From: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>,
"Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: "Jiang, Dave" <dave.jiang@intel.com>,
"linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>,
"Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"patches@lists.linux.dev" <patches@lists.linux.dev>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2026 09:17:17 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <yq5apkwqa5ve.fsf@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261030131543.GH3734323@nvidia.com>
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> writes:
> On Fri, Oct 30, 2026 at 09:58:03AM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
>> > > It can't defer the session. The TDX Module runs the whole SPDM
>> > > session setup inside TDH.SPDM.CONNECT, and the host relays its DOE
>> > > messages without interpreting them, so there is no defined point to
>> > > stop after the certificates. The chains come back in the device info
>> > > only once TDH.SPDM.CONNECT completes (TDX Connect ABI Reference Spec
>> > > 2.1 v0.66, 4.2.20.1).
>> >
>> > Yeah, its fine. TDX will have to do what Aneesh proposed for ARM, and
>> > use use the Rust SPDM Driver to operate DOE prior to calling
>> > TDH.SPDM.CONNECT. This will allow discovering what is in the slots and
>> > passing that information to userspace.
>>
>> I am somewhat confused by this.
>>
>> 1. You are saying that prior to establishing a
>> secure SPDM session, you will use unsecure DOE mechanism to discover
>> available cert chains. Here you have to take into account that anything you
>> get at this step is not trusted. A malicious device could send you any cert
>> chains from another legitimate device.
>
> I poked at this with AI for a while.. While nothing about SPDM slots seems
> particularly clean it can be made to work. It looks like 1.4 improves
> things meaningfully.
>
>> 2. Next, you will choose a cert slot to be used for SPDM authentication and
>> secure session establishment (slot 0 initially in this patch) and allow
>> everything to happen.
>
> Yep
>
>> Now, who guarantees that a cert chain that you saw
>> at step 1 for the selected slot is the same that is going to be used
>> in actual SPDM connection? Who is verifying/ensuring this?
>> Kernel? Userspace?
>
> Not sure, it would make sense if the kernel can do some of this with
> rustspdm, but there are alot of details here that I can't guess what
> is best.
>
> AI tells me there are a couple of reasonable ways to implement slot
> selection and avoid downgrade attacks:
>
> 1) With 1.4 match GET_DIGESTS and MULTI_KEY_CONN_RSP=true
> 1) Do via RustSPDM:
> GET_DIGESTS / DIGESTS
> GET_CERTIFICATE / CERTIFICATE
> 2) Userspace selects slots
> 3) TSM module does startup and also issues 'GET_DIGESTS' as part of
> the signed transcript
> 4) Confirm that the digests from #1 match the digests from #2 in
> the TSM transcript.
>
I am currently doing something similar to the above.
https://git.gitlab.arm.com/linux-arm/linux-cca/-/commit/0657d167aee1ba43dd2765d99b5e3244b83c6ea6
-aneesh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-31 3:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-28 15:26 [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] attestation: Restrict inherited operations per instance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:29 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/11] attestation: Filter evidence objects " Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:44 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] attestation: Enter secure operation when evidence is accepted Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:51 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:09 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/11] attestation: Bind object selection to accepted evidence snapshots Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/11] attestation: Make the evidence-get challenge attribute optional Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 14:01 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:43 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:05 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-31 4:22 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/11] attestation: Add attestation helpers for PCI/TSM integration Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] PCI/TSM: Bind CTLV attestation to connected and locked contexts Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 22:56 ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 5:30 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-29 12:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 14:04 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 14:08 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/11] crypto/ccp: Defer SEV-TIO link setup until evidence acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-29 16:56 ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 17:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 9:58 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-10-30 13:15 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 3:47 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V [this message]
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-guest: Refresh selected evidence against trusted digests Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Xu Yilun
2026-10-30 15:32 ` Jason Gunthorpe
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