From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Andi Kleen" <ak@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v1 02/19] uprobes: Correctly reject anonymous VMAs for breakpoint installation
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 18:29:49 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260831182949.D48221F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831150651.1134594-3-ak@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Page tables are modified under mmap_write_lock without calling vma_start_write(vma), risking a race with concurrent per-VMA locked operations.
- [High] Several functions access vma->vm_file or use it for classification without first checking !vma_is_anonymous(vma), leaving them vulnerable to anonymous VMAs that have a vm_file set.
--
commit e85d99904cf4af95b805f715ec281558955b0733
Author: Andi Kleen <ak@kernel.org>
uprobes: Correctly reject anonymous VMAs for breakpoint installation
This patch updates valid_vma() to correctly check for anonymous VMAs
using vma_is_anonymous() instead of relying only on vm_file.
> diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
> index 7709ea8824778..4287c4ff4c0fd 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
> @@ -139,7 +139,8 @@ static bool valid_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool is_register)
> if (is_register)
> flags |= VM_WRITE;
>
> - return vma->vm_file && (vma->vm_flags & flags) == VM_MAYEXEC;
> + return !vma_is_anonymous(vma) && vma->vm_file &&
> + (vma->vm_flags & flags) == VM_MAYEXEC;
> }
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but since you are fixing the
anonymous VMA check here in valid_vma(), do we need to apply this same
!vma_is_anonymous(vma) check to other functions in this file?
Several other functions, such as valid_ref_ctr_vma(),
find_active_uprobe_speculative(), find_active_uprobe_rcu(), and
uprobe_mmap(), appear to rely directly on vma->vm_file to determine if
a VMA is file-backed.
For example, valid_ref_ctr_vma() checks:
return uprobe->ref_ctr_offset &&
vma->vm_file &&
file_inode(vma->vm_file) == uprobe->inode;
If an anonymous VMA happens to have a backing file (e.g., from a private
mapping of /dev/zero or a driver mapping using vma_set_anonymous()), could
this incorrectly match the inode and update reference counters in anonymous
memory, or compute incorrect file offsets in the speculative lookups?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but while reviewing the VMA handling in
uprobes, does this file also need to call vma_start_write(vma) when
modifying page tables?
Paths like register_for_each_vma() and unapply_uprobe() take
mmap_write_lock() and eventually call uprobe_write() to modify page
tables via folio_walk_start() in __uprobe_write().
Because mmap_write_lock() does not drain per-VMA read locks, a concurrent
page table operation (like MADV_DONTNEED) under a per-VMA lock could
clear a PMD and free the PTE page while uprobe_write() is walking it.
Could this race lead to a use-after-free or page table corruption when
tracers manipulate the memory layout concurrently without the protection of
vma_start_write() draining concurrent VMA-lock readers?
>
> static unsigned long offset_to_vaddr(struct vm_area_struct *vma, loff_t offset)
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260831150651.1134594-1-ak@kernel.org?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-31 18:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-31 15:04 [RFC] ptwrite uprobes Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 01/19] uprobes: guard trace cleanup against error pointers Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 18:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 0:49 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 02/19] uprobes: Correctly reject anonymous VMAs for breakpoint installation Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 18:29 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 03/19] uprobes: Print warning for missing breakpoint install Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 18:42 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 04/19] ptwrite uprobes: Add infrastructure for ptwrite uprobes Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 18:55 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 05/19] ptwrite uprobes: Add minimal low level support for x86 Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 19:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 16:35 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 06/19] ptwrite uprobes: Add a sample module to exercise interface Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 19:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 07/19] ptwrite uprobes: Add support to tracing infrastructure Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 19:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 08/19] ptwrite uprobes / x86: Add a user fault notifier chain Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 19:38 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 09/19] ptwrite uprobes: Factor file-backed instruction reads Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 19:45 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 10/19] ptwrite uprobes: Minimal memory references and fault handling Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 19:59 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 11/19] ptwrite uprobes: Add multinop support Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 20:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 12/19] ptwrite uprobes: Add pacing to the probes Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 20:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 13/19] ptwrite uprobes: Support instruction puning Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 20:39 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 14/19] ptwrite uprobes: Use atomic patching for multinop sites Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 21:08 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 15/19] ptwrite uprobes: Add a tutorial and overview documentation Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 21:10 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 16/19] ptwrite uprobes / perf tools pt: Improve FUP error handling for ptwrite Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 21:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 17/19] ptwrite uprobes / perf tools probe: Add support of ptwrite probes Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 21:32 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 18/19] ptwrite uprobes / perf tools script: Add ptwrite uprobes decoder Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 21:39 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 15:04 ` [RFC v1 19/19] ptwrite uprobes: Add self tests Andi Kleen
2026-08-31 21:47 ` sashiko-bot
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