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From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
To: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>, Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>,
	Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
	Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
	sashiko-bot@kernel.org,
	"Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context)" <noreply@anthropic.com>
Subject: [PATCH 28/29] perf session: Snapshot event->header.size in process_user_event()
Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 18:18:04 -0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260526211806.1193848-29-acme@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260526211806.1193848-1-acme@kernel.org>

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

On native-endian files, events are read from MAP_SHARED memory.
Multiple reads of event->header.size can return different values
if the file is concurrently modified, allowing an attacker to
bypass bounds checks performed on an earlier read.

Snapshot header.size into a local variable at function entry using
READ_ONCE() to prevent compiler rematerialization, and use it for
all size-dependent arithmetic within the function.  This ensures
every bounds calculation uses the same value that was validated
by the reader.

Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org # Running on a local machine
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
---
 tools/perf/util/session.c | 27 +++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/perf/util/session.c b/tools/perf/util/session.c
index 6de665d3c9054179..e2e821b77766dbfc 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/session.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/session.c
@@ -2230,6 +2230,7 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
 {
 	struct ordered_events *oe = &session->ordered_events;
 	const struct perf_tool *tool = session->tool;
+	const u32 event_size = READ_ONCE(event->header.size);
 	struct perf_sample sample;
 	int fd = perf_data__fd(session->data);
 	s64 err;
@@ -2271,7 +2272,7 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
 		break;
 	case PERF_RECORD_HEADER_BUILD_ID:
 		if (!perf_event__check_nul(event->build_id.filename,
-					   (void *)event + event->header.size,
+					   (void *)event + event_size,
 					   "HEADER_BUILD_ID")) {
 			err = 0;
 			break;
@@ -2294,7 +2295,7 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
 		 * place already.
 		 */
 		if (!perf_data__is_pipe(session->data))
-			lseek(fd, file_offset + event->header.size, SEEK_SET);
+			lseek(fd, file_offset + event_size, SEEK_SET);
 		err = tool->auxtrace(tool, session, event);
 		break;
 	case PERF_RECORD_AUXTRACE_ERROR:
@@ -2304,14 +2305,14 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
 	case PERF_RECORD_THREAD_MAP: {
 		u64 max_nr;
 
-		if (event->header.size < sizeof(event->thread_map)) {
+		if (event_size < sizeof(event->thread_map)) {
 			pr_err("PERF_RECORD_THREAD_MAP: header.size (%u) too small\n",
-			       event->header.size);
+			       event_size);
 			err = -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		}
 
-		max_nr = (event->header.size - sizeof(event->thread_map)) /
+		max_nr = (event_size - sizeof(event->thread_map)) /
 			 sizeof(event->thread_map.entries[0]);
 		if (event->thread_map.nr > max_nr) {
 			pr_err("PERF_RECORD_THREAD_MAP: nr %" PRIu64 " exceeds max %" PRIu64 "\n",
@@ -2325,7 +2326,7 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
 	}
 	case PERF_RECORD_CPU_MAP: {
 		struct perf_record_cpu_map_data *data = &event->cpu_map.data;
-		u32 payload = event->header.size - sizeof(event->header);
+		u32 payload = event_size - sizeof(event->header);
 
 		/*
 		 * Native-endian events are mmap'd read-only, so we
@@ -2389,8 +2390,8 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
 		break;
 	}
 	case PERF_RECORD_STAT_CONFIG: {
-		/* Cannot underflow: perf_event__min_size[] guarantees header.size >= sizeof */
-		u64 max_nr = (event->header.size - sizeof(event->stat_config)) /
+		/* Cannot underflow: perf_event__min_size[] guarantees event_size >= sizeof */
+		u64 max_nr = (event_size - sizeof(event->stat_config)) /
 			     sizeof(event->stat_config.data[0]);
 
 		/*
@@ -2421,7 +2422,7 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
 		 */
 		memset(&session->time_conv, 0, sizeof(session->time_conv));
 		memcpy(&session->time_conv, &event->time_conv,
-		       min((size_t)event->header.size, sizeof(session->time_conv)));
+		       min((size_t)event_size, sizeof(session->time_conv)));
 		err = tool->time_conv(tool, session, event);
 		break;
 	case PERF_RECORD_HEADER_FEATURE:
@@ -2438,11 +2439,10 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
 		break;
 	case PERF_RECORD_BPF_METADATA: {
 		u64 nr_entries, max_entries;
-		u32 hdr_size = READ_ONCE(event->header.size);
 
-		if (hdr_size < sizeof(event->bpf_metadata)) {
+		if (event_size < sizeof(event->bpf_metadata)) {
 			pr_warning("WARNING: PERF_RECORD_BPF_METADATA: header.size (%u) too small, skipping\n",
-				   hdr_size);
+				   event_size);
 			err = 0;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -2458,9 +2458,8 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
 			break;
 		}
 
-		/* Snapshot — event is mmap'd and could change between reads */
 		nr_entries = READ_ONCE(event->bpf_metadata.nr_entries);
-		max_entries = (hdr_size - sizeof(event->bpf_metadata)) /
+		max_entries = (event_size - sizeof(event->bpf_metadata)) /
 			      sizeof(event->bpf_metadata.entries[0]);
 		if (nr_entries > max_entries) {
 			pr_warning("WARNING: PERF_RECORD_BPF_METADATA: nr_entries %" PRIu64 " exceeds max %" PRIu64 ", skipping\n",
-- 
2.54.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-05-26 21:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-26 21:17 [PATCHES v4 00/29] perf: Harden perf.data parsing against crafted/corrupted files Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 01/29] perf session: Add minimum event size and alignment validation Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 02/29] perf session: Bounds-check one_mmap event pointer in peek_event Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 22:00   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 03/29] perf tools: Fix event_contains() macro to verify full field extent Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 04/29] perf zstd: Fix compression error path in zstd_compress_stream_to_records() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 22:00   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 05/29] perf zstd: Fix multi-iteration decompression and error handling Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:49   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 06/29] perf session: Fix PERF_RECORD_READ swap and dump for variable-length events Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 07/29] perf session: Fix swap_sample_id_all() crash on crafted events Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 08/29] perf session: Add validated swap infrastructure with null-termination checks Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:55   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 09/29] perf session: Use bounded copy for PERF_RECORD_TIME_CONV Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 10/29] perf session: Validate HEADER_ATTR attr.size before swapping Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 22:01   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 11/29] perf session: Validate nr fields against event size on both swap and common paths Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:54   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 12/29] perf header: Byte-swap build ID event pid and bounds check section entries Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 22:05   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 13/29] perf cpumap: Reject RANGE_CPUS with start_cpu > end_cpu Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 22:03   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 14/29] perf auxtrace: Harden auxtrace_error event handling Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 15/29] perf session: Add byte-swap and bounds check for PERF_RECORD_BPF_METADATA events Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:56   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 16/29] perf header: Validate null-termination in PERF_RECORD_EVENT_UPDATE string fields Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 17/29] perf tools: Bounds check perf_event_attr fields against attr.size before printing Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 18/29] perf header: Propagate feature section processing errors Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 19/29] perf header: Validate f_attr.ids section before use in perf_session__read_header() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 20/29] perf header: Validate feature section size and add read path bounds checking Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 21/29] perf header: Sanity check HEADER_EVENT_DESC attr.size before swap Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 22/29] perf header: Validate bitmap size before allocating in do_read_bitmap() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:17 ` [PATCH 23/29] perf session: Add byte-swap handler for PERF_RECORD_COMPRESSED2 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:18 ` [PATCH 24/29] perf tools: Harden compressed event processing Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 22:23   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-26 21:18 ` [PATCH 25/29] perf session: Check for decompression buffer size overflow Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:18 ` [PATCH 26/29] perf session: Bound nr_cpus_avail and validate sample CPU Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 22:40   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-26 21:18 ` [PATCH 27/29] perf kwork: Bounds check work->cpu before indexing cpus_runtime[] Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 21:18 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo [this message]
2026-05-26 22:31   ` [PATCH 28/29] perf session: Snapshot event->header.size in process_user_event() sashiko-bot
2026-05-26 21:18 ` [PATCH 29/29] perf test: Add truncated perf.data robustness test Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-26 22:19   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-27  0:50     ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-27  1:06 ` [PATCHES v4 00/29] perf: Harden perf.data parsing against crafted/corrupted files Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-05-25  1:05 [PATCHES v3 " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-25  1:05 ` [PATCH 28/29] perf session: Snapshot event->header.size in process_user_event() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-25  2:39   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-24  3:26 [PATCHES v2 00/29] perf: Harden perf.data parsing against crafted/corrupted files Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-24  3:27 ` [PATCH 28/29] perf session: Snapshot event->header.size in process_user_event() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-24  4:31   ` sashiko-bot

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