* [PATCH 6.12 01/99] RDMA/rxe: Fix responder UAF on IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC modify_qp
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 02/99] RDMA/rxe: Fix OOB in free_rd_atomic_resources() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (108 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Zhu Yanjun, Ibrahim Hashimov,
Leon Romanovsky, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
[ Upstream commit 6f7014237405e7f032b5c53a82d9eccf6161c291 ]
rxe_qp_from_attr() handles IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC outside the
IB_QP_STATE path, so it holds no state_lock and runs while the responder
task rxe_receiver() (recv_task on rxe_wq) is live. A modify_qp() setting
only that attribute calls free_rd_atomic_resources() then
alloc_rd_atomic_resources(), swapping qp->resp.resources[] while
rxe_prepare_res()/find_resource() walk it; free_rd_atomic_resources()
also leaves the cached pointer qp->resp.res dangling. A local
unprivileged user can race the free/realloc into a use-after-free in
rxe_receiver() (local DoS).
Drain recv_task around the swap with rxe_disable_task()/rxe_enable_task(),
as rxe_qp_reset() already does when tearing this array down, re-enabling
only after alloc_rd_atomic_resources() succeeds so the responder never
resumes against a NULL qp->resp.resources on the ENOMEM path. Also clear
qp->resp.res in free_rd_atomic_resources(), like the rxe_resp.c
completion paths.
Reproduced under KASAN; the slab-use-after-free in rxe_receiver() is gone.
Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260712121720.78001-1-security@auditcode.ai
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
index 88fa62cd9ce51..dc75d79b79d6e 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static void free_rd_atomic_resources(struct rxe_qp *qp)
}
kfree(qp->resp.resources);
qp->resp.resources = NULL;
+ qp->resp.res = NULL;
}
}
@@ -660,11 +661,23 @@ int rxe_qp_from_attr(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct ib_qp_attr *attr, int mask,
qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic = max_dest_rd_atomic;
+ /*
+ * Not gated by IB_QP_STATE, so the responder task is live.
+ * Quiesce recv_task like rxe_qp_reset() before swapping the
+ * rd_atomic array, so rxe_receiver() cannot race the free/
+ * realloc.
+ */
+ rxe_disable_task(&qp->recv_task);
free_rd_atomic_resources(qp);
-
err = alloc_rd_atomic_resources(qp, max_dest_rd_atomic);
+ /*
+ * On ENOMEM leave recv_task quiesced: qp->resp.resources is
+ * NULL and rxe_prepare_res()/find_resource() would deref it.
+ * Re-enable only after a fresh array is installed.
+ */
if (err)
return err;
+ rxe_enable_task(&qp->recv_task);
}
if (mask & IB_QP_EN_SQD_ASYNC_NOTIFY)
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 02/99] RDMA/rxe: Fix OOB in free_rd_atomic_resources()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 01/99] RDMA/rxe: Fix responder UAF on IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC modify_qp Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 03/99] KVM: x86/mmu: Check write tracking in all address spaces Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (107 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Peiyang He, Zhu Yanjun,
Leon Romanovsky, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peiyang He <peiyang_he@smail.nju.edu.cn>
[ Upstream commit de329533792a373186d79dca1ca120f8fa0afd05 ]
free_rd_atomic_resources() iterates using qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic.
Updating max_dest_rd_atomic before freeing the old array can make the
free path walk past the old allocation and trigger a slab out-of-bounds
write catched by KASAN:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88802b8dddb8 by task syz.3.451/11063
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11063 Comm: syz.3.451 Not tainted 7.1.0 #2 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xf7/0x600 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 mm/kasan/report.c:595
free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline]
free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline]
free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline]
rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712
rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623
ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625
_ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915
modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932
ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958
ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680
vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fefc75a70cd
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fefc8495018 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fefc7835fa0 RCX: 00007fefc75a70cd
RDX: 0000000000000078 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007fefc764f10f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fefc7836038 R14: 00007fefc7835fa0 R15: 00007ffcf0586aa0
</TASK>
Allocated by task 11063:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:57
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5296 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x32a/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline]
alloc_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:155 [inline]
rxe_qp_from_attr+0x3f8/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:714
rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623
ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625
_ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915
modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932
ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958
ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680
vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802b8ddd80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 56-byte region [ffff88802b8ddd80, ffff88802b8dddb8)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x2b8dd
flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000000 ffff888015c418c0 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000800200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2c40(GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 4651, tgid 4651 ((udev-worker)), ts 123427165316, free_ts 123425874255
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0xfc/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:1853
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1861 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x75b/0x3220 mm/page_alloc.c:3941
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x27e/0x2b00 mm/page_alloc.c:5221
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:3278 [inline]
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:3467 [inline]
new_slab+0xa6/0x670 mm/slub.c:3525
refill_objects+0x278/0x420 mm/slub.c:7272
refill_sheaf mm/slub.c:2816 [inline]
__pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2ed/0x640 mm/slub.c:4652
alloc_from_pcs mm/slub.c:4750 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4884 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5295 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x68d/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline]
tomoyo_encode2+0x100/0x3e0 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:45
tomoyo_encode+0x29/0x50 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:80
tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0x18c/0x690 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:283
tomoyo_get_realpath security/tomoyo/file.c:151 [inline]
tomoyo_check_open_permission+0x2ab/0x3c0 security/tomoyo/file.c:776
tomoyo_file_open+0x6b/0x90 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:334
security_file_open+0x7a/0x1b0 security/security.c:2739
do_dentry_open+0x57e/0x1690 fs/open.c:924
vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1079
do_open fs/namei.c:4699 [inline]
path_openat+0x218a/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4858
page last free pid 1 tgid 1 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
__free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1397 [inline]
__free_frozen_pages+0x763/0xfc0 mm/page_alloc.c:2938
selinux_genfs_get_sid security/selinux/hooks.c:1364 [inline]
inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x903/0x1320 security/selinux/hooks.c:1563
selinux_d_instantiate+0x26/0x30 security/selinux/hooks.c:6658
security_d_instantiate+0x123/0x190 security/security.c:3704
d_splice_alias_ops+0x92/0x850 fs/dcache.c:3141
kernfs_iop_lookup+0x23f/0x2d0 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1289
lookup_open.isra.0+0x659/0x1080 fs/namei.c:4484
open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4611 [inline]
path_openat+0x17dd/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4855
do_file_open+0x20c/0x430 fs/namei.c:4887
do_sys_openat2+0x101/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1364
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1370 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1386 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1381 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x141/0x200 fs/open.c:1381
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88802b8ddc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88802b8ddd00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88802b8ddd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88802b8dde00: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88802b8dde80: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Fix the OOB by moving the assignment after free_rd_atomic_resources()
so the old array is freed using the old bound. This matches the original
ordering in commit 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver").
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/365C68B4923F8214+30195a67-0b90-4b92-ab96-2ce41517793c@smail.nju.edu.cn/
Fixes: b6bbee0d2438 ("IB/rxe: Properly honor max IRD value for rd/atomic.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peiyang He <peiyang_he@smail.nju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
index dc75d79b79d6e..3dbc424099547 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
@@ -659,8 +659,6 @@ int rxe_qp_from_attr(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct ib_qp_attr *attr, int mask,
int max_dest_rd_atomic = attr->max_dest_rd_atomic ?
roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_dest_rd_atomic) : 0;
- qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic = max_dest_rd_atomic;
-
/*
* Not gated by IB_QP_STATE, so the responder task is live.
* Quiesce recv_task like rxe_qp_reset() before swapping the
@@ -669,6 +667,7 @@ int rxe_qp_from_attr(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct ib_qp_attr *attr, int mask,
*/
rxe_disable_task(&qp->recv_task);
free_rd_atomic_resources(qp);
+ qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic = max_dest_rd_atomic;
err = alloc_rd_atomic_resources(qp, max_dest_rd_atomic);
/*
* On ENOMEM leave recv_task quiesced: qp->resp.resources is
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 03/99] KVM: x86/mmu: Check write tracking in all address spaces
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 01/99] RDMA/rxe: Fix responder UAF on IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC modify_qp Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 02/99] RDMA/rxe: Fix OOB in free_rd_atomic_resources() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 04/99] ext4: dont enable DAX on new encrypted files Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (106 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jinu Kim, Paolo Bonzini, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jinu Kim <kimjw04271234@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 0f38453cdb2e17566ccb7c0f3dabd5bd21caca26 ]
kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked() checks only the supplied memslot, but page
tracking is per-address-space and shadow pages are shared across all
address spaces. With SMM, a GFN can therefore be write-tracked in one
address space and appear untracked through the other.
Check the supplied slot first, then the slot for the other address space.
This ensures all callers honor write tracking regardless of the active
address space. In particular, it prevents mmu_try_to_unsync_pages() from
marking an upper-level shadow page unsync and eventually triggering the
BUG in pte_list_remove().
Fixes: 699023e23965 ("KVM: x86: add SMM to the MMU role, support SMRAM address space")
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5
Signed-off-by: Jinu Kim <kimjw04271234@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20260721103512.2136240-2-kimjw04271234@gmail.com>
[invert direction of the conditional. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
index 561c331fd6ecc..b1e73ff51fc3d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
@@ -130,13 +130,23 @@ void __kvm_write_track_remove_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(slot, gfn);
}
-/*
- * check if the corresponding access on the specified guest page is tracked.
- */
+static bool __kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+ gfn_t gfn)
+{
+ int index;
+
+ if (!slot)
+ return false;
+
+ index = gfn_to_index(gfn, slot->base_gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
+ return !!READ_ONCE(slot->arch.gfn_write_track[index]);
+}
+
+/* check if write access is tracked on the specified guest page. */
bool kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(struct kvm *kvm,
const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
{
- int index;
+ const struct kvm_memory_slot *other_slot;
if (!slot)
return false;
@@ -144,8 +154,18 @@ bool kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(struct kvm *kvm,
if (!kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm))
return false;
- index = gfn_to_index(gfn, slot->base_gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
- return !!READ_ONCE(slot->arch.gfn_write_track[index]);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_MAX_NR_ADDRESS_SPACES > 2);
+
+ if (__kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(slot, gfn))
+ return true;
+
+ if (kvm_arch_nr_memslot_as_ids(kvm) > 1) {
+ other_slot = __gfn_to_memslot(__kvm_memslots(kvm, slot->as_id ^ 1), gfn);
+ if (__kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(other_slot, gfn))
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 04/99] ext4: dont enable DAX on new encrypted files
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 03/99] KVM: x86/mmu: Check write tracking in all address spaces Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 05/99] io_uring/io-wq: fix worker accounting when canceling creation callbacks Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (105 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Disha Goel, Ojaswin Mujoo,
Eric Biggers, Jan Kara, Theodore Tso, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
commit da32af420d6d466e247c43ac0b829edeac7ae0ad upstream.
Currently, when a new encrypted regular file is created, the call to
ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=true) in __ext4_new_inode() is made
before EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT is set. As a result, it can set S_DAX if the
filesystem is mounted with "-o dax=always".
EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT then actually gets set a bit later in
__ext4_new_inode(), when it calls fscrypt_set_context() which calls
ext4_set_context(). ext4_set_context() sets EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT and
calls ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=false) to set S_ENCRYPTED too.
This was intended to clear S_DAX as well. However, this was broken by
commit 043546e46dc7 ("fs/ext4: Only change S_DAX on inode load"). This
causes data written to the file to bypass encryption, also causing
xfstests failures such as generic/548 (when "-o dax=always" is used).
Fix this by simplifying the flow by making __ext4_new_inode() set
EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT earlier. This makes it take effect in
ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=true), making S_DAX never be set.
Similarly, make EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA never be set in the first
place on new encrypted inodes. Then it doesn't need to be cleared.
As a result of these simplifications, ext4_set_context() no longer needs
to change inode flags or state when 'handle != NULL'. Remove that too.
Reported-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260723085648.1500357-1-ojaswin@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: 043546e46dc7 ("fs/ext4: Only change S_DAX on inode load")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730175212.36923-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ext4/crypto.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
fs/ext4/ialloc.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/crypto.c b/fs/ext4/crypto.c
index 78cede130cbd4..2d1f868cc3dfa 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/crypto.c
@@ -144,7 +144,13 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
if (inode->i_ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO)
return -EPERM;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_DAX(inode) && i_size_read(inode)))
+ /*
+ * For new encrypted inodes, S_DAX is never set in the first place.
+ *
+ * For existing inodes, this is called only on empty directories. ext4
+ * never sets S_DAX on directories.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_DAX(inode)))
return -EINVAL;
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_DAX))
@@ -163,6 +169,14 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
*/
if (handle) {
+ /*
+ * __ext4_new_inode() should have already set the encrypt flag
+ * on the inode and avoided enabling inline data.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)))
+ return -EINVAL;
/*
* Since the inode is new it is ok to pass the
* XATTR_CREATE flag. This is necessary to match the
@@ -170,21 +184,10 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
* function with the credits allocated for the new
* inode.
*/
- res = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode,
- EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
- EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT,
- ctx, len, XATTR_CREATE);
- if (!res) {
- ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT);
- ext4_clear_inode_state(inode,
- EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA);
- /*
- * Update inode->i_flags - S_ENCRYPTED will be enabled,
- * S_DAX may be disabled
- */
- ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, false);
- }
- return res;
+ return ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode,
+ EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
+ EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT,
+ ctx, len, XATTR_CREATE);
}
res = dquot_initialize(inode);
@@ -205,10 +208,7 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
ctx, len, 0);
if (!res) {
ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT);
- /*
- * Update inode->i_flags - S_ENCRYPTED will be enabled,
- * S_DAX may be disabled
- */
+ /* Update inode->i_flags to set S_ENCRYPTED. */
ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, false);
res = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if (res)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
index 950cda9dc7cca..5aa49839dc7ef 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
@@ -993,6 +993,8 @@ struct inode *__ext4_new_inode(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
err = fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(dir, inode, &encrypt);
if (err)
goto out;
+ if (encrypt)
+ i_flags |= EXT4_ENCRYPT_FL;
}
err = dquot_initialize(inode);
@@ -1303,6 +1305,8 @@ struct inode *__ext4_new_inode(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
ei->i_extra_isize = sbi->s_want_extra_isize;
ei->i_inline_off = 0;
if (ext4_has_feature_inline_data(sb) &&
+ /* Encrypted inodes cannot have inline data */
+ !(ei->i_flags & EXT4_ENCRYPT_FL) &&
(!(ei->i_flags & EXT4_DAX_FL) || S_ISDIR(mode)))
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA);
ret = inode;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 05/99] io_uring/io-wq: fix worker accounting when canceling creation callbacks
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 04/99] ext4: dont enable DAX on new encrypted files Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 06/99] nvme-tcp: fix usage of page_frag_cache Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (104 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi,
Vishnu Razdan, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vishnu Razdan <vrazdan@openai.com>
commit 297b5ccea4acacaa47c150f043bce695202afbf1 upstream.
create_worker_cb() reserves an io-wq worker slot only after its
task-work callback runs. If the callback is canceled before then,
io_worker_cancel_cb() still decrements acct->nr_workers. When an
existing worker retires with its creation callback pending, that
worker has already decremented the same account's worker count.
The resulting undercount permits worker creation beyond the account's
configured limit. On an AST2600 OpenBMC system, an unchanged sensor
daemon reached 4,291 threads with the original kernel. With an
equivalent downstream fix, 25 passive samples under its normal
workload showed 6-9 threads.
Decrement nr_workers only when the canceled callback is not
create_worker_cb(). Continuation callbacks still release their reserved
slot, and both callback types retain the existing running-count,
reference-count, and create-state cleanup.
[ Backport: retain the existing wq->lock protecting worker accounting. ]
Fixes: 1d5f5ea7cb7d ("io-wq: remove worker to owner tw dependency")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@suse.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811-vrazdan-io-wq-b4-submit-v1-1-719ced16c921@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Vishnu Razdan <vrazdan@openai.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
io_uring/io-wq.c | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/io_uring/io-wq.c b/io_uring/io-wq.c
index e02128374837b..3c1818e8feaa4 100644
--- a/io_uring/io-wq.c
+++ b/io_uring/io-wq.c
@@ -192,9 +192,12 @@ static void io_worker_cancel_cb(struct io_worker *worker)
struct io_wq *wq = worker->wq;
atomic_dec(&acct->nr_running);
- raw_spin_lock(&wq->lock);
- acct->nr_workers--;
- raw_spin_unlock(&wq->lock);
+ /* create_worker_cb() has not reserved a worker slot yet. */
+ if (worker->create_work.func != create_worker_cb) {
+ raw_spin_lock(&wq->lock);
+ acct->nr_workers--;
+ raw_spin_unlock(&wq->lock);
+ }
io_worker_ref_put(wq);
clear_bit_unlock(0, &worker->create_state);
io_worker_release(worker);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 06/99] nvme-tcp: fix usage of page_frag_cache
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 05/99] io_uring/io-wq: fix worker accounting when canceling creation callbacks Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 07/99] HID: uhid: convert to hid_safe_input_report() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (103 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Dmitry Bogdanov, Daniel Wagner,
Keith Busch, Carlos Bilbao (Lambda), Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Bogdanov <d.bogdanov@yadro.com>
commit 36ac05f7cfd59d90c597071304b14e98090d5dd1 upstream.
nvme uses page_frag_cache to preallocate PDU for each preallocated request
of block device. Block devices are created in parallel threads,
consequently page_frag_cache is used in not thread-safe manner.
That leads to incorrect refcounting of backstore pages and premature free.
That can be catched by !sendpage_ok inside network stack:
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 467 at ../net/core/skbuff.c:6931 skb_splice_from_iter+0xfa/0x310.
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x782/0xce0
tcp_sendmsg+0x27/0x40
sock_sendmsg+0x8b/0xa0
nvme_tcp_try_send_cmd_pdu+0x149/0x2a0
Then random panic may occur.
Fix that by serializing the usage of page_frag_cache.
Fixes: 4e893ca81170 ("nvme_core: scan namespaces asynchronously")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <d.bogdanov@yadro.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Wagner <wagi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
[carlos.bilbao: adjust context in nvme_tcp_free_queue; branch predates
19bdb70c77d3 ("nvme-tcp: lockdep: use dynamic lockdep keys per socket
instance")]
Signed-off-by: Carlos Bilbao (Lambda) <carlos.bilbao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
index 31406438e3ff2..dc917060ee1dc 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ struct nvme_tcp_queue {
struct mutex queue_lock;
struct mutex send_mutex;
+ struct mutex pf_cache_lock;
struct llist_head req_list;
struct list_head send_list;
@@ -552,9 +553,11 @@ static int nvme_tcp_init_request(struct blk_mq_tag_set *set,
struct nvme_tcp_queue *queue = &ctrl->queues[queue_idx];
u8 hdgst = nvme_tcp_hdgst_len(queue);
+ mutex_lock(&queue->pf_cache_lock);
req->pdu = page_frag_alloc(&queue->pf_cache,
sizeof(struct nvme_tcp_cmd_pdu) + hdgst,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ mutex_unlock(&queue->pf_cache_lock);
if (!req->pdu)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1452,9 +1455,11 @@ static int nvme_tcp_alloc_async_req(struct nvme_tcp_ctrl *ctrl)
struct nvme_tcp_request *async = &ctrl->async_req;
u8 hdgst = nvme_tcp_hdgst_len(queue);
+ mutex_lock(&queue->pf_cache_lock);
async->pdu = page_frag_alloc(&queue->pf_cache,
sizeof(struct nvme_tcp_cmd_pdu) + hdgst,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ mutex_unlock(&queue->pf_cache_lock);
if (!async->pdu)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1485,6 +1490,7 @@ static void nvme_tcp_free_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *nctrl, int qid)
kfree(queue->pdu);
mutex_destroy(&queue->send_mutex);
mutex_destroy(&queue->queue_lock);
+ mutex_destroy(&queue->pf_cache_lock);
}
static int nvme_tcp_init_connection(struct nvme_tcp_queue *queue)
@@ -1807,6 +1813,7 @@ static int nvme_tcp_alloc_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *nctrl, int qid,
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&queue->send_list);
mutex_init(&queue->send_mutex);
INIT_WORK(&queue->io_work, nvme_tcp_io_work);
+ mutex_init(&queue->pf_cache_lock);
if (qid > 0)
queue->cmnd_capsule_len = nctrl->ioccsz * 16;
@@ -1946,6 +1953,7 @@ static int nvme_tcp_alloc_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *nctrl, int qid,
err_destroy_mutex:
mutex_destroy(&queue->send_mutex);
mutex_destroy(&queue->queue_lock);
+ mutex_destroy(&queue->pf_cache_lock);
return ret;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 07/99] HID: uhid: convert to hid_safe_input_report()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 06/99] nvme-tcp: fix usage of page_frag_cache Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 08/99] selinux: use known type instead of void pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (102 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Carlos Llamas, Lee Jones,
Jiri Kosina, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
commit 63a694c51bf120a37550890b8e7736b4888985e9 upstream.
Commit 0a3fe972a7cb ("HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing
bogus memset()"), added a check in hid_report_raw_event() to reject
reports if the received data size is smaller than expected. This was
intended to prevent OOB errors by no longer allowing zeroing-out of
shorter reports due to the lack of buffer size information.
However, this leads to regressions in hid_report_raw_event(), where
shorter than expected reports are rejected, even though their buffers
are sufficiently large to be zero-padded.
To solve this issue, Benjamin introduced a safer alternative in commit
206342541fc8 ("HID: core: introduce hid_safe_input_report()"), which
forwards the buffer size and allows hid_report_raw_event() to safely
zero-pad the data.
Convert uhid to use hid_safe_input_report() and pass UHID_DATA_MAX as
the buffer size. This prevents the reported regressions [1], allowing
hid core to zero-pad the shorter reports safely as expected.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0a3fe972a7cb ("HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ahsh0UtTX6e0ZeHa@google.com/ [1]
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ahsh0UtTX6e0ZeHa@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/hid/uhid.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hid/uhid.c b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
index 21a70420151e4..d16667207b9f9 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/uhid.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
@@ -595,8 +595,8 @@ static int uhid_dev_input(struct uhid_device *uhid, struct uhid_event *ev)
if (!READ_ONCE(uhid->running))
return -EINVAL;
- hid_input_report(uhid->hid, HID_INPUT_REPORT, ev->u.input.data,
- min_t(size_t, ev->u.input.size, UHID_DATA_MAX), 0);
+ hid_safe_input_report(uhid->hid, HID_INPUT_REPORT, ev->u.input.data, UHID_DATA_MAX,
+ min_t(size_t, ev->u.input.size, UHID_DATA_MAX), 0);
return 0;
}
@@ -606,8 +606,8 @@ static int uhid_dev_input2(struct uhid_device *uhid, struct uhid_event *ev)
if (!READ_ONCE(uhid->running))
return -EINVAL;
- hid_input_report(uhid->hid, HID_INPUT_REPORT, ev->u.input2.data,
- min_t(size_t, ev->u.input2.size, UHID_DATA_MAX), 0);
+ hid_safe_input_report(uhid->hid, HID_INPUT_REPORT, ev->u.input2.data, UHID_DATA_MAX,
+ min_t(size_t, ev->u.input2.size, UHID_DATA_MAX), 0);
return 0;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 08/99] selinux: use known type instead of void pointer
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 07/99] HID: uhid: convert to hid_safe_input_report() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 09/99] selinux: avoid unnecessary indirection in struct level_datum Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (101 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christian Göttsche, Paul Moore,
Wentao Guan, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit f07586160fd5492f8d48e7667e7a5d8797aa5090 ]
Improve type safety and readability by using the known type.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit f07586160fd5492f8d48e7667e7a5d8797aa5090)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 8 +--
security/selinux/ss/avtab.h | 9 +--
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 12 ++--
security/selinux/ss/conditional.h | 6 +-
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c | 4 +-
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h | 5 +-
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++---------------
security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 16 +++---
8 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 8e400dd736b7a..23210faaa0465 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ static const uint16_t spec_order[] = {
};
/* clang-format on */
-int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *pol,
int (*insertf)(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
const struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
void *p)
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static int avtab_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
return avtab_insert(a, k, d);
}
-int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *pol)
{
int rc;
__le32 buf[1];
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
goto out;
}
-int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, struct policy_file *fp)
{
__le16 buf16[4];
__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p)];
@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
return 0;
}
-int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp)
{
u32 i;
int rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 8e8820484c55b..80c4a6064328e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -104,15 +104,16 @@ static inline void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag)
#endif
struct policydb;
-int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
+struct policy_file;
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *pol,
int (*insert)(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
const struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
void *p);
-int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol);
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *pol);
int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur,
- void *fp);
-int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp);
+ struct policy_file *fp);
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp);
struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
const struct avtab_key *key,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 64ba95e40a6fe..244dc82791133 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ static int bool_isvalid(struct cond_bool_datum *b)
return 1;
}
-int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
return 0;
}
-static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp,
+static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp,
struct cond_av_list *list,
struct cond_av_list *other)
{
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ static int expr_node_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr_node *expr)
return 1;
}
-static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
+static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, struct policy_file *fp)
{
__le32 buf[2];
u32 i, len;
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
return cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, &node->true_list);
}
-int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
__le32 buf[1];
u32 i, len;
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ int cond_write_bool(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
char *key = vkey;
struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
- void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
__le32 buf[3];
u32 len;
int rc;
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static int cond_write_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node,
return 0;
}
-int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
u32 i;
__le32 buf[1];
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
index 8827715bad751..468e98ad3ea14 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -68,10 +68,10 @@ int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p);
int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
-int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp);
-int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp);
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp);
int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
-int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp);
void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index 99c01be15115a..cd84357db2c47 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e)
e->node = NULL;
}
-int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, struct policy_file *fp)
{
struct ebitmap_node *n = NULL;
u32 mapunit, count, startbit, index, i;
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
goto out;
}
-int ebitmap_write(const struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+int ebitmap_write(const struct ebitmap *e, struct policy_file *fp)
{
struct ebitmap_node *n;
u32 bit, count, last_bit, last_startbit;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index ba2ac3da11539..e0150695566cb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -129,8 +129,9 @@ int ebitmap_contains(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2,
int ebitmap_get_bit(const struct ebitmap *e, u32 bit);
int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, u32 bit, int value);
void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
-int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
-int ebitmap_write(const struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+struct policy_file;
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, struct policy_file *fp);
+int ebitmap_write(const struct ebitmap *e, struct policy_file *fp);
u32 ebitmap_hash(const struct ebitmap *e, u32 hash);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 304746b503a0c..27407cb6f18a8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
* Read a MLS range structure from a policydb binary
* representation file.
*/
-static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
+static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, struct policy_file *fp)
{
__le32 buf[2];
u32 items;
@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
* from a policydb binary representation file.
*/
static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c, struct policydb *p,
- void *fp)
+ struct policy_file *fp)
{
__le32 buf[3];
int rc;
@@ -1109,7 +1109,7 @@ static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c, struct policydb *p,
* binary representation file.
*/
-static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
+static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
{
int rc;
char *str;
@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
return 0;
}
-static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct perm_datum *perdatum;
@@ -1165,7 +1165,7 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
return rc;
}
-static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct common_datum *comdatum;
@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ static void type_set_init(struct type_set *t)
ebitmap_init(&t->negset);
}
-static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
+static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, struct policy_file *fp)
{
__le32 buf[1];
int rc;
@@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@ static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
}
static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node **nodep,
- u32 ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp)
+ u32 ncons, int allowxtarget, struct policy_file *fp)
{
struct constraint_node *c, *lc;
struct constraint_expr *e, *le;
@@ -1330,7 +1330,7 @@ static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node **nodep,
return 0;
}
-static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct class_datum *cladatum;
@@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
return rc;
}
-static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct role_datum *role;
@@ -1496,7 +1496,7 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
return rc;
}
-static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct type_datum *typdatum;
@@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
* Read a MLS level structure from a policydb binary
* representation file.
*/
-static int mls_read_level(struct mls_level *lp, void *fp)
+static int mls_read_level(struct mls_level *lp, struct policy_file *fp)
{
__le32 buf[1];
int rc;
@@ -1570,7 +1570,7 @@ static int mls_read_level(struct mls_level *lp, void *fp)
return 0;
}
-static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
@@ -1621,7 +1621,7 @@ static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
return rc;
}
-static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct level_datum *levdatum;
@@ -1662,7 +1662,7 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
return rc;
}
-static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct cat_datum *catdatum;
@@ -1697,7 +1697,7 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
/* clang-format off */
static int (*const read_f[SYM_NUM])(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s,
- void *fp) = {
+ struct policy_file *fp) = {
common_read,
class_read,
role_read,
@@ -1867,7 +1867,7 @@ u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name)
return 1U << (perdatum->value - 1);
}
-static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+static int range_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
struct range_trans *rt = NULL;
struct mls_range *r = NULL;
@@ -1944,7 +1944,7 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
return rc;
}
-static int filename_trans_read_helper_compat(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+static int filename_trans_read_helper_compat(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
struct filename_trans_key key, *ft = NULL;
struct filename_trans_datum *last, *datum = NULL;
@@ -2029,7 +2029,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper_compat(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
return rc;
}
-static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
struct filename_trans_key *ft = NULL;
struct filename_trans_datum **dst, *datum, *first = NULL;
@@ -2118,7 +2118,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
return rc;
}
-static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
u32 nel, i;
__le32 buf[1];
@@ -2159,7 +2159,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
return 0;
}
-static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
int rc;
u32 i, j, nel, nel2, len, len2;
@@ -2273,7 +2273,7 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
}
static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p,
- const struct policydb_compat_info *info, void *fp)
+ const struct policydb_compat_info *info, struct policy_file *fp)
{
int rc;
unsigned int i;
@@ -2470,7 +2470,7 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p,
* Read the configuration data from a policy database binary
* representation file into a policy database structure.
*/
-int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
struct role_allow *ra, *lra;
struct role_trans_key *rtk = NULL;
@@ -2793,7 +2793,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
* Write a MLS level structure to a policydb binary
* representation file.
*/
-static int mls_write_level(struct mls_level *l, void *fp)
+static int mls_write_level(struct mls_level *l, struct policy_file *fp)
{
__le32 buf[1];
int rc;
@@ -2814,7 +2814,7 @@ static int mls_write_level(struct mls_level *l, void *fp)
* Write a MLS range structure to a policydb binary
* representation file.
*/
-static int mls_write_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
+static int mls_write_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, struct policy_file *fp)
{
__le32 buf[3];
size_t items;
@@ -2854,7 +2854,7 @@ static int sens_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
char *key = vkey;
struct level_datum *levdatum = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
- void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
__le32 buf[2];
size_t len;
int rc;
@@ -2882,7 +2882,7 @@ static int cat_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
char *key = vkey;
struct cat_datum *catdatum = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
- void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
__le32 buf[3];
size_t len;
int rc;
@@ -2907,7 +2907,7 @@ static int role_trans_write_one(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr)
struct role_trans_key *rtk = key;
struct role_trans_datum *rtd = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
- void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
struct policydb *p = pd->p;
__le32 buf[3];
int rc;
@@ -2927,7 +2927,7 @@ static int role_trans_write_one(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr)
return 0;
}
-static int role_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+static int role_trans_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
struct policy_data pd = { .p = p, .fp = fp };
__le32 buf[1];
@@ -2941,7 +2941,7 @@ static int role_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
return hashtab_map(&p->role_tr, role_trans_write_one, &pd);
}
-static int role_allow_write(struct role_allow *r, void *fp)
+static int role_allow_write(struct role_allow *r, struct policy_file *fp)
{
struct role_allow *ra;
__le32 buf[2];
@@ -2969,7 +2969,7 @@ static int role_allow_write(struct role_allow *r, void *fp)
* Write a security context structure
* to a policydb binary representation file.
*/
-static int context_write(struct policydb *p, struct context *c, void *fp)
+static int context_write(struct policydb *p, struct context *c, struct policy_file *fp)
{
int rc;
__le32 buf[3];
@@ -3022,7 +3022,7 @@ static int common_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
char *key = vkey;
struct common_datum *comdatum = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
- void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
__le32 buf[4];
size_t len;
int rc;
@@ -3047,7 +3047,7 @@ static int common_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
return 0;
}
-static int type_set_write(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
+static int type_set_write(struct type_set *t, struct policy_file *fp)
{
int rc;
__le32 buf[1];
@@ -3066,7 +3066,7 @@ static int type_set_write(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
}
static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node,
- void *fp)
+ struct policy_file *fp)
{
struct constraint_node *c;
struct constraint_expr *e;
@@ -3117,7 +3117,7 @@ static int class_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
char *key = vkey;
struct class_datum *cladatum = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
- void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
struct policydb *p = pd->p;
struct constraint_node *c;
__le32 buf[6];
@@ -3202,7 +3202,7 @@ static int role_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
char *key = vkey;
struct role_datum *role = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
- void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
struct policydb *p = pd->p;
__le32 buf[3];
size_t items, len;
@@ -3242,7 +3242,7 @@ static int type_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
struct type_datum *typdatum = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
struct policydb *p = pd->p;
- void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
__le32 buf[4];
int rc;
size_t items, len;
@@ -3283,7 +3283,7 @@ static int user_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
struct user_datum *usrdatum = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
struct policydb *p = pd->p;
- void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
__le32 buf[3];
size_t items, len;
int rc;
@@ -3332,7 +3332,8 @@ static int (*const write_f[SYM_NUM])(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
/* clang-format on */
static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p,
- const struct policydb_compat_info *info, void *fp)
+ const struct policydb_compat_info *info,
+ struct policy_file *fp)
{
unsigned int i, j;
int rc;
@@ -3468,7 +3469,7 @@ static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p,
return 0;
}
-static int genfs_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+static int genfs_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
struct genfs *genfs;
struct ocontext *c;
@@ -3526,7 +3527,7 @@ static int range_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
struct range_trans *rt = key;
struct mls_range *r = data;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
- void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
struct policydb *p = pd->p;
int rc;
@@ -3548,7 +3549,7 @@ static int range_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
return 0;
}
-static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+static int range_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
__le32 buf[1];
int rc;
@@ -3575,7 +3576,7 @@ static int filename_write_helper_compat(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
struct filename_trans_key *ft = key;
struct filename_trans_datum *datum = data;
struct ebitmap_node *node;
- void *fp = ptr;
+ struct policy_file *fp = ptr;
__le32 buf[4];
int rc;
u32 bit, len = strlen(ft->name);
@@ -3612,7 +3613,7 @@ static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
{
struct filename_trans_key *ft = key;
struct filename_trans_datum *datum;
- void *fp = ptr;
+ struct policy_file *fp = ptr;
__le32 buf[3];
int rc;
u32 ndatum, len = strlen(ft->name);
@@ -3657,7 +3658,7 @@ static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
return 0;
}
-static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
__le32 buf[1];
int rc;
@@ -3689,7 +3690,7 @@ static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
* structure to a policy database binary representation
* file.
*/
-int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
unsigned int num_syms;
int rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 4bba386264a3d..e01de17e569bf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -312,14 +312,19 @@ struct policydb {
u32 process_trans_perms;
} __randomize_layout;
+struct policy_file {
+ char *data;
+ size_t len;
+};
+
extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
extern int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s);
extern int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
extern int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class);
extern int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type);
extern int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role);
-extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
-extern int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp);
+extern int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp);
extern struct filename_trans_datum *
policydb_filenametr_search(struct policydb *p, struct filename_trans_key *key);
@@ -342,14 +347,9 @@ policydb_roletr_search(struct policydb *p, struct role_trans_key *key);
#define POLICYDB_MAGIC SELINUX_MAGIC
#define POLICYDB_STRING "SE Linux"
-struct policy_file {
- char *data;
- size_t len;
-};
-
struct policy_data {
struct policydb *p;
- void *fp;
+ struct policy_file *fp;
};
static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 09/99] selinux: avoid unnecessary indirection in struct level_datum
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 08/99] selinux: use known type instead of void pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 10/99] selinux: make more use of str_read() when loading the policy Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (100 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christian Göttsche, Paul Moore,
Wentao Guan, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit 749153636643aaa793f14e84e864fdaf5ed0620d ]
Store the owned member of type struct mls_level directly in the parent
struct instead of an extra heap allocation.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit 749153636643aaa793f14e84e864fdaf5ed0620d)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 6 +++---
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 19 ++++++-------------
security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 2 +-
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 989c809d310d6..a6e49269f5351 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l)
* levdatum->level->cat and no bit in l->cat is larger than
* p->p_cats.nprim.
*/
- return ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level->cat, &l->cat,
+ return ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level.cat, &l->cat,
p->p_cats.nprim);
}
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol, char oldc, char *scontext,
levdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_levels, sensitivity);
if (!levdatum)
return -EINVAL;
- context->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+ context->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level.sens;
/* Extract category set. */
while (next_cat != NULL) {
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp, struct policydb *newp,
if (!levdatum)
return -EINVAL;
- newc->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+ newc->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level.sens;
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&oldc->range.level[l].cat, node,
i)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 27407cb6f18a8..449458edec732 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -296,9 +296,7 @@ static int sens_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
kfree(key);
if (datum) {
levdatum = datum;
- if (levdatum->level)
- ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
- kfree(levdatum->level);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level.cat);
}
kfree(datum);
return 0;
@@ -630,11 +628,11 @@ static int sens_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
p = datap;
if (!levdatum->isalias) {
- if (!levdatum->level->sens ||
- levdatum->level->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+ if (!levdatum->level.sens ||
+ levdatum->level.sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
- p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS][levdatum->level->sens - 1] = key;
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS][levdatum->level.sens - 1] = key;
}
return 0;
@@ -1644,12 +1642,7 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
if (rc)
goto bad;
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(*levdatum->level), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!levdatum->level)
- goto bad;
-
- rc = mls_read_level(levdatum->level, fp);
+ rc = mls_read_level(&levdatum->level, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
@@ -2870,7 +2863,7 @@ static int sens_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = mls_write_level(levdatum->level, fp);
+ rc = mls_write_level(&levdatum->level, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index e01de17e569bf..e7a6f1a6c1461 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ struct user_datum {
/* Sensitivity attributes */
struct level_datum {
- struct mls_level *level; /* sensitivity and associated categories */
+ struct mls_level level; /* sensitivity and associated categories */
unsigned char isalias; /* is this sensitivity an alias for another? */
};
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 10/99] selinux: make more use of str_read() when loading the policy
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 09/99] selinux: avoid unnecessary indirection in struct level_datum Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 11/99] selinux: use u16 for security classes Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (99 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christian Göttsche, Paul Moore,
Wentao Guan, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit 01c2253a0fbdccb58cd79d4ff9ab39964bfb4474 ]
Simplify the call sites, and enable future string validation in a single
place.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit 01c2253a0fbdccb58cd79d4ff9ab39964bfb4474)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 10 ++--------
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 22 ++++++++--------------
security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 2 ++
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 244dc82791133..f8a21d10ff929 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -230,17 +230,11 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
goto err;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- if (((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1)))
- goto err;
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key)
- goto err;
- rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto err;
- key[len] = '\0';
+
rc = symtab_insert(s, key, booldatum);
if (rc)
goto err;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 449458edec732..db200b7518fc7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@ static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c, struct policydb *p,
* binary representation file.
*/
-static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
+int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
{
int rc;
char *str;
@@ -2499,24 +2499,18 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
goto bad;
}
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!policydb_str) {
- pr_err("SELinux: unable to allocate memory for policydb "
- "string of length %d\n",
- len);
- goto bad;
- }
-
- rc = next_entry(policydb_str, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&policydb_str, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc) {
- pr_err("SELinux: truncated policydb string identifier\n");
- kfree(policydb_str);
+ if (rc == -ENOMEM) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to allocate memory for policydb string of length %d\n",
+ len);
+ } else {
+ pr_err("SELinux: truncated policydb string identifier\n");
+ }
goto bad;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
- policydb_str[len] = '\0';
if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) {
pr_err("SELinux: policydb string %s does not match "
"my string %s\n",
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index e7a6f1a6c1461..d95a3941f327c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -386,6 +386,8 @@ static inline char *sym_name(struct policydb *p, unsigned int sym_num,
return p->sym_val_to_name[sym_num][element_nr];
}
+extern int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len);
+
extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 11/99] selinux: use u16 for security classes
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 10/99] selinux: make more use of str_read() when loading the policy Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 12/99] selinux: more strict policy parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (98 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christian Göttsche,
Stephen Smalley, Paul Moore, Wentao Guan, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit fa79a596848fe38c55ccab8832ac35dac07fb00c ]
Security class identifiers are limited to 2^16, thus use the appropriate
type u16 consistently.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit fa79a596848fe38c55ccab8832ac35dac07fb00c)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 5 +++--
security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 10 +++++-----
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index db200b7518fc7..6271e083c9400 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
return 0;
}
-int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class)
+int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, u16 class)
{
if (!class || class > p->p_classes.nprim)
return 0;
@@ -2027,7 +2027,8 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp
struct filename_trans_key *ft = NULL;
struct filename_trans_datum **dst, *datum, *first = NULL;
char *name = NULL;
- u32 len, ttype, tclass, ndatum, i;
+ u32 len, ttype, ndatum, i;
+ u16 tclass;
__le32 buf[3];
int rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index d95a3941f327c..06df7da747791 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ struct common_datum {
/* Class attributes */
struct class_datum {
- u32 value; /* class value */
+ u16 value; /* class value */
char *comkey; /* common name */
struct common_datum *comdatum; /* common datum */
struct symtab permissions; /* class-specific permission symbol table */
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ struct role_datum {
struct role_trans_key {
u32 role; /* current role */
u32 type; /* program executable type, or new object type */
- u32 tclass; /* process class, or new object class */
+ u16 tclass; /* process class, or new object class */
};
struct role_trans_datum {
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ struct cat_datum {
struct range_trans {
u32 source_type;
u32 target_type;
- u32 target_class;
+ u16 target_class;
};
/* Boolean data type */
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ struct ocontext {
} ibendport;
} u;
union {
- u32 sclass; /* security class for genfs */
+ u16 sclass; /* security class for genfs */
u32 behavior; /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
} v;
struct context context[2]; /* security context(s) */
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ struct policy_file {
extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
extern int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s);
extern int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
-extern int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class);
+extern int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, u16 class);
extern int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type);
extern int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role);
extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 1a883471d5383..8b3c804d231ea 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3354,7 +3354,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
{
struct class_datum *datum = d;
char *name = k, **classes = args;
- u32 value = datum->value - 1;
+ u16 value = datum->value - 1;
classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!classes[value])
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 12/99] selinux: more strict policy parsing
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 11/99] selinux: use u16 for security classes Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 13/99] selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (97 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christian Göttsche,
Stephen Smalley, Paul Moore, Wentao Guan, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit 18fa21f10d008a0fc22565109c7d38f304295912 ]
Be more strict during parsing of policies and reject invalid values.
Add some error messages in the case of policy parse failures, to
enhance debugging, either on a malformed policy or a too strict check.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: fixed checkpatch.pl warnings, style problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit 18fa21f10d008a0fc22565109c7d38f304295912)
[WG: drop the AVTAB_XPERMS_NLMSG case, netlink xperm support
(d1d991efaf34 "selinux: Add netlink xperm support") is not present
in this tree]
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 35 ++++-
security/selinux/ss/avtab.h | 12 ++
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 18 +--
security/selinux/ss/constraint.h | 1 +
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 196 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 23 +++-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 6 +-
8 files changed, 232 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 289bf9233f714..219e3e592564c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len);
int security_read_state_kernel(void **data, size_t *len);
int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
+/* Maximum supported number of permissions per class */
#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
struct av_decision {
u32 allowed;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 23210faaa0465..4553be750f2fc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *po
struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
int rc;
- unsigned int set, vers = pol->policyvers;
+ unsigned int vers = pol->policyvers;
memset(&key, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
memset(&datum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
@@ -360,9 +360,12 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *po
pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
+ /* Read five or more items: source type, target type,
+ * target class, AV type, and at least one datum.
+ */
items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
- if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
- pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
+ if (items2 < 5 || items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid item count\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32) * items2);
@@ -391,6 +394,13 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *po
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
+ !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
enabled = (val & AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD) ? AVTAB_ENABLED : 0;
@@ -409,6 +419,11 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *po
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
if (val & spec_order[i]) {
+ if (items >= items2) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has too many items (%d/%d)\n",
+ items + 1, items2);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
@@ -444,9 +459,13 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *po
return -EINVAL;
}
- set = hweight16(key.specified & (AVTAB_XPERMS | AVTAB_TYPE | AVTAB_AV));
- if (!set || set > 1) {
- pr_err("SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n");
+ if (hweight16(key.specified & ~AVTAB_ENABLED) != 1) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: not exactly one specifier\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (key.specified & ~AVTAB_SPECIFIER_MASK) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid specifier\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -464,6 +483,10 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *po
pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
+ if (!avtab_is_valid_xperm_specified(xperms.specified))
+ pr_warn_once_policyload(pol,
+ "SELinux: avtab: unsupported xperm specifier %#x\n",
+ xperms.specified);
rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
if (rc) {
pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 80c4a6064328e..844311d2fe7b5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ struct avtab_key {
AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
#define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_SPECIFIER_MASK (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE | AVTAB_XPERMS | AVTAB_ENABLED)
u16 specified; /* what field is specified */
};
@@ -67,6 +68,17 @@ struct avtab_extended_perms {
struct extended_perms_data perms;
};
+static inline bool avtab_is_valid_xperm_specified(u8 specified)
+{
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION:
+ case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
struct avtab_datum {
union {
u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index f8a21d10ff929..c15d914671ddd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -199,19 +199,12 @@ int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
return 0;
}
-static int bool_isvalid(struct cond_bool_datum *b)
-{
- if (!(b->state == 0 || b->state == 1))
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
__le32 buf[3];
- u32 len;
+ u32 len, val;
int rc;
booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*booldatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -223,11 +216,12 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
goto err;
booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
rc = -EINVAL;
- if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum))
+ if (!val_is_boolean(val))
goto err;
+ booldatum->state = (int)val;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
@@ -241,6 +235,7 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
return 0;
err:
+ pr_err("SELinux: conditional: failed to read boolean\n");
cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
return rc;
}
@@ -362,7 +357,8 @@ static int expr_node_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr_node *expr)
return 0;
}
- if (expr->boolean > p->p_bools.nprim) {
+ if (expr->expr_type == COND_BOOL &&
+ (expr->boolean == 0 || expr->boolean > p->p_bools.nprim)) {
pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
index 203033cfad672..1d75a8a044df9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct constraint_expr {
u32 op; /* operator */
struct ebitmap names; /* names */
+ /* internally unused, only forwarded via policydb_write() */
struct type_set *type_names;
struct constraint_expr *next; /* next expression */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 6271e083c9400..f93b10ce19652 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -627,13 +627,11 @@ static int sens_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
levdatum = datum;
p = datap;
- if (!levdatum->isalias) {
- if (!levdatum->level.sens ||
- levdatum->level.sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (!levdatum->level.sens || levdatum->level.sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!levdatum->isalias)
p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS][levdatum->level.sens - 1] = key;
- }
return 0;
}
@@ -646,12 +644,11 @@ static int cat_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
catdatum = datum;
p = datap;
- if (!catdatum->isalias) {
- if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!catdatum->isalias)
p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS][catdatum->value - 1] = key;
- }
return 0;
}
@@ -1148,6 +1145,9 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+ goto bad;
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
@@ -1182,6 +1182,9 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
comdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (nel > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+ goto bad;
rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, nel);
if (rc)
@@ -1333,7 +1336,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
char *key = NULL;
struct class_datum *cladatum;
__le32 buf[6];
- u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel;
+ u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val;
int rc;
cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1346,8 +1349,16 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
len2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- cladatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (nel > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+ goto bad;
+
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto bad;
+ cladatum->value = val;
rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, nel);
if (rc)
@@ -1415,16 +1426,59 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
if (rc)
goto bad;
- cladatum->default_user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- cladatum->default_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- cladatum->default_range = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+ cladatum->default_user = val;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+ cladatum->default_role = val;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
+ case DEFAULT_GLBLUB:
+ cladatum->default_range = val;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto bad;
+ }
}
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 1);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- cladatum->default_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+ cladatum->default_type = val;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto bad;
+ }
}
rc = symtab_insert(s, key, cladatum);
@@ -1434,6 +1488,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
return 0;
bad:
cls_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid class\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -1625,7 +1681,7 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
struct level_datum *levdatum;
int rc;
__le32 buf[2];
- u32 len;
+ u32 len, val;
levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!levdatum)
@@ -1636,7 +1692,11 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!val_is_boolean(val))
+ goto bad;
+ levdatum->isalias = val;
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
@@ -1652,6 +1712,8 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
return 0;
bad:
sens_destroy(key, levdatum, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid sensitivity\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -1661,7 +1723,7 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp
struct cat_datum *catdatum;
int rc;
__le32 buf[3];
- u32 len;
+ u32 len, val;
catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!catdatum)
@@ -1673,7 +1735,11 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!val_is_boolean(val))
+ goto bad;
+ catdatum->isalias = val;
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
@@ -1685,6 +1751,8 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp
return 0;
bad:
cat_destroy(key, catdatum, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid category\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -1866,7 +1934,7 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
struct mls_range *r = NULL;
int rc;
__le32 buf[2];
- u32 i, nel;
+ u32 i, nel, val;
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS)
return 0;
@@ -1897,7 +1965,11 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
- rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ rt->target_class = val;
} else
rt->target_class = p->process_class;
@@ -1934,6 +2006,8 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
out:
kfree(rt);
kfree(r);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid range\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -1942,7 +2016,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper_compat(struct policydb *p, struct policy_f
struct filename_trans_key key, *ft = NULL;
struct filename_trans_datum *last, *datum = NULL;
char *name = NULL;
- u32 len, stype, otype;
+ u32 len, stype, otype, val;
__le32 buf[4];
int rc;
@@ -1961,9 +2035,17 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper_compat(struct policydb *p, struct policy_f
if (rc)
goto out;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, stype))
+ goto out;
key.ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- key.tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, key.ttype))
+ goto out;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX || !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val))
+ goto out;
+ key.tclass = val;
key.name = name;
otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
@@ -2019,6 +2101,9 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper_compat(struct policydb *p, struct policy_f
kfree(ft);
kfree(name);
kfree(datum);
+
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid compat filename transition\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -2027,7 +2112,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp
struct filename_trans_key *ft = NULL;
struct filename_trans_datum **dst, *datum, *first = NULL;
char *name = NULL;
- u32 len, ttype, ndatum, i;
+ u32 len, ttype, ndatum, i, val;
u16 tclass;
__le32 buf[3];
int rc;
@@ -2047,8 +2132,15 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp
if (rc)
goto out;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, ttype))
+ goto out;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (val > U16_MAX || !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val))
+ goto out;
+ tclass = val;
ndatum = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
if (ndatum == 0) {
@@ -2078,6 +2170,10 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp
datum->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, datum->otype))
+ goto out;
+
dst = &datum->next;
}
@@ -2109,6 +2205,9 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp
ebitmap_destroy(&datum->stypes);
kfree(datum);
}
+
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid filename transition\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -2156,7 +2255,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
int rc;
- u32 i, j, nel, nel2, len, len2;
+ u32 i, j, nel, nel2, len, len2, val;
__le32 buf[1];
struct ocontext *l, *c;
struct ocontext *newc = NULL;
@@ -2226,7 +2325,11 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
if (rc)
goto out;
- newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX || (val != 0 && !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val)))
+ goto out;
+ newc->v.sclass = val;
rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p,
fp);
if (rc)
@@ -2263,6 +2366,9 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
}
ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid genfs\n");
+
return rc;
}
@@ -2271,7 +2377,7 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p,
{
int rc;
unsigned int i;
- u32 j, nel, len;
+ u32 j, nel, len, val;
__be64 prefixbuf[1];
__le32 buf[3];
struct ocontext *l, *c;
@@ -2335,11 +2441,25 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p,
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
if (rc)
goto out;
- c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
- p, fp);
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (val > U8_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.port.protocol = val;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.port.low_port = val;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.port.high_port = val;
+ if (c->u.port.low_port == 0 ||
+ c->u.port.low_port > c->u.port.high_port)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
break;
@@ -2457,6 +2577,8 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p,
}
rc = 0;
out:
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid ocon\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -2471,7 +2593,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
struct role_trans_datum *rtd = NULL;
int rc;
__le32 buf[4];
- u32 i, j, len, nprim, nel, perm;
+ u32 i, j, len, nprim, nel, perm, val;
char *policydb_str;
const struct policydb_compat_info *info;
@@ -2657,7 +2779,11 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto bad;
- rtk->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto bad;
+ rtk->tclass = val;
} else
rtk->tclass = p->process_class;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 06df7da747791..01ad9f7bc3ae6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct class_datum {
/* Role attributes */
struct role_datum {
u32 value; /* internal role value */
- u32 bounds; /* boundary of role */
+ u32 bounds; /* boundary of role, 0 for none */
struct ebitmap dominates; /* set of roles dominated by this role */
struct ebitmap types; /* set of authorized types for role */
};
@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ struct role_allow {
/* Type attributes */
struct type_datum {
u32 value; /* internal type value */
- u32 bounds; /* boundary of type */
+ u32 bounds; /* boundary of type, 0 for none */
+ /* internally unused, only forwarded via policydb_write() */
unsigned char primary; /* primary name? */
unsigned char attribute; /* attribute ?*/
};
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ struct type_datum {
/* User attributes */
struct user_datum {
u32 value; /* internal user value */
- u32 bounds; /* bounds of user */
+ u32 bounds; /* bounds of user, 0 for none */
struct ebitmap roles; /* set of authorized roles for user */
struct mls_range range; /* MLS range (min - max) for user */
struct mls_level dfltlevel; /* default login MLS level for user */
@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ struct ocontext {
} ibendport;
} u;
union {
- u16 sclass; /* security class for genfs */
+ u16 sclass; /* security class for genfs (can be 0 for wildcard) */
u32 behavior; /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
} v;
struct context context[2]; /* security context(s) */
@@ -386,9 +387,23 @@ static inline char *sym_name(struct policydb *p, unsigned int sym_num,
return p->sym_val_to_name[sym_num][element_nr];
}
+static inline bool val_is_boolean(u32 value)
+{
+ return value == 0 || value == 1;
+}
+
extern int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len);
extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
+#define pr_warn_once_policyload(policy, fmt, ...) \
+ do { \
+ static const void *prev_policy__; \
+ if (prev_policy__ != policy) { \
+ pr_warn(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); \
+ prev_policy__ = policy; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
#endif /* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 8b3c804d231ea..54d121d648042 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -445,8 +445,6 @@ static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
char **permission_names = args;
- BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
-
permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
return 0;
@@ -465,7 +463,7 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
char *tclass_name;
char *scontext_name = NULL;
char *tcontext_name = NULL;
- char *permission_names[32];
+ char *permission_names[SEL_VEC_MAX];
int index;
u32 length;
bool need_comma = false;
@@ -506,7 +504,7 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
"scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
- for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+ for (index = 0; index < SEL_VEC_MAX; index++) {
u32 mask = (1 << index);
if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 13/99] selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 12/99] selinux: more strict policy parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 14/99] selinux: require a classs permission values to cover its " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (96 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Bryam Vargas, Stephen Smalley,
Paul Moore, Wentao Guan, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
[ Upstream commit d14b5d0e97fccd27974fedc03b903408872907fd ]
perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the
nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the
policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1]
into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer
permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds
heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the
nested per-class permission table is not.
Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when
perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: tweak comment for line length]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit d14b5d0e97fccd27974fedc03b903408872907fd)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index f93b10ce19652..3dc6d3057a89a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1148,6 +1148,9 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
rc = -EINVAL;
if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX)
goto bad;
+ /* indexes an nprim-sized array in security_get_permissions() */
+ if (perdatum->value > s->nprim)
+ goto bad;
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 14/99] selinux: require a classs permission values to cover its permission count
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 13/99] selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 15/99] perf: Reject exited events as group leaders Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (95 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Bryam Vargas, Stephen Smalley,
Paul Moore, Wentao Guan, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
[ Upstream commit b98a8ac50775540f3804397ed08f61ef9910bcab ]
security_get_permissions() sizes an array by the class's permissions.nprim
and fills it at value - 1, from the inherited common's permission table and
then the class's own. A value no permission defines leaves a NULL that
sel_make_perm_files() passes to d_alloc_name(), an oops inside
sel_write_load() that strands selinux_state.policy_mutex and leaves every
later load in uninterruptible sleep; two permissions sharing a value
overwrite the first kstrdup(). Bounding each value by nprim catches
neither, and neither would a count: the symbol table is keyed on the
permission name, so duplicates pass.
Track the values each permission table claims and require them to cover
exactly what its count declares, rejecting a count no value can reach.
Conforming policies are unaffected.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit b98a8ac50775540f3804397ed08f61ef9910bcab)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 3dc6d3057a89a..9df804f8625fd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1127,7 +1127,18 @@ int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
return 0;
}
-static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
+/*
+ * Bitmap of the permission values a symtab has claimed. Values are 1-based
+ * and bounded by SEL_VEC_MAX, the width of an access vector, so the whole set
+ * fits in a u32 and the callers reject an nprim past that width.
+ */
+static u32 perm_claimed_mask(u32 nprim)
+{
+ return nprim ? U32_MAX >> (SEL_VEC_MAX - nprim) : 0;
+}
+
+static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s,
+ struct policy_file *fp, u32 *claimed)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct perm_datum *perdatum;
@@ -1151,6 +1162,10 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
/* indexes an nprim-sized array in security_get_permissions() */
if (perdatum->value > s->nprim)
goto bad;
+ /* two permissions cannot share one slot of that array */
+ if (*claimed & (1U << (perdatum->value - 1)))
+ goto bad;
+ *claimed |= 1U << (perdatum->value - 1);
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
@@ -1171,7 +1186,7 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file
char *key = NULL;
struct common_datum *comdatum;
__le32 buf[4];
- u32 i, len, nel;
+ u32 i, len, nel, claimed = 0;
int rc;
comdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1193,17 +1208,28 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file
if (rc)
goto bad;
comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ /* no permission value can reach a slot past SEL_VEC_MAX */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (comdatum->permissions.nprim > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+ goto bad;
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
- rc = perm_read(p, &comdatum->permissions, fp);
+ rc = perm_read(p, &comdatum->permissions, fp, &claimed);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (claimed != perm_claimed_mask(comdatum->permissions.nprim)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: common %s does not define every permission it declares\n",
+ key);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
hash_eval(&comdatum->permissions.table, "common_permissions", key);
rc = symtab_insert(s, key, comdatum);
@@ -1339,7 +1365,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
char *key = NULL;
struct class_datum *cladatum;
__le32 buf[6];
- u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val;
+ u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val, claimed = 0, inherited = 0;
int rc;
cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1367,6 +1393,10 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
if (rc)
goto bad;
cladatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+ /* no permission value can reach a slot past SEL_VEC_MAX */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (cladatum->permissions.nprim > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+ goto bad;
ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
@@ -1401,11 +1431,22 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
}
}
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
- rc = perm_read(p, &cladatum->permissions, fp);
+ rc = perm_read(p, &cladatum->permissions, fp, &claimed);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
+ /* the class's own permissions must claim the slots the common leaves */
+ if (cladatum->comdatum)
+ inherited = cladatum->comdatum->permissions.nprim;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (claimed != (perm_claimed_mask(cladatum->permissions.nprim) &
+ ~perm_claimed_mask(inherited))) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: class %s does not define every permission it declares\n",
+ key);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
hash_eval(&cladatum->permissions.table, "class_permissions", key);
rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 15/99] perf: Reject exited events as group leaders
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 14/99] selinux: require a classs permission values to cover its " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 16/99] jfs: add check read-only before truncation in jfs_truncate_nolock() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (94 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Kyle Zeng, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
[ Upstream commit fa091f46c3833fb22384f10eade2b4e1e1d0b278 ]
perf_event_remove_on_exec() sets remove-on-exec events to the EXIT state
and detaches their group relationships. The event's file descriptor can
remain open, however, and perf_event_open() currently accepts that event
as a group leader because its early validation rejects only REVOKED and
DEAD events.
A new sibling can consequently be linked to the detached leader. When
the leader is closed, perf_group_detach() observes that its
PERF_ATTACH_GROUP bit is already clear and skips the new sibling. The
sibling then retains a group_leader pointer to the freed event.
Reject group leaders in the EXIT state. Perform the check while holding
the shared context mutex so that an exec in the target task cannot detach
the leader between validation and group attachment.
[peterz: make the earlier test fully consistent]
Fixes: 037a3c43edfb ("perf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806205655.75722-1-kylebot@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
kernel/events/core.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index dd4d535fcb425..40e82ab016d94 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -12939,6 +12939,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
if (err)
goto err_fd;
group_leader = fd_file(group)->private_data;
+ if (group_leader->state <= PERF_EVENT_STATE_EXIT) {
+ err = -ENODEV;
+ goto err_group_fd;
+ }
if (flags & PERF_FLAG_FD_OUTPUT)
output_event = group_leader;
if (flags & PERF_FLAG_FD_NO_GROUP)
@@ -13066,6 +13070,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
if (group_leader->ctx != ctx)
goto err_locked;
+ /* Recheck under ctx::mutex to serialize against remove-on-exec. */
+ if (group_leader->state <= PERF_EVENT_STATE_EXIT) {
+ err = -ENODEV;
+ goto err_locked;
+ }
+
/*
* Only a group leader can be exclusive or pinned
*/
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 16/99] jfs: add check read-only before truncation in jfs_truncate_nolock()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 15/99] perf: Reject exited events as group leaders Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 17/99] jfs: add check read-only before txBeginAnon() call Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (93 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzbot+4e89b5368baba8324e07,
Vasiliy Kovalev, Dave Kleikamp, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
[ Upstream commit b5799dd77054c1ec49b0088b006c9908e256843b ]
Added a check for "read-only" mode in the `jfs_truncate_nolock`
function to avoid errors related to writing to a read-only
filesystem.
Call stack:
block_write_begin() {
jfs_write_failed() {
jfs_truncate() {
jfs_truncate_nolock() {
txEnd() {
...
log = JFS_SBI(tblk->sb)->log;
// (log == NULL)
If the `isReadOnly(ip)` condition is triggered in
`jfs_truncate_nolock`, the function execution will stop, and no
further data modification will occur. Instead, the `xtTruncate`
function will be called with the "COMMIT_WMAP" flag, preventing
modifications in "read-only" mode.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+4e89b5368baba8324e07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e89b5368baba8324e07
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/jfs/inode.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/jfs/inode.c b/fs/jfs/inode.c
index 8ee653aa07ced..cfc37b6789a29 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/inode.c
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ void jfs_truncate_nolock(struct inode *ip, loff_t length)
ASSERT(length >= 0);
- if (test_cflag(COMMIT_Nolink, ip)) {
+ if (test_cflag(COMMIT_Nolink, ip) || isReadOnly(ip)) {
xtTruncate(0, ip, length, COMMIT_WMAP);
return;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 17/99] jfs: add check read-only before txBeginAnon() call
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 16/99] jfs: add check read-only before truncation in jfs_truncate_nolock() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 18/99] ibmvnic: Use kernel helpers for hex dumps Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (92 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzbot+4e89b5368baba8324e07,
Vasiliy Kovalev, Dave Kleikamp, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
[ Upstream commit 0176e69743ecc02961f2ae1ea42439cd2bf9ed58 ]
Added a read-only check before calling `txBeginAnon` in `extAlloc`
and `extRecord`. This prevents modification attempts on a read-only
mounted filesystem, avoiding potential errors or crashes.
Call trace:
txBeginAnon+0xac/0x154
extAlloc+0xe8/0xdec fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c:78
jfs_get_block+0x340/0xb98 fs/jfs/inode.c:248
__block_write_begin_int+0x580/0x166c fs/buffer.c:2128
__block_write_begin fs/buffer.c:2177 [inline]
block_write_begin+0x98/0x11c fs/buffer.c:2236
jfs_write_begin+0x44/0x88 fs/jfs/inode.c:299
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+4e89b5368baba8324e07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e89b5368baba8324e07
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c
index 63d21822d309b..46529bcc8297e 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c
@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ extAlloc(struct inode *ip, s64 xlen, s64 pno, xad_t * xp, bool abnr)
int rc;
int xflag;
+ if (isReadOnly(ip)) {
+ jfs_error(ip->i_sb, "read-only filesystem\n");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
/* This blocks if we are low on resources */
txBeginAnon(ip->i_sb);
@@ -253,6 +258,11 @@ int extRecord(struct inode *ip, xad_t * xp)
{
int rc;
+ if (isReadOnly(ip)) {
+ jfs_error(ip->i_sb, "read-only filesystem\n");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
txBeginAnon(ip->i_sb);
mutex_lock(&JFS_IP(ip)->commit_mutex);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 18/99] ibmvnic: Use kernel helpers for hex dumps
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 17/99] jfs: add check read-only before txBeginAnon() call Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 19/99] jfs: Fix null-ptr-deref in jfs_ioc_trim Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (91 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Nick Child, Dave Marquardt,
Simon Horman, Jakub Kicinski, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
[ Upstream commit d93a6caab5d7d9b5ce034d75b1e1e993338e3852 ]
Previously, when the driver was printing hex dumps, the buffer was cast
to an 8 byte long and printed using string formatters. If the buffer
size was not a multiple of 8 then a read buffer overflow was possible.
Therefore, create a new ibmvnic function that loops over a buffer and
calls hex_dump_to_buffer instead.
This patch address KASAN reports like the one below:
ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Login Buffer:
ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 01000000af000000
<...>
ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 2e6d62692e736261
ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 65050003006d6f63
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ibmvnic_login+0xacc/0xffc [ibmvnic]
Read of size 8 at addr c0000001331a9aa8 by task ip/17681
<...>
Allocated by task 17681:
<...>
ibmvnic_login+0x2f0/0xffc [ibmvnic]
ibmvnic_open+0x148/0x308 [ibmvnic]
__dev_open+0x1ac/0x304
<...>
The buggy address is located 168 bytes inside of
allocated 175-byte region [c0000001331a9a00, c0000001331a9aaf)
<...>
=================================================================
ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 000000000033766e
Fixes: 032c5e82847a ("Driver for IBM System i/p VNIC protocol")
Signed-off-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250320212951.11142-1-nnac123@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c
index 61db00b2b33e4..a9b3e7216789a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c
@@ -4841,6 +4841,18 @@ static void vnic_add_client_data(struct ibmvnic_adapter *adapter,
strscpy(vlcd->name, adapter->netdev->name, len);
}
+static void ibmvnic_print_hex_dump(struct net_device *dev, void *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char hex_str[16 * 3];
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
+ hex_dump_to_buffer((unsigned char *)buf + i, len - i, 16, 8,
+ hex_str, sizeof(hex_str), false);
+ netdev_dbg(dev, "%s\n", hex_str);
+ }
+}
+
static int send_login(struct ibmvnic_adapter *adapter)
{
struct ibmvnic_login_rsp_buffer *login_rsp_buffer;
@@ -4951,10 +4963,8 @@ static int send_login(struct ibmvnic_adapter *adapter)
vnic_add_client_data(adapter, vlcd);
netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "Login Buffer:\n");
- for (i = 0; i < (adapter->login_buf_sz - 1) / 8 + 1; i++) {
- netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "%016lx\n",
- ((unsigned long *)(adapter->login_buf))[i]);
- }
+ ibmvnic_print_hex_dump(adapter->netdev, adapter->login_buf,
+ adapter->login_buf_sz);
memset(&crq, 0, sizeof(crq));
crq.login.first = IBMVNIC_CRQ_CMD;
@@ -5331,15 +5341,13 @@ static void handle_query_ip_offload_rsp(struct ibmvnic_adapter *adapter)
{
struct device *dev = &adapter->vdev->dev;
struct ibmvnic_query_ip_offload_buffer *buf = &adapter->ip_offload_buf;
- int i;
dma_unmap_single(dev, adapter->ip_offload_tok,
sizeof(adapter->ip_offload_buf), DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "Query IP Offload Buffer:\n");
- for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(adapter->ip_offload_buf) - 1) / 8 + 1; i++)
- netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "%016lx\n",
- ((unsigned long *)(buf))[i]);
+ ibmvnic_print_hex_dump(adapter->netdev, buf,
+ sizeof(adapter->ip_offload_buf));
netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "ipv4_chksum = %d\n", buf->ipv4_chksum);
netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "ipv6_chksum = %d\n", buf->ipv6_chksum);
@@ -5570,10 +5578,8 @@ static int handle_login_rsp(union ibmvnic_crq *login_rsp_crq,
netdev->mtu = adapter->req_mtu - ETH_HLEN;
netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "Login Response Buffer:\n");
- for (i = 0; i < (adapter->login_rsp_buf_sz - 1) / 8 + 1; i++) {
- netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "%016lx\n",
- ((unsigned long *)(adapter->login_rsp_buf))[i]);
- }
+ ibmvnic_print_hex_dump(netdev, adapter->login_rsp_buf,
+ adapter->login_rsp_buf_sz);
/* Sanity checks */
if (login->num_txcomp_subcrqs != login_rsp->num_txsubm_subcrqs ||
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 19/99] jfs: Fix null-ptr-deref in jfs_ioc_trim
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 18/99] ibmvnic: Use kernel helpers for hex dumps Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 20/99] exfat: fix double free in delayed_free Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (90 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Dylan J. Wolff, Jiacheng Xu,
Dave Kleikamp, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dylan Wolff <wolffd@comp.nus.edu.sg>
[ Upstream commit a4685408ff6c3e2af366ad9a7274f45ff3f394ee ]
[ Syzkaller Report ]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000087: 0000 [#1
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000438-0x000000000000043f]
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 10614 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted
6.13.0-rc6-gfbfd64d25c7a-dirty #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-30ms
RIP: 0010:jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
Code: e7 e8 59 a4 87 fe 4d 8b 24 24 4d 8d bc 24 38 04 00 00 48 8d 93
90 82 fe ff 4c 89 ff 31 f6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900055f7cd0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: 00005866a9e67ff8 RCX: 000000000000000a
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff88807c180003 R09: 1ffff1100f830000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100f830001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000438
FS: 00007fe520225640(0000) GS:ffff8880b7e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005593c91b2c88 CR3: 000000014927c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x61/0xb0
? die_addr+0xb1/0xe0
? exc_general_protection+0x333/0x510
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
jfs_ioctl+0x3c8/0x4f0
? __pfx_jfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_jfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10
__se_sys_ioctl+0x269/0x350
? __pfx___se_sys_ioctl+0x10/0x10
? do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x210
do_syscall_64+0xee/0x210
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1e0/0x330
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe51f4903ad
Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d
RSP: 002b:00007fe5202250c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe51f5cbf80 RCX: 00007fe51f4903ad
RDX: 0000000020000680 RSI: 00000000c0185879 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe520225640
R13: 000000000000000e R14: 00007fe51f44fca0 R15: 00007fe52021d000
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
Code: e7 e8 59 a4 87 fe 4d 8b 24 24 4d 8d bc 24 38 04 00 00 48 8d 93
90 82 fe ff 4c 89 ff 31 f6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900055f7cd0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: 00005866a9e67ff8 RCX: 000000000000000a
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff88807c180003 R09: 1ffff1100f830000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100f830001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000438
FS: 00007fe520225640(0000) GS:ffff8880b7e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005593c91b2c88 CR3: 000000014927c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ Analysis ]
We believe that we have found a concurrency bug in the `fs/jfs` module
that results in a null pointer dereference. There is a closely related
issue which has been fixed:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=d6c1b3599b2feb5c7291f5ac3a36e5fa7cedb234
... but, unfortunately, the accepted patch appears to still be
susceptible to a null pointer dereference under some interleavings.
To trigger the bug, we think that `JFS_SBI(ipbmap->i_sb)->bmap` is set
to NULL in `dbFreeBits` and then dereferenced in `jfs_ioc_trim`. This
bug manifests quite rarely under normal circumstances, but is
triggereable from a syz-program.
Reported-and-tested-by: Dylan J. Wolff<wolffd@comp.nus.edu.sg>
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiacheng Xu <stitch@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dylan J. Wolff<wolffd@comp.nus.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Xu <stitch@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c
index 5f4b305030ad5..4b660296caf39 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ int jfs_ioc_trim(struct inode *ip, struct fstrim_range *range)
down_read(&sb->s_umount);
bmp = JFS_SBI(ip->i_sb)->bmap;
- if (minlen > bmp->db_agsize ||
+ if (bmp == NULL ||
+ minlen > bmp->db_agsize ||
start >= bmp->db_mapsize ||
range->len < sb->s_blocksize) {
up_read(&sb->s_umount);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 20/99] exfat: fix double free in delayed_free
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 19/99] jfs: Fix null-ptr-deref in jfs_ioc_trim Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 21/99] media: platform: exynos4-is: Add hardware sync wait to fimc_is_hw_change_mode() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (89 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jianzhou Zhao, Namjae Jeon,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1f3d9724e16d62c7d42c67d6613b8512f2887c22 ]
The double free could happen in the following path.
exfat_create_upcase_table()
exfat_create_upcase_table() : return error
exfat_free_upcase_table() : free ->vol_utbl
exfat_load_default_upcase_table : return error
exfat_kill_sb()
delayed_free()
exfat_free_upcase_table() <--------- double free
This patch set ->vol_util as NULL after freeing it.
Reported-by: Jianzhou Zhao <xnxc22xnxc22@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/exfat/nls.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/fs/exfat/nls.c b/fs/exfat/nls.c
index d47896a895965..1729bf42eb516 100644
--- a/fs/exfat/nls.c
+++ b/fs/exfat/nls.c
@@ -801,4 +801,5 @@ int exfat_create_upcase_table(struct super_block *sb)
void exfat_free_upcase_table(struct exfat_sb_info *sbi)
{
kvfree(sbi->vol_utbl);
+ sbi->vol_utbl = NULL;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 21/99] media: platform: exynos4-is: Add hardware sync wait to fimc_is_hw_change_mode()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 20/99] exfat: fix double free in delayed_free Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 22/99] mISDN: hfcpci: Fix warning when deleting uninitialized timer Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (88 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Wentao Liang, Hans Verkuil,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
[ Upstream commit bd9f6ce7d512fa21249415c16af801a4ed5d97b6 ]
In fimc_is_hw_change_mode(), the function changes camera modes without
waiting for hardware completion, risking corrupted data or system hangs
if subsequent operations proceed before the hardware is ready.
Add fimc_is_hw_wait_intmsr0_intmsd0() after mode configuration, ensuring
hardware state synchronization and stable interrupt handling.
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/media/platform/samsung/exynos4-is/fimc-is-regs.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/samsung/exynos4-is/fimc-is-regs.c b/drivers/media/platform/samsung/exynos4-is/fimc-is-regs.c
index 366e6393817d2..5f9c44e825a5f 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/samsung/exynos4-is/fimc-is-regs.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/samsung/exynos4-is/fimc-is-regs.c
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ int fimc_is_hw_change_mode(struct fimc_is *is)
if (WARN_ON(is->config_index >= ARRAY_SIZE(cmd)))
return -EINVAL;
+ fimc_is_hw_wait_intmsr0_intmsd0(is);
mcuctl_write(cmd[is->config_index], is, MCUCTL_REG_ISSR(0));
mcuctl_write(is->sensor_index, is, MCUCTL_REG_ISSR(1));
mcuctl_write(is->setfile.sub_index, is, MCUCTL_REG_ISSR(2));
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 22/99] mISDN: hfcpci: Fix warning when deleting uninitialized timer
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 21/99] media: platform: exynos4-is: Add hardware sync wait to fimc_is_hw_change_mode() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 23/99] can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (87 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Vladimir Riabchun, Jakub Kicinski,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vladimir Riabchun <ferr.lambarginio@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 97766512a9951b9fd6fc97f1b93211642bb0b220 ]
With CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS unloading hfcpci module leads
to the following splat:
[ 250.215892] ODEBUG: assert_init not available (active state 0) object: ffffffffc01a3dc0 object type: timer_list hint: 0x0
[ 250.217520] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 233 at lib/debugobjects.c:612 debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0
[ 250.218775] Modules linked in: hfcpci(-) mISDN_core
[ 250.219537] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 233 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-g6f713187ac98 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 250.220940] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 250.222377] RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0
[ 250.223131] Code: fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 4f 41 56 48 8b 14 dd a0 4e 01 9f 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 20 46 01 9f e8 cb 84d
[ 250.225805] RSP: 0018:ffff888015ea7c08 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 250.226608] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: ffffffff9be93a95
[ 250.227708] RDX: 1ffff1100d945138 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88806ca289c0
[ 250.228993] RBP: ffffffff9f014a00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1002bd4f39
[ 250.230043] R10: ffff888015ea79cf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 250.231185] R13: ffffffff9eea0520 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888015ea7cc8
[ 250.232454] FS: 00007f3208f01540(0000) GS:ffff8880caf5a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 250.233851] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 250.234856] CR2: 00007f32090a7421 CR3: 0000000004d63000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 250.236117] Call Trace:
[ 250.236599] <TASK>
[ 250.236967] ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xd4/0x130
[ 250.237920] debug_object_assert_init+0x1f6/0x310
[ 250.238762] ? __pfx_debug_object_assert_init+0x10/0x10
[ 250.239658] ? __lock_acquire+0xdea/0x1c70
[ 250.240369] __try_to_del_timer_sync+0x69/0x140
[ 250.241172] ? __pfx___try_to_del_timer_sync+0x10/0x10
[ 250.242058] ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120
[ 250.242842] ? lock_acquire+0x30/0x80
[ 250.243474] ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120
[ 250.244262] __timer_delete_sync+0x98/0x120
[ 250.245015] HFC_cleanup+0x10/0x20 [hfcpci]
[ 250.245704] __do_sys_delete_module+0x348/0x510
[ 250.246461] ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module+0x10/0x10
[ 250.247338] do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x360
[ 250.247924] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Fix this by initializing hfc_tl timer with DEFINE_TIMER macro.
Also, use mod_timer instead of manual timeout update.
Fixes: 87c5fa1bb426 ("mISDN: Add different different timer settings for hfc-pci")
Fixes: 175302f6b79e ("mISDN: hfcpci: Fix use-after-free bug in hfcpci_softirq")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <ferr.lambarginio@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aKiy2D_LiWpQ5kXq@vova-pc
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c | 12 +++++-------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c b/drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c
index ce7bccc9faa39..465503e966b97 100644
--- a/drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c
+++ b/drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c
@@ -39,12 +39,13 @@
#include "hfc_pci.h"
+static void hfcpci_softirq(struct timer_list *unused);
static const char *hfcpci_revision = "2.0";
static int HFC_cnt;
static uint debug;
static uint poll, tics;
-static struct timer_list hfc_tl;
+static DEFINE_TIMER(hfc_tl, hfcpci_softirq);
static unsigned long hfc_jiffies;
MODULE_AUTHOR("Karsten Keil");
@@ -2305,8 +2306,7 @@ hfcpci_softirq(struct timer_list *unused)
hfc_jiffies = jiffies + 1;
else
hfc_jiffies += tics;
- hfc_tl.expires = hfc_jiffies;
- add_timer(&hfc_tl);
+ mod_timer(&hfc_tl, hfc_jiffies);
}
static int __init
@@ -2332,10 +2332,8 @@ HFC_init(void)
if (poll != HFCPCI_BTRANS_THRESHOLD) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Using alternative poll value of %d\n",
__func__, poll);
- timer_setup(&hfc_tl, hfcpci_softirq, 0);
- hfc_tl.expires = jiffies + tics;
- hfc_jiffies = hfc_tl.expires;
- add_timer(&hfc_tl);
+ hfc_jiffies = jiffies + tics;
+ mod_timer(&hfc_tl, hfc_jiffies);
} else
tics = 0; /* indicate the use of controller's timer */
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 23/99] can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 22/99] mISDN: hfcpci: Fix warning when deleting uninitialized timer Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 24/99] can: j1939: add missing calls in " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (86 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzbot, Tetsuo Handa, Oleksij Rempel,
Marc Kleine-Budde, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[ Upstream commit 7fcbe5b2c6a4b5407bf2241fdb71e0a390f6ab9a ]
syzbot is reporting
unregister_netdevice: waiting for vcan0 to become free. Usage count = 2
problem, for j1939 protocol did not have NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification
handler for undoing changes made by j1939_sk_bind().
Commit 25fe97cb7620 ("can: j1939: move j1939_priv_put() into sk_destruct
callback") expects that a call to j1939_priv_put() can be unconditionally
delayed until j1939_sk_sock_destruct() is called. But we need to call
j1939_priv_put() against an extra ref held by j1939_sk_bind() call
(as a part of undoing changes made by j1939_sk_bind()) as soon as
NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification fires (i.e. before j1939_sk_sock_destruct()
is called via j1939_sk_release()). Otherwise, the extra ref on "struct
j1939_priv" held by j1939_sk_bind() call prevents "struct net_device" from
dropping the usage count to 1; making it impossible for
unregister_netdevice() to continue.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+881d65229ca4f9ae8c84@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=881d65229ca4f9ae8c84
Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+881d65229ca4f9ae8c84@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Fixes: 25fe97cb7620 ("can: j1939: move j1939_priv_put() into sk_destruct callback")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ac9db9a4-6c30-416e-8b94-96e6559d55b2@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
[mkl: remove space in front of label]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h | 1 +
net/can/j1939/main.c | 3 +++
net/can/j1939/socket.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h b/net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h
index 1d3d5d0551e0f..cf26352d1d8ce 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h
+++ b/net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@ void j1939_priv_get(struct j1939_priv *priv);
/* notify/alert all j1939 sockets bound to ifindex */
void j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(struct j1939_priv *priv);
+void j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister(struct j1939_priv *priv);
int j1939_cancel_active_session(struct j1939_priv *priv, struct sock *sk);
void j1939_tp_init(struct j1939_priv *priv);
diff --git a/net/can/j1939/main.c b/net/can/j1939/main.c
index b45f834ff2cf6..6bbe75d2211d5 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/main.c
+++ b/net/can/j1939/main.c
@@ -377,6 +377,9 @@ static int j1939_netdev_notify(struct notifier_block *nb,
j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(priv);
j1939_ecu_unmap_all(priv);
break;
+ case NETDEV_UNREGISTER:
+ j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister(priv);
+ break;
}
j1939_priv_put(priv);
diff --git a/net/can/j1939/socket.c b/net/can/j1939/socket.c
index e843891a9323b..48b60f6cfa8fe 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/socket.c
+++ b/net/can/j1939/socket.c
@@ -1300,6 +1300,55 @@ void j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(struct j1939_priv *priv)
read_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
}
+void j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister(struct j1939_priv *priv)
+{
+ struct sock *sk;
+ struct j1939_sock *jsk;
+ bool wait_rcu = false;
+
+rescan: /* The caller is holding a ref on this "priv" via j1939_priv_get_by_ndev(). */
+ read_lock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(jsk, &priv->j1939_socks, list) {
+ /* Skip if j1939_jsk_add() is not called on this socket. */
+ if (!(jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_BOUND))
+ continue;
+ sk = &jsk->sk;
+ sock_hold(sk);
+ read_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
+ /* Check if j1939_jsk_del() is not yet called on this socket after holding
+ * socket's lock, for both j1939_sk_bind() and j1939_sk_release() call
+ * j1939_jsk_del() with socket's lock held.
+ */
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ if (jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_BOUND) {
+ /* Neither j1939_sk_bind() nor j1939_sk_release() called j1939_jsk_del().
+ * Make this socket no longer bound, by pretending as if j1939_sk_bind()
+ * dropped old references but did not get new references.
+ */
+ j1939_jsk_del(priv, jsk);
+ j1939_local_ecu_put(priv, jsk->addr.src_name, jsk->addr.sa);
+ j1939_netdev_stop(priv);
+ /* Call j1939_priv_put() now and prevent j1939_sk_sock_destruct() from
+ * calling the corresponding j1939_priv_put().
+ *
+ * j1939_sk_sock_destruct() is supposed to call j1939_priv_put() after
+ * an RCU grace period. But since the caller is holding a ref on this
+ * "priv", we can defer synchronize_rcu() until immediately before
+ * the caller calls j1939_priv_put().
+ */
+ j1939_priv_put(priv);
+ jsk->priv = NULL;
+ wait_rcu = true;
+ }
+ release_sock(sk);
+ sock_put(sk);
+ goto rescan;
+ }
+ read_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
+ if (wait_rcu)
+ synchronize_rcu();
+}
+
static int j1939_sk_no_ioctlcmd(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 24/99] can: j1939: add missing calls in NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 23/99] can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 25/99] can: j1939: make j1939_sk_bind() fail if device is no longer registered Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (85 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Tetsuo Handa, Oleksij Rempel,
Marc Kleine-Budde, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[ Upstream commit 93a27b5891b8194a8c083c9a80d2141d4bf47ba8 ]
Currently NETDEV_UNREGISTER event handler is not calling
j1939_cancel_active_session() and j1939_sk_queue_drop_all().
This will result in these calls being skipped when j1939_sk_release() is
called. And I guess that the reason syzbot is still reporting
unregister_netdevice: waiting for vcan0 to become free. Usage count = 2
is caused by lack of these calls.
Calling j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, sk) from j1939_sk_release() can
be covered by calling j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, NULL) from
j1939_netdev_notify().
Calling j1939_sk_queue_drop_all() from j1939_sk_release() can be covered
by calling j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown() from j1939_netdev_notify().
Therefore, we can reuse j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, NULL) and
j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(priv) for NETDEV_UNREGISTER event handler.
Fixes: 7fcbe5b2c6a4 ("can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3ad3c7f8-5a74-4b07-a193-cb0725823558@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/can/j1939/main.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/can/j1939/main.c b/net/can/j1939/main.c
index 6bbe75d2211d5..21186932f8f61 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/main.c
+++ b/net/can/j1939/main.c
@@ -378,6 +378,8 @@ static int j1939_netdev_notify(struct notifier_block *nb,
j1939_ecu_unmap_all(priv);
break;
case NETDEV_UNREGISTER:
+ j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, NULL);
+ j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(priv);
j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister(priv);
break;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 25/99] can: j1939: make j1939_sk_bind() fail if device is no longer registered
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 24/99] can: j1939: add missing calls in " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 26/99] smc: Fix use-after-free in __pnet_find_base_ndev() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (84 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Tetsuo Handa, Oleksij Rempel,
Marc Kleine-Budde, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[ Upstream commit 46cea215dc9444ec32a76b1b6a9cb809e17b64d5 ]
There is a theoretical race window in j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister()
where two j1939_sk_bind() calls jump in between read_unlock_bh() and
lock_sock().
The assumption jsk->priv == priv can fail if the first j1939_sk_bind()
call once made jsk->priv == NULL due to failed j1939_local_ecu_get() call
and the second j1939_sk_bind() call again made jsk->priv != NULL due to
successful j1939_local_ecu_get() call.
Since the socket lock is held by both j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister()
and j1939_sk_bind(), checking ndev->reg_state with the socket lock held can
reliably make the second j1939_sk_bind() call fail (and close this race
window).
Fixes: 7fcbe5b2c6a4 ("can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/5732921e-247e-4957-a364-da74bd7031d7@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/can/j1939/socket.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/can/j1939/socket.c b/net/can/j1939/socket.c
index 48b60f6cfa8fe..8a61fb3b1d7f1 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/socket.c
+++ b/net/can/j1939/socket.c
@@ -481,6 +481,12 @@ static int j1939_sk_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len)
goto out_release_sock;
}
+ if (ndev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED) {
+ dev_put(ndev);
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_release_sock;
+ }
+
can_ml = can_get_ml_priv(ndev);
if (!can_ml) {
dev_put(ndev);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 26/99] smc: Fix use-after-free in __pnet_find_base_ndev().
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 25/99] can: j1939: make j1939_sk_bind() fail if device is no longer registered Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 27/99] KVM: arm64: Prevent access to vCPU events before init Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (83 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzbot+ea28e9d85be2f327b6c6,
Kuniyuki Iwashima, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 3d3466878afd8d43ec0ca2facfbc7f03e40d0f79 ]
syzbot reported use-after-free of net_device in __pnet_find_base_ndev(),
which was called during connect(). [0]
smc_pnet_find_ism_resource() fetches sk_dst_get(sk)->dev and passes
down to pnet_find_base_ndev(), where RTNL is held. Then, UAF happened
at __pnet_find_base_ndev() when the dev is first used.
This means dev had already been freed before acquiring RTNL in
pnet_find_base_ndev().
While dev is going away, dst->dev could be swapped with blackhole_netdev,
and the dev's refcnt by dst will be released.
We must hold dev's refcnt before calling smc_pnet_find_ism_resource().
Also, smc_pnet_find_roce_resource() has the same problem.
Let's use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in the two functions.
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __pnet_find_base_ndev+0x1b1/0x1c0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:926
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888036bac33a by task syz.0.3632/18609
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 18609 Comm: syz.0.3632 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/18/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
__pnet_find_base_ndev+0x1b1/0x1c0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:926
pnet_find_base_ndev net/smc/smc_pnet.c:946 [inline]
smc_pnet_find_ism_by_pnetid net/smc/smc_pnet.c:1103 [inline]
smc_pnet_find_ism_resource+0xef/0x390 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:1154
smc_find_ism_device net/smc/af_smc.c:1030 [inline]
smc_find_proposal_devices net/smc/af_smc.c:1115 [inline]
__smc_connect+0x372/0x1890 net/smc/af_smc.c:1545
smc_connect+0x877/0xd90 net/smc/af_smc.c:1715
__sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2086 [inline]
__sys_connect+0x313/0x440 net/socket.c:2105
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2111 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2108 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:2108
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f47cbf8eba9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f47ccdb1038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f47cc1d5fa0 RCX: 00007f47cbf8eba9
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 00007f47cc011e19 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f47cc1d6038 R14: 00007f47cc1d5fa0 R15: 00007ffc512f8aa8
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888036bacd00 pfn:0x36bac
flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000000000 ffffea0001243d08 ffff8880b863fdc0 0000000000000000
raw: ffff888036bacd00 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as freed
page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x446dc0(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT|__GFP_ZERO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_COMP), pid 16741, tgid 16741 (syz-executor), ts 343313197788, free_ts 380670750466
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x240/0x2a0 mm/page_alloc.c:1851
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1859 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x21e4/0x22c0 mm/page_alloc.c:3858
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x181/0x370 mm/page_alloc.c:5148
alloc_pages_mpol+0x232/0x4a0 mm/mempolicy.c:2416
___kmalloc_large_node+0x5f/0x1b0 mm/slub.c:4317
__kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x18/0x90 mm/slub.c:4348
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4364 [inline]
__kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x6d/0x5f0 mm/slub.c:5067
alloc_netdev_mqs+0xa3/0x11b0 net/core/dev.c:11812
tun_set_iff+0x532/0xef0 drivers/net/tun.c:2775
__tun_chr_ioctl+0x788/0x1df0 drivers/net/tun.c:3085
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:598 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:584
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 18610 tgid 18608 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1395 [inline]
__free_frozen_pages+0xbc4/0xd30 mm/page_alloc.c:2895
free_large_kmalloc+0x13a/0x1f0 mm/slub.c:4820
device_release+0x99/0x1c0 drivers/base/core.c:-1
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:689 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:720 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
kobject_put+0x22b/0x480 lib/kobject.c:737
netdev_run_todo+0xd2e/0xea0 net/core/dev.c:11513
rtnl_unlock net/core/rtnetlink.c:157 [inline]
rtnl_net_unlock include/linux/rtnetlink.h:135 [inline]
rtnl_dellink+0x537/0x710 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3563
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7cc/0xb70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6946
netlink_rcv_skb+0x208/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2552
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1320 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x82f/0x9e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1346
netlink_sendmsg+0x805/0xb30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1896
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729
____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x830 net/socket.c:2614
___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2668
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2700 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2705 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x19b/0x260 net/socket.c:2703
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888036bac200: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff888036bac280: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff888036bac300: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff888036bac380: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff888036bac400: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
Fixes: 0afff91c6f5e ("net/smc: add pnetid support")
Fixes: 1619f770589a ("net/smc: add pnetid support for SMC-D and ISM")
Reported-by: syzbot+ea28e9d85be2f327b6c6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/68c237c7.050a0220.3c6139.0036.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250916214758.650211-2-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/smc/smc_pnet.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/smc/smc_pnet.c b/net/smc/smc_pnet.c
index b391c2ef463f2..f2849e030004d 100644
--- a/net/smc/smc_pnet.c
+++ b/net/smc/smc_pnet.c
@@ -1126,37 +1126,38 @@ static void smc_pnet_find_ism_by_pnetid(struct net_device *ndev,
*/
void smc_pnet_find_roce_resource(struct sock *sk, struct smc_init_info *ini)
{
- struct dst_entry *dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
-
- if (!dst)
- goto out;
- if (!dst->dev)
- goto out_rel;
+ struct net_device *dev;
+ struct dst_entry *dst;
- smc_pnet_find_roce_by_pnetid(dst->dev, ini);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
+ dev = dst ? dst_dev_rcu(dst) : NULL;
+ dev_hold(dev);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
-out_rel:
- dst_release(dst);
-out:
- return;
+ if (dev) {
+ smc_pnet_find_roce_by_pnetid(dev, ini);
+ dev_put(dev);
+ }
}
void smc_pnet_find_ism_resource(struct sock *sk, struct smc_init_info *ini)
{
- struct dst_entry *dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
+ struct net_device *dev;
+ struct dst_entry *dst;
ini->ism_dev[0] = NULL;
- if (!dst)
- goto out;
- if (!dst->dev)
- goto out_rel;
- smc_pnet_find_ism_by_pnetid(dst->dev, ini);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
+ dev = dst ? dst_dev_rcu(dst) : NULL;
+ dev_hold(dev);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
-out_rel:
- dst_release(dst);
-out:
- return;
+ if (dev) {
+ smc_pnet_find_ism_by_pnetid(dev, ini);
+ dev_put(dev);
+ }
}
/* Lookup and apply a pnet table entry to the given ib device.
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 27/99] KVM: arm64: Prevent access to vCPU events before init
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 26/99] smc: Fix use-after-free in __pnet_find_base_ndev() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 28/99] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in in smc_clc_prfx_set() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (82 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Oliver Upton, Marc Zyngier,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
[ Upstream commit 0aa1b76fe1429629215a7c79820e4b96233ac4a3 ]
Another day, another syzkaller bug. KVM erroneously allows userspace to
pend vCPU events for a vCPU that hasn't been initialized yet, leading to
KVM interpreting a bunch of uninitialized garbage for routing /
injecting the exception.
In one case the injection code and the hyp disagree on whether the vCPU
has a 32bit EL1 and put the vCPU into an illegal mode for AArch64,
tripping the BUG() in exception_target_el() during the next injection:
kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c:40!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 318 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4-00104-g10fd0285305d #6 PREEMPT
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 21402009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c
lr : pend_serror_exception+0x18/0x13c
sp : ffff800082f03a10
x29: ffff800082f03a10 x28: ffff0000cb132280 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000c2a99c20 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: 0000000000008000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000004
x20: 0000000000008000 x19: ffff0000c2a99c20 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 00000000200000c0
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : ffff800082f03af8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : ffff800080f621f0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 000000000040009b x1 : 0000000000000003 x0 : ffff0000c2a99c20
Call trace:
exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c (P)
kvm_inject_serror_esr+0x40/0x3b4
__kvm_arm_vcpu_set_events+0xf0/0x100
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x180/0x9d4
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x60c/0x9f4
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x104
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_svc+0x34/0xf0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
Code: f946bc01 b4fffe61 9101e020 17fffff2 (d4210000)
Reject the ioctls outright as no sane VMM would call these before
KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT anyway. Even if it did the exception would've been
thrown away by the eventual reset of the vCPU's state.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.17
Fixes: b7b27facc7b5 ("arm/arm64: KVM: Add KVM_GET/SET_VCPU_EVENTS")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
index a713f32a6545b..72e4c290d8fca 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
@@ -1767,6 +1767,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
case KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS: {
struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
+ if (!kvm_vcpu_initialized(vcpu))
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+
if (kvm_arm_vcpu_get_events(vcpu, &events))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1778,6 +1781,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
case KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS: {
struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
+ if (!kvm_vcpu_initialized(vcpu))
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+
if (copy_from_user(&events, argp, sizeof(events)))
return -EFAULT;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 28/99] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in in smc_clc_prfx_set().
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 27/99] KVM: arm64: Prevent access to vCPU events before init Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 29/99] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_clc_prfx_match() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Kuniyuki Iwashima, Eric Dumazet,
Jakub Kicinski, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 935d783e5de9b64587f3adb25641dd8385e64ddb ]
smc_clc_prfx_set() is called during connect() and not under RCU
nor RTNL.
Using sk_dst_get(sk)->dev could trigger UAF.
Let's use __sk_dst_get() and dev_dst_rcu() under rcu_read_lock()
after kernel_getsockname().
Note that the returned value of smc_clc_prfx_set() is not used
in the caller.
While at it, we change the 1st arg of smc_clc_prfx_set[46]_rcu()
not to touch dst there.
Fixes: a046d57da19f ("smc: CLC handshake (incl. preparation steps)")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250916214758.650211-3-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/smc/smc_clc.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/smc/smc_clc.c b/net/smc/smc_clc.c
index c2b2b76a8f627..467bd33f44019 100644
--- a/net/smc/smc_clc.c
+++ b/net/smc/smc_clc.c
@@ -509,10 +509,10 @@ static bool smc_clc_msg_hdr_valid(struct smc_clc_msg_hdr *clcm, bool check_trl)
}
/* find ipv4 addr on device and get the prefix len, fill CLC proposal msg */
-static int smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(struct dst_entry *dst, __be32 ipv4,
+static int smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(struct net_device *dev, __be32 ipv4,
struct smc_clc_msg_proposal_prefix *prop)
{
- struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dst->dev);
+ struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
const struct in_ifaddr *ifa;
if (!in_dev)
@@ -530,12 +530,12 @@ static int smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(struct dst_entry *dst, __be32 ipv4,
}
/* fill CLC proposal msg with ipv6 prefixes from device */
-static int smc_clc_prfx_set6_rcu(struct dst_entry *dst,
+static int smc_clc_prfx_set6_rcu(struct net_device *dev,
struct smc_clc_msg_proposal_prefix *prop,
struct smc_clc_ipv6_prefix *ipv6_prfx)
{
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
- struct inet6_dev *in6_dev = __in6_dev_get(dst->dev);
+ struct inet6_dev *in6_dev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifa;
int cnt = 0;
@@ -564,41 +564,44 @@ static int smc_clc_prfx_set(struct socket *clcsock,
struct smc_clc_msg_proposal_prefix *prop,
struct smc_clc_ipv6_prefix *ipv6_prfx)
{
- struct dst_entry *dst = sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
struct sockaddr_storage addrs;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
struct sockaddr_in *addr;
+ struct net_device *dev;
+ struct dst_entry *dst;
int rc = -ENOENT;
- if (!dst) {
- rc = -ENOTCONN;
- goto out;
- }
- if (!dst->dev) {
- rc = -ENODEV;
- goto out_rel;
- }
/* get address to which the internal TCP socket is bound */
if (kernel_getsockname(clcsock, (struct sockaddr *)&addrs) < 0)
- goto out_rel;
+ goto out;
+
/* analyze IP specific data of net_device belonging to TCP socket */
addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addrs;
+
rcu_read_lock();
+
+ dst = __sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
+ dev = dst ? dst_dev_rcu(dst) : NULL;
+ if (!dev) {
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
if (addrs.ss_family == PF_INET) {
/* IPv4 */
addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addrs;
- rc = smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(dst, addr->sin_addr.s_addr, prop);
+ rc = smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(dev, addr->sin_addr.s_addr, prop);
} else if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr6->sin6_addr)) {
/* mapped IPv4 address - peer is IPv4 only */
- rc = smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(dst, addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3],
+ rc = smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(dev, addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3],
prop);
} else {
/* IPv6 */
- rc = smc_clc_prfx_set6_rcu(dst, prop, ipv6_prfx);
+ rc = smc_clc_prfx_set6_rcu(dev, prop, ipv6_prfx);
}
+
+out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
-out_rel:
- dst_release(dst);
out:
return rc;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 29/99] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_clc_prfx_match().
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 28/99] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in in smc_clc_prfx_set() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 30/99] ASoC: nau8821: Cancel delayed work on component remove Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Kuniyuki Iwashima, Eric Dumazet,
Jakub Kicinski, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 235f81045c008169cc4e1955b4a64e118eebe61b ]
smc_clc_prfx_match() is called from smc_listen_work() and
not under RCU nor RTNL.
Using sk_dst_get(sk)->dev could trigger UAF.
Let's use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu().
Note that the returned value of smc_clc_prfx_match() is not
used in the caller.
Fixes: a046d57da19f ("smc: CLC handshake (incl. preparation steps)")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250916214758.650211-4-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/smc/smc_clc.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/smc/smc_clc.c b/net/smc/smc_clc.c
index 467bd33f44019..a9812bc85ad94 100644
--- a/net/smc/smc_clc.c
+++ b/net/smc/smc_clc.c
@@ -657,26 +657,26 @@ static int smc_clc_prfx_match6_rcu(struct net_device *dev,
int smc_clc_prfx_match(struct socket *clcsock,
struct smc_clc_msg_proposal_prefix *prop)
{
- struct dst_entry *dst = sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
+ struct net_device *dev;
+ struct dst_entry *dst;
int rc;
- if (!dst) {
- rc = -ENOTCONN;
- goto out;
- }
- if (!dst->dev) {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ dst = __sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
+ dev = dst ? dst_dev_rcu(dst) : NULL;
+ if (!dev) {
rc = -ENODEV;
- goto out_rel;
+ goto out;
}
- rcu_read_lock();
+
if (!prop->ipv6_prefixes_cnt)
- rc = smc_clc_prfx_match4_rcu(dst->dev, prop);
+ rc = smc_clc_prfx_match4_rcu(dev, prop);
else
- rc = smc_clc_prfx_match6_rcu(dst->dev, prop);
- rcu_read_unlock();
-out_rel:
- dst_release(dst);
+ rc = smc_clc_prfx_match6_rcu(dev, prop);
out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
return rc;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 30/99] ASoC: nau8821: Cancel delayed work on component remove
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 29/99] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_clc_prfx_match() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 31/99] bpf: Fix use-after-free in offloaded map/prog info fill Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Cristian Ciocaltea, Mark Brown,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com>
[ Upstream commit dbd3fd05cddfdeec1e49b0a66269881c09eebd17 ]
Attempting to unload the driver while a jack detection work is pending
would likely crash the kernel when it is eventually scheduled for
execution:
[ 1984.896308] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc10c2a20
[...]
[ 1984.896388] Hardware name: Valve Jupiter/Jupiter, BIOS F7A0131 01/30/2024
[ 1984.896396] Workqueue: events nau8821_jdet_work [snd_soc_nau8821]
[ 1984.896414] RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x9f/0x11d0
[...]
[ 1984.896504] Call Trace:
[ 1984.896511] <TASK>
[ 1984.896524] ? snd_soc_dapm_disable_pin+0x26/0x60 [snd_soc_core]
[ 1984.896572] ? snd_soc_dapm_disable_pin+0x26/0x60 [snd_soc_core]
[ 1984.896596] snd_soc_dapm_disable_pin+0x26/0x60 [snd_soc_core]
[ 1984.896622] nau8821_jdet_work+0xeb/0x1e0 [snd_soc_nau8821]
[ 1984.896636] process_one_work+0x211/0x590
[ 1984.896649] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 1984.896670] worker_thread+0x1cd/0x3a0
Cancel unscheduled jdet_work or wait for its execution to finish before
the component driver gets removed.
Fixes: aab1ad11d69f ("ASoC: nau8821: new driver")
Fixes: ee70bacef1c6 ("ASoC: nau8821: Avoid unnecessary blocking in IRQ handler")
Signed-off-by: Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251231-nau8821-cleanup-v1-2-6b0b76cbbb64@collabora.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c
index 2d040722ab881..650170edab39d 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c
@@ -1270,6 +1270,14 @@ static int nau8821_component_probe(struct snd_soc_component *component)
return 0;
}
+static void nau8821_component_remove(struct snd_soc_component *component)
+{
+ struct nau8821 *nau8821 = snd_soc_component_get_drvdata(component);
+
+ if (nau8821->jdet_active)
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&nau8821->jdet_work);
+};
+
/**
* nau8821_calc_fll_param - Calculate FLL parameters.
* @fll_in: external clock provided to codec.
@@ -1628,6 +1636,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused nau8821_resume(struct snd_soc_component *component)
static const struct snd_soc_component_driver nau8821_component_driver = {
.probe = nau8821_component_probe,
+ .remove = nau8821_component_remove,
.set_sysclk = nau8821_set_sysclk,
.set_pll = nau8821_set_fll,
.set_bias_level = nau8821_set_bias_level,
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 31/99] bpf: Fix use-after-free in offloaded map/prog info fill
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 30/99] ASoC: nau8821: Cancel delayed work on component remove Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 32/99] riscv: Fix register corruption from uninitialized cregs on error Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Yinhao Hu, Kaiyan Mei, Dongliang Mu,
Jiayuan Chen, Daniel Borkmann, Alexei Starovoitov, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
[ Upstream commit a0c584fc18056709c8e047a82a6045d6c209f4ce ]
When querying info for an offloaded BPF map or program,
bpf_map_offload_info_fill_ns() and bpf_prog_offload_info_fill_ns()
obtain the network namespace with get_net(dev_net(offmap->netdev)).
However, the associated netdev's netns may be racing with teardown
during netns destruction. If the netns refcount has already reached 0,
get_net() performs a refcount_t increment on 0, triggering:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
Although rtnl_lock and bpf_devs_lock ensure the netdev pointer remains
valid, they cannot prevent the netns refcount from reaching zero.
Fix this by using maybe_get_net() instead of get_net(). maybe_get_net()
uses refcount_inc_not_zero() and returns NULL if the refcount is already
zero, which causes ns_get_path_cb() to fail and the caller to return
-ENOENT -- the correct behavior when the netns is being destroyed.
Fixes: 675fc275a3a2d ("bpf: offload: report device information for offloaded programs")
Fixes: 52775b33bb507 ("bpf: offload: report device information about offloaded maps")
Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@hust.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@hust.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/f0aa3678-79c9-47ae-9e8c-02a3d1df160a@hust.edu.cn/
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260409023733.168050-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/offload.c | 10 ++++------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/offload.c b/kernel/bpf/offload.c
index 1a4fec330eaac..56115739fcfdd 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/offload.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/offload.c
@@ -444,9 +444,8 @@ static struct ns_common *bpf_prog_offload_info_fill_ns(void *private_data)
if (aux->offload) {
args->info->ifindex = aux->offload->netdev->ifindex;
- net = dev_net(aux->offload->netdev);
- get_net(net);
- ns = &net->ns;
+ net = maybe_get_net(dev_net(aux->offload->netdev));
+ ns = net ? &net->ns : NULL;
} else {
args->info->ifindex = 0;
ns = NULL;
@@ -652,9 +651,8 @@ static struct ns_common *bpf_map_offload_info_fill_ns(void *private_data)
if (args->offmap->netdev) {
args->info->ifindex = args->offmap->netdev->ifindex;
- net = dev_net(args->offmap->netdev);
- get_net(net);
- ns = &net->ns;
+ net = maybe_get_net(dev_net(args->offmap->netdev));
+ ns = net ? &net->ns : NULL;
} else {
args->info->ifindex = 0;
ns = NULL;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 32/99] riscv: Fix register corruption from uninitialized cregs on error
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 31/99] bpf: Fix use-after-free in offloaded map/prog info fill Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 33/99] Revert "PM: sleep: Use complete() in device_pm_sleep_init()" Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Michael Neuling, Paul Walmsley,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
[ Upstream commit 6ebcbb53fc9bc30843054ed99fd60b8e542628f4 ]
compat_riscv_gpr_set() calls cregs_to_regs() unconditionally, even when
user_regset_copyin() fails. Since cregs is an uninitialized stack
variable, a copyin failure causes uninitialized stack data to be written
into the target task's pt_regs, corrupting its register state and
potentially leaking kernel stack contents.
compat_restore_sigcontext() has the same issue: it calls cregs_to_regs()
even when __copy_from_user() fails, leading to the same corruption of
the signal-returning task's register state on error.
Only call cregs_to_regs() when the user copy succeeds.
Fixes: 4608c159594f ("riscv: compat: ptrace: Add compat_arch_ptrace implement")
Fixes: 7383ee05314b ("riscv: compat: signal: Add rt_frame implementation")
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Assisted-by: Cursor:claude-4.6-opus-high-thinking
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260501062320.2339562-1-mikey@neuling.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/riscv/kernel/compat_signal.c | 2 ++
arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/compat_signal.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/compat_signal.c
index 6ec4e34255a9a..cf3eb33a11e46 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/compat_signal.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/compat_signal.c
@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ static long compat_restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
/* sc_regs is structured the same as the start of pt_regs */
err = __copy_from_user(&cregs, &sc->sc_regs, sizeof(sc->sc_regs));
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ return err;
cregs_to_regs(&cregs, regs);
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
index 92731ff8c79ad..69e669ef48107 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -330,8 +330,8 @@ static int compat_riscv_gpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
struct compat_user_regs_struct cregs;
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, &cregs, 0, -1);
-
- cregs_to_regs(&cregs, task_pt_regs(target));
+ if (!ret)
+ cregs_to_regs(&cregs, task_pt_regs(target));
return ret;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 33/99] Revert "PM: sleep: Use complete() in device_pm_sleep_init()"
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 32/99] riscv: Fix register corruption from uninitialized cregs on error Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 34/99] ASoC: nau8821: Cancel pending work before suspend Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
This reverts commit 171ef40fce41b13f5115d988c45997e94113c7ab.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/base/power/main.c | 6 +-----
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/base/power/main.c b/drivers/base/power/main.c
index 6e5586d1e43c5..abb16a5bb7967 100644
--- a/drivers/base/power/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/power/main.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ void device_pm_sleep_init(struct device *dev)
dev->power.is_noirq_suspended = false;
dev->power.is_late_suspended = false;
init_completion(&dev->power.completion);
- complete(&dev->power.completion);
+ complete_all(&dev->power.completion);
dev->power.wakeup = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->power.entry);
}
@@ -237,10 +237,6 @@ static void dpm_wait(struct device *dev, bool async)
if (!dev)
return;
- /* Devices with no PM support don't use the completion. */
- if (dev->power.no_pm)
- return;
-
if (async || (pm_async_enabled && dev->power.async_suspend))
wait_for_completion(&dev->power.completion);
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 34/99] ASoC: nau8821: Cancel pending work before suspend
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 33/99] Revert "PM: sleep: Use complete() in device_pm_sleep_init()" Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 35/99] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_vlan_by_tcpsk() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Cristian Ciocaltea, Mark Brown,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com>
[ Upstream commit 7786b10688ac0ebeaff655923cbb2c7d34a98995 ]
A jack detection work that is unscheduled or in progress while executing
the suspend handler could trigger a race condition.
Ensure state consistency by cancelling any pending work or wait for its
execution to complete before processing the suspend. Since driver
(re)enables both insert and eject interrupts on resume, there is no risk
to miss the related jack events. Therefore, flush_delayed_work() is not
required here.
Fixes: aab1ad11d69f ("ASoC: nau8821: new driver")
Fixes: ee70bacef1c6 ("ASoC: nau8821: Avoid unnecessary blocking in IRQ handler")
Signed-off-by: Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251231-nau8821-cleanup-v1-3-6b0b76cbbb64@collabora.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c
index 650170edab39d..e235142489b6f 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c
@@ -1612,6 +1612,10 @@ static int __maybe_unused nau8821_suspend(struct snd_soc_component *component)
if (nau8821->irq)
disable_irq(nau8821->irq);
+
+ if (nau8821->jdet_active)
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&nau8821->jdet_work);
+
snd_soc_component_force_bias_level(component, SND_SOC_BIAS_OFF);
/* Power down codec power; don't support button wakeup */
snd_soc_component_disable_pin(component, "MICBIAS");
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 35/99] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_vlan_by_tcpsk().
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 34/99] ASoC: nau8821: Cancel pending work before suspend Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 36/99] selinux: switch two allocations to use kzalloc_objs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Kuniyuki Iwashima, Eric Dumazet,
Jakub Kicinski, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 0b0e4d51c6554e5ecc3f8cc73c2eaf12da21249a ]
smc_vlan_by_tcpsk() fetches sk_dst_get(sk)->dev before RTNL and
passes it to netdev_walk_all_lower_dev(), which is illegal.
Also, smc_vlan_by_tcpsk_walk() does not require RTNL at all.
Let's use __sk_dst_get(), dst_dev_rcu(), and
netdev_walk_all_lower_dev_rcu().
Note that the returned value of smc_vlan_by_tcpsk() is not used
in the caller.
Fixes: 0cfdd8f92cac ("smc: connection and link group creation")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250916214758.650211-5-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/smc/smc_core.c | 27 ++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/smc/smc_core.c b/net/smc/smc_core.c
index 15d2c69f7ebcc..d0d010414eee9 100644
--- a/net/smc/smc_core.c
+++ b/net/smc/smc_core.c
@@ -1878,35 +1878,32 @@ static int smc_vlan_by_tcpsk_walk(struct net_device *lower_dev,
/* Determine vlan of internal TCP socket. */
int smc_vlan_by_tcpsk(struct socket *clcsock, struct smc_init_info *ini)
{
- struct dst_entry *dst = sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
struct netdev_nested_priv priv;
struct net_device *ndev;
+ struct dst_entry *dst;
int rc = 0;
ini->vlan_id = 0;
- if (!dst) {
- rc = -ENOTCONN;
- goto out;
- }
- if (!dst->dev) {
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ dst = __sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
+ ndev = dst ? dst_dev_rcu(dst) : NULL;
+ if (!ndev) {
rc = -ENODEV;
- goto out_rel;
+ goto out;
}
- ndev = dst->dev;
if (is_vlan_dev(ndev)) {
ini->vlan_id = vlan_dev_vlan_id(ndev);
- goto out_rel;
+ goto out;
}
priv.data = (void *)&ini->vlan_id;
- rtnl_lock();
- netdev_walk_all_lower_dev(ndev, smc_vlan_by_tcpsk_walk, &priv);
- rtnl_unlock();
-
-out_rel:
- dst_release(dst);
+ netdev_walk_all_lower_dev_rcu(ndev, smc_vlan_by_tcpsk_walk, &priv);
out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
return rc;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 36/99] selinux: switch two allocations to use kzalloc_objs()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 35/99] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_vlan_by_tcpsk() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 37/99] ring buffer: Propagate __rb_map_vma return value to caller Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Stephen Smalley, Paul Moore,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit cf6a513f1937581eb012a217b29817e025a1a0ef ]
These were the only two allocations in the policy loading logic
that were not already using kzalloc_objs() for the policy
data structures. Fix these to be consistent with the rest and
to protect against ill-formed policy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index c15d914671ddd..d0e293051452e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
{
kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
- p->bool_val_to_struct = kmalloc_array(
+ p->bool_val_to_struct = kcalloc(
p->p_bools.nprim, sizeof(*p->bool_val_to_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -706,9 +706,8 @@ static int duplicate_policydb_bools(struct policydb *newdb,
struct cond_bool_datum **cond_bool_array;
int rc;
- cond_bool_array = kmalloc_array(orig->p_bools.nprim,
- sizeof(*orig->bool_val_to_struct),
- GFP_KERNEL);
+ cond_bool_array = kcalloc(orig->p_bools.nprim,
+ sizeof(*orig->bool_val_to_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cond_bool_array)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 37/99] ring buffer: Propagate __rb_map_vma return value to caller
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (35 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 36/99] selinux: switch two allocations to use kzalloc_objs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 38/99] veth: fix OOB txq access in veth_poll() with asymmetric queue counts Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Masami Hiramatsu, Mathieu Desnoyers,
syzbot+ddc001b92c083dbf2b97, Ankit Khushwaha,
Steven Rostedt (Google), Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ankit Khushwaha <ankitkhushwaha.linux@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit de4cbd704731778a2dc833ce5a24b38e5d672c05 ]
The return value from `__rb_map_vma()`, which rejects writable or
executable mappings (VM_WRITE, VM_EXEC, or !VM_MAYSHARE), was being
ignored. As a result the caller of `__rb_map_vma` always returned 0
even when the mapping had actually failed, allowing it to proceed
with an invalid VMA.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20251008172516.20697-1-ankitkhushwaha.linux@gmail.com
Fixes: 117c39200d9d7 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions")
Reported-by: syzbot+ddc001b92c083dbf2b97@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=194151be8eaebd826005329b2e123aecae714bdb
Signed-off-by: Ankit Khushwaha <ankitkhushwaha.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
index e59094a458989..854796fa7a464 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -7149,7 +7149,7 @@ int ring_buffer_map(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu,
atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
}
- return 0;
+ return err;
}
/*
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 38/99] veth: fix OOB txq access in veth_poll() with asymmetric queue counts
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 37/99] ring buffer: Propagate __rb_map_vma return value to caller Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 39/99] powerpc/hv-gpci: fix preempt count leak in sysfs show paths Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Sashiko, Jesper Dangaard Brouer,
Paolo Abeni, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 08f566e8f83bb70f04ad5aba5be352c490a01c8a ]
XDP redirect into a veth device (via bpf_redirect()) calls
veth_xdp_xmit(), which enqueues frames into the peer's ptr_ring using
smp_processor_id() % peer->real_num_rx_queues
as the ring index. With an asymmetric veth pair where the peer has
fewer TX queues than RX queues, that index can exceed
peer->real_num_tx_queues.
veth_poll() then resolves peer_txq for the ring via:
peer_txq = peer_dev ? netdev_get_tx_queue(peer_dev, queue_idx) : NULL;
where queue_idx = rq->xdp_rxq.queue_index. When queue_idx exceeds
peer_dev->real_num_tx_queues this is an out-of-bounds (OOB) access
into the peer's netdev_queue array, triggering DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE
in netdev_get_tx_queue().
The normal ndo_start_xmit path is not affected: the stack clamps
skb->queue_mapping via netdev_cap_txqueue() before invoking
ndo_start_xmit, so rxq in veth_xmit() never exceeds real_num_tx_queues.
Fix veth_poll() by clamping: only dereference peer_txq when queue_idx is
within bounds, otherwise set it to NULL. The out-of-range rings are fed
exclusively via XDP redirect (veth_xdp_xmit), never via ndo_start_xmit
(veth_xmit), so the peer txq was never stopped and there is nothing to
wake; NULL is the correct fallback.
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260502071828.616C3C19425@smtp.kernel.org/
Fixes: dc82a33297fc ("veth: apply qdisc backpressure on full ptr_ring to reduce TX drops")
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260505132159.241305-2-hawk@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/net/veth.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/veth.c b/drivers/net/veth.c
index 96e373d65897c..03341951a2126 100644
--- a/drivers/net/veth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/veth.c
@@ -978,7 +978,8 @@ static int veth_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
/* NAPI functions as RCU section */
peer_dev = rcu_dereference_check(priv->peer, rcu_read_lock_bh_held());
- peer_txq = peer_dev ? netdev_get_tx_queue(peer_dev, queue_idx) : NULL;
+ peer_txq = (peer_dev && queue_idx < peer_dev->real_num_tx_queues) ?
+ netdev_get_tx_queue(peer_dev, queue_idx) : NULL;
xdp_set_return_frame_no_direct();
done = veth_xdp_rcv(rq, budget, &bq, &stats);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 39/99] powerpc/hv-gpci: fix preempt count leak in sysfs show paths
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 38/99] veth: fix OOB txq access in veth_poll() with asymmetric queue counts Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 40/99] ksmbd: harden file lifetime during session teardown Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Aboorva Devarajan,
Ritesh Harjani (IBM), Madhavan Srinivasan, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aboorva Devarajan <aboorvad@linux.ibm.com>
[ Upstream commit dbc30a57bd8e026995e9fa8e8c31cffd18542c01 ]
Four sysfs show() callbacks in hv-gpci take get_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb)
(which calls preempt_disable()) but only call the matching put_cpu_var()
on the error path under the 'out:' label. Every successful read leaks
one preempt_disable():
processor_bus_topology_show()
processor_config_show()
affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor_show()
affinity_domain_via_domain_show()
(affinity_domain_via_partition_show() was already correct.)
On a CONFIG_PREEMPT=y kernel, repeated reads raise preempt_count and
eventually return to userspace with preemption still disabled. The
next user-mode page fault then hits faulthandler_disabled() == 1,
gets forced to SIGSEGV, and the resulting coredump trips
'BUG: scheduling while atomic' in call_usermodehelper_exec ->
wait_for_completion_state -> schedule:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: <task>/<pid>/0x00000004
...
__schedule_bug+0x6c/0x90
__schedule+0x58c/0x13a0
schedule+0x48/0x1a0
schedule_timeout+0x104/0x170
wait_for_completion_state+0x16c/0x330
call_usermodehelper_exec+0x254/0x2d0
vfs_coredump+0x1050/0x2590
get_signal+0xb9c/0xc80
do_notify_resume+0xf8/0x470
Add an out_success label that calls put_cpu_var() before returning
the byte count, mirroring affinity_domain_via_partition_show().
Fixes: 71f1c39647d8 ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show processor bus topology information")
Fixes: 1a160c2a13c6 ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show processor config information")
Fixes: 71a7ccb478fc ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show affinity domain via virtual processor information")
Fixes: a69a57cac1ec ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show affinity domain via domain information")
Signed-off-by: Aboorva Devarajan <aboorvad@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260508041256.3447113-1-aboorvad@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c
index 241551d1282f8..0ec0bd3110652 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static ssize_t processor_bus_topology_show(struct device *dev, struct device_att
0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
- return n;
+ goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
@@ -244,12 +244,14 @@ static ssize_t processor_bus_topology_show(struct device *dev, struct device_att
starting_index, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
- return n;
+ goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
}
+out_success:
+ put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
return n;
out:
@@ -278,7 +280,7 @@ static ssize_t processor_config_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute
0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
- return n;
+ goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
@@ -312,12 +314,14 @@ static ssize_t processor_config_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute
starting_index, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
- return n;
+ goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
}
+out_success:
+ put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
return n;
out:
@@ -346,7 +350,7 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor_show(struct device *dev,
0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
- return n;
+ goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
@@ -382,12 +386,14 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor_show(struct device *dev,
starting_index, secondary_index, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
- return n;
+ goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
}
+out_success:
+ put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
return n;
out:
@@ -416,7 +422,7 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_domain_show(struct device *dev, struct device
0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
- return n;
+ goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
@@ -448,12 +454,14 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_domain_show(struct device *dev, struct device
starting_index, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
- return n;
+ goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
}
+out_success:
+ put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
return n;
out:
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 40/99] ksmbd: harden file lifetime during session teardown
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 39/99] powerpc/hv-gpci: fix preempt count leak in sysfs show paths Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 41/99] nilfs2: correct return value kernel-doc descriptions for ioctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (69 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, DaeMyung Kang, Namjae Jeon,
Steve French
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: DaeMyung Kang <charsyam@gmail.com>
commit a42896bebfcc287ed1e61d820a888e33b1eb80ce upstream.
__close_file_table_ids() is the per-session teardown that closes every
fp belonging to a session (or to one tree connect on that session) by
walking the session's volatile-id idr. The current loop has three
related problems on busy or racing workloads:
* Sleeping under ft->lock. The session-teardown skip callback,
session_fd_check(), already sleeps in ksmbd_vfs_copy_durable_owner()
-> kstrdup(GFP_KERNEL) and down_write(&fp->f_ci->m_lock) (a
rw_semaphore). Running the callback inside write_lock(&ft->lock)
trips CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP / CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING on a
durable-fd workload.
* Refcount accounting blind to f_state. The unconditional
atomic_dec_and_test(&fp->refcount) does not distinguish
FP_INITED (idr-owned reference still intact) from FP_CLOSED (an
earlier ksmbd_close_fd() already consumed the idr-owned reference
while leaving fp in the idr because a holder kept refcount
non-zero). When the latter races with teardown the same path
over-decrements into a holder reference and ksmbd_fd_put() later
UAFs that holder.
* FP_NEW window. Between __open_id() publishing fp into the
session idr and ksmbd_update_fstate(..., FP_INITED) committing the
transition at the end of smb2_open(), an fp is in FP_NEW and an
intervening teardown that takes a transient reference and
unpublishes the volatile id leaves the original idr-owned
reference orphaned -- the opener is unaware that fp has been
unpublished, returns success to the client, and the fp leaks at
refcount = 1.
Refactor __close_file_table_ids() to take a transient reference on fp
and unpublish fp from the session idr *under ft->lock* before calling
skip() outside the lock. A transient ref protects lifetime but not
concurrent field mutation, so the idr_remove() is what keeps
__ksmbd_lookup_fd() through this session's idr from granting a new
ksmbd_fp_get() reference to an fp whose fp->conn / fp->tcon /
fp->volatile_id / op->conn / lock_list links are about to be rewritten
by session_fd_check(). Durable reconnect is unaffected because it
reaches fp through the global durable table (ksmbd_lookup_durable_fd
-> global_ft).
Decide n_to_drop together with any FP_INITED -> FP_CLOSED transition
under ft->lock so teardown and ksmbd_close_fd() never both consume the
idr-owned reference. See ksmbd_mark_fp_closed() for the per-state
accounting. For the FP_NEW path to be safe, the opener has to learn
that fp was unpublished: ksmbd_update_fstate() now returns -ENOENT
when an FP_NEW -> FP_INITED transition finds f_state already advanced
or the volatile id cleared (both committed by teardown under
ft->lock); smb2_open() propagates that as STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID
and drops the original reference via ksmbd_fd_put().
The list removal cannot be left for a deferred final putter because
fp->volatile_id has already been cleared and __ksmbd_remove_fd() will
intentionally skip both idr_remove() and list_del_init(). Move the
m_fp_list unlink in __ksmbd_remove_fd() above the volatile-id check so
that an FP_NEW fp that happened to be added to m_fp_list (smb2_open()
adds fp->node before ksmbd_update_fstate() runs) is still cleaned up
on the deferred putter path; list_del_init() on an empty node is a
no-op and remains safe for fps that were never added.
Add a defensive guard in session_fd_check() that refuses non-FP_INITED
fps so that even if a teardown reaches an FP_NEW fp it falls into the
close branch (where the n_to_drop = 1 accounting keeps the opener's
reference alive) instead of the durable-preserve branch (which mutates
fp->conn / fp->tcon).
Validation on a debug kernel additionally built with CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST
and CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_WORK used a same-session two-tcon workload
(open/write storm on one tcon, 50 tree disconnects on the other) and
reported no list-corruption, work_struct ODEBUG, sleep-in-atomic,
lockdep or kmemleak reports. Reverting only the
__close_file_table_ids() hunk while keeping a forced-is_reconnectable()
harness produced the expected sleep-in-atomic at vfs_cache.c:1095,
confirming the ft->lock-out-of-sleepable-skip discipline.
KASAN-enabled direct SMB2 coverage with durable handles enabled
exercised ksmbd_close_tree_conn_fds(), ksmbd_close_session_fds(),
the FP_NEW failure path, tree_conn_fd_check(), and a non-zero
session_fd_check() durable-preserve return. This produced no KASAN,
DEBUG_LIST, ODEBUG, or WARNING reports.
Fixes: f44158485826 ("cifsd: add file operations")
Signed-off-by: DaeMyung Kang <charsyam@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 6 +
fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h | 4 -
3 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
@@ -3773,8 +3773,10 @@ err_out1:
err_out2:
if (!rc) {
- ksmbd_update_fstate(&work->sess->file_table, fp, FP_INITED);
- rc = ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp(work, (void *)rsp, iov_len);
+ rc = ksmbd_update_fstate(&work->sess->file_table, fp,
+ FP_INITED);
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp(work, (void *)rsp, iov_len);
}
if (rc) {
if (rc == -EINVAL)
--- a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c
@@ -358,13 +358,13 @@ static void ksmbd_remove_durable_fd(stru
static void __ksmbd_remove_fd(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft, struct ksmbd_file *fp)
{
- if (!has_file_id(fp->volatile_id))
- return;
-
down_write(&fp->f_ci->m_lock);
list_del_init(&fp->node);
up_write(&fp->f_ci->m_lock);
+ if (!has_file_id(fp->volatile_id))
+ return;
+
write_lock(&ft->lock);
idr_remove(ft->idr, fp->volatile_id);
write_unlock(&ft->lock);
@@ -748,15 +748,58 @@ err_out:
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
-void ksmbd_update_fstate(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft, struct ksmbd_file *fp,
- unsigned int state)
+/**
+ * ksmbd_update_fstate() - update an fp state under the file-table lock
+ * @ft: file table that publishes @fp's volatile id
+ * @fp: file pointer to update
+ * @state: new state
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success. The FP_NEW -> FP_INITED transition is special:
+ * -ENOENT if teardown already unpublished @fp by advancing the state or
+ * clearing the volatile id. Other state updates preserve the historical
+ * fire-and-forget behavior.
+ */
+int ksmbd_update_fstate(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft, struct ksmbd_file *fp,
+ unsigned int state)
{
+ int ret;
+
if (!fp)
- return;
+ return -ENOENT;
write_lock(&ft->lock);
- fp->f_state = state;
+ if (state == FP_INITED &&
+ (fp->f_state != FP_NEW || !has_file_id(fp->volatile_id))) {
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ } else {
+ fp->f_state = state;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
write_unlock(&ft->lock);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ksmbd_mark_fp_closed() - mark fp closed under ft->lock and return how many
+ * refs the teardown path owns.
+ *
+ * FP_INITED has a normal idr-owned reference, so teardown owns both that
+ * reference and the transient lookup reference. FP_NEW is still owned by the
+ * in-flight opener/reopener, which will drop the original reference after
+ * ksmbd_update_fstate(..., FP_INITED) observes the cleared volatile id.
+ * FP_CLOSED on entry means an earlier ksmbd_close_fd() already consumed the
+ * idr-owned ref.
+ */
+static int ksmbd_mark_fp_closed(struct ksmbd_file *fp)
+{
+ if (fp->f_state == FP_INITED) {
+ set_close_state_blocked_works(fp);
+ fp->f_state = FP_CLOSED;
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
}
static int
@@ -764,7 +807,8 @@ __close_file_table_ids(struct ksmbd_sess
struct ksmbd_tree_connect *tcon,
bool (*skip)(struct ksmbd_tree_connect *tcon,
struct ksmbd_file *fp,
- struct ksmbd_user *user))
+ struct ksmbd_user *user),
+ bool skip_preserves_fp)
{
struct ksmbd_file_table *ft = &sess->file_table;
struct ksmbd_file *fp;
@@ -772,32 +816,120 @@ __close_file_table_ids(struct ksmbd_sess
int num = 0;
while (1) {
+ int n_to_drop;
+
write_lock(&ft->lock);
fp = idr_get_next(ft->idr, &id);
if (!fp) {
write_unlock(&ft->lock);
break;
}
-
- if (skip(tcon, fp, sess->user) ||
- !atomic_dec_and_test(&fp->refcount)) {
+ if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&fp->refcount)) {
id++;
write_unlock(&ft->lock);
continue;
}
- set_close_state_blocked_works(fp);
- idr_remove(ft->idr, fp->volatile_id);
- fp->volatile_id = KSMBD_NO_FID;
- write_unlock(&ft->lock);
+ if (skip_preserves_fp) {
+ /*
+ * Session teardown: skip() is session_fd_check(),
+ * which may sleep and mutates fp->conn / fp->tcon /
+ * fp->volatile_id when it chooses to preserve fp
+ * for durable reconnect. Unpublish fp from the
+ * session idr here, under ft->lock, so that
+ * __ksmbd_lookup_fd() through this session cannot
+ * grant a new ksmbd_fp_get() reference to an fp
+ * whose fields are about to be rewritten outside
+ * the lock. Durable reconnect still reaches fp via
+ * global_ft.
+ */
+ idr_remove(ft->idr, id);
+ fp->volatile_id = KSMBD_NO_FID;
+ write_unlock(&ft->lock);
+ if (skip(tcon, fp, sess->user)) {
+ /*
+ * session_fd_check() has converted fp to
+ * durable-preserve state and cleared its
+ * per-conn fields. fp is already unpublished
+ * above; the original idr-owned ref keeps it
+ * alive for the durable scavenger. Drop only
+ * the transient ref. atomic_dec() is safe --
+ * atomic_inc_not_zero() succeeded on a
+ * positive value and we added one more, so
+ * refcount cannot be zero here.
+ */
+ atomic_dec(&fp->refcount);
+ id++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Keep the close-state decision under the same lock
+ * observed by ksmbd_update_fstate(), which is how an
+ * in-flight FP_NEW opener learns that teardown has
+ * cleared its volatile id.
+ */
+ write_lock(&ft->lock);
+ n_to_drop = ksmbd_mark_fp_closed(fp);
+ write_unlock(&ft->lock);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Tree teardown: skip() is tree_conn_fd_check(), a
+ * cheap pointer compare that doesn't sleep and has
+ * no side effects, so keep the skip decision plus
+ * the unpublish-and-mark-closed sequence atomic
+ * under ft->lock. fps belonging to other tree
+ * connects (skip() == true) stay fully published in
+ * the session idr with no lock window.
+ */
+ if (skip(tcon, fp, sess->user)) {
+ atomic_dec(&fp->refcount);
+ write_unlock(&ft->lock);
+ id++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ idr_remove(ft->idr, id);
+ fp->volatile_id = KSMBD_NO_FID;
+ n_to_drop = ksmbd_mark_fp_closed(fp);
+ write_unlock(&ft->lock);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * fp->volatile_id is already cleared to prevent stale idr
+ * removal from a deferred final close. Remove fp from
+ * m_fp_list here because __ksmbd_remove_fd() will skip the
+ * list unlink when volatile_id is KSMBD_NO_FID.
+ */
down_write(&fp->f_ci->m_lock);
list_del_init(&fp->node);
up_write(&fp->f_ci->m_lock);
- __ksmbd_close_fd(ft, fp);
-
- num++;
+ /*
+ * Drop the references this iteration owns:
+ *
+ * n_to_drop == 2: we observed FP_INITED and committed
+ * the FP_CLOSED transition ourselves, so we own the
+ * transient (+1) and the still-intact idr-owned ref.
+ *
+ * n_to_drop == 1: either a prior ksmbd_close_fd()
+ * already consumed the idr-owned ref, or fp was still
+ * FP_NEW and the in-flight opener/reopener must keep
+ * the original reference until ksmbd_update_fstate()
+ * observes the cleared volatile id.
+ *
+ * If we end up as the final putter, finalize fp and
+ * account the open_files_count decrement via the caller's
+ * atomic_sub(num, ...). Otherwise the remaining user's
+ * ksmbd_fd_put() reaches __put_fd_final(), which does its
+ * own atomic_dec(&open_files_count), so we must not count
+ * this fp here -- doing so would double-decrement the
+ * connection-wide counter.
+ */
+ if (atomic_sub_and_test(n_to_drop, &fp->refcount)) {
+ __ksmbd_close_fd(NULL, fp);
+ num++;
+ }
id++;
}
@@ -1071,6 +1203,9 @@ static bool session_fd_check(struct ksmb
if (!is_reconnectable(fp))
return false;
+ if (fp->f_state != FP_INITED)
+ return false;
+
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fp->conn))
return false;
@@ -1122,7 +1257,8 @@ void ksmbd_close_tree_conn_fds(struct ks
{
int num = __close_file_table_ids(work->sess,
work->tcon,
- tree_conn_fd_check);
+ tree_conn_fd_check,
+ false);
atomic_sub(num, &work->conn->stats.open_files_count);
}
@@ -1131,7 +1267,8 @@ void ksmbd_close_session_fds(struct ksmb
{
int num = __close_file_table_ids(work->sess,
work->tcon,
- session_fd_check);
+ session_fd_check,
+ true);
atomic_sub(num, &work->conn->stats.open_files_count);
}
@@ -1271,7 +1408,7 @@ void ksmbd_destroy_file_table(struct ksm
if (!ft->idr)
return;
- __close_file_table_ids(sess, NULL, session_fd_check);
+ __close_file_table_ids(sess, NULL, session_fd_check, true);
idr_destroy(ft->idr);
kfree(ft->idr);
ft->idr = NULL;
--- a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h
+++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h
@@ -172,8 +172,8 @@ int ksmbd_close_inode_fds(struct ksmbd_w
int ksmbd_init_global_file_table(void);
void ksmbd_free_global_file_table(void);
void ksmbd_set_fd_limit(unsigned long limit);
-void ksmbd_update_fstate(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft, struct ksmbd_file *fp,
- unsigned int state);
+int ksmbd_update_fstate(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft, struct ksmbd_file *fp,
+ unsigned int state);
bool ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner(struct ksmbd_file *fp,
struct ksmbd_user *user);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 41/99] nilfs2: correct return value kernel-doc descriptions for ioctl functions
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 40/99] ksmbd: harden file lifetime during session teardown Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 42/99] nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (68 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Ryusuke Konishi, Brian G .,
Andrew Morton, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 17c46a45cdb94c500f4e93b176cdd61931b03020 ]
Patch series "nilfs2: fix kernel-doc comments for function return values",
v2.
This series fixes the inadequacies in the return value descriptions in
nilfs2's kernel-doc comments (mainly incorrect formatting), as well as the
lack of return value descriptions themselves, and fixes most of the
remaining warnings that are output when the kernel-doc script is run with
the "-Wall" option.
This patch (of 7):
In the kernel-doc comments for functions, there are many cases where the
format of the return value description is inaccurate, such as "Return
Value: ...", which causes many warnings to be output when the kernel-doc
script is executed with the "-Wall" option.
This fixes such incorrectly formatted return value descriptions for ioctl
functions.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250110010530.21872-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250110010530.21872-2-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: "Brian G ." <gissf1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: a1735eae5544 ("nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c | 231 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 136 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
@@ -33,17 +33,14 @@
* @dofunc: concrete function of get/set metadata info
*
* Description: nilfs_ioctl_wrap_copy() gets/sets metadata info by means of
- * calling dofunc() function on the basis of @argv argument.
+ * calling dofunc() function on the basis of @argv argument. If successful,
+ * the requested metadata information is copied to userspace memory.
*
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned and requested metadata info
- * is copied into userspace. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - Invalid arguments from userspace.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT - Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * * %-EINVAL - Invalid arguments from userspace.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_wrap_copy(struct the_nilfs *nilfs,
struct nilfs_argv *argv, int dir,
@@ -190,13 +187,10 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_getversion(struct
* given checkpoint between checkpoint and snapshot state. This ioctl
* is used in chcp and mkcp utilities.
*
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned and mode of a checkpoint is
- * changed. On error, one of the following negative error codes
- * is returned.
- *
- * %-EPERM - Operation not permitted.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during checkpoint mode changing.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * %-EFAULT - Failure during checkpoint mode changing.
+ * %-EPERM - Operation not permitted.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_change_cpmode(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -244,13 +238,10 @@ out:
* checkpoint from NILFS2 file system. This ioctl is used in rmcp
* utility.
*
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned and a checkpoint is
- * removed. On error, one of the following negative error codes
- * is returned.
- *
- * %-EPERM - Operation not permitted.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during checkpoint removing.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * %-EFAULT - Failure during checkpoint removing.
+ * %-EPERM - Operation not permitted.
*/
static int
nilfs_ioctl_delete_checkpoint(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
@@ -296,7 +287,7 @@ out:
* requested checkpoints. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_CPINFO ioctl is used in
* lscp utility and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
*
- * Return value: count of nilfs_cpinfo structures in output buffer.
+ * Return: Count of nilfs_cpinfo structures in output buffer.
*/
static ssize_t
nilfs_ioctl_do_get_cpinfo(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, __u64 *posp, int flags,
@@ -320,17 +311,14 @@ nilfs_ioctl_do_get_cpinfo(struct the_nil
*
* Description: nilfs_ioctl_get_cpstat() returns information about checkpoints.
* The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_CPSTAT ioctl is used by lscp, rmcp utilities
- * and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
+ * and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon. The checkpoint statistics are copied to
+ * the userspace memory pointed to by @argp.
*
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned, and checkpoints information is
- * copied into userspace pointer @argp. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during getting checkpoints statistics.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT - Failure during getting checkpoints statistics.
+ * * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_get_cpstat(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -363,7 +351,8 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_cpstat(struct
* info about requested segments. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_SUINFO ioctl is used
* in lssu, nilfs_resize utilities and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
*
- * Return value: count of nilfs_suinfo structures in output buffer.
+ * Return: Count of nilfs_suinfo structures in output buffer on success,
+ * or a negative error code on failure.
*/
static ssize_t
nilfs_ioctl_do_get_suinfo(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, __u64 *posp, int flags,
@@ -387,17 +376,14 @@ nilfs_ioctl_do_get_suinfo(struct the_nil
*
* Description: nilfs_ioctl_get_sustat() returns segment usage statistics.
* The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_SUSTAT ioctl is used in lssu, nilfs_resize utilities
- * and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
- *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned, and segment usage information is
- * copied into userspace pointer @argp. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
+ * and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon. The requested segment usage information is
+ * copied to the userspace memory pointed to by @argp.
*
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during getting segment usage statistics.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT - Failure during getting segment usage statistics.
+ * * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_get_sustat(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -430,7 +416,8 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_sustat(struct
* on virtual block addresses. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_VINFO ioctl is used
* by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
*
- * Return value: count of nilfs_vinfo structures in output buffer.
+ * Return: Count of nilfs_vinfo structures in output buffer on success, or
+ * a negative error code on failure.
*/
static ssize_t
nilfs_ioctl_do_get_vinfo(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, __u64 *posp, int flags,
@@ -457,7 +444,8 @@ nilfs_ioctl_do_get_vinfo(struct the_nilf
* about descriptors of disk block numbers. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_BDESCS ioctl
* is used by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
*
- * Return value: count of nilfs_bdescs structures in output buffer.
+ * Return: Count of nilfs_bdescs structures in output buffer on success, or
+ * a negative error code on failure.
*/
static ssize_t
nilfs_ioctl_do_get_bdescs(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, __u64 *posp, int flags,
@@ -494,19 +482,15 @@ nilfs_ioctl_do_get_bdescs(struct the_nil
*
* Description: nilfs_ioctl_do_get_bdescs() function returns information
* about descriptors of disk block numbers. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_BDESCS ioctl
- * is used by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
- *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned, and disk block descriptors are
- * copied into userspace pointer @argp. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - Invalid arguments from userspace.
+ * is used by nilfs_cleanerd daemon. If successful, disk block descriptors
+ * are copied to userspace pointer @argp.
*
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during getting disk block descriptors.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT - Failure during getting disk block descriptors.
+ * * %-EINVAL - Invalid arguments from userspace.
+ * * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_get_bdescs(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -540,16 +524,12 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_bdescs(struct
* Description: nilfs_ioctl_move_inode_block() function registers data/node
* buffer in the GC pagecache and submit read request.
*
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-ENOENT - Requested block doesn't exist.
- *
- * %-EEXIST - Blocks conflict is detected.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EEXIST - Block conflict detected.
+ * * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOENT - Requested block doesn't exist.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_move_inode_block(struct inode *inode,
struct nilfs_vdesc *vdesc,
@@ -604,8 +584,8 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_move_inode_block(
* blocks that garbage collector specified with the array of nilfs_vdesc
* structures and stores them into page caches of GC inodes.
*
- * Return Value: Number of processed nilfs_vdesc structures or
- * error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: Number of processed nilfs_vdesc structures on success, or
+ * a negative error code on failure.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_move_blocks(struct super_block *sb,
struct nilfs_argv *argv, void *buf)
@@ -682,14 +662,11 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_move_blocks(struc
* in the period from p_start to p_end, excluding p_end itself. The checkpoints
* which have been already deleted are ignored.
*
- * Return Value: Number of processed nilfs_period structures or
- * error code, otherwise.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - invalid checkpoints.
+ * Return: Number of processed nilfs_period structures on success, or one of
+ * the following negative error codes on failure:
+ * * %-EINVAL - invalid checkpoints.
+ * * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_delete_checkpoints(struct the_nilfs *nilfs,
struct nilfs_argv *argv, void *buf)
@@ -717,14 +694,11 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_delete_checkpoint
* Description: nilfs_ioctl_free_vblocknrs() function frees
* the virtual block numbers specified by @buf and @argv->v_nmembs.
*
- * Return Value: Number of processed virtual block numbers or
- * error code, otherwise.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-ENOENT - The virtual block number have not been allocated.
+ * Return: Number of processed virtual block numbers on success, or one of the
+ * following negative error codes on failure:
+ * * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOENT - Unallocated virtual block number.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_free_vblocknrs(struct the_nilfs *nilfs,
struct nilfs_argv *argv, void *buf)
@@ -746,14 +720,11 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_free_vblocknrs(st
* Description: nilfs_ioctl_mark_blocks_dirty() function marks
* metadata file or data blocks as dirty.
*
- * Return Value: Number of processed block descriptors or
- * error code, otherwise.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error
- *
- * %-ENOENT - the specified block does not exist (hole block)
+ * Return: Number of processed block descriptors on success, or one of the
+ * following negative error codes on failure:
+ * * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOENT - Non-existent block (hole block).
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_mark_blocks_dirty(struct the_nilfs *nilfs,
struct nilfs_argv *argv, void *buf)
@@ -858,7 +829,7 @@ int nilfs_ioctl_prepare_clean_segments(s
* from userspace. The NILFS_IOCTL_CLEAN_SEGMENTS ioctl is used by
* nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
*
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned or error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -982,20 +953,14 @@ out:
* and metadata are written out to the device when it successfully
* returned.
*
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is retured. On errors, one of the following
- * negative error code is returned.
- *
- * %-EROFS - Read only filesystem.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error
- *
- * %-ENOSPC - No space left on device (only in a panic state).
- *
- * %-ERESTARTSYS - Interrupted.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT - Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
+ * * %-ENOSPC - No space left on device (only in a panic state).
+ * * %-ERESTARTSYS - Interrupted.
+ * * %-EROFS - Read only filesystem.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_sync(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -1029,7 +994,7 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_sync(struct inode
* @filp: file object
* @argp: pointer on argument from userspace
*
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned or error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_resize(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
void __user *argp)
@@ -1065,7 +1030,7 @@ out:
* checks the arguments from userspace and calls nilfs_sufile_trim_fs, which
* performs the actual trim operation.
*
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned or negative error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_trim_fs(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
{
@@ -1107,7 +1072,7 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_trim_fs(struct in
* of segments in bytes and upper limit of segments in bytes.
* The NILFS_IOCTL_SET_ALLOC_RANGE is used by nilfs_resize utility.
*
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned or error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_set_alloc_range(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
{
@@ -1158,17 +1123,15 @@ out:
* @dofunc: concrete function of getting metadata info
*
* Description: nilfs_ioctl_get_info() gets metadata info by means of
- * calling dofunc() function.
- *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned and requested metadata info
- * is copied into userspace. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - Invalid arguments from userspace.
+ * calling dofunc() function. The requested metadata information is copied
+ * to userspace memory @argp.
*
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT - Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * * %-EINVAL - Invalid arguments from userspace.
+ * * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_get_info(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp,
@@ -1208,18 +1171,14 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_info(struct i
* encapsulated in nilfs_argv and updates the segment usage info
* according to the flags in nilfs_suinfo_update.
*
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned. On error, one of the
- * following negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EPERM - Not enough permissions
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Error copying input data
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - Invalid values in input (segment number, flags or nblocks)
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EEXIST - Block conflict detected.
+ * * %-EFAULT - Error copying input data.
+ * * %-EINVAL - Invalid values in input (segment number, flags or nblocks).
+ * * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
+ * * %-EPERM - Not enough permissions.
*/
static int nilfs_ioctl_set_suinfo(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 42/99] nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 41/99] nilfs2: correct return value kernel-doc descriptions for ioctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 43/99] nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (67 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzbot+c37bed40868932d790e9,
wuyankun, Ryusuke Konishi, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit a1735eae55448bc79c2da6593455791e886f6ed8 ]
Syzbot reported list corruption caused by a double list_add_tail() call on
bh->b_assoc_buffers within nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers().
Analysis revealed that the root cause was the insertion of a page/folio
with a page index of ULONG_MAX into the page cache via the GC ioctl.
filemap_get_folios_tag(), called by nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers(),
repeatedly detects a dirty folio with a page index of ULONG_MAX due to
index wrap-around, leading to duplicate processing of dirty buffers.
As a preparatory step, the GC ioctl loads the page/folio of the block to
be moved during GC and inserts it into the page cache based on information
in the nilfs_vdesc structure passed as an argument. Normally, this does
not cause issues because the user-space GC library configures the
nilfs_vdesc structure properly. However, since there is no range check on
the parameters determining the page index, a request with artificially
crafted parameters -- such as those generated by Syzbot -- can result in a
page/folio being inserted with a page index of ULONG_MAX, triggering the
above problem.
This resolves the issue by checking the ranges of 'vd_offset' and
'vd_vblocknr' in the nilfs_vdesc structure that determine the page index,
thereby preventing the invalid page/folio insertions.
Reported-by: syzbot+c37bed40868932d790e9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c37bed40868932d790e9
Fixes: 7942b919f732 ("nilfs2: ioctl operations")
Cc: wuyankun <wuyankun@uniontech.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
@@ -527,6 +527,7 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_bdescs(struct
* Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
* failure:
* * %-EEXIST - Block conflict detected.
+ * * %-EINVAL - Invalid virtual block descriptor.
* * %-EIO - I/O error.
* * %-ENOENT - Requested block doesn't exist.
* * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
@@ -536,15 +537,30 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_move_inode_block(
struct list_head *buffers)
{
struct buffer_head *bh;
+ __u64 limit_blkidx = (__u64)inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes >> inode->i_blkbits;
int ret;
- if (vdesc->vd_flags == 0)
+ /*
+ * vblocknr 0 is reserved as an invalid pointer. Also, limit_blkidx
+ * ensures that the page index converted from vd_vblocknr never
+ * overflows the page cache limit and respects the architecture's bmap
+ * key width.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(vdesc->vd_vblocknr == 0 ||
+ vdesc->vd_vblocknr >= limit_blkidx))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (vdesc->vd_flags == 0) {
+ if (unlikely(vdesc->vd_offset >= limit_blkidx))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
ret = nilfs_gccache_submit_read_data(
inode, vdesc->vd_offset, vdesc->vd_blocknr,
vdesc->vd_vblocknr, &bh);
- else
+ } else {
ret = nilfs_gccache_submit_read_node(
inode, vdesc->vd_blocknr, vdesc->vd_vblocknr, &bh);
+ }
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
if (ret == -ENOENT)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 43/99] nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 42/99] nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 44/99] HID: pidff: Rework pidff_set_time() to fix warnings Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (66 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Bryam Vargas, David Heidelberg,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
[ Upstream commit 0428fa2c22e2ba0cff766d3b80d461e149102045 ]
nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep() and
nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep() read an inner length byte from
the NCI RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF payload and use it to memcpy() into fixed
kernel buffers, but neither function receives the caller-validated
activation_params_len. A crafted NCI notification with
activation_params_len=1 and an inner length byte of up to 20 (NFC-A) or
50 (NFC-B) causes memcpy() to read that many bytes past the one valid
byte in the activation params region -- a slab out-of-bounds read of
kernel memory adjacent to the NCI skb.
The sibling nci_extract_rf_params_*() family was given equivalent
protection by commit 571dcbeb8e63 ("net: nfc: nci: Fix parameter
validation for packet data"), but the two activation parameter
extractors were not updated at that time.
Add a data_len parameter to both functions, guard against an empty
region before consuming the inner length byte, decrement the remaining
count after consuming it, and clamp the copy length to what is actually
available. Update both call sites to pass ntf.activation_params_len,
which is already validated against the skb at ntf.c:801.
Fixes: e8c0dacd9836 ("NFC: Update names and structs to NCI spec 1.0 d18")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-6d52d8b0-v3-1-e26221f8826d@proton.me
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
[ Replaced `NFC_ATS_MAXSIZE` with the literal `20` since that macro doesn't exist in this tree. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/nfc/nci/ntf.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c
+++ b/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c
@@ -525,15 +525,19 @@ static int nci_rf_discover_ntf_packet(st
static int nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf *ntf,
- const __u8 *data)
+ const __u8 *data, __u8 data_len)
{
struct activation_params_nfca_poll_iso_dep *nfca_poll;
struct activation_params_nfcb_poll_iso_dep *nfcb_poll;
switch (ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode) {
case NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
+ if (data_len < 1)
+ return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
nfca_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfca_poll_iso_dep;
nfca_poll->rats_res_len = min_t(__u8, *data++, 20);
+ data_len--;
+ nfca_poll->rats_res_len = min_t(__u8, nfca_poll->rats_res_len, data_len);
pr_debug("rats_res_len %d\n", nfca_poll->rats_res_len);
if (nfca_poll->rats_res_len > 0) {
memcpy(nfca_poll->rats_res,
@@ -542,8 +546,12 @@ static int nci_extract_activation_params
break;
case NCI_NFC_B_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
+ if (data_len < 1)
+ return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
nfcb_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfcb_poll_iso_dep;
nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len = min_t(__u8, *data++, 50);
+ data_len--;
+ nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len = min_t(__u8, nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len, data_len);
pr_debug("attrib_res_len %d\n", nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len);
if (nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len > 0) {
memcpy(nfcb_poll->attrib_res,
@@ -562,7 +570,7 @@ static int nci_extract_activation_params
static int nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf *ntf,
- const __u8 *data)
+ const __u8 *data, __u8 data_len)
{
struct activation_params_poll_nfc_dep *poll;
struct activation_params_listen_nfc_dep *listen;
@@ -570,9 +578,13 @@ static int nci_extract_activation_params
switch (ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode) {
case NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
case NCI_NFC_F_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
+ if (data_len < 1)
+ return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
poll = &ntf->activation_params.poll_nfc_dep;
poll->atr_res_len = min_t(__u8, *data++,
NFC_ATR_RES_MAXSIZE - 2);
+ data_len--;
+ poll->atr_res_len = min_t(__u8, poll->atr_res_len, data_len);
pr_debug("atr_res_len %d\n", poll->atr_res_len);
if (poll->atr_res_len > 0)
memcpy(poll->atr_res, data, poll->atr_res_len);
@@ -580,9 +592,13 @@ static int nci_extract_activation_params
case NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_LISTEN_MODE:
case NCI_NFC_F_PASSIVE_LISTEN_MODE:
+ if (data_len < 1)
+ return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
listen = &ntf->activation_params.listen_nfc_dep;
listen->atr_req_len = min_t(__u8, *data++,
NFC_ATR_REQ_MAXSIZE - 2);
+ data_len--;
+ listen->atr_req_len = min_t(__u8, listen->atr_req_len, data_len);
pr_debug("atr_req_len %d\n", listen->atr_req_len);
if (listen->atr_req_len > 0)
memcpy(listen->atr_req, data, listen->atr_req_len);
@@ -790,12 +806,14 @@ static int nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_pac
switch (ntf.rf_interface) {
case NCI_RF_INTERFACE_ISO_DEP:
err = nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep(ndev,
- &ntf, data);
+ &ntf, data,
+ ntf.activation_params_len);
break;
case NCI_RF_INTERFACE_NFC_DEP:
err = nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep(ndev,
- &ntf, data);
+ &ntf, data,
+ ntf.activation_params_len);
break;
case NCI_RF_INTERFACE_FRAME:
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 44/99] HID: pidff: Rework pidff_set_time() to fix warnings
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 43/99] nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 45/99] HID: pidff: Use ARRAY_SIZE macro instead of sizeof Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (65 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Tomasz Pakuła, Jiri Kosina,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tomasz Pakuła <tomasz.pakula.oficjalny@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit bed72bd240ce77623845853397b89a08f6dc5770 ]
Fixes blank line warning from checkpatch.pl script
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Pakuła <tomasz.pakula.oficjalny@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Stable-dep-of: 67bb1074e3d2 ("HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
@@ -339,8 +339,8 @@ static void pidff_set_signed(struct pidf
static void pidff_set_time(struct pidff_usage *usage, u16 time)
{
- u32 modified_time = pidff_rescale_time(time, usage->field);
- usage->value[0] = pidff_clamp(modified_time, usage->field);
+ usage->value[0] = pidff_clamp(
+ pidff_rescale_time(time, usage->field), usage->field);
}
static void pidff_set_duration(struct pidff_usage *usage, u16 duration)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 45/99] HID: pidff: Use ARRAY_SIZE macro instead of sizeof
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 44/99] HID: pidff: Rework pidff_set_time() to fix warnings Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 46/99] HID: pidff: clang-format pass Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Tomasz Pakuła, Oleg Makarenko,
Jiri Kosina, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tomasz Pakuła <tomasz.pakula.oficjalny@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 8de2cef6d0de8cdddee8d653a18791525af26fad ]
Could lead to issues when arrays won't be 8 bit fields
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Pakuła <tomasz.pakula.oficjalny@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Makarenko <oleg@makarenk.ooo>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Stable-dep-of: 67bb1074e3d2 ("HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
@@ -158,20 +158,20 @@ struct pidff_usage {
struct pidff_device {
struct hid_device *hid;
- struct hid_report *reports[sizeof(pidff_reports)];
+ struct hid_report *reports[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_reports)];
- struct pidff_usage set_effect[sizeof(pidff_set_effect)];
- struct pidff_usage set_envelope[sizeof(pidff_set_envelope)];
- struct pidff_usage set_condition[sizeof(pidff_set_condition)];
- struct pidff_usage set_periodic[sizeof(pidff_set_periodic)];
- struct pidff_usage set_constant[sizeof(pidff_set_constant)];
- struct pidff_usage set_ramp[sizeof(pidff_set_ramp)];
-
- struct pidff_usage device_gain[sizeof(pidff_device_gain)];
- struct pidff_usage block_load[sizeof(pidff_block_load)];
- struct pidff_usage pool[sizeof(pidff_pool)];
- struct pidff_usage effect_operation[sizeof(pidff_effect_operation)];
- struct pidff_usage block_free[sizeof(pidff_block_free)];
+ struct pidff_usage set_effect[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_set_effect)];
+ struct pidff_usage set_envelope[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_set_envelope)];
+ struct pidff_usage set_condition[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_set_condition)];
+ struct pidff_usage set_periodic[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_set_periodic)];
+ struct pidff_usage set_constant[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_set_constant)];
+ struct pidff_usage set_ramp[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_set_ramp)];
+
+ struct pidff_usage device_gain[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_device_gain)];
+ struct pidff_usage block_load[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_block_load)];
+ struct pidff_usage pool[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_pool)];
+ struct pidff_usage effect_operation[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_effect_operation)];
+ struct pidff_usage block_free[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_block_free)];
/*
* Special field is a field that is not composed of
@@ -194,10 +194,10 @@ struct pidff_device {
/* Special field in effect_operation */
struct hid_field *effect_operation_status;
- int control_id[sizeof(pidff_device_control)];
- int type_id[sizeof(pidff_effect_types)];
- int status_id[sizeof(pidff_block_load_status)];
- int operation_id[sizeof(pidff_effect_operation_status)];
+ int control_id[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_device_control)];
+ int type_id[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_effect_types)];
+ int status_id[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_block_load_status)];
+ int operation_id[ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_effect_operation_status)];
int pid_id[PID_EFFECTS_MAX];
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ static void pidff_set_device_control(str
hid_dbg(pidff->hid, "DEVICE_CONTROL is a bitmask\n");
/* Clear current bitmask */
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(pidff_device_control); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_device_control); i++) {
index = pidff->control_id[i];
if (index < 1)
continue;
@@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@ static int pidff_check_usage(int usage)
{
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(pidff_reports); i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_reports); i++)
if (usage == (HID_UP_PID | pidff_reports[i]))
return i;
@@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@ static int pidff_find_special_keys(int *
#define PIDFF_FIND_SPECIAL_KEYS(keys, field, name) \
pidff_find_special_keys(pidff->keys, pidff->field, pidff_ ## name, \
- sizeof(pidff_ ## name))
+ ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_ ## name))
/*
* Find and check the special fields
@@ -1196,7 +1196,7 @@ static int pidff_find_special_fields(str
if (PIDFF_FIND_SPECIAL_KEYS(status_id, block_load_status,
block_load_status) !=
- sizeof(pidff_block_load_status)) {
+ ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_block_load_status)) {
hid_err(pidff->hid,
"block load status identifiers not found\n");
return -1;
@@ -1204,7 +1204,7 @@ static int pidff_find_special_fields(str
if (PIDFF_FIND_SPECIAL_KEYS(operation_id, effect_operation_status,
effect_operation_status) !=
- sizeof(pidff_effect_operation_status)) {
+ ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_effect_operation_status)) {
hid_err(pidff->hid, "effect operation identifiers not found\n");
return -1;
}
@@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ static int pidff_find_effects(struct pid
{
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(pidff_effect_types); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_effect_types); i++) {
int pidff_type = pidff->type_id[i];
if (pidff->set_effect_type->usage[pidff_type].hid !=
@@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ static int pidff_find_effects(struct pid
#define PIDFF_FIND_FIELDS(name, report, strict) \
pidff_find_fields(pidff->name, pidff_ ## name, \
pidff->reports[report], \
- sizeof(pidff_ ## name), strict)
+ ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_ ## name), strict)
/*
* Fill and check the pidff_usages
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 46/99] HID: pidff: clang-format pass
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 45/99] HID: pidff: Use ARRAY_SIZE macro instead of sizeof Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 47/99] HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Tomasz Pakuła, Jiri Kosina,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tomasz Pakuła <tomasz.pakula.oficjalny@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit ae42428fb4e3d2eed344f0d6fcfa778bc8b8f80a ]
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Pakuła <tomasz.pakula.oficjalny@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Stable-dep-of: 67bb1074e3d2 ("HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
@@ -9,12 +9,11 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include "hid-pidff.h"
+#include <linux/hid.h>
#include <linux/input.h>
+#include <linux/minmax.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/usb.h>
-#include <linux/hid.h>
-#include <linux/minmax.h>
-
#define PID_EFFECTS_MAX 64
#define PID_INFINITE U16_MAX
@@ -285,7 +284,7 @@ static s32 pidff_clamp(s32 i, struct hid
static int pidff_rescale(int i, int max, struct hid_field *field)
{
return i * (field->logical_maximum - field->logical_minimum) / max +
- field->logical_minimum;
+ field->logical_minimum;
}
/*
@@ -329,18 +328,18 @@ static void pidff_set_signed(struct pidf
else {
if (value < 0)
usage->value[0] =
- pidff_rescale(-value, -S16_MIN, usage->field);
+ pidff_rescale(-value, -S16_MIN, usage->field);
else
usage->value[0] =
- pidff_rescale(value, S16_MAX, usage->field);
+ pidff_rescale(value, S16_MAX, usage->field);
}
pr_debug("calculated from %d to %d\n", value, usage->value[0]);
}
static void pidff_set_time(struct pidff_usage *usage, u16 time)
{
- usage->value[0] = pidff_clamp(
- pidff_rescale_time(time, usage->field), usage->field);
+ usage->value[0] = pidff_clamp(pidff_rescale_time(time, usage->field),
+ usage->field);
}
static void pidff_set_duration(struct pidff_usage *usage, u16 duration)
@@ -463,11 +462,11 @@ static void pidff_set_effect_report(stru
pidff_get_effect_type_id(pidff, effect);
pidff_set_duration(&pidff->set_effect[PID_DURATION],
- effect->replay.length);
+ effect->replay.length);
pidff->set_effect[PID_TRIGGER_BUTTON].value[0] = effect->trigger.button;
pidff_set_time(&pidff->set_effect[PID_TRIGGER_REPEAT_INT],
- effect->trigger.interval);
+ effect->trigger.interval);
pidff->set_effect[PID_GAIN].value[0] =
pidff->set_effect[PID_GAIN].field->logical_maximum;
pidff->set_effect[PID_DIRECTION_ENABLE].value[0] = 1;
@@ -477,10 +476,10 @@ static void pidff_set_effect_report(stru
/* Omit setting delay field if it's missing */
if (!(pidff->quirks & HID_PIDFF_QUIRK_MISSING_DELAY))
pidff_set_time(&pidff->set_effect[PID_START_DELAY],
- effect->replay.delay);
+ effect->replay.delay);
hid_hw_request(pidff->hid, pidff->reports[PID_SET_EFFECT],
- HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
+ HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
}
/*
@@ -510,10 +509,10 @@ static void pidff_set_periodic_report(st
effect->u.periodic.offset);
pidff_set(&pidff->set_periodic[PID_PHASE], effect->u.periodic.phase);
pidff_set_time(&pidff->set_periodic[PID_PERIOD],
- effect->u.periodic.period);
+ effect->u.periodic.period);
hid_hw_request(pidff->hid, pidff->reports[PID_SET_PERIODIC],
- HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
+ HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
}
/*
@@ -560,7 +559,7 @@ static void pidff_set_condition_report(s
pidff_set(&pidff->set_condition[PID_DEAD_BAND],
effect->u.condition[i].deadband);
hid_hw_request(pidff->hid, pidff->reports[PID_SET_CONDITION],
- HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
+ HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
}
}
@@ -623,7 +622,7 @@ static void pidff_set_gain_report(struct
pidff_set(&pidff->device_gain[PID_DEVICE_GAIN_FIELD], gain);
hid_hw_request(pidff->hid, pidff->reports[PID_DEVICE_GAIN],
- HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
+ HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
}
/*
@@ -717,21 +716,19 @@ static void pidff_fetch_pool(struct pidf
*/
static int pidff_request_effect_upload(struct pidff_device *pidff, int efnum)
{
- int j;
-
pidff->create_new_effect_type->value[0] = efnum;
hid_hw_request(pidff->hid, pidff->reports[PID_CREATE_NEW_EFFECT],
- HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
+ HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
hid_dbg(pidff->hid, "create_new_effect sent, type: %d\n", efnum);
pidff->block_load[PID_EFFECT_BLOCK_INDEX].value[0] = 0;
pidff->block_load_status->value[0] = 0;
hid_hw_wait(pidff->hid);
- for (j = 0; j < 60; j++) {
+ for (int i = 0; i < 60; i++) {
hid_dbg(pidff->hid, "pid_block_load requested\n");
hid_hw_request(pidff->hid, pidff->reports[PID_BLOCK_LOAD],
- HID_REQ_GET_REPORT);
+ HID_REQ_GET_REPORT);
hid_hw_wait(pidff->hid);
if (pidff->block_load_status->value[0] ==
pidff->status_id[PID_BLOCK_LOAD_SUCCESS]) {
@@ -808,8 +805,8 @@ static int pidff_erase_effect(struct inp
struct pidff_device *pidff = dev->ff->private;
int pid_id = pidff->pid_id[effect_id];
- hid_dbg(pidff->hid, "starting to erase %d/%d\n",
- effect_id, pidff->pid_id[effect_id]);
+ hid_dbg(pidff->hid, "starting to erase %d/%d\n", effect_id,
+ pidff->pid_id[effect_id]);
/*
* Wait for the queue to clear. We do not want
@@ -929,7 +926,7 @@ static void pidff_autocenter(struct pidf
pidff->set_effect[PID_START_DELAY].value[0] = 0;
hid_hw_request(pidff->hid, pidff->reports[PID_SET_EFFECT],
- HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
+ HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
}
/*
@@ -1196,7 +1193,7 @@ static int pidff_find_special_fields(str
if (PIDFF_FIND_SPECIAL_KEYS(status_id, block_load_status,
block_load_status) !=
- ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_block_load_status)) {
+ ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_block_load_status)) {
hid_err(pidff->hid,
"block load status identifiers not found\n");
return -1;
@@ -1204,7 +1201,7 @@ static int pidff_find_special_fields(str
if (PIDFF_FIND_SPECIAL_KEYS(operation_id, effect_operation_status,
effect_operation_status) !=
- ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_effect_operation_status)) {
+ ARRAY_SIZE(pidff_effect_operation_status)) {
hid_err(pidff->hid, "effect operation identifiers not found\n");
return -1;
}
@@ -1408,8 +1405,8 @@ static int pidff_check_autocenter(struct
int hid_pidff_init_with_quirks(struct hid_device *hid, u32 initial_quirks)
{
struct pidff_device *pidff;
- struct hid_input *hidinput = list_entry(hid->inputs.next,
- struct hid_input, list);
+ struct hid_input *hidinput =
+ list_entry(hid->inputs.next, struct hid_input, list);
struct input_dev *dev = hidinput->input;
struct ff_device *ff;
int max_effects;
@@ -1496,7 +1493,7 @@ int hid_pidff_init_with_quirks(struct hi
return 0;
- fail:
+fail:
hid_device_io_stop(hid);
kfree(pidff);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 47/99] HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (45 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 46/99] HID: pidff: clang-format pass Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 48/99] HID: asus: simplify RGB init sequence Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Federico Kirschbaum, Baul Lee,
Jiri Kosina, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
[ Upstream commit 67bb1074e3d2d12fa059a9cc707e89398a4e4704 ]
hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from
list_entry(hid->inputs.next, struct hid_input, list)
without first checking that hid->inputs is non-empty. The list member
of struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry()
yields &hid->inputs itself and the following hidinput->input load reads
an unrelated member of struct hid_device. dev is then a type-confused
pointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each
set_bit(FF_*, dev->ffbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of
the object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further
writes of a heap pointer and two function pointers.
Until hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from
usbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at
least one hid_input. universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with
HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT & ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls
hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a
PID usage page, bypassing that gate. A report descriptor whose only
application collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid->inputs empty while
hid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches
the unguarded list_entry().
The write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so
plugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker
software and no logged-in user are required. KASAN reports an 8-byte
out-of-bounds write in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() reached from
universal_pidff_probe().
Check for an empty list before deriving dev and return -ENODEV, as the
other HID force-feedback drivers already do. universal_pidff_probe()
propagates the error and unwinds.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Fixes: f06bf8d94fff ("HID: Add hid-universal-pidff driver and supported device ids")
Reported-by: Federico Kirschbaum <federico.kirschbaum@xbow.com>
Reported-by: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
@@ -1405,13 +1405,20 @@ static int pidff_check_autocenter(struct
int hid_pidff_init_with_quirks(struct hid_device *hid, u32 initial_quirks)
{
struct pidff_device *pidff;
- struct hid_input *hidinput =
- list_entry(hid->inputs.next, struct hid_input, list);
- struct input_dev *dev = hidinput->input;
+ struct hid_input *hidinput;
+ struct input_dev *dev;
struct ff_device *ff;
int max_effects;
int error;
+ if (list_empty(&hid->inputs)) {
+ hid_err(hid, "no inputs found\n");
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ hidinput = list_first_entry(&hid->inputs, struct hid_input, list);
+ dev = hidinput->input;
+
hid_dbg(hid, "starting pid init\n");
if (list_empty(&hid->report_enum[HID_OUTPUT_REPORT].report_list)) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 48/99] HID: asus: simplify RGB init sequence
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (46 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 47/99] HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 49/99] HID: asus: fix missing hid_is_usb() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Benjamin Tissoires,
Antheas Kapenekakis, Ilpo Järvinen, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Antheas Kapenekakis <lkml@antheas.dev>
[ Upstream commit 56d1b33e644cca1bedffbc73d28778ed4ae30f64 ]
Currently, RGB initialization forks depending on whether a device is
NKEY. However, in reality both initialization forks are the same, other
than the NKEY initialization initializing the LED_REPORT_ID1,
LED_REPORT_ID2 endpoints, and the non-NKEY initialization having a
functionality check which is skipped for the NKEY path.
Therefore, merge the if blocks, gate the ID1/ID2 initializations
behind the NKEY quirk instead, and introduce the functionality check
for NKEY devices (it is supported by them).
There should be no functional change with this patch.
Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Antheas Kapenekakis <lkml@antheas.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260122075044.5070-2-lkml@antheas.dev
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Stable-dep-of: 02bf61dfb44f ("HID: asus: fix missing hid_is_usb() check")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hid/hid-asus.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-asus.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-asus.c
@@ -635,13 +635,20 @@ static int asus_kbd_register_leds(struct
unsigned char kbd_func;
int ret;
- if (drvdata->quirks & QUIRK_ROG_NKEY_KEYBOARD) {
- /* Initialize keyboard */
- ret = asus_kbd_init(hdev, FEATURE_KBD_REPORT_ID);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ ret = asus_kbd_init(hdev, FEATURE_KBD_REPORT_ID);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Get keyboard functions */
+ ret = asus_kbd_get_functions(hdev, &kbd_func, FEATURE_KBD_REPORT_ID);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Check for backlight support */
+ if (!(kbd_func & SUPPORT_KBD_BACKLIGHT))
+ return -ENODEV;
- /* The LED endpoint is initialised in two HID */
+ if (drvdata->quirks & QUIRK_ROG_NKEY_KEYBOARD) {
ret = asus_kbd_init(hdev, FEATURE_KBD_LED_REPORT_ID1);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -649,34 +656,19 @@ static int asus_kbd_register_leds(struct
ret = asus_kbd_init(hdev, FEATURE_KBD_LED_REPORT_ID2);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ }
- if (dmi_match(DMI_PRODUCT_FAMILY, "ProArt P16")) {
- ret = asus_kbd_disable_oobe(hdev);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (drvdata->quirks & QUIRK_ROG_ALLY_XPAD) {
- intf = to_usb_interface(hdev->dev.parent);
- udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
- validate_mcu_fw_version(hdev,
- le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct));
- }
-
- } else {
- /* Initialize keyboard */
- ret = asus_kbd_init(hdev, FEATURE_KBD_REPORT_ID);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
-
- /* Get keyboard functions */
- ret = asus_kbd_get_functions(hdev, &kbd_func, FEATURE_KBD_REPORT_ID);
+ if (dmi_match(DMI_PRODUCT_FAMILY, "ProArt P16")) {
+ ret = asus_kbd_disable_oobe(hdev);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ }
- /* Check for backlight support */
- if (!(kbd_func & SUPPORT_KBD_BACKLIGHT))
- return -ENODEV;
+ if (drvdata->quirks & QUIRK_ROG_ALLY_XPAD) {
+ intf = to_usb_interface(hdev->dev.parent);
+ udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
+ validate_mcu_fw_version(hdev,
+ le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct));
}
drvdata->kbd_backlight = devm_kzalloc(&hdev->dev,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 49/99] HID: asus: fix missing hid_is_usb() check
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (47 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 48/99] HID: asus: simplify RGB init sequence Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 50/99] HID: ft260: validate i2c input report length Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (60 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jann Horn, Jiri Kosina, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 02bf61dfb44f17ec187d1da1a82495951bbd12df ]
to_usb_interface() can only be used on a hid_device whose parent is really
USB; uhid can create devices that identify as being on BUS_USB, but don't
actually have a USB parent.
Fix the use of to_usb_interface() without a hid_is_usb() check.
I have verified that it is currently possible to trigger a kernel splat due
to this bug in an ASAN build, and that this commit fixes the issue.
Fixes: 00e005c952f7 ("hid-asus: check ROG Ally MCU version and warn")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hid/hid-asus.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-asus.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-asus.c
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static int asus_kbd_register_leds(struct
return ret;
}
- if (drvdata->quirks & QUIRK_ROG_ALLY_XPAD) {
+ if ((drvdata->quirks & QUIRK_ROG_ALLY_XPAD) && hid_is_usb(hdev)) {
intf = to_usb_interface(hdev->dev.parent);
udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
validate_mcu_fw_version(hdev,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 50/99] HID: ft260: validate i2c input report length
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (48 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 49/99] HID: asus: fix missing hid_is_usb() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 51/99] HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (59 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Sebastián Josué Alba Vives,
Michael Zaidman, Jiri Kosina, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 80c4bbb2b38513e9c3d84805fa61a0ee16d79c45 ]
Add two checks to ft260_raw_event() to prevent out-of-bounds reads
from malicious or malfunctioning devices:
First, reject reports shorter than the 2-byte header (report ID +
length fields). Without this, even accessing xfer->length on a
1-byte report is an OOB read.
Second, validate xfer->length against the actual data capacity of
the received HID report. Each I2C data report ID (0xD0 through
0xDE) defines a different report size in the HID descriptor, so the
available payload varies per report. A corrupted length field could
cause memcpy to read beyond the report buffer.
Reported-by: Sebastián Josué Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
@@ -1068,10 +1068,22 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
struct ft260_device *dev = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct ft260_i2c_input_report *xfer = (void *)data;
+ if (size < offsetof(struct ft260_i2c_input_report, data)) {
+ hid_err(hdev, "short report %d\n", size);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (xfer->report >= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MIN &&
xfer->report <= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MAX) {
- ft260_dbg("i2c resp: rep %#02x len %d\n", xfer->report,
- xfer->length);
+ ft260_dbg("i2c resp: rep %#02x len %d size %d\n",
+ xfer->report, xfer->length, size);
+
+ if (xfer->length > size -
+ offsetof(struct ft260_i2c_input_report, data)) {
+ hid_err(hdev, "report %#02x: length %d exceeds HID report size\n",
+ xfer->report, xfer->length);
+ return -1;
+ }
if ((dev->read_buf == NULL) ||
(xfer->length > dev->read_len - dev->read_idx)) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 51/99] HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (49 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 50/99] HID: ft260: validate i2c input report length Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 52/99] HID: uclogic: fix use-after-free of inrange_timer on remove Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (58 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Raman Varabets, Michael Zaidman,
Jiri Kosina, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Raman Varabets <kernel-linux-20260610-80b7ab08@raman.v1.sg>
[ Upstream commit bf3e39df3a397fd82967a31d17c4e02c7feab221 ]
ft260_i2c_read() points dev->read_buf at a caller-supplied buffer
(often an on-stack variable), arms a completion and waits up to five
seconds for the device to return the data. The HID input callback
ft260_raw_event() runs in the input/IRQ path, independent of the
dev->lock mutex held by the read path, and copies the device-supplied
payload into dev->read_buf after a plain NULL check.
These two paths share read_buf, read_idx and read_len with no
serialization. If the device delays its response until the read
times out, ft260_i2c_read() resets the controller, clears read_buf
and returns, unwinding the stack frame the buffer lived in. A
response that arrives at that moment lets ft260_raw_event() pass the
NULL check and then memcpy() the device-controlled payload into the
now-freed stack location, a bounded but attacker-influenced
stack-use-after-return write triggerable by malicious or
malfunctioning hardware.
Add a dedicated spinlock that serializes every access to read_buf,
read_idx and read_len. ft260_raw_event() now holds it across the
NULL check, the memcpy and the index update, while the read path
takes it when arming and when clearing the buffer, so the teardown
can no longer slip between the check and the copy.
Fixes: 6a82582d9fa4 ("HID: ft260: add usb hid to i2c host bridge driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raman Varabets <kernel-linux-20260610-80b7ab08@raman.v1.sg>
Reviewed-by: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
@@ -240,6 +240,8 @@ struct ft260_device {
struct mutex lock;
u8 write_buf[FT260_REPORT_MAX_LENGTH];
unsigned long need_wakeup_at;
+ /* Protects read_buf, read_idx and read_len against ft260_raw_event() */
+ spinlock_t read_lock;
u8 *read_buf;
u16 read_idx;
u16 read_len;
@@ -501,6 +503,7 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
int timeout, ret = 0;
struct ft260_i2c_read_request_report rep;
struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
+ unsigned long irqflags;
u8 bus_busy = 0;
if ((flag & FT260_FLAG_START_REPEATED) == FT260_FLAG_START_REPEATED)
@@ -526,9 +529,11 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
reinit_completion(&dev->wait);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
dev->read_idx = 0;
dev->read_buf = data;
dev->read_len = rd_len;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
ret = ft260_hid_output_report(hdev, (u8 *)&rep, sizeof(rep));
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -543,7 +548,9 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
goto ft260_i2c_read_exit;
}
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
dev->read_buf = NULL;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
if (flag & FT260_FLAG_STOP)
bus_busy = FT260_I2C_STATUS_BUS_BUSY;
@@ -562,7 +569,9 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
} while (len > 0);
ft260_i2c_read_exit:
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
dev->read_buf = NULL;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
return ret;
}
@@ -1018,6 +1027,7 @@ static int ft260_probe(struct hid_device
"FT260 usb-i2c bridge");
mutex_init(&dev->lock);
+ spin_lock_init(&dev->read_lock);
init_completion(&dev->wait);
ret = ft260_xfer_status(dev, FT260_I2C_STATUS_BUS_BUSY);
@@ -1067,6 +1077,7 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
{
struct ft260_device *dev = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct ft260_i2c_input_report *xfer = (void *)data;
+ unsigned long irqflags;
if (size < offsetof(struct ft260_i2c_input_report, data)) {
hid_err(hdev, "short report %d\n", size);
@@ -1075,6 +1086,8 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
if (xfer->report >= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MIN &&
xfer->report <= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MAX) {
+ bool complete_read;
+
ft260_dbg("i2c resp: rep %#02x len %d size %d\n",
xfer->report, xfer->length, size);
@@ -1085,8 +1098,15 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
return -1;
}
+ /*
+ * Hold read_lock so a timed-out ft260_i2c_read() cannot
+ * clear read_buf between the NULL check and the memcpy.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
+
if ((dev->read_buf == NULL) ||
(xfer->length > dev->read_len - dev->read_idx)) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
hid_err(hdev, "unexpected report %#02x, length %d\n",
xfer->report, xfer->length);
return -1;
@@ -1095,8 +1115,11 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
memcpy(&dev->read_buf[dev->read_idx], &xfer->data,
xfer->length);
dev->read_idx += xfer->length;
+ complete_read = dev->read_idx == dev->read_len;
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
- if (dev->read_idx == dev->read_len)
+ if (complete_read)
complete(&dev->wait);
} else {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 52/99] HID: uclogic: fix use-after-free of inrange_timer on remove
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (50 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 51/99] HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 53/99] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Use bt_dev_err() to log error message in hci_update_event_filter_sync() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (57 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Ibrahim Hashimov, Jiri Kosina,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
[ Upstream commit 506fd50a9027340f0e9dcc587d10ccb03312dba6 ]
uclogic_remove() cancels the pen in-range timer and then stops the
device:
timer_delete_sync(&drvdata->inrange_timer);
hid_hw_stop(hdev);
timer_delete_sync() only guarantees the timer is idle at that instant.
uclogic_raw_event_pen() keeps delivering pen reports until hid_hw_stop()
stops the transport several lines later, and every report with
pen->inrange == UCLOGIC_PARAMS_PEN_INRANGE_NONE re-arms the timer:
mod_timer(&drvdata->inrange_timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(100));
A report landing between the timer_delete_sync() call and the transport
teardown in hid_hw_stop() re-arms inrange_timer after it was cancelled.
uclogic_remove() then returns and the devm drvdata is freed, while
hid_hw_stop() has already freed the input device drvdata->pen_input
points at, so when the timer fires ~100 ms later
uclogic_inrange_timeout() dereferences freed memory -- a use-after-free
in timer-softirq context.
Swapping the two calls is not a fix: stopping the device first frees
drvdata->pen_input via hidinput_disconnect() while the timer may still
be pending, so a timer already armed before removal fires on the freed
input device in the window before timer_delete_sync() runs.
Use timer_shutdown_sync() before hid_hw_stop() instead. It cancels the
timer, waits for a running callback while pen_input is still valid, and
prevents any further re-arming -- a later mod_timer() from an in-flight
report is silently ignored -- so the timer is provably dead before
hid_hw_stop() frees the inputs. This is the ordering the timer core
documents for this "timer re-armed from another path" teardown case.
Fixes: 01309e29eb95 ("HID: uclogic: Support in-range reporting emulation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
[ changed timer_delete_sync() to del_timer_sync() in the removed line to match the pre-rename API on this branch ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-core.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-core.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-core.c
@@ -477,7 +477,17 @@ static void uclogic_remove(struct hid_de
{
struct uclogic_drvdata *drvdata = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
- del_timer_sync(&drvdata->inrange_timer);
+ /*
+ * Shut the in-range timer down before stopping the device.
+ * uclogic_raw_event_pen() re-arms inrange_timer on every pen report
+ * and keeps running until hid_hw_stop() stops the transport, so a
+ * plain timer_delete_sync() here can be undone by a report landing in
+ * the window before hid_hw_stop(). timer_shutdown_sync() cancels the
+ * timer and makes any later re-arm a no-op, so it is provably dead
+ * before hid_hw_stop() frees the input device drvdata->pen_input
+ * points at.
+ */
+ timer_shutdown_sync(&drvdata->inrange_timer);
hid_hw_stop(hdev);
kfree(drvdata->desc_ptr);
uclogic_params_cleanup(&drvdata->params);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 53/99] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Use bt_dev_err() to log error message in hci_update_event_filter_sync()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (51 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 52/99] HID: uclogic: fix use-after-free of inrange_timer on remove Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 54/99] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix accept list UAF during suspend Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Zijun Hu, Luiz Augusto von Dentz,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zijun Hu <zijun.hu@oss.qualcomm.com>
[ Upstream commit da0186f19a7433d3d5607b0f61e9a3de17d1f721 ]
Use bt_dev_err() instead of bt_dev_dbg() to log error message in
hci_update_event_filter_sync().
Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <zijun.hu@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Stable-dep-of: f57b399c4fa1 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix accept list UAF during suspend")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
@@ -6239,7 +6239,7 @@ static int hci_update_event_filter_sync(
&b->bdaddr,
HCI_CONN_SETUP_AUTO_ON);
if (err)
- bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Failed to set event filter for %pMR",
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "Failed to set event filter for %pMR",
&b->bdaddr);
else
scan = SCAN_PAGE;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 54/99] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix accept list UAF during suspend
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (52 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 53/99] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Use bt_dev_err() to log error message in hci_update_event_filter_sync() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 55/99] HID: magicmouse: prevent unbounded recursion in magicmouse_raw_event() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (55 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Chengfeng Ye, Luiz Augusto von Dentz,
Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit f57b399c4fa1501b2d5451f52d861ece86bcf3db ]
hci_update_event_filter_sync() walks hdev->accept_list while sending a
synchronous HCI command for each remote-wakeup device. The suspend path
holds hdev->req_lock, but accept-list updates are serialized by hdev->lock.
Consequently, remove_device() can free the current list entry during the
controller wait.
The following interleaving causes the use-after-free:
hci_update_event_filter_sync() remove_device()
fetch accept-list entry
hci_set_event_filter_sync()
wait for controller response hci_dev_lock()
list_del()
kfree()
hci_dev_unlock()
read the freed list.next
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_suspend_sync+0x835/0x910
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810bec8440 by task kworker/0:1/10
Workqueue: events vhci_suspend_work
Call Trace:
hci_suspend_sync+0x835/0x910
hci_suspend_dev+0x182/0x450
process_one_work+0x661/0x1090
worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10
Allocated by task 86:
hci_bdaddr_list_add_with_flags+0x1a8/0x400
add_device+0x381/0x820
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0
Freed by task 91:
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
remove_device+0x429/0xb70
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0
Snapshot the remote-wakeup addresses under hdev->lock. Release the lock
before sending HCI commands. Clear the controller event filter before
building the snapshot, and skip allocation and the second list traversal
when there are no matching entries. This preserves the original filter
and scan-state updates without retaining an accept-list node across a
controller wait.
Fixes: 182ee45da083 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Rework hci_suspend_notifier")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20260730092331.2069741-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
@@ -6212,6 +6212,8 @@ static int hci_pause_discovery_sync(stru
static int hci_update_event_filter_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct bdaddr_list_with_flags *b;
+ bdaddr_t *accept_list;
+ size_t i, num_entries = 0;
u8 scan = SCAN_DISABLED;
bool scanning = test_bit(HCI_PSCAN, &hdev->flags);
int err;
@@ -6228,23 +6230,49 @@ static int hci_update_event_filter_sync(
/* Always clear event filter when starting */
hci_clear_event_filter_sync(hdev);
- list_for_each_entry(b, &hdev->accept_list, list) {
- if (!(b->flags & HCI_CONN_FLAG_REMOTE_WAKEUP))
- continue;
-
- bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Adding event filters for %pMR", &b->bdaddr);
-
- err = hci_set_event_filter_sync(hdev, HCI_FLT_CONN_SETUP,
- HCI_CONN_SETUP_ALLOW_BDADDR,
- &b->bdaddr,
- HCI_CONN_SETUP_AUTO_ON);
+ hci_dev_lock(hdev);
+
+ list_for_each_entry(b, &hdev->accept_list, list)
+ if (b->flags & HCI_CONN_FLAG_REMOTE_WAKEUP)
+ num_entries++;
+
+ if (!num_entries) {
+ hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+ goto update_scan;
+ }
+
+ accept_list = kmalloc_array(num_entries, sizeof(*accept_list),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!accept_list) {
+ hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ i = 0;
+ list_for_each_entry(b, &hdev->accept_list, list)
+ if (b->flags & HCI_CONN_FLAG_REMOTE_WAKEUP)
+ bacpy(&accept_list[i++], &b->bdaddr);
+
+ hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) {
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Adding event filters for %pMR",
+ &accept_list[i]);
+
+ err = hci_set_event_filter_sync(hdev, HCI_FLT_CONN_SETUP,
+ HCI_CONN_SETUP_ALLOW_BDADDR,
+ &accept_list[i],
+ HCI_CONN_SETUP_AUTO_ON);
if (err)
bt_dev_err(hdev, "Failed to set event filter for %pMR",
- &b->bdaddr);
+ &accept_list[i]);
else
scan = SCAN_PAGE;
}
+ kfree(accept_list);
+
+update_scan:
if (scan && !scanning)
hci_write_scan_enable_sync(hdev, scan);
else if (!scan && scanning)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 55/99] HID: magicmouse: prevent unbounded recursion in magicmouse_raw_event()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (53 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 54/99] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix accept list UAF during suspend Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 56/99] fpga: dfl: fme: add error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (54 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jose Villaseñor Montfort,
Alec Hall, Jiri Kosina, Sasha Levin
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jose Villaseñor Montfort <pepemontfort@gmail.com>
commit db8d634128d2ba88d79c0b601e983ebe14bb0519 upstream.
magicmouse_raw_event() handles DOUBLE_REPORT_ID (0xf7) packets, which pack
two touch reports into one, by splitting the packet and calling itself on
each half. The only guard against runaway recursion is a "size < 1" check,
which stops zero-sized calls but does not bound the recursion depth.
A malicious HID device that matches this driver can send a report starting
with DOUBLE_REPORT_ID and filled with the sequence [0xf7, 0x00]. Each level
consumes two bytes and recurses on the remainder, so an incoming report of
up to HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16 KiB) drives roughly 8000 nested calls. That
easily exhausts the 16 KiB kernel stack, leading to a stack overflow: a
panic with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK, or memory corruption without it.
A double report only ever wraps two normal reports; it is never
legitimately nested. Refuse to re-enter the DOUBLE_REPORT_ID case from a
recursive call so the recursion depth is bounded to two, while all valid
packets keep being parsed exactly as before.
Fixes: a462230e16ac ("HID: magicmouse: enable Magic Trackpad support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-input/20260706181347.700DB1F00A3F@smtp.kernel.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jose Villaseñor Montfort <pepemontfort@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Hall <signshop.alec@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alec Hall <signshop.alec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c
@@ -380,8 +380,8 @@ static void magicmouse_emit_touch(struct
}
}
-static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
- struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size)
+static int __magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
+ struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size, bool nested)
{
struct magicmouse_sc *msc = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct input_dev *input = msc->input;
@@ -492,6 +492,15 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct h
* packet.
*/
+ /*
+ * A double report only ever wraps two normal reports, so it is
+ * never nested. Refuse to recurse a second time; otherwise a
+ * malicious device could chain DOUBLE_REPORT_ID packets to drive
+ * unbounded recursion and overflow the kernel stack.
+ */
+ if (nested)
+ return 0;
+
/* Ensure that we have at least 2 elements (report type and size) */
if (size < 2)
return 0;
@@ -503,9 +512,9 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct h
return 0;
}
- magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2, data[1]);
- magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2 + data[1],
- size - 2 - data[1]);
+ __magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2, data[1], true);
+ __magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2 + data[1],
+ size - 2 - data[1], true);
return 0;
default:
return 0;
@@ -530,6 +539,12 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct h
return 1;
}
+static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
+ struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size)
+{
+ return __magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data, size, false);
+}
+
static int magicmouse_event(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_field *field,
struct hid_usage *usage, __s32 value)
{
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 56/99] fpga: dfl: fme: add error handling
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (54 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 55/99] HID: magicmouse: prevent unbounded recursion in magicmouse_raw_event() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 57/99] accessibility: speakup: unregister tty ldisc on later init failures Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (53 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, Xu Yilun, Tom Rix,
Moritz Fischer, Griffin Kroah-Hartman, Xu Yilun
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
commit b5ba63e247075087ab8a6a087622c762dc4172e9 upstream.
Add error handling to devm_kasprint in fme_perf_pmu_register().
Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_2000
Fixes: 724142f8c42a ("fpga: dfl: fme: add performance reporting support")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Cc: Moritz Fischer <mdf@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Yilun: Fix stable tag, add Fixes tag ]
Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2026070620-unwired-clay-f6cc@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-perf.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-perf.c
+++ b/drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-perf.c
@@ -925,6 +925,8 @@ static int fme_perf_pmu_register(struct
PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_EXCLUDE;
name = devm_kasprintf(priv->dev, GFP_KERNEL, "dfl_fme%d", pdev->id);
+ if (!name)
+ return -ENOMEM;
ret = perf_pmu_register(pmu, name, -1);
if (ret)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 57/99] accessibility: speakup: unregister tty ldisc on later init failures
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (55 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 56/99] fpga: dfl: fme: add error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 58/99] usb: xhci: Handle USB3 port events when there is one roothub Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (52 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Haoxiang Li, Samuel Thibault
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang@isrc.iscas.ac.cn>
commit a76acbaec9b8fd74413646984d2e3626d0543e39 upstream.
The ldisc registration is intentionally non-fatal, since some synth
drivers do not use tty/ldisc. However, once speakup_init() continues
past the registration point and later fails, the init unwind path should
mirror speakup_exit() and call spk_ttyio_unregister_ldisc().
Add the missing unregister call to the error path after synth_release(),
matching the normal module exit cleanup order.
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang@isrc.iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Fixes: e23a9b439ce9 ("staging: speakup: safely register and unregister ldisc")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260531230804.254962-16-samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/accessibility/speakup/main.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/accessibility/speakup/main.c
+++ b/drivers/accessibility/speakup/main.c
@@ -2444,6 +2444,7 @@ error_kbdnotifier:
mutex_lock(&spk_mutex);
synth_release();
mutex_unlock(&spk_mutex);
+ spk_ttyio_unregister_ldisc();
speakup_kobj_exit();
error_kobjects:
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 58/99] usb: xhci: Handle USB3 port events when there is one roothub
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 57/99] accessibility: speakup: unregister tty ldisc on later init failures Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 59/99] xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_register_driver() failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (51 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Semih Baskan, Mathias Nyman
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Semih Baskan <strst.gs@gmail.com>
commit 3e91ec3e7d80a327fb558207613c80415d3bf756 upstream.
handle_port_status() drops every USB3 port event when xhci->shared_hcd is
NULL. The check dates from a time when xhci-plat always created a shared
hcd, so a NULL one could only mean the hcd had been removed.
Since commit 4736ebd7fcaf ("usb: host: xhci-plat: omit shared hcd if
either root hub has no ports") that is no longer true. A controller whose
USB2 root hub has no ports gets a single roothub, the USB3 rhub is served
by the main hcd, and shared_hcd stays NULL for the lifetime of the device.
Every SuperSpeed port event is then thrown away as bogus behind a debug
message, so devices never enumerate even though the port sees the device
and its change bits stay set:
0x006a1203 Powered Connected Enabled Link:U0 PortSpeed:4
Change: CSC WRC PRC PLC
Broadcom Northstar is such a controller. USB3 works there up to 5.15 and
stops working from 5.19 onwards.
Ask xhci_get_usb3_hcd() instead. It returns the shared hcd when there is
one, the main hcd when the USB2 root hub has no ports, and NULL once the
shared hcd is gone, which keeps the original meaning of the check.
Tested on an Asus RT-N18U (BCM47081), which has a single roothub. Before
the change nothing enumerates on the USB3 port; after it SuperSpeed
devices enumerate normally over repeated connect and disconnect cycles,
the change bits shown above clear, and USB2 is unaffected on both ports.
Fixes: 4736ebd7fcaf ("usb: host: xhci-plat: omit shared hcd if either root hub has no ports")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Semih Baskan <strst.gs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806142113.2436238-17-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
@@ -1986,7 +1986,7 @@ static void handle_port_status(struct xh
vdev = xhci->devs[port->slot_id];
/* We might get interrupts after shared_hcd is removed */
- if (port->rhub == &xhci->usb3_rhub && xhci->shared_hcd == NULL) {
+ if (port->rhub == &xhci->usb3_rhub && xhci_get_usb3_hcd(xhci) == NULL) {
xhci_dbg(xhci, "ignore port event for removed USB3 hcd\n");
bogus_port_status = true;
goto cleanup;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 59/99] xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_register_driver() failure
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (57 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 58/99] usb: xhci: Handle USB3 port events when there is one roothub Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 60/99] xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_alloc_driver() failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (50 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Mathias Nyman, Lucas De Marchi
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>
commit a916fa66a43e10f63198b6ce978badffc678821a upstream.
If tty_register_driver() fails, it drops the reference, but fails to set
the global dbc_tty_driver to NULL, causing the unregister to be called
again when module exits.
On module unload dbc_tty_exit() only gates its cleanup on the driver
pointer being non-NULL, so it operates on the already-freed driver:
module_init(xhci_hcd_init)
xhci_hcd_init()
xhci_dbc_init() [return value ignored]
dbc_tty_init()
tty_register_driver() fails
tty_driver_kref_put() -> driver freed
(dbc_tty_driver left dangling)
...
module_exit(xhci_hcd_fini)
xhci_hcd_fini()
xhci_dbc_exit()
dbc_tty_exit()
if (dbc_tty_driver) -> true (dangling)
tty_unregister_driver() -> use-after-free
Fixes: 4521f1613940 ("xhci: dbctty: split dbc tty driver registration and unregistration functions.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10
Cc: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806142113.2436238-8-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
@@ -619,6 +619,7 @@ int dbc_tty_init(void)
pr_err("Can't register dbc tty driver\n");
tty_driver_kref_put(dbc_tty_driver);
idr_destroy(&dbc_tty_minors);
+ dbc_tty_driver = NULL;
}
return ret;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 60/99] xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_alloc_driver() failure
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (58 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 59/99] xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_register_driver() failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 61/99] fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (49 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Mathias Nyman, Lucas De Marchi
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>
commit 25b8dfc13495a6c1cf4abacc8ef20196c7f20e5c upstream.
Make sure to set dbc_tty_driver to NULL to match the check in
dbc_tty_exit(). For that, make detached error handling path common to the
other branch in the same function.
Fixes: 4521f1613940 ("xhci: dbctty: split dbc tty driver registration and unregistration functions.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10
Cc: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806142113.2436238-9-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
@@ -596,8 +596,8 @@ int dbc_tty_init(void)
dbc_tty_driver = tty_alloc_driver(64, TTY_DRIVER_REAL_RAW |
TTY_DRIVER_DYNAMIC_DEV);
if (IS_ERR(dbc_tty_driver)) {
- idr_destroy(&dbc_tty_minors);
- return PTR_ERR(dbc_tty_driver);
+ ret = PTR_ERR(dbc_tty_driver);
+ goto fail;
}
dbc_tty_driver->driver_name = "dbc_serial";
@@ -617,12 +617,18 @@ int dbc_tty_init(void)
ret = tty_register_driver(dbc_tty_driver);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Can't register dbc tty driver\n");
- tty_driver_kref_put(dbc_tty_driver);
- idr_destroy(&dbc_tty_minors);
- dbc_tty_driver = NULL;
+ goto fail_put;
}
return ret;
+
+fail_put:
+ tty_driver_kref_put(dbc_tty_driver);
+fail:
+ idr_destroy(&dbc_tty_minors);
+ dbc_tty_driver = NULL;
+
+ return ret;
}
void dbc_tty_exit(void)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 61/99] fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (59 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 60/99] xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_alloc_driver() failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 62/99] fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on open O_TRUNC DAX failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (48 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Baokun Li, Miklos Szeredi
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>
commit 9afeca0d569c9fc89d758fe7a9339d1e8afb1546 upstream.
fuse_do_setattr() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate
(fault_blocked = true) and releases it at the out:/error: labels. But
when a writeback flush is also needed, a write_inode_now() failure
returns directly and leaks the lock, so any later fault or truncate on
the file stalls on the stale rwsem.
For example, truncate(2) on a setuid file reaches fuse_do_setattr()
with both ATTR_SIZE and ATTR_MODE set:
truncate(2)
└─ do_truncate()
├─ dentry_needs_remove_privs() # S_ISUID
└─ notify_change() # KILL_SUID -> ATTR_MODE
└─ fuse_setattr() # no killpriv:
│ # ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE
└─ fuse_do_setattr()
├─ filemap_invalidate_lock() # IS_DAX && is_truncate
└─ write_inode_now() # is_wb && ATTR_MODE
└─ if (err) # e.g. daemon -> -EIO
return err # <- lock leaked
Fix this by adding an unlock label that releases the lock before
returning the error, and use it for the fuse_dax_break_layouts()
failure path as well.
Fixes: 6ae330cad6ef ("virtiofs: serialize truncate/punch_hole and dax fault path")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/fuse/dir.c | 9 ++++-----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
@@ -1940,10 +1940,8 @@ int fuse_do_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *id
filemap_invalidate_lock(mapping);
fault_blocked = true;
err = fuse_dax_break_layouts(inode, 0, -1);
- if (err) {
- filemap_invalidate_unlock(mapping);
- return err;
- }
+ if (err)
+ goto unlock;
}
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_OPEN) {
@@ -1970,7 +1968,7 @@ int fuse_do_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *id
ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
err = write_inode_now(inode, true);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto unlock;
fuse_set_nowrite(inode);
fuse_release_nowrite(inode);
@@ -2078,6 +2076,7 @@ error:
clear_bit(FUSE_I_SIZE_UNSTABLE, &fi->state);
+unlock:
if (fault_blocked)
filemap_invalidate_unlock(mapping);
return err;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 62/99] fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on open O_TRUNC DAX failure
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (60 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 61/99] fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 63/99] usb: usbtest: disable dynamic ID support Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (47 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Baokun Li, Miklos Szeredi
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>
commit a927f1867e61b78f39f9da0bbba3c98c2ca151fe upstream.
fuse_open() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate
(dax_truncate = true) and releases it before the out_inode_unlock
label. But when fuse_dax_break_layouts() fails, the goto
out_inode_unlock skips the unlock and leaks the rwsem, so any later
fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale lock.
fuse_dax_break_layouts() can fail with -ERESTARTSYS when a signal
interrupts the wait for busy DAX pages to drain:
open("file", O_RDWR | O_TRUNC)
└─ fuse_open()
├─ filemap_invalidate_lock() # dax_truncate
└─ fuse_dax_break_layouts()
└─ dax_break_layout()
└─ wait_page_idle() # TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE
└─ fuse_wait_dax_page() # unlock, schedule, re-lock
└─ signal → -ERESTARTSYS
goto out_inode_unlock # <- lock leaked
Fix this by moving filemap_invalidate_unlock() below the label so
that all error paths release the lock, and rename the label to
out_unlock as it now covers more than just the inode lock.
Fixes: 2fdbb8dd0155 ("fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page invalidation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/fuse/file.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/fuse/file.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/file.c
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ static int fuse_open(struct inode *inode
filemap_invalidate_lock(inode->i_mapping);
err = fuse_dax_break_layouts(inode, 0, -1);
if (err)
- goto out_inode_unlock;
+ goto out_unlock;
}
if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate)
@@ -291,9 +291,9 @@ static int fuse_open(struct inode *inode
else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE))
invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping);
}
+out_unlock:
if (dax_truncate)
filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping);
-out_inode_unlock:
if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate)
inode_unlock(inode);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 63/99] usb: usbtest: disable dynamic ID support
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 62/99] fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on open O_TRUNC DAX failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 64/99] usb: gadget: f_tcm: keep port count until LUN teardown completes Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (46 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzbot+7e1e5911f9eac50bedc7,
Aleksandr Nogikh, syzbot
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
commit 00e2071f6d5621a5ddea311a5e6b143ae6e474af upstream.
The usbtest driver relies on the driver_info field of struct usb_device_id
to point to a valid struct usbtest_info descriptor. This structure contains
essential test configurations, such as endpoint addresses and test modes,
which are required during probe.
When a user dynamically adds a new device ID via the sysfs new_id
interface without specifying a reference device, the USB core initializes
driver_info to 0 (NULL). When a matching device is subsequently probed,
usbtest_probe() unconditionally casts driver_info to a struct usbtest_info
pointer and dereferences it, leading to a NULL pointer dereference crash:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
RIP: 0010:usbtest_probe+0x3b9/0x1280 drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c:2822
Because usbtest strictly requires pre-defined usbtest_info descriptors
to function, dynamic ID binding via sysfs is fundamentally unsupported
for this driver.
Fix this by setting .no_dynamic_id = 1 on usbtest_driver. This instructs
the USB core to skip creating the new_id and remove_id sysfs interfaces
for usbtest, preventing invalid dynamic ID entries from being created.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+7e1e5911f9eac50bedc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7e1e5911f9eac50bedc7
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806152651.2370795-1-nogikh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c
@@ -3053,6 +3053,7 @@ static struct usb_driver usbtest_driver
.disconnect = usbtest_disconnect,
.suspend = usbtest_suspend,
.resume = usbtest_resume,
+ .no_dynamic_id = 1,
};
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 64/99] usb: gadget: f_tcm: keep port count until LUN teardown completes
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 63/99] usb: usbtest: disable dynamic ID support Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 65/99] tls: device: fix out-of-bounds write in tls_append_frag() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (45 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Shuangpeng Bai
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
commit c39d0916da47d94909391876c9e5bd429ea7b1b9 upstream.
tcm_usbg_drop_nexus() permits session removal once tpg_port_count
reaches zero. However, usbg_port_unlink() currently decrements that
count from the fabric_pre_unlink() callback, before core_dev_del_lun()
waits for active se_lun references to drain.
If removal of the last LUN races a nexus removal, the latter can observe
a zero port count and call target_remove_session(). This frees
sess_cmd_map while an in-flight struct usbg_cmd, including its work item,
can still be accessed.
Overlapping the last-LUN unlink with nexus removal reproduces this
lifetime violation as a DEBUG_OBJECTS "free active" warning for
usbg_cmd_work, followed by a target-core BUG/Oops.
The generic target-core unlink path has no callback after
core_dev_del_lun() completes. Add an optional fabric_post_unlink()
callback and use it for the f_tcm port count. The count now remains
nonzero until core_dev_del_lun() has finished draining active LUN
references, preventing nexus removal from freeing the session during
command completion.
Fixes: c52661d60f63 ("usb-gadget: Initial merge of target module for UASP + BOT")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807060733.3186624-1-shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c | 8 ++++++++
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c | 2 +-
include/target/target_core_fabric.h | 2 ++
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c
@@ -690,6 +690,14 @@ static void target_fabric_port_unlink(
}
core_dev_del_lun(se_tpg, lun);
+
+ if (tf->tf_ops->fabric_post_unlink) {
+ /*
+ * Allow fabrics to release state that must remain valid until
+ * core_dev_del_lun() has drained all active LUN references.
+ */
+ tf->tf_ops->fabric_post_unlink(se_tpg, lun);
+ }
}
static void target_fabric_port_release(struct config_item *item)
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c
@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ static const struct target_core_fabric_o
.fabric_enable_tpg = usbg_enable_tpg,
.fabric_drop_tpg = usbg_drop_tpg,
.fabric_post_link = usbg_port_link,
- .fabric_pre_unlink = usbg_port_unlink,
+ .fabric_post_unlink = usbg_port_unlink,
.fabric_init_nodeacl = usbg_init_nodeacl,
.tfc_wwn_attrs = usbg_wwn_attrs,
--- a/include/target/target_core_fabric.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_fabric.h
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ struct target_core_fabric_ops {
struct se_lun *);
void (*fabric_pre_unlink)(struct se_portal_group *,
struct se_lun *);
+ void (*fabric_post_unlink)(struct se_portal_group *se_tpg,
+ struct se_lun *lun);
struct se_tpg_np *(*fabric_make_np)(struct se_portal_group *,
struct config_group *, const char *);
void (*fabric_drop_np)(struct se_tpg_np *);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 65/99] tls: device: fix out-of-bounds write in tls_append_frag()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 64/99] usb: gadget: f_tcm: keep port count until LUN teardown completes Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 66/99] gtp: serialize PDP context updates Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jiayuan Chen, Paolo Abeni
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
commit b17cf742eaad70ae29ac558cefb3aa9bbeea03d4 upstream.
Found with syzkaller and a local syzbot instance running on top of a
netdevsim TLS offload emulation; tls_device.c is otherwise only reachable
on a machine with a NIC that implements the offload.
tls_push_data() only checks whether the open record still has room for
another frag at the bottom of its loop, and the MSG_MORE early break
skips that check. The record survives to the next syscall with the frag
count it already had, and tls_append_frag() does not check either, so
with TLS_TX_ZEROCOPY_RO every splice(SPLICE_F_MORE) of a byte or two adds
a non-coalescing pipe page and num_frags walks off the end of
tls_record_info.frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS]. Once the record is pushed,
tls_push_record() runs the same index over sg_tx_data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS] and
the sg_set_page() writes land on the destruct_work that follows it, which
the workqueue then calls.
The byte limit is fine because copy drops to 0 and the loop falls through
to the same check; the frag count has no such feedback.
Push the record rather than keep a full one open, which is what a plain
TCP socket does - tcp_sendmsg_locked() uses tcp_mark_push() and
new_segment in both the copy and the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES paths, and tls_sw
already sets full_record when the sk_msg ring fills up, MSG_MORE or not.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in tls_append_frag ( net/tls/tls_device.c:269)
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881104d1530 by task tls_oob/450
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 450 Comm: tls_oob Not tainted 7.2.0-rc7+ #329 PREEMPT
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
tls_append_frag (net/tls/tls_device.c:269)
tls_push_data (net/tls/tls_device.c:518)
tls_device_sendmsg (net/tls/tls_device.c:583)
inet_sendmsg (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:865)
sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:775 net/socket.c:790 net/socket.c:813)
splice_to_socket (fs/splice.c:884)
do_splice (fs/splice.c:936 fs/splice.c:1349)
__do_splice (fs/splice.c:1431)
__x64_sys_splice (fs/splice.c:1634 fs/splice.c:1616)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
</TASK>
and, once the record is pushed:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:300:24
index 18 is out of range for type 'skb_frag_t [17]'
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:301:41
index 18 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:302:39
index 18 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:307:38
index 26 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'
kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea000411a680
#PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation
Oops: Oops: 0011 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
Workqueue: ktls_device_destruct 0xffffea000411a680
RIP: 0010:0xffffea000411a680
Call Trace:
<TASK>
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3405 kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
</TASK>
Fixes: e8f69799810c ("net/tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260823084758.20936-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/tls/tls_device.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/tls/tls_device.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c
@@ -530,7 +530,8 @@ handle_error:
if (!size) {
last_record:
tls_push_record_flags = flags;
- if (flags & MSG_MORE) {
+ if ((flags & MSG_MORE) &&
+ record->num_frags < MAX_SKB_FRAGS - 1) {
more = true;
break;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 66/99] gtp: serialize PDP context updates
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 65/99] tls: device: fix out-of-bounds write in tls_append_frag() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 67/99] x86/CPU/AMD: Carve out a Zen5 models range Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Qing Ming, Jakub Kicinski
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qing Ming <a0yami@mailbox.org>
commit 498386b6d402737db1e2eeed4c385acbf0ef9e34 upstream.
PDP contexts can be deleted through GTP_CMD_DELPDP or while the GTP
network device is being unregistered. The latter is serialized by RTNL,
but the generic-netlink delete path only holds RCU.
Running both paths concurrently can therefore make both paths delete the
same PDP context. The issue was found through static analysis and
reproduced on a KASAN-enabled kernel by a simple two-thread program
racing GTP_CMD_DELPDP against RTM_DELLINK:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range
[0xdead000000000120-0xdead000000000127]
RIP: gtp_genl_del_pdp+0x1c1/0x420 [gtp]
RBP: dead000000000122
The second deletion dereferenced the poisoned hlist pprev pointer.
Serialize gtp_pdp_add(), gtp_genl_del_pdp(), and gtp_dellink() with a
shared mutex. Keep the mutex held until the final use of a PDP context in
the NEWPDP path, and keep the RCU read-side section around the complete
PDP context use in the DELPDP path.
Fixes: 459aa660eb1d ("gtp: add initial driver for datapath of GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Qing Ming <a0yami@mailbox.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260818150000.7670-1-a0yami@mailbox.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/gtp.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/gtp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/gtp.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
@@ -105,6 +106,7 @@ struct gtp_net {
};
static u32 gtp_h_initval;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(gtp_pdp_lock);
static struct genl_family gtp_genl_family;
@@ -148,7 +150,8 @@ static struct pdp_ctx *gtp0_pdp_find(str
head = >p->tid_hash[gtp0_hashfn(tid) % gtp->hash_size];
- hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pdp, head, hlist_tid) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pdp, head, hlist_tid,
+ lockdep_is_held(>p_pdp_lock)) {
if (pdp->af == family &&
pdp->gtp_version == GTP_V0 &&
pdp->u.v0.tid == tid)
@@ -165,7 +168,8 @@ static struct pdp_ctx *gtp1_pdp_find(str
head = >p->tid_hash[gtp1u_hashfn(tid) % gtp->hash_size];
- hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pdp, head, hlist_tid) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pdp, head, hlist_tid,
+ lockdep_is_held(>p_pdp_lock)) {
if (pdp->af == family &&
pdp->gtp_version == GTP_V1 &&
pdp->u.v1.i_tei == tid)
@@ -182,7 +186,8 @@ static struct pdp_ctx *ipv4_pdp_find(str
head = >p->addr_hash[ipv4_hashfn(ms_addr) % gtp->hash_size];
- hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pdp, head, hlist_addr) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pdp, head, hlist_addr,
+ lockdep_is_held(>p_pdp_lock)) {
if (pdp->af == AF_INET &&
pdp->ms.addr.s_addr == ms_addr)
return pdp;
@@ -217,7 +222,8 @@ static struct pdp_ctx *ipv6_pdp_find(str
head = >p->addr_hash[ipv6_hashfn(ms_addr) % gtp->hash_size];
- hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pdp, head, hlist_addr) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pdp, head, hlist_addr,
+ lockdep_is_held(>p_pdp_lock)) {
if (pdp->af == AF_INET6 &&
ipv6_pdp_addr_equal(&pdp->ms.addr6, ms_addr))
return pdp;
@@ -1550,9 +1556,11 @@ static void gtp_dellink(struct net_devic
struct pdp_ctx *pctx;
int i;
+ mutex_lock(>p_pdp_lock);
for (i = 0; i < gtp->hash_size; i++)
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(pctx, next, >p->tid_hash[i], hlist_tid)
pdp_context_delete(pctx);
+ mutex_unlock(>p_pdp_lock);
list_del(>p->list);
unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, head);
@@ -2051,6 +2059,7 @@ static int gtp_genl_new_pdp(struct sk_bu
goto out_unlock;
}
+ mutex_lock(>p_pdp_lock);
pctx = gtp_pdp_add(gtp, sk, info);
if (IS_ERR(pctx)) {
err = PTR_ERR(pctx);
@@ -2058,6 +2067,7 @@ static int gtp_genl_new_pdp(struct sk_bu
gtp_tunnel_notify(pctx, GTP_CMD_NEWPDP, GFP_KERNEL);
err = 0;
}
+ mutex_unlock(>p_pdp_lock);
out_unlock:
rtnl_unlock();
@@ -2135,6 +2145,8 @@ static int gtp_genl_del_pdp(struct sk_bu
if (!info->attrs[GTPA_VERSION])
return -EINVAL;
+ mutex_lock(>p_pdp_lock);
+
rcu_read_lock();
pctx = gtp_find_pdp(sock_net(skb->sk), info->attrs);
@@ -2155,6 +2167,7 @@ static int gtp_genl_del_pdp(struct sk_bu
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
+ mutex_unlock(>p_pdp_lock);
return err;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 67/99] x86/CPU/AMD: Carve out a Zen5 models range
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (65 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 66/99] gtp: serialize PDP context updates Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 68/99] net/tcp: fix TCP-AO key deletion in VRFs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Pratik Vishwakarma,
Borislav Petkov (AMD), stable
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pratik Vishwakarma <Pratik.Vishwakarma@amd.com>
commit 52075128273ace53e6254e37899a47d40d4baf45 upstream.
Family 0x1a, model 0xd0..0xd7 belongs to the Zen5 generation. Carve it
out from the larger, Zen6 range where former doesn't belong.
[ bp: Rewrite commit message, add tags. ]
Fixes: b5f53e6d3d32 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Add more Zen6 models")
Signed-off-by: Pratik Vishwakarma <Pratik.Vishwakarma@amd.com>
[ bp: Backport only the Zen5 bits. ]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260729055459.15904-1-Pratik.Vishwakarma@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -523,6 +523,7 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
case 0x00 ... 0x2f:
case 0x40 ... 0x4f:
case 0x60 ... 0x7f:
+ case 0xd0 ... 0xd7:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN5);
break;
default:
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 68/99] net/tcp: fix TCP-AO key deletion in VRFs
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (66 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 67/99] x86/CPU/AMD: Carve out a Zen5 models range Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 69/99] tcp: fix AO info use-after-free in tcp_ao_connect_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Rastislav Szabo, David Ahern,
Dmitry Safonov, Paolo Abeni
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rastislav Szabo <rastislav.szabo@isovalent.com>
commit 94ad9e114a1c7b16ea418c1456ac3835e038ab3f upstream.
TCP-AO keys with TCP_AO_KEYF_IFINDEX store the VRF L3 interface index in
l3index. tcp_ao_del_cmd() validates the supplied ifindex, but does not
assign it to its local l3index before matching keys.
As a result, deleting a key scoped to a non-default VRF always fails with
ENOENT because it is matched against l3index 0.
Fixes: 248411b8cb89 ("net/tcp: Wire up l3index to TCP-AO")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rastislav Szabo <rastislav.szabo@isovalent.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260822201119.272269-1-rastislav.szabo@isovalent.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c
@@ -1854,6 +1854,9 @@ static int tcp_ao_del_cmd(struct sock *s
if (cmd.ifindex && !(cmd.keyflags & TCP_AO_KEYF_IFINDEX))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (cmd.keyflags & TCP_AO_KEYF_IFINDEX)
+ l3index = cmd.ifindex;
+
ao_info = setsockopt_ao_info(sk);
if (IS_ERR(ao_info))
return PTR_ERR(ao_info);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 69/99] tcp: fix AO info use-after-free in tcp_ao_connect_init()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (67 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 68/99] net/tcp: fix TCP-AO key deletion in VRFs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 70/99] net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of current_key on reconnect to another peer Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Qing Ming, Eric Dumazet, Paolo Abeni
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qing Ming <a0yami@mailbox.org>
commit ea30dc5267e367b8a5e1e06cc074f813bcbf18b2 upstream.
tcp_v4_connect() adds a SYN-SENT socket to the ehash before calling
tcp_connect(). If TCP-AO is configured, tcp_connect() first verifies that
a key matches the peer and the bound device's current L3 master.
tcp_ao_connect_init() later resolves the L3 master again and removes keys
which do not match it.
The socket lock does not stabilize the bound device's VRF membership.
Detaching the device from its VRF between the initial validation and the
L3-master calculation in tcp_ao_connect_init() can therefore make the
validation succeed while initialization observes the default L3 domain and
removes the only key. The subsequent AO lookup then fails, so the no-key
path clears tp->ao_info and frees it directly.
The receive path can find the socket in the ehash and load tp->ao_info
under RCU before acquiring the socket lock. A reader which loaded the old
pointer can thus continue into tcp_inbound_ao_hash() after the direct free.
The issue was found during a static audit of TCP-AO object lifetime. An
unprivileged reproducer in self-created user and network namespaces raced
connect() with detaching a veth from its VRF while sending TCP-AO segments.
It triggered the same KASAN report on two fresh boots:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tcp_inbound_ao_hash+0x585/0x19f0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800bf88128 by task tcp_ao_vrf_race/232
Call Trace:
tcp_inbound_ao_hash+0x585/0x19f0
tcp_inbound_hash+0x677/0xa80
tcp_v4_rcv+0x1c3e/0x3ab0
Allocated by task 235:
tcp_ao_alloc_info+0x43/0xf0
tcp_ao_add_cmd+0xdf7/0x13b0
do_tcp_setsockopt+0x168c/0x2640
Freed by task 235:
kfree+0x1b8/0x550
tcp_connect+0x252/0x4f00
tcp_v4_connect+0x1114/0x1720
The bad address is 40 bytes inside the freed 128-byte object, matching the
tcp_ao_info counters.key_not_found field. The two runs used 1000 attempts
each, reached the no-key path 366 and 411 times, and produced one and two
KASAN reports respectively. With this change, the same reproducer reached
the no-key path 366 times in 1000 attempts without a KASAN report or oops.
Use tcp_ao_destroy_sock() for the no-key path. It unpublishes the AO info,
updates the socket memory and static-key accounting, and defers the free
until after an RCU grace period.
Also drop the WARN_ON_ONCE() and its stale comment. The VRF detach race
makes the no-key state reachable during normal operation, so it is a
handled condition rather than an impossible assertion. On panic_on_warn
kernels the WARN would turn this handled race into a kernel panic.
Fixes: 248411b8cb89 ("net/tcp: Wire up l3index to TCP-AO")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: Qing Ming <a0yami@mailbox.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260825072033.6921-1-a0yami@mailbox.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c | 7 +------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c
@@ -1147,12 +1147,7 @@ void tcp_ao_connect_init(struct sock *sk
ao_info->lisn = htonl(tp->write_seq);
ao_info->snd_sne = 0;
} else {
- /* Can't happen: tcp_connect() verifies that there's
- * at least one tcp-ao key that matches the remote peer.
- */
- WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
- rcu_assign_pointer(tp->ao_info, NULL);
- kfree(ao_info);
+ tcp_ao_destroy_sock(sk, false);
}
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 70/99] net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of current_key on reconnect to another peer
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (68 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 69/99] tcp: fix AO info use-after-free in tcp_ao_connect_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 71/99] xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Hyunwoo Kim, Simon Horman,
Paolo Abeni, Jakub Kicinski
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
commit da4471557f279d0f56605158a625bb6e49ef7d41 upstream.
tcp_inbound_ao_hash() is called before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken,
with only rcu_read_lock() held. On the fast path for established
sockets, if the rnext_keyid sent by the peer differs from
current_key->sndid, the key the peer asked for is looked up and stored
in current_key. The lookup is inside the RCU read side, but current_key
outlives it.
When the socket is disconnected and connect() is called again for
another peer, tcp_ao_connect_init() unlinks every key that does not
match the new peer and frees it with call_rcu(). If current_key points
at such a key, it is cleared to NULL.
The fast path reads sk_state only once on entry, so a softirq that got
into it while the socket was still established can update current_key
after that loop has already run. The update is inside the RCU read side,
so it comes before the call_rcu() callback, and once the callback frees
the key, current_key is left pointing at freed memory.
The next transmission picks that pointer up in tcp_get_current_key().
tcp_ao_transmit_skb() then reads the traffic key from the freed object,
which is the use-after-free.
Wait for one grace period before unlinking, and only if a key is going
to be removed. By the time tcp_connect() runs the socket is already in
TCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_AO_ESTABLISHED does not contain TCPF_SYN_SENT, so
a softirq entering after the wait cannot reach the fast path, and the
ones already in it have finished. The existing NULL handling in the loop
is then enough.
Fixes: 0a3a809089eb ("net/tcp: Verify inbound TCP-AO signed segments")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aoIriv3pHDgII2YR@v4bel
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c
@@ -1120,6 +1120,15 @@ void tcp_ao_connect_init(struct sock *sk
l3index = l3mdev_master_ifindex_by_index(sock_net(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(key, &ao_info->head, node) {
+ if (tcp_ao_key_cmp(key, l3index, addr, key->prefixlen,
+ family, -1, -1)) {
+ /* pairs with tcp_inbound_ao_hash() */
+ synchronize_rcu();
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(key, next, &ao_info->head, node) {
if (!tcp_ao_key_cmp(key, l3index, addr, key->prefixlen, family, -1, -1))
continue;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 71/99] xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (69 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 70/99] net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of current_key on reconnect to another peer Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 72/99] xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, zdi-disclosures, Sabrina Dubroca,
Breno Leitao, Steffen Klassert
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
commit deb232e884877bf10b4ce2580909eedec986c284 upstream.
ZDI reported and analyzed a race condition during close for espintcp
sockets:
espintcp_close() frees emsg->skb via kfree_skb() without holding
any socket lock. Concurrently, the xfrm_trans_reinject work queue
invokes esp_output_tcp_finish() -> espintcp_push_skb() ->
espintcp_push_msgs() -> skb_send_sock_locked(), which reads the
same skb as a data source.
Fix this by adding a synchronize_rcu() call after resetting sk_prot,
since esp_output_tcp_finish() runs under RCU and won't use a socket
with sk_prot == &tcp_prot. Simply taking the socket lock in
espintcp_close() could lead to leaks, if esp_output_tcp_finish()
re-adds an skb in the slot we just freed. After this, the existing
barrier() is no longer needed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/xfrm/espintcp.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
@@ -518,7 +518,8 @@ static void espintcp_close(struct sock *
strp_stop(&ctx->strp);
sk->sk_prot = &tcp_prot;
- barrier();
+
+ synchronize_rcu();
disable_work_sync(&ctx->work);
strp_done(&ctx->strp);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 72/99] xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 71/99] xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 73/99] xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Vega, Zhiling Zou, Ren Wei,
Steffen Klassert
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhiling Zou <roxy520tt@gmail.com>
commit e1d7c5ac1c246ce5775f604515de0a59fbf2116e upstream.
ESP-in-TCP receives records through the TCP strparser. handle_esp()
restores skb->dev from the saved skb_iif before passing the packet into
the XFRM input path.
Queued TCP data can be processed after the original ingress device has
been removed, for example during veth or net namespace teardown. In that
case dev_get_by_index_rcu() returns NULL. The XFRM IPv4 and IPv6 input
paths both expect skb->dev to be valid while building the route lookup,
so queued ESP-in-TCP data can dereference a NULL device.
Drop the packet if the saved ingress device can no longer be resolved.
Such a packet can no longer be routed through the normal XFRM receive
path, and this preserves the existing behaviour for packets whose ingress
device still exists.
Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Zhiling Zou <roxy520tt@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Reviewed-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/xfrm/espintcp.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ static void handle_esp(struct sk_buff *s
rcu_read_lock();
skb->dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif);
+ if (!skb->dev) {
+ XFRM_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_XFRMINERROR);
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ goto out;
+ }
local_bh_disable();
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6)
@@ -48,6 +53,7 @@ static void handle_esp(struct sk_buff *s
#endif
xfrm4_rcv_encap(skb, IPPROTO_ESP, 0, TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP);
local_bh_enable();
+out:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 73/99] xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 72/99] xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 74/99] xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Vega, Zihan Xi, Ren Wei,
Steffen Klassert
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zihan Xi <xizh2024@lzu.edu.cn>
commit 763fe700b7c58ad64fe5202c5638848244dd4127 upstream.
nat_keepalive_work() walks the state table while xfrm_state_walk()
holds net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock. Its callback then acquires x->lock,
which conflicts with the delete path taking the same locks in reverse
order via xfrm_state_delete() and __xfrm_state_delete(). This creates
an AB-BA deadlock that is reported by lockdep when a NAT keepalive
worker races with SA deletion.
Fix this by splitting the keepalive walk into two phases. First,
collect the candidate states while the walk holds xfrm_state_lock and
take a reference on each state. Then, after the walk completes, process
each collected state and acquire x->lock without nesting it under
xfrm_state_lock.
Fixes: f531d13bdfe3 ("xfrm: support sending NAT keepalives in ESP in UDP states")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <xizh2024@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_nat_keepalive.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_nat_keepalive.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_nat_keepalive.c
index eb1b6f67739e..8679c68c10a1 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_nat_keepalive.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_nat_keepalive.c
@@ -156,24 +156,51 @@ static void nat_keepalive_send(struct nat_keepalive *ka)
}
struct nat_keepalive_work_ctx {
+ struct list_head states;
time64_t next_run;
time64_t now;
};
-static int nat_keepalive_work_single(struct xfrm_state *x, int count, void *ptr)
+struct nat_keepalive_state {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct xfrm_state *x;
+};
+
+static int nat_keepalive_work_collect(struct xfrm_state *x, int count, void *ptr)
{
struct nat_keepalive_work_ctx *ctx = ptr;
+ struct nat_keepalive_state *state;
+
+ if (!READ_ONCE(x->nat_keepalive_interval))
+ return 0;
+
+ state = kmalloc_obj(*state, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!state)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ xfrm_state_hold(x);
+ state->x = x;
+ list_add_tail(&state->list, &ctx->states);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void nat_keepalive_work_single(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct nat_keepalive_work_ctx *ctx)
+{
bool send_keepalive = false;
struct nat_keepalive ka;
- time64_t next_run;
+ time64_t next_run = 0;
u32 interval;
int delta;
+ spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
+
+ if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_DEAD)
+ goto out;
+
interval = x->nat_keepalive_interval;
if (!interval)
- return 0;
-
- spin_lock(&x->lock);
+ goto out;
delta = (int)(ctx->now - x->lastused);
if (delta < interval) {
@@ -187,29 +214,41 @@ static int nat_keepalive_work_single(struct xfrm_state *x, int count, void *ptr)
send_keepalive = true;
}
- spin_unlock(&x->lock);
+out:
+ spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
if (send_keepalive)
nat_keepalive_send(&ka);
- if (!ctx->next_run || next_run < ctx->next_run)
+ if (next_run && (!ctx->next_run || next_run < ctx->next_run))
ctx->next_run = next_run;
- return 0;
}
static void nat_keepalive_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
+ struct nat_keepalive_state *state, *tmp;
struct nat_keepalive_work_ctx ctx;
struct xfrm_state_walk walk;
struct net *net;
+ int err;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx.states);
ctx.next_run = 0;
ctx.now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
net = container_of(work, struct net, xfrm.nat_keepalive_work.work);
xfrm_state_walk_init(&walk, IPPROTO_ESP, NULL);
- xfrm_state_walk(net, &walk, nat_keepalive_work_single, &ctx);
+ err = xfrm_state_walk(net, &walk, nat_keepalive_work_collect, &ctx);
xfrm_state_walk_done(&walk, net);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(state, tmp, &ctx.states, list) {
+ nat_keepalive_work_single(state->x, &ctx);
+ xfrm_state_put(state->x);
+ kfree(state);
+ }
+ if (err == -ENOMEM) {
+ schedule_delayed_work(&net->xfrm.nat_keepalive_work, 0);
+ return;
+ }
if (ctx.next_run)
schedule_delayed_work(&net->xfrm.nat_keepalive_work,
(ctx.next_run - ctx.now) * HZ);
--
2.55.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 74/99] xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 73/99] xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 75/99] xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (35 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada,
Steffen Klassert
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>
commit 7bad4bda74dc4713f398d3b7624ff05478e3a568 upstream.
AH6 rearranges routing-header addresses before computing or verifying the
ICV. ipv6_rearrange_rthdr() assumes that segments_left is not larger than
the number of addresses described by the routing header's hdrlen field.
That assumption does not hold for raw IPv6 HDRINCL packets. A packet with
hdrlen equal to 2 describes one address, but can carry an arbitrary
segments_left value. With segments_left equal to 255, the function moves
its address pointer 4,064 bytes backwards and passes a 4,064-byte length to
memmove(), resulting in an out-of-bounds access.
Validate the invariant locally before modifying the routing header or
performing any address-pointer arithmetic, and propagate malformed-header
errors to the existing AH6 input and output error paths.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: avom-custom-harness:gpt-5.5-qwen3.6-mod-mix
Signed-off-by: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv6/ah6.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv6/ah6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ah6.c
@@ -232,26 +232,28 @@ static void ipv6_rearrange_destopt(struc
* Rearrange the destination address in @iph and the addresses in @rthdr
* so that they appear in the order they will at the final destination.
* See Appendix A2 of RFC 2402 for details.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -EINVAL if segments_left exceeds the number of
+ * addresses described by hdrlen.
*/
-static void ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(struct ipv6hdr *iph, struct ipv6_rt_hdr *rthdr)
+static int ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(struct ipv6hdr *iph, struct ipv6_rt_hdr *rthdr)
{
- int segments, segments_left;
+ unsigned int segments, segments_left;
struct in6_addr *addrs;
struct in6_addr final_addr;
segments_left = rthdr->segments_left;
if (segments_left == 0)
- return;
- rthdr->segments_left = 0;
+ return 0;
- /* The value of rthdr->hdrlen has been verified either by the system
- * call if it is locally generated, or by ipv6_rthdr_rcv() for incoming
- * packets. So we can assume that it is even and that segments is
- * greater than or equal to segments_left.
- *
- * For the same reason we can assume that this option is of type 0.
+ /* Raw locally generated packets can reach AH6 without the invariant
+ * required by the rt0-style address rearrangement below.
*/
segments = rthdr->hdrlen >> 1;
+ if (segments_left > segments)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rthdr->segments_left = 0;
addrs = ((struct rt0_hdr *)rthdr)->addr;
final_addr = addrs[segments - 1];
@@ -261,6 +263,8 @@ static void ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(struct
addrs[0] = iph->daddr;
iph->daddr = final_addr;
+
+ return 0;
}
static int ipv6_clear_mutable_options(struct ipv6hdr *iph, int len, int dir)
@@ -273,6 +277,7 @@ static int ipv6_clear_mutable_options(st
} exthdr = { .iph = iph };
char *end = exthdr.raw + len;
int nexthdr = iph->nexthdr;
+ int err;
exthdr.iph++;
@@ -292,7 +297,9 @@ static int ipv6_clear_mutable_options(st
break;
case NEXTHDR_ROUTING:
- ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(iph, exthdr.rth);
+ err = ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(iph, exthdr.rth);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
break;
default:
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 75/99] xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 74/99] xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 76/99] xfrm: bound nat keepalive state collection Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Vega, Zihan Xi, Ren Wei,
Steffen Klassert
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
commit c12cbf56320fb633484ee0ca1fb7d68d6b64b213 upstream.
attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving
x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no
sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes).
xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth
algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites
x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown
only frees the replacement pointer.
Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that
state from x->props.aalgo.
Fixes: 4447bb33f094 ("xfrm: Store aalg in xfrm_state with a user specified truncation length")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_con
if ((err = attach_auth_trunc(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo,
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC], extack)))
goto error;
- if (!x->props.aalgo) {
+ if (!x->aalg) {
if ((err = attach_auth(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo,
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH], extack)))
goto error;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 76/99] xfrm: bound nat keepalive state collection
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 75/99] xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 77/99] net: bridge: mcast: fix use-after-free of a master VLANs multicast context Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Eyal Birger, Vega, Zihan Xi,
Steffen Klassert
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
commit 4e9442ce551ebd84b52ad649df721e2dc28af95a upstream.
The v1 nat keepalive fix allocates a GFP_ATOMIC object for every state
while collecting references for phase two. This makes the worker's
temporary memory use depend on the number of states and lets -ENOMEM abort
the scan.
Replace the allocated list with a fixed-size batch. When the batch is full,
return a private walk status so xfrm_state_walk() leaves a cursor; drain
the references after the walk releases xfrm_state_lock and resume from
the cursor. This bounds temporary memory use and avoids the allocation
failure path.
The v1 fix also moved nat_keepalive_send() out of the walk callback. Keep
the phase-two drain BH-disabled, as required by local_lock_nested_bh()
used by the keepalive sockets.
Fixes: 763fe700b7c5 ("xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_nat_keepalive.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_nat_keepalive.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_nat_keepalive.c
@@ -155,32 +155,30 @@ static void nat_keepalive_send(struct na
}
}
+enum {
+ NAT_KEEPALIVE_BATCH_SIZE = 16,
+ NAT_KEEPALIVE_BATCH_FULL = 1,
+};
+
struct nat_keepalive_work_ctx {
- struct list_head states;
+ struct xfrm_state *batch[NAT_KEEPALIVE_BATCH_SIZE];
+ unsigned int nr;
time64_t next_run;
time64_t now;
};
-struct nat_keepalive_state {
- struct list_head list;
- struct xfrm_state *x;
-};
-
static int nat_keepalive_work_collect(struct xfrm_state *x, int count, void *ptr)
{
struct nat_keepalive_work_ctx *ctx = ptr;
- struct nat_keepalive_state *state;
if (!READ_ONCE(x->nat_keepalive_interval))
return 0;
- state = kmalloc_obj(*state, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!state)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (ctx->nr == ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->batch))
+ return NAT_KEEPALIVE_BATCH_FULL;
xfrm_state_hold(x);
- state->x = x;
- list_add_tail(&state->list, &ctx->states);
+ ctx->batch[ctx->nr++] = x;
return 0;
}
@@ -226,29 +224,27 @@ out:
static void nat_keepalive_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
- struct nat_keepalive_state *state, *tmp;
struct nat_keepalive_work_ctx ctx;
struct xfrm_state_walk walk;
struct net *net;
- int err;
+ int err, i;
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx.states);
ctx.next_run = 0;
ctx.now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
net = container_of(work, struct net, xfrm.nat_keepalive_work.work);
xfrm_state_walk_init(&walk, IPPROTO_ESP, NULL);
- err = xfrm_state_walk(net, &walk, nat_keepalive_work_collect, &ctx);
+ do {
+ ctx.nr = 0;
+ err = xfrm_state_walk(net, &walk, nat_keepalive_work_collect, &ctx);
+ local_bh_disable();
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx.nr; i++) {
+ nat_keepalive_work_single(ctx.batch[i], &ctx);
+ xfrm_state_put(ctx.batch[i]);
+ }
+ local_bh_enable();
+ } while (err == NAT_KEEPALIVE_BATCH_FULL);
xfrm_state_walk_done(&walk, net);
- list_for_each_entry_safe(state, tmp, &ctx.states, list) {
- nat_keepalive_work_single(state->x, &ctx);
- xfrm_state_put(state->x);
- kfree(state);
- }
- if (err == -ENOMEM) {
- schedule_delayed_work(&net->xfrm.nat_keepalive_work, 0);
- return;
- }
if (ctx.next_run)
schedule_delayed_work(&net->xfrm.nat_keepalive_work,
(ctx.next_run - ctx.now) * HZ);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 77/99] net: bridge: mcast: fix use-after-free of a master VLANs multicast context
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 76/99] xfrm: bound nat keepalive state collection Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 78/99] ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Norbert Szetei, Nikolay Aleksandrov,
Jakub Kicinski
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
commit 50e5c6605cc9c2dd57bd2d1b3459674d19738983 upstream.
br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan() clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under
br->multicast_lock before stopping a VLAN's multicast context. That is
the teardown handshake: lockless readers gate on the flag through
br_multicast_ctx_should_use() -> br_multicast_ctx_vlan_disabled(), so
once it is cleared under the lock no reader can arm the context again.
For a master VLAN the handshake never runs. __vlan_del() clears
BRIDGE_VLAN_INFO_BRENTRY before calling br_vlan_put_master(), so
br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan(masterv, false) returns early on
!br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan): the flag stays set and br->multicast_lock is
never taken. br_vlan_put_master() then drains the context in
br_multicast_ctx_deinit() and frees the VLAN through call_rcu(), while a
reader still inside rcu_read_lock() sees the context as enabled and
re-arms it. The port and port-VLAN branch of the function has no
br_vlan_is_brentry() test and flips the flag under br->multicast_lock,
so it is not affected.
The reader is the bridge transmit path. For a master VLAN
br_multicast_rcv() selects brmctx = &vlan->br_mcast_ctx with
pmctx = NULL, so IGMP sent to the bridge device re-arms the context's
timers after br_multicast_ctx_deinit() has already stopped them.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in detach_if_pending+0x412/0x4a0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88810ac39918 by task brmc/601
__mod_timer+0x51a/0xc50
br_multicast_host_join+0x25b/0x390
__br_multicast_add_group+0x468/0x530
br_ip4_multicast_add_group+0x1a0/0x260
br_multicast_rcv+0x2cda/0x61e0
br_dev_xmit+0x6c4/0x1540
Allocated by task 610:
br_vlan_add+0x111/0xb40
br_vlan_info+0x370/0x3e0
Freed by task 0:
kfree+0x1a7/0x4f0
rcu_core+0x7dc/0x10a0
Only test br_vlan_is_brentry() when enabling, like the
br_multicast_ctx_vlan_global_disabled() test next to it. Disabling then
always clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under br->multicast_lock before
br_multicast_ctx_deinit() drains the context.
Fixes: 7b54aaaf53cb ("net: bridge: multicast: add vlan state initialization and control")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/D400F6C7-543A-4B79-9E5B-D1D8974DE5C9@doyensec.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
@@ -4313,8 +4313,8 @@ void br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan(struct
if (br_vlan_is_master(vlan)) {
br = vlan->br;
- if (!br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan) ||
- (on &&
+ if (on &&
+ (!br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan) ||
br_multicast_ctx_vlan_global_disabled(&vlan->br_mcast_ctx)))
return;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 78/99] ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 77/99] net: bridge: mcast: fix use-after-free of a master VLANs multicast context Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 79/99] batman-adv: reject unrepresentable multicast TVLV offsets Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Andrea Mayer, Kyle Zeng, David Lee,
Jakub Kicinski
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
commit 44930446dde45a7a90fe1446fa38eb0e2c561646 upstream.
End.DX4 and End.DT4 decapsulate an IPv4 packet through
decap_and_validate() and send it directly to IPv4 routing. The inner
packet therefore bypasses ip_rcv_core(), which normally clears IPCB
before IPv4 interprets skb->cb.
The skb instead retains IP6CB data from the outer packet. IP6CB and
IPCB use the same skb->cb storage, so IP6CB(skb)->lastopt overlaps
IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen and srr, while IP6CB(skb)->nhoff overlaps rr and
ts.
The sender can make the stale optlen byte nonzero with a valid outer
extension-header chain. The reproducers put an eight-byte Destination
Options header immediately after the 40-byte IPv6 header and before the
Segment Routing Header. ipv6_destopt_rcv() records the sender-controlled
Destination Options offset in both lastopt and nhoff, setting them to
40. On the reproduced little-endian x86-64 kernel, IPv4 therefore sees
optlen = 40 and rr = 40.
Both tcp_v4_save_options() and __ip_options_echo() skip option copying
when optlen is zero. Here optlen is 40, so the TCP SYN path allocates
room for 40 bytes of option data and calls __ip_options_echo(). The
stale rr value makes that function read inner packet byte 41 as the
Record Route option length. The reproducers set that sender-controlled
byte to 255, so __ip_options_echo() copies 255 bytes into the 40-byte
option-data area.
Separate End.DX4 and End.DT4 reproducers on the unpatched v7.2-rc5
kernel both produced:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo()
Write of size 255
The relevant End.DX4 call path is:
__ip_options_echo
tcp_v4_route_req
tcp_conn_request
tcp_v4_conn_request
tcp_rcv_state_process
tcp_v4_do_rcv
tcp_v4_rcv
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
ip_local_deliver_finish
ip_local_deliver
input_action_end_dx4_finish
input_action_end_dx4
The relevant End.DT4 call path is:
__ip_options_echo
tcp_v4_route_req
tcp_conn_request
tcp_v4_conn_request
tcp_rcv_state_process
tcp_v4_do_rcv
tcp_v4_rcv
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
ip_local_deliver_finish
ip_local_deliver
input_action_end_dt4
tcp_v4_save_options() is inlined into the tcp_v4_route_req() path, so
it does not appear as a separate frame.
When decap_and_validate() handles IPPROTO_IPIP, save the ingress
interface from IP6CB, clear IPCB, and restore the saved value. Doing
this in the common decapsulation path covers End.DX4, End.DT4, and
End.DT46's IPv4 arm.
Use IP6CB(skb)->iif rather than skb->skb_iif. These actions run after
l3mdev processing, which can replace skb_iif with the L3 master;
IP6CB iif still records the receiving interface set at IPv6 ingress.
Fixes: 891ef8dd2a8d ("ipv6: sr: implement additional seg6local actions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Co-developed-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260817085839.946321-1-david.lee@trailofbits.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv6/seg6_local.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c
@@ -256,6 +256,13 @@ static bool decap_and_validate(struct sk
if (iptunnel_pull_offloads(skb))
return false;
+ if (proto == IPPROTO_IPIP) {
+ int iif = IP6CB(skb)->iif;
+
+ memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb)));
+ IPCB(skb)->iif = iif;
+ }
+
return true;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 79/99] batman-adv: reject unrepresentable multicast TVLV offsets
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 78/99] ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 80/99] vxlan: keep the last remote linked during FDB flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Kyle Zeng, David Lee, Sven Eckelmann,
Jakub Kicinski
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
commit f12c2de4f542e3220e17e0606f492110064f04cb upstream.
The network and transport header fields in struct sk_buff are 16-bit
offsets from skb->head, and U16_MAX is reserved as the unset transport
header value. batadv_tvlv_call_handler() sets both fields from a received
multicast TVLV without checking whether the TVLV end is representable.
If the end offset exceeds the field's range, skb_set_transport_header()
truncates it so that the transport header precedes the network header.
The negative difference is then returned by skb_network_header_len() as
a large u32. batadv_mcast_forw_packet() consequently accepts an oversized
multicast tracker and accesses memory beyond the skb data.
Add skb_set_transport_header_careful(), an offset-aware counterpart to
skb_reset_transport_header_careful(), which validates the final
head-relative offset before assigning it. Use the new helper in
batadv_tvlv_call_handler() and reject unrepresentable TVLVs before
setting the network header.
Fixes: 07afe1ba288c ("batman-adv: mcast: implement multicast packet reception and forwarding")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Co-developed-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Acked-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260817084955.944189-1-david.lee@trailofbits.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/skbuff.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/batman-adv/tvlv.c | 5 ++++-
2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
@@ -3055,6 +3055,30 @@ static inline void skb_set_transport_hea
skb->transport_header += offset;
}
+/**
+ * skb_set_transport_header_careful - conditionally set transport header
+ * @skb: buffer to alter
+ * @offset: offset to add to skb->data
+ *
+ * Hardened version of skb_set_transport_header().
+ *
+ * Returns: true if the operation was a success.
+ */
+static inline bool __must_check
+skb_set_transport_header_careful(struct sk_buff *skb, const int offset)
+{
+ long thoff = skb->data - skb->head + offset;
+
+ if (unlikely(thoff != (typeof(skb->transport_header))thoff))
+ return false;
+
+ if (unlikely(thoff == (typeof(skb->transport_header))~0U))
+ return false;
+
+ skb->transport_header = thoff;
+ return true;
+}
+
static inline unsigned char *skb_network_header(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return skb->head + skb->network_header;
--- a/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
@@ -420,8 +420,11 @@ static int batadv_tvlv_call_handler(stru
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
tvlv_offset = (unsigned char *)tvlv_value - skb->data;
+ if (!skb_set_transport_header_careful(skb,
+ tvlv_offset + tvlv_value_len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
skb_set_network_header(skb, tvlv_offset);
- skb_set_transport_header(skb, tvlv_offset + tvlv_value_len);
return tvlv_handler->mcast_handler(bat_priv, skb);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 80/99] vxlan: keep the last remote linked during FDB flush
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 79/99] batman-adv: reject unrepresentable multicast TVLV offsets Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 81/99] netfilter: nf_tables: dont queue packet path object notifications Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Kyle Zeng, David Lee, Ido Schimmel,
Jakub Kicinski
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
commit d5d4a7b538b52db63927773a8905fcd9f78a42e2 upstream.
A non-nexthop FDB entry is expected to have at least one remote while it
remains reachable through the FDB hash table. A filtered bulk flush
violates this invariant when every remote matches: It unlinks the last
remote in vxlan_fdb_dst_destroy() and only afterwards tells vxlan_flush()
to destroy the parent FDB entry.
An RCU reader can find the parent during this interval.
first_remote_rcu() then applies list_entry_rcu() to the empty list head,
producing an invalid remote pointer that the receive learning path can
read from and write to.
When a matching remote is the sole remaining remote, leave it linked and
ask the caller to destroy the entire FDB entry. vxlan_fdb_destroy() keeps
the remote attached while sending the deletion notification and removing
the parent from the lookup structures.
Fixes: c499fccb71cb ("vxlan: vxlan_core: Support FDB flushing by destination VNI")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Co-developed-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260810144115.821654-1-david.lee@trailofbits.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c
+++ b/drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c
@@ -3062,18 +3062,19 @@ vxlan_fdb_flush_match_remotes(struct vxl
const struct vxlan_fdb_flush_desc *desc,
bool *p_destroy_fdb)
{
- bool remotes_flushed = false;
struct vxlan_rdst *rd, *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(rd, tmp, &f->remotes, list) {
if (!vxlan_fdb_flush_remote_matches(desc, rd))
continue;
+ if (list_is_singular(&f->remotes)) {
+ *p_destroy_fdb = true;
+ return;
+ }
+
vxlan_fdb_dst_destroy(vxlan, f, rd, true);
- remotes_flushed = true;
}
-
- *p_destroy_fdb = remotes_flushed && list_empty(&f->remotes);
}
/* Purge the forwarding table */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 81/99] netfilter: nf_tables: dont queue packet path object notifications
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 80/99] vxlan: keep the last remote linked during FDB flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 82/99] mm/swap: reject swapon() on filesystem-level encrypted files Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, stable, TencentOS Corvus AI,
Fourie Zhang, Pablo Neira Ayuso
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fourie Zhang <littleddfu@gmail.com>
commit 7904b94768e983bcb2be34a8d6d1f3450f5b838b upstream.
All file:line references below are against v7.2-rc4 (ac5b0e5651b1). The
trace was captured on 7.2.0-rc6-kasan72rc6 (075b74841bd0), where the same
lines apply.
nft_obj_notify() is exported and reached from the packet path. Its only
in-tree caller is nft_quota_obj_eval() (net/netfilter/nft_quota.c:68),
which notifies with GFP_ATOMIC while evaluating a rule for a transiting
packet, holding no mutex.
Since commit 67cc570edaa0 ("netfilter: nf_tables: coalesce multiple
notifications into one skbuff") that notification is no longer sent
immediately. __nft_obj_notify() queues it onto nft_net->notify_list via
nft_notify_enqueue() (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1211), which is a bare
list_add_tail(). notify_list has no lock of its own
(include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h:1951), it is serialised by commit_mutex:
the six other enqueue sites all run inside a netlink transaction, and the
drain in nft_commit_notify() (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:10746) does
list_del() + kfree_skb() from nf_tables_commit() with commit_mutex held.
Sending packets through a chain that references a depleted quota object
therefore races an unlocked list_add_tail() against list_del() +
kfree_skb() on another CPU. The WRITE_ONCE(prev->next, new) in __list_add()
then stores through an sk_buff that has already been freed:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __nft_obj_notify+0x2c5/0x2d0
Write of size 8 at addr ff110001047183c0 by task poc/76
CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 76 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 7.2.0-rc6-kasan72rc6 #4
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__nft_obj_notify (include/linux/list.h:164 include/linux/list.h:191
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1211
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:8743)
nft_quota_obj_eval (net/netfilter/nft_quota.c:68)
nft_do_chain_inet
nf_hook_slow
__ip_local_out
ip_push_pending_frames
udp_send_skb
udp_sendmsg
__x64_sys_sendto
Allocated by task 77:
__alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:704)
__nft_obj_notify (include/net/netlink.h:1055
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:8731)
nft_quota_obj_eval (net/netfilter/nft_quota.c:68)
nft_do_chain
Freed by task 79:
nf_tables_commit (include/linux/skbuff.h:1332
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:10759
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:11185)
nfnetlink_rcv_batch (net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:574)
netlink_unicast
netlink_sendmsg
The buggy address belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232
Queueing from the packet path is wrong even leaving the race aside:
notify_list is only drained by nft_commit_notify() from nf_tables_commit()
(:11185), so a notification enqueued outside a transaction is not sent
until some later netlink batch commits, if one ever does.
The gfp argument that nft_obj_notify() still takes is a leftover of the
pre-67cc570edaa0 behaviour, where this path called nfnetlink_send()
directly. Restore that: split the message construction out into
nft_obj_notify_alloc() and let each caller decide what to do with the skb.
nft_obj_notify(), the exported one reached from the packet path, sends it
straight away; nf_tables_obj_notify(), which runs under commit_mutex, keeps
queueing it, so transaction notifications are still coalesced.
Fixes: 67cc570edaa0 ("netfilter: nf_tables: coalesce multiple notifications into one skbuff")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: TencentOS Corvus AI <corvus@tencent.com>
Assisted-by: tencentos-corvus-ai:kimi-k3
Signed-off-by: Fourie Zhang <fouriezhang@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -8200,18 +8200,17 @@ static int nf_tables_delobj(struct sk_bu
return nft_delobj(&ctx, obj);
}
-static void
-__nft_obj_notify(struct net *net, const struct nft_table *table,
- struct nft_object *obj, u32 portid, u32 seq, int event,
- u16 flags, int family, int report, gfp_t gfp)
+static struct sk_buff *
+nft_obj_notify_alloc(struct net *net, const struct nft_table *table,
+ struct nft_object *obj, u32 portid, u32 seq, int event,
+ u16 flags, int family, int report, gfp_t gfp)
{
- struct nftables_pernet *nft_net = nft_pernet(net);
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
if (!report &&
!nfnetlink_has_listeners(net, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES))
- return;
+ return NULL;
skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, gfp);
if (skb == NULL)
@@ -8225,10 +8224,10 @@ __nft_obj_notify(struct net *net, const
goto err;
}
- nft_notify_enqueue(skb, report, &nft_net->notify_list);
- return;
+ return skb;
err:
nfnetlink_set_err(net, portid, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES, -ENOBUFS);
+ return NULL;
}
void nft_obj_notify(struct net *net, const struct nft_table *table,
@@ -8237,6 +8236,7 @@ void nft_obj_notify(struct net *net, con
{
char *buf = kasprintf(gfp, "%s:%u",
table->name, nft_base_seq(net));
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
audit_log_nfcfg(buf,
family,
@@ -8247,17 +8247,27 @@ void nft_obj_notify(struct net *net, con
gfp);
kfree(buf);
- __nft_obj_notify(net, table, obj, portid, seq, event,
- flags, family, report, gfp);
+ /* Called from the packet path, holding no mutex: notify_list is
+ * serialised by commit_mutex, so send this notification directly.
+ */
+ skb = nft_obj_notify_alloc(net, table, obj, portid, seq, event,
+ flags, family, report, gfp);
+ if (skb)
+ nfnetlink_send(skb, net, portid, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES, report, gfp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nft_obj_notify);
static void nf_tables_obj_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
struct nft_object *obj, int event)
{
- __nft_obj_notify(ctx->net, ctx->table, obj, ctx->portid,
- ctx->seq, event, ctx->flags, ctx->family,
- ctx->report, GFP_KERNEL);
+ struct nftables_pernet *nft_net = nft_pernet(ctx->net);
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+
+ skb = nft_obj_notify_alloc(ctx->net, ctx->table, obj, ctx->portid,
+ ctx->seq, event, ctx->flags, ctx->family,
+ ctx->report, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (skb)
+ nft_notify_enqueue(skb, ctx->report, &nft_net->notify_list);
}
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 82/99] mm/swap: reject swapon() on filesystem-level encrypted files
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 81/99] netfilter: nf_tables: dont queue packet path object notifications Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 83/99] crypto: qcom-rng - Enable clock in hwrng case Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Eric Biggers, Baoquan He,
Muhammad Usama Anjum, Darrick J. Wong, Barry Song, Chris Li,
Kairui Song, Kemeng Shi, Nhat Pham, Andrew Morton
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
commit c310a8932a3107c9bc8f01d473e9d085f8aa9c98 upstream.
ext4 and f2fs don't prevent filesystem-level encrypted files from being
set up directly as swap files. In this case, encryption is bypassed.
No one should be doing this, vs. the methods of encrypted swap that
actually do work (such as swapping to a dm-crypt device, or swapping to a
loopback device on top of a filesystem-level encrypted file).
Nevertheless, to prevent user error, make swapon() explicitly reject this
case. Document this behavior in fscrypt.rst as well.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260803180426.3123-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Fixes: f424f664f0e8 ("f2fs crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <baoquan.he@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Cc: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Li <chrisl@kernel.org>
Cc: Kairui Song <kasong@tencent.com>
Cc: Kemeng Shi <shikemeng@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 4 ++++
mm/swapfile.c | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
@@ -1216,6 +1216,10 @@ astute users may notice some differences
- DAX (Direct Access) is not supported on encrypted files.
+- Encrypted files cannot be used directly as swap files. To swap to
+ an encrypted file, set up a loopback device on top of it.
+ Alternatively, encrypted swap can use a dm-crypt device.
+
- The maximum length of an encrypted symlink is 2 bytes shorter than
the maximum length of an unencrypted symlink. For example, on an
EXT4 filesystem with a 4K block size, unencrypted symlinks can be up
--- a/mm/swapfile.c
+++ b/mm/swapfile.c
@@ -3430,6 +3430,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(swapon, const char __use
error = -EBUSY;
goto bad_swap_unlock_inode;
}
+ if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) {
+ pr_warn_once(
+ "Filesystem-level encrypted swapfile '%s' is unsupported. Create a loop device over it, or use dm-crypt\n",
+ name->name);
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad_swap_unlock_inode;
+ }
/*
* Read the swap header.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 83/99] crypto: qcom-rng - Enable clock in hwrng case
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 82/99] mm/swap: reject swapon() on filesystem-level encrypted files Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 84/99] crypto: qcom-rng - Allow zero as a random number Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Dmitry Baryshkov, Konrad Dybcio,
Eric Biggers, Herbert Xu
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
commit 0fd97bbda2842d7dcccee599ac2c0e9554bdddbc upstream.
Fix qcom-rng.c to enable the clock before accessing the hardware.
Fixes: f29cd5bb64c2 ("crypto: qcom-rng - Add hw_random interface support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c
@@ -113,6 +113,13 @@ static int qcom_rng_seed(struct crypto_r
return 0;
}
+static int qcom_hwrng_init(struct hwrng *hwrng)
+{
+ struct qcom_rng *qrng = container_of(hwrng, struct qcom_rng, hwrng);
+
+ return clk_prepare_enable(qrng->clk);
+}
+
static int qcom_hwrng_read(struct hwrng *hwrng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait)
{
struct qcom_rng *qrng = container_of(hwrng, struct qcom_rng, hwrng);
@@ -120,6 +127,13 @@ static int qcom_hwrng_read(struct hwrng
return qcom_rng_read(qrng, data, max);
}
+static void qcom_hwrng_cleanup(struct hwrng *hwrng)
+{
+ struct qcom_rng *qrng = container_of(hwrng, struct qcom_rng, hwrng);
+
+ clk_disable_unprepare(qrng->clk);
+}
+
static int qcom_rng_enable(struct qcom_rng *rng)
{
u32 val;
@@ -208,7 +222,9 @@ static int qcom_rng_probe(struct platfor
if (rng->match_data->hwrng_support) {
rng->hwrng.name = "qcom_hwrng";
+ rng->hwrng.init = qcom_hwrng_init;
rng->hwrng.read = qcom_hwrng_read;
+ rng->hwrng.cleanup = qcom_hwrng_cleanup;
rng->hwrng.quality = QCOM_TRNG_QUALITY;
ret = devm_hwrng_register(&pdev->dev, &rng->hwrng);
if (ret) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 84/99] crypto: qcom-rng - Allow zero as a random number
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (82 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 83/99] crypto: qcom-rng - Enable clock in hwrng case Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 85/99] crypto: qcom-rng - Remove crypto_rng interface Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Dmitry Baryshkov, Konrad Dybcio,
Eric Biggers, Herbert Xu
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
commit 4ef04bdc0c9f98836d1638be516f6bf1bad55f69 upstream.
Zero is a valid random number and needs to be allowed. Otherwise the
output is distinguishable from random.
Fixes: f29cd5bb64c2 ("crypto: qcom-rng - Add hw_random interface support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c
@@ -65,8 +65,6 @@ static int qcom_rng_read(struct qcom_rng
return ret;
val = readl_relaxed(rng->base + PRNG_DATA_OUT);
- if (!val)
- return -EINVAL;
if ((max - currsize) >= WORD_SZ) {
memcpy(data, &val, WORD_SZ);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 85/99] crypto: qcom-rng - Remove crypto_rng interface
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (83 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 84/99] crypto: qcom-rng - Allow zero as a random number Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 86/99] crypto: atmel-tdes - use scatterlist length before DMA mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Eric Biggers, Dmitry Baryshkov,
Herbert Xu
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
commit 2ecdf5c9910e20f73639bc322f0518a3439d17c0 upstream.
qcom-rng.c exposes the same hardware through two completely separate
interfaces, crypto_rng and hwrng. However, the implementation of this
is buggy because it permits generation operations from these interfaces
to run concurrently with each other, accessing the same registers. That
is, qcom_rng_generate() synchronizes with itself but not with
qcom_hwrng_read(). This results in potential repetition of output from
the RNG, output of non-random values, etc.
Fortunately, there's actually no point in hardware RNG drivers
implementing the crypto_rng interface. It's not actually used by
anything besides the "rng" algorithm type of AF_ALG, which in turn is
not actually used in practice. Other crypto_rng hardware drivers are
likewise being phased out, leaving just the hwrng support.
Thus, remove it to simplify the code and avoid conflict (and confusion)
with the hwrng interface which is the one that actually matters.
Fixes: f29cd5bb64c2 ("crypto: qcom-rng - Add hw_random interface support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/crypto/Kconfig | 1
drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c | 158 +++++-----------------------------------------
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -648,7 +648,6 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_QCOM_RNG
tristate "Qualcomm Random Number Generator Driver"
depends on ARCH_QCOM || COMPILE_TEST
depends on HW_RANDOM
- select CRYPTO_RNG
help
This driver provides support for the Random Number
Generator hardware found on Qualcomm SoCs.
--- a/drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c
@@ -3,10 +3,8 @@
//
// Based on msm-rng.c and downstream driver
-#include <crypto/internal/rng.h>
#include <linux/acpi.h>
#include <linux/clk.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/hw_random.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/iopoll.h>
@@ -32,24 +30,15 @@
#define QCOM_TRNG_QUALITY 1024
struct qcom_rng {
- struct mutex lock;
void __iomem *base;
struct clk *clk;
struct hwrng hwrng;
- struct qcom_rng_match_data *match_data;
-};
-
-struct qcom_rng_ctx {
- struct qcom_rng *rng;
};
struct qcom_rng_match_data {
- bool skip_init;
bool hwrng_support;
};
-static struct qcom_rng *qcom_rng_dev;
-
static int qcom_rng_read(struct qcom_rng *rng, u8 *data, unsigned int max)
{
unsigned int currsize = 0;
@@ -80,37 +69,6 @@ static int qcom_rng_read(struct qcom_rng
return currsize;
}
-static int qcom_rng_generate(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
- const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
- u8 *dstn, unsigned int dlen)
-{
- struct qcom_rng_ctx *ctx = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
- struct qcom_rng *rng = ctx->rng;
- int ret;
-
- ret = clk_prepare_enable(rng->clk);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- mutex_lock(&rng->lock);
-
- ret = qcom_rng_read(rng, dstn, dlen);
-
- mutex_unlock(&rng->lock);
- clk_disable_unprepare(rng->clk);
-
- if (ret >= 0)
- ret = 0;
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int qcom_rng_seed(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed,
- unsigned int slen)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static int qcom_hwrng_init(struct hwrng *hwrng)
{
struct qcom_rng *qrng = container_of(hwrng, struct qcom_rng, hwrng);
@@ -132,74 +90,26 @@ static void qcom_hwrng_cleanup(struct hw
clk_disable_unprepare(qrng->clk);
}
-static int qcom_rng_enable(struct qcom_rng *rng)
-{
- u32 val;
- int ret;
-
- ret = clk_prepare_enable(rng->clk);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- /* Enable PRNG only if it is not already enabled */
- val = readl_relaxed(rng->base + PRNG_CONFIG);
- if (val & PRNG_CONFIG_HW_ENABLE)
- goto already_enabled;
-
- val = readl_relaxed(rng->base + PRNG_LFSR_CFG);
- val &= ~PRNG_LFSR_CFG_MASK;
- val |= PRNG_LFSR_CFG_CLOCKS;
- writel(val, rng->base + PRNG_LFSR_CFG);
-
- val = readl_relaxed(rng->base + PRNG_CONFIG);
- val |= PRNG_CONFIG_HW_ENABLE;
- writel(val, rng->base + PRNG_CONFIG);
-
-already_enabled:
- clk_disable_unprepare(rng->clk);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int qcom_rng_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
-{
- struct qcom_rng_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
-
- ctx->rng = qcom_rng_dev;
-
- if (!ctx->rng->match_data->skip_init)
- return qcom_rng_enable(ctx->rng);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static struct rng_alg qcom_rng_alg = {
- .generate = qcom_rng_generate,
- .seed = qcom_rng_seed,
- .seedsize = 0,
- .base = {
- .cra_name = "stdrng",
- .cra_driver_name = "qcom-rng",
- .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG,
- .cra_priority = 300,
- .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct qcom_rng_ctx),
- .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
- .cra_init = qcom_rng_init,
- }
-};
-
static int qcom_rng_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
+ const struct qcom_rng_match_data *match_data;
struct qcom_rng *rng;
int ret;
+ match_data = device_get_match_data(&pdev->dev);
+ if (match_data == NULL || !match_data->hwrng_support) {
+ dev_info(&pdev->dev, "TRNG support not detected\n");
+ /*
+ * In this case the driver does nothing except the dev_info(),
+ * but bind the device anyway to avoid effects on GCC state.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
rng = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*rng), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rng)
return -ENOMEM;
- platform_set_drvdata(pdev, rng);
- mutex_init(&rng->lock);
-
rng->base = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0);
if (IS_ERR(rng->base))
return PTR_ERR(rng->base);
@@ -208,55 +118,26 @@ static int qcom_rng_probe(struct platfor
if (IS_ERR(rng->clk))
return PTR_ERR(rng->clk);
- rng->match_data = (struct qcom_rng_match_data *)device_get_match_data(&pdev->dev);
-
- qcom_rng_dev = rng;
- ret = crypto_register_rng(&qcom_rng_alg);
- if (ret) {
- dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Register crypto rng failed: %d\n", ret);
- qcom_rng_dev = NULL;
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (rng->match_data->hwrng_support) {
- rng->hwrng.name = "qcom_hwrng";
- rng->hwrng.init = qcom_hwrng_init;
- rng->hwrng.read = qcom_hwrng_read;
- rng->hwrng.cleanup = qcom_hwrng_cleanup;
- rng->hwrng.quality = QCOM_TRNG_QUALITY;
- ret = devm_hwrng_register(&pdev->dev, &rng->hwrng);
- if (ret) {
- dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Register hwrng failed: %d\n", ret);
- qcom_rng_dev = NULL;
- goto fail;
- }
- }
-
- return ret;
-fail:
- crypto_unregister_rng(&qcom_rng_alg);
+ rng->hwrng.name = "qcom_hwrng";
+ rng->hwrng.init = qcom_hwrng_init;
+ rng->hwrng.read = qcom_hwrng_read;
+ rng->hwrng.cleanup = qcom_hwrng_cleanup;
+ rng->hwrng.quality = QCOM_TRNG_QUALITY;
+ ret = devm_hwrng_register(&pdev->dev, &rng->hwrng);
+ if (ret)
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Register hwrng failed: %d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
-static void qcom_rng_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
-{
- crypto_unregister_rng(&qcom_rng_alg);
-
- qcom_rng_dev = NULL;
-}
-
static struct qcom_rng_match_data qcom_prng_match_data = {
- .skip_init = false,
.hwrng_support = false,
};
static struct qcom_rng_match_data qcom_prng_ee_match_data = {
- .skip_init = true,
.hwrng_support = false,
};
static struct qcom_rng_match_data qcom_trng_match_data = {
- .skip_init = true,
.hwrng_support = true,
};
@@ -276,7 +157,6 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, qcom_rng_of_matc
static struct platform_driver qcom_rng_driver = {
.probe = qcom_rng_probe,
- .remove_new = qcom_rng_remove,
.driver = {
.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
.of_match_table = of_match_ptr(qcom_rng_of_match),
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 86/99] crypto: atmel-tdes - use scatterlist length before DMA mapping
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (84 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 85/99] crypto: qcom-rng - Remove crypto_rng interface Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 87/99] crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Thorsten Blum, Herbert Xu
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
commit ba199bdaa80b09a7dd92f28751de7f3dbb06c510 upstream.
Using sg_dma_len() is only valid after mapping the scatterlist with
dma_map_sg(). However, atmel_tdes_crypt_start() uses it before mapping
to compare input/output lengths and to compute the transfer count.
Use the original scatterlist lengths before DMA mapping to avoid reading
stale or uninitialized DMA lengths when CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH=y.
Drop the output scatterlist length in the fast path since it is equal to
->in_sg->length and does not change the transfer count.
Fixes: 13802005d8f2 ("crypto: atmel - add Atmel DES/TDES driver")
Fixes: 1f858040c2f7 ("crypto: atmel-tdes - add support for latest release of the IP (0x700)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c
@@ -463,14 +463,13 @@ static int atmel_tdes_crypt_start(struct
IS_ALIGNED(dd->out_sg->length, dd->ctx->block_size);
fast = in && out;
- if (sg_dma_len(dd->in_sg) != sg_dma_len(dd->out_sg))
+ if (dd->in_sg->length != dd->out_sg->length)
fast = 0;
}
if (fast) {
- count = min_t(size_t, dd->total, sg_dma_len(dd->in_sg));
- count = min_t(size_t, count, sg_dma_len(dd->out_sg));
+ count = min_t(size_t, dd->total, dd->in_sg->length);
err = dma_map_sg(dd->dev, dd->in_sg, 1, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (!err) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 87/99] crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (85 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 86/99] crypto: atmel-tdes - use scatterlist length before DMA mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 88/99] crypto: mxs-dcp - fix source scatterlist length access Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Md Sadre Alam, Bartosz Golaszewski,
Herbert Xu
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Md Sadre Alam <md.alam@oss.qualcomm.com>
commit 7f2345f47dd189625f657cd72437179ab4170ee1 upstream.
The AAD buffer allocated in qce_aead_ccm_prepare_buf_assoclen()
can be smaller than the length later programmed into the DMA
scatterlist.
The allocation size is currently calculated as:
ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN
while the DMA length is set to:
ALIGN(assoclen + adata_header_len, 16)
Since ALIGN() does not distribute over addition, the allocation
can be smaller than the DMA length. For example, when
assoclen = 32 and adata_header_len = 2:
allocation = ALIGN(32, 16) + 6 = 38
DMA length = ALIGN(32 + 2, 16) = 48
As a result, the QCE hardware can read beyond the allocated
buffer while computing the CBC-MAC over the associated data.
The extra bytes are folded into the authentication tag,
resulting in an incorrect tag and causing CCM self-test
failures such as:
alg: aead: ccm-aes-qce encryption test failed (wrong result)
on test vector 8
Fix the allocation by adding the maximum possible AAD header
length before alignment:
ALIGN(assoclen + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN, 16)
This guarantees that the allocated buffer is large enough
for the fully padded AAD data for all supported header sizes.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9363efb4181c ("crypto: qce - Add support for AEAD algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Md Sadre Alam <md.alam@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ qce_aead_ccm_prepare_buf_assoclen(struct
/* Get the msg */
msg_sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(__sg, req->src, req->assoclen);
- rctx->adata = kzalloc((ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN) *
+ rctx->adata = kzalloc(ALIGN(assoclen + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN, 16) *
sizeof(unsigned char), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!rctx->adata)
return -ENOMEM;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 88/99] crypto: mxs-dcp - fix source scatterlist length access
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (86 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 87/99] crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 89/99] crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Thorsten Blum, Frank Li, Herbert Xu
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
commit c5bcb084a9871e5b62afb5f48b60adfa13b5d9f8 upstream.
mxs_dcp_aes_block_crypt() uses sg_dma_len() without mapping the source
scatterlist with dma_map_sg() first. Therefore, sg_dma_len() is invalid
and could return zero or a stale DMA length, causing encryption and
decryption to process the wrong number of bytes when
CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH=y.
Use the original scatterlist length instead.
Fixes: 15b59e7c3733 ("crypto: mxs - Add Freescale MXS DCP driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_block_crypt(struc
for_each_sg(req->src, src, sg_nents(req->src), i) {
src_buf = sg_virt(src);
- len = sg_dma_len(src);
+ len = src->length;
tlen += len;
limit_hit = tlen > req->cryptlen;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 89/99] crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (87 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 88/99] crypto: mxs-dcp - fix source scatterlist length access Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 90/99] KVM: s390: vsie: zero stale crypto bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Eric Biggers, Kuldeep Singh,
Bartosz Golaszewski, Herbert Xu
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
commit 7e28b0a5c4b7d075b98ce6d8f5290a9d3deb5b92 upstream.
Remove algorithms that are either unsafe or deprecated and have no
in-kernel users that cannot be served by the ARM CE implementations.
AES-ECB reveals plaintext patterns (identical plaintext blocks produce
identical ciphertext blocks) and should not be exposed as a hardware-
accelerated primitive. DES, Triple DES and HMAC-SHA1 have been
deprecated for years.
Remove sha1, ecb(aes), ecb(des), cbc(des), ecb(des3_ede), cbc(des3_ede),
hmac(sha1) and all AEAD variants built on these primitives as well as
authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des)). Also clean up the - now dead - code,
flags and constants.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Kuldeep Singh <kuldeep.singh@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c | 56 ------------------------
drivers/crypto/qce/common.c | 55 +++++------------------
drivers/crypto/qce/common.h | 16 +-----
drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h | 4 -
drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c | 30 ------------
drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h | 1
drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c | 97 ------------------------------------------
7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 239 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
#include <crypto/gcm.h>
#include <crypto/authenc.h>
#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/des.h>
-#include <crypto/sha1.h>
#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
#include "aead.h"
@@ -597,7 +595,6 @@ static int qce_aead_setkey(struct crypto
struct qce_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
struct crypto_authenc_keys authenc_keys;
unsigned long flags = to_aead_tmpl(tfm)->alg_flags;
- u32 _key[6];
int err;
err = crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&authenc_keys, key, keylen);
@@ -608,26 +605,7 @@ static int qce_aead_setkey(struct crypto
authenc_keys.authkeylen > QCE_MAX_KEY_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
- if (IS_DES(flags)) {
- err = verify_aead_des_key(tfm, authenc_keys.enckey, authenc_keys.enckeylen);
- if (err)
- return err;
- } else if (IS_3DES(flags)) {
- err = verify_aead_des3_key(tfm, authenc_keys.enckey, authenc_keys.enckeylen);
- if (err)
- return err;
- /*
- * The crypto engine does not support any two keys
- * being the same for triple des algorithms. The
- * verify_skcipher_des3_key does not check for all the
- * below conditions. Schedule fallback in this case.
- */
- memcpy(_key, authenc_keys.enckey, DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE);
- if (!((_key[0] ^ _key[2]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[3])) ||
- !((_key[2] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[3] ^ _key[5])) ||
- !((_key[0] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[5])))
- ctx->need_fallback = true;
- } else if (IS_AES(flags)) {
+ if (IS_AES(flags)) {
/* No random key sizes */
if (authenc_keys.enckeylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
authenc_keys.enckeylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
@@ -699,38 +677,6 @@ struct qce_aead_def {
static const struct qce_aead_def aead_def[] = {
{
- .flags = QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC,
- .name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des))",
- .drv_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-des-qce",
- .blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .maxauthsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
- },
- {
- .flags = QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC,
- .name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des3_ede))",
- .drv_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-3des-qce",
- .blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .maxauthsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
- },
- {
- .flags = QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
- .name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des))",
- .drv_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-des-qce",
- .blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .maxauthsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
- },
- {
- .flags = QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
- .name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des3_ede))",
- .drv_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-3des-qce",
- .blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .maxauthsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
- },
- {
.flags = QCE_ALG_AES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
.name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
.drv_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-aes-qce",
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/common.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/common.c
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
-#include <crypto/sha1.h>
#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include "cipher.h"
@@ -115,18 +114,16 @@ static u32 qce_auth_cfg(unsigned long fl
cfg |= AUTH_KEY_SZ_AES256 << AUTH_KEY_SIZE_SHIFT;
}
- if (IS_SHA1(flags) || IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags))
- cfg |= AUTH_SIZE_SHA1 << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
- else if (IS_SHA256(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
+ if (IS_SHA256(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
cfg |= AUTH_SIZE_SHA256 << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
else if (IS_CMAC(flags))
cfg |= AUTH_SIZE_ENUM_16_BYTES << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
else if (IS_CCM(flags))
cfg |= (auth_size - 1) << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
- if (IS_SHA1(flags) || IS_SHA256(flags))
+ if (IS_SHA256(flags))
cfg |= AUTH_MODE_HASH << AUTH_MODE_SHIFT;
- else if (IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
+ else if (IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
cfg |= AUTH_MODE_HMAC << AUTH_MODE_SHIFT;
else if (IS_CCM(flags))
cfg |= AUTH_MODE_CCM << AUTH_MODE_SHIFT;
@@ -191,7 +188,7 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_ahash(struct c
else
qce_cpu_to_be32p_array(auth, rctx->digest, digestsize);
- iv_words = (IS_SHA1(rctx->flags) || IS_SHA1_HMAC(rctx->flags)) ? 5 : 8;
+ iv_words = 8;
qce_write_array(qce, REG_AUTH_IV0, (u32 *)auth, iv_words);
if (rctx->first_blk)
@@ -243,19 +240,8 @@ static u32 qce_encr_cfg(unsigned long fl
if (IS_AES(flags))
cfg |= ENCR_ALG_AES << ENCR_ALG_SHIFT;
- else if (IS_DES(flags) || IS_3DES(flags))
- cfg |= ENCR_ALG_DES << ENCR_ALG_SHIFT;
-
- if (IS_DES(flags))
- cfg |= ENCR_KEY_SZ_DES << ENCR_KEY_SZ_SHIFT;
-
- if (IS_3DES(flags))
- cfg |= ENCR_KEY_SZ_3DES << ENCR_KEY_SZ_SHIFT;
switch (flags & QCE_MODE_MASK) {
- case QCE_MODE_ECB:
- cfg |= ENCR_MODE_ECB << ENCR_MODE_SHIFT;
- break;
case QCE_MODE_CBC:
cfg |= ENCR_MODE_CBC << ENCR_MODE_SHIFT;
break;
@@ -340,13 +326,7 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_skcipher(struc
encr_cfg = qce_encr_cfg(flags, keylen);
- if (IS_DES(flags)) {
- enciv_words = 2;
- enckey_words = 2;
- } else if (IS_3DES(flags)) {
- enciv_words = 2;
- enckey_words = 6;
- } else if (IS_AES(flags)) {
+ if (IS_AES(flags)) {
if (IS_XTS(flags))
qce_xtskey(qce, ctx->enc_key, ctx->enc_keylen,
rctx->cryptlen);
@@ -357,14 +337,12 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_skcipher(struc
qce_write_array(qce, REG_ENCR_KEY0, (u32 *)enckey, enckey_words);
- if (!IS_ECB(flags)) {
- if (IS_XTS(flags))
- qce_xts_swapiv(enciv, rctx->iv, ivsize);
- else
- qce_cpu_to_be32p_array(enciv, rctx->iv, ivsize);
+ if (IS_XTS(flags))
+ qce_xts_swapiv(enciv, rctx->iv, ivsize);
+ else
+ qce_cpu_to_be32p_array(enciv, rctx->iv, ivsize);
- qce_write_array(qce, REG_CNTR0_IV0, (u32 *)enciv, enciv_words);
- }
+ qce_write_array(qce, REG_CNTR0_IV0, (u32 *)enciv, enciv_words);
if (IS_ENCRYPT(flags))
encr_cfg |= BIT(ENCODE_SHIFT);
@@ -393,10 +371,6 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_skcipher(struc
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QCE_AEAD
-static const u32 std_iv_sha1[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
- SHA1_H0, SHA1_H1, SHA1_H2, SHA1_H3, SHA1_H4, 0, 0, 0
-};
-
static const u32 std_iv_sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
SHA256_H0, SHA256_H1, SHA256_H2, SHA256_H3,
SHA256_H4, SHA256_H5, SHA256_H6, SHA256_H7
@@ -473,13 +447,8 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_aead(struct cr
/* Write initial authentication IV only for HMAC algorithms */
if (IS_SHA_HMAC(rctx->flags)) {
/* Write default authentication iv */
- if (IS_SHA1_HMAC(rctx->flags)) {
- auth_ivsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
- memcpy(authiv, std_iv_sha1, auth_ivsize);
- } else if (IS_SHA256_HMAC(rctx->flags)) {
- auth_ivsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
- memcpy(authiv, std_iv_sha256, auth_ivsize);
- }
+ auth_ivsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ memcpy(authiv, std_iv_sha256, auth_ivsize);
authiv_words = auth_ivsize / sizeof(u32);
qce_write_array(qce, REG_AUTH_IV0, (u32 *)authiv, authiv_words);
} else if (IS_CCM(rctx->flags)) {
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/common.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/common.h
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
/* IV length in bytes */
#define QCE_AES_IV_LENGTH AES_BLOCK_SIZE
-/* max of AES_BLOCK_SIZE, DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE */
+/* max of AES_BLOCK_SIZE */
#define QCE_MAX_IV_SIZE AES_BLOCK_SIZE
/* maximum nonce bytes */
@@ -33,14 +33,10 @@
#define QCE_MAX_ALIGN_SIZE 64
/* cipher algorithms */
-#define QCE_ALG_DES BIT(0)
-#define QCE_ALG_3DES BIT(1)
#define QCE_ALG_AES BIT(2)
/* hash and hmac algorithms */
-#define QCE_HASH_SHA1 BIT(3)
#define QCE_HASH_SHA256 BIT(4)
-#define QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC BIT(5)
#define QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC BIT(6)
#define QCE_HASH_AES_CMAC BIT(7)
@@ -58,21 +54,15 @@
#define QCE_ENCRYPT BIT(30)
#define QCE_DECRYPT BIT(31)
-#define IS_DES(flags) (flags & QCE_ALG_DES)
-#define IS_3DES(flags) (flags & QCE_ALG_3DES)
#define IS_AES(flags) (flags & QCE_ALG_AES)
-#define IS_SHA1(flags) (flags & QCE_HASH_SHA1)
#define IS_SHA256(flags) (flags & QCE_HASH_SHA256)
-#define IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags) (flags & QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC)
#define IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags) (flags & QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC)
#define IS_CMAC(flags) (flags & QCE_HASH_AES_CMAC)
-#define IS_SHA(flags) (IS_SHA1(flags) || IS_SHA256(flags))
-#define IS_SHA_HMAC(flags) \
- (IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
+#define IS_SHA(flags) IS_SHA256(flags)
+#define IS_SHA_HMAC(flags) IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags)
#define IS_CBC(mode) (mode & QCE_MODE_CBC)
-#define IS_ECB(mode) (mode & QCE_MODE_ECB)
#define IS_CTR(mode) (mode & QCE_MODE_CTR)
#define IS_XTS(mode) (mode & QCE_MODE_XTS)
#define IS_CCM(mode) (mode & QCE_MODE_CCM)
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h
@@ -203,7 +203,6 @@
#define AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT 9
#define AUTH_SIZE_MASK GENMASK(13, 9)
-#define AUTH_SIZE_SHA1 0
#define AUTH_SIZE_SHA256 1
#define AUTH_SIZE_ENUM_1_BYTES 0
#define AUTH_SIZE_ENUM_2_BYTES 1
@@ -284,15 +283,12 @@
#define ENCR_KEY_SZ_SHIFT 3
#define ENCR_KEY_SZ_MASK GENMASK(5, 3)
-#define ENCR_KEY_SZ_DES 0
-#define ENCR_KEY_SZ_3DES 1
#define ENCR_KEY_SZ_AES128 0
#define ENCR_KEY_SZ_AES256 2
#define ENCR_ALG_SHIFT 0
#define ENCR_ALG_MASK GENMASK(2, 0)
#define ENCR_ALG_NONE 0
-#define ENCR_ALG_DES 1
#define ENCR_ALG_AES 2
#define ENCR_ALG_KASUMI 4
#define ENCR_ALG_SNOW_3G 5
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
@@ -24,10 +24,6 @@ struct qce_sha_saved_state {
static LIST_HEAD(ahash_algs);
-static const u32 std_iv_sha1[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
- SHA1_H0, SHA1_H1, SHA1_H2, SHA1_H3, SHA1_H4, 0, 0, 0
-};
-
static const u32 std_iv_sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
SHA256_H0, SHA256_H1, SHA256_H2, SHA256_H3,
SHA256_H4, SHA256_H5, SHA256_H6, SHA256_H7
@@ -348,9 +344,7 @@ static int qce_ahash_hmac_setkey(struct
return 0;
}
- if (digestsize == SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
- alg_name = "sha1-qce";
- else if (digestsize == SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
+ if (digestsize == SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
alg_name = "sha256-qce";
else
return -EINVAL;
@@ -412,15 +406,6 @@ struct qce_ahash_def {
static const struct qce_ahash_def ahash_def[] = {
{
- .flags = QCE_HASH_SHA1,
- .name = "sha1",
- .drv_name = "sha1-qce",
- .digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
- .blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .statesize = sizeof(struct qce_sha_saved_state),
- .std_iv = std_iv_sha1,
- },
- {
.flags = QCE_HASH_SHA256,
.name = "sha256",
.drv_name = "sha256-qce",
@@ -430,15 +415,6 @@ static const struct qce_ahash_def ahash_
.std_iv = std_iv_sha256,
},
{
- .flags = QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC,
- .name = "hmac(sha1)",
- .drv_name = "hmac-sha1-qce",
- .digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
- .blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .statesize = sizeof(struct qce_sha_saved_state),
- .std_iv = std_iv_sha1,
- },
- {
.flags = QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
.name = "hmac(sha256)",
.drv_name = "hmac-sha256-qce",
@@ -475,9 +451,7 @@ static int qce_ahash_register_one(const
alg->halg.digestsize = def->digestsize;
alg->halg.statesize = def->statesize;
- if (IS_SHA1(def->flags))
- tmpl->hash_zero = sha1_zero_message_hash;
- else if (IS_SHA256(def->flags))
+ if (IS_SHA256(def->flags))
tmpl->hash_zero = sha256_zero_message_hash;
base = &alg->halg.base;
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
#define _SHA_H_
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
-#include <crypto/sha1.h>
#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include "common.h"
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/des.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include "cipher.h"
@@ -208,51 +207,6 @@ static int qce_skcipher_setkey(struct cr
return ret;
}
-static int qce_des_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *ablk, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keylen)
-{
- struct qce_cipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(ablk);
- int err;
-
- err = verify_skcipher_des_key(ablk, key);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- ctx->enc_keylen = keylen;
- memcpy(ctx->enc_key, key, keylen);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int qce_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *ablk, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keylen)
-{
- struct qce_cipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(ablk);
- u32 _key[6];
- int err;
-
- err = verify_skcipher_des3_key(ablk, key);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- /*
- * The crypto engine does not support any two keys
- * being the same for triple des algorithms. The
- * verify_skcipher_des3_key does not check for all the
- * below conditions. Return -ENOKEY in case any two keys
- * are the same. Revisit to see if a fallback cipher
- * is needed to handle this condition.
- */
- memcpy(_key, key, DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE);
- if (!((_key[0] ^ _key[2]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[3])) ||
- !((_key[2] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[3] ^ _key[5])) ||
- !((_key[0] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[5])))
- return -ENOKEY;
-
- ctx->enc_keylen = keylen;
- memcpy(ctx->enc_key, key, keylen);
- return 0;
-}
-
static int qce_skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, int encrypt)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -275,7 +229,7 @@ static int qce_skcipher_crypt(struct skc
* ECB and CBC algorithms require message lengths to be
* multiples of block size.
*/
- if (IS_ECB(rctx->flags) || IS_CBC(rctx->flags))
+ if (IS_CBC(rctx->flags))
if (!IS_ALIGNED(req->cryptlen, blocksize))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -359,15 +313,6 @@ struct qce_skcipher_def {
static const struct qce_skcipher_def skcipher_def[] = {
{
- .flags = QCE_ALG_AES | QCE_MODE_ECB,
- .name = "ecb(aes)",
- .drv_name = "ecb-aes-qce",
- .blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .ivsize = 0,
- .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
- .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
- },
- {
.flags = QCE_ALG_AES | QCE_MODE_CBC,
.name = "cbc(aes)",
.drv_name = "cbc-aes-qce",
@@ -395,42 +340,6 @@ static const struct qce_skcipher_def skc
.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE * 2,
.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE * 2,
},
- {
- .flags = QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_ECB,
- .name = "ecb(des)",
- .drv_name = "ecb-des-qce",
- .blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .ivsize = 0,
- .min_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE,
- .max_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE,
- },
- {
- .flags = QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_CBC,
- .name = "cbc(des)",
- .drv_name = "cbc-des-qce",
- .blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .min_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE,
- .max_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE,
- },
- {
- .flags = QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_ECB,
- .name = "ecb(des3_ede)",
- .drv_name = "ecb-3des-qce",
- .blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .ivsize = 0,
- .min_keysize = DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
- .max_keysize = DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
- },
- {
- .flags = QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_CBC,
- .name = "cbc(des3_ede)",
- .drv_name = "cbc-3des-qce",
- .blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .min_keysize = DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
- .max_keysize = DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
- },
};
static int qce_skcipher_register_one(const struct qce_skcipher_def *def,
@@ -455,9 +364,7 @@ static int qce_skcipher_register_one(con
alg->ivsize = def->ivsize;
alg->min_keysize = def->min_keysize;
alg->max_keysize = def->max_keysize;
- alg->setkey = IS_3DES(def->flags) ? qce_des3_setkey :
- IS_DES(def->flags) ? qce_des_setkey :
- qce_skcipher_setkey;
+ alg->setkey = qce_skcipher_setkey;
alg->encrypt = qce_skcipher_encrypt;
alg->decrypt = qce_skcipher_decrypt;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 90/99] KVM: s390: vsie: zero stale crypto bits
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (88 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 89/99] crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 91/99] usb: core: Add lock to usb_wakeup_notification() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Christian Borntraeger,
Claudio Imbrenda
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
commit 34d5b5b646c91cfb9338d7a12c955a70ffb8c66b upstream.
When shadowing crypto access bits from a format0 apcb (crycb 0 or 1),
the bits 64..255 are unchanged from whatever is in the vsie page in the
crycb and thus in the apcb. This gives a nested guest potential access
to a device no longer available. Zero out the remaining bits.
Fixes: 6b79de4b056e ("KVM: s390: vsie: allow guest FORMAT-1 CRYCB on host FORMAT-2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <20260811153738.206885-3-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ static int setup_apcb10(struct kvm_vcpu
sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb0)))
return -EFAULT;
+ memset(apcb_s, 0, sizeof(*apcb_s));
apcb_s->apm[0] = apcb_h->apm[0] & tmp.apm[0];
apcb_s->aqm[0] = apcb_h->aqm[0] & tmp.aqm[0] & 0xffff000000000000UL;
apcb_s->adm[0] = apcb_h->adm[0] & tmp.adm[0] & 0xffff000000000000UL;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 91/99] usb: core: Add lock to usb_wakeup_notification()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (89 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 90/99] KVM: s390: vsie: zero stale crypto bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 92/99] usb: core: Strengthen error handling in hub_hub_status() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Griffin Kroah-Hartman
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
commit e263e18a9e7b1ff3e7301f0801c6ff87c31adfb6 upstream.
Add a spin lock to usb_wakeup notification to prevent a race condition
with dereferencing freed memory. This could be hit by the xHCI driver as
it calls this function from an IRQ and could race with the
hub_disconnect() function, which properly grabs this lock to protect the
state of the device.
Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260713-usb_core_patches_1-v1-3-7721c2b33f53@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -756,10 +756,12 @@ void usb_wakeup_notification(struct usb_
{
struct usb_hub *hub;
struct usb_port *port_dev;
+ unsigned long flags;
if (!hdev)
return;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&device_state_lock, flags);
hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(hdev);
if (hub) {
port_dev = hub->ports[portnum - 1];
@@ -769,6 +771,7 @@ void usb_wakeup_notification(struct usb_
set_bit(portnum, hub->wakeup_bits);
kick_hub_wq(hub);
}
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&device_state_lock, flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_wakeup_notification);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 92/99] usb: core: Strengthen error handling in hub_hub_status()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (90 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 91/99] usb: core: Add lock to usb_wakeup_notification() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 93/99] ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Griffin Kroah-Hartman
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
commit a29496745aa335d97f617385809583241e118610 upstream.
Add additional error handling after the call to get_hub_status() in
hub_hub_status().
get_hub_status() uses usb_control_msg() which does not verify that the
message is the correct length, substituting it for
usb_control_msg_recv() would also solve this issue but increase memory
allocations.
Instead, error handling is copied from the method used in
hub_ext_port_status(), which shares the same flow of logic as
hub_hub_status().
Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260722-usb_core_patches_2-v3-1-87622252bfdd@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -997,10 +997,12 @@ static int hub_hub_status(struct usb_hub
mutex_lock(&hub->status_mutex);
ret = get_hub_status(hub->hdev, &hub->status->hub);
- if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret < (int)sizeof(hub->status->hub)) {
if (ret != -ENODEV)
dev_err(hub->intfdev,
"%s failed (err = %d)\n", __func__, ret);
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ ret = -EIO;
} else {
*status = le16_to_cpu(hub->status->hub.wHubStatus);
*change = le16_to_cpu(hub->status->hub.wHubChange);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 93/99] ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (91 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 92/99] usb: core: Strengthen error handling in hub_hub_status() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 94/99] ALSA: usb-audio: Complete cleanup after system-resume errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Marouane El Moufid, Takashi Iwai
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marouane El Moufid <eun0us@espilon.net>
commit 1035a8f63bae28e498b0e7b5ac91d749844a7158 upstream.
snd_usbmidi_novation_output() lays out a two-byte header at
transfer_buffer[0..1] and passes &transfer_buffer[2] together with a
length of ep->max_transfer - 2 to snd_rawmidi_transmit():
count = snd_rawmidi_transmit(ep->ports[0].substream,
&transfer_buffer[2],
ep->max_transfer - 2);
ep->max_transfer comes from the output endpoint's wMaxPacketSize via
usb_maxpacket(). A malformed or malicious device can advertise a bulk
OUT endpoint with a wMaxPacketSize of 1 - the USB core only clamps this
value downwards - so ep->max_transfer becomes 1 and the count argument
becomes -1.
snd_rawmidi_transmit() passes the negative count on to
__snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(), where "if (count1 > count) count1 = count"
leaves count1 negative; get_aligned_size() keeps it negative for a
byte-stream substream, so the following memcpy(buffer, ..., count1) runs
with a (size_t)-1 length and writes far past the transfer buffer, which
was allocated with usb_alloc_coherent(ep->max_transfer).
This is the same class of bug that was fixed for snd_usbmidi_akai_output()
in commit 0970274613fb ("ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in
snd_usbmidi_akai_output()"); the novation output routine was left
unguarded. Bail out when the endpoint cannot hold the two-byte header
plus at least one payload byte.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marouane El Moufid <eun0us@espilon.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/178749334830.543645.13722252148340572274@espilon.net
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/usb/midi.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/sound/usb/midi.c
+++ b/sound/usb/midi.c
@@ -878,6 +878,8 @@ static void snd_usbmidi_novation_output(
if (!ep->ports[0].active)
return;
+ if (ep->max_transfer < 3)
+ return;
transfer_buffer = urb->transfer_buffer;
count = snd_rawmidi_transmit(ep->ports[0].substream,
&transfer_buffer[2],
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 94/99] ALSA: usb-audio: Complete cleanup after system-resume errors
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (92 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 93/99] ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 95/99] USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Will Porter, Takashi Iwai
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Will Porter <mrwillporter@gmail.com>
commit 1739a976312e110c93a8dee66a1cdf893a1b187e upstream.
A failed system resume can leave the card unusable until reboot.
usb_audio_resume() jumps to err_out when snd_usb_pcm_resume() or
snd_usb_mixer_resume() fails. The error path skips the out: block, which
restores D0 and decrements chip->num_suspended_intf.
The card stays in SNDRV_CTL_POWER_D3hot, so later control access blocks in
snd_power_ref_and_wait(). USB core logs an interface resume callback error.
It does not retry that callback, so a later callback cannot complete the
skipped cleanup.
usb_audio_suspend() increments num_suspended_intf before returning success.
A system-resume callback must consume the system-suspend count even if a
component resume fails. Otherwise, the stranded count skews later suspend
and resume cycles.
Do not apply this cleanup to runtime-resume errors. Runtime PM can retry
-EAGAIN or -EBUSY without another suspend callback. The count must continue
to describe that suspended interface. Other runtime-resume errors latch
runtime_error in the PM core and do not cause an immediate callback retry.
Both parts of the system-resume error path are longstanding. Commit
88a8516a2128a ("ALSA: usbaudio: implement USB autosuspend") introduced
err_out past the D0 restore. Commit 862b2509d157c ("ALSA: usb-audio: Fix
inconsistent card PM state after resume") later moved
num_suspended_intf-- into the out: block. The error path now skips both
operations.
No third-party code is needed to reach the error path.
snd_usb_mixer_resume() ends in snd_usb_mixer_activate(), which returns the
result of usb_submit_urb() for devices that have a mixer status URB. Its
mixer->private_resume hook can also fail through scarlett2_init_notify().
snd_usb_pcm_resume() issues a SET_CUR request to a UAC3 power domain. It
can return -EPIPE or -EIO when the device stalls the request.
Route a component error through out: only when system_suspend is nonzero.
Continue to return runtime-resume errors through err_out. Later component
resume stages remain skipped. The original error still reaches USB core.
A later transfer can fail if the device did not recover.
I reproduced the system-resume failure on an Audient iD14 MkI with an
out-of-tree diagnostic mixer resume hook. An injected -EIO on the unpatched
core left control readers in uninterruptible sleep in
snd_power_ref_and_wait() until a reboot. With this patch, the same failure
restored control access. A second system suspend and resume also succeeded
after I disabled fault injection.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.1-pro-high
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
Fixes: 88a8516a2128a ("ALSA: usbaudio: implement USB autosuspend")
Fixes: 862b2509d157c ("ALSA: usb-audio: Fix inconsistent card PM state after resume")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Porter <mrwillporter@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260824225757.26749-1-mrwillporter@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/usb/card.c | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/usb/card.c
+++ b/sound/usb/card.c
@@ -1128,8 +1128,11 @@ static int usb_audio_resume(struct usb_i
list_for_each_entry(as, &chip->pcm_list, list) {
err = snd_usb_pcm_resume(as);
- if (err < 0)
- goto err_out;
+ if (err < 0) {
+ if (!chip->system_suspend)
+ goto err_out;
+ goto out;
+ }
}
/*
@@ -1138,8 +1141,11 @@ static int usb_audio_resume(struct usb_i
*/
list_for_each_entry(mixer, &chip->mixer_list, list) {
err = snd_usb_mixer_resume(mixer);
- if (err < 0)
- goto err_out;
+ if (err < 0) {
+ if (!chip->system_suspend)
+ goto err_out;
+ goto out;
+ }
}
list_for_each(p, &chip->midi_list) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 95/99] USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (93 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 94/99] ALSA: usb-audio: Complete cleanup after system-resume errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 96/99] USB: serial: spcp8x5: drop broken carrier detect support Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Jiale Yao, Johan Hovold
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiale Yao <yaojiale02@163.com>
commit 885d802f544ca7bfa8f3984d94233cce715bb6b3 upstream.
The interrupt URB buffer is allocated in setup_port_interrupt_in() based
on the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize:
buffer_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(epd);
port->interrupt_in_buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);
When a USB device declares wMaxPacketSize = 8 on its interrupt IN
endpoint, the buffer is allocated from kmalloc-8 cache (exactly
8 bytes).
If the device sends a short packet (actual_length < wMaxPacketSize),
the URB completes with status == 0 and the callback proceeds to read:
data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)]
which evaluates to data[8], accessing 1 byte beyond the allocated 8-byte
buffer. This results in a slab out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by adding the missing bounds check: first verify that the
actual length is large enough to contain the struct usb_ctrlrequest
header before accessing req_pkt->bRequestType and req_pkt->bRequest,
and then verify that there is an additional byte for the modem signal
state before reading data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)] inside the
conditional. Use sizeof(*req_pkt) instead of sizeof(struct
usb_ctrlrequest) for consistency.
Assisted-by: Claude:deepseek-v4-pro
Signed-off-by: Jiale Yao <yaojiale02@163.com>
Fixes: 58cfe9113e48 ("[PATCH] USB: add Option Card driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.12
[ johan: use dev_err(); split signals declaration and initialisation ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -2690,12 +2690,26 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struc
dev_dbg(dev, "%s: NULL req_pkt\n", __func__);
return;
}
+
+ if (urb->actual_length < sizeof(*req_pkt)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "%s: short packet: %u bytes\n", __func__,
+ urb->actual_length);
+ return;
+ }
+
if ((req_pkt->bRequestType == 0xA1) &&
(req_pkt->bRequest == 0x20)) {
+ unsigned char signals;
int old_dcd_state;
- unsigned char signals = *((unsigned char *)
- urb->transfer_buffer +
- sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest));
+
+ if (urb->actual_length < sizeof(*req_pkt) + 1) {
+ dev_err(dev, "%s: short interrupt transfer: %u bytes\n",
+ __func__, urb->actual_length);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ signals = *((unsigned char *)urb->transfer_buffer +
+ sizeof(*req_pkt));
dev_dbg(dev, "%s: signal x%x\n", __func__, signals);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 96/99] USB: serial: spcp8x5: drop broken carrier detect support
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (94 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 95/99] USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 97/99] USB: c67x00: fix use-after-free in c67x00_add_iso_urb() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, syzbot+3b514b87202742f22c44,
Johan Hovold
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
commit d37186bd95a07e334447f47274a38a311dad2172 upstream.
The driver does not support modem status notifications and instead used
to fetch the modem status once at open() and subsequently operate on and
report stale state.
As part of fixing this, a call to fetch the status was added to
carrier_raised(), which does not work as that callback must not sleep
(e.g. unlike tiocmget()).
Drop the broken carrier detect support.
Fixes: e1ed212d8593 ("USB: spcp8x5: add proper modem-status support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.10
Reported-by: syzbot+3b514b87202742f22c44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6a73cea2.01d0871a.3a0d52.000d.GAE@google.com
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/spcp8x5.c | 13 -------------
1 file changed, 13 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/spcp8x5.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/spcp8x5.c
@@ -237,18 +237,6 @@ static void spcp8x5_set_work_mode(struct
dev_err(&port->dev, "failed to set work mode: %d\n", ret);
}
-static int spcp8x5_carrier_raised(struct usb_serial_port *port)
-{
- u8 msr;
- int ret;
-
- ret = spcp8x5_get_msr(port, &msr);
- if (ret || msr & MSR_STATUS_LINE_DCD)
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
static void spcp8x5_dtr_rts(struct usb_serial_port *port, int on)
{
struct spcp8x5_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
@@ -460,7 +448,6 @@ static struct usb_serial_driver spcp8x5_
.num_bulk_out = 1,
.open = spcp8x5_open,
.dtr_rts = spcp8x5_dtr_rts,
- .carrier_raised = spcp8x5_carrier_raised,
.set_termios = spcp8x5_set_termios,
.init_termios = spcp8x5_init_termios,
.tiocmget = spcp8x5_tiocmget,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 97/99] USB: c67x00: fix use-after-free in c67x00_add_iso_urb()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (95 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 96/99] USB: serial: spcp8x5: drop broken carrier detect support Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 98/99] wifi: mt76: mt7925: ensure tx headroom in usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Shuangpeng Bai
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
commit b1e24de475bf2d66fffc9103f3444b783527d55a upstream.
When TD creation fails for the last packet of an isochronous URB,
c67x00_add_iso_urb() gives the URB back before updating the endpoint
scheduling state.
c67x00_giveback_urb() frees the URB private data, and the completion
callback may release the final URB reference. The following accesses to
urbp->ep_data, urb->interval, and urbp->cnt can therefore use freed
memory.
Update next_frame and cnt before giving back the failed final packet,
making the giveback the last operation that uses the URB and its private
data.
Fixes: e9b29ffc519b ("USB: add Cypress c67x00 OTG controller HCD driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806013502.322067-1-shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/c67x00/c67x00-sched.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/c67x00/c67x00-sched.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/c67x00/c67x00-sched.c
@@ -761,13 +761,13 @@ static int c67x00_add_iso_urb(struct c67
ret);
urb->iso_frame_desc[urbp->cnt].actual_length = 0;
urb->iso_frame_desc[urbp->cnt].status = ret;
- if (urbp->cnt + 1 == urb->number_of_packets)
- c67x00_giveback_urb(c67x00, urb, 0);
}
urbp->ep_data->next_frame =
frame_add(urbp->ep_data->next_frame, urb->interval);
urbp->cnt++;
+ if (ret && urbp->cnt == urb->number_of_packets)
+ c67x00_giveback_urb(c67x00, urb, 0);
}
return 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 98/99] wifi: mt76: mt7925: ensure tx headroom in usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (96 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 97/99] USB: c67x00: fix use-after-free in c67x00_add_iso_urb() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 99/99] usb: usbfs: fix use-after-free of usb_device in usbdev_release() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Devin Wittmayer, Felix Fietkau
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Devin Wittmayer <lucid_duck@justthetip.ca>
commit ef3e34874d2332d0f63e72c2c35ce5c93568c125 upstream.
mt7925_usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb() pushes a TX descriptor and a USB
header onto every skb and assumes the headroom for them is already
there. That holds for locally generated traffic, where mac80211
reserves hw->extra_tx_headroom, but forwarded frames are sent through
ieee80211_8023_xmit(), which does not reserve it. Bridge a wired
interface to an mt7925u AP and the first forwarded frame that arrives
short panics the kernel:
skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:415 put:4 tail:0x19b end:0x640 dev:wlan1
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:212!
Call trace:
skb_panic+0x58/0x60 (P)
skb_push+0x58/0x60
mt7925_usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb+0xf8/0x1b8 [mt7925_common]
mt76u_tx_queue_skb+0xa0/0x1f8 [mt76_usb]
__mt76_tx_queue_skb+0x54/0xe8 [mt76]
mt76_txq_schedule.part.0+0x204/0x478 [mt76]
mt76_txq_schedule_all+0x50/0x80 [mt76]
mt792x_tx_worker+0x68/0x100 [mt792x_lib]
__mt76_worker_fn+0x84/0x150 [mt76]
Whether a given setup hits it depends on how much headroom the ingress
netdev leaves in its rx skbs. Reproduced on a Raspberry Pi 5 bridging
onboard ethernet to a Netgear A9000; originally reported on an MT7986
router running OpenWrt. Nick Morrow's testing on a Pi 4 (bcmgenet),
which leaves more headroom, helped narrow the trigger to the ingress
path.
The same bug was fixed on mt7921 by commit 98c4d0abf5c4 ("mt76:
mt7921: don't assume adequate headroom for SDIO headers"), but mt7925
was copied from mt7921 without the fix. Add the same guard here.
Fixes: c948b5da6bbe ("wifi: mt76: mt7925: add Mediatek Wi-Fi7 driver for mt7925 chips")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://github.com/morrownr/mt76/issues/52
Signed-off-by: Devin Wittmayer <lucid_duck@justthetip.ca>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260715023348.59506-1-lucid_duck@justthetip.ca
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7925/mac.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7925/mac.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7925/mac.c
@@ -1432,6 +1432,10 @@ int mt7925_usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb(struc
if (!wcid)
wcid = &dev->mt76.global_wcid;
+ err = skb_cow_head(skb, MT_SDIO_TXD_SIZE + MT_SDIO_HDR_SIZE);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
if (sta) {
struct mt792x_sta *msta = (struct mt792x_sta *)sta->drv_priv;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.12 99/99] usb: usbfs: fix use-after-free of usb_device in usbdev_release()
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (97 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 98/99] wifi: mt76: mt7925: ensure tx headroom in usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 18:15 ` [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Francesco Dolcini
` (10 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-08-31 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, patches, Miguel Peñaranda, Alan Stern
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Miguel Peñaranda <mig.penaranda07@gmail.com>
commit 0dd68b5d01d022fc9c5e71c82a82b0a94d3d0671 upstream.
usbdev_release() drops its reference to the struct usb_device before
draining the list of completed async URBs, but that drain path reads back
through the same object: free_async() calls dec_usb_memory_use_count()
for any URB whose buffer came from the usbfs mmap() region, and its first
statement is bus_to_hcd(ps->dev->bus).
After a disconnect the usbfs reference can be the last one, in which case
usb_put_dev() frees the device and the subsequent loop reads offset 80 of
freed memory and uses the result as a struct usb_hcd *, which
hcd_buffer_free_pages() then dereferences.
This is reachable by an unprivileged process that has read/write access to
a /dev/bus/usb node: mmap() the fd, submit one URB with a buffer inside the
mapping, wait for the device to be unplugged, then munmap() and close().
It reproduces on every attempt rather than being a race, because a live
MAP_SHARED vma holds a reference on the struct file, so usbdev_release()
cannot run until the last vma is gone and the freeing branch of
dec_usb_memory_use_count() is always taken.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dec_usb_memory_use_count+0x3ae/0x410
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880122ee050 by task poc/769
CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 769 Comm: poc Tainted: G B 6.12.94 #3
Call Trace:
dec_usb_memory_use_count+0x3ae/0x410
free_async+0x2aa/0x4f0
usbdev_release+0x375/0x460
__fput+0x3ea/0xb50
__x64_sys_close+0x86/0x100
Allocated by task 11:
usb_alloc_dev+0x55/0xd90
hub_event+0x2524/0x43d0
Freed by task 769:
kfree+0x121/0x360
device_release+0xd2/0x280
usb_put_dev+0x23/0x30
usbdev_release+0x2d8/0x460
Release the device reference after the drain loop instead. Nothing between
the two points requires it to have been dropped.
Fixes: f7d34b445abc ("USB: Add support for usbfs zerocopy.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Miguel Peñaranda <mig.penaranda07@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260810121209.795089-1-mig.penaranda07@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/core/devio.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
@@ -1110,7 +1110,6 @@ static int usbdev_release(struct inode *
if (!ps->suspend_allowed)
usb_autosuspend_device(dev);
usb_unlock_device(dev);
- usb_put_dev(dev);
put_pid(ps->disc_pid);
put_cred(ps->cred);
@@ -1119,6 +1118,7 @@ static int usbdev_release(struct inode *
free_async(as);
as = async_getcompleted(ps);
}
+ usb_put_dev(dev);
kfree(ps);
return 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (98 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 99/99] usb: usbfs: fix use-after-free of usb_device in usbdev_release() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2026-08-31 18:15 ` Francesco Dolcini
2026-08-31 19:00 ` Florian Fainelli
` (9 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Francesco Dolcini @ 2026-08-31 18:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr
On Mon, Aug 31, 2026 at 03:33:29PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.108 release.
> There are 99 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
Tested-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (99 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 18:15 ` [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Francesco Dolcini
@ 2026-08-31 19:00 ` Florian Fainelli
2026-08-31 19:12 ` Brett A C Sheffield
` (8 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Florian Fainelli @ 2026-08-31 19:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable
Cc: patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, sudipm.mukherjee, rwarsow, conor,
hargar, broonie, achill, sr
On 8/31/2026 6:33 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.108 release.
> There are 99 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.108-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.12.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on
BMIPS_GENERIC:
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
--
Florian
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (100 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 19:00 ` Florian Fainelli
@ 2026-08-31 19:12 ` Brett A C Sheffield
2026-08-31 22:04 ` Peter Schneider
` (7 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Brett A C Sheffield @ 2026-08-31 19:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: gregkh
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr,
Brett A C Sheffield
# Librecast Test Results
020/020 [ OK ] liblcrq
010/010 [ OK ] libmld
120/120 [ OK ] liblibrecast
CPU/kernel: Linux auntie 6.12.108-rc1-g7e0459c39579 #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Mon Aug 31 19:06:39 -00 2026 x86_64 AMD Ryzen 9 9950X 16-Core Processor AuthenticAMD GNU/Linux
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (101 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 19:12 ` Brett A C Sheffield
@ 2026-08-31 22:04 ` Peter Schneider
2026-09-01 1:59 ` Dominique Martinet
` (6 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Peter Schneider @ 2026-08-31 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable
Cc: patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee,
rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr
Am 31.08.2026 um 15:33 schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.108 release.
> There are 99 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
Builds, boots and works on my 2-socket Ivy Bridge Xeon E5-2697 v2 server. No dmesg oddities or regressions found.
Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com>
Beste Grüße,
Peter Schneider
--
Climb the mountain not to plant your flag, but to embrace the challenge,
enjoy the air and behold the view. Climb it so you can see the world,
not so the world can see you. -- David McCullough Jr.
OpenPGP: 0xA3828BD796CCE11A8CADE8866E3A92C92C3FF244
Download: https://www.peters-netzplatz.de/download/pschneider1968_pub.asc
https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=pschneider1968@googlemail.com
https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=pschneider1968@gmail.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (102 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-31 22:04 ` Peter Schneider
@ 2026-09-01 1:59 ` Dominique Martinet
2026-09-01 4:56 ` Harshit Mogalapalli
` (5 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Dominique Martinet @ 2026-09-01 1:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr
Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote on Mon, Aug 31, 2026 at 03:33:29PM +0200:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.108 release.
> There are 99 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.108-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.12.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
Tested 7e0459c39579 ("Linux 6.12.108-rc1") on:
- arm i.MX6ULL (Armadillo 640)
- arm64 i.MX8MP (Armadillo G4)
- arm64 i.MX8ULP (Armadillo IoT A9E)
No obvious regression in dmesg or basic tests:
Tested-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@atmark-techno.com>
--
Dominique Martinet
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (103 preceding siblings ...)
2026-09-01 1:59 ` Dominique Martinet
@ 2026-09-01 4:56 ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2026-09-01 8:44 ` Pavel Machek
` (4 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Harshit Mogalapalli @ 2026-09-01 4:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sasha Levin
Cc: patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee,
rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr
Hi Greg,
On 31/08/26 7:03 pm, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.108 release.
> There are 99 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
No problems seen on x86_64 and aarch64 with our testing.
AI assisted reviews haven't spotted any problems
Tested-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Thanks,
Harshit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (104 preceding siblings ...)
2026-09-01 4:56 ` Harshit Mogalapalli
@ 2026-09-01 8:44 ` Pavel Machek
2026-09-01 16:45 ` Shuah Khan
` (3 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Pavel Machek @ 2026-09-01 8:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: stable, patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah,
patches, lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli,
sudipm.mukherjee, rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 504 bytes --]
Hi!
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.108 release.
> There are 99 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
CIP testing did not find any problems here:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-6.12.y
Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@nabladev.com>
Best regards,
Pavel
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (105 preceding siblings ...)
2026-09-01 8:44 ` Pavel Machek
@ 2026-09-01 16:45 ` Shuah Khan
2026-09-01 22:30 ` Miguel Ojeda
` (2 subsequent siblings)
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Shuah Khan @ 2026-09-01 16:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable
Cc: patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee,
rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr, Shuah Khan
On 8/31/26 07:33, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.108 release.
> There are 99 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.108-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.12.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
thanks,
-- Shuah
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (106 preceding siblings ...)
2026-09-01 16:45 ` Shuah Khan
@ 2026-09-01 22:30 ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-09-01 23:10 ` Ron Economos
2026-09-02 2:28 ` Barry K. Nathan
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Miguel Ojeda @ 2026-09-01 22:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: gregkh
Cc: achill, akpm, broonie, conor, f.fainelli, hargar, jonathanh,
linux-kernel, linux, lkft-triage, patches, patches, pavel,
rwarsow, shuah, sr, stable, sudipm.mukherjee, torvalds,
Miguel Ojeda
On Mon, 31 Aug 2026 15:33:29 +0200 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.108 release.
> There are 99 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
Boot-tested under QEMU for Rust x86_64, arm64 and riscv64; built-tested
for loongarch64:
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Thanks!
Cheers,
Miguel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (107 preceding siblings ...)
2026-09-01 22:30 ` Miguel Ojeda
@ 2026-09-01 23:10 ` Ron Economos
2026-09-02 2:28 ` Barry K. Nathan
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Ron Economos @ 2026-09-01 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable
Cc: patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee,
rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr
On 8/31/26 06:33, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.108 release.
> There are 99 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.108-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.12.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).
Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (108 preceding siblings ...)
2026-09-01 23:10 ` Ron Economos
@ 2026-09-02 2:28 ` Barry K. Nathan
109 siblings, 0 replies; 111+ messages in thread
From: Barry K. Nathan @ 2026-09-02 2:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable
Cc: patches, linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
lkft-triage, pavel, jonathanh, f.fainelli, sudipm.mukherjee,
rwarsow, conor, hargar, broonie, achill, sr
On 8/31/26 6:33 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.108 release.
> There are 99 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.108-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.12.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Tested on an amd64 laptop (Lenovo ThinkPad T14 Gen 1). Working well,
no regressions observed.
Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan <barryn@pobox.com>
--
-Barry K. Nathan <barryn@pobox.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 111+ messages in thread