1174,10 +1174,9 @@ int batadv_recv_frag_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
/* Route the fragment if it is not for us and too big to be merged. */
if (!batadv_is_my_mac(bat_priv, frag_packet->dest) &&
- batadv_frag_skb_fwd(skb, recv_if, orig_node_src)) {
+ batadv_frag_skb_fwd(skb, recv_if, orig_node_src, &ret)) {
/* skb was consumed */
skb = NULL;
- ret = NET_RX_SUCCESS;
goto put_orig_node;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 105/175] batman-adv: frag: avoid underflow of TTL
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (103 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 104/175] batman-adv: frag: ensure fragment is writable before modifying TTL Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 106/175] batman-adv: v: prevent OGM aggregation on disabled hardif Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 493d9d2528e1a09b090e4b37f0f553def7bd5ce9 upstream.
Packets with a TTL are using it to limit the amount of time this packet can
be forwarded. But for batadv_frag_packet, the TTL was always only reduced
but it was never evaluated. It could even underflow without any effect.
Check the TTL in batadv_frag_skb_fwd() before attempting to prepare it for
forwarding. This keeps it in sync with the not fragmented unicast packet.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 610bfc6bc99b ("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
index fbf030c57ac04d..0138b0953e10b5 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
@@ -420,6 +420,13 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb,
*/
total_size = ntohs(packet->total_size);
if (total_size > neigh_node->if_incoming->net_dev->mtu) {
+ if (packet->ttl < 2) {
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ *rx_result = NET_RX_DROP;
+ ret = true;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (skb_cow(skb, ETH_HLEN) < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
*rx_result = NET_RX_DROP;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 106/175] batman-adv: v: prevent OGM aggregation on disabled hardif
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (104 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 105/175] batman-adv: frag: avoid underflow of TTL Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 107/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: restrict number of unacked list entries Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit d11c00b95b2a3b3934007fc003dccc6fdcc061ad upstream.
When an interface gets disabled, the worker is correctly disabled by
batadv_hardif_disable_interface() -> ... -> batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable().
In this process, the skb aggr_list is also freed.
But batadv_v_ogm_send_meshif() can still queue new skbs (via
batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if()) to the aggr_list. This will only stop after all
cores can no longer find the RCU protected list of hard interfaces. These
queued skbs will never be freed or consumed by batadv_v_ogm_aggr_work.
The batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable() function must block
batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if() to avoid leak of skbs.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: f89255a02f1d ("batman-adv: BATMAN_V: introduce per hard-iface OGMv2 queues")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/bat_v.c | 1 +
net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c | 12 ++++++++++++
net/batman-adv/types.h | 6 ++++++
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bat_v.c b/net/batman-adv/bat_v.c
index d35479c465e2c4..e13b39121f2db8 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/bat_v.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/bat_v.c
@@ -819,6 +819,7 @@ void batadv_v_hardif_init(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface)
hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_len = 0;
skb_queue_head_init(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list);
+ hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled = false;
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_wq,
batadv_v_ogm_aggr_work);
}
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c b/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c
index 8cfc3944dcfd52..48a67705eba85c 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c
@@ -254,11 +254,18 @@ static void batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
}
spin_lock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
+ if (!hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled) {
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
if (!batadv_v_ogm_queue_left(skb, hard_iface))
batadv_v_ogm_aggr_send(bat_priv, hard_iface);
hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_len += batadv_v_ogm_len(skb);
__skb_queue_tail(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list, skb);
+
+unlock:
spin_unlock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
}
@@ -421,6 +428,10 @@ int batadv_v_ogm_iface_enable(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface)
{
struct batadv_priv *bat_priv = netdev_priv(hard_iface->soft_iface);
+ spin_lock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
+ hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled = true;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
+
batadv_v_ogm_start_queue_timer(hard_iface);
batadv_v_ogm_start_timer(bat_priv);
@@ -436,6 +447,7 @@ void batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface)
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_wq);
spin_lock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
+ hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled = false;
batadv_v_ogm_aggr_list_free(hard_iface);
spin_unlock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
}
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h
index 2dfdc78d4ded99..d56886951177d9 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/types.h
+++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h
@@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ struct batadv_hard_iface_bat_v {
/** @aggr_list: queue for to be aggregated OGM packets */
struct sk_buff_head aggr_list;
+ /**
+ * @aggr_list_enabled: aggr_list is active and new skbs can be
+ * enqueued. Protected by aggr_list.lock after initialization
+ */
+ bool aggr_list_enabled:1;
+
/** @aggr_len: size of the OGM aggregate (excluding ethernet header) */
unsigned int aggr_len;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 107/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: restrict number of unacked list entries
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (105 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 106/175] batman-adv: v: prevent OGM aggregation on disabled hardif Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 108/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: annotate last_recv_time access with READ/WRITE_ONCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit e7c775110e1858e5a7471a23a9c9658c0af9df89 upstream.
When the unacked_list is unbound, an attacker could send messages with
small lengths and appropriated seqno + gaps to force the receiver to
allocate more and more unacked_list entries. And the end either causing an
out-of-memory situation or increase the management overhead for the (large)
list that significant portions of CPU cycles are wasted in searching
through the list.
When limiting the list to a specific number, it is important to still
correctly add a new entry to the list. But if the list became larger than
the limit, the last entry of the list (with the highest seqno) must be
dropped to still allow the earlier seqnos to finish and therefore to
continue the process. Otherwise, the process might get stuck with too high
seqnos which are not handled by batadv_tp_ack_unordered().
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
[ Switch to pre-splitted tp_vars structure names ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
net/batman-adv/types.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index 133eed2fa9507f..638dd438a6c052 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -87,6 +87,11 @@
#define BATADV_TP_PLEN (BATADV_TP_PACKET_LEN - ETH_HLEN - \
sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet))
+/**
+ * BATADV_TP_MAX_UNACKED - maximum number of packets a receiver didn't yet ack
+ */
+#define BATADV_TP_MAX_UNACKED 100
+
static u8 batadv_tp_prerandom[4096] __read_mostly;
/**
@@ -1195,6 +1200,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown(struct timer_list *t)
list_for_each_entry_safe(un, safe, &tp_vars->unacked_list, list) {
list_del(&un->list);
kfree(un);
+ tp_vars->unacked_count--;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
@@ -1308,6 +1314,7 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
/* if the list is empty immediately attach this new object */
if (list_empty(&tp_vars->unacked_list)) {
list_add(&new->list, &tp_vars->unacked_list);
+ tp_vars->unacked_count++;
goto out;
}
@@ -1338,12 +1345,24 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
*/
list_add(&new->list, &un->list);
added = true;
+ tp_vars->unacked_count++;
break;
}
/* received packet with smallest seqno out of order; add it to front */
- if (!added)
+ if (!added) {
list_add(&new->list, &tp_vars->unacked_list);
+ tp_vars->unacked_count++;
+ }
+
+ /* remove the last (biggest) unacked seqno when list is too large */
+ if (tp_vars->unacked_count > BATADV_TP_MAX_UNACKED) {
+ un = list_last_entry(&tp_vars->unacked_list,
+ struct batadv_tp_unacked, list);
+ list_del(&un->list);
+ kfree(un);
+ tp_vars->unacked_count--;
+ }
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
@@ -1380,6 +1399,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars)
list_del(&un->list);
kfree(un);
+ tp_vars->unacked_count--;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
}
@@ -1430,6 +1450,7 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
spin_lock_init(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tp_vars->unacked_list);
+ tp_vars->unacked_count = 0;
kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0);
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h
index d56886951177d9..7c32947414cd80 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/types.h
+++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h
@@ -1494,6 +1494,9 @@ struct batadv_tp_vars {
/** @unacked_lock: protect unacked_list */
spinlock_t unacked_lock;
+ /** @unacked_count: number of unacked entries */
+ size_t unacked_count;
+
/** @last_recv_time: time (jiffies) a msg was received */
unsigned long last_recv_time;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 108/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: annotate last_recv_time access with READ/WRITE_ONCE
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (106 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 107/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: restrict number of unacked list entries Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 109/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: prevent parallel modifications of last_recv Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit d67c728f07fca2ee6ffdc6dd4421cf2e8691f4d1 upstream.
The last_recv_time field for batadv_tp_receiver tracks the jiffies value of
the most recent activity and is used to detect timeouts. These accesses are
not consistently protected by a lock, so READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE must be used
to prevent data races caused by compiler optimizations.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index 638dd438a6c052..b882919a868ca0 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown(struct timer_list *t)
bat_priv = tp_vars->bat_priv;
/* if there is recent activity rearm the timer */
- if (!batadv_has_timed_out(tp_vars->last_recv_time,
+ if (!batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time),
BATADV_TP_RECV_TIMEOUT)) {
/* reset the receiver shutdown timer */
batadv_tp_reset_receiver_timer(tp_vars);
@@ -1424,7 +1424,7 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
tp_vars = batadv_tp_list_find_session(bat_priv, icmp->orig,
icmp->session, BATADV_TP_RECEIVER);
if (tp_vars) {
- tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+ WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies);
goto out_unlock;
}
@@ -1455,7 +1455,7 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0);
- tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+ WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies);
kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list);
@@ -1506,7 +1506,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
goto out;
}
- tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+ WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies);
}
/* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 109/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: prevent parallel modifications of last_recv
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (107 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 108/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: annotate last_recv_time access with READ/WRITE_ONCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 110/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: handle overlapping packets Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 6dde0cfcb36e4d5b3de35b75696937478441eed4 upstream.
When last_recv is updated to store the last receive sequence number, it is
assuming that nothing is modifying in parallel while:
* check for outdated packets is done
* out of order check is performed (and packets are stored in out-of-order
queue)
* the out-of-order queue was searched for closed gaps
* sequence number for next ack is calculated
Nothing of that was actually protected. It could therefore happen that the
last_recv was updated multiple times in parallel and the final sequence
number was calculated with deltas which had no connection to the sequence
number they were added to.
Lock this whole region with the same lock which was already used to protect
the unacked (out-of-order) list.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
[ Switch to pre-splitted tp_vars structure names ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 22 +++++++++++++---------
net/batman-adv/types.h | 2 +-
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index b882919a868ca0..f745bc09a04963 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1294,6 +1294,7 @@ static int batadv_tp_send_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
*/
static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
+ __must_hold(&tp_vars->unacked_lock)
{
const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp;
struct batadv_tp_unacked *un, *new;
@@ -1310,12 +1311,11 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
payload_len = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet);
new->len = payload_len;
- spin_lock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
/* if the list is empty immediately attach this new object */
if (list_empty(&tp_vars->unacked_list)) {
list_add(&new->list, &tp_vars->unacked_list);
tp_vars->unacked_count++;
- goto out;
+ return true;
}
/* otherwise loop over the list and either drop the packet because this
@@ -1364,9 +1364,6 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
tp_vars->unacked_count--;
}
-out:
- spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
-
return true;
}
@@ -1376,6 +1373,7 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
* @tp_vars: the private data of the current TP meter session
*/
static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars)
+ __must_hold(&tp_vars->unacked_lock)
{
struct batadv_tp_unacked *un, *safe;
u32 to_ack;
@@ -1383,7 +1381,6 @@ static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars)
/* go through the unacked packet list and possibly ACK them as
* well
*/
- spin_lock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(un, safe, &tp_vars->unacked_list, list) {
/* the list is ordered, therefore it is possible to stop as soon
* there is a gap between the last acked seqno and the seqno of
@@ -1401,7 +1398,6 @@ static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars)
kfree(un);
tp_vars->unacked_count--;
}
- spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
}
/**
@@ -1481,6 +1477,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp;
struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars;
size_t packet_size;
+ u32 to_ack;
u32 seqno;
icmp = (struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *)skb->data;
@@ -1509,6 +1506,8 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies);
}
+ spin_lock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
+
/* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been
* lost. Resend the ACK
*/
@@ -1520,8 +1519,10 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
/* exit immediately (and do not send any ACK) if the packet has
* not been enqueued correctly
*/
- if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, skb))
+ if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, skb)) {
+ spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
goto out;
+ }
/* send a duplicate ACK */
goto send_ack;
@@ -1535,11 +1536,14 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
batadv_tp_ack_unordered(tp_vars);
send_ack:
+ to_ack = tp_vars->last_recv;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
+
/* send the ACK. If the received packet was out of order, the ACK that
* is going to be sent is a duplicate (the sender will count them and
* possibly enter Fast Retransmit as soon as it has reached 3)
*/
- batadv_tp_send_ack(bat_priv, icmp->orig, tp_vars->last_recv,
+ batadv_tp_send_ack(bat_priv, icmp->orig, to_ack,
icmp->timestamp, icmp->session, icmp->uid);
out:
batadv_tp_vars_put(tp_vars);
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h
index 7c32947414cd80..883da8acae7381 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/types.h
+++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h
@@ -1491,7 +1491,7 @@ struct batadv_tp_vars {
/** @unacked_list: list of unacked packets (meta-info only) */
struct list_head unacked_list;
- /** @unacked_lock: protect unacked_list */
+ /** @unacked_lock: protect unacked_list + &batadv_tp_receiver.last_recv */
spinlock_t unacked_lock;
/** @unacked_count: number of unacked entries */
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 110/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: handle overlapping packets
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (108 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 109/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: prevent parallel modifications of last_recv Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 111/175] batman-adv: tt: dont merge change entries with different VIDs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit cbde75c38b21f022891525078622587ad557b7c1 upstream.
If the size of the packets would change during the transmission, it could
happen that some retries of packets are overlapping. In this case, precise
comparisons of sequence numbers by the receiver would be wrong. It is then
necessary to check if the start sequence number to the end sequence number
("seqno + length") would contain a new range.
If this is the case then this is enough to accept this packet. In all other
cases, the packet still has to be dropped (and not acked).
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
[ Switch to pre-splitted tp_vars structure names ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 25 +++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index f745bc09a04963..50b83e0438a07b 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1284,7 +1284,8 @@ static int batadv_tp_send_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
/**
* batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order() - store an out of order packet
* @tp_vars: the private data of the current TP meter session
- * @skb: the buffer containing the received packet
+ * @seqno: sequence number of new received packet
+ * @payload_len: length of the received packet
*
* Store the out of order packet in the unacked list for late processing. This
* packets are kept in this list so that they can be ACKed at once as soon as
@@ -1293,22 +1294,17 @@ static int batadv_tp_send_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
* Return: true if the packed has been successfully processed, false otherwise
*/
static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
- const struct sk_buff *skb)
+ u32 seqno, u32 payload_len)
__must_hold(&tp_vars->unacked_lock)
{
- const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp;
struct batadv_tp_unacked *un, *new;
- u32 payload_len;
bool added = false;
new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!new))
return false;
- icmp = (struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *)skb->data;
-
- new->seqno = ntohl(icmp->seqno);
- payload_len = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet);
+ new->seqno = seqno;
new->len = payload_len;
/* if the list is empty immediately attach this new object */
@@ -1476,7 +1472,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
{
const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp;
struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars;
- size_t packet_size;
+ u32 payload_len;
u32 to_ack;
u32 seqno;
@@ -1511,15 +1507,17 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
/* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been
* lost. Resend the ACK
*/
- if (batadv_seq_before(seqno, tp_vars->last_recv))
+ payload_len = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet);
+ to_ack = seqno + payload_len;
+ if (batadv_seq_before(to_ack, tp_vars->last_recv))
goto send_ack;
/* if the packet is out of order enqueue it */
- if (ntohl(icmp->seqno) != tp_vars->last_recv) {
+ if (batadv_seq_before(tp_vars->last_recv, seqno)) {
/* exit immediately (and do not send any ACK) if the packet has
* not been enqueued correctly
*/
- if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, skb)) {
+ if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, seqno, payload_len)) {
spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
goto out;
}
@@ -1529,8 +1527,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
}
/* if everything was fine count the ACKed bytes */
- packet_size = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet);
- tp_vars->last_recv += packet_size;
+ tp_vars->last_recv = to_ack;
/* check if this ordered message filled a gap.... */
batadv_tp_ack_unordered(tp_vars);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 111/175] batman-adv: tt: dont merge change entries with different VIDs
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (109 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 110/175] batman-adv: tp_meter: handle overlapping packets Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 112/175] batman-adv: tt: track roam count per VID Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit f08e06c2d5c3e2434e7c773f2213f4a7dce6bc1e upstream.
batadv_tt_local_event() merges/cancels events for the same client which
would conflict or be duplicates. The matching of the queued events only
compares the MAC address - the VLAN ID stored in each event is ignored.
If a MAC would now appear on multiple VID, the two ADD change events (for
VID 1 and VID 2) would be merged to a single vid event. The remote can
therefore not calculate the correct TT table and desync. A full translation
table exchange is required to recover from this state.
A check of VID is therefore necessary to avoid such wrong merges/cancels.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: c018ad3de61a ("batman-adv: add the VLAN ID attribute to the TT entry")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
index 7041cd69e20070..69a42bc3fa02e6 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
@@ -485,6 +485,9 @@ static void batadv_tt_local_event(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
if (!batadv_compare_eth(entry->change.addr, common->addr))
continue;
+ if (entry->change.vid != tt_change_node->change.vid)
+ continue;
+
/* DEL+ADD in the same orig interval have no effect and can be
* removed to avoid silly behaviour on the receiver side. The
* other way around (ADD+DEL) can happen in case of roaming of
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 112/175] batman-adv: tt: track roam count per VID
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (110 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 111/175] batman-adv: tt: dont merge change entries with different VIDs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 113/175] batman-adv: dat: prevent false sharing between VLANs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 12407d5f61c2653a64f2ff4b22f3c267f8420ef1 upstream.
batadv_tt_check_roam_count() is supposed to track roaming of a TT entry.
But TT entries are for a MAC + VID. The VID was completely missed and thus
leads to incorrect detection of ROAM counts when a client MAC exists in
multiple VLANs.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: c018ad3de61a ("batman-adv: add the VLAN ID attribute to the TT entry")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 9 +++++++--
net/batman-adv/types.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
index 69a42bc3fa02e6..2a7caab5c197ea 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
@@ -3517,6 +3517,7 @@ static void batadv_tt_roam_purge(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv)
* batadv_tt_check_roam_count() - check if a client has roamed too frequently
* @bat_priv: the bat priv with all the soft interface information
* @client: mac address of the roaming client
+ * @vid: VLAN identifier
*
* This function checks whether the client already reached the
* maximum number of possible roaming phases. In this case the ROAMING_ADV
@@ -3524,7 +3525,7 @@ static void batadv_tt_roam_purge(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv)
*
* Return: true if the ROAMING_ADV can be sent, false otherwise
*/
-static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client)
+static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client, u16 vid)
{
struct batadv_tt_roam_node *tt_roam_node;
bool ret = false;
@@ -3537,6 +3538,9 @@ static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client)
if (!batadv_compare_eth(tt_roam_node->addr, client))
continue;
+ if (tt_roam_node->vid != vid)
+ continue;
+
if (batadv_has_timed_out(tt_roam_node->first_time,
BATADV_ROAMING_MAX_TIME))
continue;
@@ -3558,6 +3562,7 @@ static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client)
atomic_set(&tt_roam_node->counter,
BATADV_ROAMING_MAX_COUNT - 1);
ether_addr_copy(tt_roam_node->addr, client);
+ tt_roam_node->vid = vid;
list_add(&tt_roam_node->list, &bat_priv->tt.roam_list);
ret = true;
@@ -3594,7 +3599,7 @@ static void batadv_send_roam_adv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client,
/* before going on we have to check whether the client has
* already roamed to us too many times
*/
- if (!batadv_tt_check_roam_count(bat_priv, client))
+ if (!batadv_tt_check_roam_count(bat_priv, client, vid))
goto out;
batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_TT, bat_priv,
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h
index 883da8acae7381..0368cb93865f39 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/types.h
+++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h
@@ -1995,6 +1995,9 @@ struct batadv_tt_roam_node {
/** @addr: mac address of the client in the roaming phase */
u8 addr[ETH_ALEN];
+ /** @vid: VLAN identifier */
+ u16 vid;
+
/**
* @counter: number of allowed roaming events per client within a single
* OGM interval (changes are committed with each OGM)
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 113/175] batman-adv: dat: prevent false sharing between VLANs
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (111 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 112/175] batman-adv: tt: track roam count per VID Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 114/175] batman-adv: tvlv: enforce 2-byte alignment Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 20d7658b74169f86d4ac01b9185b3eadddf71f28 upstream.
The local hash of DAT entries is supposed to be VLAN (VID) aware. But
the adding to the hash and the search in the hash were not checking the VID
information of the hash entries. The entries would therefore only be
correctly separated when batadv_hash_dat() didn't select the same buckets
for different VIDs.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: be1db4f6615b ("batman-adv: make the Distributed ARP Table vlan aware")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c b/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c
index c76bddbf816ada..92d90e352d1f41 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c
@@ -215,10 +215,13 @@ static void batadv_dat_purge(struct work_struct *work)
*/
static bool batadv_compare_dat(const struct hlist_node *node, const void *data2)
{
- const void *data1 = container_of(node, struct batadv_dat_entry,
- hash_entry);
+ const struct batadv_dat_entry *entry1;
+ const struct batadv_dat_entry *entry2;
- return memcmp(data1, data2, sizeof(__be32)) == 0;
+ entry1 = container_of(node, struct batadv_dat_entry, hash_entry);
+ entry2 = data2;
+
+ return entry1->ip == entry2->ip && entry1->vid == entry2->vid;
}
/**
@@ -345,6 +348,9 @@ batadv_dat_entry_hash_find(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, __be32 ip,
if (dat_entry->ip != ip)
continue;
+ if (dat_entry->vid != vid)
+ continue;
+
if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&dat_entry->refcount))
continue;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 114/175] batman-adv: tvlv: enforce 2-byte alignment
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (112 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 113/175] batman-adv: dat: prevent false sharing between VLANs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 115/175] batman-adv: tvlv: avoid race of cifsnotfound handler state Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (69 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit 32a6799255525d6ea4da0f7e9e0e521ad9560a46 upstream.
The fields of an aggregated OGM(v2) are accessed assuming (at least) 2-byte
alignment, so a following OGM must start at an even offset. As the header
length is even, an odd tvlv_len would misalign it and trigger unaligned
accesses on strict-alignment architectures.
Such a misaligned TVLV/OGM/OGMv2 is not created by a normal participant in
the mesh. Therefore, reject such malformed packets.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: ef26157747d4 ("batman-adv: tvlv - basic infrastructure")
[ Drop change for non-existing mcast handling ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c | 11 ++++++++++-
net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c | 11 ++++++++++-
net/batman-adv/tvlv.c | 6 ++++++
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c b/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c
index b37c9fb178ae50..5dd3e1f281bab2 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c
@@ -310,14 +310,23 @@ batadv_iv_ogm_aggr_packet(int buff_pos, int packet_len,
const struct batadv_ogm_packet *ogm_packet)
{
int next_buff_pos = 0;
+ u16 tvlv_len;
/* check if there is enough space for the header */
next_buff_pos += buff_pos + sizeof(*ogm_packet);
if (next_buff_pos > packet_len)
return false;
+ tvlv_len = ntohs(ogm_packet->tvlv_len);
+
+ /* the fields of an aggregated OGM are accessed assuming (at least)
+ * 2-byte alignment, so a following OGM must start at an even offset.
+ */
+ if (tvlv_len & 1)
+ return false;
+
/* check if there is enough space for the optional TVLV */
- next_buff_pos += ntohs(ogm_packet->tvlv_len);
+ next_buff_pos += tvlv_len;
return next_buff_pos <= packet_len;
}
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c b/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c
index 48a67705eba85c..c5c4d33cb19838 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c
@@ -853,14 +853,23 @@ batadv_v_ogm_aggr_packet(int buff_pos, int packet_len,
const struct batadv_ogm2_packet *ogm2_packet)
{
int next_buff_pos = 0;
+ u16 tvlv_len;
/* check if there is enough space for the header */
next_buff_pos += buff_pos + sizeof(*ogm2_packet);
if (next_buff_pos > packet_len)
return false;
+ tvlv_len = ntohs(ogm2_packet->tvlv_len);
+
+ /* the fields of an aggregated OGMv2 are accessed assuming (at least)
+ * 2-byte alignment, so a following OGMv2 must start at an even offset.
+ */
+ if (tvlv_len & 1)
+ return false;
+
/* check if there is enough space for the optional TVLV */
- next_buff_pos += ntohs(ogm2_packet->tvlv_len);
+ next_buff_pos += tvlv_len;
return next_buff_pos <= packet_len;
}
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c b/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
index 8d6b017c433cc9..e1cd27b99bd119 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
@@ -464,6 +464,12 @@ int batadv_tvlv_containers_process(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
if (tvlv_value_cont_len > tvlv_value_len)
break;
+ /* the next tvlv header is accessed assuming (at least) 2-byte
+ * alignment, so it must start at an even offset.
+ */
+ if (tvlv_value_cont_len & 1)
+ break;
+
tvlv_handler = batadv_tvlv_handler_get(bat_priv,
tvlv_hdr->type,
tvlv_hdr->version);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 115/175] batman-adv: tvlv: avoid race of cifsnotfound handler state
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (113 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 114/175] batman-adv: tvlv: enforce 2-byte alignment Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 116/175] ipv6: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (68 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Sven Eckelmann, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
commit edb557b2ba38fea2c5eb710cf366c797e187218c upstream.
TVLV handlers can have the flag BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND set to
signal that the OGM handler should be called (with NULL for data) when the
specific TVLV container was not found in the OGM. This is used by:
* DAT
* GW
* Multicast (OGM + Tracker)
The state whether the handler was executed was stored in the struct
batadv_tvlv_handler. But the TVLV processing is started without any lock.
Multiple parallel contexts processing TVLVs would therefore overwrite each
others BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED flag in the shared
batadv_tvlv_handler.
Drop the shared BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED flag and instead determine,
per TVLV buffer, whether a matching container was present by scanning the
packet's buffer.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: ef26157747d4 ("batman-adv: tvlv - basic infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/batman-adv/tvlv.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
net/batman-adv/types.h | 7 -----
2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c b/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
index e1cd27b99bd119..cc66e231ccb8a0 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
@@ -398,7 +398,6 @@ static int batadv_tvlv_call_handler(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
tvlv_handler->ogm_handler(bat_priv, orig_node,
BATADV_NO_FLAGS,
tvlv_value, tvlv_value_len);
- tvlv_handler->flags |= BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED;
break;
case BATADV_UNICAST_TVLV:
if (!skb)
@@ -430,6 +429,48 @@ static int batadv_tvlv_call_handler(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
+/**
+ * batadv_tvlv_containers_contain() - check if a tvlv buffer holds a container
+ * @tvlv_value: tvlv content
+ * @tvlv_value_len: tvlv content length
+ * @type: tvlv container type to look for
+ * @version: tvlv container version to look for
+ *
+ * Return: true if a container of the given type and version is present in the
+ * tvlv buffer, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool batadv_tvlv_containers_contain(void *tvlv_value,
+ u16 tvlv_value_len, u8 type,
+ u8 version)
+{
+ struct batadv_tvlv_hdr *tvlv_hdr;
+ u16 tvlv_value_cont_len;
+
+ while (tvlv_value_len >= sizeof(*tvlv_hdr)) {
+ tvlv_hdr = tvlv_value;
+ tvlv_value_cont_len = ntohs(tvlv_hdr->len);
+ tvlv_value = tvlv_hdr + 1;
+ tvlv_value_len -= sizeof(*tvlv_hdr);
+
+ if (tvlv_value_cont_len > tvlv_value_len)
+ break;
+
+ /* the next tvlv header is accessed assuming (at least) 2-byte
+ * alignment, so it must start at an even offset.
+ */
+ if (tvlv_value_cont_len & 1)
+ break;
+
+ if (tvlv_hdr->type == type && tvlv_hdr->version == version)
+ return true;
+
+ tvlv_value = (u8 *)tvlv_value + tvlv_value_cont_len;
+ tvlv_value_len -= tvlv_value_cont_len;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/**
* batadv_tvlv_containers_process() - parse the given tvlv buffer to call the
* appropriate handlers
@@ -449,7 +490,9 @@ int batadv_tvlv_containers_process(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
struct sk_buff *skb, void *tvlv_value,
u16 tvlv_value_len)
{
+ u16 tvlv_value_start_len = tvlv_value_len;
struct batadv_tvlv_handler *tvlv_handler;
+ void *tvlv_value_start = tvlv_value;
struct batadv_tvlv_hdr *tvlv_hdr;
u16 tvlv_value_cont_len;
u8 cifnotfound = BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND;
@@ -493,12 +536,20 @@ int batadv_tvlv_containers_process(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
if (!tvlv_handler->ogm_handler)
continue;
- if ((tvlv_handler->flags & BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND) &&
- !(tvlv_handler->flags & BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED))
- tvlv_handler->ogm_handler(bat_priv, orig_node,
- cifnotfound, NULL, 0);
+ if (!(tvlv_handler->flags & BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND))
+ continue;
- tvlv_handler->flags &= ~BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED;
+ /* if the corresponding container was present then the handler
+ * was already called from the loop above
+ */
+ if (batadv_tvlv_containers_contain(tvlv_value_start,
+ tvlv_value_start_len,
+ tvlv_handler->type,
+ tvlv_handler->version))
+ continue;
+
+ tvlv_handler->ogm_handler(bat_priv, orig_node,
+ cifnotfound, NULL, 0);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h
index 0368cb93865f39..4856cc98fc3c51 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/types.h
+++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h
@@ -2413,13 +2413,6 @@ enum batadv_tvlv_handler_flags {
* will call this handler even if its type was not found (with no data)
*/
BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND = BIT(1),
-
- /**
- * @BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED: interval tvlv handling flag - the
- * API marks a handler as being called, so it won't be called if the
- * BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND flag was set
- */
- BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED = BIT(2),
};
#endif /* _NET_BATMAN_ADV_TYPES_H_ */
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 116/175] ipv6: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (114 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 115/175] batman-adv: tvlv: avoid race of cifsnotfound handler state Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 117/175] inet: add indirect call wrapper for getfrag() calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (67 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jungwoo Lee, Wongi Lee, Ido Schimmel,
Jakub Kicinski
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wongi Lee <qw3rtyp0@gmail.com>
commit 736b380e28d0480c7bc3e022f1950f31fe53a7c5 upstream.
In __ip6_append_data(), when the paged-allocation branch is taken
(MSG_MORE / NETIF_F_SG / large fraglen), alloclen and pagedlen are
computed as
alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen;
pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen;
datalen already includes fraggap (datalen = length + fraggap). When
fraggap is non-zero, this is not the first skb and transhdrlen is zero.
The fraggap bytes carried over from the previous skb are copied just past
the fragment headers in the new skb's linear area. The linear area is
therefore undersized by fraggap bytes while pagedlen is overstated by the
same amount, and the copy writes past skb->end into the trailing
skb_shared_info.
An unprivileged user can trigger this via a UDPv6 socket using
MSG_MORE together with MSG_SPLICE_PAGES.
The bad accounting was introduced by commit 773ba4fe9104 ("ipv6:
avoid partial copy for zc"). Before commit ce650a166335 ("udp6: Fix
__ip6_append_data()'s handling of MSG_SPLICE_PAGES"), the negative
copy value caused -EINVAL to be returned. That later commit allowed
MSG_SPLICE_PAGES to proceed in this case, making the corruption
triggerable.
The non-paged branch sets alloclen to fraglen, which already accounts
for fraggap because datalen does. Bring the paged branch in line by
adding fraggap to alloclen and subtracting it from pagedlen.
After this adjustment, copy no longer collapses to -fraggap on the
paged path, so remove the stale comment describing that old arithmetic.
Since a negative copy is no longer expected for a valid MSG_SPLICE_PAGES
case, remove the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES exception from the negative copy check.
Fixes: 773ba4fe9104 ("ipv6: avoid partial copy for zc")
Signed-off-by: Jungwoo Lee <jwlee2217@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Wongi Lee <qw3rtyp0@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ajFTqRljatR17fFy@DESKTOP-19IMU7U.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 9 +++------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -1633,8 +1633,8 @@ alloc_new_skb:
!(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_SG)))
alloclen = fraglen;
else {
- alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen;
- pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen;
+ alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + fraggap;
+ pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap;
}
alloclen += alloc_extra;
@@ -1649,10 +1649,7 @@ alloc_new_skb:
fraglen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap - pagedlen;
- /* [!] NOTE: copy may be negative if pagedlen>0
- * because then the equation may reduces to -fraggap.
- */
- if (copy < 0 && !(flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES)) {
+ if (copy < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 117/175] inet: add indirect call wrapper for getfrag() calls
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (115 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 116/175] ipv6: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 118/175] ipv4: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (66 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Eric Dumazet, Willem de Bruijn,
Brian Vazquez, Jakub Kicinski, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 5204ccbfa22358f95afd031a3f337e6d9a74baea ]
UDP send path suffers from one indirect call to ip_generic_getfrag()
We can use INDIRECT_CALL_1() to avoid it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Vazquez <brianvv@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241203173617.2595451-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: eca856950f7c ("ipv4: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 13 +++++++++----
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 13 ++++++++-----
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
index 305d0e2786a2a8..fb1d8be8c6757c 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
@@ -1168,7 +1168,10 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock *sk,
/* [!] NOTE: copy will be negative if pagedlen>0
* because then the equation reduces to -fraggap.
*/
- if (copy > 0 && getfrag(from, data + transhdrlen, offset, copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
+ if (copy > 0 &&
+ INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
+ from, data + transhdrlen, offset,
+ copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
err = -EFAULT;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
@@ -1212,8 +1215,9 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock *sk,
unsigned int off;
off = skb->len;
- if (getfrag(from, skb_put(skb, copy),
- offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
+ if (INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
+ from, skb_put(skb, copy),
+ offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
__skb_trim(skb, off);
err = -EFAULT;
goto error;
@@ -1253,7 +1257,8 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock *sk,
get_page(pfrag->page);
}
copy = min_t(int, copy, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset);
- if (getfrag(from,
+ if (INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
+ from,
page_address(pfrag->page) + pfrag->offset,
offset, copy, skb->len, skb) < 0)
goto error_efault;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
index 9a08ee6f52da0f..2e2cd0e0d48a5d 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -1695,8 +1695,9 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk,
pskb_trim_unique(skb_prev, maxfraglen);
}
if (copy > 0 &&
- getfrag(from, data + transhdrlen, offset,
- copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
+ INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
+ from, data + transhdrlen, offset,
+ copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
err = -EFAULT;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
@@ -1740,8 +1741,9 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk,
unsigned int off;
off = skb->len;
- if (getfrag(from, skb_put(skb, copy),
- offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
+ if (INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
+ from, skb_put(skb, copy),
+ offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
__skb_trim(skb, off);
err = -EFAULT;
goto error;
@@ -1781,7 +1783,8 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk,
get_page(pfrag->page);
}
copy = min_t(int, copy, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset);
- if (getfrag(from,
+ if (INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
+ from,
page_address(pfrag->page) + pfrag->offset,
offset, copy, skb->len, skb) < 0)
goto error_efault;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 118/175] ipv4: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (116 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 117/175] inet: add indirect call wrapper for getfrag() calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 119/175] ntfs3: reject direct userspace writes to reserved $LX* xattrs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (65 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jungwoo Lee, Wongi Lee, Ido Schimmel,
Jakub Kicinski, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wongi Lee <qw3rtyp0@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit eca856950f7cb1a221e02b99d758409f2c5cec42 ]
In __ip_append_data(), when the paged-allocation branch is taken,
alloclen and pagedlen are computed as
alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen;
pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen;
datalen already includes fraggap, but the fraggap bytes carried over
from the previous skb are copied into the new skb's linear area at
offset transhdrlen by the subsequent skb_copy_and_csum_bits(). The
linear area is therefore undersized by fraggap bytes while pagedlen is
overstated by the same amount.
The non-paged branch sets alloclen to fraglen, which already accounts
for fraggap because datalen does. Bring the paged branch in line by
adding fraggap to alloclen and subtracting it from pagedlen.
After this adjustment, copy no longer collapses to -fraggap on the
paged path, so remove the stale comment describing that old arithmetic.
Fixes: 8eb77cc73977 ("ipv4: avoid partial copy for zc")
Signed-off-by: Jungwoo Lee <jwlee2217@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Wongi Lee <qw3rtyp0@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ajFR1eLAIs42TN3g@DESKTOP-19IMU7U.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 7 ++-----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
index fb1d8be8c6757c..8502cd34b578c0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
@@ -1117,8 +1117,8 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock *sk,
!(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_SG)))
alloclen = fraglen;
else {
- alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen;
- pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen;
+ alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + fraggap;
+ pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap;
}
alloclen += alloc_extra;
@@ -1165,9 +1165,6 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock *sk,
}
copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap - pagedlen;
- /* [!] NOTE: copy will be negative if pagedlen>0
- * because then the equation reduces to -fraggap.
- */
if (copy > 0 &&
INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
from, data + transhdrlen, offset,
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 119/175] ntfs3: reject direct userspace writes to reserved $LX* xattrs
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (117 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 118/175] ipv4: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 120/175] nvmet-tcp: fix race between ICReq handling and queue teardown Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Zhen Yan, Konstantin Komarov
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
commit 5b08dccecf825cbf905f348bc6ccb497507e28e2 upstream.
NTFS3 uses $LXUID, $LXGID, $LXMOD and $LXDEV as internal WSL
permission metadata and reloads them into i_uid, i_gid and i_mode
from ntfs_get_wsl_perm().
Because the empty-prefix xattr handler also lets file owners call
setxattr() on these names directly, an unprivileged writer on a
writable ntfs3 mount can plant root ownership and S_ISUID on their own
file and gain euid 0 after inode reload.
Reject direct userspace writes to the reserved $LX* names. Internal
ntfs3 metadata updates are unchanged because ntfs_save_wsl_perm()
writes them via ntfs_set_ea() directly.
Signed-off-by: Zhen Yan <sdjasjbuaa@gmail.com>
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: added an additional check for non privileged users]
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ntfs3/xattr.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c
@@ -828,6 +828,12 @@ out:
return err;
}
+static bool ntfs_is_reserved_lxattr(const char *name)
+{
+ return !strcmp(name, "$LXUID") || !strcmp(name, "$LXGID") ||
+ !strcmp(name, "$LXMOD") || !strcmp(name, "$LXDEV");
+}
+
/*
* ntfs_setxattr - inode_operations::setxattr
*/
@@ -932,6 +938,12 @@ set_new_fa:
goto out;
}
+ /* Do not allow non privileged users to change $LXUID/$LXGID... */
+ if (ntfs_is_reserved_lxattr(name) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ err = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* Deal with NTFS extended attribute. */
err = ntfs_set_ea(inode, name, strlen(name), value, size, flags, 0,
NULL);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 120/175] nvmet-tcp: fix race between ICReq handling and queue teardown
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (118 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 119/175] ntfs3: reject direct userspace writes to reserved $LX* xattrs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 121/175] af_unix: Set gc_in_progress to true in unix_gc() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Shivam Kumar, Shivam Kumar,
Chaitanya Kulkarni, Keith Busch, Philo Lu, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
commit 5293a8882c549fab4a878bc76b0b6c951f980a61 upstream.
nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() updates queue->state after sending an
Initialization Connection Response (ICResp), but it does so without
serializing against target-side queue teardown.
If an NVMe/TCP host sends an Initialization Connection Request
(ICReq) and immediately closes the connection, target-side teardown
may start in softirq context before io_work drains the already
buffered ICReq. In that case, nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue()
sets queue->state to NVMET_TCP_Q_DISCONNECTING and drops the queue
reference under state_lock.
If io_work later processes that ICReq, nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() can
still overwrite the state back to NVMET_TCP_Q_LIVE. That defeats the
DISCONNECTING-state guard in nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() and
allows a later socket state change to re-enter teardown and issue a
second kref_put() on an already released queue.
The ICResp send failure path has the same problem. If teardown has
already moved the queue to DISCONNECTING, a send error can still
overwrite the state with NVMET_TCP_Q_FAILED, again reopening the
window for a second teardown path to drop the queue reference.
Fix this by serializing both post-send state transitions with
state_lock and bailing out if teardown has already started.
Use -ESHUTDOWN as an internal sentinel for that bail-out path rather
than propagating it as a transport error like -ECONNRESET. Keep
nvmet_tcp_socket_error() setting rcv_state to NVMET_TCP_RECV_ERR before
honoring that sentinel so receive-side parsing stays quiesced until the
existing release path completes.
Fixes: c46a6465bac2 ("nvmet-tcp: add NVMe over TCP target driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Shivam Kumar <skumar47@syr.edu>
Tested-by: Shivam Kumar <kumar.shivam43666@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
[ context diff adaptation: drop `queue->state = NVMET_TCP_Q_FAILED` since
the enum introduced in 6.7, 675b453e0241 ("nvmet-tcp: enable TLS handshake
upcall" ]
Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
index 5f85c4a812abcd..4174fef03eac7f 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
@@ -380,6 +380,19 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(struct nvmet_tcp_cmd *cmd)
static void nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
{
+ /*
+ * Keep rcv_state at RECV_ERR even for the internal -ESHUTDOWN path.
+ * nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() can return -ESHUTDOWN after the ICReq has
+ * already been consumed and queue teardown has started.
+ *
+ * If nvmet_tcp_data_ready() or nvmet_tcp_write_space() queues
+ * nvmet_tcp_io_work() again before nvmet_tcp_release_queue_work()
+ * cancels it, the queue must not keep that old receive state.
+ * Otherwise the next nvmet_tcp_io_work() run can reach
+ * nvmet_tcp_done_recv_pdu() and try to handle the same ICReq again.
+ *
+ * That is why queue->rcv_state needs to be updated before we return.
+ */
queue->rcv_state = NVMET_TCP_RECV_ERR;
if (queue->nvme_sq.ctrl)
nvmet_ctrl_fatal_error(queue->nvme_sq.ctrl);
@@ -935,10 +948,24 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
iov.iov_base = icresp;
iov.iov_len = sizeof(*icresp);
ret = kernel_sendmsg(queue->sock, &msg, &iov, 1, iov.iov_len);
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ spin_lock_bh(&queue->state_lock);
+ if (queue->state == NVMET_TCP_Q_DISCONNECTING) {
+ spin_unlock_bh(&queue->state_lock);
+ return -ESHUTDOWN;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_bh(&queue->state_lock);
return ret; /* queue removal will cleanup */
+ }
+ spin_lock_bh(&queue->state_lock);
+ if (queue->state == NVMET_TCP_Q_DISCONNECTING) {
+ spin_unlock_bh(&queue->state_lock);
+ /* Tell nvmet_tcp_socket_error() teardown is in progress. */
+ return -ESHUTDOWN;
+ }
queue->state = NVMET_TCP_Q_LIVE;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&queue->state_lock);
nvmet_prepare_receive_pdu(queue);
return 0;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 121/175] af_unix: Set gc_in_progress to true in unix_gc().
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (119 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 120/175] nvmet-tcp: fix race between ICReq handling and queue teardown Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 122/175] mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Igor Ushakov, Kuniyuki Iwashima,
Jakub Kicinski, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
[ Upstream commit d82ba05263c69fa2437fe93e4e561cc40f4c03af ]
Igor Ushakov reported that unix_gc() could run with gc_in_progress
being false if the work is scheduled while running:
Thread 1 Thread 2 Thread 3
-------- -------- --------
unix_schedule_gc() unix_schedule_gc()
`- if (!gc_in_progress) `- if (!gc_in_progress)
|- gc_in_progress = true |
`- queue_work() |
unix_gc() <----------------/ |
| |- gc_in_progress = true
... `- queue_work()
| |
`- gc_in_progress = false |
|
unix_gc() <---------------------------------------------'
|
... /* gc_in_progress == false */
|
`- gc_in_progress = false
unix_peek_fpl() relies on gc_in_progress not to confuse GC
by MSG_PEEK.
Let's set gc_in_progress to true in unix_gc().
Fixes: 8b90a9f819dc ("af_unix: Run GC on only one CPU.")
Reported-by: Igor Ushakov <sysroot314@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260501073945.1884564-1-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Add setting gc_in_progress in __unix_gc(). Keep the existing
set in unix_gc() for wait_for_unix_gc() over-limit throttling. ]
Signed-off-by: Igor Ushakov <sysroot314@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/unix/garbage.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c
index 1cdb54c61619f5..fa6983dc3181d9 100644
--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
@@ -583,6 +583,8 @@ static void __unix_gc(struct work_struct *work)
struct sk_buff_head hitlist;
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ WRITE_ONCE(gc_in_progress, true);
+
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
if (!unix_graph_maybe_cyclic) {
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 122/175] mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (120 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 121/175] af_unix: Set gc_in_progress to true in unix_gc() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 123/175] net: skmsg: preserve sg.copy across SG transforms Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Doruk Tan Ozturk, Alexander Lobakin,
Stefan Schmidt
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
commit 84a04eb5b210643bd67aab81ff805d32f62aa865 upstream.
llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(),
llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform
in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a
scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area
and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API
(e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt).
On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb
before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The
cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference
counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared
buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially
belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference.
On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has
been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true).
The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto
operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not
shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments,
it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in
place. This is the same pattern used by:
- ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c)
- MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c)
- WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c)
- TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c)
Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to:
- Silent data corruption of other skb clones
- Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a
page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb()
- Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security
enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free)
Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis.
Fixes: 4c14a2fb5d14 ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method")
Fixes: 03556e4d0dbb ("mac802154: add llsec encryption method")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wpan/20260525161806.96158-1-doruk@0sec.ai/
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Closes: <link to your mail on lore>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260526183726.56100-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/mac802154/llsec.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
--- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c
+++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
@@ -710,6 +710,7 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac80
{
struct ieee802154_hdr hdr;
int rc, authlen, hlen;
+ struct sk_buff *trailer;
struct mac802154_llsec_key *key;
u32 frame_ctr;
@@ -769,6 +770,12 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac80
skb->mac_len = ieee802154_hdr_push(skb, &hdr);
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
+ rc = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ llsec_key_put(key);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
rc = llsec_do_encrypt(skb, sec, &hdr, key);
llsec_key_put(key);
@@ -908,6 +915,13 @@ llsec_do_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, co
const struct ieee802154_hdr *hdr,
struct mac802154_llsec_key *key, __le64 dev_addr)
{
+ struct sk_buff *trailer;
+ int err;
+
+ err = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
if (hdr->sec.level == IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)
return llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(skb, sec, hdr, key, dev_addr);
else
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 123/175] net: skmsg: preserve sg.copy across SG transforms
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (121 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 122/175] mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 124/175] apparmor: mediate the implicit connect of TCP fast open sendmsg Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (60 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Yiming Qian, Keenan Dong,
Jakub Kicinski
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591@gmail.com>
commit 406e8a651a7b854c41fecd5117bb282b3a6c2c6b upstream.
The sk_msg sg.copy bitmap is part of the scatterlist entry ownership
state. A set bit tells sk_msg_compute_data_pointers() not to expose the
entry through writable BPF ctx->data. This protects entries backed by
pages that are not private to the sk_msg, such as splice-backed file
page-cache pages.
Several sk_msg transform paths move, copy, split, or compact
msg->sg.data[] entries without moving the matching sg.copy bit. This can
make an externally backed entry arrive at a new slot with a clear copy
bit. A later SK_MSG verdict can then expose sg_virt(sge) as writable
ctx->data and BPF stores can modify the original page cache.
Keep sg.copy synchronized with sg.data[] whenever entries are
transferred, shifted, split, or copied into a new sk_msg. Clear the bit
when an entry is replaced by a newly allocated private page or freed.
This covers the BPF pull/push/pop helpers, sk_msg_shift_left/right(),
sk_msg_xfer(), and tls_split_open_record(), including the partial tail
entry created during TLS open-record splitting.
Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260610062137.49075-1-yimingqian591@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/skmsg.h | 15 +++++++++++----
net/core/filter.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/core/skmsg.c | 2 ++
net/tls/tls_sw.c | 4 ++++
4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/skmsg.h
+++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_SKMSG_H
#define _LINUX_SKMSG_H
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
@@ -190,11 +191,14 @@ static inline void sk_msg_xfer(struct sk
int which, u32 size)
{
dst->sg.data[which] = src->sg.data[which];
+ __assign_bit(which, dst->sg.copy, test_bit(which, src->sg.copy));
dst->sg.data[which].length = size;
dst->sg.size += size;
src->sg.size -= size;
src->sg.data[which].length -= size;
src->sg.data[which].offset += size;
+ if (!src->sg.data[which].length)
+ __clear_bit(which, src->sg.copy);
}
static inline void sk_msg_xfer_full(struct sk_msg *dst, struct sk_msg *src)
@@ -264,16 +268,19 @@ static inline void sk_msg_page_add(struc
static inline void sk_msg_sg_copy(struct sk_msg *msg, u32 i, bool copy_state)
{
do {
- if (copy_state)
- __set_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
- else
- __clear_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
+ __assign_bit(i, msg->sg.copy, copy_state);
sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
if (i == msg->sg.end)
break;
} while (1);
}
+static inline void sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(struct sk_msg *dst, u32 dst_i,
+ const struct sk_msg *src, u32 src_i)
+{
+ __assign_bit(dst_i, dst->sg.copy, test_bit(src_i, src->sg.copy));
+}
+
static inline void sk_msg_sg_copy_set(struct sk_msg *msg, u32 start)
{
sk_msg_sg_copy(msg, start, true);
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -2721,11 +2721,13 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pull_data, struct sk_
poffset += len;
sge->length = 0;
put_page(sg_page(sge));
+ __clear_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
} while (i != last_sge);
sg_set_page(&msg->sg.data[first_sge], page, copy, 0);
+ __clear_bit(first_sge, msg->sg.copy);
/* To repair sg ring we need to shift entries. If we only
* had a single entry though we can just replace it and
@@ -2751,9 +2753,11 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pull_data, struct sk_
break;
msg->sg.data[i] = msg->sg.data[move_from];
+ sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(msg, i, msg, move_from);
msg->sg.data[move_from].length = 0;
msg->sg.data[move_from].page_link = 0;
msg->sg.data[move_from].offset = 0;
+ __clear_bit(move_from, msg->sg.copy);
sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
} while (1);
@@ -2782,6 +2786,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_
{
struct scatterlist sge, nsge, nnsge, rsge = {0}, *psge;
u32 new, i = 0, l = 0, space, copy = 0, offset = 0;
+ bool sge_copy, nsge_copy, nnsge_copy, rsge_copy = false;
u8 *raw, *to, *from;
struct page *page;
@@ -2854,6 +2859,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_
sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
psge = sk_msg_elem(msg, i);
rsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+ rsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
psge->length = start - offset;
rsge.length -= psge->length;
@@ -2878,24 +2884,32 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_
/* Shift one or two slots as needed */
sge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, new);
+ sge_copy = test_bit(new, msg->sg.copy);
sg_unmark_end(&sge);
nsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+ nsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
if (rsge.length) {
sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
nnsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+ nnsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
sk_msg_iter_next(msg, end);
}
while (i != msg->sg.end) {
msg->sg.data[i] = sge;
+ __assign_bit(i, msg->sg.copy, sge_copy);
sge = nsge;
+ sge_copy = nsge_copy;
sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
if (rsge.length) {
nsge = nnsge;
+ nsge_copy = nnsge_copy;
nnsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+ nnsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
} else {
nsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+ nsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
}
}
@@ -2909,6 +2923,7 @@ place_new:
get_page(sg_page(&rsge));
sk_msg_iter_var_next(new);
msg->sg.data[new] = rsge;
+ __assign_bit(new, msg->sg.copy, rsge_copy);
}
sk_msg_reset_curr(msg);
@@ -2936,25 +2951,33 @@ static void sk_msg_shift_left(struct sk_
prev = i;
sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
msg->sg.data[prev] = msg->sg.data[i];
+ sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(msg, prev, msg, i);
} while (i != msg->sg.end);
sk_msg_iter_prev(msg, end);
+ __clear_bit(msg->sg.end, msg->sg.copy);
}
static void sk_msg_shift_right(struct sk_msg *msg, int i)
{
struct scatterlist tmp, sge;
+ bool tmp_copy, sge_copy;
sk_msg_iter_next(msg, end);
sge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+ sge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
tmp = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+ tmp_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
while (i != msg->sg.end) {
msg->sg.data[i] = sge;
+ __assign_bit(i, msg->sg.copy, sge_copy);
sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
sge = tmp;
+ sge_copy = tmp_copy;
tmp = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+ tmp_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
}
}
@@ -3014,6 +3037,8 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pop_data, struct sk_m
struct scatterlist *nsge, *sge = sk_msg_elem(msg, i);
int a = start - offset;
int b = sge->length - pop - a;
+ u32 sge_i = i;
+ bool sge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
@@ -3026,6 +3051,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pop_data, struct sk_m
sg_set_page(nsge,
sg_page(sge),
b, sge->offset + pop + a);
+ __assign_bit(i, msg->sg.copy, sge_copy);
} else {
struct page *page, *orig;
u8 *to, *from;
@@ -3042,6 +3068,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pop_data, struct sk_m
memcpy(to, from, a);
memcpy(to + a, from + a + pop, b);
sg_set_page(sge, page, a + b, 0);
+ __clear_bit(sge_i, msg->sg.copy);
put_page(orig);
}
pop = 0;
--- a/net/core/skmsg.c
+++ b/net/core/skmsg.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ int sk_msg_alloc(struct sock *sk, struct
sge = &msg->sg.data[msg->sg.end];
sg_unmark_end(sge);
sg_set_page(sge, pfrag->page, use, orig_offset);
+ __clear_bit(msg->sg.end, msg->sg.copy);
get_page(pfrag->page);
sk_msg_iter_next(msg, end);
}
@@ -186,6 +187,7 @@ static int sk_msg_free_elem(struct sock
sk_mem_uncharge(sk, len);
put_page(sg_page(sge));
}
+ __clear_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
memset(sge, 0, sizeof(*sge));
return len;
}
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -623,6 +623,7 @@ static int tls_split_open_record(struct
struct scatterlist *sge, *osge, *nsge;
u32 orig_size = msg_opl->sg.size;
struct scatterlist tmp = { };
+ u32 tmp_i = 0;
struct sk_msg *msg_npl;
struct tls_rec *new;
int ret;
@@ -644,6 +645,7 @@ static int tls_split_open_record(struct
if (sge->length > apply) {
u32 len = sge->length - apply;
+ tmp_i = i;
get_page(sg_page(sge));
sg_set_page(&tmp, sg_page(sge), len,
sge->offset + apply);
@@ -675,6 +677,7 @@ static int tls_split_open_record(struct
nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
if (tmp.length) {
memcpy(nsge, &tmp, sizeof(*nsge));
+ sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(msg_npl, j, msg_opl, tmp_i);
sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
}
@@ -682,6 +685,7 @@ static int tls_split_open_record(struct
osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
while (osge->length) {
memcpy(nsge, osge, sizeof(*nsge));
+ sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(msg_npl, j, msg_opl, i);
sg_unmark_end(nsge);
sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 124/175] apparmor: mediate the implicit connect of TCP fast open sendmsg
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (122 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 123/175] net: skmsg: preserve sg.copy across SG transforms Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 125/175] apparmor: fix use-after-free in rawdata dedup loop Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (59 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Bryam Vargas, John Johansen
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
commit 4d587cd8a72155089a627130bbd4716ec0856e21 upstream.
sendmsg()/sendto() with MSG_FASTOPEN is a combination of connect(2) and
write(2): it opens the connection in the SYN. apparmor_socket_sendmsg()
only checks AA_MAY_SEND, so a profile that grants send but denies connect
lets a confined task open an outbound TCP/MPTCP connection that connect(2)
would have refused, bypassing connect mediation.
Mediate the implicit connect when MSG_FASTOPEN is set and a destination
is supplied. Add it to apparmor_socket_sendmsg() (not the shared
aa_sock_msg_perm() helper, which recvmsg also uses) and call aa_sk_perm()
directly, mirroring the selinux and tomoyo fixes. sk_is_tcp() does not
cover MPTCP fast open, so the SOCK_STREAM/IPPROTO_MPTCP arm is explicit.
Fixes: cf60af03ca4e ("net-tcp: Fast Open client - sendmsg(MSG_FASTOPEN)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1033,7 +1033,21 @@ static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *
static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
- return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+ int error = aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ /* TCP fast open carries connect() semantics in sendmsg(); mediate
+ * the implicit connect so it cannot bypass the connect permission.
+ */
+ if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_FASTOPEN) && msg->msg_name &&
+ (sk_is_tcp(sock->sk) ||
+ (sk_is_inet(sock->sk) && sock->sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM &&
+ sock->sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP)))
+ error = aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk);
+
+ return error;
}
/**
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 125/175] apparmor: fix use-after-free in rawdata dedup loop
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (123 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 124/175] apparmor: mediate the implicit connect of TCP fast open sendmsg Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 126/175] NTB: epf: Avoid pci_iounmap() with offset when PEER_SPAD and CONFIG share BAR Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (58 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Colin Ian King, Ruslan Valiyev,
John Johansen
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ruslan Valiyev <linuxoid@gmail.com>
commit 6f060496d03e4dc560a40f73770bd08335cb7a27 upstream.
aa_replace_profiles() walks ns->rawdata_list to dedup the incoming
policy blob against entries already attached to existing profiles.
Per the kernel-doc on struct aa_loaddata, list membership does not
hold a reference: profiles hold pcount, and when the last pcount
drops, do_ploaddata_rmfs() is queued on a workqueue that takes
ns->lock and removes the entry. Between dropping the last pcount
and the workqueue running, an entry remains on the list with
pcount == 0.
aa_get_profile_loaddata() is an unconditional kref_get() on
pcount, so when the dedup loop hits such an entry, refcount
hardening reports
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
inside aa_replace_profiles(), and the poisoned counter then
trips "saturated" and "underflow" warnings on the subsequent
uses of the same loaddata.
Before commit a0b7091c4de4 ("apparmor: fix race on rawdata
dereference") the dedup path used a get_unless_zero-style helper
on a single counter, so the existing "if (tmp)" guard was
meaningful. The split-refcount refactor introduced
aa_get_profile_loaddata(), which has plain kref_get() semantics,
and the guard quietly became a no-op.
Introduce aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(), matching the existing
_not0 convention used by aa_get_profile_not0(), and use it for
the rawdata_list dedup lookup so dying entries are skipped.
Reproduced on x86_64 with v7.1-rc5 in QEMU+KVM running Ubuntu
24.04 + stress-ng 0.17.06:
stress-ng --apparmor 1 --klog-check --timeout 60s
Without this patch the three refcount_t warnings fire within a
few seconds. With it the same 60 s run is clean. Coverage is a
smoke-test only; a longer soak with CONFIG_KASAN, CONFIG_KCSAN
and CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING would be welcome from anyone with the
cycles.
Fixes: a0b7091c4de4 ("apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference")
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221513
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ruslan Valiyev <linuxoid@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
security/apparmor/policy.c | 8 ++++++--
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
@@ -163,6 +163,25 @@ aa_get_profile_loaddata(struct aa_loadda
return data;
}
+/**
+ * aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0 - get a profile reference count if not zero
+ * @data: reference to get a count on
+ *
+ * Like aa_get_profile_loaddata(), but safe to call on an entry that may
+ * be on a list (e.g. ns->rawdata_list) where the last pcount has already
+ * dropped and the deferred cleanup has not yet run.
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to reference, or %NULL if @data is NULL or its
+ * profile refcount has already reached zero.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_loaddata *
+aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(struct aa_loaddata *data)
+{
+ if (data && kref_get_unless_zero(&data->pcount))
+ return data;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision);
bool aa_rawdata_eq(struct aa_loaddata *l, struct aa_loaddata *r);
void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref);
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -1172,8 +1172,12 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns
if (aa_rawdata_eq(rawdata_ent, udata)) {
struct aa_loaddata *tmp;
- tmp = aa_get_profile_loaddata(rawdata_ent);
- /* check we didn't fail the race */
+ /*
+ * Entries remain on rawdata_list with
+ * pcount == 0 until do_ploaddata_rmfs()
+ * runs; only take a live profile ref.
+ */
+ tmp = aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(rawdata_ent);
if (tmp) {
aa_put_profile_loaddata(udata);
udata = tmp;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 126/175] NTB: epf: Avoid pci_iounmap() with offset when PEER_SPAD and CONFIG share BAR
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (124 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 125/175] apparmor: fix use-after-free in rawdata dedup loop Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 127/175] fbdev: fix use-after-free in store_modes() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (57 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Frank Li, Koichiro Den, Dave Jiang,
Jon Mason
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
commit d876153680e3d721d385e554def919bce3d18c74 upstream.
When BAR_PEER_SPAD and BAR_CONFIG share one PCI BAR, the module teardown
path ends up calling pci_iounmap() on the same iomem with some offset,
which is unnecessary and triggers a kernel warning like the following:
Trying to vunmap() nonexistent vm area (0000000069a5ffe8)
WARNING: mm/vmalloc.c:3470 at vunmap+0x58/0x68, CPU#5: modprobe/2937
[...]
Call trace:
vunmap+0x58/0x68 (P)
iounmap+0x34/0x48
pci_iounmap+0x2c/0x40
ntb_epf_pci_remove+0x44/0x80 [ntb_hw_epf]
pci_device_remove+0x48/0xf8
device_remove+0x50/0x88
device_release_driver_internal+0x1c8/0x228
driver_detach+0x50/0xb0
bus_remove_driver+0x74/0x100
driver_unregister+0x34/0x68
pci_unregister_driver+0x34/0xa0
ntb_epf_pci_driver_exit+0x14/0xfe0 [ntb_hw_epf]
[...]
Fix it by unmapping only when PEER_SPAD and CONFIG use difference bars.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e75d5ae8ab88 ("NTB: epf: Allow more flexibility in the memory BAR map method")
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c
+++ b/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c
@@ -646,7 +646,8 @@ static void ntb_epf_deinit_pci(struct nt
struct pci_dev *pdev = ndev->ntb.pdev;
pci_iounmap(pdev, ndev->ctrl_reg);
- pci_iounmap(pdev, ndev->peer_spad_reg);
+ if (ndev->barno_map[BAR_PEER_SPAD] != ndev->barno_map[BAR_CONFIG])
+ pci_iounmap(pdev, ndev->peer_spad_reg);
pci_iounmap(pdev, ndev->db_reg);
pci_release_regions(pdev);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 127/175] fbdev: fix use-after-free in store_modes()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (125 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 126/175] NTB: epf: Avoid pci_iounmap() with offset when PEER_SPAD and CONFIG share BAR Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 128/175] err.h: use __always_inline on all error pointer helpers Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzbot+81c7c6b52649fd07299d,
Ian Bridges, Helge Deller
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
commit 2c1c805c65fb7dc7524e20376d6987721e73a0b1 upstream.
store_modes() replaces a framebuffer's modelist with modes from userspace.
On success it frees the old modelist with fb_destroy_modelist(). Two
fields still point into that freed list.
One pointer is fb_display[i].mode, the mode a console is using.
fbcon_new_modelist() moves these pointers to the new list. It only does so
for consoles still mapped to the framebuffer. An unmapped console is
skipped and keeps its stale pointer. Unbinding fbcon, for example, sets
con2fb_map[i] to -1 but leaves fb_display[i].mode set. An
FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO ioctl with FB_ACTIVATE_INV_MODE later reaches
fbcon_mode_deleted(). That function reads the stale fb_display[i].mode
through fb_mode_is_equal(). The read is a use-after-free.
The other pointer is fb_info->mode, the current mode. It is set through
the mode sysfs attribute. store_modes() does not update fb_info->mode, so
it is left pointing into the freed list. show_mode(), the attribute's read
handler, dereferences the stale fb_info->mode through mode_string(). The
read is a use-after-free.
Clear both pointers before freeing the list. Commit a1f305893074 ("fbcon:
Set fb_display[i]->mode to NULL when the mode is released") added the
helper fbcon_delete_modelist(). It clears every fb_display[i].mode that
points into a given list. So far it is called only from the unregister
path. Call it from store_modes() too, and set fb_info->mode to NULL.
Reported-by: syzbot+81c7c6b52649fd07299d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=81c7c6b52649fd07299d
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ajjoDhAi2y4ArSlz@dev/
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbsysfs.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbsysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbsysfs.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/major.h>
#include "fb_internal.h"
+#include "fbcon.h"
#define FB_SYSFS_FLAG_ATTR 1
@@ -113,8 +114,15 @@ static ssize_t store_modes(struct device
if (fb_new_modelist(fb_info)) {
fb_destroy_modelist(&fb_info->modelist);
list_splice(&old_list, &fb_info->modelist);
- } else
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * fb_display[i].mode and fb_info->mode both point into the old
+ * list. Clear them before it is freed.
+ */
+ fbcon_delete_modelist(&old_list);
+ fb_info->mode = NULL;
fb_destroy_modelist(&old_list);
+ }
unlock_fb_info(fb_info);
console_unlock();
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 128/175] err.h: use __always_inline on all error pointer helpers
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (126 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 127/175] fbdev: fix use-after-free in store_modes() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 129/175] KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (55 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Arnd Bergmann, Alexander Lobakin,
Nathan Chancellor, Tamir Duberstein, Alexander Gordeev,
Andriy Shevchenko, Ansuel Smith, Bjorn Andersson, Heiko Carstens,
Vasily Gorbik, Andrew Morton
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
commit 94bfc7f3b0c7c33331ba4ff6cc64ff309dfcbce8 upstream.
While testing randconfig builds on s390, I came across a link failure with
CONFIG_DMA_SHARED_BUFFER disabled:
ERROR: modpost: "dma_buf_put" [drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd.ko] undefined!
The problem here is that IS_ERR() is not inlined and dead code elimination
fails as a consequence.
The err.h helpers all turn into a trivial assignment of a bit mask and
should never result in a function call, so force them to always be inline.
This should generally result in better object code aside from avoiding
the link failure above.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260526101851.2495110-1-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Andriy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ansuel Smith <ansuelsmth@gmail.com>
Cc: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/err.h | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/err.h
+++ b/include/linux/err.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
*
* Return: A pointer with @error encoded within its value.
*/
-static inline void * __must_check ERR_PTR(long error)
+static __always_inline void * __must_check ERR_PTR(long error)
{
return (void *) error;
}
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static inline void * __must_check ERR_PT
* @ptr: An error pointer.
* Return: The error code within @ptr.
*/
-static inline long __must_check PTR_ERR(__force const void *ptr)
+static __always_inline long __must_check PTR_ERR(__force const void *ptr)
{
return (long) ptr;
}
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static inline long __must_check PTR_ERR(
* @ptr: The pointer to check.
* Return: true if @ptr is an error pointer, false otherwise.
*/
-static inline bool __must_check IS_ERR(__force const void *ptr)
+static __always_inline bool __must_check IS_ERR(__force const void *ptr)
{
return IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)ptr);
}
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check IS_ERR(_
*
* Like IS_ERR(), but also returns true for a null pointer.
*/
-static inline bool __must_check IS_ERR_OR_NULL(__force const void *ptr)
+static __always_inline bool __must_check IS_ERR_OR_NULL(__force const void *ptr)
{
return unlikely(!ptr) || IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)ptr);
}
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check IS_ERR_O
* Explicitly cast an error-valued pointer to another pointer type in such a
* way as to make it clear that's what's going on.
*/
-static inline void * __must_check ERR_CAST(__force const void *ptr)
+static __always_inline void * __must_check ERR_CAST(__force const void *ptr)
{
/* cast away the const */
return (void *) ptr;
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static inline void * __must_check ERR_CA
*
* Return: The error code within @ptr if it is an error pointer; 0 otherwise.
*/
-static inline int __must_check PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(__force const void *ptr)
+static __always_inline int __must_check PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(__force const void *ptr)
{
if (IS_ERR(ptr))
return PTR_ERR(ptr);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 129/175] KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (127 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 128/175] err.h: use __always_inline on all error pointer helpers Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 130/175] keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (54 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Alessandro Groppo, Jarkko Sakkinen
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
commit cb481e59ea6cae3b7796ac1d7a22b6b24c3f3c0b upstream.
The length for the internal output buffer is calculated incorrectly, which
can result overflow when a too small buffer is provided.
Fix the bug by allocating internal output with the size of the maximum
length of the cryptographic primitive instead of caller provided size.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20260531024914.3712130-1-jarkko@kernel.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+
Fixes: 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Reported-by: Alessandro Groppo <ale.grpp@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alessandro Groppo <ale.grpp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -138,28 +138,35 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(cons
if (uparams.in_len > info.max_dec_size ||
uparams.out_len > info.max_enc_size)
return -EINVAL;
+
+ params->out_len = info.max_enc_size;
break;
case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
if (uparams.in_len > info.max_enc_size ||
uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size)
return -EINVAL;
+
+ params->out_len = info.max_dec_size;
break;
case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
if (uparams.in_len > info.max_data_size ||
uparams.out_len > info.max_sig_size)
return -EINVAL;
+
+ params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
break;
case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
if (uparams.in_len > info.max_data_size ||
uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size)
return -EINVAL;
+
+ params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
break;
default:
BUG();
}
params->in_len = uparams.in_len;
- params->out_len = uparams.out_len; /* Note: same as in2_len */
return 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 130/175] keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (128 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 129/175] KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 131/175] wifi: mt76: mt76x2u: Add support for ELECOM WDC-867SU3S Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (53 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Shaomin Chen, Jarkko Sakkinen
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shaomin Chen <eeesssooo020@gmail.com>
commit fd15b457a86939c38aa12116adabd8ff686c5e51 upstream.
A: request_key() B: KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV
================ =========================
create auth key
store rka in auth key
wait for helper
get auth key
load rka from auth key
copy user payload
sleep on #PF
helper completed
detach and free rka
destroy auth key
wake up
use rka->target_key
**USE-AFTER-FREE**
Give request_key_auth payloads a refcount. Take a payload reference while
authkey->sem stabilizes the payload and revocation state. Hold that
reference across the instantiate and reject paths. Drop the auth key
owning reference from revoke and destroy.
[jarkko: Replaced the first two paragraphs of text with an actual
concurrency scenario.]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Fixes: b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys")
Reported-by: Shaomin Chen <eeesssooo020@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260519144403.436694-1-eeesssooo020@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Shaomin Chen <eeesssooo020@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h | 2 ++
security/keys/internal.h | 2 ++
security/keys/keyctl.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h
@@ -9,12 +9,14 @@
#define _KEYS_REQUEST_KEY_AUTH_TYPE_H
#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
/*
* Authorisation record for request_key().
*/
struct request_key_auth {
struct rcu_head rcu;
+ refcount_t usage;
struct key *target_key;
struct key *dest_keyring;
const struct cred *cred;
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -215,6 +215,8 @@ extern struct key *request_key_auth_new(
const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
struct key *dest_keyring);
+struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey);
+void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka);
extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id);
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1196,9 +1196,13 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_commo
if (!instkey)
goto error;
- rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
- if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+ rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey);
+ if (!rka) {
+ ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
goto error;
+ }
+ if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+ goto error_put_rka;
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
@@ -1207,7 +1211,7 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_commo
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload)
- goto error;
+ goto error_put_rka;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (!copy_from_iter_full(payload, plen, from))
@@ -1233,6 +1237,8 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_commo
error2:
kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
+error_put_rka:
+ request_key_auth_put(rka);
error:
return ret;
}
@@ -1358,15 +1364,19 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id,
if (!instkey)
goto error;
- rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
- if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+ rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey);
+ if (!rka) {
+ ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
goto error;
+ }
+ if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+ goto error_put_rka;
/* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be
* writable) */
ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
+ goto error_put_rka;
/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error,
@@ -1379,6 +1389,8 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id,
if (ret == 0)
keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
+error_put_rka:
+ request_key_auth_put(rka);
error:
return ret;
}
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(co
static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);
static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t);
+static void request_key_auth_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *);
/*
* The request-key authorisation key type definition.
@@ -116,6 +117,31 @@ static void free_request_key_auth(struct
}
/*
+ * Take a reference to the request-key authorisation payload so callers can
+ * drop authkey->sem before doing operations that may sleep.
+ */
+struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey)
+{
+ struct request_key_auth *rka;
+
+ down_read(&authkey->sem);
+ rka = dereference_key_locked(authkey);
+ if (rka && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags))
+ refcount_inc(&rka->usage);
+ else
+ rka = NULL;
+ up_read(&authkey->sem);
+
+ return rka;
+}
+
+void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka)
+{
+ if (rka && refcount_dec_and_test(&rka->usage))
+ call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+}
+
+/*
* Dispose of the request_key_auth record under RCU conditions
*/
static void request_key_auth_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
@@ -136,8 +162,10 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(stru
struct request_key_auth *rka = dereference_key_locked(key);
kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
+ if (!rka)
+ return;
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
- call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+ request_key_auth_put(rka);
}
/*
@@ -150,7 +178,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(str
kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
if (rka) {
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
- call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+ request_key_auth_put(rka);
}
}
@@ -174,6 +202,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct
rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rka)
goto error;
+ refcount_set(&rka->usage, 1);
rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rka->callout_info)
goto error_free_rka;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 131/175] wifi: mt76: mt76x2u: Add support for ELECOM WDC-867SU3S
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (129 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 130/175] keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 132/175] wifi: ath11k: fix warning when unbinding Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (52 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Zenm Chen, Lorenzo Bianconi,
Felix Fietkau
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zenm Chen <zenmchen@gmail.com>
commit f4ce0664e9f0387873b181777891741c33e19465 upstream.
Add the ID 056e:400a to the table to support an additional MT7612U
adapter: ELECOM WDC-867SU3S.
Compile tested only.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10.x
Signed-off-by: Zenm Chen <zenmchen@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407154430.9184-1-zenmchen@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id mt76x2
{ USB_DEVICE(0x0e8d, 0x7612) }, /* Aukey USBAC1200 - Alfa AWUS036ACM */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x057c, 0x8503) }, /* Avm FRITZ!WLAN AC860 */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x7392, 0xb711) }, /* Edimax EW 7722 UAC */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x056e, 0x400a) }, /* ELECOM WDC-867SU3S */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x0e8d, 0x7632) }, /* HC-M7662BU1 */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x0471, 0x2126) }, /* LiteOn WN4516R module, nonstandard USB connector */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x0471, 0x7600) }, /* LiteOn WN4519R module, nonstandard USB connector */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 132/175] wifi: ath11k: fix warning when unbinding
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (130 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 131/175] wifi: mt76: mt76x2u: Add support for ELECOM WDC-867SU3S Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 133/175] wifi: rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Fix C2H bit location in RX descriptor Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (51 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez,
Baochen Qiang, Rameshkumar Sundaram, Jeff Johnson
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm@redhat.com>
commit 8b7a26b6681922a38cd5a7829ace61f8e54df9b7 upstream.
If there is an error during some initialization related to firmware,
the buffers dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status are released.
However this is released again when the device is unbinded (ath11k_pci),
and we get:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6231 at mm/slub.c:4368 free_large_kmalloc+0x57/0x90
Call Trace:
free_large_kmalloc
ath11k_dp_free
ath11k_core_deinit
ath11k_pci_remove
...
The issue is always reproducible from a VM because the MSI addressing
initialization is failing.
In order to fix the issue, just set the buffers to NULL after releasing in
order to avoid the double free.
Fixes: d5c65159f289 ("ath11k: driver for Qualcomm IEEE 802.11ax devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Baochen Qiang <baochen.qiang@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Rameshkumar Sundaram <rameshkumar.sundaram@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260420110130.509670-1-jtornosm@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson <jeff.johnson@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c
@@ -1039,6 +1039,7 @@ void ath11k_dp_free(struct ath11k_base *
idr_destroy(&dp->tx_ring[i].txbuf_idr);
spin_unlock_bh(&dp->tx_ring[i].tx_idr_lock);
kfree(dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status);
+ dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status = NULL;
}
/* Deinit any SOC level resource */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 133/175] wifi: rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Fix C2H bit location in RX descriptor
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (131 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 132/175] wifi: ath11k: fix warning when unbinding Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 134/175] wifi: rtw88: increase TX report timeout to fix race condition Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (50 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Bitterblue Smith, Ping-Ke Shih
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bitterblue Smith <rtl8821cerfe2@gmail.com>
commit 83d38df6929118c3f996b9e3351c2d5014073d87 upstream.
Bit 28 of double word 2 in the RX descriptor indicates if the packet is
a normal 802.11 frame, or a message from the wifi firmware to the
driver (Card 2 Host).
Commit f5678bfe1cdc ("rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Replace local bit manipulation
macros") mistakenly made the driver look for this bit in double word 1,
causing packet loss and Bluetooth coexistence problems.
Fixes: f5678bfe1cdc ("rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Replace local bit manipulation macros")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bitterblue Smith <rtl8821cerfe2@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/04da7398-cedb-425a-a810-5772ab10139d@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static inline int get_rx_desc_paggr(__le
static inline int get_rx_status_desc_rpt_sel(__le32 *__pdesc)
{
- return le32_get_bits(*(__pdesc + 1), BIT(28));
+ return le32_get_bits(*(__pdesc + 2), BIT(28));
}
static inline int get_rx_desc_rxmcs(__le32 *__pdesc)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 134/175] wifi: rtw88: increase TX report timeout to fix race condition
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (132 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 133/175] wifi: rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Fix C2H bit location in RX descriptor Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 135/175] wifi: rtw88: usb: fix memory leaks on USB write failures Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (49 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Ping-Ke Shih, Luka Gejak
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
commit c80788f7c5aed8d420366b821f867a8a353d83a5 upstream.
The driver expects the firmware to report TX status within 500ms.
However, a timeout can be triggered when the hardware performs
background scans while under TX load. During these scans, the firmware
stays off-channel for periods exceeding 500ms, delaying the delivery of
TX reports back to the driver.
When this occurs, the purge timer fires prematurely and drops the
tracking skbs from the queue. This results in the host stack
interpreting the missing status as packet loss, leading to TCP window
collapse. In testing with iperf3, this causes throughput to drop from
~90 Mbps to near-zero for approximately 2 seconds until the connection
recovers.
Increase RTW_TX_PROBE_TIMEOUT to 2500ms for RTL8723DU. This duration is
sufficient to accommodate off-channel dwell time during full background
scans, ensuring the purge timer only trips during genuine firmware
lockups and preventing unnecessary TCP retransmission cycles.
Fixes: a82dfd33d123 ("wifi: rtw88: Add common USB chip support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Tested-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518142311.10328-1-luka.gejak@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/tx.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/tx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/tx.c
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ void rtw_tx_report_purge_timer(struct ti
void rtw_tx_report_enqueue(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev, struct sk_buff *skb, u8 sn)
{
struct rtw_tx_report *tx_report = &rtwdev->tx_report;
+ unsigned long timeout = RTW_TX_PROBE_TIMEOUT;
unsigned long flags;
u8 *drv_data;
@@ -201,7 +202,11 @@ void rtw_tx_report_enqueue(struct rtw_de
__skb_queue_tail(&tx_report->queue, skb);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tx_report->q_lock, flags);
- mod_timer(&tx_report->purge_timer, jiffies + RTW_TX_PROBE_TIMEOUT);
+ if (rtwdev->chip->id == RTW_CHIP_TYPE_8723D &&
+ rtwdev->hci.type == RTW_HCI_TYPE_USB)
+ timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(2500);
+
+ mod_timer(&tx_report->purge_timer, jiffies + timeout);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(rtw_tx_report_enqueue);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 135/175] wifi: rtw88: usb: fix memory leaks on USB write failures
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (133 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 134/175] wifi: rtw88: increase TX report timeout to fix race condition Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 136/175] wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix race condition in PTP removal Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (48 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Ping-Ke Shih, Luka Gejak
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
commit 6b964941bbfe6e0f18b1a5e008486dbb62df440a upstream.
When rtw_usb_write_port() fails to submit a USB Request Block (URB)
(e.g., due to device disconnect or ENOMEM), the completion callback is
never executed.
Currently, the driver ignores the return value of rtw_usb_write_port()
in rtw_usb_write_data() and rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb(). Because these
functions rely on the completion callback to free the socket buffers
(skbs) and the transaction control block (txcb), a submission failure
results in:
1. A memory leak of the allocated skb in rtw_usb_write_data().
2. A memory leak of the txcb structure and all aggregated skbs in
rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb().
Fix this by checking the return value of rtw_usb_write_port(). If it
fails, explicitly free the skb in rtw_usb_write_data(), and properly
purge the tx_ack_queue and free the txcb in rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb().
The issue was discovered in practice during device disconnect/reconnect
scenarios and memory pressure conditions. Tested by verifying normal TX
operation continues after the fix without regressions.
Fixes: a82dfd33d123 ("wifi: rtw88: Add common USB chip support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Tested-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518142311.10328-2-luka.gejak@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/usb.c | 13 +++++++++++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/usb.c
@@ -339,6 +339,7 @@ static bool rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb(struct rt
int agg_num = 0;
unsigned int align_next = 0;
u8 qsel;
+ int ret;
if (skb_queue_empty(list))
return false;
@@ -394,7 +395,13 @@ queue:
tx_desc = (struct rtw_tx_desc *)skb_head->data;
qsel = le32_get_bits(tx_desc->w1, RTW_TX_DESC_W1_QSEL);
- rtw_usb_write_port(rtwdev, qsel, skb_head, rtw_usb_write_port_tx_complete, txcb);
+ ret = rtw_usb_write_port(rtwdev, qsel, skb_head,
+ rtw_usb_write_port_tx_complete, txcb);
+ if (ret) {
+ ieee80211_purge_tx_queue(rtwdev->hw, &txcb->tx_ack_queue);
+ kfree(txcb);
+ return false;
+ }
return true;
}
@@ -458,8 +465,10 @@ static int rtw_usb_write_data(struct rtw
ret = rtw_usb_write_port(rtwdev, qsel, skb,
rtw_usb_write_port_complete, skb);
- if (unlikely(ret))
+ if (unlikely(ret)) {
rtw_err(rtwdev, "failed to do USB write, ret=%d\n", ret);
+ dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
+ }
return ret;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 136/175] wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix race condition in PTP removal
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (134 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 135/175] wifi: rtw88: usb: fix memory leaks on USB write failures Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 137/175] f2fs: validate compress cache inode only when enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (47 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Simon Horman, Vadim Fedorenko,
Junjie Cao, Miri Korenblit
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Junjie Cao <junjie.cao@intel.com>
commit 65150c9cc3e06ab54bc4e8134a47f6f5d095a4e3 upstream.
iwl_mvm_ptp_remove() calls cancel_delayed_work_sync() only after
ptp_clock_unregister() and clearing ptp_data state (ptp_clock,
ptp_clock_info, last_gp2).
This creates a race where the delayed work iwl_mvm_ptp_work() can
execute between ptp_clock_unregister() and cancel_delayed_work_sync(),
observing partially cleared PTP state.
Move cancel_delayed_work_sync() before ptp_clock_unregister() to
ensure the delayed work is fully stopped before any PTP cleanup
begins.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Junjie Cao <junjie.cao@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260212125035.1345718-1-junjie.cao@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ptp.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ptp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ptp.c
@@ -316,11 +316,11 @@ void iwl_mvm_ptp_remove(struct iwl_mvm *
mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock_info.name,
ptp_clock_index(mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock));
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&mvm->ptp_data.dwork);
ptp_clock_unregister(mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock);
mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock = NULL;
memset(&mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock_info, 0,
sizeof(mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock_info));
mvm->ptp_data.last_gp2 = 0;
- cancel_delayed_work_sync(&mvm->ptp_data.dwork);
}
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 137/175] f2fs: validate compress cache inode only when enabled
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (135 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 136/175] wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix race condition in PTP removal Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 138/175] f2fs: fix to round down start offset of fallocate for pin file Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (46 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Wenjie Qi, Chao Yu,
Jaegeuk Kim
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wenjie Qi <qwjhust@gmail.com>
commit 5073c66a96a9c23c0c2533ed4ed06e42f9021208 upstream.
F2FS_COMPRESS_INO() uses NM_I(sbi)->max_nid as the synthetic inode
number for the compressed page cache inode. That inode only exists when
the compress_cache mount option is enabled.
When compress_cache is disabled, max_nid is outside the valid inode
range. A corrupted directory entry that points to ino == max_nid should
therefore be rejected by f2fs_check_nid_range(). However, is_meta_ino()
currently treats F2FS_COMPRESS_INO() as a meta inode unconditionally,
so f2fs_iget() bypasses do_read_inode() and its nid range check, and
instantiates a fake internal inode instead.
Gate the compressed cache inode case on COMPRESS_CACHE, matching
f2fs_init_compress_inode(). With compress_cache disabled, ino ==
max_nid now follows the normal inode path and is rejected as an
out-of-range nid.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 6ce19aff0b8c ("f2fs: compress: add compress_inode to cache compressed blocks")
Signed-off-by: Wenjie Qi <qiwenjie@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -544,8 +544,13 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
static bool is_meta_ino(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned int ino)
{
- return ino == F2FS_NODE_INO(sbi) || ino == F2FS_META_INO(sbi) ||
- ino == F2FS_COMPRESS_INO(sbi);
+ if (ino == F2FS_NODE_INO(sbi) || ino == F2FS_META_INO(sbi))
+ return true;
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_COMPRESSION
+ if (test_opt(sbi, COMPRESS_CACHE) && ino == F2FS_COMPRESS_INO(sbi))
+ return true;
+#endif
+ return false;
}
struct inode *f2fs_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 138/175] f2fs: fix to round down start offset of fallocate for pin file
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (136 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 137/175] f2fs: validate compress cache inode only when enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 139/175] f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (45 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Yunji Kang, Yeongjin Gil,
Sungjong Seo, Sunmin Jeong, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sunmin Jeong <s_min.jeong@samsung.com>
commit 4275b59673eb60b02eec3997816c83f1f4b909c4 upstream.
Currently, the length of fallocate for pin file is section-aligned to
keep allocated sections from being selected as victims of GC. However,
for the case that the start offset of fallocate is not aligned in
section, the allocated sections can't be fully utilized. It's because a
new section is allocated by f2fs_allocate_pinning_section() after using
blks_per_sec blocks regardless of the start offset. As a result, several
unexpected dirty segments may be created, including blocks assigned to
the pinned file.
To address this issue, let's round down the start offset of fallocate
to the length of section.
The reproducing scenario is as below
chunk=$(((2<<20)+4096)) # 2MB + 4KB
touch test
f2fs_io pinfile set test
f2fs_io fallocate 0 0 $chunk test
f2fs_io fallocate 0 $chunk $chunk test
f2fs_io fallocate 0 $((chunk*2)) $chunk test
f2fs_io fiemap 0 $((chunk*3)) test
Fiemap: offset = 0 len = 12288
logical addr. physical addr. length flags
0 0000000000000000 000000068c600000 0000000000400000 00001088
1 0000000000400000 000000003d400000 0000000000001000 00001088
2 0000000000401000 00000003eb200000 0000000000200000 00001088
3 0000000000601000 00000005e4200000 0000000000001000 00001088
4 0000000000602000 0000000605400000 0000000000200000 00001089
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f5a53edcf01e ("f2fs: support aligned pinned file")
Reviewed-by: Yunji Kang <yunji0.kang@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Yeongjin Gil <youngjin.gil@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Sunmin Jeong <s_min.jeong@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/file.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -1826,8 +1826,15 @@ static int f2fs_expand_inode_data(struct
if (f2fs_is_pinned_file(inode)) {
block_t sec_blks = CAP_BLKS_PER_SEC(sbi);
- block_t sec_len = roundup(map.m_len, sec_blks);
+ block_t sec_len;
+ if (map.m_lblk % sec_blks) {
+ map.m_lblk = rounddown(map.m_lblk, sec_blks);
+ map.m_len = pg_end - map.m_lblk;
+ if (off_end)
+ map.m_len++;
+ }
+ sec_len = roundup(map.m_len, sec_blks);
map.m_len = sec_blks;
next_alloc:
if (has_not_enough_free_secs(sbi, 0,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 139/175] f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (137 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 138/175] f2fs: fix to round down start offset of fallocate for pin file Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 140/175] f2fs: fix incorrect FI_NO_EXTENT handling in __destroy_extent_node() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Zhang Cen, Chao Yu,
Jaegeuk Kim
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
commit c4810ada31e80cbe4011467c4f3b1e93f94134f3 upstream.
f2fs_acl_count() only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A
malformed ACL can still place ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP in a slot that only
contains struct f2fs_acl_entry_short bytes, and f2fs_acl_from_disk()
then reads entry->e_id before verifying that a full entry fits.
Require a short entry before reading e_tag and e_perm, and require a
full entry before reading e_id for ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP. Return
-EFSCORRUPTED from these new truncated-entry checks, while keeping the
pre-existing -EINVAL paths unchanged.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0
RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte
region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968)
Read of size 4
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?)
__f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
__f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
__get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?)
vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?)
do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?)
do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?)
do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?)
filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?)
do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?)
path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?)
lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?)
cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?)
lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?)
trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?)
_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?)
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: af48b85b8cd3 ("f2fs: add xattr and acl functionalities")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/acl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/acl.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/acl.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static inline int f2fs_acl_count(size_t
static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)
{
int i, count;
+ int err = -EINVAL;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct f2fs_acl_header *hdr = (struct f2fs_acl_header *)value;
struct f2fs_acl_entry *entry = (struct f2fs_acl_entry *)(hdr + 1);
@@ -69,8 +70,11 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_d
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- if ((char *)entry > end)
+ if (unlikely((char *)entry +
+ sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry_short) > end)) {
+ err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto fail;
+ }
acl->a_entries[i].e_tag = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag);
acl->a_entries[i].e_perm = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_perm);
@@ -85,6 +89,11 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_d
break;
case ACL_USER:
+ if (unlikely((char *)entry +
+ sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)) {
+ err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto fail;
+ }
acl->a_entries[i].e_uid =
make_kuid(&init_user_ns,
le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
@@ -92,6 +101,11 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_d
sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry));
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
+ if (unlikely((char *)entry +
+ sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)) {
+ err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto fail;
+ }
acl->a_entries[i].e_gid =
make_kgid(&init_user_ns,
le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
@@ -107,7 +121,7 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_d
return acl;
fail:
posix_acl_release(acl);
- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
}
static void *f2fs_acl_to_disk(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 140/175] f2fs: fix incorrect FI_NO_EXTENT handling in __destroy_extent_node()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (138 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 139/175] f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 141/175] f2fs: keep atomic write retry from zeroing original data Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Chao Yu, Yongpeng Yang, Jaegeuk Kim
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yongpeng Yang <yangyongpeng@xiaomi.com>
commit 1f70ddb28a3c71df124da5fa4040c808116d6bb9 upstream.
When __destroy_extent_node() sets the inode flag FI_NO_EXTENT, it does
not reset the length of the largest extent to 0 and update the inode
folio. Since modifications to the extent tree are disallowed afterward,
the cached largest extent may become stale. This can trigger the
following error in xfstests generic/388:
F2FS-fs (dm-0): sanity_check_extent_cache: inode (ino=1761) extent info [220057, 57, 6] is incorrect, run fsck to fix
In the f2fs_drop_inode path, __destroy_extent_node() does not need to
guarantee that et->node_cnt is 0, because concurrency with writeback
is expected in this path, and writeback may update the extent cache.
This patch reverts commit ed78aeebef05 ("f2fs: fix node_cnt race between
extent node destroy and writeback"), and remove the unnecessary zero
check of et->node_cnt.
Fixes: ed78aeebef05 ("f2fs: fix node_cnt race between extent node destroy and writeback")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang <yangyongpeng@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c | 19 +++++++------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c
@@ -87,10 +87,9 @@ static bool __may_extent_tree(struct ino
if (!__init_may_extent_tree(inode, type))
return false;
- if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT))
- return false;
-
if (type == EX_READ) {
+ if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT))
+ return false;
if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_COMPRESSED_FILE) &&
!f2fs_sb_has_readonly(F2FS_I_SB(inode)))
return false;
@@ -603,14 +602,10 @@ static unsigned int __destroy_extent_nod
while (atomic_read(&et->node_cnt)) {
write_lock(&et->lock);
- if (!is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT))
- set_inode_flag(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT);
node_cnt += __free_extent_tree(sbi, et, nr_shrink);
write_unlock(&et->lock);
}
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, atomic_read(&et->node_cnt));
-
return node_cnt;
}
@@ -640,12 +635,12 @@ static void __update_extent_tree_range(s
write_lock(&et->lock);
- if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT)) {
- write_unlock(&et->lock);
- return;
- }
-
if (type == EX_READ) {
+ if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT)) {
+ write_unlock(&et->lock);
+ return;
+ }
+
prev = et->largest;
dei.len = 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 141/175] f2fs: keep atomic write retry from zeroing original data
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (139 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 140/175] f2fs: fix incorrect FI_NO_EXTENT handling in __destroy_extent_node() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 142/175] bpf: use kvfree() for replaced sysctl write buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Wenjie Qi, Chao Yu,
Jaegeuk Kim
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wenjie Qi <qwjhust@gmail.com>
commit 6d874b65aadce56ac78f76129dbcfc2599b638f8 upstream.
A partial atomic write reserves a block in the COW inode before reading the
original data page for the untouched bytes in that page.
If that read fails, write_begin returns an error but leaves the COW inode
entry as NEW_ADDR. A retry of the same partial write then finds the COW
entry, treats it as existing COW data, and f2fs_write_begin() zeroes the
whole folio because blkaddr is NEW_ADDR.
If the retry is committed, the bytes outside the retried write range are
committed as zeroes instead of preserving the original file contents.
Only use the COW inode as the read source when it already has a real data
block. If the COW entry is still NEW_ADDR, treat it as a reservation to
reuse: keep reading the old data from the original inode and avoid
reserving or accounting the same atomic block again.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 3db1de0e582c ("f2fs: change the current atomic write way")
Signed-off-by: Wenjie Qi <qiwenjie@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/data.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -3527,6 +3527,7 @@ static int prepare_atomic_write_begin(st
pgoff_t index = page->index;
int err = 0;
block_t ori_blk_addr = NULL_ADDR;
+ bool cow_has_reserved_block = false;
/* If pos is beyond the end of file, reserve a new block in COW inode */
if ((pos & PAGE_MASK) >= i_size_read(inode))
@@ -3536,9 +3537,11 @@ static int prepare_atomic_write_begin(st
err = __find_data_block(cow_inode, index, blk_addr);
if (err) {
return err;
- } else if (*blk_addr != NULL_ADDR) {
+ } else if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(*blk_addr)) {
*use_cow = true;
return 0;
+ } else if (*blk_addr == NEW_ADDR) {
+ cow_has_reserved_block = true;
}
if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_ATOMIC_REPLACE))
@@ -3551,10 +3554,13 @@ static int prepare_atomic_write_begin(st
reserve_block:
/* Finally, we should reserve a new block in COW inode for the update */
- err = __reserve_data_block(cow_inode, index, blk_addr, node_changed);
- if (err)
- return err;
- inc_atomic_write_cnt(inode);
+ if (!cow_has_reserved_block) {
+ err = __reserve_data_block(cow_inode, index, blk_addr,
+ node_changed);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ inc_atomic_write_cnt(inode);
+ }
if (ori_blk_addr != NULL_ADDR)
*blk_addr = ori_blk_addr;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 142/175] bpf: use kvfree() for replaced sysctl write buffer
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (140 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 141/175] f2fs: keep atomic write retry from zeroing original data Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 143/175] MIPS: DEC: Prevent initial console buffer from landing in XKPHYS Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Emil Tsalapatis, Jiayuan Chen,
Yonghong Song, Zilin Guan, Dawei Feng, Alexei Starovoitov
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
commit 4c21b5927d4364bfe7365f2700da5fea0ed0d004 upstream.
proc_sys_call_handler() allocates its temporary sysctl buffer with
kvzalloc() and passes it to __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since
kvzalloc() may fall back to vmalloc() for large allocations, freeing
that buffer with kfree() is wrong and can corrupt memory.
Use kvfree() to safely handle both kmalloc and kvzalloc()/vmalloc
allocations.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still
present in v7.1-rc5.
Reproduced the bug based on v7.1-rc4 in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with
KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. To exercise the replacement path, the
test tree also included the accompanying fix for the stale ret == 1
check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). The reproducer confines
failslab injections to the proc_sys_call_handler() range, uses
stacktrace-depth=32, and injects fail-nth=1 while writing 8191 bytes to
/proc/sys/kernel/domainname from a task in the target cgroup. Under
that setup, fail-nth=1 triggered the fault:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb0200024d48
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 209 Comm: repro_proc_sys_ Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-00686-g97625979a5d4 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:kfree+0x6e/0x510
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x626/0xc30
__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x74d/0xc30
? __pfx___cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x10/0x10
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x345/0x870
? proc_sys_call_handler+0x250/0x480
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
proc_sys_call_handler+0x3a2/0x480
? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120
vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000
...
</TASK>
With this fix applied on top of the same test setup, rerunning the
reproducer with fail-nth=1 yields no corresponding Oops reports.
Fixes: 4508943794ef ("proc: use kvzalloc for our kernel buffer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603105317.944304-3-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
@@ -1776,7 +1776,7 @@ int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(struc
kfree(ctx.cur_val);
if (ret == 1 && ctx.new_updated) {
- kfree(*buf);
+ kvfree(*buf);
*buf = ctx.new_val;
*pcount = ctx.new_len;
} else {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 143/175] MIPS: DEC: Prevent initial console buffer from landing in XKPHYS
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (141 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 142/175] bpf: use kvfree() for replaced sysctl write buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 144/175] exfat: fix potential use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Maciej W. Rozycki,
Thomas Bogendoerfer
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
commit 7fb13fd35110ebe95eb053faf79d018f51144d85 upstream.
In 64-bit configurations calling the initial console output handler from
a kernel thread other than the initial one will result in a situation
where the stack has been placed in the XKPHYS 64-bit memory segment and
consequently so has been the buffer allocated there that is used as the
argument corresponding to the `%s' output conversion specifier for the
firmware's printf() entry point.
This 64-bit address will then be truncated by 32-bit firmware, resulting
in an attempt to access the wrong memory location, which in turn will
cause all kinds of unpredictable behaviour, such as a kernel crash:
Console: colour dummy device 160x64
Calibrating delay loop... 49.36 BogoMIPS (lpj=192512)
pid_max: default: 32768 minimum: 301
CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 000000000203bd00, epc == ffffffffbfc08364, ra == ffffffffbfc08800
Oops[#1]:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-00254-gfb649bda6f56-dirty #121
$ 0 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000023 ffffffff80684ba0
$ 4 : 000000000203bd00 ffffffffbfc0f3b4 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000073
$ 8 : 0a303d7469000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000073 ffffffffbfc0f473
$12 : 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 ffffffff80684c1c 0000000000000000
$16 : 0000000000000000 ffffffff80596dc9 0000000000000000 ffffffffbfc09240
$20 : ffffffff80684c40 ffffffffbfc0f400 000000000000002d 000000000000002b
$24 : ffffffffffffffbf 000000000203bd00
$28 : ffffffff805f0000 ffffffff80684b58 0000000000000030 ffffffffbfc08800
Hi : 0000000000000000
Lo : 0000000000000aa8
epc : ffffffffbfc08364 0xffffffffbfc08364
ra : ffffffffbfc08800 0xffffffffbfc08800
Status: 140120e2 KX SX UX KERNEL EXL
Cause : 00000008 (ExcCode 02)
BadVA : 000000000203bd00
PrId : 00000430 (R4000SC)
Modules linked in:
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=(____ptrval____), task=(____ptrval____), tls=0000000000000000)
Stack : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000004d0000004d
80684cc0806a2a40 80596dc80000004d 8061000000000000 bfc0850c80684c38
0000000000000000 000000000203bd00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 00000000bfc0f3b4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000002500000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 802c1a7400000000
0203bd0080596dc8 0203bd4d69000000 6c61632000000018 5f746567646e6172
6c616320625f6d6f 5f736e5f6d6f7266 206361323778302b 303d74696e726320
806a0a38806b0000 806a0a38806b0000 00000000806b0000 80683c58806b0000
...
Call Trace:
Code: a082ffff 03e00008 00601021 <80820000> 00001821 10400005 24840001 80820000 24630001
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
KN04 V2.1k (PC: 0xa0026768, SP: 0x806848e8)
>>
In this case the pointer in $4 was truncated from 0x980000000203bd00 to
0x000000000203bd00.
This may happen when no final console driver has been enabled in the
configuration and consequently the initial console continues being used
late into bootstrap or with an upcoming change that will switch the zs
driver to use a platform device, which in turn will make the console
handover happen only after other kernel threads have already been
started.
Fix the issue by making the buffer static and initdata, and therefore
placed in the CKSEG0 32-bit compatibility segment, observing that the
console output handler is called with the console lock held, implying
no need for this code to be reentrant. Add an assertion to verify the
buffer actually has been placed in a compatibility segment.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.12+
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c
+++ b/arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c
@@ -2,8 +2,9 @@
/*
* DECstation PROM-based early console support.
*
- * Copyright (C) 2004, 2007 Maciej W. Rozycki
+ * Copyright (C) 2004, 2007, 2026 Maciej W. Rozycki
*/
+#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/console.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -14,9 +15,11 @@
static void __init prom_console_write(struct console *con, const char *s,
unsigned int c)
{
- char buf[81];
+ static char buf[81] __initdata = { 0 };
unsigned int chunk = sizeof(buf) - 1;
+ BUG_ON((long)buf != (int)(long)buf);
+
while (c > 0) {
if (chunk > c)
chunk = c;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 144/175] exfat: fix potential use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (142 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 143/175] MIPS: DEC: Prevent initial console buffer from landing in XKPHYS Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 145/175] gfs2: fix use-after-free in gfs2_qd_dealloc Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Michael Bommarito, Namjae Jeon
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
commit 3f5f8ee9917cc2b9076ac533492d8a200edcabb8 upstream.
In exfat_find_dir_entry(), the buffer_head obtained from
exfat_get_dentry() is released with brelse(bh) before the fall-through
TYPE_EXTEND branch reads the directory entry through ep (which points
into bh->b_data):
brelse(bh);
if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) {
...
len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
...
}
After brelse() drops our reference, nothing guarantees that the
underlying page backing bh->b_data remains valid for the subsequent
exfat_extract_uni_name() read. This is the same pattern fixed in
commit fc961522ddbd ("exfat: Fix potential use after free in
exfat_load_upcase_table()").
Move brelse(bh) so it runs after ep is no longer dereferenced on
each branch.
Confirmed on QEMU x86_64 with CONFIG_KASAN=y + CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y
+ CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y on linux-next, using a crafted exFAT image
(long filename with same-hash collisions forcing the TYPE_EXTEND path).
With a debug-only invalidate_bdev() inserted between brelse(bh) and
the ep read to make the stale-deref window deterministic, the
unpatched kernel faults:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry+0x133b/0x15a0
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88801a5fa0c2
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:exfat_find_dir_entry+0x1188/0x15a0
With this patch applied, the same instrumented harness completes
cleanly under the same sanitizer stack. I have not reproduced a
crash on an uninstrumented kernel under ordinary reclaim; the
instrumented A/B establishes the lifetime violation and that the
patch closes it, not an unaided triggerability claim.
Fixes: ca06197382bd ("exfat: add directory operations")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/exfat/dir.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/exfat/dir.c
+++ b/fs/exfat/dir.c
@@ -1079,12 +1079,12 @@ rewind:
continue;
}
- brelse(bh);
if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) {
unsigned short entry_uniname[16], unichar;
if (step != DIRENT_STEP_NAME ||
name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH) {
+ brelse(bh);
step = DIRENT_STEP_FILE;
continue;
}
@@ -1095,6 +1095,7 @@ rewind:
uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
+ brelse(bh);
name_len += len;
unichar = *(uniname+len);
@@ -1113,6 +1114,7 @@ rewind:
continue;
}
+ brelse(bh);
if (entry_type &
(TYPE_CRITICAL_SEC | TYPE_BENIGN_SEC)) {
if (step == DIRENT_STEP_SECD) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 145/175] gfs2: fix use-after-free in gfs2_qd_dealloc
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (143 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 144/175] exfat: fix potential use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 146/175] hdlc_ppp: sync per-proto timers before freeing hdlc state Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzbot+42a37bf8045847d8f9d2,
Tristan Madani, Andreas Gruenbacher
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
commit f9c9ec2c319f843b70ecdf939d48b52d189bc081 upstream.
gfs2_qd_dealloc(), called as an RCU callback from gfs2_qd_dispose(),
accesses the superblock object sdp through qd->qd_sbd after freeing qd.
It does so to decrement sd_quota_count and wake up sd_kill_wait.
However, by the time the RCU callback runs, gfs2_put_super() may have
already freed sdp via free_sbd(). This can happen when
gfs2_quota_cleanup() is called during unmount: it disposes of quota
objects via call_rcu() and then waits on sd_kill_wait with a 60-second
timeout. If the timeout expires, or if gfs2_gl_hash_clear() triggers
additional qd_put() calls that schedule more RCU callbacks after the
wait completes, gfs2_put_super() will proceed to free the superblock
while RCU callbacks referencing it are still pending.
Add an rcu_barrier() before free_sbd() in gfs2_put_super() to ensure
all pending RCU callbacks (including gfs2_qd_dealloc) have completed
before the superblock is freed.
Fixes: a475c5dd16e5 ("gfs2: Free quota data objects synchronously")
Reported-by: syzbot+42a37bf8045847d8f9d2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=42a37bf8045847d8f9d2
Tested-by: syzbot+42a37bf8045847d8f9d2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/gfs2/super.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/fs/gfs2/super.c
+++ b/fs/gfs2/super.c
@@ -652,6 +652,7 @@ restart:
gfs2_delete_debugfs_file(sdp);
gfs2_sys_fs_del(sdp);
+ rcu_barrier();
free_sbd(sdp);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 146/175] hdlc_ppp: sync per-proto timers before freeing hdlc state
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (144 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 145/175] gfs2: fix use-after-free in gfs2_qd_dealloc Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 147/175] blk-cgroup: fix UAF in __blkcg_rstat_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Fan Wu, Jakub Kicinski
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fan Wu <fanwu01@zju.edu.cn>
commit c78a4e41ab5ead6193ad8a2dd92e8906bae659fa upstream.
Each PPP control protocol (LCP/IPCP/IPV6CP) embedded in struct ppp
registers a timer via timer_setup(). That struct ppp is the
hdlc->state allocation, which detach_hdlc_protocol() frees with kfree()
in both teardown paths: unregister_hdlc_device() and the re-attach inside
attach_hdlc_protocol().
The ppp proto never registered a .detach callback, so
detach_hdlc_protocol() performs no timer synchronization before the
kfree(). The only cancel, timer_delete(&proto->timer) in ppp_cp_event(),
is partial (it does not wait for a running callback) and only runs on the
->CLOSED transition; ppp_stop()/ppp_close() do not sync either. A
ppp_timer callback already executing (blocked on ppp->lock) survives the
kfree and then dereferences proto->state / ppp->lock in freed memory,
leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by adding a .detach helper that calls timer_shutdown_sync() on
every per-proto timer. detach_hdlc_protocol() invokes proto->detach(dev)
before kfree(hdlc->state), so timer_shutdown_sync()
now runs on both free paths.
timer_shutdown_sync() is used instead of timer_delete_sync() because the
keepalive path re-arms the timer through add_timer()/mod_timer() and
shutdown blocks any re-activation during teardown.
Initialize the per-protocol timers in ppp_ioctl() when the protocol is
attached, and remove the now-redundant timer_setup() from ppp_start(), so
that the timers are initialized exactly once at attach time and
ppp_timer_release() never operates on uninitialized timer_list
structures. attach_hdlc_protocol() uses kmalloc() (not kzalloc), so
struct ppp's protos[i].timer is uninitialized garbage until the first
timer_setup(); without this init-at-attach, attaching the PPP protocol
without ever bringing the device up would leave timer_shutdown_sync()
operating on uninitialized memory in .detach. Moving the init out of
ppp_start() (which only runs on NETDEV_UP) into the attach path makes the
initialization unconditional and avoids initializing the same timer_list
twice.
This bug was found by static analysis.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <fanwu01@zju.edu.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617020518.116319-1-fanwu01@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c
@@ -621,7 +621,6 @@ static void ppp_start(struct net_device
struct proto *proto = &ppp->protos[i];
proto->dev = dev;
- timer_setup(&proto->timer, ppp_timer, 0);
proto->state = CLOSED;
}
ppp->protos[IDX_LCP].pid = PID_LCP;
@@ -641,6 +640,15 @@ static void ppp_close(struct net_device
ppp_tx_flush();
}
+static void ppp_timer_release(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+ struct ppp *ppp = get_ppp(dev);
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < IDX_COUNT; i++)
+ timer_shutdown_sync(&ppp->protos[i].timer);
+}
+
static struct hdlc_proto proto = {
.start = ppp_start,
.stop = ppp_stop,
@@ -649,6 +657,7 @@ static struct hdlc_proto proto = {
.ioctl = ppp_ioctl,
.netif_rx = ppp_rx,
.module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .detach = ppp_timer_release,
};
static const struct header_ops ppp_header_ops = {
@@ -659,7 +668,7 @@ static int ppp_ioctl(struct net_device *
{
hdlc_device *hdlc = dev_to_hdlc(dev);
struct ppp *ppp;
- int result;
+ int i, result;
switch (ifs->type) {
case IF_GET_PROTO:
@@ -687,6 +696,8 @@ static int ppp_ioctl(struct net_device *
return result;
ppp = get_ppp(dev);
+ for (i = 0; i < IDX_COUNT; i++)
+ timer_setup(&ppp->protos[i].timer, ppp_timer, 0);
spin_lock_init(&ppp->lock);
ppp->req_timeout = 2;
ppp->cr_retries = 10;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 147/175] blk-cgroup: fix UAF in __blkcg_rstat_flush()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (145 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 146/175] hdlc_ppp: sync per-proto timers before freeing hdlc state Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 148/175] tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jay Shin, Tejun Heo, Waiman Long,
coregee2000, Ming Lei, Jose Fernandez (Anthropic), Jens Axboe
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
commit 0ab5ee5a1badb58cbb2242617cb01a4972b1f2a2 upstream.
When multiple blkgs in the same blkcg are released concurrently,
a use-after-free can occur. The race happens when one blkg's
__blkcg_rstat_flush() removes another blkg's iostat entries via
llist_del_all(). The second blkg sees an empty list and proceeds
to free itself while the first is still iterating over its entries.
Move the flush from __blkg_release() (RCU callback) to blkg_release()
(before call_rcu). This ensures the RCU grace period waits for any
concurrent flush's rcu_read_lock() section to complete before freeing.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jay Shin <jaeshin@redhat.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Fixes: 20cb1c2fb756 ("blk-cgroup: Flush stats before releasing blkcg_gq")
Reported-by: coregee2000@gmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/CAHPqNmwT9oRpem3J3erS_W0uSQND47LGGSBsNxP8E6uSUish1w@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jose Fernandez (Anthropic) <jose.fernandez@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260205155425.342084-1-ming.lei@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
block/blk-cgroup.c | 21 +++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/block/blk-cgroup.c
+++ b/block/blk-cgroup.c
@@ -170,20 +170,10 @@ static void blkg_free(struct blkcg_gq *b
static void __blkg_release(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct blkcg_gq *blkg = container_of(rcu, struct blkcg_gq, rcu_head);
- struct blkcg *blkcg = blkg->blkcg;
- int cpu;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP_PUNT_BIO
WARN_ON(!bio_list_empty(&blkg->async_bios));
#endif
- /*
- * Flush all the non-empty percpu lockless lists before releasing
- * us, given these stat belongs to us.
- *
- * blkg_stat_lock is for serializing blkg stat update
- */
- for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
- __blkcg_rstat_flush(blkcg, cpu);
/* release the blkcg and parent blkg refs this blkg has been holding */
css_put(&blkg->blkcg->css);
@@ -201,6 +191,17 @@ static void __blkg_release(struct rcu_he
static void blkg_release(struct percpu_ref *ref)
{
struct blkcg_gq *blkg = container_of(ref, struct blkcg_gq, refcnt);
+ struct blkcg *blkcg = blkg->blkcg;
+ int cpu;
+
+ /*
+ * Flush all the non-empty percpu lockless lists before releasing
+ * us, given these stat belongs to us.
+ *
+ * blkg_stat_lock is for serializing blkg stat update
+ */
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
+ __blkcg_rstat_flush(blkcg, cpu);
call_rcu(&blkg->rcu_head, __blkg_release);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 148/175] tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (146 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 147/175] blk-cgroup: fix UAF in __blkcg_rstat_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 149/175] LoongArch: Report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (35 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Doruk Tan Ozturk, Alexander Lobakin,
Tung Nguyen, Simon Horman, Jakub Kicinski
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
commit bda3348872a2ef0d19f2df6aa8cb5025adce2f20 upstream.
tipc_aead_decrypt() goes straight from tipc_bearer_hold(b) to
crypto_aead_decrypt(req) without taking a reference on the netns, unlike
the encrypt path. When crypto_aead_decrypt() is offloaded asynchronously
(e.g. the SIMD aead wrapper queuing to cryptd), the cryptd worker runs
tipc_aead_decrypt_done() later. If the bearer's netns is torn down in the
meantime, cleanup_net() -> tipc_exit_net() -> tipc_crypto_stop() frees the
per-netns tipc_crypto, and the completion then reads it:
tipc_aead_decrypt_done() dereferences aead->crypto->stats and
aead->crypto->net, and tipc_crypto_rcv_complete() dereferences
aead->crypto->aead[] and the node table -- reading freed memory.
Decoded KASAN splat (v7.1-rc7, CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + TIPC + TIPC_CRYPTO):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881056258a8 by task kworker/u16:2/51
Workqueue: events_unbound
Call Trace:
tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
Allocated by task 169:
__kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415)
tipc_crypto_start (net/tipc/crypto.c:1502)
tipc_init_net (net/tipc/core.c:72)
ops_init (net/core/net_namespace.c:137)
setup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:446)
copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:579)
create_new_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:132)
__x64_sys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3316)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Freed by task 8:
kfree (mm/slub.c:6566)
tipc_exit_net (net/tipc/core.c:119)
cleanup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:704)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
This is the same class of bug that commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc: fix
slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") fixed for the encrypt
side. The encrypt path takes maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net) before
crypto_aead_encrypt() and drops it with put_net() on the synchronous
return paths and in tipc_aead_encrypt_done(); the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY
return keeps the reference for the async callback to release. The decrypt
path was left without the equivalent guard.
Mirror the encrypt-side fix on the decrypt path: take a net reference
before crypto_aead_decrypt() (failing with -ENODEV and the matching
bearer put if it cannot be acquired), keep it across the
-EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY async return, and drop it with put_net() on the
synchronous success/error return and at the end of
tipc_aead_decrypt_done().
Reproduced under KASAN on v7.1-rc7: a UDP bearer with a cluster key is
flooded with crafted encrypted frames from an unknown peer (driving the
cluster-key decrypt path) while the bearer's netns is repeatedly torn
down. The completion must run asynchronously to outlive
tipc_crypto_stop(); on x86 the stock aesni gcm(aes) now decrypts
synchronously, so the async path was exercised via cryptd offload. The
unguarded aead->crypto dereference in tipc_aead_decrypt_done() is the
unpatched upstream path; tipc_aead_decrypt() still lacks
maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net), so the completion can outlive the free
on any config where crypto_aead_decrypt() goes async.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Fixes: fc1b6d6de220 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617075818.37431-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/tipc/crypto.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
--- a/net/tipc/crypto.c
+++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c
@@ -950,12 +950,20 @@ static int tipc_aead_decrypt(struct net
goto exit;
}
+ /* Get net to avoid freed tipc_crypto when delete namespace */
+ if (!maybe_get_net(net)) {
+ tipc_bearer_put(b);
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
/* Now, do decrypt */
rc = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY)
return rc;
tipc_bearer_put(b);
+ put_net(net);
exit:
kfree(ctx);
@@ -993,6 +1001,7 @@ static void tipc_aead_decrypt_done(void
}
tipc_bearer_put(b);
+ put_net(net);
}
static inline int tipc_ehdr_size(struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 149/175] LoongArch: Report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (147 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 148/175] tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 150/175] pNFS: Fix use-after-free in pnfs_update_layout() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Guo Ren, Huacai Chen
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
commit f2539c56c74691e7a88af6372ba2b48c06ed2fe4 upstream.
This is a port of MIPS commit 9f3f3bdc6d9dac1 ("MIPS: smp: report dying
CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu()"). smp_send_stop() parks all secondary
CPUs in stop_this_cpu(). And the function marks the CPU offline for the
scheduler via set_cpu_online(false) but never informs RCU, so RCU keeps
expecting a quiescent state from CPUs that are now spinning forever with
interrupts disabled.
As long as nothing waits for an RCU grace period after smp_send_stop()
this is harmless, which is why it went unnoticed. However, since commit
91840be8f710370 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on
PREEMPT_RT"), irq_work_sync() calls synchronize_rcu() on architectures
without an irq_work self-IPI, i.e. where arch_irq_work_has_interrupt()
returns false. Any irq_work_sync() issued in the reboot/shutdown/halt
path after smp_send_stop() then blocks on a grace period that can never
complete, hanging the reboot:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15 at kernel/irq_work.c:144 irq_work_queue_on
...
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
rcu: Offline CPU 1 blocking current GP.
rcu: Offline CPU 2 blocking current GP.
rcu: Offline CPU 3 blocking current GP.
This issue needs some hacks to reproduce, and it was not noticed on
LoongArch because arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() usually returns true.
Call rcutree_report_cpu_dead() once interrupts are disabled, mirroring
the generic CPU-hotplug offline path, so RCU stops waiting on the parked
CPUs and grace periods can still complete. LoongArch shuts down all CPUs
here without going through the CPU-hotplug mechanism, so this report is
not otherwise issued.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT")
Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c
@@ -613,6 +613,7 @@ static void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)
set_cpu_online(smp_processor_id(), false);
calculate_cpu_foreign_map();
local_irq_disable();
+ rcutree_report_cpu_dead();
while (true);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 150/175] pNFS: Fix use-after-free in pnfs_update_layout()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (148 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 149/175] LoongArch: Report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 151/175] irqchip/imgpdc: Fix resource leak, add missing chained handler cleanup on remove Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Wentao Liang, Anna Schumaker
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
commit 13e198a90ca4050f4bee8a3f23680389a6563ccc upstream.
When hitting the NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN branch in pnfs_update_layout(),
the code calls pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo). If it succeeds,
pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo) is called before trace_pnfs_update_layout(),
which still references 'lo'. This results in a use-after-free when the
tracepoint accesses lo's fields.
Fix this by moving the tracepoint call before pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo).
Fixes: 2c8d5fc37fe2 ("pNFS: Stricter ordering of layoutget and layoutreturn")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
@@ -2094,11 +2094,11 @@ lookup_again:
dprintk("%s wait for layoutreturn\n", __func__);
lseg = ERR_PTR(pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo));
if (!IS_ERR(lseg)) {
- pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo);
dprintk("%s retrying\n", __func__);
trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo,
lseg,
PNFS_UPDATE_LAYOUT_RETRY);
+ pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo);
goto lookup_again;
}
trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo, lseg,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 151/175] irqchip/imgpdc: Fix resource leak, add missing chained handler cleanup on remove
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (149 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 150/175] pNFS: Fix use-after-free in pnfs_update_layout() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 152/175] fpga: region: fix use-after-free in child_regions_with_firmware() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Qingshuang Fu, Thomas Gleixner
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qingshuang Fu <fuqingshuang@kylinos.cn>
commit 37738fdf2ab1e504d1c63ce5bc0aeb6452d8f057 upstream.
The driver allocates domain generic chips using
irq_alloc_domain_generic_chips() during probe and sets up chained
handlers using irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(). However, on driver
removal, the generic chips are not freed and the chained handlers are
not removed.
The generic chips remain on the global gc_list and may later be accessed by
generic interrupt chip suspend, resume, or shutdown callbacks after the
driver has been removed, potentially resulting in a use-after-free and
kernel crash.
The chained handlers that were installed in probe for peripheral and
syswake interrupts are also left dangling, which can lead to spurious
interrupts accessing freed memory.
Fix these issues by:
- Setting IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC flag in domain->flags, so the
core code automatically removes generic chips when irq_domain_remove()
is called
- Clearing all chained handlers with NULL in pdc_intc_remove()
Fixes: b6ef9161e43a ("irq-imgpdc: add ImgTec PDC irqchip driver")
Signed-off-by: Qingshuang Fu <fuqingshuang@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260618021352.661773-1-fffsqian@163.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c
@@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ static int pdc_intc_probe(struct platfor
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "cannot add IRQ domain\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ priv->domain->flags |= IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC;
/*
* Set up 2 generic irq chips with 2 chip types.
@@ -465,6 +466,11 @@ static int pdc_intc_remove(struct platfo
{
struct pdc_intc_priv *priv = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < priv->nr_perips; ++i)
+ irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(priv->perip_irqs[i], NULL, NULL);
+
+ irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(priv->syswake_irq, NULL, NULL);
+
irq_domain_remove(priv->domain);
return 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 152/175] fpga: region: fix use-after-free in child_regions_with_firmware()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (150 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 151/175] irqchip/imgpdc: Fix resource leak, add missing chained handler cleanup on remove Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 153/175] rpmsg: char: Fix use-after-free on probe error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Wentao Liang, Xu Yilun, Xu Yilun
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
commit 54f3c5643ec523a04b6ec0e7c19eb10f5ebebdd3 upstream.
Move of_node_put(child_region) after the error print to avoid accessing
freed memory when pr_err() references child_region.
Fixes: 0fa20cdfcc1f ("fpga: fpga-region: device tree control for FPGA")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
[ Yilun: Fix the Fixes tag ]
Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408154534.404327-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c
+++ b/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c
@@ -168,11 +168,10 @@ static int child_regions_with_firmware(s
fpga_region_of_match);
}
- of_node_put(child_region);
-
if (ret)
pr_err("firmware-name not allowed in child FPGA region: %pOF",
child_region);
+ of_node_put(child_region);
return ret;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 153/175] rpmsg: char: Fix use-after-free on probe error path
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (151 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 152/175] fpga: region: fix use-after-free in child_regions_with_firmware() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 154/175] ocfs2: reject oversized group bitmap descriptors Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Yuho Choi, Mathieu Poirier
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yuho Choi <dbgh9129@gmail.com>
commit 1ff3f528e67d20e2b1483dcaba899dc7832b2e6b upstream.
rpmsg_chrdev_probe() stores the newly allocated eptdev in the default
endpoint's priv pointer before calling rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add(). If
rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add() then fails, its error path frees eptdev while
the default endpoint may still dispatch callbacks with the stale priv
pointer.
Avoid publishing eptdev through the default endpoint until
rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add() succeeds. Messages received before the priv
pointer is published should be ignored by rpmsg_ept_cb(). Flow-control
updates can hit rpmsg_ept_flow_cb() in the same window, so make both
callbacks return success when priv is NULL.
Fixes: bc69d1066569 ("rpmsg: char: Introduce the "rpmsg-raw" channel")
Signed-off-by: Yuho Choi <dbgh9129@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601183247.1962010-1-dbgh9129@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c
+++ b/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c
@@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ static int rpmsg_ept_cb(struct rpmsg_dev
struct rpmsg_eptdev *eptdev = priv;
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ if (!eptdev)
+ return 0;
+
skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -124,6 +127,9 @@ static int rpmsg_ept_flow_cb(struct rpms
{
struct rpmsg_eptdev *eptdev = priv;
+ if (!eptdev)
+ return 0;
+
eptdev->remote_flow_restricted = enable;
eptdev->remote_flow_updated = true;
@@ -490,6 +496,7 @@ static int rpmsg_chrdev_probe(struct rpm
struct rpmsg_channel_info chinfo;
struct rpmsg_eptdev *eptdev;
struct device *dev = &rpdev->dev;
+ int ret;
memcpy(chinfo.name, rpdev->id.name, RPMSG_NAME_SIZE);
chinfo.src = rpdev->src;
@@ -502,13 +509,17 @@ static int rpmsg_chrdev_probe(struct rpm
/* Set the default_ept to the rpmsg device endpoint */
eptdev->default_ept = rpdev->ept;
+ ret = rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add(eptdev, chinfo);
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
/*
* The rpmsg_ept_cb uses *priv parameter to get its rpmsg_eptdev context.
- * Storedit in default_ept *priv field.
+ * Stored it in default_ept *priv field.
*/
eptdev->default_ept->priv = eptdev;
- return rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add(eptdev, chinfo);
+ return 0;
}
static void rpmsg_chrdev_remove(struct rpmsg_device *rpdev)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 154/175] ocfs2: reject oversized group bitmap descriptors
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (152 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 153/175] rpmsg: char: Fix use-after-free on probe error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 155/175] 9p: avoid putting oldfid in p9_client_walk() error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Zhang Cen, Joseph Qi, Mark Fasheh,
Joel Becker, Junxiao Bi, Changwei Ge, Jun Piao, Heming Zhao,
Andrew Morton
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
commit 9bd541e09dffff27e5bec0f9f45b0228173a5375 upstream.
ocfs2_validate_gd_parent() only bounds bg_bits against the parent
allocator's chain geometry. A malicious descriptor can still claim a
bg_size/bg_bits pair that exceeds the bitmap bytes that physically fit in
the group descriptor block, so later bitmap scans and bit updates can run
past bg_bitmap.
Add a physical-cap check based on ocfs2_group_bitmap_size() for the parent
allocator type and reject descriptors whose bg_size or bg_bits exceed that
capacity. Keep the existing chain geometry check so both the on-disk
bitmap layout and the allocator metadata must agree before the descriptor
is used.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN use-after-free in _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0
Read of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?)
_find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 (?:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?)
ocfs2_find_max_contig_free_bits+0x35/0x70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1375)
ocfs2_block_group_set_bits+0x472/0x4b0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1457)
ocfs2_cluster_group_search+0x16b/0x440 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:86)
ocfs2_bg_discontig_fix_result+0x1ef/0x230 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1786)
ocfs2_search_chain+0x8f8/0x10a0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1886)
get_page_from_freelist+0x70e/0x2370 (?:?)
lock_release+0xc6/0x290 (?:?)
do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 (?:?)
kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 (?:?)
__bfs+0x147/0x240 (?:?)
get_page_from_freelist+0x83d/0x2370 (?:?)
ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits+0x38c/0xe70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:96)
sched_domains_numa_masks_clear+0x70/0xd0 (?:?)
check_irq_usage+0xe8/0xb70 (?:?)
__ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x18d/0x4c0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:2497)
check_path+0x24/0x50 (?:?)
rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 (?:?)
check_prev_add+0xfd/0xd00 (?:?)
ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree+0x17d/0x810 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
__folio_batch_add_and_move+0x1f5/0x3d0 (?:?)
ocfs2_add_inode_data+0xd9/0x120 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
filemap_add_folio+0x105/0x1f0 (?:?)
ocfs2_write_begin_nolock+0x29f7/0x2f80 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:3043)
ocfs2_read_inode_block+0xb5/0x110 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
down_write+0xf5/0x180 (?:?)
ocfs2_write_begin+0x180/0x240 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
__mark_inode_dirty+0x758/0x9a0 (?:?)
inode_to_bdi+0x41/0x90 (?:?)
balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited_flags+0xf8/0x1d0 (?:?)
generic_perform_write+0x252/0x440 (?:?)
mnt_put_write_access_file+0x16/0x70 (?:?)
file_update_time_flags+0xe4/0x200 (?:?)
ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x80a/0x1320 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
lock_acquire+0x184/0x2f0 (?:?)
ksys_write+0xd2/0x170 (?:?)
apparmor_file_permission+0xf5/0x310 (?:?)
read_zero+0x8d/0x140 (?:?)
lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 (?:?)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260524111248.1429884-1-rollkingzzc@gmail.com
Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c
@@ -201,8 +201,16 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_gd_parent(stru
int resize)
{
unsigned int max_bits;
+ unsigned int max_bitmap_bits;
+ unsigned int max_bitmap_size;
+ int suballocator;
struct ocfs2_group_desc *gd = (struct ocfs2_group_desc *)bh->b_data;
+ suballocator = le64_to_cpu(di->i_blkno) != OCFS2_SB(sb)->bitmap_blkno;
+ max_bitmap_size = ocfs2_group_bitmap_size(sb, suballocator,
+ OCFS2_SB(sb)->s_feature_incompat);
+ max_bitmap_bits = max_bitmap_size * 8;
+
if (di->i_blkno != gd->bg_parent_dinode) {
do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bad parent pointer (%llu, expected %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
@@ -210,6 +218,20 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_gd_parent(stru
(unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(di->i_blkno));
}
+ if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_size) > max_bitmap_size) {
+ do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bitmap size %u but physical max of %u\n",
+ (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+ le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_size),
+ max_bitmap_size);
+ }
+
+ if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits) > max_bitmap_bits) {
+ do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bit count %u but physical max of %u\n",
+ (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+ le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits),
+ max_bitmap_bits);
+ }
+
max_bits = le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_chain.cl_cpg) * le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_chain.cl_bpc);
if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits) > max_bits) {
do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bit count of %u\n",
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 155/175] 9p: avoid putting oldfid in p9_client_walk() error path
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (153 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 154/175] ocfs2: reject oversized group bitmap descriptors Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 156/175] MIPS: smp: report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Yuxiang Yang, Ao Wang, Xuewei Feng,
Qi Li, Ke Xu, Yizhou Zhao, Dominique Martinet
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yizhou Zhao <zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
commit 1a3860d46e3eb47dbd60339783cdad7904486b9f upstream.
When p9_client_walk() is called with clone set to false, fid aliases
oldfid. If the walk subsequently fails after the request has been sent,
the error path jumps to clunk_fid, which currently calls p9_fid_put(fid)
unconditionally.
This drops a reference to oldfid even though ownership of oldfid remains
with the caller. If this is the last reference, oldfid can be clunked and
destroyed while the caller still expects it to be valid. A later use or
put of oldfid can then trigger a use-after-free or refcount underflow.
Fix this by only putting fid in the clunk_fid error path when it does not
alias oldfid, matching the existing guard in the error path below.
This can be triggered when a multi-component walk is split into multiple
p9_client_walk() calls and a later non-cloning walk fails. A reproducer
and refcount warning logs are available on request.
Fixes: b48dbb998d70 ("9p fid refcount: add p9_fid_get/put wrappers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuxiang Yang <yangyx22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Ao Wang <wangao@seu.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Xuewei Feng <fengxw06@126.com>
Reported-by: Qi Li <qli01@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Ke Xu <xuke@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: GLM 5.1
Signed-off-by: Yizhou Zhao <zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Message-ID: <20260528053918.53550-1-zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/9p/client.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/9p/client.c
+++ b/net/9p/client.c
@@ -1214,7 +1214,8 @@ struct p9_fid *p9_client_walk(struct p9_
clunk_fid:
kfree(wqids);
- p9_fid_put(fid);
+ if (fid != oldfid)
+ p9_fid_put(fid);
fid = NULL;
error:
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 156/175] MIPS: smp: report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (154 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 155/175] 9p: avoid putting oldfid in p9_client_walk() error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 157/175] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Bound the bank index when querying sparse banks Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jonas Jelonek, Thomas Bogendoerfer
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jonas Jelonek <jelonek.jonas@gmail.com>
commit 9f3f3bdc6d9dac1a5a8262ee7ad0f2ff1527a7e7 upstream.
smp_send_stop() parks all secondary CPUs in stop_this_cpu(). The function
marks the CPU offline for the scheduler via set_cpu_online(false) but
never informs RCU, so RCU keeps expecting a quiescent state from CPUs
that are now spinning forever with interrupts disabled.
As long as nothing waits for an RCU grace period after smp_send_stop()
this is harmless, which is why it went unnoticed. Since commit
91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT")
however, irq_work_sync() calls synchronize_rcu() on architectures without
an irq_work self-IPI, i.e. where arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() returns
false. That is the asm-generic default used by MIPS. Any irq_work_sync()
issued in the reboot/shutdown path after smp_send_stop() then blocks on
a grace period that can never complete, hanging the reboot:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15 at kernel/irq_work.c:144 irq_work_queue_on
...
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
rcu: Offline CPU 1 blocking current GP.
rcu: Offline CPU 2 blocking current GP.
rcu: Offline CPU 3 blocking current GP.
This issue was noticed on several Realtek MIPS switch SoCs (MIPS
interAptiv) and came up during kernel bump downstream in OpenWrt from
6.18.33 to 6.18.34, after the backport of the patch to the 6.18 stable
branch. The patch also has been backported all the way back to 6.1.
Call rcutree_report_cpu_dead() once interrupts are disabled, mirroring the
generic CPU-hotplug offline path, so RCU stops waiting on the parked CPUs
and grace periods can still complete. MIPS shuts down all CPUs here
without going through the CPU-hotplug mechanism, so this report is not
otherwise issued. Reporting a dying CPU to RCU outside the regular hotplug
offline path is not unprecedented: arm64 does the same in cpu_die_early().
There it is an exception for a CPU that was coming online and is aborting
bringup, rather than the default shutdown action as on MIPS.
Fixes: 91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonas Jelonek <jelonek.jonas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/smp.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/smp.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/ftrace.h>
#include <linux/irqdomain.h>
@@ -410,6 +411,7 @@ static void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)
set_cpu_online(smp_processor_id(), false);
calculate_cpu_foreign_map();
local_irq_disable();
+ rcutree_report_cpu_dead();
while (1);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 157/175] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Bound the bank index when querying sparse banks
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (155 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 156/175] MIPS: smp: report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 158/175] KVM: SVM: Fix page overflow in sev_dbg_crypt() for ENCRYPT path Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Hyunwoo Kim, Vitaly Kuznetsov,
Sean Christopherson
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
commit 4721f8160f17554b003e8928bb61e6c9b2fe92a3 upstream.
When checking if a VP ID is included in a sparse bank set, explicitly check
that the ID can actually be contained in a sparse bank (the TLFS allows for
a maximum of 64 banks of 64 vCPUs each). When handling a paravirtual TLB
flush for L2, the VP ID is copied verbatim from the enlightened VMCS,
without any bounds check, i.e. isn't guaranteed to be under the limit of
4096.
Failure to check the bounds of the VP ID leads to an out-of-bounds read
when testing the sparse bank, and super strictly speaking could lead to KVM
performing an unnecessary TLB flush for an L2 vCPU.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811ba5f598 by task hyperv_evmcs/2802
CPU: 12 UID: 1000 PID: 2802 Comm: hyperv_evmcs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2 #7 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60
print_report+0xcb/0x5d0
kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0
kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm]
kvm_hv_flush_tlb+0xe9e/0x16c0 [kvm]
kvm_hv_hypercall+0xe6b/0x1e60 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x485/0x1b60 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x22e3/0x5070 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5d0/0x10c0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0
do_syscall_64+0xb9/0xcf0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f0e62d1a9bf
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffffffffffffffff pfn:0x11ba5f
flags: 0x4000000000000000(zone=1)
raw: 4000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
raw: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88811ba5f480: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88811ba5f500: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff88811ba5f580: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff88811ba5f600: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88811ba5f680: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Opportunistically add a compile time assertion to ensure the maximum number
of sparse banks exactly matches the number of possible bits in the passed
in mask.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c58a318f6090 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: L2 TLB flush")
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aiQyZIJtO-2Aj_xN@v4bel
[sean: add KASAN splat, drop comment, add assert, massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -1787,6 +1787,11 @@ static bool hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set(u32 v
int valid_bit_nr = vp_id / HV_VCPUS_PER_SPARSE_BANK;
unsigned long sbank;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(BITS_PER_TYPE(valid_bank_mask) != HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_BANKS);
+
+ if (valid_bit_nr >= HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_BANKS)
+ return false;
+
if (!test_bit(valid_bit_nr, (unsigned long *)&valid_bank_mask))
return false;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 158/175] KVM: SVM: Fix page overflow in sev_dbg_crypt() for ENCRYPT path
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (156 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 157/175] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Bound the bank index when querying sparse banks Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 159/175] power: reset: linkstation-poweroff: fix use-after-free in the linkstation_poweroff_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Ashutosh Desai, Sean Christopherson
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ashutosh Desai <ashutoshdesai993@gmail.com>
commit 78ee2d50185a037b3d2452a97f3dad69c3f7f389 upstream.
In sev_dbg_crypt(), the per-iteration transfer length is bounded by
the source page offset (PAGE_SIZE - s_off) but not by the destination
page offset (PAGE_SIZE - d_off). When d_off > s_off, the encrypt
path (__sev_dbg_encrypt_user) performs a read-modify-write using a
single-page intermediate buffer (dst_tpage):
1. __sev_dbg_decrypt() expands the size to round_up(len + (d_off & 15), 16)
before issuing the PSP command. If len + (d_off & 15) > PAGE_SIZE,
the PSP writes beyond the end of the 4096-byte dst_tpage allocation.
2. The subsequent memcpy()/copy_from_user() into
page_address(dst_tpage) + (d_off & 15) of 'len' bytes overflows
by up to 15 bytes under the same condition.
Trigger example: s_off = 0, d_off = 1, debug.len = PAGE_SIZE -
the PSP is instructed to write round_up(4097, 16) = 4112 bytes to
a 4096-byte buffer.
Fix by also bounding len by (PAGE_SIZE - d_off), the same check that
sev_send_update_data() already performs for its single-page guest
region.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd]
Write of size 4095 at addr ff110062293bb009 by task sev_dbg_test/228214
CPU: 96 UID: 0 PID: 228214 Comm: sev_dbg_test Tainted: G U W 7.0.0-smp--5ce9b0c48211-dbg #156 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN
Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20250817.1-0 08/25/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70
print_report+0xbc/0x260
kasan_report+0xa2/0xd0
kasan_check_range+0x25f/0x2c0
__asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70
sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd]
sev_mem_enc_ioctl+0x33c/0x450 [kvm_amd]
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x65d/0x6d0 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xb2/0x100
do_syscall_64+0xe8/0x870
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7fe72b6a0 pfn:0x62293bb
memcg:ff11000112827d82
flags: 0x1400000000000000(node=1|zone=1)
raw: 1400000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 00000007fe72b6a0 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ff11000112827d82
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ff110062293bbf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ff110062293bbf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ff110062293bc000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ff110062293bc080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ff110062293bc100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Fixes: 24f41fb23a39 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command")
Fixes: 7d1594f5d94b ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Desai <ashutoshdesai993@gmail.com>
[sean: add sample KASAN splat, Fixes, and stable@]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260501203537.2120074-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -1004,6 +1004,7 @@ static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm
s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
+ len = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE - d_off);
if (dec)
ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 159/175] power: reset: linkstation-poweroff: fix use-after-free in the linkstation_poweroff_init()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (157 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:20 ` [PATCH 6.6 158/175] KVM: SVM: Fix page overflow in sev_dbg_crypt() for ENCRYPT path Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 160/175] fbdev: Fix fb_new_modelist to prevent null-ptr-deref in fb_videomode_to_var Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Wentao Liang, Sebastian Reichel
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
commit 8eec545cde69e46e9a1d2b7d915ce4f5df85b3bd upstream.
Move of_node_put(dn) after the of_match_node() call, which still needs
the node pointer. The node reference is correctly released after use.
Fixes: e2f471efe1d6 ("power: reset: linkstation-poweroff: prepare for new devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407073025.271865-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/power/reset/linkstation-poweroff.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/power/reset/linkstation-poweroff.c
+++ b/drivers/power/reset/linkstation-poweroff.c
@@ -163,10 +163,10 @@ static int __init linkstation_poweroff_i
dn = of_find_matching_node(NULL, ls_poweroff_of_match);
if (!dn)
return -ENODEV;
- of_node_put(dn);
match = of_match_node(ls_poweroff_of_match, dn);
cfg = match->data;
+ of_node_put(dn);
dn = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, cfg->mdio_node_name);
if (!dn)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 160/175] fbdev: Fix fb_new_modelist to prevent null-ptr-deref in fb_videomode_to_var
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (158 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 159/175] power: reset: linkstation-poweroff: fix use-after-free in the linkstation_poweroff_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 161/175] fbdev: modedb: fix a possible UAF in fb_find_mode() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Ian Bridges, Helge Deller
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
commit 7f08fc10fa3d3366dc3af723970bd03d7d6d10e3 upstream.
info->var, a framebuffer's current mode, is expected to have a matching
entry in info->modelist. var_to_display() relies on this and treats a
failed fb_match_mode() as "This should not happen". fb_set_var() keeps it
true by adding the mode to the list on every change, and
do_register_framebuffer() does the same at registration.
store_modes() replaces the modelist from userspace. fb_new_modelist()
validates the new modes but does not check that info->var still has a
match. It relies on fbcon_new_modelist() to re-point consoles, but that
only handles consoles mapped to the framebuffer. With fbcon unbound there
are none, so info->var is left describing a mode that is no longer in the
list.
A later console takeover runs var_to_display(), where fb_match_mode()
returns NULL and leaves fb_display[i].mode NULL. fbcon_switch() passes it
to display_to_var(), and fb_videomode_to_var() dereferences the NULL mode.
Keep the current mode in the list in fb_new_modelist(), the same way
fb_set_var() does.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c
@@ -1190,6 +1190,18 @@ int fb_new_modelist(struct fb_info *info
if (list_empty(&info->modelist))
return 1;
+ /*
+ * The new modelist may not contain the current mode (info->var), and
+ * fbcon_new_modelist() below only re-points consoles mapped to this
+ * framebuffer. Add the current mode here so info->var keeps a match
+ * even when fbcon is unbound.
+ */
+ if (!fb_match_mode(&info->var, &info->modelist)) {
+ fb_var_to_videomode(&mode, &info->var);
+ if (fb_add_videomode(&mode, &info->modelist))
+ return 1;
+ }
+
fbcon_new_modelist(info);
return 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 161/175] fbdev: modedb: fix a possible UAF in fb_find_mode()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (159 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 160/175] fbdev: Fix fb_new_modelist to prevent null-ptr-deref in fb_videomode_to_var Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 162/175] fbdev: modedb: Fix misaligned fields in the 1920x1080-60 mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Tuo Li, Helge Deller
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tuo Li <islituo@gmail.com>
commit 85b6256469cebdac395e7447147e06b2e151014f upstream.
If mode_option is NULL, it is assigned from mode_option_buf:
if (!mode_option) {
fb_get_options(NULL, &mode_option_buf);
mode_option = mode_option_buf;
}
Later, name is assigned from mode_option:
const char *name = mode_option;
However, mode_option_buf is freed before name is no longer used:
kfree(mode_option_buf);
while name is still accessed by:
if ((name_matches(db[i], name, namelen) ||
Since name aliases mode_option_buf, this may result in a
use-after-free.
Fix this by extending the lifetime of mode_option_buf until the end of the
function by using scope-based resource management for cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Tuo Li <islituo@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c
@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ int fb_find_mode(struct fb_var_screeninf
const struct fb_videomode *default_mode,
unsigned int default_bpp)
{
- char *mode_option_buf = NULL;
+ char *mode_option_buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
int i;
/* Set up defaults */
@@ -723,7 +723,6 @@ int fb_find_mode(struct fb_var_screeninf
res_specified = 1;
}
done:
- kfree(mode_option_buf);
if (cvt) {
struct fb_videomode cvt_mode;
int ret;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 162/175] fbdev: modedb: Fix misaligned fields in the 1920x1080-60 mode
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (160 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 161/175] fbdev: modedb: fix a possible UAF in fb_find_mode() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 163/175] NFSD: Fix SECINFO_NO_NAME decode error cleanup Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Steffen Persvold, Helge Deller
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steffen Persvold <spersvold@gmail.com>
commit d894c48a57d78206e4df9c90d4acfaf39394806a upstream.
The 1920x1080@60 modedb entry has one too many initializers before
its sync field: a stray "0" occupies the sync slot, which shifts the
remaining values by one field. The entry therefore decodes as
sync = 0, vmode = FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT | FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT (0x3,
i.e. FB_VMODE_INTERLACED | FB_VMODE_DOUBLE), and flag =
FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, instead of the intended sync = positive H/V,
vmode = non-interlaced.
fb_find_mode() then returns a 1920x1080 mode flagged as interlaced +
doublescan with active-low syncs. Drivers that honour var->vmode and
var->sync when programming display timing enable doublescan and the
wrong sync polarity, corrupting the output.
Drop the stray initializer so sync and vmode hold their intended
values (positive H/V sync, non-interlaced), matching the adjacent
1920x1200 entry.
Fixes: c8902258b2b8 ("fbdev: modedb: Add 1920x1080 at 60 Hz video mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steffen Persvold <spersvold@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static const struct fb_videomode modedb[
FB_VMODE_DOUBLE },
/* 1920x1080 @ 60 Hz, 67.3 kHz hsync */
- { NULL, 60, 1920, 1080, 6734, 148, 88, 36, 4, 44, 5, 0,
+ { NULL, 60, 1920, 1080, 6734, 148, 88, 36, 4, 44, 5,
FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT | FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT,
FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED },
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 163/175] NFSD: Fix SECINFO_NO_NAME decode error cleanup
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (161 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 162/175] fbdev: modedb: Fix misaligned fields in the 1920x1080-60 mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 164/175] nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Guannan Wang, Chuck Lever
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guannan Wang <wgnbuaa@gmail.com>
commit 9e18e83b8846a5c3fe13fc8a464b4865d33996c6 upstream.
nfsd4_decode_secinfo_no_name() currently initializes sin_exp after
decoding sin_style. If the XDR stream is truncated, the decoder returns
nfserr_bad_xdr before sin_exp is initialized.
Since commit 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct
nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing"), the inline iops array is not
cleared between RPC calls. A failed SECINFO_NO_NAME decode can therefore
leave sin_exp holding stale union contents from a previous operation.
The error response path still invokes nfsd4_secinfo_no_name_release(),
which calls exp_put() on a non-NULL sin_exp.
Initialize sin_exp before the first failable decode step, matching
nfsd4_decode_secinfo().
Fixes: 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guannan Wang <wgnbuaa@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -1821,10 +1821,11 @@ static __be32 nfsd4_decode_secinfo_no_na
union nfsd4_op_u *u)
{
struct nfsd4_secinfo_no_name *sin = &u->secinfo_no_name;
+
+ sin->sin_exp = NULL;
if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(argp->xdr, &sin->sin_style) < 0)
return nfserr_bad_xdr;
- sin->sin_exp = NULL;
return nfs_ok;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 164/175] nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (162 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 163/175] NFSD: Fix SECINFO_NO_NAME decode error cleanup Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 165/175] nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jeff Layton, Chuck Lever
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
commit 0853ac544c590880d797b04daa33fcb72b6be0e1 upstream.
nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() and nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() each
call nfs_stream_decode_acl() twice, first for NFS_ACL and then for
NFS_DFACL. Each successful call transfers ownership of a freshly
allocated posix_acl into argp->acl_access or argp->acl_default. If
the first call succeeds but the second fails, the decoder returns
false and argp->acl_access is left dangling.
ACLPROC2_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfssvc_release_attrstat and
ACLPROC3_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfs3svc_release_fhandle.
Both only call fh_put() and have no knowledge of the ACL fields on
argp. The posix_acl_release() pairs sat at the out: labels inside
nfsacld_proc_setacl() and nfsd3_proc_setacl(), but svc_process()
skips pc_func when pc_decode returns false, so that cleanup is
unreachable on decode failure:
svc_process_common()
pc_decode() /* decode_setaclargs: false */
/* pc_func skipped */
pc_release() /* fh_put only -- ACLs leaked */
The orphaned posix_acl is leaked for the lifetime of the server.
Fix by adding nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() and nfs3svc_release_setacl(),
which release both argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default in addition
to fh_put(), and wiring them as pc_release for their respective SETACL
procedures. pc_release runs on every path svc_process() takes after
decode, including decode failure, so the posix_acl_release() pairs are
removed from the proc functions' out: labels to keep ownership in one
place. This matches the existing release_getacl() pattern used by
the sibling GETACL procedures.
Fixes: a257cdd0e217 ("[PATCH] NFSD: Add server support for NFSv3 ACLs.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
@@ -131,10 +131,7 @@ static __be32 nfsacld_proc_setacl(struct
resp->status = fh_getattr(fh, &resp->stat);
out:
- /* argp->acl_{access,default} may have been allocated in
- nfssvc_decode_setaclargs. */
- posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
- posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
+ /* argp->acl_{access,default} are released in nfsaclsvc_release_setacl. */
return rpc_success;
out_drop_lock:
@@ -312,6 +309,16 @@ static void nfsaclsvc_release_access(str
struct nfsd3_voidargs { int dummy; };
+static void nfsaclsvc_release_setacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ struct nfsd3_setaclargs *argp = rqstp->rq_argp;
+ struct nfsd_attrstat *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
+
+ fh_put(&resp->fh);
+ posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
+ posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
+}
+
#define ST 1 /* status*/
#define AT 21 /* attributes */
#define pAT (1+AT) /* post attributes - conditional */
@@ -345,7 +352,7 @@ static const struct svc_procedure nfsd_a
.pc_func = nfsacld_proc_setacl,
.pc_decode = nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs,
.pc_encode = nfssvc_encode_attrstatres,
- .pc_release = nfssvc_release_attrstat,
+ .pc_release = nfsaclsvc_release_setacl,
.pc_argsize = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs),
.pc_argzero = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs),
.pc_ressize = sizeof(struct nfsd_attrstat),
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c
@@ -118,10 +118,7 @@ out_drop_lock:
out_errno:
resp->status = nfserrno(error);
out:
- /* argp->acl_{access,default} may have been allocated in
- nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs. */
- posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
- posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
+ /* argp->acl_{access,default} are released in nfs3svc_release_setacl. */
return rpc_success;
}
@@ -225,6 +222,16 @@ static void nfs3svc_release_getacl(struc
struct nfsd3_voidargs { int dummy; };
+static void nfs3svc_release_setacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ struct nfsd3_setaclargs *argp = rqstp->rq_argp;
+ struct nfsd3_attrstat *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
+
+ fh_put(&resp->fh);
+ posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
+ posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
+}
+
#define ST 1 /* status*/
#define AT 21 /* attributes */
#define pAT (1+AT) /* post attributes - conditional */
@@ -258,7 +265,7 @@ static const struct svc_procedure nfsd_a
.pc_func = nfsd3_proc_setacl,
.pc_decode = nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs,
.pc_encode = nfs3svc_encode_setaclres,
- .pc_release = nfs3svc_release_fhandle,
+ .pc_release = nfs3svc_release_setacl,
.pc_argsize = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs),
.pc_argzero = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs),
.pc_ressize = sizeof(struct nfsd3_attrstat),
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 165/175] nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (163 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 164/175] nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 166/175] NFSv4/pNFS: reject zero-length r_addr in nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Dominik Woźniak, Jeff Layton,
Chuck Lever
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dominik Woźniak <stalion@gmail.com>
commit e186fa1c057f5eccb22afb1e83e34c0627085868 upstream.
In __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(), the get_user() that reads
princhashlen from the userspace cld_msg_v2 buffer does not check its
return value. A failing copy leaves princhashlen with uninitialised
stack contents, which are then used to drive memdup_user() and stored
as princhash.len on the resulting reclaim record. The other get_user()
calls in this function all check the return; only this one is missed,
which is most likely a copy-paste oversight from when v2 upcalls were
introduced.
Mirror the existing pattern used a few lines above for namelen.
namecopy is declared with __free(kfree) so the early return cleans up
the already-allocated buffer automatically.
Fixes: 6ee95d1c8991 ("nfsd: add support for upcall version 2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dominik Woźniak <stalion@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
@@ -815,7 +815,8 @@ __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(const str
if (IS_ERR(name.data))
return PTR_ERR(name.data);
name.len = namelen;
- get_user(princhashlen, &ci->cc_princhash.cp_len);
+ if (get_user(princhashlen, &ci->cc_princhash.cp_len))
+ return -EFAULT;
if (princhashlen > 0) {
princhash.data = memdup_user(
&ci->cc_princhash.cp_data,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 166/175] NFSv4/pNFS: reject zero-length r_addr in nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (164 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 165/175] nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 167/175] NFS: Prevent resource leak in nfs_alloc_server() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Michael Bommarito, Anna Schumaker
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
commit 41fe0f7b84f0cb822ae10ab08592996a592b2a25 upstream.
nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr() decodes the r_netid and r_addr opaques of a
netaddr4 from a GETDEVICEINFO multipath-DS body, then immediately
calls strrchr(buf, '.') to locate the port separator. Both decodes
use xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(), and the current code checks only
"nlen < 0" / "rlen < 0" before dereferencing the returned string.
When the on-wire opaque has length zero, xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline()
returns 0 and xdr_stream_decode_string_dup() falls through to its
"*str = NULL; return ret" tail, leaving buf NULL with a return value
of 0. The "< 0" check does not catch this, and the next line is
strrchr(NULL, '.'), a kernel NULL pointer dereference reachable from
any pNFS-flexfile client mounted against a malicious or compromised
metadata server.
Reject the zero-length cases explicitly so the decoder fails with
-EBADMSG (treated as a malformed GETDEVICEINFO body) instead of
panicking the client.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6b7f3cf96364 ("nfs41: pull decode_ds_addr from file layout to generic pnfs")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c
@@ -1102,14 +1102,14 @@ nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr(struct net *net,
/* r_netid */
nlen = xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(xdr, &netid, XDR_MAX_NETOBJ,
gfp_flags);
- if (unlikely(nlen < 0))
+ if (unlikely(nlen <= 0))
goto out_err;
/* r_addr: ip/ip6addr with port in dec octets - see RFC 5665 */
/* port is ".ABC.DEF", 8 chars max */
rlen = xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(xdr, &buf, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN +
IPV6_SCOPE_ID_LEN + 8, gfp_flags);
- if (unlikely(rlen < 0))
+ if (unlikely(rlen <= 0))
goto out_free_netid;
/* replace port '.' with '-' */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 167/175] NFS: Prevent resource leak in nfs_alloc_server()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (165 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 166/175] NFSv4/pNFS: reject zero-length r_addr in nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 168/175] ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christophe Jaillet, Markus Elfring,
Anna Schumaker
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
commit d189f224308c8ac3feeea8e442c99922bd18f1b2 upstream.
It was overlooked to call ida_free() after a failed nfs_alloc_iostats() call.
Thus add the missed function call in an if branch.
Fixes: 1c7251187dc067a6d460cf33ca67da9c1dd87807 ("NFS: add superblock sysfs entries")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christophe Jaillet <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/1c8e10c9-def7-4f0d-8aa1-23c8035a38c8@wanadoo.fr/
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/nfs/client.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/fs/nfs/client.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/client.c
@@ -1046,6 +1046,7 @@ struct nfs_server *nfs_alloc_server(void
server->io_stats = nfs_alloc_iostats();
if (!server->io_stats) {
+ ida_free(&s_sysfs_ids, server->s_sysfs_id);
kfree(server);
return NULL;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 168/175] ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (166 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 167/175] NFS: Prevent resource leak in nfs_alloc_server() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 169/175] serial: qcom_geni: Fix RX DMA stall when SE_DMA_RX_LEN_IN is zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Hem Parekh, Namjae Jeon,
Steve French
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hem Parekh <hemparekh1596@gmail.com>
commit 1ef06004ed4bd6d3ed8c840d9d1a376b66d4935b upstream.
The permission-check ACE walk in smb_check_perm_dacl() validates the ACE
header size and caps sid.num_subauth at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES, but it
never checks that ace->size is actually large enough to contain
num_subauth sub-authorities before compare_sids() dereferences them.
CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE covers the SID header up to but excluding the
sub_auth[] array, and offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) is the ACE header,
so the existing guards only guarantee the 8-byte SID base, i.e. zero
sub-authorities. compare_sids() then reads ace->sid.sub_auth[i] for
i < min(local_sid->num_subauth, ace->sid.num_subauth). The local
comparison SIDs (sid_everyone, sid_unix_NFS_mode, and the id_to_sid()
result) always have at least one sub-authority, and an attacker controls
the ACE revision and authority bytes (which lie within the in-bounds SID
base), so they can match one of those SIDs and force the sub_auth read.
A crafted ACE with size == 16 and num_subauth >= 1 placed at the tail of
the security descriptor therefore causes a heap out-of-bounds read of up
to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * sizeof(__le32) bytes past the pntsd
allocation. The security descriptor is loaded by ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr()
into a buffer sized exactly to the on-disk data (kzalloc(sd_size) in
ndr_decode_v4_ntacl()), so the read lands past the allocation. The
malformed descriptor can be stored verbatim via SMB2_SET_INFO (the DACL
is not normalised before being written to the security.NTACL xattr) and
the read fires on a subsequent SMB2_CREATE access check, making this
reachable by an authenticated client on a share that uses ACL xattrs.
Add the missing num_subauth-versus-ace_size check, mirroring the
identical guards already present in the sibling parsers parse_dacl() and
smb_inherit_dacl().
Fixes: d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hem Parekh <hemparekh1596@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
@@ -1419,7 +1419,9 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con
break;
aces_size -= ace_size;
- if (ace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
+ if (ace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES ||
+ ace_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE +
+ sizeof(__le32) * ace->sid.num_subauth)
break;
if (!compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid) ||
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 169/175] serial: qcom_geni: Fix RX DMA stall when SE_DMA_RX_LEN_IN is zero
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (167 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 168/175] ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 170/175] serial: 8250_dw: unregister 8250 port if clk_notifier_register() fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Bartosz Golaszewski, Viken Dadhaniya,
Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Viken Dadhaniya <viken.dadhaniya@oss.qualcomm.com>
[ Upstream commit b93062b6d8a1b2d9bad235cac25558a909819026 ]
In qcom_geni_serial_handle_rx_dma(), geni_se_rx_dma_unprep() clears
port->rx_dma_addr before SE_DMA_RX_LEN_IN is read. If the register is zero,
for example when the RX stale counter fires on an idle line, the handler
returns without calling geni_se_rx_dma_prep().
The next RX DMA interrupt then hits the !port->rx_dma_addr guard and
returns immediately, so the RX DMA buffer is never rearmed and later input
is lost.
Keep the handler on the rearm path when rx_in is zero. Warn about the
unexpected zero-length DMA completion, skip received-data handling, and
always call geni_se_rx_dma_prep().
Fixes: 2aaa43c70778 ("tty: serial: qcom-geni-serial: add support for serial engine DMA")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Viken Dadhaniya <viken.dadhaniya@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260528-serial-rx-0-byte-fix-v2-1-b4195cfe342f@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c | 9 +++------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c
@@ -838,12 +838,9 @@ static void qcom_geni_serial_handle_rx_d
port->rx_dma_addr = 0;
rx_in = readl(uport->membase + SE_DMA_RX_LEN_IN);
- if (!rx_in) {
- dev_warn(uport->dev, "serial engine reports 0 RX bytes in!\n");
- return;
- }
-
- if (!drop)
+ if (!rx_in)
+ dev_warn_ratelimited(uport->dev, "serial engine reports 0 RX bytes in!\n");
+ else if (!drop)
handle_rx_uart(uport, rx_in, drop);
ret = geni_se_rx_dma_prep(&port->se, port->rx_buf,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 170/175] serial: 8250_dw: unregister 8250 port if clk_notifier_register() fails
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (168 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 169/175] serial: qcom_geni: Fix RX DMA stall when SE_DMA_RX_LEN_IN is zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 171/175] drivers/base/memory: set mem->altmap after successful device registration Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Stepan Ionichev, Andy Shevchenko,
Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stepan Ionichev <sozdayvek@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 10fc708b4de7f86002d2d735a2dbf3b5b7f65692 ]
dw8250_probe() registers the 8250 port via serial8250_register_8250_port()
and then, if the device has a clock, registers a clock notifier. If
clk_notifier_register() fails, probe returns the error but leaves the
8250 port registered. The matching serial8250_unregister_port() lives
in dw8250_remove(), which is not called when probe fails, so the port
slot stays occupied until the device is rebound or the system is
rebooted. The devm-allocated driver data is freed while the port still
references it (via the saved private_data and serial_in/serial_out
callbacks), so any access to that port slot before a rebind is a
use-after-free hazard.
Unregister the port on the clk_notifier_register() error path.
Fixes: cc816969d7b5 ("serial: 8250_dw: Fix common clocks usage race condition")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stepan Ionichev <sozdayvek@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260514143746.23671-2-sozdayvek@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c
@@ -688,8 +688,10 @@ static int dw8250_probe(struct platform_
*/
if (data->clk) {
err = clk_notifier_register(data->clk, &data->clk_notifier);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ serial8250_unregister_port(data->data.line);
return dev_err_probe(dev, err, "Failed to set the clock notifier\n");
+ }
queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &data->clk_work);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 171/175] drivers/base/memory: set mem->altmap after successful device registration
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (169 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 170/175] serial: 8250_dw: unregister 8250 port if clk_notifier_register() fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 172/175] Documentation: ioctl-number: Extend "Include File" column width Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Georgi Djakov, Oscar Salvador (SUSE),
Vishal Verma, Mike Rapoport, Richard Cheng, David Hildenbrand,
Georgi Djakov, Rafael J. Wysocki, Andrew Morton, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Georgi Djakov <georgi.djakov@oss.qualcomm.com>
[ Upstream commit a2b8d7827f48ee54a686cb80e4a1d0ff954ec42a ]
If __add_memory_block() fails at xa_store() (under memory pressure for
example), device_unregister() is called, which eventually triggers
memory_block_release() with mem->altmap still set, causing a
WARN_ON(mem->altmap). This was triggered by modifying virtio-mem driver.
Fix this by delaying the assignment of mem->altmap until after
__add_memory_block() has succeeded.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260514092657.3057141-1-georgi.djakov@oss.qualcomm.com
Fixes: 1a8c64e11043 ("mm/memory_hotplug: embed vmem_altmap details in memory block")
Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov <georgi.djakov@oss.qualcomm.com>
Acked-by: Oscar Salvador (SUSE) <osalvador@kernel.org>
Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Cheng <icheng@nvidia.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>
Cc: Georgi Djakov <djakov@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/base/memory.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/base/memory.c
+++ b/drivers/base/memory.c
@@ -773,7 +773,6 @@ static int add_memory_block(unsigned lon
mem->start_section_nr = block_id * sections_per_block;
mem->state = state;
mem->nid = NUMA_NO_NODE;
- mem->altmap = altmap;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mem->group_next);
#ifndef CONFIG_NUMA
@@ -791,6 +790,8 @@ static int add_memory_block(unsigned lon
if (ret)
return ret;
+ mem->altmap = altmap;
+
if (group) {
mem->group = group;
list_add(&mem->group_next, &group->memory_blocks);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 172/175] Documentation: ioctl-number: Extend "Include File" column width
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (170 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 171/175] drivers/base/memory: set mem->altmap after successful device registration Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 173/175] crypto: qat - Replace kzalloc() + copy_from_user() with memdup_user() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Haren Myneni, Bagas Sanjaya,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Jonathan Corbet, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 15afd5def819e4df2a29cef6fcfa6ae7ba167c0f ]
Extend width of "Include File" column to fit full path to
papr-physical-attestation.h in later commit.
Reviewed-by: Haren Myneni <haren@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250714015711.14525-3-bagasdotme@gmail.com
Stable-dep-of: d237230728c5 ("crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst | 464 ++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 232 insertions(+), 232 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
@@ -66,17 +66,17 @@ This table lists ioctls visible from use
most drivers up to 2.6.31, but I know I am missing some. There has been
no attempt to list non-X86 architectures or ioctls from drivers/staging/.
-==== ===== ======================================================= ================================================================
-Code Seq# Include File Comments
+==== ===== ========================================================= ================================================================
+Code Seq# Include File Comments
(hex)
-==== ===== ======================================================= ================================================================
-0x00 00-1F linux/fs.h conflict!
-0x00 00-1F scsi/scsi_ioctl.h conflict!
-0x00 00-1F linux/fb.h conflict!
-0x00 00-1F linux/wavefront.h conflict!
+==== ===== ========================================================= ================================================================
+0x00 00-1F linux/fs.h conflict!
+0x00 00-1F scsi/scsi_ioctl.h conflict!
+0x00 00-1F linux/fb.h conflict!
+0x00 00-1F linux/wavefront.h conflict!
0x02 all linux/fd.h
0x03 all linux/hdreg.h
-0x04 D2-DC linux/umsdos_fs.h Dead since 2.6.11, but don't reuse these.
+0x04 D2-DC linux/umsdos_fs.h Dead since 2.6.11, but don't reuse these.
0x06 all linux/lp.h
0x09 all linux/raid/md_u.h
0x10 00-0F drivers/char/s390/vmcp.h
@@ -84,299 +84,299 @@ Code Seq# Include File
0x10 20-2F arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/hypfs.h
0x12 all linux/fs.h
linux/blkpg.h
-0x1b all InfiniBand Subsystem
- <http://infiniband.sourceforge.net/>
+0x1b all InfiniBand Subsystem
+ <http://infiniband.sourceforge.net/>
0x20 all drivers/cdrom/cm206.h
0x22 all scsi/sg.h
-0x3E 00-0F linux/counter.h <mailto:linux-iio@vger.kernel.org>
+0x3E 00-0F linux/counter.h <mailto:linux-iio@vger.kernel.org>
'!' 00-1F uapi/linux/seccomp.h
-'#' 00-3F IEEE 1394 Subsystem
- Block for the entire subsystem
+'#' 00-3F IEEE 1394 Subsystem
+ Block for the entire subsystem
'$' 00-0F linux/perf_counter.h, linux/perf_event.h
-'%' 00-0F include/uapi/linux/stm.h System Trace Module subsystem
- <mailto:alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
+'%' 00-0F include/uapi/linux/stm.h System Trace Module subsystem
+ <mailto:alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
'&' 00-07 drivers/firewire/nosy-user.h
-'1' 00-1F linux/timepps.h PPS kit from Ulrich Windl
- <ftp://ftp.de.kernel.org/pub/linux/daemons/ntp/PPS/>
+'1' 00-1F linux/timepps.h PPS kit from Ulrich Windl
+ <ftp://ftp.de.kernel.org/pub/linux/daemons/ntp/PPS/>
'2' 01-04 linux/i2o.h
-'3' 00-0F drivers/s390/char/raw3270.h conflict!
-'3' 00-1F linux/suspend_ioctls.h, conflict!
+'3' 00-0F drivers/s390/char/raw3270.h conflict!
+'3' 00-1F linux/suspend_ioctls.h, conflict!
kernel/power/user.c
-'8' all SNP8023 advanced NIC card
- <mailto:mcr@solidum.com>
+'8' all SNP8023 advanced NIC card
+ <mailto:mcr@solidum.com>
';' 64-7F linux/vfio.h
';' 80-FF linux/iommufd.h
-'=' 00-3f uapi/linux/ptp_clock.h <mailto:richardcochran@gmail.com>
-'@' 00-0F linux/radeonfb.h conflict!
-'@' 00-0F drivers/video/aty/aty128fb.c conflict!
-'A' 00-1F linux/apm_bios.h conflict!
-'A' 00-0F linux/agpgart.h, conflict!
+'=' 00-3f uapi/linux/ptp_clock.h <mailto:richardcochran@gmail.com>
+'@' 00-0F linux/radeonfb.h conflict!
+'@' 00-0F drivers/video/aty/aty128fb.c conflict!
+'A' 00-1F linux/apm_bios.h conflict!
+'A' 00-0F linux/agpgart.h, conflict!
drivers/char/agp/compat_ioctl.h
-'A' 00-7F sound/asound.h conflict!
-'B' 00-1F linux/cciss_ioctl.h conflict!
-'B' 00-0F include/linux/pmu.h conflict!
-'B' C0-FF advanced bbus <mailto:maassen@uni-freiburg.de>
-'B' 00-0F xen/xenbus_dev.h conflict!
-'C' all linux/soundcard.h conflict!
-'C' 01-2F linux/capi.h conflict!
-'C' F0-FF drivers/net/wan/cosa.h conflict!
+'A' 00-7F sound/asound.h conflict!
+'B' 00-1F linux/cciss_ioctl.h conflict!
+'B' 00-0F include/linux/pmu.h conflict!
+'B' C0-FF advanced bbus <mailto:maassen@uni-freiburg.de>
+'B' 00-0F xen/xenbus_dev.h conflict!
+'C' all linux/soundcard.h conflict!
+'C' 01-2F linux/capi.h conflict!
+'C' F0-FF drivers/net/wan/cosa.h conflict!
'D' all arch/s390/include/asm/dasd.h
-'D' 40-5F drivers/scsi/dpt/dtpi_ioctl.h Dead since 2022
+'D' 40-5F drivers/scsi/dpt/dtpi_ioctl.h Dead since 2022
'D' 05 drivers/scsi/pmcraid.h
-'E' all linux/input.h conflict!
-'E' 00-0F xen/evtchn.h conflict!
-'F' all linux/fb.h conflict!
-'F' 01-02 drivers/scsi/pmcraid.h conflict!
-'F' 20 drivers/video/fsl-diu-fb.h conflict!
-'F' 20 drivers/video/intelfb/intelfb.h conflict!
-'F' 20 linux/ivtvfb.h conflict!
-'F' 20 linux/matroxfb.h conflict!
-'F' 20 drivers/video/aty/atyfb_base.c conflict!
-'F' 00-0F video/da8xx-fb.h conflict!
-'F' 80-8F linux/arcfb.h conflict!
-'F' DD video/sstfb.h conflict!
-'G' 00-3F drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grulib.h conflict!
-'G' 00-0F xen/gntalloc.h, xen/gntdev.h conflict!
-'H' 00-7F linux/hiddev.h conflict!
-'H' 00-0F linux/hidraw.h conflict!
-'H' 01 linux/mei.h conflict!
-'H' 02 linux/mei.h conflict!
-'H' 03 linux/mei.h conflict!
-'H' 00-0F sound/asound.h conflict!
-'H' 20-40 sound/asound_fm.h conflict!
-'H' 80-8F sound/sfnt_info.h conflict!
-'H' 10-8F sound/emu10k1.h conflict!
-'H' 10-1F sound/sb16_csp.h conflict!
-'H' 10-1F sound/hda_hwdep.h conflict!
-'H' 40-4F sound/hdspm.h conflict!
-'H' 40-4F sound/hdsp.h conflict!
+'E' all linux/input.h conflict!
+'E' 00-0F xen/evtchn.h conflict!
+'F' all linux/fb.h conflict!
+'F' 01-02 drivers/scsi/pmcraid.h conflict!
+'F' 20 drivers/video/fsl-diu-fb.h conflict!
+'F' 20 drivers/video/intelfb/intelfb.h conflict!
+'F' 20 linux/ivtvfb.h conflict!
+'F' 20 linux/matroxfb.h conflict!
+'F' 20 drivers/video/aty/atyfb_base.c conflict!
+'F' 00-0F video/da8xx-fb.h conflict!
+'F' 80-8F linux/arcfb.h conflict!
+'F' DD video/sstfb.h conflict!
+'G' 00-3F drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grulib.h conflict!
+'G' 00-0F xen/gntalloc.h, xen/gntdev.h conflict!
+'H' 00-7F linux/hiddev.h conflict!
+'H' 00-0F linux/hidraw.h conflict!
+'H' 01 linux/mei.h conflict!
+'H' 02 linux/mei.h conflict!
+'H' 03 linux/mei.h conflict!
+'H' 00-0F sound/asound.h conflict!
+'H' 20-40 sound/asound_fm.h conflict!
+'H' 80-8F sound/sfnt_info.h conflict!
+'H' 10-8F sound/emu10k1.h conflict!
+'H' 10-1F sound/sb16_csp.h conflict!
+'H' 10-1F sound/hda_hwdep.h conflict!
+'H' 40-4F sound/hdspm.h conflict!
+'H' 40-4F sound/hdsp.h conflict!
'H' 90 sound/usb/usx2y/usb_stream.h
-'H' 00-0F uapi/misc/habanalabs.h conflict!
+'H' 00-0F uapi/misc/habanalabs.h conflict!
'H' A0 uapi/linux/usb/cdc-wdm.h
-'H' C0-F0 net/bluetooth/hci.h conflict!
-'H' C0-DF net/bluetooth/hidp/hidp.h conflict!
-'H' C0-DF net/bluetooth/cmtp/cmtp.h conflict!
-'H' C0-DF net/bluetooth/bnep/bnep.h conflict!
-'H' F1 linux/hid-roccat.h <mailto:erazor_de@users.sourceforge.net>
+'H' C0-F0 net/bluetooth/hci.h conflict!
+'H' C0-DF net/bluetooth/hidp/hidp.h conflict!
+'H' C0-DF net/bluetooth/cmtp/cmtp.h conflict!
+'H' C0-DF net/bluetooth/bnep/bnep.h conflict!
+'H' F1 linux/hid-roccat.h <mailto:erazor_de@users.sourceforge.net>
'H' F8-FA sound/firewire.h
-'I' all linux/isdn.h conflict!
-'I' 00-0F drivers/isdn/divert/isdn_divert.h conflict!
-'I' 40-4F linux/mISDNif.h conflict!
+'I' all linux/isdn.h conflict!
+'I' 00-0F drivers/isdn/divert/isdn_divert.h conflict!
+'I' 40-4F linux/mISDNif.h conflict!
'K' all linux/kd.h
-'L' 00-1F linux/loop.h conflict!
-'L' 10-1F drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.h conflict!
-'L' E0-FF linux/ppdd.h encrypted disk device driver
- <http://linux01.gwdg.de/~alatham/ppdd.html>
-'M' all linux/soundcard.h conflict!
-'M' 01-16 mtd/mtd-abi.h conflict!
+'L' 00-1F linux/loop.h conflict!
+'L' 10-1F drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.h conflict!
+'L' E0-FF linux/ppdd.h encrypted disk device driver
+ <http://linux01.gwdg.de/~alatham/ppdd.html>
+'M' all linux/soundcard.h conflict!
+'M' 01-16 mtd/mtd-abi.h conflict!
and drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c
'M' 01-03 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas.h
-'M' 00-0F drivers/video/fsl-diu-fb.h conflict!
+'M' 00-0F drivers/video/fsl-diu-fb.h conflict!
'N' 00-1F drivers/usb/scanner.h
'N' 40-7F drivers/block/nvme.c
-'O' 00-06 mtd/ubi-user.h UBI
-'P' all linux/soundcard.h conflict!
-'P' 60-6F sound/sscape_ioctl.h conflict!
-'P' 00-0F drivers/usb/class/usblp.c conflict!
-'P' 01-09 drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c conflict!
-'P' 00-0F xen/privcmd.h conflict!
-'P' 00-05 linux/tps6594_pfsm.h conflict!
+'O' 00-06 mtd/ubi-user.h UBI
+'P' all linux/soundcard.h conflict!
+'P' 60-6F sound/sscape_ioctl.h conflict!
+'P' 00-0F drivers/usb/class/usblp.c conflict!
+'P' 01-09 drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c conflict!
+'P' 00-0F xen/privcmd.h conflict!
+'P' 00-05 linux/tps6594_pfsm.h conflict!
'Q' all linux/soundcard.h
-'R' 00-1F linux/random.h conflict!
-'R' 01 linux/rfkill.h conflict!
+'R' 00-1F linux/random.h conflict!
+'R' 01 linux/rfkill.h conflict!
'R' C0-DF net/bluetooth/rfcomm.h
'R' E0 uapi/linux/fsl_mc.h
-'S' all linux/cdrom.h conflict!
-'S' 80-81 scsi/scsi_ioctl.h conflict!
-'S' 82-FF scsi/scsi.h conflict!
-'S' 00-7F sound/asequencer.h conflict!
-'T' all linux/soundcard.h conflict!
-'T' 00-AF sound/asound.h conflict!
-'T' all arch/x86/include/asm/ioctls.h conflict!
-'T' C0-DF linux/if_tun.h conflict!
-'U' all sound/asound.h conflict!
-'U' 00-CF linux/uinput.h conflict!
+'S' all linux/cdrom.h conflict!
+'S' 80-81 scsi/scsi_ioctl.h conflict!
+'S' 82-FF scsi/scsi.h conflict!
+'S' 00-7F sound/asequencer.h conflict!
+'T' all linux/soundcard.h conflict!
+'T' 00-AF sound/asound.h conflict!
+'T' all arch/x86/include/asm/ioctls.h conflict!
+'T' C0-DF linux/if_tun.h conflict!
+'U' all sound/asound.h conflict!
+'U' 00-CF linux/uinput.h conflict!
'U' 00-EF linux/usbdevice_fs.h
'U' C0-CF drivers/bluetooth/hci_uart.h
-'V' all linux/vt.h conflict!
-'V' all linux/videodev2.h conflict!
-'V' C0 linux/ivtvfb.h conflict!
-'V' C0 linux/ivtv.h conflict!
-'V' C0 media/si4713.h conflict!
-'W' 00-1F linux/watchdog.h conflict!
-'W' 00-1F linux/wanrouter.h conflict! (pre 3.9)
-'W' 00-3F sound/asound.h conflict!
+'V' all linux/vt.h conflict!
+'V' all linux/videodev2.h conflict!
+'V' C0 linux/ivtvfb.h conflict!
+'V' C0 linux/ivtv.h conflict!
+'V' C0 media/si4713.h conflict!
+'W' 00-1F linux/watchdog.h conflict!
+'W' 00-1F linux/wanrouter.h conflict! (pre 3.9)
+'W' 00-3F sound/asound.h conflict!
'W' 40-5F drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c
'W' 60-61 linux/watch_queue.h
-'X' all fs/xfs/xfs_fs.h, conflict!
+'X' all fs/xfs/xfs_fs.h, conflict!
fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_ioctl32.h,
include/linux/falloc.h,
linux/fs.h,
-'X' all fs/ocfs2/ocfs_fs.h conflict!
-'X' 01 linux/pktcdvd.h conflict!
+'X' all fs/ocfs2/ocfs_fs.h conflict!
+'X' 01 linux/pktcdvd.h conflict!
'Z' 14-15 drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.h
-'[' 00-3F linux/usb/tmc.h USB Test and Measurement Devices
- <mailto:gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-'a' all linux/atm*.h, linux/sonet.h ATM on linux
- <http://lrcwww.epfl.ch/>
-'a' 00-0F drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h conflict! qat driver
-'b' 00-FF conflict! bit3 vme host bridge
- <mailto:natalia@nikhefk.nikhef.nl>
-'b' 00-0F linux/dma-buf.h conflict!
-'c' 00-7F linux/comstats.h conflict!
-'c' 00-7F linux/coda.h conflict!
-'c' 00-1F linux/chio.h conflict!
-'c' 80-9F arch/s390/include/asm/chsc.h conflict!
+'[' 00-3F linux/usb/tmc.h USB Test and Measurement Devices
+ <mailto:gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+'a' all linux/atm*.h, linux/sonet.h ATM on linux
+ <http://lrcwww.epfl.ch/>
+'a' 00-0F drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h conflict! qat driver
+'b' 00-FF conflict! bit3 vme host bridge
+ <mailto:natalia@nikhefk.nikhef.nl>
+'b' 00-0F linux/dma-buf.h conflict!
+'c' 00-7F linux/comstats.h conflict!
+'c' 00-7F linux/coda.h conflict!
+'c' 00-1F linux/chio.h conflict!
+'c' 80-9F arch/s390/include/asm/chsc.h conflict!
'c' A0-AF arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h conflict!
-'d' 00-FF linux/char/drm/drm.h conflict!
-'d' 02-40 pcmcia/ds.h conflict!
+'d' 00-FF linux/char/drm/drm.h conflict!
+'d' 02-40 pcmcia/ds.h conflict!
'd' F0-FF linux/digi1.h
-'e' all linux/digi1.h conflict!
-'f' 00-1F linux/ext2_fs.h conflict!
-'f' 00-1F linux/ext3_fs.h conflict!
-'f' 00-0F fs/jfs/jfs_dinode.h conflict!
-'f' 00-0F fs/ext4/ext4.h conflict!
-'f' 00-0F linux/fs.h conflict!
-'f' 00-0F fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h conflict!
+'e' all linux/digi1.h conflict!
+'f' 00-1F linux/ext2_fs.h conflict!
+'f' 00-1F linux/ext3_fs.h conflict!
+'f' 00-0F fs/jfs/jfs_dinode.h conflict!
+'f' 00-0F fs/ext4/ext4.h conflict!
+'f' 00-0F linux/fs.h conflict!
+'f' 00-0F fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h conflict!
'f' 13-27 linux/fscrypt.h
'f' 81-8F linux/fsverity.h
'g' 00-0F linux/usb/gadgetfs.h
'g' 20-2F linux/usb/g_printer.h
-'h' 00-7F conflict! Charon filesystem
- <mailto:zapman@interlan.net>
-'h' 00-1F linux/hpet.h conflict!
+'h' 00-7F conflict! Charon filesystem
+ <mailto:zapman@interlan.net>
+'h' 00-1F linux/hpet.h conflict!
'h' 80-8F fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c
-'i' 00-3F linux/i2o-dev.h conflict!
-'i' 0B-1F linux/ipmi.h conflict!
+'i' 00-3F linux/i2o-dev.h conflict!
+'i' 0B-1F linux/ipmi.h conflict!
'i' 80-8F linux/i8k.h
-'i' 90-9F `linux/iio/*.h` IIO
+'i' 90-9F `linux/iio/*.h` IIO
'j' 00-3F linux/joystick.h
-'k' 00-0F linux/spi/spidev.h conflict!
-'k' 00-05 video/kyro.h conflict!
-'k' 10-17 linux/hsi/hsi_char.h HSI character device
-'l' 00-3F linux/tcfs_fs.h transparent cryptographic file system
- <http://web.archive.org/web/%2A/http://mikonos.dia.unisa.it/tcfs>
-'l' 40-7F linux/udf_fs_i.h in development:
- <https://github.com/pali/udftools>
-'m' 00-09 linux/mmtimer.h conflict!
-'m' all linux/mtio.h conflict!
-'m' all linux/soundcard.h conflict!
-'m' all linux/synclink.h conflict!
-'m' 00-19 drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.h conflict!
-'m' 00 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_ioctl.h conflict!
+'k' 00-0F linux/spi/spidev.h conflict!
+'k' 00-05 video/kyro.h conflict!
+'k' 10-17 linux/hsi/hsi_char.h HSI character device
+'l' 00-3F linux/tcfs_fs.h transparent cryptographic file system
+ <http://web.archive.org/web/%2A/http://mikonos.dia.unisa.it/tcfs>
+'l' 40-7F linux/udf_fs_i.h in development:
+ <https://github.com/pali/udftools>
+'m' 00-09 linux/mmtimer.h conflict!
+'m' all linux/mtio.h conflict!
+'m' all linux/soundcard.h conflict!
+'m' all linux/synclink.h conflict!
+'m' 00-19 drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.h conflict!
+'m' 00 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_ioctl.h conflict!
'n' 00-7F linux/ncp_fs.h and fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c
-'n' 80-8F uapi/linux/nilfs2_api.h NILFS2
-'n' E0-FF linux/matroxfb.h matroxfb
-'o' 00-1F fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h OCFS2
-'o' 00-03 mtd/ubi-user.h conflict! (OCFS2 and UBI overlaps)
-'o' 40-41 mtd/ubi-user.h UBI
-'o' 01-A1 `linux/dvb/*.h` DVB
-'p' 00-0F linux/phantom.h conflict! (OpenHaptics needs this)
-'p' 00-1F linux/rtc.h conflict!
+'n' 80-8F uapi/linux/nilfs2_api.h NILFS2
+'n' E0-FF linux/matroxfb.h matroxfb
+'o' 00-1F fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h OCFS2
+'o' 00-03 mtd/ubi-user.h conflict! (OCFS2 and UBI overlaps)
+'o' 40-41 mtd/ubi-user.h UBI
+'o' 01-A1 `linux/dvb/*.h` DVB
+'p' 00-0F linux/phantom.h conflict! (OpenHaptics needs this)
+'p' 00-1F linux/rtc.h conflict!
'p' 40-7F linux/nvram.h
-'p' 80-9F linux/ppdev.h user-space parport
- <mailto:tim@cyberelk.net>
-'p' A1-A5 linux/pps.h LinuxPPS
- <mailto:giometti@linux.it>
+'p' 80-9F linux/ppdev.h user-space parport
+ <mailto:tim@cyberelk.net>
+'p' A1-A5 linux/pps.h LinuxPPS
+ <mailto:giometti@linux.it>
'q' 00-1F linux/serio.h
-'q' 80-FF linux/telephony.h Internet PhoneJACK, Internet LineJACK
- linux/ixjuser.h <http://web.archive.org/web/%2A/http://www.quicknet.net>
+'q' 80-FF linux/telephony.h Internet PhoneJACK, Internet LineJACK
+ linux/ixjuser.h <http://web.archive.org/web/%2A/http://www.quicknet.net>
'r' 00-1F linux/msdos_fs.h and fs/fat/dir.c
's' all linux/cdk.h
't' 00-7F linux/ppp-ioctl.h
't' 80-8F linux/isdn_ppp.h
-'t' 90-91 linux/toshiba.h toshiba and toshiba_acpi SMM
-'u' 00-1F linux/smb_fs.h gone
-'u' 20-3F linux/uvcvideo.h USB video class host driver
-'u' 40-4f linux/udmabuf.h userspace dma-buf misc device
-'v' 00-1F linux/ext2_fs.h conflict!
-'v' 00-1F linux/fs.h conflict!
-'v' 00-0F linux/sonypi.h conflict!
-'v' 00-0F media/v4l2-subdev.h conflict!
-'v' 20-27 arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/vas-api.h VAS API
-'v' C0-FF linux/meye.h conflict!
-'w' all CERN SCI driver
-'y' 00-1F packet based user level communications
- <mailto:zapman@interlan.net>
-'z' 00-3F CAN bus card conflict!
- <mailto:hdstich@connectu.ulm.circular.de>
-'z' 40-7F CAN bus card conflict!
- <mailto:oe@port.de>
-'z' 10-4F drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h conflict!
+'t' 90-91 linux/toshiba.h toshiba and toshiba_acpi SMM
+'u' 00-1F linux/smb_fs.h gone
+'u' 20-3F linux/uvcvideo.h USB video class host driver
+'u' 40-4f linux/udmabuf.h userspace dma-buf misc device
+'v' 00-1F linux/ext2_fs.h conflict!
+'v' 00-1F linux/fs.h conflict!
+'v' 00-0F linux/sonypi.h conflict!
+'v' 00-0F media/v4l2-subdev.h conflict!
+'v' 20-27 arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/vas-api.h VAS API
+'v' C0-FF linux/meye.h conflict!
+'w' all CERN SCI driver
+'y' 00-1F packet based user level communications
+ <mailto:zapman@interlan.net>
+'z' 00-3F CAN bus card conflict!
+ <mailto:hdstich@connectu.ulm.circular.de>
+'z' 40-7F CAN bus card conflict!
+ <mailto:oe@port.de>
+'z' 10-4F drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h conflict!
'|' 00-7F linux/media.h
0x80 00-1F linux/fb.h
0x81 00-1F linux/vduse.h
0x89 00-06 arch/x86/include/asm/sockios.h
0x89 0B-DF linux/sockios.h
-0x89 E0-EF linux/sockios.h SIOCPROTOPRIVATE range
-0x89 F0-FF linux/sockios.h SIOCDEVPRIVATE range
+0x89 E0-EF linux/sockios.h SIOCPROTOPRIVATE range
+0x89 F0-FF linux/sockios.h SIOCDEVPRIVATE range
0x8B all linux/wireless.h
-0x8C 00-3F WiNRADiO driver
- <http://www.winradio.com.au/>
+0x8C 00-3F WiNRADiO driver
+ <http://www.winradio.com.au/>
0x90 00 drivers/cdrom/sbpcd.h
0x92 00-0F drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
0x93 60-7F linux/auto_fs.h
-0x94 all fs/btrfs/ioctl.h Btrfs filesystem
- and linux/fs.h some lifted to vfs/generic
-0x97 00-7F fs/ceph/ioctl.h Ceph file system
-0x99 00-0F 537-Addinboard driver
- <mailto:buk@buks.ipn.de>
-0xA0 all linux/sdp/sdp.h Industrial Device Project
- <mailto:kenji@bitgate.com>
-0xA1 0 linux/vtpm_proxy.h TPM Emulator Proxy Driver
-0xA2 all uapi/linux/acrn.h ACRN hypervisor
-0xA3 80-8F Port ACL in development:
- <mailto:tlewis@mindspring.com>
+0x94 all fs/btrfs/ioctl.h Btrfs filesystem
+ and linux/fs.h some lifted to vfs/generic
+0x97 00-7F fs/ceph/ioctl.h Ceph file system
+0x99 00-0F 537-Addinboard driver
+ <mailto:buk@buks.ipn.de>
+0xA0 all linux/sdp/sdp.h Industrial Device Project
+ <mailto:kenji@bitgate.com>
+0xA1 0 linux/vtpm_proxy.h TPM Emulator Proxy Driver
+0xA2 all uapi/linux/acrn.h ACRN hypervisor
+0xA3 80-8F Port ACL in development:
+ <mailto:tlewis@mindspring.com>
0xA3 90-9F linux/dtlk.h
-0xA4 00-1F uapi/linux/tee.h Generic TEE subsystem
-0xA4 00-1F uapi/asm/sgx.h <mailto:linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>
-0xA5 01-05 linux/surface_aggregator/cdev.h Microsoft Surface Platform System Aggregator
- <mailto:luzmaximilian@gmail.com>
-0xA5 20-2F linux/surface_aggregator/dtx.h Microsoft Surface DTX driver
- <mailto:luzmaximilian@gmail.com>
+0xA4 00-1F uapi/linux/tee.h Generic TEE subsystem
+0xA4 00-1F uapi/asm/sgx.h <mailto:linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>
+0xA5 01-05 linux/surface_aggregator/cdev.h Microsoft Surface Platform System Aggregator
+ <mailto:luzmaximilian@gmail.com>
+0xA5 20-2F linux/surface_aggregator/dtx.h Microsoft Surface DTX driver
+ <mailto:luzmaximilian@gmail.com>
0xAA 00-3F linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
0xAB 00-1F linux/nbd.h
0xAC 00-1F linux/raw.h
-0xAD 00 Netfilter device in development:
- <mailto:rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
-0xAE 00-1F linux/kvm.h Kernel-based Virtual Machine
- <mailto:kvm@vger.kernel.org>
-0xAE 40-FF linux/kvm.h Kernel-based Virtual Machine
- <mailto:kvm@vger.kernel.org>
-0xAE 20-3F linux/nitro_enclaves.h Nitro Enclaves
-0xAF 00-1F linux/fsl_hypervisor.h Freescale hypervisor
-0xB0 all RATIO devices in development:
- <mailto:vgo@ratio.de>
-0xB1 00-1F PPPoX
- <mailto:mostrows@styx.uwaterloo.ca>
+0xAD 00 Netfilter device in development:
+ <mailto:rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
+0xAE 00-1F linux/kvm.h Kernel-based Virtual Machine
+ <mailto:kvm@vger.kernel.org>
+0xAE 40-FF linux/kvm.h Kernel-based Virtual Machine
+ <mailto:kvm@vger.kernel.org>
+0xAE 20-3F linux/nitro_enclaves.h Nitro Enclaves
+0xAF 00-1F linux/fsl_hypervisor.h Freescale hypervisor
+0xB0 all RATIO devices in development:
+ <mailto:vgo@ratio.de>
+0xB1 00-1F PPPoX
+ <mailto:mostrows@styx.uwaterloo.ca>
0xB3 00 linux/mmc/ioctl.h
-0xB4 00-0F linux/gpio.h <mailto:linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org>
-0xB5 00-0F uapi/linux/rpmsg.h <mailto:linux-remoteproc@vger.kernel.org>
+0xB4 00-0F linux/gpio.h <mailto:linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org>
+0xB5 00-0F uapi/linux/rpmsg.h <mailto:linux-remoteproc@vger.kernel.org>
0xB6 all linux/fpga-dfl.h
-0xB7 all uapi/linux/remoteproc_cdev.h <mailto:linux-remoteproc@vger.kernel.org>
-0xB7 all uapi/linux/nsfs.h <mailto:Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>>
+0xB7 all uapi/linux/remoteproc_cdev.h <mailto:linux-remoteproc@vger.kernel.org>
+0xB7 all uapi/linux/nsfs.h <mailto:Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>>
0xC0 00-0F linux/usb/iowarrior.h
0xCA 00-0F uapi/misc/cxl.h
0xCA 10-2F uapi/misc/ocxl.h
0xCA 80-BF uapi/scsi/cxlflash_ioctl.h
-0xCB 00-1F CBM serial IEC bus in development:
- <mailto:michael.klein@puffin.lb.shuttle.de>
-0xCC 00-0F drivers/misc/ibmvmc.h pseries VMC driver
+0xCB 00-1F CBM serial IEC bus in development:
+ <mailto:michael.klein@puffin.lb.shuttle.de>
+0xCC 00-0F drivers/misc/ibmvmc.h pseries VMC driver
0xCD 01 linux/reiserfs_fs.h
-0xCE 01-02 uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h Compute Express Link Memory Devices
+0xCE 01-02 uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h Compute Express Link Memory Devices
0xCF 02 fs/smb/client/cifs_ioctl.h
0xDB 00-0F drivers/char/mwave/mwavepub.h
-0xDD 00-3F ZFCP device driver see drivers/s390/scsi/
- <mailto:aherrman@de.ibm.com>
+0xDD 00-3F ZFCP device driver see drivers/s390/scsi/
+ <mailto:aherrman@de.ibm.com>
0xE5 00-3F linux/fuse.h
-0xEC 00-01 drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_dev.h ChromeOS EC driver
-0xEE 00-09 uapi/linux/pfrut.h Platform Firmware Runtime Update and Telemetry
-0xF3 00-3F drivers/usb/misc/sisusbvga/sisusb.h sisfb (in development)
- <mailto:thomas@winischhofer.net>
-0xF6 all LTTng Linux Trace Toolkit Next Generation
- <mailto:mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
-0xF8 all arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/amd_hsmp.h AMD HSMP EPYC system management interface driver
- <mailto:nchatrad@amd.com>
+0xEC 00-01 drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_dev.h ChromeOS EC driver
+0xEE 00-09 uapi/linux/pfrut.h Platform Firmware Runtime Update and Telemetry
+0xF3 00-3F drivers/usb/misc/sisusbvga/sisusb.h sisfb (in development)
+ <mailto:thomas@winischhofer.net>
+0xF6 all LTTng Linux Trace Toolkit Next Generation
+ <mailto:mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+0xF8 all arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/amd_hsmp.h AMD HSMP EPYC system management interface driver
+ <mailto:nchatrad@amd.com>
0xFD all linux/dm-ioctl.h
0xFE all linux/isst_if.h
-==== ===== ======================================================= ================================================================
+==== ===== ========================================================= ================================================================
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 173/175] crypto: qat - Replace kzalloc() + copy_from_user() with memdup_user()
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (171 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 172/175] Documentation: ioctl-number: Extend "Include File" column width Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 174/175] crypto: qat - Return pointer directly in adf_ctl_alloc_resources Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Thorsten Blum, Herbert Xu,
Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
[ Upstream commit 1e26339703e2afd397037defa798682b2b93dcc0 ]
Replace kzalloc() followed by copy_from_user() with memdup_user() to
improve and simplify adf_ctl_alloc_resources(). memdup_user() returns
either -ENOMEM or -EFAULT (instead of -EIO) if an error occurs.
Remove the unnecessary device id initialization, since memdup_user()
(like copy_from_user()) immediately overwrites it.
No functional changes intended other than returning the more idiomatic
error code -EFAULT.
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: d237230728c5 ("crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c | 13 +++----------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
@@ -91,17 +91,10 @@ static int adf_ctl_alloc_resources(struc
{
struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *cfg_data;
- cfg_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*cfg_data), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cfg_data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- /* Initialize device id to NO DEVICE as 0 is a valid device id */
- cfg_data->device_id = ADF_CFG_NO_DEVICE;
-
- if (copy_from_user(cfg_data, (void __user *)arg, sizeof(*cfg_data))) {
+ cfg_data = memdup_user((void __user *)arg, sizeof(*cfg_data));
+ if (IS_ERR(cfg_data)) {
pr_err("QAT: failed to copy from user cfg_data.\n");
- kfree(cfg_data);
- return -EIO;
+ return PTR_ERR(cfg_data);
}
*ctl_data = cfg_data;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 174/175] crypto: qat - Return pointer directly in adf_ctl_alloc_resources
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (172 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 173/175] crypto: qat - Replace kzalloc() + copy_from_user() with memdup_user() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 175/175] crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Herbert Xu, Thorsten Blum,
Giovanni Cabiddu, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
[ Upstream commit 5ce9891ea928208a915411ce8227f8c3e37e5ad9 ]
Returning values through arguments is confusing and that has
upset the compiler with the recent change to memdup_user:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c: In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:308:26: warning: ‘ctl_data’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
308 | ctl_data->device_id);
| ^~
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:294:39: note: ‘ctl_data’ was declared here
294 | struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
| ^~~~~~~~
In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_stop’,
inlined from ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’ at ../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:386:9:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:273:48: warning: ‘ctl_data’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
273 | ret = adf_ctl_is_device_in_use(ctl_data->device_id);
| ~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c: In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:261:39: note: ‘ctl_data’ was declared here
261 | struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
| ^~~~~~~~
In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_config’,
inlined from ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’ at ../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:382:9:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:192:54: warning: ‘ctl_data’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
192 | accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id);
| ~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c: In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:185:39: note: ‘ctl_data’ was declared here
185 | struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
| ^~~~~~~~
Fix this by returning the pointer directly.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: d237230728c5 ("crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c | 31 +++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
@@ -86,19 +86,14 @@ err_chrdev_unreg:
return -EFAULT;
}
-static int adf_ctl_alloc_resources(struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data **ctl_data,
- unsigned long arg)
+static struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *adf_ctl_alloc_resources(unsigned long arg)
{
struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *cfg_data;
cfg_data = memdup_user((void __user *)arg, sizeof(*cfg_data));
- if (IS_ERR(cfg_data)) {
+ if (IS_ERR(cfg_data))
pr_err("QAT: failed to copy from user cfg_data.\n");
- return PTR_ERR(cfg_data);
- }
-
- *ctl_data = cfg_data;
- return 0;
+ return cfg_data;
}
static int adf_add_key_value_data(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
@@ -178,13 +173,13 @@ out_err:
static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_config(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
- int ret;
struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
+ int ret = 0;
- ret = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(&ctl_data, arg);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
+ if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
+ return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id);
if (!accel_dev) {
@@ -257,9 +252,9 @@ static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_stop(struct
int ret;
struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
- ret = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(&ctl_data, arg);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
+ if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
+ return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
if (adf_devmgr_verify_id(ctl_data->device_id)) {
pr_err("QAT: Device %d not found\n", ctl_data->device_id);
@@ -291,9 +286,9 @@ static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_start(struc
struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
- ret = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(&ctl_data, arg);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
+ if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
+ return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
ret = -ENODEV;
accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6 175/175] crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (173 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 174/175] crypto: qat - Return pointer directly in adf_ctl_alloc_resources Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-07-02 19:46 ` [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Brett A C Sheffield
` (8 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-07-02 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Zhi Wang, Bin Yu, MingYu Wang,
Giovanni Cabiddu, Ahsan Atta, Herbert Xu, Sasha Levin
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
[ Upstream commit d237230728c567297f2f98b425d63156ab2ed17f ]
The QAT driver exposes a character device (qat_adf_ctl) with IOCTLs
for device configuration, start, stop, status query and enumeration.
These IOCTLs are not part of any public uAPI header and have no known
in-tree or out-of-tree users. Device lifecycle is already managed via
sysfs.
The ioctl interface also increases the attack surface and is the
subject of a number of bug reports.
Remove the character device, the IOCTL definitions, and the related
data structures (adf_dev_status_info, adf_user_cfg_key_val,
adf_user_cfg_section, adf_user_cfg_ctl_data). Drop the now-unused
adf_cfg_user.h header and strip adf_ctl_drv.c down to the minimal
module_init/module_exit hooks for workqueue, AER, and crypto/compression
algorithm registration.
Clean up leftover dead code that was only reachable from the removed
IOCTL paths: adf_cfg_del_all(), adf_devmgr_verify_id(),
adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(), adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(),
adf_get_vf_real_id() and the unused ADF_CFG macros.
Additionally, drop the entry associated to QAT IOCTLs in
ioctl-number.rst.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d8cba25d2c68 ("crypto: qat - Intel(R) QAT driver framework")
Reported-by: Zhi Wang <wangzhi@stu.xidian.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Bin Yu <byu@xidian.edu.cn>
Reported-by: MingYu Wang <w15303746062@163.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/61d6d499.ab89.19b9b7f3186.Coremail.wangzhi_xd@stu.xidian.edu.cn/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260508034841.256794-1-w15303746062@163.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260508023542.256299-1-w15303746062@163.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260504025120.98242-1-w15303746062@163.com/
Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ahsan Atta <ahsan.atta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst | 1
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h | 32 -
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h | 38 -
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h | 3
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c | 401 -------------------
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c | 70 ---
6 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 544 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
@@ -219,7 +219,6 @@ Code Seq# Include File
<mailto:gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
'a' all linux/atm*.h, linux/sonet.h ATM on linux
<http://lrcwww.epfl.ch/>
-'a' 00-0F drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h conflict! qat driver
'b' 00-FF conflict! bit3 vme host bridge
<mailto:natalia@nikhefk.nikhef.nl>
'b' 00-0F linux/dma-buf.h conflict!
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h
@@ -4,18 +4,11 @@
#define ADF_CFG_COMMON_H_
#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/ioctl.h>
#define ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN 64
#define ADF_CFG_MAX_KEY_LEN_IN_BYTES ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN
#define ADF_CFG_MAX_VAL_LEN_IN_BYTES ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN
#define ADF_CFG_MAX_SECTION_LEN_IN_BYTES ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN
-#define ADF_CFG_BASE_DEC 10
-#define ADF_CFG_BASE_HEX 16
-#define ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES 0xFE
-#define ADF_CFG_NO_DEVICE 0xFF
-#define ADF_CFG_AFFINITY_WHATEVER 0xFF
-#define MAX_DEVICE_NAME_SIZE 32
#define ADF_MAX_DEVICES (32 * 32)
#define ADF_DEVS_ARRAY_SIZE BITS_TO_LONGS(ADF_MAX_DEVICES)
@@ -48,29 +41,4 @@ enum adf_device_type {
DEV_C3XXXVF,
DEV_4XXX,
};
-
-struct adf_dev_status_info {
- enum adf_device_type type;
- __u32 accel_id;
- __u32 instance_id;
- __u8 num_ae;
- __u8 num_accel;
- __u8 num_logical_accel;
- __u8 banks_per_accel;
- __u8 state;
- __u8 bus;
- __u8 dev;
- __u8 fun;
- char name[MAX_DEVICE_NAME_SIZE];
-};
-
-#define ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC 'a'
-#define IOCTL_CONFIG_SYS_RESOURCE_PARAMETERS _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 0, \
- struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data)
-#define IOCTL_STOP_ACCEL_DEV _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 1, \
- struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data)
-#define IOCTL_START_ACCEL_DEV _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 2, \
- struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data)
-#define IOCTL_STATUS_ACCEL_DEV _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 3, __u32)
-#define IOCTL_GET_NUM_DEVICES _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 4, __s32)
#endif
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (BSD-3-Clause OR GPL-2.0-only) */
-/* Copyright(c) 2014 - 2020 Intel Corporation */
-#ifndef ADF_CFG_USER_H_
-#define ADF_CFG_USER_H_
-
-#include "adf_cfg_common.h"
-#include "adf_cfg_strings.h"
-
-struct adf_user_cfg_key_val {
- char key[ADF_CFG_MAX_KEY_LEN_IN_BYTES];
- char val[ADF_CFG_MAX_VAL_LEN_IN_BYTES];
- union {
- struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *next;
- __u64 padding3;
- };
- enum adf_cfg_val_type type;
-} __packed;
-
-struct adf_user_cfg_section {
- char name[ADF_CFG_MAX_SECTION_LEN_IN_BYTES];
- union {
- struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *params;
- __u64 padding1;
- };
- union {
- struct adf_user_cfg_section *next;
- __u64 padding3;
- };
-} __packed;
-
-struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data {
- union {
- struct adf_user_cfg_section *config_section;
- __u64 padding;
- };
- __u8 device_id;
-} __packed;
-#endif
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h
@@ -65,11 +65,8 @@ int adf_devmgr_add_dev(struct adf_accel_
void adf_devmgr_rm_dev(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
struct adf_accel_dev *pf);
struct list_head *adf_devmgr_get_head(void);
-struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(u32 id);
struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_get_first(void);
struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev);
-int adf_devmgr_verify_id(u32 id);
-void adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(u32 *num);
int adf_devmgr_in_reset(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev);
int adf_dev_started(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev);
int adf_dev_restarting_notify(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev);
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
@@ -2,407 +2,13 @@
/* Copyright(c) 2014 - 2020 Intel Corporation */
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/mutex.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <linux/bitops.h>
-#include <linux/pci.h>
-#include <linux/cdev.h>
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
-#include "adf_accel_devices.h"
#include "adf_common_drv.h"
-#include "adf_cfg.h"
-#include "adf_cfg_common.h"
-#include "adf_cfg_user.h"
-
-#define ADF_CFG_MAX_SECTION 512
-#define ADF_CFG_MAX_KEY_VAL 256
-
-#define DEVICE_NAME "qat_adf_ctl"
-
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(adf_ctl_lock);
-static long adf_ctl_ioctl(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
-
-static const struct file_operations adf_ctl_ops = {
- .owner = THIS_MODULE,
- .unlocked_ioctl = adf_ctl_ioctl,
- .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
-};
-
-struct adf_ctl_drv_info {
- unsigned int major;
- struct cdev drv_cdev;
- struct class *drv_class;
-};
-
-static struct adf_ctl_drv_info adf_ctl_drv;
-
-static void adf_chr_drv_destroy(void)
-{
- device_destroy(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class, MKDEV(adf_ctl_drv.major, 0));
- cdev_del(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev);
- class_destroy(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class);
- unregister_chrdev_region(MKDEV(adf_ctl_drv.major, 0), 1);
-}
-
-static int adf_chr_drv_create(void)
-{
- dev_t dev_id;
- struct device *drv_device;
-
- if (alloc_chrdev_region(&dev_id, 0, 1, DEVICE_NAME)) {
- pr_err("QAT: unable to allocate chrdev region\n");
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- adf_ctl_drv.drv_class = class_create(DEVICE_NAME);
- if (IS_ERR(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class)) {
- pr_err("QAT: class_create failed for adf_ctl\n");
- goto err_chrdev_unreg;
- }
- adf_ctl_drv.major = MAJOR(dev_id);
- cdev_init(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev, &adf_ctl_ops);
- if (cdev_add(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev, dev_id, 1)) {
- pr_err("QAT: cdev add failed\n");
- goto err_class_destr;
- }
-
- drv_device = device_create(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class, NULL,
- MKDEV(adf_ctl_drv.major, 0),
- NULL, DEVICE_NAME);
- if (IS_ERR(drv_device)) {
- pr_err("QAT: failed to create device\n");
- goto err_cdev_del;
- }
- return 0;
-err_cdev_del:
- cdev_del(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev);
-err_class_destr:
- class_destroy(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class);
-err_chrdev_unreg:
- unregister_chrdev_region(dev_id, 1);
- return -EFAULT;
-}
-
-static struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *adf_ctl_alloc_resources(unsigned long arg)
-{
- struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *cfg_data;
-
- cfg_data = memdup_user((void __user *)arg, sizeof(*cfg_data));
- if (IS_ERR(cfg_data))
- pr_err("QAT: failed to copy from user cfg_data.\n");
- return cfg_data;
-}
-
-static int adf_add_key_value_data(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
- const char *section,
- const struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *key_val)
-{
- if (key_val->type == ADF_HEX) {
- long *ptr = (long *)key_val->val;
- long val = *ptr;
-
- if (adf_cfg_add_key_value_param(accel_dev, section,
- key_val->key, (void *)val,
- key_val->type)) {
- dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
- "failed to add hex keyvalue.\n");
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- } else {
- if (adf_cfg_add_key_value_param(accel_dev, section,
- key_val->key, key_val->val,
- key_val->type)) {
- dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
- "failed to add keyvalue.\n");
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int adf_copy_key_value_data(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
- struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data)
-{
- struct adf_user_cfg_key_val key_val;
- struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *params_head;
- struct adf_user_cfg_section section, *section_head;
- int i, j;
-
- section_head = ctl_data->config_section;
-
- for (i = 0; section_head && i < ADF_CFG_MAX_SECTION; i++) {
- if (copy_from_user(§ion, (void __user *)section_head,
- sizeof(*section_head))) {
- dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
- "failed to copy section info\n");
- goto out_err;
- }
-
- if (adf_cfg_section_add(accel_dev, section.name)) {
- dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
- "failed to add section.\n");
- goto out_err;
- }
-
- params_head = section.params;
-
- for (j = 0; params_head && j < ADF_CFG_MAX_KEY_VAL; j++) {
- if (copy_from_user(&key_val, (void __user *)params_head,
- sizeof(key_val))) {
- dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
- "Failed to copy keyvalue.\n");
- goto out_err;
- }
- if (adf_add_key_value_data(accel_dev, section.name,
- &key_val)) {
- goto out_err;
- }
- params_head = key_val.next;
- }
- section_head = section.next;
- }
- return 0;
-out_err:
- adf_cfg_del_all(accel_dev);
- return -EFAULT;
-}
-
-static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_config(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
- unsigned long arg)
-{
- struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
- struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
- int ret = 0;
-
- ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
- if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
- return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
-
- accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id);
- if (!accel_dev) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (adf_dev_started(accel_dev)) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (adf_copy_key_value_data(accel_dev, ctl_data)) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
- set_bit(ADF_STATUS_CONFIGURED, &accel_dev->status);
-out:
- kfree(ctl_data);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int adf_ctl_is_device_in_use(int id)
-{
- struct adf_accel_dev *dev;
-
- list_for_each_entry(dev, adf_devmgr_get_head(), list) {
- if (id == dev->accel_id || id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES) {
- if (adf_devmgr_in_reset(dev) || adf_dev_in_use(dev)) {
- dev_info(&GET_DEV(dev),
- "device qat_dev%d is busy\n",
- dev->accel_id);
- return -EBUSY;
- }
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void adf_ctl_stop_devices(u32 id)
-{
- struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
-
- list_for_each_entry(accel_dev, adf_devmgr_get_head(), list) {
- if (id == accel_dev->accel_id || id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES) {
- if (!adf_dev_started(accel_dev))
- continue;
-
- /* First stop all VFs */
- if (!accel_dev->is_vf)
- continue;
-
- adf_dev_down(accel_dev, false);
- }
- }
-
- list_for_each_entry(accel_dev, adf_devmgr_get_head(), list) {
- if (id == accel_dev->accel_id || id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES) {
- if (!adf_dev_started(accel_dev))
- continue;
-
- adf_dev_down(accel_dev, false);
- }
- }
-}
-
-static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_stop(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
- unsigned long arg)
-{
- int ret;
- struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
-
- ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
- if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
- return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
-
- if (adf_devmgr_verify_id(ctl_data->device_id)) {
- pr_err("QAT: Device %d not found\n", ctl_data->device_id);
- ret = -ENODEV;
- goto out;
- }
-
- ret = adf_ctl_is_device_in_use(ctl_data->device_id);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
-
- if (ctl_data->device_id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES)
- pr_info("QAT: Stopping all acceleration devices.\n");
- else
- pr_info("QAT: Stopping acceleration device qat_dev%d.\n",
- ctl_data->device_id);
-
- adf_ctl_stop_devices(ctl_data->device_id);
-
-out:
- kfree(ctl_data);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_start(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
- unsigned long arg)
-{
- int ret;
- struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
- struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
-
- ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
- if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
- return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
-
- ret = -ENODEV;
- accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id);
- if (!accel_dev)
- goto out;
-
- dev_info(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
- "Starting acceleration device qat_dev%d.\n",
- ctl_data->device_id);
-
- ret = adf_dev_up(accel_dev, false);
-
- if (ret) {
- dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "Failed to start qat_dev%d\n",
- ctl_data->device_id);
- adf_dev_down(accel_dev, false);
- }
-out:
- kfree(ctl_data);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int adf_ctl_ioctl_get_num_devices(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
- unsigned long arg)
-{
- u32 num_devices = 0;
-
- adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(&num_devices);
- if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &num_devices, sizeof(num_devices)))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int adf_ctl_ioctl_get_status(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
- unsigned long arg)
-{
- struct adf_hw_device_data *hw_data;
- struct adf_dev_status_info dev_info;
- struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
-
- if (copy_from_user(&dev_info, (void __user *)arg,
- sizeof(struct adf_dev_status_info))) {
- pr_err("QAT: failed to copy from user.\n");
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(dev_info.accel_id);
- if (!accel_dev)
- return -ENODEV;
-
- hw_data = accel_dev->hw_device;
- dev_info.state = adf_dev_started(accel_dev) ? DEV_UP : DEV_DOWN;
- dev_info.num_ae = hw_data->get_num_aes(hw_data);
- dev_info.num_accel = hw_data->get_num_accels(hw_data);
- dev_info.num_logical_accel = hw_data->num_logical_accel;
- dev_info.banks_per_accel = hw_data->num_banks
- / hw_data->num_logical_accel;
- strscpy(dev_info.name, hw_data->dev_class->name, sizeof(dev_info.name));
- dev_info.instance_id = hw_data->instance_id;
- dev_info.type = hw_data->dev_class->type;
- dev_info.bus = accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)->bus->number;
- dev_info.dev = PCI_SLOT(accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)->devfn);
- dev_info.fun = PCI_FUNC(accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)->devfn);
-
- if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &dev_info,
- sizeof(struct adf_dev_status_info))) {
- dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "failed to copy status.\n");
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static long adf_ctl_ioctl(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
-{
- int ret;
-
- if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&adf_ctl_lock))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case IOCTL_CONFIG_SYS_RESOURCE_PARAMETERS:
- ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_config(fp, cmd, arg);
- break;
-
- case IOCTL_STOP_ACCEL_DEV:
- ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_stop(fp, cmd, arg);
- break;
-
- case IOCTL_START_ACCEL_DEV:
- ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_start(fp, cmd, arg);
- break;
-
- case IOCTL_GET_NUM_DEVICES:
- ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_get_num_devices(fp, cmd, arg);
- break;
-
- case IOCTL_STATUS_ACCEL_DEV:
- ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_get_status(fp, cmd, arg);
- break;
- default:
- pr_err_ratelimited("QAT: Invalid ioctl %d\n", cmd);
- ret = -EFAULT;
- break;
- }
- mutex_unlock(&adf_ctl_lock);
- return ret;
-}
static int __init adf_register_ctl_device_driver(void)
{
- if (adf_chr_drv_create())
- goto err_chr_dev;
-
if (adf_init_misc_wq())
goto err_misc_wq;
@@ -434,15 +40,11 @@ err_pf_wq:
err_aer:
adf_exit_misc_wq();
err_misc_wq:
- adf_chr_drv_destroy();
-err_chr_dev:
- mutex_destroy(&adf_ctl_lock);
return -EFAULT;
}
static void __exit adf_unregister_ctl_device_driver(void)
{
- adf_chr_drv_destroy();
adf_exit_misc_wq();
adf_exit_aer();
adf_exit_vf_wq();
@@ -450,7 +52,6 @@ static void __exit adf_unregister_ctl_de
qat_crypto_unregister();
qat_compression_unregister();
adf_clean_vf_map(false);
- mutex_destroy(&adf_ctl_lock);
}
module_init(adf_register_ctl_device_driver);
--- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c
@@ -45,19 +45,6 @@ static struct vf_id_map *adf_find_vf(u32
return NULL;
}
-static int adf_get_vf_real_id(u32 fake)
-{
- struct list_head *itr;
-
- list_for_each(itr, &vfs_table) {
- struct vf_id_map *ptr =
- list_entry(itr, struct vf_id_map, list);
- if (ptr->fake_id == fake)
- return ptr->id;
- }
- return -1;
-}
-
/**
* adf_clean_vf_map() - Cleans VF id mapings
*
@@ -314,63 +301,6 @@ struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_pci_to_
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev);
-struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(u32 id)
-{
- struct list_head *itr;
- int real_id;
-
- mutex_lock(&table_lock);
- real_id = adf_get_vf_real_id(id);
- if (real_id < 0)
- goto unlock;
-
- id = real_id;
-
- list_for_each(itr, &accel_table) {
- struct adf_accel_dev *ptr =
- list_entry(itr, struct adf_accel_dev, list);
- if (ptr->accel_id == id) {
- mutex_unlock(&table_lock);
- return ptr;
- }
- }
-unlock:
- mutex_unlock(&table_lock);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-int adf_devmgr_verify_id(u32 id)
-{
- if (id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES)
- return 0;
-
- if (adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(id))
- return 0;
-
- return -ENODEV;
-}
-
-static int adf_get_num_dettached_vfs(void)
-{
- struct list_head *itr;
- int vfs = 0;
-
- mutex_lock(&table_lock);
- list_for_each(itr, &vfs_table) {
- struct vf_id_map *ptr =
- list_entry(itr, struct vf_id_map, list);
- if (ptr->bdf != ~0 && !ptr->attached)
- vfs++;
- }
- mutex_unlock(&table_lock);
- return vfs;
-}
-
-void adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(u32 *num)
-{
- *num = num_devices - adf_get_num_dettached_vfs();
-}
-
/**
* adf_dev_in_use() - Check whether accel_dev is currently in use
* @accel_dev: Pointer to acceleration device.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (174 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 16:21 ` [PATCH 6.6 175/175] crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-07-02 19:46 ` Brett A C Sheffield
2026-07-02 20:46 ` Peter Schneider
` (7 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Brett A C Sheffield @ 2026-07-02 19:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: gregkh
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr,
Brett A C Sheffield
# Librecast Test Results
020/020 [ OK ] liblcrq
010/010 [ OK ] libmld
120/120 [ OK ] liblibrecast
CPU/kernel: Linux auntie 6.6.144-rc1-g383d9611bec7 #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Thu Jul 2 19:35:43 -00 2026 x86_64 AMD Ryzen 9 9950X 16-Core Processor AuthenticAMD GNU/Linux
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (175 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 19:46 ` [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Brett A C Sheffield
@ 2026-07-02 20:46 ` Peter Schneider
2026-07-02 23:49 ` Miguel Ojeda
` (6 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Peter Schneider @ 2026-07-02 20:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable
Cc: patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee,
rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr
Am 02.07.2026 um 18:18 schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.144 release.
> There are 175 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
Builds, boots and works on my 2-socket Ivy Bridge Xeon E5-2697 v2 server. No dmesg oddities or regressions found.
Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com>
Beste Grüße,
Peter Schneider
--
Climb the mountain not to plant your flag, but to embrace the challenge,
enjoy the air and behold the view. Climb it so you can see the world,
not so the world can see you. -- David McCullough Jr.
OpenPGP: 0xA3828BD796CCE11A8CADE8866E3A92C92C3FF244
Download: https://www.peters-netzplatz.de/download/pschneider1968_pub.asc
https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=pschneider1968@googlemail.com
https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=pschneider1968@gmail.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (176 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 20:46 ` Peter Schneider
@ 2026-07-02 23:49 ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-07-03 6:33 ` Ron Economos
` (5 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Miguel Ojeda @ 2026-07-02 23:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: gregkh
Cc: achill, akpm, broonie, conor, f.fainelli, hargar, jonathanh,
linux-kernel, linux, lkft-triage, patches, patches, pavel,
rwarsow, shuah, sr, stable, sudipm.mukherjee, torvalds,
Miguel Ojeda
On Thu, 02 Jul 2026 18:18:21 +0200 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.144 release.
> There are 175 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat, 04 Jul 2026 15:50:58 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
Boot-tested under QEMU for Rust x86_64:
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Thanks!
Cheers,
Miguel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (177 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-02 23:49 ` Miguel Ojeda
@ 2026-07-03 6:33 ` Ron Economos
2026-07-03 7:13 ` Shung-Hsi Yu
` (4 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Ron Economos @ 2026-07-03 6:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable
Cc: patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee,
rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr
On 7/2/26 09:18, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.144 release.
> There are 175 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat, 04 Jul 2026 15:50:58 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.144-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.6.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).
Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (178 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-03 6:33 ` Ron Economos
@ 2026-07-03 7:13 ` Shung-Hsi Yu
2026-07-03 7:40 ` Francesco Dolcini
` (3 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Shung-Hsi Yu @ 2026-07-03 7:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr
On Thu, Jul 02, 2026 at 06:18:21PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.144 release.
> There are 175 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat, 04 Jul 2026 15:50:58 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
test_progs, test_progs-no_alu32, test_progs-cpuv4, test_maps, test_verifier
in BPF selftests all passes[1] on both x86_64 and aarch64.
Tested-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
1: https://github.com/kernel-patches/linux-stable/actions/runs/28642644980
[...]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (179 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-03 7:13 ` Shung-Hsi Yu
@ 2026-07-03 7:40 ` Francesco Dolcini
2026-07-03 8:01 ` Wentao Guan
` (2 subsequent siblings)
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Francesco Dolcini @ 2026-07-03 7:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr
On Thu, Jul 02, 2026 at 06:18:21PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.144 release.
> There are 175 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
Tested-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (180 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-03 7:40 ` Francesco Dolcini
@ 2026-07-03 8:01 ` Wentao Guan
2026-07-03 9:39 ` Greg KH
2026-07-03 9:42 ` Pavel Machek
2026-07-03 13:43 ` Mark Brown
183 siblings, 1 reply; 186+ messages in thread
From: Wentao Guan @ 2026-07-03 8:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: gregkh
Cc: achill, akpm, broonie, conor, f.fainelli, hargar, jonathanh,
linux-kernel, linux, lkft-triage, patches, patches, pavel,
rwarsow, shuah, sr, stable, sudipm.mukherjee, torvalds,
Wentao Guan
Hi,
Build failed in loongarch arch, which resolve in link:
https://lore.kernel.org/stable/20260703032401.857553-1-chenhuacai@loongson.cn/
https://lore.kernel.org/stable/2026070318-monotone-mug-74d6@gregkh/
arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c: In function ‘stop_this_cpu’:
arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c:616:9: error: implicit declaration of function ‘rcutree_report_cpu_dead’; did you mean ‘rcutree_prepare_cpu’? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
616 | rcutree_report_cpu_dead();
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| rcutree_prepare_cpu
Build tested in our x86,arm64,riscv config successfully without error.
Tested-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
BRs
Wentao Guan
Log:
Linux version 6.6.144-rc1-arm64-desktop-hwe-g383d9611bec7 (guanwentao@uos-PC) (aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc-12 (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin8) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) # SMP PREEMPT
Linux version 6.6.144-rc1-arm64-desktop-hwe-g383d9611bec7 (guanwentao@uos-PC) (aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc-12 (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin8) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) #2 SMP PREEMPT Fri Jul 3 12:05:13 CST 2026
Linux version 6.6.144-rc1-riscv64-desktop-hwe+ (guanwentao@uos-PC) (riscv64-linux-gnu-gcc-12 (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin8) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) # SMP
Linux version 6.6.144-rc1-riscv64-desktop-hwe+ (guanwentao@uos-PC) (riscv64-linux-gnu-gcc-12 (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin8) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) #4 SMP Fri Jul 3 15:53:55 CST 2026
Linux version 6.6.144-rc1-amd64-desktop-hwe-g383d9611bec7 (guanwentao@uos-PC) (gcc (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin15) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) # SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC
Linux version 6.6.144-rc1-amd64-desktop-hwe-g383d9611bec7 (guanwentao@uos-PC) (gcc (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin15) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Fri Jul 3 11:47:09 CST 2026
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review
2026-07-03 8:01 ` Wentao Guan
@ 2026-07-03 9:39 ` Greg KH
0 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2026-07-03 9:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wentao Guan
Cc: achill, akpm, broonie, conor, f.fainelli, hargar, jonathanh,
linux-kernel, linux, lkft-triage, patches, patches, pavel,
rwarsow, shuah, sr, stable, sudipm.mukherjee, torvalds
On Fri, Jul 03, 2026 at 04:01:27PM +0800, Wentao Guan wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Build failed in loongarch arch, which resolve in link:
> https://lore.kernel.org/stable/20260703032401.857553-1-chenhuacai@loongson.cn/
> https://lore.kernel.org/stable/2026070318-monotone-mug-74d6@gregkh/
>
> arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c: In function ‘stop_this_cpu’:
> arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c:616:9: error: implicit declaration of function ‘rcutree_report_cpu_dead’; did you mean ‘rcutree_prepare_cpu’? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
> 616 | rcutree_report_cpu_dead();
> | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> | rcutree_prepare_cpu
>
> Build tested in our x86,arm64,riscv config successfully without error.
Offending commit already dropped.
thans,
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (181 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-03 8:01 ` Wentao Guan
@ 2026-07-03 9:42 ` Pavel Machek
2026-07-03 13:43 ` Mark Brown
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Pavel Machek @ 2026-07-03 9:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 458 bytes --]
Hi!
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.144 release.
> There are 175 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-6.6.y
Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@nabladev.com>
Best regards,
Pavel
[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 195 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review
2026-07-02 16:18 [PATCH 6.6 000/175] 6.6.144-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (182 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-03 9:42 ` Pavel Machek
@ 2026-07-03 13:43 ` Mark Brown
183 siblings, 0 replies; 186+ messages in thread
From: Mark Brown @ 2026-07-03 13:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, rwarsow, conor, hargar, achill, sr
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 346 bytes --]
On Thu, Jul 02, 2026 at 06:18:21PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.144 release.
> There are 175 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 488 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 186+ messages in thread