[PATCH 5.15 00/69] 5.15.220-rc1 review

[PATCH 5.15 00/69] 5.15.220-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.220 release.
There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.220-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 5.15.220-rc1

Miguel Peñaranda <mig.penaranda07@gmail.com>
    usb: usbfs: fix use-after-free of usb_device in usbdev_release()

Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
    USB: c67x00: fix use-after-free in c67x00_add_iso_urb()

Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
    USB: serial: spcp8x5: drop broken carrier detect support

Jiale Yao <yaojiale02@163.com>
    USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback

Will Porter <mrwillporter@gmail.com>
    ALSA: usb-audio: Complete cleanup after system-resume errors

Marouane El Moufid <eun0us@espilon.net>
    ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output()

Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
    usb: core: Strengthen error handling in hub_hub_status()

Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
    usb: core: Add lock to usb_wakeup_notification()

Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
    KVM: s390: vsie: zero stale crypto bits

Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
    crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms

Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
    crypto: mxs-dcp - fix source scatterlist length access

Md Sadre Alam <md.alam@oss.qualcomm.com>
    crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation

Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
    crypto: atmel-tdes - use scatterlist length before DMA mapping

Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
    mm/swap: reject swapon() on filesystem-level encrypted files

Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
    ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation

Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
    net: bridge: mcast: fix use-after-free of a master VLAN's multicast context

Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
    xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak

Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>
    xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left

Zhiling Zou <roxy520tt@gmail.com>
    xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device

Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
    xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close

Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
    usb: gadget: f_tcm: keep port count until LUN teardown completes

Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
    usb: usbtest: disable dynamic ID support

Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>
    fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on open O_TRUNC DAX failure

Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>
    fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure

Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>
    xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_alloc_driver() failure

Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>
    xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_register_driver() failure

Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang@isrc.iscas.ac.cn>
    accessibility: speakup: unregister tty ldisc on later init failures

Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
    fpga: dfl: fme: add error handling

Jose Villaseñor Montfort <pepemontfort@gmail.com>
    HID: input: read battery capacity from its actual report offset

Raman Varabets <kernel-linux-20260610-80b7ab08@raman.v1.sg>
    HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race

Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
    HID: ft260: validate i2c input report length

Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
    HID: ft260: missed NACK from busy device

Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
    HID: ft260: wake up device from power saving mode

Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
    HID: ft260: skip unexpected HID input reports

Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
    HID: ft260: improve i2c large reads performance

Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
    HID: ft260: improve i2c write performance

Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
    HID: ft260: fix i2c probing for hwmon devices

Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
    HID: uclogic: fix use-after-free of inrange_timer on remove

Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
    nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers

Weiwen Hu <huweiwen@linux.alibaba.com>
    nvme: rename CDR/MORE/DNR to NVME_STATUS_*

Jose Villaseñor Montfort <pepemontfort@gmail.com>
    HID: magicmouse: prevent unbounded recursion in magicmouse_raw_event()

Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
    nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors

Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
    nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl

Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
    nilfs2: correct return value kernel-doc descriptions for ioctl functions

Guanghui Yang <3497809730@qq.com>
    ext4: propagate errors from fast commit range replay

Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
    kcov: fix data corruption and race conditions on PREEMPT_RT

Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
    kcov: replace local_irq_save() with a local_lock_t

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    ipv4: igmp: Fix potential UAF in igmp_gq_start_timer()

Ji'an Zhou <eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com>
    ALSA: PCM: Fix wait queue list corruption in snd_pcm_drain() on linked streams

Mehul Rao <mehulrao@gmail.com>
    ALSA: pcm: fix use-after-free on linked stream runtime in snd_pcm_drain()

Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
    ASoC: tegra: Fix Master Volume Control

Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen@gmx.de>
    ALSA: pcm: fix wait_time calculations

Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
    Revert "smb: client: use kvzalloc() for megabyte buffer in simple fallocate"

Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
    Revert "mtd: maps: vmu-flash: fix fault in unaligned fixup"

Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
    selinux: switch two allocations to use kzalloc_objs()

Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
    smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_vlan_by_tcpsk().

Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
    Revert "PM: sleep: Use complete() in device_pm_sleep_init()"

Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
    bpf: Fix use-after-free in offloaded map/prog info fill

Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
    KVM: arm64: Prevent access to vCPU events before init

Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
    can: j1939: make j1939_sk_bind() fail if device is no longer registered

Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
    can: j1939: add missing calls in NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler

Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
    can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler

Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
    jfs: add check read-only before txBeginAnon() call

Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
    jfs: add check read-only before truncation in jfs_truncate_nolock()

Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
    bpf: Remove tst_run from lwt_seg6local_prog_ops.

Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
    ipvs: reload ip header after head reallocation

Vishnu Razdan <vrazdan@openai.com>
    io_uring/io-wq: fix worker accounting when canceling creation callbacks

Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
    ext4: don't enable DAX on new encrypted files

Peiyang He <peiyang_he@smail.nju.edu.cn>
    RDMA/rxe: Fix OOB in free_rd_atomic_resources()


-------------

Diffstat:

 Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst        |   4 +
 Makefile                                     |   4 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c                         |   6 +
 arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c                         |   1 +
 drivers/accessibility/speakup/main.c         |   1 +
 drivers/base/power/main.c                    |   6 +-
 drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c                  |   5 +-
 drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c                     |   2 +-
 drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c                    |  58 +------
 drivers/crypto/qce/common.c                  |  55 ++----
 drivers/crypto/qce/common.h                  |  16 +-
 drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h                 |   4 -
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c                     |  30 +---
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h                     |   1 -
 drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c                |  97 +----------
 drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-perf.c                  |   2 +
 drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c                      | 162 +++++++++++++----
 drivers/hid/hid-input.c                      |  17 +-
 drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c                 |  25 ++-
 drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-core.c               |  12 +-
 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c           |   3 +-
 drivers/mtd/maps/vmu-flash.c                 |   8 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c                     |  12 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c                  |   8 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/fault_inject.c             |   2 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/fc.c                       |   8 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c              |  20 +--
 drivers/nvme/target/core.c                   |  42 ++---
 drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c              |  14 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c            |  32 ++--
 drivers/nvme/target/io-cmd-bdev.c            |  12 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h                  |   2 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c               |  10 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c                   |  10 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c                    |  17 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/zns.c                    |  30 ++--
 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c |   8 +
 drivers/usb/c67x00/c67x00-sched.c            |   4 +-
 drivers/usb/core/devio.c                     |   2 +-
 drivers/usb/core/hub.c                       |   7 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c          |   2 +-
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c               |  15 +-
 drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c                   |   1 +
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c                  |  20 ++-
 drivers/usb/serial/spcp8x5.c                 |  13 --
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c                            |   4 +-
 fs/ext4/fast_commit.c                        |  10 +-
 fs/ext4/ialloc.c                             |   4 +
 fs/ext4/super.c                              |  40 ++---
 fs/fuse/dir.c                                |   9 +-
 fs/fuse/file.c                               |   4 +-
 fs/jfs/inode.c                               |   2 +-
 fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c                          |  10 ++
 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c                            | 251 ++++++++++++---------------
 include/linux/hid.h                          |   1 +
 include/linux/inetdevice.h                   |   5 +
 include/linux/nvme.h                         |   4 +-
 include/linux/sched.h                        |   8 +
 include/target/target_core_fabric.h          |   2 +
 io_uring/io-wq.c                             |   9 +-
 kernel/bpf/offload.c                         |  10 +-
 kernel/kcov.c                                | 126 +++++++-------
 lib/Kconfig.debug                            |   5 +-
 mm/swapfile.c                                |   7 +
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c                    |   4 +-
 net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h                   |   1 +
 net/can/j1939/main.c                         |   5 +
 net/can/j1939/socket.c                       |  55 ++++++
 net/core/filter.c                            |   1 -
 net/ipv4/igmp.c                              |  14 +-
 net/ipv6/ah6.c                               |  29 ++--
 net/ipv6/seg6_local.c                        |   7 +
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c              |   6 +-
 net/nfc/nci/ntf.c                            |  26 ++-
 net/smc/smc_core.c                           |  27 ++-
 net/xfrm/espintcp.c                          |   9 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c                         |   2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.c            |  12 +-
 sound/core/pcm_lib.c                         |  11 +-
 sound/core/pcm_native.c                      |  32 ++--
 sound/soc/tegra/tegra_pcm.c                  |   3 +
 sound/usb/card.c                             |  14 +-
 sound/usb/midi.c                             |   2 +
 83 files changed, 839 insertions(+), 742 deletions(-)

[PATCH 5.15 01/69] RDMA/rxe: Fix OOB in free_rd_atomic_resources()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peiyang He <peiyang_he@smail.nju.edu.cn>

commit de329533792a373186d79dca1ca120f8fa0afd05 upstream.

free_rd_atomic_resources() iterates using qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic.
Updating max_dest_rd_atomic before freeing the old array can make the
free path walk past the old allocation and trigger a slab out-of-bounds
write catched by KASAN:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88802b8dddb8 by task syz.3.451/11063

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11063 Comm: syz.3.451 Not tainted 7.1.0 #2 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xf7/0x600 mm/kasan/report.c:482
 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline]
 free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline]
 free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline]
 rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712
 rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623
 ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625
 _ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915
 modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932
 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958
 ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680
 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686
 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fefc75a70cd
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fefc8495018 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fefc7835fa0 RCX: 00007fefc75a70cd
RDX: 0000000000000078 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007fefc764f10f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fefc7836038 R14: 00007fefc7835fa0 R15: 00007ffcf0586aa0
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 11063:
 kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:57
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78
 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5296 [inline]
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x32a/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline]
 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline]
 alloc_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:155 [inline]
 rxe_qp_from_attr+0x3f8/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:714
 rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623
 ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625
 _ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915
 modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932
 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958
 ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680
 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686
 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802b8ddd80
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
 allocated 56-byte region [ffff88802b8ddd80, ffff88802b8dddb8)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x2b8dd
flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000000 ffff888015c418c0 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000800200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2c40(GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 4651, tgid 4651 ((udev-worker)), ts 123427165316, free_ts 123425874255
 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
 post_alloc_hook+0xfc/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:1853
 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1861 [inline]
 get_page_from_freelist+0x75b/0x3220 mm/page_alloc.c:3941
 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x27e/0x2b00 mm/page_alloc.c:5221
 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:3278 [inline]
 allocate_slab mm/slub.c:3467 [inline]
 new_slab+0xa6/0x670 mm/slub.c:3525
 refill_objects+0x278/0x420 mm/slub.c:7272
 refill_sheaf mm/slub.c:2816 [inline]
 __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2ed/0x640 mm/slub.c:4652
 alloc_from_pcs mm/slub.c:4750 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4884 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5295 [inline]
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x68d/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline]
 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline]
 tomoyo_encode2+0x100/0x3e0 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:45
 tomoyo_encode+0x29/0x50 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:80
 tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0x18c/0x690 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:283
 tomoyo_get_realpath security/tomoyo/file.c:151 [inline]
 tomoyo_check_open_permission+0x2ab/0x3c0 security/tomoyo/file.c:776
 tomoyo_file_open+0x6b/0x90 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:334
 security_file_open+0x7a/0x1b0 security/security.c:2739
 do_dentry_open+0x57e/0x1690 fs/open.c:924
 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1079
 do_open fs/namei.c:4699 [inline]
 path_openat+0x218a/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4858
page last free pid 1 tgid 1 stack trace:
 reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
 __free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1397 [inline]
 __free_frozen_pages+0x763/0xfc0 mm/page_alloc.c:2938
 selinux_genfs_get_sid security/selinux/hooks.c:1364 [inline]
 inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x903/0x1320 security/selinux/hooks.c:1563
 selinux_d_instantiate+0x26/0x30 security/selinux/hooks.c:6658
 security_d_instantiate+0x123/0x190 security/security.c:3704
 d_splice_alias_ops+0x92/0x850 fs/dcache.c:3141
 kernfs_iop_lookup+0x23f/0x2d0 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1289
 lookup_open.isra.0+0x659/0x1080 fs/namei.c:4484
 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4611 [inline]
 path_openat+0x17dd/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4855
 do_file_open+0x20c/0x430 fs/namei.c:4887
 do_sys_openat2+0x101/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1364
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1370 [inline]
 __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1386 [inline]
 __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1381 [inline]
 __x64_sys_openat+0x141/0x200 fs/open.c:1381
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88802b8ddc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88802b8ddd00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88802b8ddd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                        ^
 ffff88802b8dde00: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88802b8dde80: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Fix the OOB by moving the assignment after free_rd_atomic_resources()
so the old array is freed using the old bound. This matches the original
ordering in commit 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver").

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/365C68B4923F8214+30195a67-0b90-4b92-ab96-2ce41517793c@smail.nju.edu.cn/
Fixes: b6bbee0d2438 ("IB/rxe: Properly honor max IRD value for rd/atomic.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peiyang He <peiyang_he@smail.nju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
(cherry picked from commit de329533792a373186d79dca1ca120f8fa0afd05)
[This commit is based on the upstream commit 6f7014237405 ("RDMA/rxe: Fix responder UAF on IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC modify_qp")]
Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
index 13b237d93a616..b09e0516c4099 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
@@ -598,10 +598,9 @@ int rxe_qp_from_attr(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct ib_qp_attr *attr, int mask,
 		int max_dest_rd_atomic = attr->max_dest_rd_atomic ?
 			roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_dest_rd_atomic) : 0;
 
-		qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic = max_dest_rd_atomic;
-
 		free_rd_atomic_resources(qp);
 
+		qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic = max_dest_rd_atomic;
 		err = alloc_rd_atomic_resources(qp, max_dest_rd_atomic);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 02/69] ext4: dont enable DAX on new encrypted files

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>

commit da32af420d6d466e247c43ac0b829edeac7ae0ad upstream.

Currently, when a new encrypted regular file is created, the call to
ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=true) in __ext4_new_inode() is made
before EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT is set.  As a result, it can set S_DAX if the
filesystem is mounted with "-o dax=always".

EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT then actually gets set a bit later in
__ext4_new_inode(), when it calls fscrypt_set_context() which calls
ext4_set_context().  ext4_set_context() sets EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT and
calls ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=false) to set S_ENCRYPTED too.

This was intended to clear S_DAX as well.  However, this was broken by
commit 043546e46dc7 ("fs/ext4: Only change S_DAX on inode load").  This
causes data written to the file to bypass encryption, also causing
xfstests failures such as generic/548 (when "-o dax=always" is used).

Fix this by simplifying the flow by making __ext4_new_inode() set
EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT earlier.  This makes it take effect in
ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=true), making S_DAX never be set.

Similarly, make EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA never be set in the first
place on new encrypted inodes.  Then it doesn't need to be cleared.

As a result of these simplifications, ext4_set_context() no longer needs
to change inode flags or state when 'handle != NULL'.  Remove that too.

Reported-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260723085648.1500357-1-ojaswin@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: 043546e46dc7 ("fs/ext4: Only change S_DAX on inode load")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730175212.36923-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ext4/ialloc.c |  4 ++++
 fs/ext4/super.c  | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
index 2ee7467c0a6a2..9f5d8acf31db9 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
@@ -997,6 +997,8 @@ struct inode *__ext4_new_inode(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 		err = fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(dir, inode, &encrypt);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
+		if (encrypt)
+			i_flags |= EXT4_ENCRYPT_FL;
 	}
 
 	err = dquot_initialize(inode);
@@ -1312,6 +1314,8 @@ struct inode *__ext4_new_inode(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	ei->i_extra_isize = sbi->s_want_extra_isize;
 	ei->i_inline_off = 0;
 	if (ext4_has_feature_inline_data(sb) &&
+	    /* Encrypted inodes cannot have inline data */
+	    !(ei->i_flags & EXT4_ENCRYPT_FL) &&
 	    (!(ei->i_flags & EXT4_DAX_FL) || S_ISDIR(mode)))
 		ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA);
 	ret = inode;
diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
index 48628e917b708..c89e460180b82 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -1487,7 +1487,13 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
 	if (inode->i_ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO)
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_DAX(inode) && i_size_read(inode)))
+	/*
+	 * For new encrypted inodes, S_DAX is never set in the first place.
+	 *
+	 * For existing inodes, this is called only on empty directories.  ext4
+	 * never sets S_DAX on directories.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_DAX(inode)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_DAX))
@@ -1506,21 +1512,18 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
 	 */
 
 	if (handle) {
-		res = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode,
-					    EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
-					    EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT,
-					    ctx, len, 0);
-		if (!res) {
-			ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT);
-			ext4_clear_inode_state(inode,
-					EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA);
-			/*
-			 * Update inode->i_flags - S_ENCRYPTED will be enabled,
-			 * S_DAX may be disabled
-			 */
-			ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, false);
-		}
-		return res;
+		/*
+		 * __ext4_new_inode() should have already set the encrypt flag
+		 * on the inode and avoided enabling inline data.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode,
+					     EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
+					     EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT,
+					     ctx, len, 0);
 	}
 
 	res = dquot_initialize(inode);
@@ -1541,10 +1544,7 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
 				    ctx, len, 0);
 	if (!res) {
 		ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT);
-		/*
-		 * Update inode->i_flags - S_ENCRYPTED will be enabled,
-		 * S_DAX may be disabled
-		 */
+		/* Update inode->i_flags to set S_ENCRYPTED. */
 		ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, false);
 		res = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
 		if (res)
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 03/69] io_uring/io-wq: fix worker accounting when canceling creation callbacks

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vishnu Razdan <vrazdan@openai.com>

commit 297b5ccea4acacaa47c150f043bce695202afbf1 upstream.

create_worker_cb() reserves an io-wq worker slot only after its
task-work callback runs. If the callback is canceled before then,
io_worker_cancel_cb() still decrements acct->nr_workers. When an
existing worker retires with its creation callback pending, that
worker has already decremented the same account's worker count.

The resulting undercount permits worker creation beyond the account's
configured limit. On an AST2600 OpenBMC system, an unchanged sensor
daemon reached 4,291 threads with the original kernel. With an
equivalent downstream fix, 25 passive samples under its normal
workload showed 6-9 threads.

Decrement nr_workers only when the canceled callback is not
create_worker_cb(). Continuation callbacks still release their reserved
slot, and both callback types retain the existing running-count,
reference-count, and create-state cleanup.

[ Backport: retain the existing worker->wqe->lock protecting worker
  accounting. ]

Fixes: 1d5f5ea7cb7d ("io-wq: remove worker to owner tw dependency")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@suse.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811-vrazdan-io-wq-b4-submit-v1-1-719ced16c921@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Vishnu Razdan <vrazdan@openai.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 io_uring/io-wq.c | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/io_uring/io-wq.c b/io_uring/io-wq.c
index edcb5af514b53..f57743d911b4c 100644
--- a/io_uring/io-wq.c
+++ b/io_uring/io-wq.c
@@ -195,9 +195,12 @@ static void io_worker_cancel_cb(struct io_worker *worker)
 	struct io_wq *wq = wqe->wq;
 
 	atomic_dec(&acct->nr_running);
-	raw_spin_lock(&worker->wqe->lock);
-	acct->nr_workers--;
-	raw_spin_unlock(&worker->wqe->lock);
+	/* create_worker_cb() has not reserved a worker slot yet. */
+	if (worker->create_work.func != create_worker_cb) {
+		raw_spin_lock(&worker->wqe->lock);
+		acct->nr_workers--;
+		raw_spin_unlock(&worker->wqe->lock);
+	}
 	io_worker_ref_put(wq);
 	clear_bit_unlock(0, &worker->create_state);
 	io_worker_release(worker);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 04/69] ipvs: reload ip header after head reallocation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

commit a2f57827bf7c695b8c72dc4511cae8e86582369d upstream.

__ip_vs_get_out_rt() calls skb_ensure_writable() which may
reallocate skb->head.

Fixes: 8d8e20e2d7bb ("ipvs: Decrement ttl")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
[Denis Arefev: adapted for 5.10/6.1: keep EnterFunction/LeaveFunction
instrumentation]
Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <arefev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c | 6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c
index 9e199f00eea73..40a1d31b4054f 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c
@@ -718,15 +718,13 @@ int
 ip_vs_bypass_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_conn *cp,
 		  struct ip_vs_protocol *pp, struct ip_vs_iphdr *ipvsh)
 {
-	struct iphdr  *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
-
 	EnterFunction(10);
 
-	if (__ip_vs_get_out_rt(cp->ipvs, cp->af, skb, NULL, iph->daddr,
+	if (__ip_vs_get_out_rt(cp->ipvs, cp->af, skb, NULL, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
 			       IP_VS_RT_MODE_NON_LOCAL, NULL, ipvsh) < 0)
 		goto tx_error;
 
-	ip_send_check(iph);
+	ip_send_check(ip_hdr(skb));
 
 	/* Another hack: avoid icmp_send in ip_fragment */
 	skb->ignore_df = 1;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 05/69] bpf: Remove tst_run from lwt_seg6local_prog_ops.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

[ Upstream commit c13fda93aca118b8e5cd202e339046728ee7dddb ]

The syzbot reported that the lwt_seg6 related BPF ops can be invoked
via bpf_test_run() without without entering input_action_end_bpf()
first.

Martin KaFai Lau said that self test for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL
probably didn't work since it was introduced in commit 04d4b274e2a
("ipv6: sr: Add seg6local action End.BPF"). The reason is that the
per-CPU variable seg6_bpf_srh_states::srh is never assigned in the self
test case but each BPF function expects it.

Remove test_run for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL.

Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
Reported-by: syzbot+608a2acde8c5a101d07d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: d1542d4ae4df ("seg6: Use nested-BH locking for seg6_bpf_srh_states.")
Fixes: 004d4b274e2a ("ipv6: sr: Add seg6local action End.BPF")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240710141631.FbmHcQaX@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/core/filter.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index af34e922836ce..6c81daf9efc9d 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -10419,7 +10419,6 @@ const struct bpf_verifier_ops lwt_seg6local_verifier_ops = {
 };
 
 const struct bpf_prog_ops lwt_seg6local_prog_ops = {
-	.test_run		= bpf_prog_test_run_skb,
 };
 
 const struct bpf_verifier_ops cg_sock_verifier_ops = {
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 06/69] jfs: add check read-only before truncation in jfs_truncate_nolock()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>

[ Upstream commit b5799dd77054c1ec49b0088b006c9908e256843b ]

Added a check for "read-only" mode in the `jfs_truncate_nolock`
function to avoid errors related to writing to a read-only
filesystem.

Call stack:

block_write_begin() {
  jfs_write_failed() {
    jfs_truncate() {
      jfs_truncate_nolock() {
        txEnd() {
          ...
          log = JFS_SBI(tblk->sb)->log;
          // (log == NULL)

If the `isReadOnly(ip)` condition is triggered in
`jfs_truncate_nolock`, the function execution will stop, and no
further data modification will occur. Instead, the `xtTruncate`
function will be called with the "COMMIT_WMAP" flag, preventing
modifications in "read-only" mode.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+4e89b5368baba8324e07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e89b5368baba8324e07
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/jfs/inode.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/jfs/inode.c b/fs/jfs/inode.c
index 6d6425cdb1185..84e79c7574032 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/inode.c
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ void jfs_truncate_nolock(struct inode *ip, loff_t length)
 
 	ASSERT(length >= 0);
 
-	if (test_cflag(COMMIT_Nolink, ip)) {
+	if (test_cflag(COMMIT_Nolink, ip) || isReadOnly(ip)) {
 		xtTruncate(0, ip, length, COMMIT_WMAP);
 		return;
 	}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 07/69] jfs: add check read-only before txBeginAnon() call

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>

[ Upstream commit 0176e69743ecc02961f2ae1ea42439cd2bf9ed58 ]

Added a read-only check before calling `txBeginAnon` in `extAlloc`
and `extRecord`. This prevents modification attempts on a read-only
mounted filesystem, avoiding potential errors or crashes.

Call trace:
 txBeginAnon+0xac/0x154
 extAlloc+0xe8/0xdec fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c:78
 jfs_get_block+0x340/0xb98 fs/jfs/inode.c:248
 __block_write_begin_int+0x580/0x166c fs/buffer.c:2128
 __block_write_begin fs/buffer.c:2177 [inline]
 block_write_begin+0x98/0x11c fs/buffer.c:2236
 jfs_write_begin+0x44/0x88 fs/jfs/inode.c:299

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+4e89b5368baba8324e07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e89b5368baba8324e07
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c
index 6420b6749d48f..25b5a866ee18e 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c
@@ -77,6 +77,11 @@ extAlloc(struct inode *ip, s64 xlen, s64 pno, xad_t * xp, bool abnr)
 	int rc;
 	int xflag;
 
+	if (isReadOnly(ip)) {
+		jfs_error(ip->i_sb, "read-only filesystem\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	/* This blocks if we are low on resources */
 	txBeginAnon(ip->i_sb);
 
@@ -412,6 +417,11 @@ int extRecord(struct inode *ip, xad_t * xp)
 {
 	int rc;
 
+	if (isReadOnly(ip)) {
+		jfs_error(ip->i_sb, "read-only filesystem\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	txBeginAnon(ip->i_sb);
 
 	mutex_lock(&JFS_IP(ip)->commit_mutex);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 08/69] can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

[ Upstream commit 7fcbe5b2c6a4b5407bf2241fdb71e0a390f6ab9a ]

syzbot is reporting

  unregister_netdevice: waiting for vcan0 to become free. Usage count = 2

problem, for j1939 protocol did not have NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification
handler for undoing changes made by j1939_sk_bind().

Commit 25fe97cb7620 ("can: j1939: move j1939_priv_put() into sk_destruct
callback") expects that a call to j1939_priv_put() can be unconditionally
delayed until j1939_sk_sock_destruct() is called. But we need to call
j1939_priv_put() against an extra ref held by j1939_sk_bind() call
(as a part of undoing changes made by j1939_sk_bind()) as soon as
NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification fires (i.e. before j1939_sk_sock_destruct()
is called via j1939_sk_release()). Otherwise, the extra ref on "struct
j1939_priv" held by j1939_sk_bind() call prevents "struct net_device" from
dropping the usage count to 1; making it impossible for
unregister_netdevice() to continue.

Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+881d65229ca4f9ae8c84@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=881d65229ca4f9ae8c84
Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+881d65229ca4f9ae8c84@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Fixes: 25fe97cb7620 ("can: j1939: move j1939_priv_put() into sk_destruct callback")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ac9db9a4-6c30-416e-8b94-96e6559d55b2@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
[mkl: remove space in front of label]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h |  1 +
 net/can/j1939/main.c       |  3 +++
 net/can/j1939/socket.c     | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h b/net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h
index 31a93cae5111b..81f58924b4acd 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h
+++ b/net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ void j1939_priv_get(struct j1939_priv *priv);
 
 /* notify/alert all j1939 sockets bound to ifindex */
 void j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(struct j1939_priv *priv);
+void j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister(struct j1939_priv *priv);
 int j1939_cancel_active_session(struct j1939_priv *priv, struct sock *sk);
 void j1939_tp_init(struct j1939_priv *priv);
 
diff --git a/net/can/j1939/main.c b/net/can/j1939/main.c
index cc03ea2f897fd..21528d7ff83db 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/main.c
+++ b/net/can/j1939/main.c
@@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ static int j1939_netdev_notify(struct notifier_block *nb,
 		j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(priv);
 		j1939_ecu_unmap_all(priv);
 		break;
+	case NETDEV_UNREGISTER:
+		j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister(priv);
+		break;
 	}
 
 	j1939_priv_put(priv);
diff --git a/net/can/j1939/socket.c b/net/can/j1939/socket.c
index 540836c4964d2..5819a6aba1209 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/socket.c
+++ b/net/can/j1939/socket.c
@@ -1298,6 +1298,55 @@ void j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(struct j1939_priv *priv)
 	read_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
 }
 
+void j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister(struct j1939_priv *priv)
+{
+	struct sock *sk;
+	struct j1939_sock *jsk;
+	bool wait_rcu = false;
+
+rescan: /* The caller is holding a ref on this "priv" via j1939_priv_get_by_ndev(). */
+	read_lock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(jsk, &priv->j1939_socks, list) {
+		/* Skip if j1939_jsk_add() is not called on this socket. */
+		if (!(jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_BOUND))
+			continue;
+		sk = &jsk->sk;
+		sock_hold(sk);
+		read_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
+		/* Check if j1939_jsk_del() is not yet called on this socket after holding
+		 * socket's lock, for both j1939_sk_bind() and j1939_sk_release() call
+		 * j1939_jsk_del() with socket's lock held.
+		 */
+		lock_sock(sk);
+		if (jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_BOUND) {
+			/* Neither j1939_sk_bind() nor j1939_sk_release() called j1939_jsk_del().
+			 * Make this socket no longer bound, by pretending as if j1939_sk_bind()
+			 * dropped old references but did not get new references.
+			 */
+			j1939_jsk_del(priv, jsk);
+			j1939_local_ecu_put(priv, jsk->addr.src_name, jsk->addr.sa);
+			j1939_netdev_stop(priv);
+			/* Call j1939_priv_put() now and prevent j1939_sk_sock_destruct() from
+			 * calling the corresponding j1939_priv_put().
+			 *
+			 * j1939_sk_sock_destruct() is supposed to call j1939_priv_put() after
+			 * an RCU grace period. But since the caller is holding a ref on this
+			 * "priv", we can defer synchronize_rcu() until immediately before
+			 * the caller calls j1939_priv_put().
+			 */
+			j1939_priv_put(priv);
+			jsk->priv = NULL;
+			wait_rcu = true;
+		}
+		release_sock(sk);
+		sock_put(sk);
+		goto rescan;
+	}
+	read_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
+	if (wait_rcu)
+		synchronize_rcu();
+}
+
 static int j1939_sk_no_ioctlcmd(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd,
 				unsigned long arg)
 {
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 09/69] can: j1939: add missing calls in NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

[ Upstream commit 93a27b5891b8194a8c083c9a80d2141d4bf47ba8 ]

Currently NETDEV_UNREGISTER event handler is not calling
j1939_cancel_active_session() and j1939_sk_queue_drop_all().
This will result in these calls being skipped when j1939_sk_release() is
called. And I guess that the reason syzbot is still reporting

  unregister_netdevice: waiting for vcan0 to become free. Usage count = 2

is caused by lack of these calls.

Calling j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, sk) from j1939_sk_release() can
be covered by calling j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, NULL) from
j1939_netdev_notify().

Calling j1939_sk_queue_drop_all() from j1939_sk_release() can be covered
by calling j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown() from j1939_netdev_notify().

Therefore, we can reuse j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, NULL) and
j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(priv) for NETDEV_UNREGISTER event handler.

Fixes: 7fcbe5b2c6a4 ("can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3ad3c7f8-5a74-4b07-a193-cb0725823558@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/can/j1939/main.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/can/j1939/main.c b/net/can/j1939/main.c
index 21528d7ff83db..503d344fe628b 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/main.c
+++ b/net/can/j1939/main.c
@@ -374,6 +374,8 @@ static int j1939_netdev_notify(struct notifier_block *nb,
 		j1939_ecu_unmap_all(priv);
 		break;
 	case NETDEV_UNREGISTER:
+		j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, NULL);
+		j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(priv);
 		j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister(priv);
 		break;
 	}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 10/69] can: j1939: make j1939_sk_bind() fail if device is no longer registered

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

[ Upstream commit 46cea215dc9444ec32a76b1b6a9cb809e17b64d5 ]

There is a theoretical race window in j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister()
where two j1939_sk_bind() calls jump in between read_unlock_bh() and
lock_sock().

The assumption jsk->priv == priv can fail if the first j1939_sk_bind()
call once made jsk->priv == NULL due to failed j1939_local_ecu_get() call
and the second j1939_sk_bind() call again made jsk->priv != NULL due to
successful j1939_local_ecu_get() call.

Since the socket lock is held by both j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister()
and j1939_sk_bind(), checking ndev->reg_state with the socket lock held can
reliably make the second j1939_sk_bind() call fail (and close this race
window).

Fixes: 7fcbe5b2c6a4 ("can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/5732921e-247e-4957-a364-da74bd7031d7@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/can/j1939/socket.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/can/j1939/socket.c b/net/can/j1939/socket.c
index 5819a6aba1209..c088f1d8150f0 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/socket.c
+++ b/net/can/j1939/socket.c
@@ -481,6 +481,12 @@ static int j1939_sk_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len)
 			goto out_release_sock;
 		}
 
+		if (ndev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED) {
+			dev_put(ndev);
+			ret = -ENODEV;
+			goto out_release_sock;
+		}
+
 		can_ml = can_get_ml_priv(ndev);
 		if (!can_ml) {
 			dev_put(ndev);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 11/69] KVM: arm64: Prevent access to vCPU events before init

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>

[ Upstream commit 0aa1b76fe1429629215a7c79820e4b96233ac4a3 ]

Another day, another syzkaller bug. KVM erroneously allows userspace to
pend vCPU events for a vCPU that hasn't been initialized yet, leading to
KVM interpreting a bunch of uninitialized garbage for routing /
injecting the exception.

In one case the injection code and the hyp disagree on whether the vCPU
has a 32bit EL1 and put the vCPU into an illegal mode for AArch64,
tripping the BUG() in exception_target_el() during the next injection:

  kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c:40!
  Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1]  SMP
  CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 318 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4-00104-g10fd0285305d #6 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  pstate: 21402009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c
  lr : pend_serror_exception+0x18/0x13c
  sp : ffff800082f03a10
  x29: ffff800082f03a10 x28: ffff0000cb132280 x27: 0000000000000000
  x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000c2a99c20 x24: 0000000000000000
  x23: 0000000000008000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000004
  x20: 0000000000008000 x19: ffff0000c2a99c20 x18: 0000000000000000
  x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 00000000200000c0
  x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
  x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
  x8 : ffff800082f03af8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
  x5 : ffff800080f621f0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
  x2 : 000000000040009b x1 : 0000000000000003 x0 : ffff0000c2a99c20
  Call trace:
   exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c (P)
   kvm_inject_serror_esr+0x40/0x3b4
   __kvm_arm_vcpu_set_events+0xf0/0x100
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x180/0x9d4
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x60c/0x9f4
   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x104
   invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110
   el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
   do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
   el0_svc+0x34/0xf0
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
   el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
  Code: f946bc01 b4fffe61 9101e020 17fffff2 (d4210000)

Reject the ioctls outright as no sane VMM would call these before
KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT anyway. Even if it did the exception would've been
thrown away by the eventual reset of the vCPU's state.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.17
Fixes: b7b27facc7b5 ("arm/arm64: KVM: Add KVM_GET/SET_VCPU_EVENTS")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
index 5ca8782edb960..ca69ae7f86d70 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
@@ -1313,6 +1313,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	case KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS: {
 		struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
 
+		if (!kvm_vcpu_initialized(vcpu))
+			return -ENOEXEC;
+
 		if (kvm_arm_vcpu_get_events(vcpu, &events))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1324,6 +1327,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	case KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS: {
 		struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
 
+		if (!kvm_vcpu_initialized(vcpu))
+			return -ENOEXEC;
+
 		if (copy_from_user(&events, argp, sizeof(events)))
 			return -EFAULT;
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 12/69] bpf: Fix use-after-free in offloaded map/prog info fill

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>

[ Upstream commit a0c584fc18056709c8e047a82a6045d6c209f4ce ]

When querying info for an offloaded BPF map or program,
bpf_map_offload_info_fill_ns() and bpf_prog_offload_info_fill_ns()
obtain the network namespace with get_net(dev_net(offmap->netdev)).
However, the associated netdev's netns may be racing with teardown
during netns destruction. If the netns refcount has already reached 0,
get_net() performs a refcount_t increment on 0, triggering:

  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.

Although rtnl_lock and bpf_devs_lock ensure the netdev pointer remains
valid, they cannot prevent the netns refcount from reaching zero.

Fix this by using maybe_get_net() instead of get_net(). maybe_get_net()
uses refcount_inc_not_zero() and returns NULL if the refcount is already
zero, which causes ns_get_path_cb() to fail and the caller to return
-ENOENT -- the correct behavior when the netns is being destroyed.

Fixes: 675fc275a3a2d ("bpf: offload: report device information for offloaded programs")
Fixes: 52775b33bb507 ("bpf: offload: report device information about offloaded maps")
Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@hust.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@hust.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/f0aa3678-79c9-47ae-9e8c-02a3d1df160a@hust.edu.cn/
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260409023733.168050-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/offload.c | 10 ++++------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/offload.c b/kernel/bpf/offload.c
index fcdd28224f532..b3850bd8a2c5f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/offload.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/offload.c
@@ -274,9 +274,8 @@ static struct ns_common *bpf_prog_offload_info_fill_ns(void *private_data)
 
 	if (aux->offload) {
 		args->info->ifindex = aux->offload->netdev->ifindex;
-		net = dev_net(aux->offload->netdev);
-		get_net(net);
-		ns = &net->ns;
+		net = maybe_get_net(dev_net(aux->offload->netdev));
+		ns = net ? &net->ns : NULL;
 	} else {
 		args->info->ifindex = 0;
 		ns = NULL;
@@ -501,9 +500,8 @@ static struct ns_common *bpf_map_offload_info_fill_ns(void *private_data)
 
 	if (args->offmap->netdev) {
 		args->info->ifindex = args->offmap->netdev->ifindex;
-		net = dev_net(args->offmap->netdev);
-		get_net(net);
-		ns = &net->ns;
+		net = maybe_get_net(dev_net(args->offmap->netdev));
+		ns = net ? &net->ns : NULL;
 	} else {
 		args->info->ifindex = 0;
 		ns = NULL;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 13/69] Revert "PM: sleep: Use complete() in device_pm_sleep_init()"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

This reverts commit 31064374d24dc18cf132ffb9d350f318f3274b06.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/base/power/main.c | 6 +-----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/base/power/main.c b/drivers/base/power/main.c
index 3d3e710f71733..9cd0a837af425 100644
--- a/drivers/base/power/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/power/main.c
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ void device_pm_sleep_init(struct device *dev)
 	dev->power.is_noirq_suspended = false;
 	dev->power.is_late_suspended = false;
 	init_completion(&dev->power.completion);
-	complete(&dev->power.completion);
+	complete_all(&dev->power.completion);
 	dev->power.wakeup = NULL;
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->power.entry);
 }
@@ -239,10 +239,6 @@ static void dpm_wait(struct device *dev, bool async)
 	if (!dev)
 		return;
 
-	/* Devices with no PM support don't use the completion. */
-	if (dev->power.no_pm)
-		return;
-
 	if (async || (pm_async_enabled && dev->power.async_suspend))
 		wait_for_completion(&dev->power.completion);
 }
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 14/69] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_vlan_by_tcpsk().

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 0b0e4d51c6554e5ecc3f8cc73c2eaf12da21249a ]

smc_vlan_by_tcpsk() fetches sk_dst_get(sk)->dev before RTNL and
passes it to netdev_walk_all_lower_dev(), which is illegal.

Also, smc_vlan_by_tcpsk_walk() does not require RTNL at all.

Let's use __sk_dst_get(), dst_dev_rcu(), and
netdev_walk_all_lower_dev_rcu().

Note that the returned value of smc_vlan_by_tcpsk() is not used
in the caller.

Fixes: 0cfdd8f92cac ("smc: connection and link group creation")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250916214758.650211-5-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/smc/smc_core.c | 27 ++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/smc/smc_core.c b/net/smc/smc_core.c
index 37614dcf19194..f6119f29b44ce 100644
--- a/net/smc/smc_core.c
+++ b/net/smc/smc_core.c
@@ -1612,35 +1612,32 @@ static int smc_vlan_by_tcpsk_walk(struct net_device *lower_dev,
 /* Determine vlan of internal TCP socket. */
 int smc_vlan_by_tcpsk(struct socket *clcsock, struct smc_init_info *ini)
 {
-	struct dst_entry *dst = sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
 	struct netdev_nested_priv priv;
 	struct net_device *ndev;
+	struct dst_entry *dst;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	ini->vlan_id = 0;
-	if (!dst) {
-		rc = -ENOTCONN;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (!dst->dev) {
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	dst = __sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
+	ndev = dst ? dst_dev_rcu(dst) : NULL;
+	if (!ndev) {
 		rc = -ENODEV;
-		goto out_rel;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ndev = dst->dev;
 	if (is_vlan_dev(ndev)) {
 		ini->vlan_id = vlan_dev_vlan_id(ndev);
-		goto out_rel;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	priv.data = (void *)&ini->vlan_id;
-	rtnl_lock();
-	netdev_walk_all_lower_dev(ndev, smc_vlan_by_tcpsk_walk, &priv);
-	rtnl_unlock();
-
-out_rel:
-	dst_release(dst);
+	netdev_walk_all_lower_dev_rcu(ndev, smc_vlan_by_tcpsk_walk, &priv);
 out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
 	return rc;
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 15/69] selinux: switch two allocations to use kzalloc_objs()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit cf6a513f1937581eb012a217b29817e025a1a0ef ]

These were the only two allocations in the policy loading logic
that were not already using kzalloc_objs() for the policy
data structures. Fix these to be consistent with the rest and
to protect against ill-formed policy.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index feb206f3acb4a..12a2c5ef80813 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -166,9 +166,9 @@ void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
 {
 	kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
-	p->bool_val_to_struct = kmalloc_array(p->p_bools.nprim,
-					      sizeof(*p->bool_val_to_struct),
-					      GFP_KERNEL);
+	p->bool_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_bools.nprim,
+					sizeof(*p->bool_val_to_struct),
+					GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	return 0;
@@ -716,9 +716,9 @@ static int duplicate_policydb_bools(struct policydb *newdb,
 	struct cond_bool_datum **cond_bool_array;
 	int rc;
 
-	cond_bool_array = kmalloc_array(orig->p_bools.nprim,
-					sizeof(*orig->bool_val_to_struct),
-					GFP_KERNEL);
+	cond_bool_array = kcalloc(orig->p_bools.nprim,
+				  sizeof(*orig->bool_val_to_struct),
+				  GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!cond_bool_array)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 16/69] Revert "mtd: maps: vmu-flash: fix fault in unaligned fixup"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

This reverts commit 631edc934e476991a04723d3283e6628d077f8c1.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/mtd/maps/vmu-flash.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/mtd/maps/vmu-flash.c b/drivers/mtd/maps/vmu-flash.c
index ad10f7887dfa0..f96a165fccc7c 100644
--- a/drivers/mtd/maps/vmu-flash.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/maps/vmu-flash.c
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static int vmu_connect(struct maple_device *mdev)
 
 	basic_flash_data = be32_to_cpu(mdev->devinfo.function_data[c - 1]);
 
-	card = kzalloc_obj(struct memcard);
+	card = kmalloc(sizeof(struct memcard), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!card) {
 		error = -ENOMEM;
 		goto fail_nomem;
@@ -628,13 +628,15 @@ static int vmu_connect(struct maple_device *mdev)
 	* Not sure there are actually any multi-partition devices in the
 	* real world, but the hardware supports them, so, so will we
 	*/
-	card->parts = kzalloc_objs(struct vmupart, card->partitions);
+	card->parts = kmalloc_array(card->partitions, sizeof(struct vmupart),
+				    GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!card->parts) {
 		error = -ENOMEM;
 		goto fail_partitions;
 	}
 
-	card->mtd = kzalloc_objs(struct mtd_info, card->partitions);
+	card->mtd = kmalloc_array(card->partitions, sizeof(struct mtd_info),
+				  GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!card->mtd) {
 		error = -ENOMEM;
 		goto fail_mtd_info;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 17/69] Revert "smb: client: use kvzalloc() for megabyte buffer in simple fallocate"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

This reverts commit d1bc345f6229412d45bab2baf81d45d0e678253a.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
index 9727cb9250807..3aaa45375d8ba 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
@@ -3736,7 +3736,7 @@ static int smb3_simple_fallocate_range(unsigned int xid,
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	buf = kvzalloc(1024 * 1024, GFP_KERNEL);
+	buf = kzalloc(1024 * 1024, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (buf == NULL) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
@@ -3803,7 +3803,7 @@ static int smb3_simple_fallocate_range(unsigned int xid,
 
  out:
 	kfree(out_data);
-	kvfree(buf);
+	kfree(buf);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 18/69] ALSA: pcm: fix wait_time calculations

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen@gmx.de>

[ Upstream commit 3ed2b549b39f57239aad50a255ece353997183fd ]

... in wait_for_avail() and snd_pcm_drain().

t was calculated in seconds, so it would be pretty much always zero, to
be subsequently de-facto ignored due to being max(t, 10)'d. And then it
(i.e., 10) would be treated as secs, which doesn't seem right.

However, fixing it to properly calculate msecs would potentially cause
timeouts when using twice the period size for the default timeout (which
seems reasonable to me), so instead use the buffer size plus 10 percent
to be on the safe side ... but that still seems insufficient, presumably
because the hardware typically needs a moment to fire up. To compensate
for this, we up the minimal timeout to 100ms, which is still two orders
of magnitude less than the bogus minimum.

substream->wait_time was also misinterpreted as jiffies, despite being
documented as being in msecs. Only the soc/sof driver sets it - to 500,
which looks very much like msecs were intended.

Speaking of which, shouldn't snd_pcm_drain() also use substream->
wait_time?

As a drive-by, make the debug messages on timeout less confusing.

Signed-off-by: Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen@gmx.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230405201219.2197774-1-oswald.buddenhagen@gmx.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/core/pcm_lib.c    | 11 +++++------
 sound/core/pcm_native.c |  8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/core/pcm_lib.c b/sound/core/pcm_lib.c
index f319e4298b874..38671c4737f51 100644
--- a/sound/core/pcm_lib.c
+++ b/sound/core/pcm_lib.c
@@ -1877,15 +1877,14 @@ static int wait_for_avail(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
 		if (substream->wait_time) {
 			wait_time = substream->wait_time;
 		} else {
-			wait_time = 10;
+			wait_time = 100;
 
 			if (runtime->rate) {
-				long t = runtime->period_size * 2 /
-					 runtime->rate;
+				long t = runtime->buffer_size * 1100 / runtime->rate;
 				wait_time = max(t, wait_time);
 			}
-			wait_time = msecs_to_jiffies(wait_time * 1000);
 		}
+		wait_time = msecs_to_jiffies(wait_time);
 	}
 
 	for (;;) {
@@ -1933,8 +1932,8 @@ static int wait_for_avail(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
 		}
 		if (!tout) {
 			pcm_dbg(substream->pcm,
-				"%s write error (DMA or IRQ trouble?)\n",
-				is_playback ? "playback" : "capture");
+				"%s timeout (DMA or IRQ trouble?)\n",
+				is_playback ? "playback write" : "capture read");
 			err = -EIO;
 			break;
 		}
diff --git a/sound/core/pcm_native.c b/sound/core/pcm_native.c
index 94e3e3ba6a33a..831633edb77b6 100644
--- a/sound/core/pcm_native.c
+++ b/sound/core/pcm_native.c
@@ -2170,12 +2170,12 @@ static int snd_pcm_drain(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
 		if (runtime->no_period_wakeup)
 			tout = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
 		else {
-			tout = 10;
+			tout = 100;
 			if (runtime->rate) {
-				long t = runtime->period_size * 2 / runtime->rate;
+				long t = runtime->buffer_size * 1100 / runtime->rate;
 				tout = max(t, tout);
 			}
-			tout = msecs_to_jiffies(tout * 1000);
+			tout = msecs_to_jiffies(tout);
 		}
 		tout = schedule_timeout(tout);
 
@@ -2198,7 +2198,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_drain(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
 				result = -ESTRPIPE;
 			else {
 				dev_dbg(substream->pcm->card->dev,
-					"playback drain error (DMA or IRQ trouble?)\n");
+					"playback drain timeout (DMA or IRQ trouble?)\n");
 				snd_pcm_stop(substream, SNDRV_PCM_STATE_SETUP);
 				result = -EIO;
 			}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 19/69] ASoC: tegra: Fix Master Volume Control

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>

[ Upstream commit f9fd804aa0a36f15a35ca070ec4c52650876cc29 ]

Commit 3ed2b549b39f ("ALSA: pcm: fix wait_time calculations") corrected
the PCM wait_time calculations and in doing so reduced the calculated
wait_time. This exposed an issue with the Tegra Master Volume Control
(MVC) device where the reduced wait_time caused the MVC to fail. For now
fix this by setting the default wait_time for Tegra to be 500ms.

Fixes: 3ed2b549b39f ("ALSA: pcm: fix wait_time calculations")
Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613093453.13927-1-jonathanh@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/soc/tegra/tegra_pcm.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/sound/soc/tegra/tegra_pcm.c b/sound/soc/tegra/tegra_pcm.c
index ef1e74d952369..e5a2091090cdf 100644
--- a/sound/soc/tegra/tegra_pcm.c
+++ b/sound/soc/tegra/tegra_pcm.c
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ int tegra_pcm_open(struct snd_soc_component *component,
 		return ret;
 	}
 
+	/* Set wait time to 500ms by default */
+	substream->wait_time = 500;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tegra_pcm_open);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 20/69] ALSA: pcm: fix use-after-free on linked stream runtime in snd_pcm_drain()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mehul Rao <mehulrao@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 9b1dbd69ba6f8f8c69bc7b77c2ce3b9c6ed05ba6 ]

In the drain loop, the local variable 'runtime' is reassigned to a
linked stream's runtime (runtime = s->runtime at line 2157).  After
releasing the stream lock at line 2169, the code accesses
runtime->no_period_wakeup, runtime->rate, and runtime->buffer_size
(lines 2170-2178) — all referencing the linked stream's runtime without
any lock or refcount protecting its lifetime.

A concurrent close() on the linked stream's fd triggers
snd_pcm_release_substream() → snd_pcm_drop() → pcm_release_private()
→ snd_pcm_unlink() → snd_pcm_detach_substream() → kfree(runtime).
No synchronization prevents kfree(runtime) from completing while the
drain path dereferences the stale pointer.

Fix by caching the needed runtime fields (no_period_wakeup, rate,
buffer_size) into local variables while still holding the stream lock,
and using the cached values after the lock is released.

Fixes: f2b3614cefb6 ("ALSA: PCM - Don't check DMA time-out too shortly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mehul Rao <mehulrao@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260305193508.311096-1-mehulrao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/core/pcm_native.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/core/pcm_native.c b/sound/core/pcm_native.c
index 831633edb77b6..c835fd0fe315a 100644
--- a/sound/core/pcm_native.c
+++ b/sound/core/pcm_native.c
@@ -2144,6 +2144,10 @@ static int snd_pcm_drain(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
 	for (;;) {
 		long tout;
 		struct snd_pcm_runtime *to_check;
+		unsigned int drain_rate;
+		snd_pcm_uframes_t drain_bufsz;
+		bool drain_no_period_wakeup;
+
 		if (signal_pending(current)) {
 			result = -ERESTARTSYS;
 			break;
@@ -2163,16 +2167,25 @@ static int snd_pcm_drain(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
 		snd_pcm_group_unref(group, substream);
 		if (!to_check)
 			break; /* all drained */
+		/*
+		 * Cache the runtime fields needed after unlock.
+		 * A concurrent close() on the linked stream may free
+		 * its runtime via snd_pcm_detach_substream() once we
+		 * release the stream lock below.
+		 */
+		drain_no_period_wakeup = to_check->no_period_wakeup;
+		drain_rate = to_check->rate;
+		drain_bufsz = to_check->buffer_size;
 		init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
 		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 		add_wait_queue(&to_check->sleep, &wait);
 		snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irq(substream);
-		if (runtime->no_period_wakeup)
+		if (drain_no_period_wakeup)
 			tout = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
 		else {
 			tout = 100;
-			if (runtime->rate) {
-				long t = runtime->buffer_size * 1100 / runtime->rate;
+			if (drain_rate) {
+				long t = drain_bufsz * 1100 / drain_rate;
 				tout = max(t, tout);
 			}
 			tout = msecs_to_jiffies(tout);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 21/69] ALSA: PCM: Fix wait queue list corruption in snd_pcm_drain() on linked streams

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ji'an Zhou <eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 88fe2e3658726cb21ff2dcf9770bf672f9b9d31b ]

snd_pcm_drain() uses init_waitqueue_entry which does not clear
entry.prev/next, and add_wait_queue with a conditional
remove_wait_queue that is skipped when to_check is no longer
in the group after concurrent UNLINK.  The orphaned wait entry
remains on the unlinked substream sleep queue.  On the next
drain iteration, add_wait_queue adds the entry to a new queue
while still linked on the old one, corrupting both lists.  A
subsequent wake_up dereferences NULL at the func pointer
(mapped from the spinlock at offset 0 of the misinterpreted
wait_queue_head_t), causing a kernel panic.

Replace init_waitqueue_entry/add_wait_queue/conditional
remove_wait_queue with init_wait_entry/prepare_to_wait/
finish_wait.  init_wait_entry clears prev/next via
INIT_LIST_HEAD on each iteration and sets
autoremove_wake_function which auto-removes the entry on
wake-up.  finish_wait safely handles both the already-removed
and still-queued cases.

Fixes: 9b1dbd69ba6f ("ALSA: pcm: fix use-after-free on linked stream runtime in snd_pcm_drain")
Signed-off-by: Ji'an Zhou <eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260604142559.3840881-1-eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/core/pcm_native.c | 7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/core/pcm_native.c b/sound/core/pcm_native.c
index c835fd0fe315a..e45ca7793959d 100644
--- a/sound/core/pcm_native.c
+++ b/sound/core/pcm_native.c
@@ -2176,9 +2176,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_drain(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
 		drain_no_period_wakeup = to_check->no_period_wakeup;
 		drain_rate = to_check->rate;
 		drain_bufsz = to_check->buffer_size;
-		init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
-		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
-		add_wait_queue(&to_check->sleep, &wait);
+		init_wait_entry(&wait, 0);
+		prepare_to_wait(&to_check->sleep, &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 		snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irq(substream);
 		if (drain_no_period_wakeup)
 			tout = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
@@ -2196,7 +2195,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_drain(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
 		group = snd_pcm_stream_group_ref(substream);
 		snd_pcm_group_for_each_entry(s, substream) {
 			if (s->runtime == to_check) {
-				remove_wait_queue(&to_check->sleep, &wait);
+				finish_wait(&to_check->sleep, &wait);
 				break;
 			}
 		}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.15 22/69] ipv4: igmp: Fix potential UAF in igmp_gq_start_timer()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

commit 7b19c0f81ed1fdaec6bc522569be367199a9edf3 upstream.

A race condition exists between device teardown (inetdev_destroy) and
incoming IGMP query processing (igmp_rcv), leading to a Use-After-Free
in the IGMP timer callback.

During device destruction, inetdev_destroy() drops the primary reference
to in_device, which can drop its refcount to 0. The actual freeing of
in_device memory is deferred via RCU (using call_rcu()).

Concurrently, igmp_rcv() runs under RCU read lock and obtains the
in_device pointer. Because the memory is RCU-protected, CPU-0 can safely
dereference in_device even if its refcount has hit 0.

However, if CPU-0 calls igmp_gq_start_timer() and re-arms the timer, it
attempts to acquire a reference using in_dev_hold(). This increments the
refcount from 0 to 1, triggering a "refcount_t: addition on 0" warning.
Since the in_device memory is still scheduled to be freed after the RCU
grace period (as the free callback does not check the refcount again),
the device is freed while the timer is still armed. When the timer
expires, it accesses the freed memory, causing a kernel panic.

Fix this by using refcount_inc_not_zero() (via a new helper
in_dev_hold_safe()) to prevent acquiring a reference if the device is
already being destroyed. If the refcount is 0, we do not arm the timer.

A similar issue in IPv6 MLD is fixed in a subsequent patch.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Zero Day Initiative <zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260705181756.963063-2-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
[Denis Arefev: adapted for 5.10/5.15: keep prandom_u32(),
get_random_u32_below() not used here]
Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <arefev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/inetdevice.h |    5 +++++
 net/ipv4/igmp.c            |   14 +++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/inetdevice.h
+++ b/include/linux/inetdevice.h
@@ -277,6 +277,11 @@ static inline void in_dev_put(struct in_
 #define __in_dev_put(idev)  refcount_dec(&(idev)->refcnt)
 #define in_dev_hold(idev)   refcount_inc(&(idev)->refcnt)
 
+static inline bool in_dev_hold_safe(struct in_device *idev)
+{
+	return refcount_inc_not_zero(&idev->refcnt);
+}
+
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 
 static __inline__ __be32 inet_make_mask(int logmask)
--- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
@@ -232,16 +232,20 @@ static void igmp_gq_start_timer(struct i
 		return;
 
 	in_dev->mr_gq_running = 1;
-	if (!mod_timer(&in_dev->mr_gq_timer, exp))
-		in_dev_hold(in_dev);
+	if (in_dev_hold_safe(in_dev)) {
+		if (mod_timer(&in_dev->mr_gq_timer, exp))
+			in_dev_put(in_dev);
+	}
 }
 
 static void igmp_ifc_start_timer(struct in_device *in_dev, int delay)
 {
-	int tv = prandom_u32() % delay;
+	if (in_dev_hold_safe(in_dev)) {
+		int tv = prandom_u32() % delay;
 
-	if (!mod_timer(&in_dev->mr_ifc_timer, jiffies+tv+2))
-		in_dev_hold(in_dev);
+		if (mod_timer(&in_dev->mr_ifc_timer, jiffies + tv + 2))
+			in_dev_put(in_dev);
+	}
 }
 
 static void igmp_mod_timer(struct ip_mc_list *im, int max_delay)

[PATCH 5.15 23/69] kcov: replace local_irq_save() with a local_lock_t

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

[ Upstream commit d5d2c51f1e5f56ed01d2c773974630c007e5e5f5 ]

The kcov code mixes local_irq_save() and spin_lock() in
kcov_remote_{start|end}().  This creates a warning on PREEMPT_RT because
local_irq_save() disables interrupts and spin_lock_t is turned into a
sleeping lock which can not be acquired in a section with disabled
interrupts.

The kcov_remote_lock is used to synchronize the access to the hash-list
kcov_remote_map.  The local_irq_save() block protects access to the
per-CPU data kcov_percpu_data.

There is no compelling reason to change the lock type to raw_spin_lock_t
to make it work with local_irq_save().  Changing it would require to
move memory allocation (in kcov_remote_add()) and deallocation outside
of the locked section.

Adding an unlimited amount of entries to the hashlist will increase the
IRQ-off time during lookup.  It could be argued that this is debug code
and the latency does not matter.  There is however no need to do so and
it would allow to use this facility in an RT enabled build.

Using a local_lock_t instead of local_irq_save() has the befit of adding
a protection scope within the source which makes it obvious what is
protected.  On a !PREEMPT_RT && !LOCKDEP build the local_lock_irqsave()
maps directly to local_irq_save() so there is overhead at runtime.

Replace the local_irq_save() section with a local_lock_t.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210923164741.1859522-6-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210830172627.267989-6-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Reported-by: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: 2eed77fdcb0c ("kcov: fix data corruption and race conditions on PREEMPT_RT")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/kcov.c |   32 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/kcov.c
+++ b/kernel/kcov.c
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static struct list_head kcov_remote_area
 
 struct kcov_percpu_data {
 	void			*irq_area;
+	local_lock_t		lock;
 
 	unsigned int		saved_mode;
 	unsigned int		saved_size;
@@ -96,7 +97,9 @@ struct kcov_percpu_data {
 	int			saved_sequence;
 };
 
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kcov_percpu_data, kcov_percpu_data);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kcov_percpu_data, kcov_percpu_data) = {
+	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(lock),
+};
 
 /* Must be called with kcov_remote_lock locked. */
 static struct kcov_remote *kcov_remote_find(u64 handle)
@@ -834,7 +837,7 @@ void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle)
 	if (!in_task() && !in_softirq_really())
 		return;
 
-	local_irq_save(flags);
+	local_lock_irqsave(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
 
 	/*
 	 * Check that kcov_remote_start() is not called twice in background
@@ -842,7 +845,7 @@ void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle)
 	 */
 	mode = READ_ONCE(t->kcov_mode);
 	if (WARN_ON(in_task() && kcov_mode_enabled(mode))) {
-		local_irq_restore(flags);
+		local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
 		return;
 	}
 	/*
@@ -851,14 +854,15 @@ void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle)
 	 * happened while collecting coverage from a background thread.
 	 */
 	if (WARN_ON(in_serving_softirq() && t->kcov_softirq)) {
-		local_irq_restore(flags);
+		local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
 		return;
 	}
 
 	spin_lock(&kcov_remote_lock);
 	remote = kcov_remote_find(handle);
 	if (!remote) {
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_remote_lock, flags);
+		spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
+		local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
 		return;
 	}
 	kcov_debug("handle = %llx, context: %s\n", handle,
@@ -879,19 +883,19 @@ void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle)
 		size = CONFIG_KCOV_IRQ_AREA_SIZE;
 		area = this_cpu_ptr(&kcov_percpu_data)->irq_area;
 	}
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_remote_lock, flags);
+	spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
 
 	/* Can only happen when in_task(). */
 	if (!area) {
+		local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
 		area = vmalloc(size * sizeof(unsigned long));
 		if (!area) {
 			kcov_put(kcov);
 			return;
 		}
+		local_lock_irqsave(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
 	}
 
-	local_irq_save(flags);
-
 	/* Reset coverage size. */
 	*(u64 *)area = 0;
 
@@ -901,7 +905,7 @@ void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle)
 	}
 	kcov_start(t, kcov, size, area, mode, sequence);
 
-	local_irq_restore(flags);
+	local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
 
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcov_remote_start);
@@ -975,12 +979,12 @@ void kcov_remote_stop(void)
 	if (!in_task() && !in_softirq_really())
 		return;
 
-	local_irq_save(flags);
+	local_lock_irqsave(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
 
 	mode = READ_ONCE(t->kcov_mode);
 	barrier();
 	if (!kcov_mode_enabled(mode)) {
-		local_irq_restore(flags);
+		local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
 		return;
 	}
 	/*
@@ -988,12 +992,12 @@ void kcov_remote_stop(void)
 	 * actually found the remote handle and started collecting coverage.
 	 */
 	if (in_serving_softirq() && !t->kcov_softirq) {
-		local_irq_restore(flags);
+		local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
 		return;
 	}
 	/* Make sure that kcov_softirq is only set when in softirq. */
 	if (WARN_ON(!in_serving_softirq() && t->kcov_softirq)) {
-		local_irq_restore(flags);
+		local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -1023,7 +1027,7 @@ void kcov_remote_stop(void)
 		spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
 	}
 
-	local_irq_restore(flags);
+	local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
 
 	/* Get in kcov_remote_start(). */
 	kcov_put(kcov);

[PATCH 5.15 24/69] kcov: fix data corruption and race conditions on PREEMPT_RT

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

[ Upstream commit 2eed77fdcb0cc48e8eccb2bcd4b7f2c6d650e84c ]

syzbot is reporting KCOV state corruption on PREEMPT_RT kernels, for the
temporary storage used for saving/restoring remote KCOV state is currently
allocated as the per-CPU area.

On PREEMPT_RT kernels, softirq handlers run as preemptible task threads
(e.g., ksoftirqd). If a softirq context preempts a task running a remote
KCOV session, it safely saves the task's state into the per-CPU area.
However, if that softirq thread is subsequently preempted by a higher-
priority softirq thread on the same CPU, the second softirq will overwrite
the same per-CPU area, permanently destroying the original task's KCOV
state.

Fix this data corruption by moving the temporary storage from the per-CPU
area to the per-thread area. Since each softirq thread now owns its own
task context, nested softirq preemption no longer causes data overwrites.

Note that while the temporary storage is now on a per-thread basis, the
per-CPU kcov_percpu_data.lock must be retained, for we need to ensure that
kcov_remote_start() and kcov_remote_stop() operate atomically without
racing against asynchronous interrupts that manipulate the current task's
KCOV state.

It is likely that GFP_KERNEL allocation by vmalloc_node() in kcov_init()
has already called panic() before returning NULL, for there will be no
OOM-killable userspace processes when __init function of built-in module
runs. But this patch also fixes crashing the kernel when vmalloc_node()
in kcov_init() returned NULL, for kcov_init() left per-CPU irq_area == NULL
but kcov_remote_start() depends on per-CPU irq_area != NULL, resulting in

  (1) doing vmalloc() in kcov_remote_start() despite !in_task() context

  (2) out-of-array-bounds access if (1) succeeded but
      kcov->remote_size < CONFIG_KCOV_IRQ_AREA_SIZE

  (3) always leak memory allocated by (1), eventually killing all
      OOM-killable userspace processes

problems.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/43552d09-2ce2-4b19-b0d3-a2d1ab952145@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Reported-by: syzbot+3f51ad7ac3ae57a6fdcc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3f51ad7ac3ae57a6fdcc
Reported-by: syzbot+47cf95ca1f9dcca872c8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=47cf95ca1f9dcca872c8
Reported-by: syzbot+8a173e13208949931dc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=8a173e13208949931dc7
Reported-by: syzbot+90984d3713722683112e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=90984d3713722683112e
Analyzed-by: AI Mode in Google Search (no mail address)
Fixes: 5ff3b30ab57d ("kcov: collect coverage from interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
[ Adjusted the `kcov_init()` deletion context to plain `vmalloc()` since 5.15 lacks the `vmalloc_node()`/`cpu_to_node()` conversion. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/sched.h |    8 ++++
 kernel/kcov.c         |   90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
 lib/Kconfig.debug     |    5 +-
 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1398,6 +1398,14 @@ struct task_struct {
 
 	/* Collect coverage from softirq context: */
 	unsigned int			kcov_softirq;
+
+	/* Temporary storage for preempting remote coverage collection: */
+	unsigned int			kcov_saved_mode;
+	unsigned int			kcov_saved_size;
+	void				*kcov_saved_area;
+	struct kcov			*kcov_saved_kcov;
+	int				kcov_saved_sequence;
+
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
--- a/kernel/kcov.c
+++ b/kernel/kcov.c
@@ -84,17 +84,12 @@ struct kcov_remote {
 
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kcov_remote_lock);
 static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(kcov_remote_map, 4);
-static struct list_head kcov_remote_areas = LIST_HEAD_INIT(kcov_remote_areas);
+static struct list_head kcov_remote_areas[2] = {
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(kcov_remote_areas[0]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(kcov_remote_areas[1])
+};
 
 struct kcov_percpu_data {
-	void			*irq_area;
 	local_lock_t		lock;
-
-	unsigned int		saved_mode;
-	unsigned int		saved_size;
-	void			*saved_area;
-	struct kcov		*saved_kcov;
-	int			saved_sequence;
 };
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kcov_percpu_data, kcov_percpu_data) = {
@@ -130,12 +125,13 @@ static struct kcov_remote *kcov_remote_a
 }
 
 /* Must be called with kcov_remote_lock locked. */
-static struct kcov_remote_area *kcov_remote_area_get(unsigned int size)
+static struct kcov_remote_area *kcov_remote_area_get(unsigned int size, bool irq)
 {
 	struct kcov_remote_area *area;
 	struct list_head *pos;
+	struct list_head *list = &kcov_remote_areas[irq];
 
-	list_for_each(pos, &kcov_remote_areas) {
+	list_for_each(pos, list) {
 		area = list_entry(pos, struct kcov_remote_area, list);
 		if (area->size == size) {
 			list_del(&area->list);
@@ -147,11 +143,11 @@ static struct kcov_remote_area *kcov_rem
 
 /* Must be called with kcov_remote_lock locked. */
 static void kcov_remote_area_put(struct kcov_remote_area *area,
-					unsigned int size)
+				 unsigned int size, bool irq)
 {
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&area->list);
 	area->size = size;
-	list_add(&area->list, &kcov_remote_areas);
+	list_add(&area->list, &kcov_remote_areas[irq]);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -369,6 +365,12 @@ void kcov_task_init(struct task_struct *
 {
 	kcov_task_reset(t);
 	t->kcov_handle = current->kcov_handle;
+	t->kcov_softirq = 0;
+	t->kcov_saved_mode = 0;
+	t->kcov_saved_size = 0;
+	t->kcov_saved_area = NULL;
+	t->kcov_saved_kcov = NULL;
+	t->kcov_saved_sequence = 0;
 }
 
 static void kcov_reset(struct kcov *kcov)
@@ -790,34 +792,31 @@ static inline bool kcov_mode_enabled(uns
 
 static void kcov_remote_softirq_start(struct task_struct *t)
 {
-	struct kcov_percpu_data *data = this_cpu_ptr(&kcov_percpu_data);
 	unsigned int mode;
 
 	mode = READ_ONCE(t->kcov_mode);
 	barrier();
 	if (kcov_mode_enabled(mode)) {
-		data->saved_mode = mode;
-		data->saved_size = t->kcov_size;
-		data->saved_area = t->kcov_area;
-		data->saved_sequence = t->kcov_sequence;
-		data->saved_kcov = t->kcov;
+		t->kcov_saved_mode = mode;
+		t->kcov_saved_size = t->kcov_size;
+		t->kcov_saved_area = t->kcov_area;
+		t->kcov_saved_sequence = t->kcov_sequence;
+		t->kcov_saved_kcov = t->kcov;
 		kcov_stop(t);
 	}
 }
 
 static void kcov_remote_softirq_stop(struct task_struct *t)
 {
-	struct kcov_percpu_data *data = this_cpu_ptr(&kcov_percpu_data);
-
-	if (data->saved_kcov) {
-		kcov_start(t, data->saved_kcov, data->saved_size,
-				data->saved_area, data->saved_mode,
-				data->saved_sequence);
-		data->saved_mode = 0;
-		data->saved_size = 0;
-		data->saved_area = NULL;
-		data->saved_sequence = 0;
-		data->saved_kcov = NULL;
+	if (t->kcov_saved_kcov) {
+		kcov_start(t, t->kcov_saved_kcov, t->kcov_saved_size,
+			   t->kcov_saved_area, t->kcov_saved_mode,
+			   t->kcov_saved_sequence);
+		t->kcov_saved_mode = 0;
+		t->kcov_saved_size = 0;
+		t->kcov_saved_area = NULL;
+		t->kcov_saved_sequence = 0;
+		t->kcov_saved_kcov = NULL;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -878,17 +877,17 @@ void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle)
 	sequence = kcov->sequence;
 	if (in_task()) {
 		size = kcov->remote_size;
-		area = kcov_remote_area_get(size);
+		area = kcov_remote_area_get(size, false);
 	} else {
 		size = CONFIG_KCOV_IRQ_AREA_SIZE;
-		area = this_cpu_ptr(&kcov_percpu_data)->irq_area;
+		area = kcov_remote_area_get(size, true);
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
 
-	/* Can only happen when in_task(). */
+	/* Allocate new buffer if we can sleep. */
 	if (!area) {
 		local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
-		area = vmalloc(size * sizeof(unsigned long));
+		area = in_task() ? vmalloc(size * sizeof(unsigned long)) : NULL;
 		if (!area) {
 			kcov_put(kcov);
 			return;
@@ -1021,11 +1020,9 @@ void kcov_remote_stop(void)
 		kcov_move_area(kcov->mode, kcov->area, kcov->size, area);
 	spin_unlock(&kcov->lock);
 
-	if (in_task()) {
-		spin_lock(&kcov_remote_lock);
-		kcov_remote_area_put(area, size);
-		spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
-	}
+	spin_lock(&kcov_remote_lock);
+	kcov_remote_area_put(area, size, !in_task());
+	spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
 
 	local_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_percpu_data.lock, flags);
 
@@ -1045,14 +1042,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcov_common_handle);
 
 static int __init kcov_init(void)
 {
-	int cpu;
+	int cpu = num_possible_cpus();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
+	/* Allocate some extra buffers in order to prepare for softirq preemption. */
+	cpu = cpu >= 4 ? cpu * 2 : cpu + 4;
+#endif
+	while (cpu--) {
+		void *area = vmalloc(CONFIG_KCOV_IRQ_AREA_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long));
+		unsigned long flags;
 
-	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
-		void *area = vmalloc(CONFIG_KCOV_IRQ_AREA_SIZE *
-				sizeof(unsigned long));
 		if (!area)
 			return -ENOMEM;
-		per_cpu_ptr(&kcov_percpu_data, cpu)->irq_area = area;
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&kcov_remote_lock, flags);
+		kcov_remote_area_put(area, CONFIG_KCOV_IRQ_AREA_SIZE, true);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov_remote_lock, flags);
 	}
 
 	/*
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -2032,10 +2032,11 @@ config KCOV_INSTRUMENT_ALL
 config KCOV_IRQ_AREA_SIZE
 	hex "Size of interrupt coverage collection area in words"
 	depends on KCOV
+	range 0x80 0x1000000
 	default 0x40000
 	help
-	  KCOV uses preallocated per-cpu areas to collect coverage from
-	  soft interrupts. This specifies the size of those areas in the
+	  KCOV uses preallocated areas to collect coverage from soft
+	  interrupts. This specifies the size of those areas in the
 	  number of unsigned long words.
 
 menuconfig RUNTIME_TESTING_MENU

[PATCH 5.15 25/69] ext4: propagate errors from fast commit range replay

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guanghui Yang <3497809730@qq.com>

[ Upstream commit d8b8dd3530bf41e14b118702cdaf9de64bb96885 ]

ext4_fc_replay() stops replaying fast commit tags only when a tag
handler returns a negative error. However, ext4_fc_replay_add_range()
and ext4_fc_replay_del_range() currently return 0 from their common
exit paths even after internal failures.

This hides errors from ext4_fc_record_modified_inode(),
ext4_map_blocks(), ext4_find_extent(), ext4_ext_insert_extent(),
ext4_ext_replay_update_ex(), and ext4_ext_remove_space(). As a result,
a failed ADD_RANGE or DEL_RANGE replay can be treated as successful and
the replay code may continue with subsequent fast commit tags.

This is particularly problematic for DEL_RANGE because it may already
have marked blocks as free before ext4_ext_remove_space() fails. If the
error is swallowed, replay may continue from a partially applied range
operation.

Return the saved error from the common exit paths and make the
ERR_PTR() cases in ADD_RANGE store PTR_ERR() before jumping to out.

Fixes: 8016e29f4362 ("ext4: fast commit recovery path")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guanghui Yang <3497809730@qq.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_E3622146846A84C75C31C7D32AC4D5AD0605@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[ kept the existing `ext4_find_extent(inode, cur, NULL, 0)` call and dropped the `ext4_ext_insert_extent()` error-capture hunk, since this tree's extents API predates the ppath rework and already returns errors via `int` ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/ext4/fast_commit.c |   10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c
@@ -1780,8 +1780,10 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_add_range(stru
 		if (ret == 0) {
 			/* Range is not mapped */
 			path = ext4_find_extent(inode, cur, NULL, 0);
-			if (IS_ERR(path))
+			if (IS_ERR(path)) {
+				ret = PTR_ERR(path);
 				goto out;
+			}
 			memset(&newex, 0, sizeof(newex));
 			newex.ee_block = cpu_to_le32(cur);
 			ext4_ext_store_pblock(
@@ -1843,9 +1845,10 @@ next:
 	}
 	ext4_ext_replay_shrink_inode(inode, i_size_read(inode) >>
 					sb->s_blocksize_bits);
+	ret = 0;
 out:
 	iput(inode);
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /* Replay DEL_RANGE tag */
@@ -1906,9 +1909,10 @@ ext4_fc_replay_del_range(struct super_bl
 	ext4_ext_replay_shrink_inode(inode,
 		i_size_read(inode) >> sb->s_blocksize_bits);
 	ext4_mark_inode_dirty(NULL, inode);
+	ret = 0;
 out:
 	iput(inode);
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void ext4_fc_set_bitmaps_and_counters(struct super_block *sb)

[PATCH 5.15 26/69] nilfs2: correct return value kernel-doc descriptions for ioctl functions

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 17c46a45cdb94c500f4e93b176cdd61931b03020 ]

Patch series "nilfs2: fix kernel-doc comments for function return values",
v2.

This series fixes the inadequacies in the return value descriptions in
nilfs2's kernel-doc comments (mainly incorrect formatting), as well as the
lack of return value descriptions themselves, and fixes most of the
remaining warnings that are output when the kernel-doc script is run with
the "-Wall" option.

This patch (of 7):

In the kernel-doc comments for functions, there are many cases where the
format of the return value description is inaccurate, such as "Return
Value: ...", which causes many warnings to be output when the kernel-doc
script is executed with the "-Wall" option.

This fixes such incorrectly formatted return value descriptions for ioctl
functions.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250110010530.21872-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250110010530.21872-2-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: "Brian G ." <gissf1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: a1735eae5544 ("nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c |  231 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
 1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 136 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
@@ -32,17 +32,14 @@
  * @dofunc: concrete function of get/set metadata info
  *
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_wrap_copy() gets/sets metadata info by means of
- * calling dofunc() function on the basis of @argv argument.
+ * calling dofunc() function on the basis of @argv argument.  If successful,
+ * the requested metadata information is copied to userspace memory.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned and requested metadata info
- * is copied into userspace. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - Invalid arguments from userspace.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT	- Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Invalid arguments from userspace.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_wrap_copy(struct the_nilfs *nilfs,
 				 struct nilfs_argv *argv, int dir,
@@ -176,13 +173,10 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_getversion(struct
  * given checkpoint between checkpoint and snapshot state. This ioctl
  * is used in chcp and mkcp utilities.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned and mode of a checkpoint is
- * changed. On error, one of the following negative error codes
- * is returned.
- *
- * %-EPERM - Operation not permitted.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during checkpoint mode changing.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * %-EFAULT	- Failure during checkpoint mode changing.
+ * %-EPERM	- Operation not permitted.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_change_cpmode(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				     unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -230,13 +224,10 @@ out:
  * checkpoint from NILFS2 file system. This ioctl is used in rmcp
  * utility.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned and a checkpoint is
- * removed. On error, one of the following negative error codes
- * is returned.
- *
- * %-EPERM - Operation not permitted.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during checkpoint removing.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * %-EFAULT	- Failure during checkpoint removing.
+ * %-EPERM	- Operation not permitted.
  */
 static int
 nilfs_ioctl_delete_checkpoint(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
@@ -282,7 +273,7 @@ out:
  * requested checkpoints. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_CPINFO ioctl is used in
  * lscp utility and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
  *
- * Return value: count of nilfs_cpinfo structures in output buffer.
+ * Return: Count of nilfs_cpinfo structures in output buffer.
  */
 static ssize_t
 nilfs_ioctl_do_get_cpinfo(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, __u64 *posp, int flags,
@@ -306,17 +297,14 @@ nilfs_ioctl_do_get_cpinfo(struct the_nil
  *
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_get_cpstat() returns information about checkpoints.
  * The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_CPSTAT ioctl is used by lscp, rmcp utilities
- * and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
- *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned, and checkpoints information is
- * copied into userspace pointer @argp. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.  The checkpoint statistics are copied to
+ * the userspace memory pointed to by @argp.
  *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during getting checkpoints statistics.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT	- Failure during getting checkpoints statistics.
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_get_cpstat(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				  unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -349,7 +337,8 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_cpstat(struct
  * info about requested segments. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_SUINFO ioctl is used
  * in lssu, nilfs_resize utilities and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
  *
- * Return value: count of nilfs_suinfo structures in output buffer.
+ * Return: Count of nilfs_suinfo structures in output buffer on success,
+ * or a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static ssize_t
 nilfs_ioctl_do_get_suinfo(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, __u64 *posp, int flags,
@@ -373,17 +362,14 @@ nilfs_ioctl_do_get_suinfo(struct the_nil
  *
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_get_sustat() returns segment usage statistics.
  * The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_SUSTAT ioctl is used in lssu, nilfs_resize utilities
- * and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
- *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned, and segment usage information is
- * copied into userspace pointer @argp. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.  The requested segment usage information is
+ * copied to the userspace memory pointed to by @argp.
  *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during getting segment usage statistics.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT	- Failure during getting segment usage statistics.
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_get_sustat(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				  unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -416,7 +402,8 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_sustat(struct
  * on virtual block addresses. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_VINFO ioctl is used
  * by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
  *
- * Return value: count of nilfs_vinfo structures in output buffer.
+ * Return: Count of nilfs_vinfo structures in output buffer on success, or
+ * a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static ssize_t
 nilfs_ioctl_do_get_vinfo(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, __u64 *posp, int flags,
@@ -443,7 +430,8 @@ nilfs_ioctl_do_get_vinfo(struct the_nilf
  * about descriptors of disk block numbers. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_BDESCS ioctl
  * is used by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
  *
- * Return value: count of nilfs_bdescs structures in output buffer.
+ * Return: Count of nilfs_bdescs structures in output buffer on success, or
+ * a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static ssize_t
 nilfs_ioctl_do_get_bdescs(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, __u64 *posp, int flags,
@@ -480,19 +468,15 @@ nilfs_ioctl_do_get_bdescs(struct the_nil
  *
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_do_get_bdescs() function returns information
  * about descriptors of disk block numbers. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_BDESCS ioctl
- * is used by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
- *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned, and disk block descriptors are
- * copied into userspace pointer @argp. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - Invalid arguments from userspace.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
+ * is used by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.  If successful, disk block descriptors
+ * are copied to userspace pointer @argp.
  *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during getting disk block descriptors.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT	- Failure during getting disk block descriptors.
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Invalid arguments from userspace.
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_get_bdescs(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				  unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -526,16 +510,12 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_bdescs(struct
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_move_inode_block() function registers data/node
  * buffer in the GC pagecache and submit read request.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-ENOENT - Requested block doesn't exist.
- *
- * %-EEXIST - Blocks conflict is detected.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EEXIST	- Block conflict detected.
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOENT	- Requested block doesn't exist.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_move_inode_block(struct inode *inode,
 					struct nilfs_vdesc *vdesc,
@@ -590,8 +570,8 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_move_inode_block(
  * blocks that garbage collector specified with the array of nilfs_vdesc
  * structures and stores them into page caches of GC inodes.
  *
- * Return Value: Number of processed nilfs_vdesc structures or
- * error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: Number of processed nilfs_vdesc structures on success, or
+ * a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_move_blocks(struct super_block *sb,
 				   struct nilfs_argv *argv, void *buf)
@@ -668,14 +648,11 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_move_blocks(struc
  * in the period from p_start to p_end, excluding p_end itself. The checkpoints
  * which have been already deleted are ignored.
  *
- * Return Value: Number of processed nilfs_period structures or
- * error code, otherwise.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - invalid checkpoints.
+ * Return: Number of processed nilfs_period structures on success, or one of
+ * the following negative error codes on failure:
+ * * %-EINVAL	- invalid checkpoints.
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_delete_checkpoints(struct the_nilfs *nilfs,
 					  struct nilfs_argv *argv, void *buf)
@@ -703,14 +680,11 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_delete_checkpoint
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_free_vblocknrs() function frees
  * the virtual block numbers specified by @buf and @argv->v_nmembs.
  *
- * Return Value: Number of processed virtual block numbers or
- * error code, otherwise.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-ENOENT - The virtual block number have not been allocated.
+ * Return: Number of processed virtual block numbers on success, or one of the
+ * following negative error codes on failure:
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOENT	- Unallocated virtual block number.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_free_vblocknrs(struct the_nilfs *nilfs,
 				      struct nilfs_argv *argv, void *buf)
@@ -732,14 +706,11 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_free_vblocknrs(st
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_mark_blocks_dirty() function marks
  * metadata file or data blocks as dirty.
  *
- * Return Value: Number of processed block descriptors or
- * error code, otherwise.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error
- *
- * %-ENOENT - the specified block does not exist (hole block)
+ * Return: Number of processed block descriptors on success, or one of the
+ * following negative error codes on failure:
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOENT	- Non-existent block (hole block).
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_mark_blocks_dirty(struct the_nilfs *nilfs,
 					 struct nilfs_argv *argv, void *buf)
@@ -844,7 +815,7 @@ int nilfs_ioctl_prepare_clean_segments(s
  * from userspace. The NILFS_IOCTL_CLEAN_SEGMENTS ioctl is used by
  * nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned or error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				      unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -970,20 +941,14 @@ out:
  * and metadata are written out to the device when it successfully
  * returned.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is retured. On errors, one of the following
- * negative error code is returned.
- *
- * %-EROFS - Read only filesystem.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error
- *
- * %-ENOSPC - No space left on device (only in a panic state).
- *
- * %-ERESTARTSYS - Interrupted.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT		- Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * * %-EIO		- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM		- Insufficient memory available.
+ * * %-ENOSPC		- No space left on device (only in a panic state).
+ * * %-ERESTARTSYS	- Interrupted.
+ * * %-EROFS		- Read only filesystem.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_sync(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 			    unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -1017,7 +982,7 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_sync(struct inode
  * @filp: file object
  * @argp: pointer on argument from userspace
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned or error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_resize(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 			      void __user *argp)
@@ -1053,7 +1018,7 @@ out:
  * checks the arguments from userspace and calls nilfs_sufile_trim_fs, which
  * performs the actual trim operation.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned or negative error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_trim_fs(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
 {
@@ -1095,7 +1060,7 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_trim_fs(struct in
  * of segments in bytes and upper limit of segments in bytes.
  * The NILFS_IOCTL_SET_ALLOC_RANGE is used by nilfs_resize utility.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned or error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_set_alloc_range(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
 {
@@ -1146,17 +1111,15 @@ out:
  * @dofunc: concrete function of getting metadata info
  *
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_get_info() gets metadata info by means of
- * calling dofunc() function.
- *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned and requested metadata info
- * is copied into userspace. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - Invalid arguments from userspace.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
+ * calling dofunc() function.  The requested metadata information is copied
+ * to userspace memory @argp.
  *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT	- Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Invalid arguments from userspace.
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_get_info(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp,
@@ -1196,18 +1159,14 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_info(struct i
  * encapsulated in nilfs_argv and updates the segment usage info
  * according to the flags in nilfs_suinfo_update.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned. On error, one of the
- * following negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EPERM - Not enough permissions
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Error copying input data
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - Invalid values in input (segment number, flags or nblocks)
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EEXIST	- Block conflict detected.
+ * * %-EFAULT	- Error copying input data.
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Invalid values in input (segment number, flags or nblocks).
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
+ * * %-EPERM	- Not enough permissions.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_set_suinfo(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)

[PATCH 5.15 27/69] nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit a1735eae55448bc79c2da6593455791e886f6ed8 ]

Syzbot reported list corruption caused by a double list_add_tail() call on
bh->b_assoc_buffers within nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers().

Analysis revealed that the root cause was the insertion of a page/folio
with a page index of ULONG_MAX into the page cache via the GC ioctl.
filemap_get_folios_tag(), called by nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers(),
repeatedly detects a dirty folio with a page index of ULONG_MAX due to
index wrap-around, leading to duplicate processing of dirty buffers.

As a preparatory step, the GC ioctl loads the page/folio of the block to
be moved during GC and inserts it into the page cache based on information
in the nilfs_vdesc structure passed as an argument.  Normally, this does
not cause issues because the user-space GC library configures the
nilfs_vdesc structure properly.  However, since there is no range check on
the parameters determining the page index, a request with artificially
crafted parameters -- such as those generated by Syzbot -- can result in a
page/folio being inserted with a page index of ULONG_MAX, triggering the
above problem.

This resolves the issue by checking the ranges of 'vd_offset' and
'vd_vblocknr' in the nilfs_vdesc structure that determine the page index,
thereby preventing the invalid page/folio insertions.

Reported-by: syzbot+c37bed40868932d790e9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c37bed40868932d790e9
Fixes: 7942b919f732 ("nilfs2: ioctl operations")
Cc: wuyankun <wuyankun@uniontech.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c |   20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
@@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_bdescs(struct
  * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
  * failure:
  * * %-EEXIST	- Block conflict detected.
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Invalid virtual block descriptor.
  * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
  * * %-ENOENT	- Requested block doesn't exist.
  * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
@@ -522,15 +523,30 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_move_inode_block(
 					struct list_head *buffers)
 {
 	struct buffer_head *bh;
+	__u64 limit_blkidx = (__u64)inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes >> inode->i_blkbits;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (vdesc->vd_flags == 0)
+	/*
+	 * vblocknr 0 is reserved as an invalid pointer.  Also, limit_blkidx
+	 * ensures that the page index converted from vd_vblocknr never
+	 * overflows the page cache limit and respects the architecture's bmap
+	 * key width.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(vdesc->vd_vblocknr == 0 ||
+			vdesc->vd_vblocknr >= limit_blkidx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (vdesc->vd_flags == 0) {
+		if (unlikely(vdesc->vd_offset >= limit_blkidx))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		ret = nilfs_gccache_submit_read_data(
 			inode, vdesc->vd_offset, vdesc->vd_blocknr,
 			vdesc->vd_vblocknr, &bh);
-	else
+	} else {
 		ret = nilfs_gccache_submit_read_node(
 			inode, vdesc->vd_blocknr, vdesc->vd_vblocknr, &bh);
+	}
 
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
 		if (ret == -ENOENT)

[PATCH 5.15 28/69] nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>

[ Upstream commit 0428fa2c22e2ba0cff766d3b80d461e149102045 ]

nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep() and
nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep() read an inner length byte from
the NCI RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF payload and use it to memcpy() into fixed
kernel buffers, but neither function receives the caller-validated
activation_params_len.  A crafted NCI notification with
activation_params_len=1 and an inner length byte of up to 20 (NFC-A) or
50 (NFC-B) causes memcpy() to read that many bytes past the one valid
byte in the activation params region -- a slab out-of-bounds read of
kernel memory adjacent to the NCI skb.

The sibling nci_extract_rf_params_*() family was given equivalent
protection by commit 571dcbeb8e63 ("net: nfc: nci: Fix parameter
validation for packet data"), but the two activation parameter
extractors were not updated at that time.

Add a data_len parameter to both functions, guard against an empty
region before consuming the inner length byte, decrement the remaining
count after consuming it, and clamp the copy length to what is actually
available.  Update both call sites to pass ntf.activation_params_len,
which is already validated against the skb at ntf.c:801.

Fixes: e8c0dacd9836 ("NFC: Update names and structs to NCI spec 1.0 d18")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-6d52d8b0-v3-1-e26221f8826d@proton.me
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
[ Replaced `NFC_ATS_MAXSIZE` with the literal `20` since that macro doesn't exist in this tree. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/nfc/nci/ntf.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c
+++ b/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c
@@ -525,15 +525,19 @@ static int nci_rf_discover_ntf_packet(st
 
 static int nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep(struct nci_dev *ndev,
 						 struct nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf *ntf,
-						 const __u8 *data)
+						 const __u8 *data, __u8 data_len)
 {
 	struct activation_params_nfca_poll_iso_dep *nfca_poll;
 	struct activation_params_nfcb_poll_iso_dep *nfcb_poll;
 
 	switch (ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode) {
 	case NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
+		if (data_len < 1)
+			return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
 		nfca_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfca_poll_iso_dep;
 		nfca_poll->rats_res_len = min_t(__u8, *data++, 20);
+		data_len--;
+		nfca_poll->rats_res_len = min_t(__u8, nfca_poll->rats_res_len, data_len);
 		pr_debug("rats_res_len %d\n", nfca_poll->rats_res_len);
 		if (nfca_poll->rats_res_len > 0) {
 			memcpy(nfca_poll->rats_res,
@@ -542,8 +546,12 @@ static int nci_extract_activation_params
 		break;
 
 	case NCI_NFC_B_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
+		if (data_len < 1)
+			return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
 		nfcb_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfcb_poll_iso_dep;
 		nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len = min_t(__u8, *data++, 50);
+		data_len--;
+		nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len = min_t(__u8, nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len, data_len);
 		pr_debug("attrib_res_len %d\n", nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len);
 		if (nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len > 0) {
 			memcpy(nfcb_poll->attrib_res,
@@ -562,7 +570,7 @@ static int nci_extract_activation_params
 
 static int nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep(struct nci_dev *ndev,
 						 struct nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf *ntf,
-						 const __u8 *data)
+						 const __u8 *data, __u8 data_len)
 {
 	struct activation_params_poll_nfc_dep *poll;
 	struct activation_params_listen_nfc_dep *listen;
@@ -570,9 +578,13 @@ static int nci_extract_activation_params
 	switch (ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode) {
 	case NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
 	case NCI_NFC_F_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
+		if (data_len < 1)
+			return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
 		poll = &ntf->activation_params.poll_nfc_dep;
 		poll->atr_res_len = min_t(__u8, *data++,
 					  NFC_ATR_RES_MAXSIZE - 2);
+		data_len--;
+		poll->atr_res_len = min_t(__u8, poll->atr_res_len, data_len);
 		pr_debug("atr_res_len %d\n", poll->atr_res_len);
 		if (poll->atr_res_len > 0)
 			memcpy(poll->atr_res, data, poll->atr_res_len);
@@ -580,9 +592,13 @@ static int nci_extract_activation_params
 
 	case NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_LISTEN_MODE:
 	case NCI_NFC_F_PASSIVE_LISTEN_MODE:
+		if (data_len < 1)
+			return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
 		listen = &ntf->activation_params.listen_nfc_dep;
 		listen->atr_req_len = min_t(__u8, *data++,
 					    NFC_ATR_REQ_MAXSIZE - 2);
+		data_len--;
+		listen->atr_req_len = min_t(__u8, listen->atr_req_len, data_len);
 		pr_debug("atr_req_len %d\n", listen->atr_req_len);
 		if (listen->atr_req_len > 0)
 			memcpy(listen->atr_req, data, listen->atr_req_len);
@@ -790,12 +806,14 @@ static int nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_pac
 		switch (ntf.rf_interface) {
 		case NCI_RF_INTERFACE_ISO_DEP:
 			err = nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep(ndev,
-								    &ntf, data);
+								    &ntf, data,
+								    ntf.activation_params_len);
 			break;
 
 		case NCI_RF_INTERFACE_NFC_DEP:
 			err = nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep(ndev,
-								    &ntf, data);
+								    &ntf, data,
+								    ntf.activation_params_len);
 			break;
 
 		case NCI_RF_INTERFACE_FRAME:

[PATCH 5.15 29/69] HID: magicmouse: prevent unbounded recursion in magicmouse_raw_event()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jose Villaseñor Montfort <pepemontfort@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit db8d634128d2ba88d79c0b601e983ebe14bb0519 ]

magicmouse_raw_event() handles DOUBLE_REPORT_ID (0xf7) packets, which pack
two touch reports into one, by splitting the packet and calling itself on
each half. The only guard against runaway recursion is a "size < 1" check,
which stops zero-sized calls but does not bound the recursion depth.

A malicious HID device that matches this driver can send a report starting
with DOUBLE_REPORT_ID and filled with the sequence [0xf7, 0x00]. Each level
consumes two bytes and recurses on the remainder, so an incoming report of
up to HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16 KiB) drives roughly 8000 nested calls. That
easily exhausts the 16 KiB kernel stack, leading to a stack overflow: a
panic with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK, or memory corruption without it.

A double report only ever wraps two normal reports; it is never
legitimately nested. Refuse to re-enter the DOUBLE_REPORT_ID case from a
recursive call so the recursion depth is bounded to two, while all valid
packets keep being parsed exactly as before.

Fixes: a462230e16ac ("HID: magicmouse: enable Magic Trackpad support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-input/20260706181347.700DB1F00A3F@smtp.kernel.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jose Villaseñor Montfort <pepemontfort@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Hall <signshop.alec@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alec Hall <signshop.alec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c |   25 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c
@@ -368,8 +368,8 @@ static void magicmouse_emit_touch(struct
 	}
 }
 
-static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
-		struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size)
+static int __magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
+		struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size, bool nested)
 {
 	struct magicmouse_sc *msc = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
 	struct input_dev *input = msc->input;
@@ -480,6 +480,15 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct h
 		 * packet.
 		 */
 
+		/*
+		 * A double report only ever wraps two normal reports, so it is
+		 * never nested. Refuse to recurse a second time; otherwise a
+		 * malicious device could chain DOUBLE_REPORT_ID packets to drive
+		 * unbounded recursion and overflow the kernel stack.
+		 */
+		if (nested)
+			return 0;
+
 		/* Ensure that we have at least 2 elements (report type and size) */
 		if (size < 2)
 			return 0;
@@ -491,9 +500,9 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct h
 			return 0;
 		}
 
-		magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2, data[1]);
-		magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2 + data[1],
-			size - 2 - data[1]);
+		__magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2, data[1], true);
+		__magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2 + data[1],
+			size - 2 - data[1], true);
 		return 0;
 	default:
 		return 0;
@@ -516,6 +525,12 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct h
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
+		struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size)
+{
+	return __magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data, size, false);
+}
+
 static int magicmouse_event(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_field *field,
 		struct hid_usage *usage, __s32 value)
 {

[PATCH 5.15 30/69] nvme: rename CDR/MORE/DNR to NVME_STATUS_*

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weiwen Hu <huweiwen@linux.alibaba.com>

[ Upstream commit dd0b0a4a2c5d7209457dc172997d1243ad269cfa ]

CDR/MORE/DNR fields are not belonging to SC in the NVMe spec, rename
them to NVME_STATUS_* to avoid confusion.

Signed-off-by: Weiwen Hu <huweiwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 4a3f00262a04 ("nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c          |   12 +++++-----
 drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c       |    8 +++----
 drivers/nvme/host/fault_inject.c  |    2 -
 drivers/nvme/host/fc.c            |    8 +++----
 drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c   |   20 +++++++++---------
 drivers/nvme/target/core.c        |   42 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c   |   14 ++++++------
 drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c |   32 ++++++++++++++--------------
 drivers/nvme/target/io-cmd-bdev.c |   12 +++++-----
 drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h       |    2 -
 drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c    |   10 ++++-----
 drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c        |   10 ++++-----
 drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c         |    4 +--
 drivers/nvme/target/zns.c         |   30 +++++++++++++--------------
 include/linux/nvme.h              |    4 +--
 15 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static void nvme_retry_req(struct reques
 	u16 crd;
 
 	/* The mask and shift result must be <= 3 */
-	crd = (nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_SC_CRD) >> 11;
+	crd = (nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_STATUS_CRD) >> 11;
 	if (crd)
 		delay = nvme_req(req)->ctrl->crdt[crd - 1] * 100;
 
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static inline enum nvme_disposition nvme
 		return COMPLETE;
 
 	if (blk_noretry_request(req) ||
-	    (nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_SC_DNR) ||
+	    (nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_STATUS_DNR) ||
 	    nvme_req(req)->retries >= nvme_max_retries)
 		return COMPLETE;
 
@@ -1519,7 +1519,7 @@ static int nvme_identify_ns(struct nvme_
 		goto out_free_id;
 	}
 
-	error = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_SC_DNR;
+	error = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	if ((*id)->ncap == 0) /* namespace not allocated or attached */
 		goto out_free_id;
 
@@ -4015,7 +4015,7 @@ static void nvme_ns_remove_by_nsid(struc
 static void nvme_validate_ns(struct nvme_ns *ns, struct nvme_ns_ids *ids)
 {
 	struct nvme_id_ns *id;
-	int ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_SC_DNR;
+	int ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 
 	if (test_bit(NVME_NS_DEAD, &ns->flags))
 		goto out;
@@ -4024,7 +4024,7 @@ static void nvme_validate_ns(struct nvme
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
-	ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_SC_DNR;
+	ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	if (!nvme_ns_ids_equal(&ns->head->ids, ids)) {
 		dev_err(ns->ctrl->device,
 			"identifiers changed for nsid %d\n", ns->head->ns_id);
@@ -4042,7 +4042,7 @@ out:
 	 *
 	 * TODO: we should probably schedule a delayed retry here.
 	 */
-	if (ret > 0 && (ret & NVME_SC_DNR))
+	if (ret > 0 && (ret & NVME_STATUS_DNR))
 		nvme_ns_remove(ns);
 }
 
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ int nvmf_reg_read32(struct nvme_ctrl *ct
 	if (unlikely(ret != 0))
 		dev_err(ctrl->device,
 			"Property Get error: %d, offset %#x\n",
-			ret > 0 ? ret & ~NVME_SC_DNR : ret, off);
+			ret > 0 ? ret & ~NVME_STATUS_DNR : ret, off);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ int nvmf_reg_read64(struct nvme_ctrl *ct
 	if (unlikely(ret != 0))
 		dev_err(ctrl->device,
 			"Property Get error: %d, offset %#x\n",
-			ret > 0 ? ret & ~NVME_SC_DNR : ret, off);
+			ret > 0 ? ret & ~NVME_STATUS_DNR : ret, off);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmf_reg_read64);
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ int nvmf_reg_write32(struct nvme_ctrl *c
 	if (unlikely(ret))
 		dev_err(ctrl->device,
 			"Property Set error: %d, offset %#x\n",
-			ret > 0 ? ret & ~NVME_SC_DNR : ret, off);
+			ret > 0 ? ret & ~NVME_STATUS_DNR : ret, off);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmf_reg_write32);
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static void nvmf_log_connect_error(struc
 		int errval, int offset, struct nvme_command *cmd,
 		struct nvmf_connect_data *data)
 {
-	int err_sctype = errval & ~NVME_SC_DNR;
+	int err_sctype = errval & ~NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 
 	switch (err_sctype) {
 	case (NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM):
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/fault_inject.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fault_inject.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ void nvme_should_fail(struct request *re
 		/* inject status code and DNR bit */
 		status = fault_inject->status;
 		if (fault_inject->dont_retry)
-			status |= NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status |= NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		nvme_req(req)->status =	status;
 	}
 }
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/fc.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fc.c
@@ -3108,7 +3108,7 @@ nvme_fc_create_association(struct nvme_f
 	if (ctrl->ctrl.icdoff) {
 		dev_err(ctrl->ctrl.device, "icdoff %d is not supported!\n",
 				ctrl->ctrl.icdoff);
-		ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out_disconnect_admin_queue;
 	}
 
@@ -3116,7 +3116,7 @@ nvme_fc_create_association(struct nvme_f
 	if (!nvme_ctrl_sgl_supported(&ctrl->ctrl)) {
 		dev_err(ctrl->ctrl.device,
 			"Mandatory sgls are not supported!\n");
-		ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out_disconnect_admin_queue;
 	}
 
@@ -3287,7 +3287,7 @@ nvme_fc_reconnect_or_delete(struct nvme_
 		dev_info(ctrl->ctrl.device,
 			"NVME-FC{%d}: reset: Reconnect attempt failed (%d)\n",
 			ctrl->cnum, status);
-		if (status > 0 && (status & NVME_SC_DNR))
+		if (status > 0 && (status & NVME_STATUS_DNR))
 			recon = false;
 	} else if (time_after_eq(jiffies, rport->dev_loss_end))
 		recon = false;
@@ -3304,7 +3304,7 @@ nvme_fc_reconnect_or_delete(struct nvme_
 		queue_delayed_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->connect_work, recon_delay);
 	} else {
 		if (portptr->port_state == FC_OBJSTATE_ONLINE) {
-			if (status > 0 && (status & NVME_SC_DNR))
+			if (status > 0 && (status & NVME_STATUS_DNR))
 				dev_warn(ctrl->ctrl.device,
 					 "NVME-FC{%d}: reconnect failure\n",
 					 ctrl->cnum);
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_get_log_page(s
 	pr_debug("unhandled lid %d on qid %d\n",
 	       req->cmd->get_log_page.lid, req->sq->qid);
 	req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_get_log_page_command, lid);
-	nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR);
+	nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR);
 }
 
 static void nvmet_execute_identify_ctrl(struct nvmet_req *req)
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_identify_ns(st
 
 	if (le32_to_cpu(req->cmd->identify.nsid) == NVME_NSID_ALL) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_identify, nsid);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_identify_descl
 
 	if (sg_zero_buffer(req->sg, req->sg_cnt, NVME_IDENTIFY_DATA_SIZE - off,
 			off) != NVME_IDENTIFY_DATA_SIZE - off)
-		status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 
 out:
 	nvmet_req_complete(req, status);
@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ u16 nvmet_set_feat_async_event(struct nv
 
 	if (val32 & ~mask) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, cdw11);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	WRITE_ONCE(req->sq->ctrl->aen_enabled, val32);
@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_set_features(struct n
 		ncqr = (cdw11 >> 16) & 0xffff;
 		nsqr = cdw11 & 0xffff;
 		if (ncqr == 0xffff || nsqr == 0xffff) {
-			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 			break;
 		}
 		nvmet_set_result(req,
@@ -853,14 +853,14 @@ void nvmet_execute_set_features(struct n
 		status = nvmet_set_feat_async_event(req, NVMET_AEN_CFG_ALL);
 		break;
 	case NVME_FEAT_HOST_ID:
-		status = NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		break;
 	case NVME_FEAT_WRITE_PROTECT:
 		status = nvmet_set_feat_write_protect(req);
 		break;
 	default:
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, cdw10);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_get_features(struct n
 		if (!(req->cmd->common.cdw11 & cpu_to_le32(1 << 0))) {
 			req->error_loc =
 				offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, cdw11);
-			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 			break;
 		}
 
@@ -959,7 +959,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_get_features(struct n
 	default:
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, cdw10);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -976,7 +976,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_async_event(struct nv
 	mutex_lock(&ctrl->lock);
 	if (ctrl->nr_async_event_cmds >= NVMET_ASYNC_EVENTS) {
 		mutex_unlock(&ctrl->lock);
-		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_ASYNC_LIMIT | NVME_SC_DNR);
+		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_ASYNC_LIMIT | NVME_STATUS_DNR);
 		return;
 	}
 	ctrl->async_event_cmds[ctrl->nr_async_event_cmds++] = req;
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/core.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/core.c
@@ -53,18 +53,18 @@ inline u16 errno_to_nvme_status(struct n
 		return NVME_SC_SUCCESS;
 	case -ENOSPC:
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_rw_command, length);
-		return NVME_SC_CAP_EXCEEDED | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_CAP_EXCEEDED | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	case -EREMOTEIO:
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_rw_command, slba);
-		return  NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return  NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	case -EOPNOTSUPP:
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
 		switch (req->cmd->common.opcode) {
 		case nvme_cmd_dsm:
 		case nvme_cmd_write_zeroes:
-			return NVME_SC_ONCS_NOT_SUPPORTED | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_ONCS_NOT_SUPPORTED | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		default:
-			return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		}
 		break;
 	case -ENODATA:
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ inline u16 errno_to_nvme_status(struct n
 		fallthrough;
 	default:
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
-		return NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ u16 nvmet_report_invalid_opcode(struct n
 		 req->sq->qid);
 
 	req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
-	return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+	return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 }
 
 static struct nvmet_subsys *nvmet_find_get_subsys(struct nvmet_port *port,
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ u16 nvmet_copy_to_sgl(struct nvmet_req *
 {
 	if (sg_pcopy_from_buffer(req->sg, req->sg_cnt, buf, len, off) != len) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ u16 nvmet_copy_from_sgl(struct nvmet_req
 {
 	if (sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->sg, req->sg_cnt, buf, len, off) != len) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ u16 nvmet_zero_sgl(struct nvmet_req *req
 {
 	if (sg_zero_buffer(req->sg, req->sg_cnt, len, off) != len) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static void nvmet_async_events_failall(s
 	while (ctrl->nr_async_event_cmds) {
 		req = ctrl->async_event_cmds[--ctrl->nr_async_event_cmds];
 		mutex_unlock(&ctrl->lock);
-		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_SC_DNR);
+		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_STATUS_DNR);
 		mutex_lock(&ctrl->lock);
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&ctrl->lock);
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ u16 nvmet_req_find_ns(struct nvmet_req *
 	req->ns = xa_load(&nvmet_req_subsys(req)->namespaces, nsid);
 	if (unlikely(!req->ns)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, nsid);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	percpu_ref_get(&req->ns->ref);
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ bool nvmet_req_init(struct nvmet_req *re
 	/* no support for fused commands yet */
 	if (unlikely(flags & (NVME_CMD_FUSE_FIRST | NVME_CMD_FUSE_SECOND))) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, flags);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ bool nvmet_req_init(struct nvmet_req *re
 	 */
 	if (unlikely((flags & NVME_CMD_SGL_ALL) != NVME_CMD_SGL_METABUF)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, flags);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ bool nvmet_req_init(struct nvmet_req *re
 	trace_nvmet_req_init(req, req->cmd);
 
 	if (unlikely(!percpu_ref_tryget_live(&sq->ref))) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ bool nvmet_check_transfer_len(struct nvm
 {
 	if (unlikely(len != req->transfer_len)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_SC_DNR);
+		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_STATUS_DNR);
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ bool nvmet_check_data_len_lte(struct nvm
 {
 	if (unlikely(data_len > req->transfer_len)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_SC_DNR);
+		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_STATUS_DNR);
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -1275,13 +1275,13 @@ u16 nvmet_check_ctrl_status(struct nvmet
 	if (unlikely(!(req->sq->ctrl->cc & NVME_CC_ENABLE))) {
 		pr_err("got cmd %d while CC.EN == 0 on qid = %d\n",
 		       req->cmd->common.opcode, req->sq->qid);
-		return NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(!(req->sq->ctrl->csts & NVME_CSTS_RDY))) {
 		pr_err("got cmd %d while CSTS.RDY == 0 on qid = %d\n",
 		       req->cmd->common.opcode, req->sq->qid);
-		return NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ u16 nvmet_alloc_ctrl(const char *subsysn
 	int ret;
 	u16 status;
 
-	status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_SC_DNR;
+	status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	subsys = nvmet_find_get_subsys(req->port, subsysnqn);
 	if (!subsys) {
 		pr_warn("connect request for invalid subsystem %s!\n",
@@ -1371,7 +1371,7 @@ u16 nvmet_alloc_ctrl(const char *subsysn
 			hostnqn, subsysnqn);
 		req->cqe->result.u32 = IPO_IATTR_CONNECT_DATA(hostnqn);
 		up_read(&nvmet_config_sem);
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_HOST | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_HOST | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
 		goto out_put_subsystem;
 	}
@@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ u16 nvmet_alloc_ctrl(const char *subsysn
 			     subsys->cntlid_min, subsys->cntlid_max,
 			     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (ret < 0) {
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_CTRL_BUSY | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_CTRL_BUSY | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out_free_sqs;
 	}
 	ctrl->cntlid = ret;
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_p
 	if (req->cmd->get_log_page.lid != NVME_LOG_DISC) {
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_get_log_page_command, lid);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_p
 	if (offset & 0x3) {
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_get_log_page_command, lpo);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_identify(
 
 	if (req->cmd->identify.cns != NVME_ID_CNS_CTRL) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_identify, cns);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_set_featu
 	default:
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, cdw10);
-		stat = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		stat = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_get_featu
 	default:
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, cdw10);
-		stat = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		stat = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_discovery_cmd(struct nvm
 		       cmd->common.opcode);
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	switch (cmd->common.opcode) {
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_discovery_cmd(struct nvm
 	default:
 		pr_debug("unhandled cmd %d\n", cmd->common.opcode);
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 }
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_prop_set(struc
 	if (req->cmd->prop_set.attrib & 1) {
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvmf_property_set_command, attrib);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_prop_set(struc
 	default:
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvmf_property_set_command, offset);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 out:
 	nvmet_req_complete(req, status);
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_prop_get(struc
 			val = ctrl->cap;
 			break;
 		default:
-			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 			break;
 		}
 	} else {
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_prop_get(struc
 			val = ctrl->csts;
 			break;
 		default:
-			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_fabrics_cmd(struct nvmet
 		pr_debug("received unknown capsule type 0x%x\n",
 			cmd->fabrics.fctype);
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_common_command, fctype);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -116,14 +116,14 @@ static u16 nvmet_install_queue(struct nv
 		pr_warn("queue size zero!\n");
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_connect_command, sqsize);
 		req->cqe->result.u32 = IPO_IATTR_CONNECT_SQE(sqsize);
-		ret = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		ret = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto err;
 	}
 
 	if (ctrl->sqs[qid] != NULL) {
 		pr_warn("qid %u has already been created\n", qid);
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_connect_command, qid);
-		return NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	if (sqsize > mqes) {
@@ -131,14 +131,14 @@ static u16 nvmet_install_queue(struct nv
 				sqsize, mqes, ctrl->cntlid);
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_connect_command, sqsize);
 		req->cqe->result.u32 = IPO_IATTR_CONNECT_SQE(sqsize);
-		return NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	old = cmpxchg(&req->sq->ctrl, NULL, ctrl);
 	if (old) {
 		pr_warn("queue already connected!\n");
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_connect_command, opcode);
-		return NVME_SC_CONNECT_CTRL_BUSY | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_CONNECT_CTRL_BUSY | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	/* note: convert queue size from 0's-based value to 1's-based value */
@@ -191,14 +191,14 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(
 		pr_warn("invalid connect version (%d).\n",
 			le16_to_cpu(c->recfmt));
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_connect_command, recfmt);
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_FORMAT | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_FORMAT | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(d->cntlid != cpu_to_le16(0xffff))) {
 		pr_warn("connect attempt for invalid controller ID %#x\n",
 			d->cntlid);
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->cqe->result.u32 = IPO_IATTR_CONNECT_DATA(cntlid);
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_io_connect(str
 	if (c->recfmt != 0) {
 		pr_warn("invalid connect version (%d).\n",
 			le16_to_cpu(c->recfmt));
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_FORMAT | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_FORMAT | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -264,13 +264,13 @@ static void nvmet_execute_io_connect(str
 	ctrl = nvmet_ctrl_find_get(d->subsysnqn, d->hostnqn,
 				   le16_to_cpu(d->cntlid), req);
 	if (!ctrl) {
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(qid > ctrl->subsys->max_qid)) {
 		pr_warn("invalid queue id (%d)\n", qid);
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->cqe->result.u32 = IPO_IATTR_CONNECT_SQE(qid);
 		goto out_ctrl_put;
 	}
@@ -303,13 +303,13 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_connect_cmd(struct nvmet
 		pr_debug("invalid command 0x%x on unconnected queue.\n",
 			cmd->fabrics.opcode);
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 	if (cmd->fabrics.fctype != nvme_fabrics_type_connect) {
 		pr_debug("invalid capsule type 0x%x on unconnected queue.\n",
 			cmd->fabrics.fctype);
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_common_command, fctype);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	if (cmd->connect.qid == 0)
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/io-cmd-bdev.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/io-cmd-bdev.c
@@ -124,11 +124,11 @@ u16 blk_to_nvme_status(struct nvmet_req
 	 */
 	switch (blk_sts) {
 	case BLK_STS_NOSPC:
-		status = NVME_SC_CAP_EXCEEDED | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CAP_EXCEEDED | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_rw_command, length);
 		break;
 	case BLK_STS_TARGET:
-		status = NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_rw_command, slba);
 		break;
 	case BLK_STS_NOTSUPP:
@@ -136,10 +136,10 @@ u16 blk_to_nvme_status(struct nvmet_req
 		switch (req->cmd->common.opcode) {
 		case nvme_cmd_dsm:
 		case nvme_cmd_write_zeroes:
-			status = NVME_SC_ONCS_NOT_SUPPORTED | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_ONCS_NOT_SUPPORTED | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 			break;
 		default:
-			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		}
 		break;
 	case BLK_STS_MEDIUM:
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ u16 blk_to_nvme_status(struct nvmet_req
 		break;
 	case BLK_STS_IOERR:
 	default:
-		status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
 	}
 
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void nvmet_bdev_execute_flush(str
 u16 nvmet_bdev_flush(struct nvmet_req *req)
 {
 	if (blkdev_issue_flush(req->ns->bdev))
-		return NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	return 0;
 }
 
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ static inline void nvmet_req_cns_error_c
 	pr_debug("unhandled identify cns %d on qid %d\n",
 	       req->cmd->identify.cns, req->sq->qid);
 	req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_identify, cns);
-	nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR);
+	nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR);
 }
 
 static inline void nvmet_req_bio_put(struct nvmet_req *req, struct bio *bio)
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static void nvmet_passthru_execute_cmd(s
 		ns = nvme_find_get_ns(ctrl, nsid);
 		if (unlikely(!ns)) {
 			pr_err("failed to get passthru ns nsid:%u\n", nsid);
-			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 			goto out;
 		}
 
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_passthru_io_cmd(struct n
 		 * emulated in the future if regular targets grow support for
 		 * this feature.
 		 */
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	return nvmet_setup_passthru_command(req);
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_passthru_get_set_featur
 	case NVME_FEAT_RESV_PERSIST:
 		/* No reservations, see nvmet_parse_passthru_io_cmd() */
 	default:
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_passthru_admin_cmd(struc
 				req->p.use_workqueue = true;
 				return NVME_SC_SUCCESS;
 			}
-			return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		case NVME_ID_CNS_NS:
 			req->execute = nvmet_passthru_execute_cmd;
 			req->p.use_workqueue = true;
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_passthru_admin_cmd(struc
 				req->p.use_workqueue = true;
 				return NVME_SC_SUCCESS;
 			}
-			return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		default:
 			return nvmet_setup_passthru_command(req);
 		}
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c
@@ -852,12 +852,12 @@ static u16 nvmet_rdma_map_sgl_inline(str
 	if (!nvme_is_write(rsp->req.cmd)) {
 		rsp->req.error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	if (off + len > rsp->queue->dev->inline_data_size) {
 		pr_err("invalid inline data offset!\n");
-		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_OFFSET | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_OFFSET | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	/* no data command? */
@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_rdma_map_sgl(struct nvm
 			pr_err("invalid SGL subtype: %#x\n", sgl->type);
 			rsp->req.error_loc =
 				offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-			return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		}
 	case NVME_KEY_SGL_FMT_DATA_DESC:
 		switch (sgl->type & 0xf) {
@@ -933,12 +933,12 @@ static u16 nvmet_rdma_map_sgl(struct nvm
 			pr_err("invalid SGL subtype: %#x\n", sgl->type);
 			rsp->req.error_loc =
 				offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-			return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		}
 	default:
 		pr_err("invalid SGL type: %#x\n", sgl->type);
 		rsp->req.error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_TYPE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_TYPE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 }
 
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
@@ -397,10 +397,10 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_map_data(struct nvm
 	if (sgl->type == ((NVME_SGL_FMT_DATA_DESC << 4) |
 			  NVME_SGL_FMT_OFFSET)) {
 		if (!nvme_is_write(cmd->req.cmd))
-			return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 
 		if (len > cmd->req.port->inline_data_size)
-			return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_OFFSET | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_OFFSET | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		cmd->pdu_len = len;
 	}
 	cmd->req.transfer_len += len;
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/zns.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/zns.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_identify_cns_cs_ns(st
 
 	if (le32_to_cpu(req->cmd->identify.nsid) == NVME_NSID_ALL) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_identify, nsid);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_identify_cns_cs_ns(st
 	}
 
 	if (!bdev_is_zoned(req->ns->bdev)) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_identify, nsid);
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -162,17 +162,17 @@ static u16 nvmet_bdev_validate_zone_mgmt
 
 	if (sect >= get_capacity(req->ns->bdev->bd_disk)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_recv_cmd, slba);
-		return NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	if (out_bufsize < sizeof(struct nvme_zone_report)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_recv_cmd, numd);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	if (req->cmd->zmr.zra != NVME_ZRA_ZONE_REPORT) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_recv_cmd, zra);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	switch (req->cmd->zmr.pr) {
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_bdev_validate_zone_mgmt
 		break;
 	default:
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_recv_cmd, pr);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	switch (req->cmd->zmr.zrasf) {
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_bdev_validate_zone_mgmt
 	default:
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_recv_cmd, zrasf);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	return NVME_SC_SUCCESS;
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ static u16 blkdev_zone_mgmt_errno_to_nvm
 		return NVME_SC_SUCCESS;
 	case -EINVAL:
 	case -EIO:
-		return NVME_SC_ZONE_INVALID_TRANSITION | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_ZONE_INVALID_TRANSITION | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	default:
 		return NVME_SC_INTERNAL;
 	}
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_bdev_execute_zmgmt_send
 	default:
 		/* this is needed to quiet compiler warning */
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_send_cmd, zsa);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	return NVME_SC_SUCCESS;
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ static void nvmet_bdev_zmgmt_send_work(s
 
 	if (op == REQ_OP_LAST) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_send_cmd, zsa);
-		status = NVME_SC_ZONE_INVALID_TRANSITION | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_ZONE_INVALID_TRANSITION | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -500,13 +500,13 @@ static void nvmet_bdev_zmgmt_send_work(s
 
 	if (sect >= get_capacity(bdev->bd_disk)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_send_cmd, slba);
-		status = NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (sect & (zone_sectors - 1)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_send_cmd, slba);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -557,13 +557,13 @@ void nvmet_bdev_execute_zone_append(stru
 
 	if (sect >= get_capacity(req->ns->bdev->bd_disk)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_rw_command, slba);
-		status = NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (sect & (bdev_zone_sectors(req->ns->bdev) - 1)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_rw_command, slba);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ void nvmet_bdev_execute_zone_append(stru
 	}
 
 	if (total_len != nvmet_rw_data_len(req)) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out_put_bio;
 	}
 
--- a/include/linux/nvme.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme.h
@@ -1622,8 +1622,8 @@ enum {
 	NVME_SC_HOST_PATH_ERROR		= 0x370,
 	NVME_SC_HOST_ABORTED_CMD	= 0x371,
 
-	NVME_SC_CRD			= 0x1800,
-	NVME_SC_DNR			= 0x4000,
+	NVME_STATUS_CRD			= 0x1800,
+	NVME_STATUS_DNR			= 0x4000,
 };
 
 struct nvme_completion {

[PATCH 5.15 31/69] nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>

[ Upstream commit 4a3f00262a044e8e15064b1a6860968bf0500bf4 ]

nvmet_tcp_map_data() reads the host-controlled 32-bit sgl->length
and, for the in-capsule offset descriptor (type 0x01), checks it
against port->inline_data_size before use. Any other SGL descriptor
type -- including the non-inline transport SGL data-block descriptor
(type (NVME_TRANSPORT_SGL_DATA_DESC << 4) | NVME_SGL_FMT_TRANSPORT_A,
the type a real host uses for out-of-capsule writes) skips that check
entirely and falls straight through to:

	cmd->req.sg = sgl_alloc(len, GFP_KERNEL, &cmd->req.sg_cnt);

with len taken directly from the wire, unbounded up to 4 GiB.

nvmet_req_init() only parses the command and never inspects
sgl->length, and nvmet_check_transfer_len() -- the only other place
transfer_len is validated -- runs later, from req->execute(), after
the allocation has already happened. For a write command the target
responds with an R2T and parks the command waiting for the host to
send the data; if the host (or an unauthenticated peer that simply
never follows up) never does, the sgl_alloc() buffer stays resident
for the life of the command. NVMe/TCP has no mandatory authentication
in the default configuration, so any peer able to reach the target
portal and complete a Fabrics connect can drive this with a single
crafted command, repeatable across queues and connections for
amplification. This is unbounded kernel memory allocation
triggered by a remote, effectively unauthenticated peer.

Validate len against the same NVMET_TCP_MAXH2CDATA ceiling this file
already uses to bound per-PDU H2C data, for every SGL descriptor type,
before doing any allocation. This closes the gap for the non-inline
descriptor while leaving the existing, tighter inline_data_size check
in place for the in-capsule case.

Runtime-verified on a v6.19 KASAN stand: with this bound in place, a
crafted write command carrying an oversized non-inline SGL length is
rejected before sgl_alloc() runs, where the same request previously
drove an unbounded ~256 MiB kernel allocation (up to 4 GiB) that
stayed resident pending an R2T the host never satisfies.

Fixes: 872d26a391da ("nvmet-tcp: add NVMe over TCP target driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
@@ -394,6 +394,19 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_map_data(struct nvm
 	if (!len)
 		return 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * inline_data_size only bounds the in-capsule (type 0x01) SGL
+	 * descriptor below. A non-inline transport SGL data-block
+	 * descriptor skips that check entirely and would otherwise reach
+	 * sgl_alloc() with an attacker-controlled len of up to 4 GiB,
+	 * pinning that much kernel memory for a command that may never
+	 * complete. Bound every descriptor type here, before allocating
+	 * anything, using the same ceiling this file already applies to
+	 * per-PDU H2C data.
+	 */
+	if (len > NVMET_TCP_MAXH2CDATA)
+		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
+
 	if (sgl->type == ((NVME_SGL_FMT_DATA_DESC << 4) |
 			  NVME_SGL_FMT_OFFSET)) {
 		if (!nvme_is_write(cmd->req.cmd))

[PATCH 5.15 32/69] HID: uclogic: fix use-after-free of inrange_timer on remove

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>

[ Upstream commit 506fd50a9027340f0e9dcc587d10ccb03312dba6 ]

uclogic_remove() cancels the pen in-range timer and then stops the
device:

	timer_delete_sync(&drvdata->inrange_timer);
	hid_hw_stop(hdev);

timer_delete_sync() only guarantees the timer is idle at that instant.
uclogic_raw_event_pen() keeps delivering pen reports until hid_hw_stop()
stops the transport several lines later, and every report with
pen->inrange == UCLOGIC_PARAMS_PEN_INRANGE_NONE re-arms the timer:

	mod_timer(&drvdata->inrange_timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(100));

A report landing between the timer_delete_sync() call and the transport
teardown in hid_hw_stop() re-arms inrange_timer after it was cancelled.
uclogic_remove() then returns and the devm drvdata is freed, while
hid_hw_stop() has already freed the input device drvdata->pen_input
points at, so when the timer fires ~100 ms later
uclogic_inrange_timeout() dereferences freed memory -- a use-after-free
in timer-softirq context.

Swapping the two calls is not a fix: stopping the device first frees
drvdata->pen_input via hidinput_disconnect() while the timer may still
be pending, so a timer already armed before removal fires on the freed
input device in the window before timer_delete_sync() runs.

Use timer_shutdown_sync() before hid_hw_stop() instead. It cancels the
timer, waits for a running callback while pen_input is still valid, and
prevents any further re-arming -- a later mod_timer() from an in-flight
report is silently ignored -- so the timer is provably dead before
hid_hw_stop() frees the inputs. This is the ordering the timer core
documents for this "timer re-armed from another path" teardown case.

Fixes: 01309e29eb95 ("HID: uclogic: Support in-range reporting emulation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
[ changed timer_delete_sync() to del_timer_sync() in the removed line to match the pre-rename API on this branch ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-core.c |   12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-core.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-core.c
@@ -346,7 +346,17 @@ static void uclogic_remove(struct hid_de
 {
 	struct uclogic_drvdata *drvdata = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
 
-	del_timer_sync(&drvdata->inrange_timer);
+	/*
+	 * Shut the in-range timer down before stopping the device.
+	 * uclogic_raw_event_pen() re-arms inrange_timer on every pen report
+	 * and keeps running until hid_hw_stop() stops the transport, so a
+	 * plain timer_delete_sync() here can be undone by a report landing in
+	 * the window before hid_hw_stop().  timer_shutdown_sync() cancels the
+	 * timer and makes any later re-arm a no-op, so it is provably dead
+	 * before hid_hw_stop() frees the input device drvdata->pen_input
+	 * points at.
+	 */
+	timer_shutdown_sync(&drvdata->inrange_timer);
 	hid_hw_stop(hdev);
 	kfree(drvdata->desc_ptr);
 	uclogic_params_cleanup(&drvdata->params);

[PATCH 5.15 33/69] HID: ft260: fix i2c probing for hwmon devices

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit a94f61e63f337d95001e1a976ab701100fa1d666 ]

The below scenario causes the kernel NULL pointer dereference failure:
1. sudo insmod hid-ft260.ko
2. sudo modprobe lm75
3. unplug USB hid-ft260
4. plug USB hid-ft260

[  +0.000006] Call Trace:
[  +0.000004]  __i2c_smbus_xfer.part.0+0xd1/0x310
[  +0.000007]  ? ft260_smbus_write+0x140/0x140 [hid_ft260]
[  +0.000005]  __i2c_smbus_xfer+0x2b/0x80
[  +0.000004]  i2c_smbus_xfer+0x61/0xf0
[  +0.000005]  i2c_default_probe+0xf9/0x130
[  +0.000004]  i2c_detect_address+0x84/0x160
[  +0.000004]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xf6/0x200
[  +0.000009]  ? i2c_detect.isra.0+0x69/0x130
[  +0.000005]  i2c_detect.isra.0+0xbf/0x130
[  +0.000004]  ? __process_new_driver+0x30/0x30
[  +0.000004]  __process_new_adapter+0x18/0x20
[  +0.000004]  bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xd0
[  +0.000003]  i2c_register_adapter+0x1e4/0x400
[  +0.000005]  i2c_add_adapter+0x5c/0x80
[  +0.000004]  ft260_probe.cold+0x222/0x2e2 [hid_ft260]
[  +0.000006]  hid_device_probe+0x10e/0x170 [hid]
[  +0.000009]  really_probe+0xff/0x460
[  +0.000004]  driver_probe_device+0xe9/0x160
[  +0.000003]  __device_attach_driver+0x71/0xd0
[  +0.000004]  ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x50/0x50
[  +0.000004]  bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xd0
[  +0.000002]  __device_attach+0xde/0x1e0
[  +0.000004]  device_initial_probe+0x13/0x20
[  +0.000004]  bus_probe_device+0x8f/0xa0
[  +0.000003]  device_add+0x333/0x5f0

It happened when i2c core probed for the devices associated with the lm75
driver by invoking 2c_detect()-->..-->ft260_smbus_write() from within the
ft260_probe before setting the adapter data with i2c_set_adapdata().

Moving the i2c_set_adapdata() before i2c_add_adapter() fixed the failure.

Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Germain Hebert <germain.hebert@ca.abb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c |   11 +++++------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
@@ -969,24 +969,23 @@ static int ft260_probe(struct hid_device
 	mutex_init(&dev->lock);
 	init_completion(&dev->wait);
 
+	ret = ft260_xfer_status(dev);
+	if (ret)
+		ft260_i2c_reset(hdev);
+
+	i2c_set_adapdata(&dev->adap, dev);
 	ret = i2c_add_adapter(&dev->adap);
 	if (ret) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "failed to add i2c adapter\n");
 		goto err_hid_close;
 	}
 
-	i2c_set_adapdata(&dev->adap, dev);
-
 	ret = sysfs_create_group(&hdev->dev.kobj, &ft260_attr_group);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "failed to create sysfs attrs\n");
 		goto err_i2c_free;
 	}
 
-	ret = ft260_xfer_status(dev);
-	if (ret)
-		ft260_i2c_reset(hdev);
-
 	return 0;
 
 err_i2c_free:

[PATCH 5.15 34/69] HID: ft260: improve i2c write performance

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 6fca5e3f5574ca1bd5bade5737848c816f924c6a ]

The patch improves the I2C write performance by 20 - 30 percent by
revising the sleep time in the ft260_hid_output_report_check_status()
in the following ways:

1. Reduce the wait time and start to poll earlier.

Sending a large amount of data at a low I2C clock rate saturates the
internal FT260 buffer and causes hiccups in status readiness, as shown
below in the log fragment. Aligning the status check wait time to the
worst case significantly reduces the write performance.

[Oct22 10:28] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0
[  +0.005296] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x20, clock 100
[  +0.013460] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0
[  +0.003244] ft260_hid_output_report_check_status: wait 1920 usec, len 38
[  +0.000190] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100
[  +0.015324] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0
[  +0.003491] ft260_hid_output_report_check_status: wait 1920 usec, len 38
[  +0.000202] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100
[  +0.016047] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0
[  +0.002768] ft260_hid_output_report_check_status: wait 1920 usec, len 38
[  +0.000150] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100
[  +0.011389] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0
[  +0.003467] ft260_hid_output_report_check_status: wait 1920 usec, len 38
[  +0.000191] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000172] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000131] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000241] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000233] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000190] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000196] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100
[  +0.011314] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0
[  +0.003334] ft260_hid_output_report_check_status: wait 1920 usec, len 38
[  +0.000227] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000204] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000198] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000147] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100
[  +0.011060] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0

  Before:
    $ sudo ./i2cperf -f 2 -o 2 -s 32 -r 0-0xff 13 0x51 -S

      Fill block with increment via i2ctransfer by chunks
      -------------------------------------------------------------------
      data rate(bps)  efficiency(%)  data size(B)  total IOs   IO size(B)
      -------------------------------------------------------------------
      40510           80             256           8           32

  After:
    $ sudo ./i2cperf -f 2 -o 2 -s 32 -r 0-0xff 13 0x51 -S

      Fill block with increment via i2ctransfer by chunks
      -------------------------------------------------------------------
      data rate(bps)  efficiency(%)  data size(B)  total IOs   IO size(B)
      -------------------------------------------------------------------
      52584           80             256           8           32

2. Do not sleep if the estimated I2C transfer time is below 2 ms since
   the first xfer status query frequently takes around 1.5 ms, and the
   following status queries take about 200us on average. So we usually
   return from the routine after the first 1 - 3 status checks.

[Oct22 11:14] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd4 addr 0x51 off 0 len 18 d[0] 0x0
[  +0.004270] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x20, clock 100
[  +0.013889] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd4 addr 0x51 off 0 len 18 d[0] 0x0
[  +0.000856] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000138] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100
[  +0.013352] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd4 addr 0x51 off 0 len 18 d[0] 0x0
[  +0.001501] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000177] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100
[  +0.014477] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd4 addr 0x51 off 0 len 18 d[0] 0x0
[  +0.001377] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000233] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000191] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100
[  +0.013197] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd4 addr 0x51 off 0 len 18 d[0] 0x0

  Before:
    $ sudo ./i2cperf -f 2 -o 2 -s 16 -r 0-0xff 13 0x51 -S

      Fill block with increment via i2ctransfer by chunks
      -------------------------------------------------------------------
      data rate(bps)  efficiency(%)  data size(B)  total IOs   IO size(B)
      -------------------------------------------------------------------
      28826           73             256           16          16

  After:
    $ sudo ./i2cperf -f 2 -o 2 -s 16 -r 0-0xff 13 0x51 -S

      Fill block with increment via i2ctransfer by chunks
      -------------------------------------------------------------------
      data rate(bps)  efficiency(%)  data size(B)  total IOs   IO size(B)
      -------------------------------------------------------------------
      45138           73             256           16          16

Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Guillaume Champagne <champagne.guillaume.c@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c |   14 +++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ static int ft260_hid_output_report(struc
 static int ft260_hid_output_report_check_status(struct ft260_device *dev,
 						u8 *data, int len)
 {
-	int ret, usec, try = 3;
+	int ret, usec, try = 100;
 	struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
 
 	ret = ft260_hid_output_report(hdev, data, len);
@@ -366,10 +366,14 @@ static int ft260_hid_output_report_check
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	/* transfer time = 1 / clock(KHz) * 10 bits * bytes */
-	usec = 10000 / dev->clock * len;
-	usleep_range(usec, usec + 100);
-	ft260_dbg("wait %d usec, len %d\n", usec, len);
+	/* transfer time = 1 / clock(KHz) * 9 bits * bytes */
+	usec = len * 9000 / dev->clock;
+	if (usec > 2000) {
+		usec -= 1500;
+		usleep_range(usec, usec + 100);
+		ft260_dbg("wait %d usec, len %d\n", usec, len);
+	}
+
 	do {
 		ret = ft260_xfer_status(dev);
 		if (ret != -EAGAIN)

[PATCH 5.15 35/69] HID: ft260: improve i2c large reads performance

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 54410c14800ad652c77e5c6fc5c17baad6e42cb6 ]

The patch increases the read buffer size to 180 bytes. It reduces
the number of ft260_i2c_read() calls by three, improving the big
reads performance.

$ sudo i2ctransfer -y -f 13 w2@0x51 0x0 0x0 r180

Before:

[  +4.071878] ft260_i2c_write_read: off 0x0 rlen 180 wlen 2
[  +0.000005] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd0 addr 0x51 off 0 len 2 wlen 2 flag 0x2 d[0] 0x0
[  +0.001097] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100
[  +0.000175] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100
[  +0.000004] ft260_i2c_read: rep 0xc2 addr 0x51 len 180 rlen 60 flag 0x3
[  +0.008579] ft260_raw_event: i2c resp: rep 0xde len 60
[  +0.000208] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100
[  +0.000001] ft260_i2c_read: rep 0xc2 addr 0x51 len 120 rlen 60 flag 0x0
[  +0.008794] ft260_raw_event: i2c resp: rep 0xde len 60
[  +0.000181] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100
[  +0.000002] ft260_i2c_read: rep 0xc2 addr 0x51 len 60 rlen 60 flag 0x4
[  +0.008817] ft260_raw_event: i2c resp: rep 0xde len 60
[  +0.000223] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x20, clock 100

After:

[ +11.611642] ft260_i2c_write_read: off 0x0 rlen 180 wlen 2
[  +0.000005] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd0 addr 0x51 off 0 len 2 wlen 2 flag 0x2 d[0] 0x0
[  +0.008001] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x20, clock 100
[  +0.000001] ft260_i2c_read: rep 0xc2 addr 0x51 len 180 rlen 180 flag 0x7
[  +0.008994] ft260_raw_event: i2c resp: rep 0xde len 60
[  +0.007987] ft260_raw_event: i2c resp: rep 0xde len 60
[  +0.007992] ft260_raw_event: i2c resp: rep 0xde len 60
[  +0.000206] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x20, clock 100

Suggested-by: Enrik Berkhan <Enrik.Berkhan@inka.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c |   17 ++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
@@ -30,12 +30,19 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Toggle FT260 de
 
 #define FT260_REPORT_MAX_LENGTH (64)
 #define FT260_I2C_DATA_REPORT_ID(len) (FT260_I2C_REPORT_MIN + (len - 1) / 4)
+
 /*
- * The input report format assigns 62 bytes for the data payload, but ft260
- * returns 60 and 2 in two separate transactions. To minimize transfer time
- * in reading chunks mode, set the maximum read payload length to 60 bytes.
- */
-#define FT260_RD_DATA_MAX (60)
+ * The ft260 input report format defines 62 bytes for the data payload, but
+ * when requested 62 bytes, the controller returns 60 and 2 in separate input
+ * reports. To achieve better performance with the multi-report read data
+ * transfers, we set the maximum read payload length to a multiple of 60.
+ * With a 100 kHz I2C clock, one 240 bytes read takes about 1/27 second,
+ * which is excessive; On the other hand, some higher layer drivers like at24
+ * or optoe limit the i2c reads to 128 bytes. To not block other drivers out
+ * of I2C for potentially troublesome amounts of time, we select the maximum
+ * read payload length to be 180 bytes.
+*/
+#define FT260_RD_DATA_MAX (180)
 #define FT260_WR_DATA_MAX (60)
 
 /*

[PATCH 5.15 36/69] HID: ft260: skip unexpected HID input reports

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit b7121e3c04440cc2af9cabbabb24efd23741294a ]

The FT260 is not supposed to generate unexpected HID reports. However,
in theory, the unsolicited HID Input reports can be issued by a specially
crafted malicious USB device masquerading as FT260 when the attacker has
physical access to the USB port. In this case, the read_buf pointer points
to the final data portion of the previous I2C Read transfer, and the memcpy
invoked in the ft260_raw_event() will try copying the content of the
unexpected report into the wrong location.

This commit sets the Read buffer pointer to NULL on the I2C Read
transaction completion and checks it in the ft260_raw_event() to detect
and skip the unsolicited Input report.

Reported-by: Enrik Berkhan <Enrik.Berkhan@inka.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c |   36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
@@ -471,17 +471,13 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
 	struct ft260_i2c_read_request_report rep;
 	struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
 	int timeout;
-	int ret;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 	if (len > FT260_RD_DATA_MAX) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "%s: unsupported rd len: %d\n", __func__, len);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	dev->read_idx = 0;
-	dev->read_buf = data;
-	dev->read_len = len;
-
 	rep.report = FT260_I2C_READ_REQ;
 	rep.length = cpu_to_le16(len);
 	rep.address = addr;
@@ -492,25 +488,36 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
 
 	reinit_completion(&dev->wait);
 
+	dev->read_idx = 0;
+	dev->read_buf = data;
+	dev->read_len = len;
+
 	ret = ft260_hid_output_report(hdev, (u8 *)&rep, sizeof(rep));
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "%s: failed to start transaction, ret %d\n",
 			__func__, ret);
-		return ret;
+		goto ft260_i2c_read_exit;
 	}
 
 	timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(5000);
 	if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&dev->wait, timeout)) {
+		ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
 		ft260_i2c_reset(hdev);
-		return -ETIMEDOUT;
+		goto ft260_i2c_read_exit;
 	}
 
+	dev->read_buf = NULL;
+
 	ret = ft260_xfer_status(dev);
-	if (ret == 0)
-		return 0;
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		ret = -EIO;
+		ft260_i2c_reset(hdev);
+		goto ft260_i2c_read_exit;
+	}
 
-	ft260_i2c_reset(hdev);
-	return -EIO;
+ft260_i2c_read_exit:
+	dev->read_buf = NULL;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1033,6 +1040,13 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
 		ft260_dbg("i2c resp: rep %#02x len %d\n", xfer->report,
 			  xfer->length);
 
+		if ((dev->read_buf == NULL) ||
+		    (xfer->length > dev->read_len - dev->read_idx)) {
+			hid_err(hdev, "unexpected report %#02x, length %d\n",
+				xfer->report, xfer->length);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
 		memcpy(&dev->read_buf[dev->read_idx], &xfer->data,
 		       xfer->length);
 		dev->read_idx += xfer->length;

[PATCH 5.15 37/69] HID: ft260: wake up device from power saving mode

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 4b3da6853a619a952e8caf2e8393264dd42ffa27 ]

The FT260 can enter a power saving mode after being idle for longer
than 5 seconds.

When being woken up from power saving mode by an I2C write request,
a possible NACK is not correctly reported by the controller. As a
workaround, the driver will issue an I2C status report two times in
ft260_xfer_status() after the chip has been idle for more than 5s.

Co-developed-by: Enrik Berkhan <Enrik.Berkhan@inka.de>
Signed-off-by: Enrik Berkhan <Enrik.Berkhan@inka.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Toggle FT260 de
 #define FT260_REPORT_MAX_LENGTH (64)
 #define FT260_I2C_DATA_REPORT_ID(len) (FT260_I2C_REPORT_MIN + (len - 1) / 4)
 
+#define FT260_WAKEUP_NEEDED_AFTER_MS (4800) /* 5s minus 200ms margin */
+
 /*
  * The ft260 input report format defines 62 bytes for the data payload, but
  * when requested 62 bytes, the controller returns 60 and 2 in separate input
@@ -237,6 +239,7 @@ struct ft260_device {
 	struct completion wait;
 	struct mutex lock;
 	u8 write_buf[FT260_REPORT_MAX_LENGTH];
+	unsigned long need_wakeup_at;
 	u8 *read_buf;
 	u16 read_idx;
 	u16 read_len;
@@ -306,6 +309,20 @@ static int ft260_xfer_status(struct ft26
 	struct ft260_get_i2c_status_report report;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (time_is_before_jiffies(dev->need_wakeup_at)) {
+		ret = ft260_hid_feature_report_get(hdev, FT260_I2C_STATUS,
+						(u8 *)&report, sizeof(report));
+		if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
+			hid_err(hdev, "failed to retrieve status: %d, no wakeup\n",
+				ret);
+		} else {
+			dev->need_wakeup_at = jiffies +
+				msecs_to_jiffies(FT260_WAKEUP_NEEDED_AFTER_MS);
+			ft260_dbg("bus_status %#02x, wakeup\n",
+				  report.bus_status);
+		}
+	}
+
 	ret = ft260_hid_feature_report_get(hdev, FT260_I2C_STATUS,
 					   (u8 *)&report, sizeof(report));
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {

[PATCH 5.15 38/69] HID: ft260: missed NACK from busy device

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 5afac727defa0b2a3dffb2abd5fb5f594b98d217 ]

When writing into a slow device like an EEPROM chip, the
controller may exit the busy state before the device releases
the bus. In this case, the ft260_xfer_status returns success
before the data transfer completion.

The patch fixes it by returning from the ft260_xfer_status()
with the "-EAGAIN" on both controller and bus busy status when
appropriate.

It does not apply to the i2c combined transactions when after
the write IO, the controller keeps the bus busy until the read
IO and then between reading IOs to ensure an atomic operation.

Co-developed-by: Germain Hebert <germain.hebert@ca.abb.com>
Signed-off-by: Germain Hebert <germain.hebert@ca.abb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c |   30 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static int ft260_i2c_reset(struct hid_de
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int ft260_xfer_status(struct ft260_device *dev)
+static int ft260_xfer_status(struct ft260_device *dev, u8 bus_busy)
 {
 	struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
 	struct ft260_get_i2c_status_report report;
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static int ft260_xfer_status(struct ft26
 	ft260_dbg("bus_status %#02x, clock %u\n", report.bus_status,
 		  dev->clock);
 
-	if (report.bus_status & FT260_I2C_STATUS_CTRL_BUSY)
+	if (report.bus_status & (FT260_I2C_STATUS_CTRL_BUSY | bus_busy))
 		return -EAGAIN;
 
 	if (report.bus_status & FT260_I2C_STATUS_BUS_BUSY)
@@ -379,8 +379,11 @@ static int ft260_hid_output_report(struc
 static int ft260_hid_output_report_check_status(struct ft260_device *dev,
 						u8 *data, int len)
 {
+	u8 bus_busy;
 	int ret, usec, try = 100;
 	struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
+	struct ft260_i2c_write_request_report *rep =
+		(struct ft260_i2c_write_request_report *)data;
 
 	ret = ft260_hid_output_report(hdev, data, len);
 	if (ret < 0) {
@@ -398,8 +401,18 @@ static int ft260_hid_output_report_check
 		ft260_dbg("wait %d usec, len %d\n", usec, len);
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Do not check the busy bit for combined transactions
+	 * since the controller keeps the bus busy between writing
+	 * and reading IOs to ensure an atomic operation.
+	 */
+	if (rep->flag == FT260_FLAG_START)
+		bus_busy = 0;
+	else
+		bus_busy = FT260_I2C_STATUS_BUS_BUSY;
+
 	do {
-		ret = ft260_xfer_status(dev);
+		ret = ft260_xfer_status(dev, bus_busy);
 		if (ret != -EAGAIN)
 			break;
 	} while (--try);
@@ -485,10 +498,10 @@ static int ft260_smbus_write(struct ft26
 static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_device *dev, u8 addr, u8 *data,
 			  u16 len, u8 flag)
 {
+	int timeout, ret = 0;
 	struct ft260_i2c_read_request_report rep;
 	struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
-	int timeout;
-	int ret = 0;
+	u8 bus_busy = 0;
 
 	if (len > FT260_RD_DATA_MAX) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "%s: unsupported rd len: %d\n", __func__, len);
@@ -525,7 +538,10 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
 
 	dev->read_buf = NULL;
 
-	ret = ft260_xfer_status(dev);
+	if (flag & FT260_FLAG_STOP)
+		bus_busy = FT260_I2C_STATUS_BUS_BUSY;
+
+	ret = ft260_xfer_status(dev, bus_busy);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		ret = -EIO;
 		ft260_i2c_reset(hdev);
@@ -1004,7 +1020,7 @@ static int ft260_probe(struct hid_device
 	mutex_init(&dev->lock);
 	init_completion(&dev->wait);
 
-	ret = ft260_xfer_status(dev);
+	ret = ft260_xfer_status(dev, FT260_I2C_STATUS_BUS_BUSY);
 	if (ret)
 		ft260_i2c_reset(hdev);
 

[PATCH 5.15 39/69] HID: ft260: validate i2c input report length

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 80c4bbb2b38513e9c3d84805fa61a0ee16d79c45 ]

Add two checks to ft260_raw_event() to prevent out-of-bounds reads
from malicious or malfunctioning devices:

First, reject reports shorter than the 2-byte header (report ID +
length fields). Without this, even accessing xfer->length on a
1-byte report is an OOB read.

Second, validate xfer->length against the actual data capacity of
the received HID report. Each I2C data report ID (0xD0 through
0xDE) defines a different report size in the HID descriptor, so the
available payload varies per report. A corrupted length field could
cause memcpy to read beyond the report buffer.

Reported-by: Sebastián Josué Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c |   16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
@@ -1068,10 +1068,22 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
 	struct ft260_device *dev = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
 	struct ft260_i2c_input_report *xfer = (void *)data;
 
+	if (size < offsetof(struct ft260_i2c_input_report, data)) {
+		hid_err(hdev, "short report %d\n", size);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	if (xfer->report >= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MIN &&
 	    xfer->report <= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MAX) {
-		ft260_dbg("i2c resp: rep %#02x len %d\n", xfer->report,
-			  xfer->length);
+		ft260_dbg("i2c resp: rep %#02x len %d size %d\n",
+			  xfer->report, xfer->length, size);
+
+		if (xfer->length > size -
+		    offsetof(struct ft260_i2c_input_report, data)) {
+			hid_err(hdev, "report %#02x: length %d exceeds HID report size\n",
+				xfer->report, xfer->length);
+			return -1;
+		}
 
 		if ((dev->read_buf == NULL) ||
 		    (xfer->length > dev->read_len - dev->read_idx)) {

[PATCH 5.15 40/69] HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Raman Varabets <kernel-linux-20260610-80b7ab08@raman.v1.sg>

[ Upstream commit bf3e39df3a397fd82967a31d17c4e02c7feab221 ]

ft260_i2c_read() points dev->read_buf at a caller-supplied buffer
(often an on-stack variable), arms a completion and waits up to five
seconds for the device to return the data. The HID input callback
ft260_raw_event() runs in the input/IRQ path, independent of the
dev->lock mutex held by the read path, and copies the device-supplied
payload into dev->read_buf after a plain NULL check.

These two paths share read_buf, read_idx and read_len with no
serialization. If the device delays its response until the read
times out, ft260_i2c_read() resets the controller, clears read_buf
and returns, unwinding the stack frame the buffer lived in. A
response that arrives at that moment lets ft260_raw_event() pass the
NULL check and then memcpy() the device-controlled payload into the
now-freed stack location, a bounded but attacker-influenced
stack-use-after-return write triggerable by malicious or
malfunctioning hardware.

Add a dedicated spinlock that serializes every access to read_buf,
read_idx and read_len. ft260_raw_event() now holds it across the
NULL check, the memcpy and the index update, while the read path
takes it when arming and when clearing the buffer, so the teardown
can no longer slip between the check and the copy.

Fixes: 6a82582d9fa4 ("HID: ft260: add usb hid to i2c host bridge driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raman Varabets <kernel-linux-20260610-80b7ab08@raman.v1.sg>
Reviewed-by: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
[ de-indented one tab and renamed `rd_len` to `len` since the chunking loop in `ft260_i2c_read()` is absent. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c |   25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
@@ -240,6 +240,8 @@ struct ft260_device {
 	struct mutex lock;
 	u8 write_buf[FT260_REPORT_MAX_LENGTH];
 	unsigned long need_wakeup_at;
+	/* Protects read_buf, read_idx and read_len against ft260_raw_event() */
+	spinlock_t read_lock;
 	u8 *read_buf;
 	u16 read_idx;
 	u16 read_len;
@@ -501,6 +503,7 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
 	int timeout, ret = 0;
 	struct ft260_i2c_read_request_report rep;
 	struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
+	unsigned long irqflags;
 	u8 bus_busy = 0;
 
 	if (len > FT260_RD_DATA_MAX) {
@@ -518,9 +521,11 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
 
 	reinit_completion(&dev->wait);
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 	dev->read_idx = 0;
 	dev->read_buf = data;
 	dev->read_len = len;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 
 	ret = ft260_hid_output_report(hdev, (u8 *)&rep, sizeof(rep));
 	if (ret < 0) {
@@ -536,7 +541,9 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
 		goto ft260_i2c_read_exit;
 	}
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 	dev->read_buf = NULL;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 
 	if (flag & FT260_FLAG_STOP)
 		bus_busy = FT260_I2C_STATUS_BUS_BUSY;
@@ -549,7 +556,9 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
 	}
 
 ft260_i2c_read_exit:
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 	dev->read_buf = NULL;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1018,6 +1027,7 @@ static int ft260_probe(struct hid_device
 		 ((struct hidraw *)hdev->hidraw)->minor);
 
 	mutex_init(&dev->lock);
+	spin_lock_init(&dev->read_lock);
 	init_completion(&dev->wait);
 
 	ret = ft260_xfer_status(dev, FT260_I2C_STATUS_BUS_BUSY);
@@ -1067,6 +1077,7 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
 {
 	struct ft260_device *dev = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
 	struct ft260_i2c_input_report *xfer = (void *)data;
+	unsigned long irqflags;
 
 	if (size < offsetof(struct ft260_i2c_input_report, data)) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "short report %d\n", size);
@@ -1075,6 +1086,8 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
 
 	if (xfer->report >= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MIN &&
 	    xfer->report <= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MAX) {
+		bool complete_read;
+
 		ft260_dbg("i2c resp: rep %#02x len %d size %d\n",
 			  xfer->report, xfer->length, size);
 
@@ -1085,8 +1098,15 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
 			return -1;
 		}
 
+		/*
+		 * Hold read_lock so a timed-out ft260_i2c_read() cannot
+		 * clear read_buf between the NULL check and the memcpy.
+		 */
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
+
 		if ((dev->read_buf == NULL) ||
 		    (xfer->length > dev->read_len - dev->read_idx)) {
+			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 			hid_err(hdev, "unexpected report %#02x, length %d\n",
 				xfer->report, xfer->length);
 			return -1;
@@ -1095,8 +1115,11 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
 		memcpy(&dev->read_buf[dev->read_idx], &xfer->data,
 		       xfer->length);
 		dev->read_idx += xfer->length;
+		complete_read = dev->read_idx == dev->read_len;
+
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 
-		if (dev->read_idx == dev->read_len)
+		if (complete_read)
 			complete(&dev->wait);
 
 	} else {

[PATCH 5.15 41/69] HID: input: read battery capacity from its actual report offset

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jose Villaseñor Montfort <pepemontfort@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit d07644524b6511b622ee7b0e2e68c9ee43d522a4 ]

hidinput_query_battery_capacity() assumes the state-of-charge value is
the first byte following the report ID (buf[1]) and ignores where the
battery field actually sits within the report.

An Apple Magic Trackpad 2 precedes the AbsoluteStateOfCharge byte with a
byte of status flags in its battery reports, so this query returns the
flags byte instead of the charge level.

The device happens to make that easy to observe, because it exposes the
same cell twice: its report descriptor declares AbsoluteStateOfCharge in
two reports (0x90 and 0x9b), so hidinput_setup_battery() registers two
power supplies. Only the first one is refreshed by hid-magicmouse -- it
uses hid_get_battery(), which returns the first battery of the list --
and that refresh goes through the report event path, which parses the
field correctly. Nothing ever reports the second one, so every read of
its capacity takes the query path above. On a USB-C Magic Trackpad over
USB, on an unpatched 7.1.5:

  hid-<serial>-battery-144 = 100%  (Charging)      <- report event path
  hid-<serial>-battery-155 =   3%  (Discharging)   <- query path

Both are the same physical battery. A raw HIDIOCGINPUT of the two
reports at that same moment:

  report 0x90 -> [90 03 64]
  report 0x9b -> [9b 03 64 64 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00]
                     ^flags ^SoC = 0x64 = 100%

The device answers correctly in both cases; only the offset the kernel
reads the capacity from is wrong. 0x03 is the flags byte (present,
charging), reported as "3%".

Bluetooth takes the same query path for its capacity, where the trackpad
reported a bogus near-constant ~4% -- 0b100, the FullyCharged flag --
regardless of the real charge.

Store the battery field's offset within the report at setup time and use
it when querying, so the capacity is read from its real position. The
report event path already parses the field correctly through the HID
core; only the explicit GET_REPORT query was wrong.

Devices whose capacity field is the first field in the report have a
report_offset of 0 and are unaffected (buf[1 + 0] == buf[1]).

Fixes: 581c4484769e ("HID: input: map digitizer battery usage")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jose Villaseñor Montfort <pepemontfort@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Hall <signshop.alec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
[ Adapted `bat->report_offset` and other `struct hid_battery` accessors to the flat `dev->battery_*` fields on `struct hid_device` and replaced `__free(kfree)` with manual `kfree(buf)` calls. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-input.c |   17 +++++++++++++----
 include/linux/hid.h     |    1 +
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-input.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-input.c
@@ -367,19 +367,27 @@ static int hidinput_query_battery_capaci
 {
 	u8 *buf;
 	int ret;
+	/*
+	 * The capacity field may not be the first field in the report: some
+	 * devices (e.g. the Apple Magic Trackpad 2 over Bluetooth) precede it
+	 * with status flags. Read it from its actual byte offset in the report
+	 * (report_offset is in bits; the leading byte is the report id).
+	 */
+	int offset = 1 + dev->battery_report_offset / 8;
+	int len = offset + 1;
 
-	buf = kmalloc(4, GFP_KERNEL);
+	buf = kmalloc(max(len, 4), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ret = hid_hw_raw_request(dev, dev->battery_report_id, buf, 4,
+	ret = hid_hw_raw_request(dev, dev->battery_report_id, buf, max(len, 4),
 				 dev->battery_report_type, HID_REQ_GET_REPORT);
-	if (ret < 2) {
+	if (ret < len) {
 		kfree(buf);
 		return -ENODATA;
 	}
 
-	ret = hidinput_scale_battery_capacity(dev, buf[1]);
+	ret = hidinput_scale_battery_capacity(dev, buf[offset]);
 	kfree(buf);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -497,6 +505,7 @@ static int hidinput_setup_battery(struct
 	dev->battery_max = max;
 	dev->battery_report_type = report_type;
 	dev->battery_report_id = field->report->id;
+	dev->battery_report_offset = field->report_offset;
 
 	/*
 	 * Stylus is normally not connected to the device and thus we
--- a/include/linux/hid.h
+++ b/include/linux/hid.h
@@ -620,6 +620,7 @@ struct hid_device {							/* device repo
 	__s32 battery_max;
 	__s32 battery_report_type;
 	__s32 battery_report_id;
+	__s32 battery_report_offset;					/* bit offset of the capacity field within its report */
 	enum hid_battery_status battery_status;
 	bool battery_avoid_query;
 	ktime_t battery_ratelimit_time;

[PATCH 5.15 42/69] fpga: dfl: fme: add error handling

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>

commit b5ba63e247075087ab8a6a087622c762dc4172e9 upstream.

Add error handling to devm_kasprint in fme_perf_pmu_register().

Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_2000
Fixes: 724142f8c42a ("fpga: dfl: fme: add performance reporting support")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Cc: Moritz Fischer <mdf@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Yilun: Fix stable tag, add Fixes tag ]
Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2026070620-unwired-clay-f6cc@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-perf.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-perf.c
+++ b/drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-perf.c
@@ -925,6 +925,8 @@ static int fme_perf_pmu_register(struct
 				PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_EXCLUDE;
 
 	name = devm_kasprintf(priv->dev, GFP_KERNEL, "dfl_fme%d", pdev->id);
+	if (!name)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	ret = perf_pmu_register(pmu, name, -1);
 	if (ret)

[PATCH 5.15 43/69] accessibility: speakup: unregister tty ldisc on later init failures

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang@isrc.iscas.ac.cn>

commit a76acbaec9b8fd74413646984d2e3626d0543e39 upstream.

The ldisc registration is intentionally non-fatal, since some synth
drivers do not use tty/ldisc.  However, once speakup_init() continues
past the registration point and later fails, the init unwind path should
mirror speakup_exit() and call spk_ttyio_unregister_ldisc().

Add the missing unregister call to the error path after synth_release(),
matching the normal module exit cleanup order.

Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang@isrc.iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Fixes: e23a9b439ce9 ("staging: speakup: safely register and unregister ldisc")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260531230804.254962-16-samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/accessibility/speakup/main.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/accessibility/speakup/main.c
+++ b/drivers/accessibility/speakup/main.c
@@ -2430,6 +2430,7 @@ error_kbdnotifier:
 	mutex_lock(&spk_mutex);
 	synth_release();
 	mutex_unlock(&spk_mutex);
+	spk_ttyio_unregister_ldisc();
 	speakup_kobj_exit();
 
 error_kobjects:

[PATCH 5.15 44/69] xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_register_driver() failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>

commit a916fa66a43e10f63198b6ce978badffc678821a upstream.

If tty_register_driver() fails, it drops the reference, but fails to set
the global dbc_tty_driver to NULL, causing the unregister to be called
again when module exits.

On module unload dbc_tty_exit() only gates its cleanup on the driver
pointer being non-NULL, so it operates on the already-freed driver:

    module_init(xhci_hcd_init)
      xhci_hcd_init()
        xhci_dbc_init()                       [return value ignored]
          dbc_tty_init()
            tty_register_driver() fails
              tty_driver_kref_put()           -> driver freed
              (dbc_tty_driver left dangling)
    ...
    module_exit(xhci_hcd_fini)
      xhci_hcd_fini()
        xhci_dbc_exit()
          dbc_tty_exit()
            if (dbc_tty_driver)               -> true (dangling)
              tty_unregister_driver()         -> use-after-free

Fixes: 4521f1613940 ("xhci: dbctty: split dbc tty driver registration and unregistration functions.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10
Cc: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806142113.2436238-8-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
@@ -599,6 +599,7 @@ static int dbc_tty_init(void)
 		pr_err("Can't register dbc tty driver\n");
 		tty_driver_kref_put(dbc_tty_driver);
 		idr_destroy(&dbc_tty_minors);
+		dbc_tty_driver = NULL;
 	}
 
 	return ret;

[PATCH 5.15 45/69] xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_alloc_driver() failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>

commit 25b8dfc13495a6c1cf4abacc8ef20196c7f20e5c upstream.

Make sure to set dbc_tty_driver to NULL to match the check in
dbc_tty_exit(). For that, make detached error handling path common to the
other branch in the same function.

Fixes: 4521f1613940 ("xhci: dbctty: split dbc tty driver registration and unregistration functions.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10
Cc: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806142113.2436238-9-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c |   16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
@@ -576,8 +576,8 @@ static int dbc_tty_init(void)
 	dbc_tty_driver = tty_alloc_driver(64, TTY_DRIVER_REAL_RAW |
 					  TTY_DRIVER_DYNAMIC_DEV);
 	if (IS_ERR(dbc_tty_driver)) {
-		idr_destroy(&dbc_tty_minors);
-		return PTR_ERR(dbc_tty_driver);
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dbc_tty_driver);
+		goto fail;
 	}
 
 	dbc_tty_driver->driver_name = "dbc_serial";
@@ -597,12 +597,18 @@ static int dbc_tty_init(void)
 	ret = tty_register_driver(dbc_tty_driver);
 	if (ret) {
 		pr_err("Can't register dbc tty driver\n");
-		tty_driver_kref_put(dbc_tty_driver);
-		idr_destroy(&dbc_tty_minors);
-		dbc_tty_driver = NULL;
+		goto fail_put;
 	}
 
 	return ret;
+
+fail_put:
+	tty_driver_kref_put(dbc_tty_driver);
+fail:
+	idr_destroy(&dbc_tty_minors);
+	dbc_tty_driver = NULL;
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void dbc_tty_exit(void)

[PATCH 5.15 46/69] fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>

commit 9afeca0d569c9fc89d758fe7a9339d1e8afb1546 upstream.

fuse_do_setattr() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate
(fault_blocked = true) and releases it at the out:/error: labels.  But
when a writeback flush is also needed, a write_inode_now() failure
returns directly and leaks the lock, so any later fault or truncate on
the file stalls on the stale rwsem.

For example, truncate(2) on a setuid file reaches fuse_do_setattr()
with both ATTR_SIZE and ATTR_MODE set:

  truncate(2)
  └─ do_truncate()
     ├─ dentry_needs_remove_privs()         # S_ISUID
     └─ notify_change()                     # KILL_SUID -> ATTR_MODE
        └─ fuse_setattr()                   # no killpriv:
           │                                #   ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE
           └─ fuse_do_setattr()
              ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock()  # IS_DAX && is_truncate
              └─ write_inode_now()          # is_wb && ATTR_MODE
                 └─ if (err)                # e.g. daemon -> -EIO
                    return err              # <- lock leaked

Fix this by adding an unlock label that releases the lock before
returning the error, and use it for the fuse_dax_break_layouts()
failure path as well.

Fixes: 6ae330cad6ef ("virtiofs: serialize truncate/punch_hole and dax fault path")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/fuse/dir.c |    9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
@@ -1601,10 +1601,8 @@ int fuse_do_setattr(struct dentry *dentr
 		filemap_invalidate_lock(mapping);
 		fault_blocked = true;
 		err = fuse_dax_break_layouts(inode, 0, -1);
-		if (err) {
-			filemap_invalidate_unlock(mapping);
-			return err;
-		}
+		if (err)
+			goto unlock;
 	}
 
 	if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_OPEN) {
@@ -1631,7 +1629,7 @@ int fuse_do_setattr(struct dentry *dentr
 			 ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
 		err = write_inode_now(inode, true);
 		if (err)
-			return err;
+			goto unlock;
 
 		fuse_set_nowrite(inode);
 		fuse_release_nowrite(inode);
@@ -1728,6 +1726,7 @@ error:
 
 	clear_bit(FUSE_I_SIZE_UNSTABLE, &fi->state);
 
+unlock:
 	if (fault_blocked)
 		filemap_invalidate_unlock(mapping);
 	return err;

[PATCH 5.15 47/69] fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on open O_TRUNC DAX failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>

commit a927f1867e61b78f39f9da0bbba3c98c2ca151fe upstream.

fuse_open() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate
(dax_truncate = true) and releases it before the out_inode_unlock
label.  But when fuse_dax_break_layouts() fails, the goto
out_inode_unlock skips the unlock and leaks the rwsem, so any later
fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale lock.

fuse_dax_break_layouts() can fail with -ERESTARTSYS when a signal
interrupts the wait for busy DAX pages to drain:

  open("file", O_RDWR | O_TRUNC)
  └─ fuse_open()
     ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock()        # dax_truncate
     └─ fuse_dax_break_layouts()
        └─ dax_break_layout()
           └─ wait_page_idle()           # TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE
              └─ fuse_wait_dax_page()    # unlock, schedule, re-lock
                 └─ signal → -ERESTARTSYS
     goto out_inode_unlock               # <- lock leaked

Fix this by moving filemap_invalidate_unlock() below the label so
that all error paths release the lock, and rename the label to
out_unlock as it now covers more than just the inode lock.

Fixes: 2fdbb8dd0155 ("fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page invalidation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/fuse/file.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/fuse/file.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/file.c
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ int fuse_open_common(struct inode *inode
 		filemap_invalidate_lock(inode->i_mapping);
 		err = fuse_dax_break_layouts(inode, 0, -1);
 		if (err)
-			goto out_inode_unlock;
+			goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
 	if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate)
@@ -281,9 +281,9 @@ int fuse_open_common(struct inode *inode
 		else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE))
 			invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping);
 	}
+out_unlock:
 	if (dax_truncate)
 		filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping);
-out_inode_unlock:
 	if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate)
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 

[PATCH 5.15 48/69] usb: usbtest: disable dynamic ID support

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>

commit 00e2071f6d5621a5ddea311a5e6b143ae6e474af upstream.

The usbtest driver relies on the driver_info field of struct usb_device_id
to point to a valid struct usbtest_info descriptor. This structure contains
essential test configurations, such as endpoint addresses and test modes,
which are required during probe.

When a user dynamically adds a new device ID via the sysfs new_id
interface without specifying a reference device, the USB core initializes
driver_info to 0 (NULL). When a matching device is subsequently probed,
usbtest_probe() unconditionally casts driver_info to a struct usbtest_info
pointer and dereferences it, leading to a NULL pointer dereference crash:

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
  0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
  RIP: 0010:usbtest_probe+0x3b9/0x1280 drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c:2822

Because usbtest strictly requires pre-defined usbtest_info descriptors
to function, dynamic ID binding via sysfs is fundamentally unsupported
for this driver.

Fix this by setting .no_dynamic_id = 1 on usbtest_driver. This instructs
the USB core to skip creating the new_id and remove_id sysfs interfaces
for usbtest, preventing invalid dynamic ID entries from being created.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+7e1e5911f9eac50bedc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7e1e5911f9eac50bedc7
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806152651.2370795-1-nogikh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c
@@ -3053,6 +3053,7 @@ static struct usb_driver usbtest_driver
 	.disconnect =	usbtest_disconnect,
 	.suspend =	usbtest_suspend,
 	.resume =	usbtest_resume,
+	.no_dynamic_id = 1,
 };
 
 /*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/

[PATCH 5.15 49/69] usb: gadget: f_tcm: keep port count until LUN teardown completes

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>

commit c39d0916da47d94909391876c9e5bd429ea7b1b9 upstream.

tcm_usbg_drop_nexus() permits session removal once tpg_port_count
reaches zero. However, usbg_port_unlink() currently decrements that
count from the fabric_pre_unlink() callback, before core_dev_del_lun()
waits for active se_lun references to drain.

If removal of the last LUN races a nexus removal, the latter can observe
a zero port count and call target_remove_session(). This frees
sess_cmd_map while an in-flight struct usbg_cmd, including its work item,
can still be accessed.

Overlapping the last-LUN unlink with nexus removal reproduces this
lifetime violation as a DEBUG_OBJECTS "free active" warning for
usbg_cmd_work, followed by a target-core BUG/Oops.

The generic target-core unlink path has no callback after
core_dev_del_lun() completes. Add an optional fabric_post_unlink()
callback and use it for the f_tcm port count. The count now remains
nonzero until core_dev_del_lun() has finished draining active LUN
references, preventing nexus removal from freeing the session during
command completion.

Fixes: c52661d60f63 ("usb-gadget: Initial merge of target module for UASP + BOT")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807060733.3186624-1-shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c |    8 ++++++++
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c          |    2 +-
 include/target/target_core_fabric.h          |    2 ++
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c
@@ -689,6 +689,14 @@ static void target_fabric_port_unlink(
 	}
 
 	core_dev_del_lun(se_tpg, lun);
+
+	if (tf->tf_ops->fabric_post_unlink) {
+		/*
+		 * Allow fabrics to release state that must remain valid until
+		 * core_dev_del_lun() has drained all active LUN references.
+		 */
+		tf->tf_ops->fabric_post_unlink(se_tpg, lun);
+	}
 }
 
 static void target_fabric_port_release(struct config_item *item)
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c
@@ -1714,7 +1714,7 @@ static const struct target_core_fabric_o
 	.fabric_make_tpg		= usbg_make_tpg,
 	.fabric_drop_tpg		= usbg_drop_tpg,
 	.fabric_post_link		= usbg_port_link,
-	.fabric_pre_unlink		= usbg_port_unlink,
+	.fabric_post_unlink		= usbg_port_unlink,
 	.fabric_init_nodeacl		= usbg_init_nodeacl,
 
 	.tfc_wwn_attrs			= usbg_wwn_attrs,
--- a/include/target/target_core_fabric.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_fabric.h
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ struct target_core_fabric_ops {
 				struct se_lun *);
 	void (*fabric_pre_unlink)(struct se_portal_group *,
 				struct se_lun *);
+	void (*fabric_post_unlink)(struct se_portal_group *se_tpg,
+				   struct se_lun *lun);
 	struct se_tpg_np *(*fabric_make_np)(struct se_portal_group *,
 				struct config_group *, const char *);
 	void (*fabric_drop_np)(struct se_tpg_np *);

[PATCH 5.15 50/69] xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>

commit deb232e884877bf10b4ce2580909eedec986c284 upstream.

ZDI reported and analyzed a race condition during close for espintcp
sockets:

    espintcp_close() frees emsg->skb via kfree_skb() without holding
    any socket lock. Concurrently, the xfrm_trans_reinject work queue
    invokes esp_output_tcp_finish() -> espintcp_push_skb() ->
    espintcp_push_msgs() -> skb_send_sock_locked(), which reads the
    same skb as a data source.

Fix this by adding a synchronize_rcu() call after resetting sk_prot,
since esp_output_tcp_finish() runs under RCU and won't use a socket
with sk_prot == &tcp_prot.  Simply taking the socket lock in
espintcp_close() could lead to leaks, if esp_output_tcp_finish()
re-adds an skb in the slot we just freed. After this, the existing
barrier() is no longer needed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/xfrm/espintcp.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
@@ -508,7 +508,8 @@ static void espintcp_close(struct sock *
 	strp_stop(&ctx->strp);
 
 	sk->sk_prot = &tcp_prot;
-	barrier();
+
+	synchronize_rcu();
 
 	cancel_work_sync(&ctx->work);
 	strp_done(&ctx->strp);

[PATCH 5.15 51/69] xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhiling Zou <roxy520tt@gmail.com>

commit e1d7c5ac1c246ce5775f604515de0a59fbf2116e upstream.

ESP-in-TCP receives records through the TCP strparser. handle_esp()
restores skb->dev from the saved skb_iif before passing the packet into
the XFRM input path.

Queued TCP data can be processed after the original ingress device has
been removed, for example during veth or net namespace teardown. In that
case dev_get_by_index_rcu() returns NULL. The XFRM IPv4 and IPv6 input
paths both expect skb->dev to be valid while building the route lookup,
so queued ESP-in-TCP data can dereference a NULL device.

Drop the packet if the saved ingress device can no longer be resolved.
Such a packet can no longer be routed through the normal XFRM receive
path, and this preserves the existing behaviour for packets whose ingress
device still exists.

Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Zhiling Zou <roxy520tt@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Reviewed-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/xfrm/espintcp.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
@@ -38,6 +38,11 @@ static void handle_esp(struct sk_buff *s
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	skb->dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif);
+	if (!skb->dev) {
+		XFRM_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_XFRMINERROR);
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+		goto out;
+	}
 	local_bh_disable();
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 	if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6)
@@ -46,6 +51,7 @@ static void handle_esp(struct sk_buff *s
 #endif
 		xfrm4_rcv_encap(skb, IPPROTO_ESP, 0, TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP);
 	local_bh_enable();
+out:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 

[PATCH 5.15 52/69] xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>

commit 7bad4bda74dc4713f398d3b7624ff05478e3a568 upstream.

AH6 rearranges routing-header addresses before computing or verifying the
ICV. ipv6_rearrange_rthdr() assumes that segments_left is not larger than
the number of addresses described by the routing header's hdrlen field.

That assumption does not hold for raw IPv6 HDRINCL packets. A packet with
hdrlen equal to 2 describes one address, but can carry an arbitrary
segments_left value. With segments_left equal to 255, the function moves
its address pointer 4,064 bytes backwards and passes a 4,064-byte length to
memmove(), resulting in an out-of-bounds access.

Validate the invariant locally before modifying the routing header or
performing any address-pointer arithmetic, and propagate malformed-header
errors to the existing AH6 input and output error paths.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: avom-custom-harness:gpt-5.5-qwen3.6-mod-mix
Signed-off-by: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/ah6.c |   29 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/ah6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ah6.c
@@ -235,26 +235,28 @@ static void ipv6_rearrange_destopt(struc
  *	Rearrange the destination address in @iph and the addresses in @rthdr
  *	so that they appear in the order they will at the final destination.
  *	See Appendix A2 of RFC 2402 for details.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -EINVAL if segments_left exceeds the number of
+ * addresses described by hdrlen.
  */
-static void ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(struct ipv6hdr *iph, struct ipv6_rt_hdr *rthdr)
+static int ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(struct ipv6hdr *iph, struct ipv6_rt_hdr *rthdr)
 {
-	int segments, segments_left;
+	unsigned int segments, segments_left;
 	struct in6_addr *addrs;
 	struct in6_addr final_addr;
 
 	segments_left = rthdr->segments_left;
 	if (segments_left == 0)
-		return;
-	rthdr->segments_left = 0;
+		return 0;
 
-	/* The value of rthdr->hdrlen has been verified either by the system
-	 * call if it is locally generated, or by ipv6_rthdr_rcv() for incoming
-	 * packets.  So we can assume that it is even and that segments is
-	 * greater than or equal to segments_left.
-	 *
-	 * For the same reason we can assume that this option is of type 0.
+	/* Raw locally generated packets can reach AH6 without the invariant
+	 * required by the rt0-style address rearrangement below.
 	 */
 	segments = rthdr->hdrlen >> 1;
+	if (segments_left > segments)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rthdr->segments_left = 0;
 
 	addrs = ((struct rt0_hdr *)rthdr)->addr;
 	final_addr = addrs[segments - 1];
@@ -264,6 +266,8 @@ static void ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(struct
 
 	addrs[0] = iph->daddr;
 	iph->daddr = final_addr;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int ipv6_clear_mutable_options(struct ipv6hdr *iph, int len, int dir)
@@ -276,6 +280,7 @@ static int ipv6_clear_mutable_options(st
 	} exthdr = { .iph = iph };
 	char *end = exthdr.raw + len;
 	int nexthdr = iph->nexthdr;
+	int err;
 
 	exthdr.iph++;
 
@@ -295,7 +300,9 @@ static int ipv6_clear_mutable_options(st
 			break;
 
 		case NEXTHDR_ROUTING:
-			ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(iph, exthdr.rth);
+			err = ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(iph, exthdr.rth);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
 			break;
 
 		default:

[PATCH 5.15 53/69] xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>

commit c12cbf56320fb633484ee0ca1fb7d68d6b64b213 upstream.

attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving
x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no
sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes).

xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth
algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites
x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown
only frees the replacement pointer.

Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that
state from x->props.aalgo.

Fixes: 4447bb33f094 ("xfrm: Store aalg in xfrm_state with a user specified truncation length")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_con
 	if ((err = attach_auth_trunc(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo,
 				     attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC])))
 		goto error;
-	if (!x->props.aalgo) {
+	if (!x->aalg) {
 		if ((err = attach_auth(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo,
 				       attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH])))
 			goto error;

[PATCH 5.15 54/69] net: bridge: mcast: fix use-after-free of a master VLANs multicast context

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>

commit 50e5c6605cc9c2dd57bd2d1b3459674d19738983 upstream.

br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan() clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under
br->multicast_lock before stopping a VLAN's multicast context.  That is
the teardown handshake: lockless readers gate on the flag through
br_multicast_ctx_should_use() -> br_multicast_ctx_vlan_disabled(), so
once it is cleared under the lock no reader can arm the context again.

For a master VLAN the handshake never runs.  __vlan_del() clears
BRIDGE_VLAN_INFO_BRENTRY before calling br_vlan_put_master(), so
br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan(masterv, false) returns early on
!br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan): the flag stays set and br->multicast_lock is
never taken.  br_vlan_put_master() then drains the context in
br_multicast_ctx_deinit() and frees the VLAN through call_rcu(), while a
reader still inside rcu_read_lock() sees the context as enabled and
re-arms it.  The port and port-VLAN branch of the function has no
br_vlan_is_brentry() test and flips the flag under br->multicast_lock,
so it is not affected.

The reader is the bridge transmit path.  For a master VLAN
br_multicast_rcv() selects brmctx = &vlan->br_mcast_ctx with
pmctx = NULL, so IGMP sent to the bridge device re-arms the context's
timers after br_multicast_ctx_deinit() has already stopped them.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in detach_if_pending+0x412/0x4a0
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff88810ac39918 by task brmc/601
   __mod_timer+0x51a/0xc50
   br_multicast_host_join+0x25b/0x390
   __br_multicast_add_group+0x468/0x530
   br_ip4_multicast_add_group+0x1a0/0x260
   br_multicast_rcv+0x2cda/0x61e0
   br_dev_xmit+0x6c4/0x1540
  Allocated by task 610:
   br_vlan_add+0x111/0xb40
   br_vlan_info+0x370/0x3e0
  Freed by task 0:
   kfree+0x1a7/0x4f0
   rcu_core+0x7dc/0x10a0

Only test br_vlan_is_brentry() when enabling, like the
br_multicast_ctx_vlan_global_disabled() test next to it.  Disabling then
always clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under br->multicast_lock before
br_multicast_ctx_deinit() drains the context.

Fixes: 7b54aaaf53cb ("net: bridge: multicast: add vlan state initialization and control")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/D400F6C7-543A-4B79-9E5B-D1D8974DE5C9@doyensec.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
@@ -4113,8 +4113,8 @@ void br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan(struct
 	if (br_vlan_is_master(vlan)) {
 		br = vlan->br;
 
-		if (!br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan) ||
-		    (on &&
+		if (on &&
+		    (!br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan) ||
 		     br_multicast_ctx_vlan_global_disabled(&vlan->br_mcast_ctx)))
 			return;
 

[PATCH 5.15 55/69] ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>

commit 44930446dde45a7a90fe1446fa38eb0e2c561646 upstream.

End.DX4 and End.DT4 decapsulate an IPv4 packet through
decap_and_validate() and send it directly to IPv4 routing. The inner
packet therefore bypasses ip_rcv_core(), which normally clears IPCB
before IPv4 interprets skb->cb.

The skb instead retains IP6CB data from the outer packet. IP6CB and
IPCB use the same skb->cb storage, so IP6CB(skb)->lastopt overlaps
IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen and srr, while IP6CB(skb)->nhoff overlaps rr and
ts.

The sender can make the stale optlen byte nonzero with a valid outer
extension-header chain. The reproducers put an eight-byte Destination
Options header immediately after the 40-byte IPv6 header and before the
Segment Routing Header. ipv6_destopt_rcv() records the sender-controlled
Destination Options offset in both lastopt and nhoff, setting them to
40. On the reproduced little-endian x86-64 kernel, IPv4 therefore sees
optlen = 40 and rr = 40.

Both tcp_v4_save_options() and __ip_options_echo() skip option copying
when optlen is zero. Here optlen is 40, so the TCP SYN path allocates
room for 40 bytes of option data and calls __ip_options_echo(). The
stale rr value makes that function read inner packet byte 41 as the
Record Route option length. The reproducers set that sender-controlled
byte to 255, so __ip_options_echo() copies 255 bytes into the 40-byte
option-data area.

Separate End.DX4 and End.DT4 reproducers on the unpatched v7.2-rc5
kernel both produced:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo()
  Write of size 255

The relevant End.DX4 call path is:

  __ip_options_echo
  tcp_v4_route_req
  tcp_conn_request
  tcp_v4_conn_request
  tcp_rcv_state_process
  tcp_v4_do_rcv
  tcp_v4_rcv
  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
  ip_local_deliver_finish
  ip_local_deliver
  input_action_end_dx4_finish
  input_action_end_dx4

The relevant End.DT4 call path is:

  __ip_options_echo
  tcp_v4_route_req
  tcp_conn_request
  tcp_v4_conn_request
  tcp_rcv_state_process
  tcp_v4_do_rcv
  tcp_v4_rcv
  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
  ip_local_deliver_finish
  ip_local_deliver
  input_action_end_dt4

tcp_v4_save_options() is inlined into the tcp_v4_route_req() path, so
it does not appear as a separate frame.

When decap_and_validate() handles IPPROTO_IPIP, save the ingress
interface from IP6CB, clear IPCB, and restore the saved value. Doing
this in the common decapsulation path covers End.DX4, End.DT4, and
End.DT46's IPv4 arm.

Use IP6CB(skb)->iif rather than skb->skb_iif. These actions run after
l3mdev processing, which can replace skb_iif with the L3 master;
IP6CB iif still records the receiving interface set at IPv6 ingress.

Fixes: 891ef8dd2a8d ("ipv6: sr: implement additional seg6local actions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Co-developed-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260817085839.946321-1-david.lee@trailofbits.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/seg6_local.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c
@@ -193,6 +193,13 @@ static bool decap_and_validate(struct sk
 	if (iptunnel_pull_offloads(skb))
 		return false;
 
+	if (proto == IPPROTO_IPIP) {
+		int iif = IP6CB(skb)->iif;
+
+		memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb)));
+		IPCB(skb)->iif = iif;
+	}
+
 	return true;
 }
 

[PATCH 5.15 56/69] mm/swap: reject swapon() on filesystem-level encrypted files

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>

commit c310a8932a3107c9bc8f01d473e9d085f8aa9c98 upstream.

ext4 and f2fs don't prevent filesystem-level encrypted files from being
set up directly as swap files.  In this case, encryption is bypassed.

No one should be doing this, vs.  the methods of encrypted swap that
actually do work (such as swapping to a dm-crypt device, or swapping to a
loopback device on top of a filesystem-level encrypted file).

Nevertheless, to prevent user error, make swapon() explicitly reject this
case.  Document this behavior in fscrypt.rst as well.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260803180426.3123-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Fixes: f424f664f0e8 ("f2fs crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <baoquan.he@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Cc: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Li <chrisl@kernel.org>
Cc: Kairui Song <kasong@tencent.com>
Cc: Kemeng Shi <shikemeng@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst |    4 ++++
 mm/swapfile.c                         |    7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
@@ -1063,6 +1063,10 @@ astute users may notice some differences
 
 - DAX (Direct Access) is not supported on encrypted files.
 
+- Encrypted files cannot be used directly as swap files.  To swap to
+  an encrypted file, set up a loopback device on top of it.
+  Alternatively, encrypted swap can use a dm-crypt device.
+
 - The maximum length of an encrypted symlink is 2 bytes shorter than
   the maximum length of an unencrypted symlink.  For example, on an
   EXT4 filesystem with a 4K block size, unencrypted symlinks can be up
--- a/mm/swapfile.c
+++ b/mm/swapfile.c
@@ -3209,6 +3209,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(swapon, const char __use
 		error = -EBUSY;
 		goto bad_swap_unlock_inode;
 	}
+	if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) {
+		pr_warn_once(
+			"Filesystem-level encrypted swapfile '%s' is unsupported. Create a loop device over it, or use dm-crypt\n",
+			name->name);
+		error = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad_swap_unlock_inode;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Read the swap header.

[PATCH 5.15 57/69] crypto: atmel-tdes - use scatterlist length before DMA mapping

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>

commit ba199bdaa80b09a7dd92f28751de7f3dbb06c510 upstream.

Using sg_dma_len() is only valid after mapping the scatterlist with
dma_map_sg(). However, atmel_tdes_crypt_start() uses it before mapping
to compare input/output lengths and to compute the transfer count.

Use the original scatterlist lengths before DMA mapping to avoid reading
stale or uninitialized DMA lengths when CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH=y.

Drop the output scatterlist length in the fast path since it is equal to
->in_sg->length and does not change the transfer count.

Fixes: 13802005d8f2 ("crypto: atmel - add Atmel DES/TDES driver")
Fixes: 1f858040c2f7 ("crypto: atmel-tdes - add support for latest release of the IP (0x700)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c
@@ -499,14 +499,13 @@ static int atmel_tdes_crypt_start(struct
 			IS_ALIGNED(dd->out_sg->length, dd->ctx->block_size);
 		fast = in && out;
 
-		if (sg_dma_len(dd->in_sg) != sg_dma_len(dd->out_sg))
+		if (dd->in_sg->length != dd->out_sg->length)
 			fast = 0;
 	}
 
 
 	if (fast)  {
-		count = min_t(size_t, dd->total, sg_dma_len(dd->in_sg));
-		count = min_t(size_t, count, sg_dma_len(dd->out_sg));
+		count = min_t(size_t, dd->total, dd->in_sg->length);
 
 		err = dma_map_sg(dd->dev, dd->in_sg, 1, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
 		if (!err) {

[PATCH 5.15 58/69] crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Md Sadre Alam <md.alam@oss.qualcomm.com>

commit 7f2345f47dd189625f657cd72437179ab4170ee1 upstream.

The AAD buffer allocated in qce_aead_ccm_prepare_buf_assoclen()
can be smaller than the length later programmed into the DMA
scatterlist.

The allocation size is currently calculated as:

  ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN

while the DMA length is set to:

  ALIGN(assoclen + adata_header_len, 16)

Since ALIGN() does not distribute over addition, the allocation
can be smaller than the DMA length. For example, when
assoclen = 32 and adata_header_len = 2:

  allocation = ALIGN(32, 16) + 6 = 38
  DMA length = ALIGN(32 + 2, 16) = 48

As a result, the QCE hardware can read beyond the allocated
buffer while computing the CBC-MAC over the associated data.
The extra bytes are folded into the authentication tag,
resulting in an incorrect tag and causing CCM self-test
failures such as:

  alg: aead: ccm-aes-qce encryption test failed (wrong result)
  on test vector 8

Fix the allocation by adding the maximum possible AAD header
length before alignment:

  ALIGN(assoclen + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN, 16)

This guarantees that the allocated buffer is large enough
for the fully padded AAD data for all supported header sizes.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9363efb4181c ("crypto: qce - Add support for AEAD algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Md Sadre Alam <md.alam@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ qce_aead_ccm_prepare_buf_assoclen(struct
 	/* Get the msg */
 	msg_sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(__sg, req->src, req->assoclen);
 
-	rctx->adata = kzalloc((ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN) *
+	rctx->adata = kzalloc(ALIGN(assoclen + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN, 16) *
 			       sizeof(unsigned char), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!rctx->adata)
 		return -ENOMEM;

[PATCH 5.15 59/69] crypto: mxs-dcp - fix source scatterlist length access

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>

commit c5bcb084a9871e5b62afb5f48b60adfa13b5d9f8 upstream.

mxs_dcp_aes_block_crypt() uses sg_dma_len() without mapping the source
scatterlist with dma_map_sg() first. Therefore, sg_dma_len() is invalid
and could return zero or a stale DMA length, causing encryption and
decryption to process the wrong number of bytes when
CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH=y.

Use the original scatterlist length instead.

Fixes: 15b59e7c3733 ("crypto: mxs - Add Freescale MXS DCP driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_block_crypt(struc
 
 	for_each_sg(req->src, src, sg_nents(req->src), i) {
 		src_buf = sg_virt(src);
-		len = sg_dma_len(src);
+		len = src->length;
 		tlen += len;
 		limit_hit = tlen > req->cryptlen;
 

[PATCH 5.15 60/69] crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>

commit 7e28b0a5c4b7d075b98ce6d8f5290a9d3deb5b92 upstream.

Remove algorithms that are either unsafe or deprecated and have no
in-kernel users that cannot be served by the ARM CE implementations.

AES-ECB reveals plaintext patterns (identical plaintext blocks produce
identical ciphertext blocks) and should not be exposed as a hardware-
accelerated primitive. DES, Triple DES and HMAC-SHA1 have been
deprecated for years.

Remove sha1, ecb(aes), ecb(des), cbc(des), ecb(des3_ede), cbc(des3_ede),
hmac(sha1) and all AEAD variants built on these primitives as well as
authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des)). Also clean up the - now dead - code,
flags and constants.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Kuldeep Singh <kuldeep.singh@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c     |   56 ------------------------
 drivers/crypto/qce/common.c   |   55 +++++------------------
 drivers/crypto/qce/common.h   |   16 +-----
 drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h  |    4 -
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c      |   30 ------------
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h      |    1 
 drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c |   97 ------------------------------------------
 7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 239 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
 #include <crypto/gcm.h>
 #include <crypto/authenc.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/des.h>
-#include <crypto/sha1.h>
 #include <crypto/sha2.h>
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
 #include "aead.h"
@@ -597,7 +595,6 @@ static int qce_aead_setkey(struct crypto
 	struct qce_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
 	struct crypto_authenc_keys authenc_keys;
 	unsigned long flags = to_aead_tmpl(tfm)->alg_flags;
-	u32 _key[6];
 	int err;
 
 	err = crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&authenc_keys, key, keylen);
@@ -608,26 +605,7 @@ static int qce_aead_setkey(struct crypto
 	    authenc_keys.authkeylen > QCE_MAX_KEY_SIZE)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (IS_DES(flags)) {
-		err = verify_aead_des_key(tfm, authenc_keys.enckey, authenc_keys.enckeylen);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-	} else if (IS_3DES(flags)) {
-		err = verify_aead_des3_key(tfm, authenc_keys.enckey, authenc_keys.enckeylen);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-		/*
-		 * The crypto engine does not support any two keys
-		 * being the same for triple des algorithms. The
-		 * verify_skcipher_des3_key does not check for all the
-		 * below conditions. Schedule fallback in this case.
-		 */
-		memcpy(_key, authenc_keys.enckey, DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE);
-		if (!((_key[0] ^ _key[2]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[3])) ||
-		    !((_key[2] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[3] ^ _key[5])) ||
-		    !((_key[0] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[5])))
-			ctx->need_fallback = true;
-	} else if (IS_AES(flags)) {
+	if (IS_AES(flags)) {
 		/* No random key sizes */
 		if (authenc_keys.enckeylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
 		    authenc_keys.enckeylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
@@ -699,38 +677,6 @@ struct qce_aead_def {
 
 static const struct qce_aead_def aead_def[] = {
 	{
-		.flags          = QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC,
-		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des))",
-		.drv_name       = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-des-qce",
-		.blocksize      = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize         = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.maxauthsize	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags          = QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC,
-		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des3_ede))",
-		.drv_name       = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-3des-qce",
-		.blocksize      = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize         = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.maxauthsize	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags          = QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
-		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des))",
-		.drv_name       = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-des-qce",
-		.blocksize      = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize         = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.maxauthsize	= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags          = QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
-		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des3_ede))",
-		.drv_name       = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-3des-qce",
-		.blocksize      = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize         = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.maxauthsize	= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
 		.flags          =  QCE_ALG_AES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
 		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
 		.drv_name       = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-aes-qce",
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/common.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/common.c
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
-#include <crypto/sha1.h>
 #include <crypto/sha2.h>
 
 #include "cipher.h"
@@ -114,18 +113,16 @@ static u32 qce_auth_cfg(unsigned long fl
 			cfg |= AUTH_KEY_SZ_AES256 << AUTH_KEY_SIZE_SHIFT;
 	}
 
-	if (IS_SHA1(flags) || IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags))
-		cfg |= AUTH_SIZE_SHA1 << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
-	else if (IS_SHA256(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
+	if (IS_SHA256(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_SIZE_SHA256 << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
 	else if (IS_CMAC(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_SIZE_ENUM_16_BYTES << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
 	else if (IS_CCM(flags))
 		cfg |= (auth_size - 1) << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
 
-	if (IS_SHA1(flags) || IS_SHA256(flags))
+	if (IS_SHA256(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_MODE_HASH << AUTH_MODE_SHIFT;
-	else if (IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
+	else if (IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_MODE_HMAC << AUTH_MODE_SHIFT;
 	else if (IS_CCM(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_MODE_CCM << AUTH_MODE_SHIFT;
@@ -190,7 +187,7 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_ahash(struct c
 	else
 		qce_cpu_to_be32p_array(auth, rctx->digest, digestsize);
 
-	iv_words = (IS_SHA1(rctx->flags) || IS_SHA1_HMAC(rctx->flags)) ? 5 : 8;
+	iv_words = 8;
 	qce_write_array(qce, REG_AUTH_IV0, (u32 *)auth, iv_words);
 
 	if (rctx->first_blk)
@@ -242,19 +239,8 @@ static u32 qce_encr_cfg(unsigned long fl
 
 	if (IS_AES(flags))
 		cfg |= ENCR_ALG_AES << ENCR_ALG_SHIFT;
-	else if (IS_DES(flags) || IS_3DES(flags))
-		cfg |= ENCR_ALG_DES << ENCR_ALG_SHIFT;
-
-	if (IS_DES(flags))
-		cfg |= ENCR_KEY_SZ_DES << ENCR_KEY_SZ_SHIFT;
-
-	if (IS_3DES(flags))
-		cfg |= ENCR_KEY_SZ_3DES << ENCR_KEY_SZ_SHIFT;
 
 	switch (flags & QCE_MODE_MASK) {
-	case QCE_MODE_ECB:
-		cfg |= ENCR_MODE_ECB << ENCR_MODE_SHIFT;
-		break;
 	case QCE_MODE_CBC:
 		cfg |= ENCR_MODE_CBC << ENCR_MODE_SHIFT;
 		break;
@@ -339,13 +325,7 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_skcipher(struc
 
 	encr_cfg = qce_encr_cfg(flags, keylen);
 
-	if (IS_DES(flags)) {
-		enciv_words = 2;
-		enckey_words = 2;
-	} else if (IS_3DES(flags)) {
-		enciv_words = 2;
-		enckey_words = 6;
-	} else if (IS_AES(flags)) {
+	if (IS_AES(flags)) {
 		if (IS_XTS(flags))
 			qce_xtskey(qce, ctx->enc_key, ctx->enc_keylen,
 				   rctx->cryptlen);
@@ -356,14 +336,12 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_skcipher(struc
 
 	qce_write_array(qce, REG_ENCR_KEY0, (u32 *)enckey, enckey_words);
 
-	if (!IS_ECB(flags)) {
-		if (IS_XTS(flags))
-			qce_xts_swapiv(enciv, rctx->iv, ivsize);
-		else
-			qce_cpu_to_be32p_array(enciv, rctx->iv, ivsize);
+	if (IS_XTS(flags))
+		qce_xts_swapiv(enciv, rctx->iv, ivsize);
+	else
+		qce_cpu_to_be32p_array(enciv, rctx->iv, ivsize);
 
-		qce_write_array(qce, REG_CNTR0_IV0, (u32 *)enciv, enciv_words);
-	}
+	qce_write_array(qce, REG_CNTR0_IV0, (u32 *)enciv, enciv_words);
 
 	if (IS_ENCRYPT(flags))
 		encr_cfg |= BIT(ENCODE_SHIFT);
@@ -392,10 +370,6 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_skcipher(struc
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QCE_AEAD
-static const u32 std_iv_sha1[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
-	SHA1_H0, SHA1_H1, SHA1_H2, SHA1_H3, SHA1_H4, 0, 0, 0
-};
-
 static const u32 std_iv_sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
 	SHA256_H0, SHA256_H1, SHA256_H2, SHA256_H3,
 	SHA256_H4, SHA256_H5, SHA256_H6, SHA256_H7
@@ -472,13 +446,8 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_aead(struct cr
 	/* Write initial authentication IV only for HMAC algorithms */
 	if (IS_SHA_HMAC(rctx->flags)) {
 		/* Write default authentication iv */
-		if (IS_SHA1_HMAC(rctx->flags)) {
-			auth_ivsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
-			memcpy(authiv, std_iv_sha1, auth_ivsize);
-		} else if (IS_SHA256_HMAC(rctx->flags)) {
-			auth_ivsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
-			memcpy(authiv, std_iv_sha256, auth_ivsize);
-		}
+		auth_ivsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		memcpy(authiv, std_iv_sha256, auth_ivsize);
 		authiv_words = auth_ivsize / sizeof(u32);
 		qce_write_array(qce, REG_AUTH_IV0, (u32 *)authiv, authiv_words);
 	} else if (IS_CCM(rctx->flags)) {
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/common.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/common.h
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 
 /* IV length in bytes */
 #define QCE_AES_IV_LENGTH		AES_BLOCK_SIZE
-/* max of AES_BLOCK_SIZE, DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE */
+/* max of AES_BLOCK_SIZE */
 #define QCE_MAX_IV_SIZE			AES_BLOCK_SIZE
 
 /* maximum nonce bytes  */
@@ -33,14 +33,10 @@
 #define QCE_MAX_ALIGN_SIZE		64
 
 /* cipher algorithms */
-#define QCE_ALG_DES			BIT(0)
-#define QCE_ALG_3DES			BIT(1)
 #define QCE_ALG_AES			BIT(2)
 
 /* hash and hmac algorithms */
-#define QCE_HASH_SHA1			BIT(3)
 #define QCE_HASH_SHA256			BIT(4)
-#define QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC		BIT(5)
 #define QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC		BIT(6)
 #define QCE_HASH_AES_CMAC		BIT(7)
 
@@ -58,21 +54,15 @@
 #define QCE_ENCRYPT			BIT(30)
 #define QCE_DECRYPT			BIT(31)
 
-#define IS_DES(flags)			(flags & QCE_ALG_DES)
-#define IS_3DES(flags)			(flags & QCE_ALG_3DES)
 #define IS_AES(flags)			(flags & QCE_ALG_AES)
 
-#define IS_SHA1(flags)			(flags & QCE_HASH_SHA1)
 #define IS_SHA256(flags)		(flags & QCE_HASH_SHA256)
-#define IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags)		(flags & QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC)
 #define IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags)		(flags & QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC)
 #define IS_CMAC(flags)			(flags & QCE_HASH_AES_CMAC)
-#define IS_SHA(flags)			(IS_SHA1(flags) || IS_SHA256(flags))
-#define IS_SHA_HMAC(flags)		\
-		(IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
+#define IS_SHA(flags)			IS_SHA256(flags)
+#define IS_SHA_HMAC(flags)		IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags)
 
 #define IS_CBC(mode)			(mode & QCE_MODE_CBC)
-#define IS_ECB(mode)			(mode & QCE_MODE_ECB)
 #define IS_CTR(mode)			(mode & QCE_MODE_CTR)
 #define IS_XTS(mode)			(mode & QCE_MODE_XTS)
 #define IS_CCM(mode)			(mode & QCE_MODE_CCM)
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h
@@ -203,7 +203,6 @@
 
 #define AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT			9
 #define AUTH_SIZE_MASK			GENMASK(13, 9)
-#define AUTH_SIZE_SHA1			0
 #define AUTH_SIZE_SHA256		1
 #define AUTH_SIZE_ENUM_1_BYTES		0
 #define AUTH_SIZE_ENUM_2_BYTES		1
@@ -284,15 +283,12 @@
 
 #define ENCR_KEY_SZ_SHIFT		3
 #define ENCR_KEY_SZ_MASK		GENMASK(5, 3)
-#define ENCR_KEY_SZ_DES			0
-#define ENCR_KEY_SZ_3DES		1
 #define ENCR_KEY_SZ_AES128		0
 #define ENCR_KEY_SZ_AES256		2
 
 #define ENCR_ALG_SHIFT			0
 #define ENCR_ALG_MASK			GENMASK(2, 0)
 #define ENCR_ALG_NONE			0
-#define ENCR_ALG_DES			1
 #define ENCR_ALG_AES			2
 #define ENCR_ALG_KASUMI			4
 #define ENCR_ALG_SNOW_3G		5
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
@@ -24,10 +24,6 @@ struct qce_sha_saved_state {
 
 static LIST_HEAD(ahash_algs);
 
-static const u32 std_iv_sha1[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
-	SHA1_H0, SHA1_H1, SHA1_H2, SHA1_H3, SHA1_H4, 0, 0, 0
-};
-
 static const u32 std_iv_sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
 	SHA256_H0, SHA256_H1, SHA256_H2, SHA256_H3,
 	SHA256_H4, SHA256_H5, SHA256_H6, SHA256_H7
@@ -346,9 +342,7 @@ static int qce_ahash_hmac_setkey(struct
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (digestsize == SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
-		alg_name = "sha1-qce";
-	else if (digestsize == SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
+	if (digestsize == SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
 		alg_name = "sha256-qce";
 	else
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -410,15 +404,6 @@ struct qce_ahash_def {
 
 static const struct qce_ahash_def ahash_def[] = {
 	{
-		.flags		= QCE_HASH_SHA1,
-		.name		= "sha1",
-		.drv_name	= "sha1-qce",
-		.digestsize	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-		.blocksize	= SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.statesize	= sizeof(struct qce_sha_saved_state),
-		.std_iv		= std_iv_sha1,
-	},
-	{
 		.flags		= QCE_HASH_SHA256,
 		.name		= "sha256",
 		.drv_name	= "sha256-qce",
@@ -428,15 +413,6 @@ static const struct qce_ahash_def ahash_
 		.std_iv		= std_iv_sha256,
 	},
 	{
-		.flags		= QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC,
-		.name		= "hmac(sha1)",
-		.drv_name	= "hmac-sha1-qce",
-		.digestsize	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-		.blocksize	= SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.statesize	= sizeof(struct qce_sha_saved_state),
-		.std_iv		= std_iv_sha1,
-	},
-	{
 		.flags		= QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
 		.name		= "hmac(sha256)",
 		.drv_name	= "hmac-sha256-qce",
@@ -473,9 +449,7 @@ static int qce_ahash_register_one(const
 	alg->halg.digestsize = def->digestsize;
 	alg->halg.statesize = def->statesize;
 
-	if (IS_SHA1(def->flags))
-		tmpl->hash_zero = sha1_zero_message_hash;
-	else if (IS_SHA256(def->flags))
+	if (IS_SHA256(def->flags))
 		tmpl->hash_zero = sha256_zero_message_hash;
 
 	base = &alg->halg.base;
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
 #define _SHA_H_
 
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
-#include <crypto/sha1.h>
 #include <crypto/sha2.h>
 
 #include "common.h"
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/des.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
 
 #include "cipher.h"
@@ -208,51 +207,6 @@ static int qce_skcipher_setkey(struct cr
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int qce_des_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *ablk, const u8 *key,
-			  unsigned int keylen)
-{
-	struct qce_cipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(ablk);
-	int err;
-
-	err = verify_skcipher_des_key(ablk, key);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	ctx->enc_keylen = keylen;
-	memcpy(ctx->enc_key, key, keylen);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int qce_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *ablk, const u8 *key,
-			   unsigned int keylen)
-{
-	struct qce_cipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(ablk);
-	u32 _key[6];
-	int err;
-
-	err = verify_skcipher_des3_key(ablk, key);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	/*
-	 * The crypto engine does not support any two keys
-	 * being the same for triple des algorithms. The
-	 * verify_skcipher_des3_key does not check for all the
-	 * below conditions. Return -ENOKEY in case any two keys
-	 * are the same. Revisit to see if a fallback cipher
-	 * is needed to handle this condition.
-	 */
-	memcpy(_key, key, DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE);
-	if (!((_key[0] ^ _key[2]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[3])) ||
-	    !((_key[2] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[3] ^ _key[5])) ||
-	    !((_key[0] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[5])))
-		return -ENOKEY;
-
-	ctx->enc_keylen = keylen;
-	memcpy(ctx->enc_key, key, keylen);
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int qce_skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, int encrypt)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -275,7 +229,7 @@ static int qce_skcipher_crypt(struct skc
 	 * ECB and CBC algorithms require message lengths to be
 	 * multiples of block size.
 	 */
-	if (IS_ECB(rctx->flags) || IS_CBC(rctx->flags))
+	if (IS_CBC(rctx->flags))
 		if (!IS_ALIGNED(req->cryptlen, blocksize))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -359,15 +313,6 @@ struct qce_skcipher_def {
 
 static const struct qce_skcipher_def skcipher_def[] = {
 	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_AES | QCE_MODE_ECB,
-		.name		= "ecb(aes)",
-		.drv_name	= "ecb-aes-qce",
-		.blocksize	= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= 0,
-		.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
 		.flags		= QCE_ALG_AES | QCE_MODE_CBC,
 		.name		= "cbc(aes)",
 		.drv_name	= "cbc-aes-qce",
@@ -395,42 +340,6 @@ static const struct qce_skcipher_def skc
 		.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE * 2,
 		.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE * 2,
 	},
-	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_ECB,
-		.name		= "ecb(des)",
-		.drv_name	= "ecb-des-qce",
-		.blocksize	= DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= 0,
-		.min_keysize	= DES_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= DES_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_CBC,
-		.name		= "cbc(des)",
-		.drv_name	= "cbc-des-qce",
-		.blocksize	= DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.min_keysize	= DES_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= DES_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_ECB,
-		.name		= "ecb(des3_ede)",
-		.drv_name	= "ecb-3des-qce",
-		.blocksize	= DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= 0,
-		.min_keysize	= DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_CBC,
-		.name		= "cbc(des3_ede)",
-		.drv_name	= "cbc-3des-qce",
-		.blocksize	= DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.min_keysize	= DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
 };
 
 static int qce_skcipher_register_one(const struct qce_skcipher_def *def,
@@ -455,9 +364,7 @@ static int qce_skcipher_register_one(con
 	alg->ivsize			= def->ivsize;
 	alg->min_keysize		= def->min_keysize;
 	alg->max_keysize		= def->max_keysize;
-	alg->setkey			= IS_3DES(def->flags) ? qce_des3_setkey :
-					  IS_DES(def->flags) ? qce_des_setkey :
-					  qce_skcipher_setkey;
+	alg->setkey			= qce_skcipher_setkey;
 	alg->encrypt			= qce_skcipher_encrypt;
 	alg->decrypt			= qce_skcipher_decrypt;
 

[PATCH 5.15 61/69] KVM: s390: vsie: zero stale crypto bits

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>

commit 34d5b5b646c91cfb9338d7a12c955a70ffb8c66b upstream.

When shadowing crypto access bits from a format0 apcb (crycb 0 or 1),
the bits 64..255 are unchanged from whatever is in the vsie page in the
crycb and thus in the apcb. This gives a nested guest potential access
to a device no longer available. Zero out the remaining bits.

Fixes: 6b79de4b056e ("KVM: s390: vsie: allow guest FORMAT-1 CRYCB on host FORMAT-2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <20260811153738.206885-3-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ static int setup_apcb10(struct kvm_vcpu
 	if (read_guest_real(vcpu, apcb_o, &tmp, sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb0)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	memset(apcb_s, 0, sizeof(*apcb_s));
 	apcb_s->apm[0] = apcb_h->apm[0] & tmp.apm[0];
 	apcb_s->aqm[0] = apcb_h->aqm[0] & tmp.aqm[0] & 0xffff000000000000UL;
 	apcb_s->adm[0] = apcb_h->adm[0] & tmp.adm[0] & 0xffff000000000000UL;

[PATCH 5.15 62/69] usb: core: Add lock to usb_wakeup_notification()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>

commit e263e18a9e7b1ff3e7301f0801c6ff87c31adfb6 upstream.

Add a spin lock to usb_wakeup notification to prevent a race condition
with dereferencing freed memory. This could be hit by the xHCI driver as
it calls this function from an IRQ and could race with the
hub_disconnect() function, which properly grabs this lock to protect the
state of the device.

Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260713-usb_core_patches_1-v1-3-7721c2b33f53@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/core/hub.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -714,10 +714,12 @@ void usb_wakeup_notification(struct usb_
 {
 	struct usb_hub *hub;
 	struct usb_port *port_dev;
+	unsigned long flags;
 
 	if (!hdev)
 		return;
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&device_state_lock, flags);
 	hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(hdev);
 	if (hub) {
 		port_dev = hub->ports[portnum - 1];
@@ -727,6 +729,7 @@ void usb_wakeup_notification(struct usb_
 		set_bit(portnum, hub->wakeup_bits);
 		kick_hub_wq(hub);
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&device_state_lock, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_wakeup_notification);
 

[PATCH 5.15 63/69] usb: core: Strengthen error handling in hub_hub_status()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>

commit a29496745aa335d97f617385809583241e118610 upstream.

Add additional error handling after the call to get_hub_status() in
hub_hub_status().

get_hub_status() uses usb_control_msg() which does not verify that the
message is the correct length, substituting it for
usb_control_msg_recv() would also solve this issue but increase memory
allocations.

Instead, error handling is copied from the method used in
hub_ext_port_status(), which shares the same flow of logic as
hub_hub_status().

Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260722-usb_core_patches_2-v3-1-87622252bfdd@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/core/hub.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -955,10 +955,12 @@ static int hub_hub_status(struct usb_hub
 
 	mutex_lock(&hub->status_mutex);
 	ret = get_hub_status(hub->hdev, &hub->status->hub);
-	if (ret < 0) {
+	if (ret < (int)sizeof(hub->status->hub)) {
 		if (ret != -ENODEV)
 			dev_err(hub->intfdev,
 				"%s failed (err = %d)\n", __func__, ret);
+		if (ret >= 0)
+			ret = -EIO;
 	} else {
 		*status = le16_to_cpu(hub->status->hub.wHubStatus);
 		*change = le16_to_cpu(hub->status->hub.wHubChange);

[PATCH 5.15 64/69] ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marouane El Moufid <eun0us@espilon.net>

commit 1035a8f63bae28e498b0e7b5ac91d749844a7158 upstream.

snd_usbmidi_novation_output() lays out a two-byte header at
transfer_buffer[0..1] and passes &transfer_buffer[2] together with a
length of ep->max_transfer - 2 to snd_rawmidi_transmit():

	count = snd_rawmidi_transmit(ep->ports[0].substream,
				     &transfer_buffer[2],
				     ep->max_transfer - 2);

ep->max_transfer comes from the output endpoint's wMaxPacketSize via
usb_maxpacket(). A malformed or malicious device can advertise a bulk
OUT endpoint with a wMaxPacketSize of 1 - the USB core only clamps this
value downwards - so ep->max_transfer becomes 1 and the count argument
becomes -1.

snd_rawmidi_transmit() passes the negative count on to
__snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(), where "if (count1 > count) count1 = count"
leaves count1 negative; get_aligned_size() keeps it negative for a
byte-stream substream, so the following memcpy(buffer, ..., count1) runs
with a (size_t)-1 length and writes far past the transfer buffer, which
was allocated with usb_alloc_coherent(ep->max_transfer).

This is the same class of bug that was fixed for snd_usbmidi_akai_output()
in commit 0970274613fb ("ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in
snd_usbmidi_akai_output()"); the novation output routine was left
unguarded. Bail out when the endpoint cannot hold the two-byte header
plus at least one payload byte.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marouane El Moufid <eun0us@espilon.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/178749334830.543645.13722252148340572274@espilon.net
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 sound/usb/midi.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/sound/usb/midi.c
+++ b/sound/usb/midi.c
@@ -878,6 +878,8 @@ static void snd_usbmidi_novation_output(
 
 	if (!ep->ports[0].active)
 		return;
+	if (ep->max_transfer < 3)
+		return;
 	transfer_buffer = urb->transfer_buffer;
 	count = snd_rawmidi_transmit(ep->ports[0].substream,
 				     &transfer_buffer[2],

[PATCH 5.15 65/69] ALSA: usb-audio: Complete cleanup after system-resume errors

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Will Porter <mrwillporter@gmail.com>

commit 1739a976312e110c93a8dee66a1cdf893a1b187e upstream.

A failed system resume can leave the card unusable until reboot.
usb_audio_resume() jumps to err_out when snd_usb_pcm_resume() or
snd_usb_mixer_resume() fails. The error path skips the out: block, which
restores D0 and decrements chip->num_suspended_intf.

The card stays in SNDRV_CTL_POWER_D3hot, so later control access blocks in
snd_power_ref_and_wait(). USB core logs an interface resume callback error.
It does not retry that callback, so a later callback cannot complete the
skipped cleanup.

usb_audio_suspend() increments num_suspended_intf before returning success.
A system-resume callback must consume the system-suspend count even if a
component resume fails. Otherwise, the stranded count skews later suspend
and resume cycles.

Do not apply this cleanup to runtime-resume errors. Runtime PM can retry
-EAGAIN or -EBUSY without another suspend callback. The count must continue
to describe that suspended interface. Other runtime-resume errors latch
runtime_error in the PM core and do not cause an immediate callback retry.

Both parts of the system-resume error path are longstanding. Commit
88a8516a2128a ("ALSA: usbaudio: implement USB autosuspend") introduced
err_out past the D0 restore. Commit 862b2509d157c ("ALSA: usb-audio: Fix
inconsistent card PM state after resume") later moved
num_suspended_intf-- into the out: block. The error path now skips both
operations.

No third-party code is needed to reach the error path.
snd_usb_mixer_resume() ends in snd_usb_mixer_activate(), which returns the
result of usb_submit_urb() for devices that have a mixer status URB. Its
mixer->private_resume hook can also fail through scarlett2_init_notify().
snd_usb_pcm_resume() issues a SET_CUR request to a UAC3 power domain. It
can return -EPIPE or -EIO when the device stalls the request.

Route a component error through out: only when system_suspend is nonzero.
Continue to return runtime-resume errors through err_out. Later component
resume stages remain skipped. The original error still reaches USB core.
A later transfer can fail if the device did not recover.

I reproduced the system-resume failure on an Audient iD14 MkI with an
out-of-tree diagnostic mixer resume hook. An injected -EIO on the unpatched
core left control readers in uninterruptible sleep in
snd_power_ref_and_wait() until a reboot. With this patch, the same failure
restored control access. A second system suspend and resume also succeeded
after I disabled fault injection.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.1-pro-high
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
Fixes: 88a8516a2128a ("ALSA: usbaudio: implement USB autosuspend")
Fixes: 862b2509d157c ("ALSA: usb-audio: Fix inconsistent card PM state after resume")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Porter <mrwillporter@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260824225757.26749-1-mrwillporter@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 sound/usb/card.c |   14 ++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/usb/card.c
+++ b/sound/usb/card.c
@@ -1121,8 +1121,11 @@ static int usb_audio_resume(struct usb_i
 
 	list_for_each_entry(as, &chip->pcm_list, list) {
 		err = snd_usb_pcm_resume(as);
-		if (err < 0)
-			goto err_out;
+		if (err < 0) {
+			if (!chip->system_suspend)
+				goto err_out;
+			goto out;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -1131,8 +1134,11 @@ static int usb_audio_resume(struct usb_i
 	 */
 	list_for_each_entry(mixer, &chip->mixer_list, list) {
 		err = snd_usb_mixer_resume(mixer);
-		if (err < 0)
-			goto err_out;
+		if (err < 0) {
+			if (!chip->system_suspend)
+				goto err_out;
+			goto out;
+		}
 	}
 
 	list_for_each(p, &chip->midi_list) {

[PATCH 5.15 66/69] USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiale Yao <yaojiale02@163.com>

commit 885d802f544ca7bfa8f3984d94233cce715bb6b3 upstream.

The interrupt URB buffer is allocated in setup_port_interrupt_in() based
on the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize:

    buffer_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(epd);
    port->interrupt_in_buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);

When a USB device declares wMaxPacketSize = 8 on its interrupt IN
endpoint, the buffer is allocated from kmalloc-8 cache (exactly
8 bytes).

If the device sends a short packet (actual_length < wMaxPacketSize),
the URB completes with status == 0 and the callback proceeds to read:

    data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)]

which evaluates to data[8], accessing 1 byte beyond the allocated 8-byte
buffer. This results in a slab out-of-bounds read.

Fix this by adding the missing bounds check: first verify that the
actual length is large enough to contain the struct usb_ctrlrequest
header before accessing req_pkt->bRequestType and req_pkt->bRequest,
and then verify that there is an additional byte for the modem signal
state before reading data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)] inside the
conditional.  Use sizeof(*req_pkt) instead of sizeof(struct
usb_ctrlrequest) for consistency.

Assisted-by: Claude:deepseek-v4-pro
Signed-off-by: Jiale Yao <yaojiale02@163.com>
Fixes: 58cfe9113e48 ("[PATCH] USB: add Option Card driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org	# v2.6.12
[ johan: use dev_err(); split signals declaration and initialisation ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c |   20 +++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -2691,12 +2691,26 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struc
 			dev_dbg(dev, "%s: NULL req_pkt\n", __func__);
 			return;
 		}
+
+		if (urb->actual_length < sizeof(*req_pkt)) {
+			dev_err(dev, "%s: short packet: %u bytes\n", __func__,
+				urb->actual_length);
+			return;
+		}
+
 		if ((req_pkt->bRequestType == 0xA1) &&
 				(req_pkt->bRequest == 0x20)) {
+			unsigned char signals;
 			int old_dcd_state;
-			unsigned char signals = *((unsigned char *)
-					urb->transfer_buffer +
-					sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest));
+
+			if (urb->actual_length < sizeof(*req_pkt) + 1) {
+				dev_err(dev, "%s: short interrupt transfer: %u bytes\n",
+					__func__, urb->actual_length);
+				return;
+			}
+
+			signals = *((unsigned char *)urb->transfer_buffer +
+					sizeof(*req_pkt));
 
 			dev_dbg(dev, "%s: signal x%x\n", __func__, signals);
 

[PATCH 5.15 67/69] USB: serial: spcp8x5: drop broken carrier detect support

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>

commit d37186bd95a07e334447f47274a38a311dad2172 upstream.

The driver does not support modem status notifications and instead used
to fetch the modem status once at open() and subsequently operate on and
report stale state.

As part of fixing this, a call to fetch the status was added to
carrier_raised(), which does not work as that callback must not sleep
(e.g. unlike tiocmget()).

Drop the broken carrier detect support.

Fixes: e1ed212d8593 ("USB: spcp8x5: add proper modem-status support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org	# 3.10
Reported-by: syzbot+3b514b87202742f22c44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6a73cea2.01d0871a.3a0d52.000d.GAE@google.com
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/serial/spcp8x5.c |   13 -------------
 1 file changed, 13 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/spcp8x5.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/spcp8x5.c
@@ -247,18 +247,6 @@ static void spcp8x5_set_work_mode(struct
 		dev_err(&port->dev, "failed to set work mode: %d\n", ret);
 }
 
-static int spcp8x5_carrier_raised(struct usb_serial_port *port)
-{
-	u8 msr;
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = spcp8x5_get_msr(port, &msr);
-	if (ret || msr & MSR_STATUS_LINE_DCD)
-		return 1;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static void spcp8x5_dtr_rts(struct usb_serial_port *port, int on)
 {
 	struct spcp8x5_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
@@ -470,7 +458,6 @@ static struct usb_serial_driver spcp8x5_
 	.num_bulk_out		= 1,
 	.open			= spcp8x5_open,
 	.dtr_rts		= spcp8x5_dtr_rts,
-	.carrier_raised		= spcp8x5_carrier_raised,
 	.set_termios		= spcp8x5_set_termios,
 	.init_termios		= spcp8x5_init_termios,
 	.tiocmget		= spcp8x5_tiocmget,

[PATCH 5.15 68/69] USB: c67x00: fix use-after-free in c67x00_add_iso_urb()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>

commit b1e24de475bf2d66fffc9103f3444b783527d55a upstream.

When TD creation fails for the last packet of an isochronous URB,
c67x00_add_iso_urb() gives the URB back before updating the endpoint
scheduling state.

c67x00_giveback_urb() frees the URB private data, and the completion
callback may release the final URB reference. The following accesses to
urbp->ep_data, urb->interval, and urbp->cnt can therefore use freed
memory.

Update next_frame and cnt before giving back the failed final packet,
making the giveback the last operation that uses the URB and its private
data.

Fixes: e9b29ffc519b ("USB: add Cypress c67x00 OTG controller HCD driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806013502.322067-1-shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/c67x00/c67x00-sched.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/c67x00/c67x00-sched.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/c67x00/c67x00-sched.c
@@ -761,13 +761,13 @@ static int c67x00_add_iso_urb(struct c67
 				ret);
 			urb->iso_frame_desc[urbp->cnt].actual_length = 0;
 			urb->iso_frame_desc[urbp->cnt].status = ret;
-			if (urbp->cnt + 1 == urb->number_of_packets)
-				c67x00_giveback_urb(c67x00, urb, 0);
 		}
 
 		urbp->ep_data->next_frame =
 		    frame_add(urbp->ep_data->next_frame, urb->interval);
 		urbp->cnt++;
+		if (ret && urbp->cnt == urb->number_of_packets)
+			c67x00_giveback_urb(c67x00, urb, 0);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }

[PATCH 5.15 69/69] usb: usbfs: fix use-after-free of usb_device in usbdev_release()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Miguel Peñaranda <mig.penaranda07@gmail.com>

commit 0dd68b5d01d022fc9c5e71c82a82b0a94d3d0671 upstream.

usbdev_release() drops its reference to the struct usb_device before
draining the list of completed async URBs, but that drain path reads back
through the same object: free_async() calls dec_usb_memory_use_count()
for any URB whose buffer came from the usbfs mmap() region, and its first
statement is bus_to_hcd(ps->dev->bus).

After a disconnect the usbfs reference can be the last one, in which case
usb_put_dev() frees the device and the subsequent loop reads offset 80 of
freed memory and uses the result as a struct usb_hcd *, which
hcd_buffer_free_pages() then dereferences.

This is reachable by an unprivileged process that has read/write access to
a /dev/bus/usb node: mmap() the fd, submit one URB with a buffer inside the
mapping, wait for the device to be unplugged, then munmap() and close().
It reproduces on every attempt rather than being a race, because a live
MAP_SHARED vma holds a reference on the struct file, so usbdev_release()
cannot run until the last vma is gone and the freeing branch of
dec_usb_memory_use_count() is always taken.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dec_usb_memory_use_count+0x3ae/0x410
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880122ee050 by task poc/769
  CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 769 Comm: poc Tainted: G    B    6.12.94 #3

  Call Trace:
   dec_usb_memory_use_count+0x3ae/0x410
   free_async+0x2aa/0x4f0
   usbdev_release+0x375/0x460
   __fput+0x3ea/0xb50
   __x64_sys_close+0x86/0x100

  Allocated by task 11:
   usb_alloc_dev+0x55/0xd90
   hub_event+0x2524/0x43d0

  Freed by task 769:
   kfree+0x121/0x360
   device_release+0xd2/0x280
   usb_put_dev+0x23/0x30
   usbdev_release+0x2d8/0x460

Release the device reference after the drain loop instead. Nothing between
the two points requires it to have been dropped.

Fixes: f7d34b445abc ("USB: Add support for usbfs zerocopy.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Miguel Peñaranda <mig.penaranda07@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260810121209.795089-1-mig.penaranda07@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/core/devio.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
@@ -1099,7 +1099,6 @@ static int usbdev_release(struct inode *
 	if (!ps->suspend_allowed)
 		usb_autosuspend_device(dev);
 	usb_unlock_device(dev);
-	usb_put_dev(dev);
 	put_pid(ps->disc_pid);
 	put_cred(ps->cred);
 
@@ -1108,6 +1107,7 @@ static int usbdev_release(struct inode *
 		free_async(as);
 		as = async_getcompleted(ps);
 	}
+	usb_put_dev(dev);
 
 	kfree(ps);
 	return 0;

Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/69] 5.15.220-rc1 review

[Florian Fainelli]

On 8/31/2026 6:34 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.220 release.
> There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.220-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h

On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on 
BMIPS_GENERIC:

Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
-- 
Florian

Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/69] 5.15.220-rc1 review

[Brett A C Sheffield]

# Librecast Test Results

020/020 [ OK ] liblcrq
010/010 [ OK ] libmld
120/120 [ OK ] liblibrecast

CPU/kernel: Linux auntie 5.15.220-rc1-01693-gf2453fb1ad06 #1 SMP Mon Aug 31 18:59:25 -00 2026 x86_64 AMD Ryzen 9 9950X 16-Core Processor AuthenticAMD GNU/Linux

Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>

Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/69] 5.15.220-rc1 review

[Harshit Mogalapalli]

Hi Greg,


On 31/08/26 7:04 pm, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.220 release.
> There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.

No problems seen on x86_64 and aarch64 with our testing.

AI assisted reviews haven't spotted any problems

Tested-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>


Thanks,
Harshit

Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/69] 5.15.220-rc1 review

[Pavel Machek]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 504 bytes --]

Hi!

> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.220 release.
> There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.

CIP testing did not find any problems here:

https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-5.15.y

Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@nabladev.com>

Best regards,
                                                                Pavel

[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
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Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/69] 5.15.220-rc1 review

[Shuah Khan]

On 8/31/26 07:34, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.220 release.
> There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.220-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>

thanks,
-- Shuah

Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/69] 5.15.220-rc1 review

[Ron Economos]

On 8/31/26 06:34, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.220 release.
> There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.220-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h

Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).

Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>

Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/69] 5.15.220-rc1 review

[Barry K. Nathan]

On 8/31/26 6:34 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.220 release.
> There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.220-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h

Tested on an amd64 laptop (Lenovo ThinkPad T14 Gen 1). Working well,
no regressions observed.

Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan <barryn@pobox.com>

-- 
-Barry K. Nathan  <barryn@pobox.com>